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Chinese migration
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This article was downloaded by [Kam Wing Chan]On 30 December 2012 At 1217Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number 1072954 Registeredoffice Mortimer House 37-41 Mortimer Street London W1T 3JH UK
Migration and DevelopmentPublication details including instructions for authors andsubscription informationhttpwwwtandfonlinecomloirmad20
Migration and development in Chinatrends geography and current issuesKam Wing Chan aa Department of Geography University of Washington SeattleWA USA
To cite this article Kam Wing Chan (2012) Migration and development in China trends geographyand current issues Migration and Development 12 187-205
To link to this article httpdxdoiorg101080216323242012739316
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This article may be used for research teaching and private study purposes Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction redistribution reselling loan sub-licensingsystematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representationthat the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date The accuracy of anyinstructions formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primarysources The publisher shall not be liable for any loss actions claims proceedingsdemand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material
Migration and development in China trends geography and currentissues
Kam Wing Chan
Department of Geography University of Washington Seattle WA USA
(Received 13 August 2012 final version received 14 September 2012)
Chinarsquos recent meteoric rise in the global economy is closely related to the strength of itsmanufacturing sector which is heavily dependent on cheap migrant labor This paper ana-lyzes Chinarsquos recent migration trends spatial pattern and their relationship with Chinarsquoseconomic strategy Internal migration in China is special in that it is heavily controlled andregulated by the hukou (household registration) system The system enables the country tocreate a massive exploitable migrant labor force that makes Chinarsquos industry highly com-petitive in the global economy The paper explains how the system works and distils thecomplex population and migration statistics to present a relatively complete picture ofmigration over time and space including the latest changes Special focus is on analyzinglsquorural migrant laborrsquo which has constituted the most important human cog powering theChina economic engine Long-distance interprovincial migration is also studied in the con-text of the changes in the regional economy in supporting Chinarsquos ascendancy to being thelsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo Three major issues pertaining to this migrant labor system and recentdevelopments in China and the global economy are examined They presage importantchanges to come which are likely to impact both China and the rest of the world
Keywords China migration hukou system interprovincial migration worldrsquos factory
1 Introduction
Chinarsquos rise as the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is definitely one of the biggest stories of the 21st CChinarsquos dominance in manufacturing has made it a major player in the global economy ThisChina success story is closely intertwined with the migration story without the epic-scalemigration of peasants ndash which supplies almost infinite low-cost human labor to power theChina economic engine ndash the ascent of China would be totally unthinkable Cheap migrantlabor is what makes lsquoChina pricersquo so unrelenting (Harney 2008) The last three decades havewitnessed the worldrsquos lsquoGreat Migrationrsquo ndash an estimated 200ndash250 million rural residents havemoved to cities and towns within China (Chan 2012a) To put this in perspective the volumeof the Great Migration of Europeans to North America from 1800 to the World War I wasonly a fraction of Chinarsquos lsquoon the order of fifty million personsrsquo (Tilly 1976 p 58)
Building on the previous work (Chan 2001b 2012b Liang 2007) and using the latestCensus data available this paper analyzes Chinarsquos recent migration trends spatial pattern andtheir relationship with economic development Chinarsquos internal migration is special in that itis heavily controlled and regulated by the hukou (household registration) system (Chan 1994Fan 2008) As will be explained below through the special institutional design of the hukou
Email kwchanuwedu
Migration and DevelopmentVol 1 No 2 December 2012 187ndash205
ISSN 2163-2324 printISSN 2163-2332 online 2012 Taylor amp Francishttpdxdoiorg101080216323242012739316httpwwwtandfonlinecom
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system China has also managed to turn this vast number of rural-urban migrants into thelargest army of cheap industrial labor the world has ever seen Moreover Chinarsquos simulta-neous use of a de jure hukou-based population registration system and de facto populationstatistical counts have greatly complicated the task of counting especially migrants and mea-suring migration There are all kinds of conceptual and technical complexity plus a plethoraof lexicon both of which serve mostly to mislead and confuses some researchers (see Chan2007 Liang 2007 Liu amp Chan 2001) This requires some explanation before one cananalyze the trends and patterns The concluding section of this paper highlights the latestimportant migration issues affecting Chinarsquos development and the world
2 The hukou system1 and migration
After the Communist Revolution in 1949 China opted for the traditional Stalinist growthstrategy of rapid industrialization centered on heavy industry in cities and extraction of agri-cultural surplus from the peasantry (Chan 1994) This strategy was predicated upon exploit-ing the rural labor by denying it geographic mobility and access to state welfare From themid-1950s the government repeatedly introduced measures to stem rural outflows culminat-ing in 1958 in the formal codification of a comprehensive registration system to control pop-ulation mobility (Chan 2009a Wang 2005) The regulation decreed that all internalmigration be subject to approval by the relevant local government From that point Chinesecitizens lost the freedom of residence and migration within their own country Each person isassigned a hukou (registration status) classified as lsquoruralrsquo or lsquourbanrsquo in a specific administra-tive unit The hukou mechanism served a central instrument of the command system designedfor the big-push industrialization to prevent peasants from exiting from the countryside Thisindustrialization strategy led China to create in effect two very different societies on the onehand the urban class whose members worked in the priority and protected industrial sectorand who had access to (at least basic) social welfare and full citizenship and on the otherhand the peasants who were tied to the land to produce an agricultural surplus for industriali-zation and who had to fend for themselves Hukou conversion referring to change from therural to the urban category was tightly controlled and permitted only under very limitedconditions usually when it was in accordance with state industrialization plans The hukousystem was not merely a means of limiting rural-urban population and labor mobility as ithas been commonly depicted but also a system of social control aimed at excluding the ruralpopulation from access to state-provided goods welfare and entitlements so that the ruralpopulation segment remains cheap and easily exploited
It was under this socioeconomic context that China in the late 1970s launched its eco-nomic reform After some experimentation as China latched onto a labor intensive export-oriented growth strategy in the mid-1980s rural labor was allowed en masse to the cities tofill industryrsquos labor demand which later became a major state industrialization strategy Bythe mid-1990s rural-hukou labor had become the backbone labor force of the export industrybased on manufacturing Today rural hukou labor also staffs almost all of the low-end ser-vices in urban areas In coastal export centers such as Shenzhen and Dongguan migrant labornow accounts for by far the greater part (70ndash80) of the labor force (Chan 2009b Liang1999)
lsquoRural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong) as the term comes to be known in China has a spe-cific meaning in the country it refers to industrial and service workers with rural hukouThese village-origin laborers though working on urban jobs and residing for the most part intowns and cities are not considered legally to be urban workers Neither are they (nor underthe current system will they one day be) treated as lsquolocalsrsquo rural migrant is not a probational
188 KW Chan
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30
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12
status but permanent (Wu 2011) They are not eligible for regular urban welfare benefits andsocial services (access to local schools urban pension plans public housing etc) and otherrights that are available to people with urban hukou Instead rural migrant workers are treatedofficially as part of the rural hukou population even though they may have worked and livedin an urban area for many years In short they are trapped through institutional mechanismin a permanent social lsquohalf-arrivalrsquo situation belong to the netherworld of rural or urban andwith little hope of acculturating into the urban permanent population (Saunders 2012 Zhang2012) This also applies to their children even some of them are born in the city The legallylsquotemporaryrsquo status of this grouprsquos members and their permanent ineligibility for locallsquocitizenshiprsquo in the form of urban hukou make them forever vulnerable and easily expendable(Solinger 1999 Wu 2011)
Onersquos hukou classification remains unchanged no matter where heshe moves unless heshe effects a formal hukou conversion which is almost impossible to get for an ordinary ruralmigrant As a result of this institutional design they are consigned to low-end factory andservice jobs In many cities and export zones local decrees have also forbidden migrantsfrom taking up jobs other than those in the low-skilled 3-D (dangerous dirty and demeaning)category The denial of local urban hukou to migrant workers combined with their plentifulsupply and lack of access to legal support has created a large easily exploitable yet highlymobile and flexible industrial workforce for Chinarsquos export economy The internal migrantlabor force is equivalent to the cheap migrant labor in the classical Lewis model of theunlimited supply of labor It has greatly contributed to Chinarsquos emergence as the worldrsquoslsquomost efficientrsquo ndash ie the least-cost ndash producer Figure 1 outlines the main components of Chi-narsquos dual society with particular reference to position in the social (and economic) hierarchy(pyramid) type of hukou (urban or rural) and ruralurban location in two different historicalperiods ndash Maorsquos (pre-1979) era and the present
Alarmingly their numbers have been swelling rapidly even excluding those employed intownship or village enterprises close to their home villages the size of the rural migrant laborforce has expanded from about 20ndash30million in the 1980s to close to 160 million in 2011(see Table 1 later) The total number of (urban) population without local hukou was even
Figure 1 Main components of Chinese society with reference to the social hierarchy hukou type andlocation in ruralurban area
Migration and Development 189
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Table
1Major
aggregatemigratio
nandurbanpo
pulatio
nstatistics19
82ndash2011(inmillions)
HukouMigrants
(Yearlyflow
figures)
Non
-HukouPop
ulation
(Stock
figures)
Defactopopulatio
nin
urbanareas
lsquoTem
porary
Populationrsquo
lsquoRural
Migrant
Laborrsquo
Rural-hukou
populatio
nin
urbanareas
Policestatistics
Registeredwith
MPS(m
id-year)
NationalCensusesMini-Censuses
NBSestim
ates
basedon
samplesurveys
Authorrsquosestim
ates
NBSstatistics
Geographicboundary
(tocross)
Citytownor
township
Township-
levelunit
Countyor
city
Tow
nship
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Minim
umlength
ofstay
(for
those
with
outlocalhukou)
Nominim
um3days
6months
6months(unless
otherw
isespecified)
Away
foroutsidework
(for
6monthsor
more)
6months
6months
Series
AB
CD
EF
G(
)H
1982
1730
66(1year)
465
217
2145
1987
1973
152
a260
c640
231
2767
1990
1924
216
(1year)
663
220
3020
1995
1846
497
291
b750
694
197
3517
2000
1908
448
1444
1210
1366
298
4591
2001
1701
551
1486
309
4806
2002
1722
598
1047
1528
304
5021
2003
1726
699
1139
1495
285
5238
2004
1949
780
1182
1514
279
5428
2005
1933
867
1531
1258
1531
272
5621
2006
2060
953
1321
1564
271
5771
2007
2084
1044
1370
1630
275
5938
2008
1892
1166
1404
1670
275
6067
2009
1677
1222
1453
1716
276
6219
2010
1701
1314
2614
2214
1534
2056
309
6656
2011
1554
1586
6908
Notes
andsources
MPS=Ministryof
Public
Security
NBS=NationalBureauof
Statistics
a the
geographic
boundary
isbasedon
citycounty
ortown
bthegeographic
boundary
isbasedon
county-level
units
c refersto
1988
AMPS(1988ndash
2010)NBSamp
MPS(1988)BMPS(1997ndash
2011)C
andDNBS(1988)SC
ampNBS(1985
1993200220072012)andNPSSO
(1997)E2002
ndash2008figuresarefrom
NBS
compliedby
Cai
andChan(2009
Table1)2009
ndash2011figuresarefrom
NBS(2010
2011
and2012a)Earlierfiguresareestim
ates
inLuet
al(2002)
andthey
may
notbe
fully
comparableto
recent
NBSfiguresFEstim
ates
derivedfrom
Chan(2012aTable1)GFexpressedas
apercentage
ofHHNBSfigurescompiledby
Chan(2012a)2011
figure
isfrom
Ma(2012)
190 KW Chan
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higher reaching 230 million in 2011 (NPFPC 2012) Again to put the number in perspec-tive the total number of international migrants is estimated by the United Nations (2012Table 1) to be 214 million in 2010 which is smaller than Chinarsquos non-hukou population inurban areas The rapid expansion of Chinarsquos essentially disenfranchised population primarilyin urban areas has become its hallmark in the last quarter century
Based on the above two broad categories of migrants can thus be identified in China(Chan Liu amp Yang 1999)
(a) Migration with lsquolocalrsquo residency rights (hereafter hukou migration) This is usuallyopen only to a select group (currently the rich or the highly educated) and immediatefamily members of residents with local hukou (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
(b) Migration without hukou residency rights (non-hukou migration)
Officially only hukou migration is considered qianyi (migration) Migrants in that categoryare eligible for the same array of social benefits and rights other local residents have Othertypes of moves are considered renkou liudong (population movements or lsquofloatingrsquo popula-tion) implying a lsquotemporaryrsquo move to a destination where the person is not supposed to andis legally not entitled to stay permanently Chinarsquos exceptionally large numbers of peoplemoving internally as well as the circulatory and temporary nature of some of them havehugely complicated the efforts to measure the movement consistently and to address accu-rately its many implications (Chan 2007 2012b)
Based on the above understanding and a careful differentiation of migration urbanizationand hukou statistics gleaned from a variety of sources and surveys2 in accordance with theirnature (flow or stock) and temporal and geographic coverage a matrix set up in Table 1allows us to make good sense of those numbers and gain an understanding the overall vol-ume of migration its variety and trends in the last 30 years Despite the diverse sources andthe varying quality of these data sets when analyzed side by side they not only becomemeaningful and useful information but also display some notable broad consistencies asexplained next
Hukou Migrants Series (A) This series refers to hukou migrants and is the only lsquoflowrsquodata series presented in Table 1 The figures refer to the number of in-migrants who are for-mally granted hukou status in the destination (city town and township) each year The dataare from Ministry of Public Security They represent the total number of all types officiallyapproved changes in hukou (residence) within a particular year from townships to cities fromcities to cities from townships to townships etc most probably excluding moves within cit-ies towns and within townships A portion of hukou migration is rural-to-rural migrationmainly involving marriage
Non-Hukou Population Series (Series BndashG) This refers to the people staying in anadministrative unit (usually city town street or township) other than their place of hukouregistration This group is also commonly known as the liudong renkou (floating population)The lsquofloating populationrsquo is not the de jure population In some cases (such as Shenzhen) thesize of the floating population is far larger than that of the de jure population (Chan 2009b)The non-hukou population series are migrant lsquostockrsquo figures ie the number of non-hukoumigrants who reside in a certain locale at a given point in time
Owing to the different purposes coverage and criteria used in defining the geographicboundary and the minimum duration of stay the statistics for the non-hukou population ineach series may be expectedly quite different even for the same year
Series B This is a systematic series of non-hukou population based on actual registrationstatistics kept by the Ministry of Public Security By law anyone staying in places other than
Migration and Development 191
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r 20
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hisher place of household registration for three days or more is required to register with thepolice and apply for a zanzhu zheng (temporary resident permit) Consequently this group isalso categorized as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (zanzhu renkou) by the police authorities In real-ity a large number of lsquofloatersrsquo fail to comply with this requirement that helps to explain partof the large discrepancies between Series B and C
Series C and D These are statistics collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)through censuses and mini-censuses (1 national surveys) The population is definedbasically on a de facto basis The de facto definition stipulates a minimum residence require-ment (6months or one year) to define a changzhu population (de facto resident population)the residence period is far longer than the one used in Series B The series are also commonlyreferred to as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (Yang 1996) although many in this group stay farlonger that what would commonly be considered as lsquotemporaryrsquo These two series howeverexclude the truly temporary such as tourists and shorter-term migrant workers Because Calso includes people moving within the same cities who are not truly lsquonon-hukou populationrsquoas we generally understand it D is the better statistic for representing the non-hukoupopulation
Series E This series refers to what is known as lsquorural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong)which is the largest constituent group of the non-hukou population This group includes onlythe working population with rural-hukou (and without local hukou in the destination)3 almostall of them work in cities and towns and are away from home villages for usually six monthsor more The figures are estimates based on large-scale sample surveys conducted in the ruralareas Despite this grouprsquos importance systematic and consistent national surveys of thisgroup by the NBS did not take place until the early years of the 21st C Estimates for thepre-2000 period are less systematic and based on smaller samples and somewhat differentdefinitions The majority of rural migrant laborers are unskilled or low-skilled workers Someof these rural migrants are seasonal and are therefore prone to move between the city and thecountryside 2ndash3 times in a year They are also harder to be enumerated using standard popu-lation counting procedures4
Series F and G F is an estimate of those carrying rural-hukou but staying in the urbanarea The number is computed as the difference between the de facto urban population (SeriesH) and the lsquononagricultural-hukou populationrsquo published by the Ministry of Public SecurityThe latter is commonly considered as the urban-hukou population (see Table 1 in Chan2012a) Series F is closely related to Series E broadly the former is the sum of E (ruralmigrant laborers) and their dependents (non-working population) Series F also overlaps withthe urban population without local hukou to a large extent The latter figure in 2010 asreported by NPFPC (2011) for instance is 221million which is very close to the figure in Ffor the same year (206million) G is F expressed as a percentage of H
Urban Population Series (H) This is added here to show the growth of the urban popula-tion an important metric of Chinarsquos urbanization This de facto urban population is the com-mon perhaps only statistic of lsquourban populationrsquo known at the national level in almost allcountries in the world In China however there are multiple series of lsquourban populationrsquoincluding several defined based exclusively on the de jure population counts (see Chan 20072012a)5 The series presented here refers to the number of people counted based on a de factocriterion6
3 Trends and geography of migration since 1982
Based on the figures presented in Table 1 one can identify some broad migration trends Theannual number of hukou migrants recorded by the Ministry of Public Security remained
192 KW Chan
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12
relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
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at 1
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30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
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ded
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Kam
Win
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han]
at 1
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30
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embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
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ded
by [
Kam
Win
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han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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Migration and development in China trends geography and currentissues
Kam Wing Chan
Department of Geography University of Washington Seattle WA USA
(Received 13 August 2012 final version received 14 September 2012)
Chinarsquos recent meteoric rise in the global economy is closely related to the strength of itsmanufacturing sector which is heavily dependent on cheap migrant labor This paper ana-lyzes Chinarsquos recent migration trends spatial pattern and their relationship with Chinarsquoseconomic strategy Internal migration in China is special in that it is heavily controlled andregulated by the hukou (household registration) system The system enables the country tocreate a massive exploitable migrant labor force that makes Chinarsquos industry highly com-petitive in the global economy The paper explains how the system works and distils thecomplex population and migration statistics to present a relatively complete picture ofmigration over time and space including the latest changes Special focus is on analyzinglsquorural migrant laborrsquo which has constituted the most important human cog powering theChina economic engine Long-distance interprovincial migration is also studied in the con-text of the changes in the regional economy in supporting Chinarsquos ascendancy to being thelsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo Three major issues pertaining to this migrant labor system and recentdevelopments in China and the global economy are examined They presage importantchanges to come which are likely to impact both China and the rest of the world
Keywords China migration hukou system interprovincial migration worldrsquos factory
1 Introduction
Chinarsquos rise as the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is definitely one of the biggest stories of the 21st CChinarsquos dominance in manufacturing has made it a major player in the global economy ThisChina success story is closely intertwined with the migration story without the epic-scalemigration of peasants ndash which supplies almost infinite low-cost human labor to power theChina economic engine ndash the ascent of China would be totally unthinkable Cheap migrantlabor is what makes lsquoChina pricersquo so unrelenting (Harney 2008) The last three decades havewitnessed the worldrsquos lsquoGreat Migrationrsquo ndash an estimated 200ndash250 million rural residents havemoved to cities and towns within China (Chan 2012a) To put this in perspective the volumeof the Great Migration of Europeans to North America from 1800 to the World War I wasonly a fraction of Chinarsquos lsquoon the order of fifty million personsrsquo (Tilly 1976 p 58)
Building on the previous work (Chan 2001b 2012b Liang 2007) and using the latestCensus data available this paper analyzes Chinarsquos recent migration trends spatial pattern andtheir relationship with economic development Chinarsquos internal migration is special in that itis heavily controlled and regulated by the hukou (household registration) system (Chan 1994Fan 2008) As will be explained below through the special institutional design of the hukou
Email kwchanuwedu
Migration and DevelopmentVol 1 No 2 December 2012 187ndash205
ISSN 2163-2324 printISSN 2163-2332 online 2012 Taylor amp Francishttpdxdoiorg101080216323242012739316httpwwwtandfonlinecom
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system China has also managed to turn this vast number of rural-urban migrants into thelargest army of cheap industrial labor the world has ever seen Moreover Chinarsquos simulta-neous use of a de jure hukou-based population registration system and de facto populationstatistical counts have greatly complicated the task of counting especially migrants and mea-suring migration There are all kinds of conceptual and technical complexity plus a plethoraof lexicon both of which serve mostly to mislead and confuses some researchers (see Chan2007 Liang 2007 Liu amp Chan 2001) This requires some explanation before one cananalyze the trends and patterns The concluding section of this paper highlights the latestimportant migration issues affecting Chinarsquos development and the world
2 The hukou system1 and migration
After the Communist Revolution in 1949 China opted for the traditional Stalinist growthstrategy of rapid industrialization centered on heavy industry in cities and extraction of agri-cultural surplus from the peasantry (Chan 1994) This strategy was predicated upon exploit-ing the rural labor by denying it geographic mobility and access to state welfare From themid-1950s the government repeatedly introduced measures to stem rural outflows culminat-ing in 1958 in the formal codification of a comprehensive registration system to control pop-ulation mobility (Chan 2009a Wang 2005) The regulation decreed that all internalmigration be subject to approval by the relevant local government From that point Chinesecitizens lost the freedom of residence and migration within their own country Each person isassigned a hukou (registration status) classified as lsquoruralrsquo or lsquourbanrsquo in a specific administra-tive unit The hukou mechanism served a central instrument of the command system designedfor the big-push industrialization to prevent peasants from exiting from the countryside Thisindustrialization strategy led China to create in effect two very different societies on the onehand the urban class whose members worked in the priority and protected industrial sectorand who had access to (at least basic) social welfare and full citizenship and on the otherhand the peasants who were tied to the land to produce an agricultural surplus for industriali-zation and who had to fend for themselves Hukou conversion referring to change from therural to the urban category was tightly controlled and permitted only under very limitedconditions usually when it was in accordance with state industrialization plans The hukousystem was not merely a means of limiting rural-urban population and labor mobility as ithas been commonly depicted but also a system of social control aimed at excluding the ruralpopulation from access to state-provided goods welfare and entitlements so that the ruralpopulation segment remains cheap and easily exploited
It was under this socioeconomic context that China in the late 1970s launched its eco-nomic reform After some experimentation as China latched onto a labor intensive export-oriented growth strategy in the mid-1980s rural labor was allowed en masse to the cities tofill industryrsquos labor demand which later became a major state industrialization strategy Bythe mid-1990s rural-hukou labor had become the backbone labor force of the export industrybased on manufacturing Today rural hukou labor also staffs almost all of the low-end ser-vices in urban areas In coastal export centers such as Shenzhen and Dongguan migrant labornow accounts for by far the greater part (70ndash80) of the labor force (Chan 2009b Liang1999)
lsquoRural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong) as the term comes to be known in China has a spe-cific meaning in the country it refers to industrial and service workers with rural hukouThese village-origin laborers though working on urban jobs and residing for the most part intowns and cities are not considered legally to be urban workers Neither are they (nor underthe current system will they one day be) treated as lsquolocalsrsquo rural migrant is not a probational
188 KW Chan
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status but permanent (Wu 2011) They are not eligible for regular urban welfare benefits andsocial services (access to local schools urban pension plans public housing etc) and otherrights that are available to people with urban hukou Instead rural migrant workers are treatedofficially as part of the rural hukou population even though they may have worked and livedin an urban area for many years In short they are trapped through institutional mechanismin a permanent social lsquohalf-arrivalrsquo situation belong to the netherworld of rural or urban andwith little hope of acculturating into the urban permanent population (Saunders 2012 Zhang2012) This also applies to their children even some of them are born in the city The legallylsquotemporaryrsquo status of this grouprsquos members and their permanent ineligibility for locallsquocitizenshiprsquo in the form of urban hukou make them forever vulnerable and easily expendable(Solinger 1999 Wu 2011)
Onersquos hukou classification remains unchanged no matter where heshe moves unless heshe effects a formal hukou conversion which is almost impossible to get for an ordinary ruralmigrant As a result of this institutional design they are consigned to low-end factory andservice jobs In many cities and export zones local decrees have also forbidden migrantsfrom taking up jobs other than those in the low-skilled 3-D (dangerous dirty and demeaning)category The denial of local urban hukou to migrant workers combined with their plentifulsupply and lack of access to legal support has created a large easily exploitable yet highlymobile and flexible industrial workforce for Chinarsquos export economy The internal migrantlabor force is equivalent to the cheap migrant labor in the classical Lewis model of theunlimited supply of labor It has greatly contributed to Chinarsquos emergence as the worldrsquoslsquomost efficientrsquo ndash ie the least-cost ndash producer Figure 1 outlines the main components of Chi-narsquos dual society with particular reference to position in the social (and economic) hierarchy(pyramid) type of hukou (urban or rural) and ruralurban location in two different historicalperiods ndash Maorsquos (pre-1979) era and the present
Alarmingly their numbers have been swelling rapidly even excluding those employed intownship or village enterprises close to their home villages the size of the rural migrant laborforce has expanded from about 20ndash30million in the 1980s to close to 160 million in 2011(see Table 1 later) The total number of (urban) population without local hukou was even
Figure 1 Main components of Chinese society with reference to the social hierarchy hukou type andlocation in ruralurban area
Migration and Development 189
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Table
1Major
aggregatemigratio
nandurbanpo
pulatio
nstatistics19
82ndash2011(inmillions)
HukouMigrants
(Yearlyflow
figures)
Non
-HukouPop
ulation
(Stock
figures)
Defactopopulatio
nin
urbanareas
lsquoTem
porary
Populationrsquo
lsquoRural
Migrant
Laborrsquo
Rural-hukou
populatio
nin
urbanareas
Policestatistics
Registeredwith
MPS(m
id-year)
NationalCensusesMini-Censuses
NBSestim
ates
basedon
samplesurveys
Authorrsquosestim
ates
NBSstatistics
Geographicboundary
(tocross)
Citytownor
township
Township-
levelunit
Countyor
city
Tow
nship
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Minim
umlength
ofstay
(for
those
with
outlocalhukou)
Nominim
um3days
6months
6months(unless
otherw
isespecified)
Away
foroutsidework
(for
6monthsor
more)
6months
6months
Series
AB
CD
EF
G(
)H
1982
1730
66(1year)
465
217
2145
1987
1973
152
a260
c640
231
2767
1990
1924
216
(1year)
663
220
3020
1995
1846
497
291
b750
694
197
3517
2000
1908
448
1444
1210
1366
298
4591
2001
1701
551
1486
309
4806
2002
1722
598
1047
1528
304
5021
2003
1726
699
1139
1495
285
5238
2004
1949
780
1182
1514
279
5428
2005
1933
867
1531
1258
1531
272
5621
2006
2060
953
1321
1564
271
5771
2007
2084
1044
1370
1630
275
5938
2008
1892
1166
1404
1670
275
6067
2009
1677
1222
1453
1716
276
6219
2010
1701
1314
2614
2214
1534
2056
309
6656
2011
1554
1586
6908
Notes
andsources
MPS=Ministryof
Public
Security
NBS=NationalBureauof
Statistics
a the
geographic
boundary
isbasedon
citycounty
ortown
bthegeographic
boundary
isbasedon
county-level
units
c refersto
1988
AMPS(1988ndash
2010)NBSamp
MPS(1988)BMPS(1997ndash
2011)C
andDNBS(1988)SC
ampNBS(1985
1993200220072012)andNPSSO
(1997)E2002
ndash2008figuresarefrom
NBS
compliedby
Cai
andChan(2009
Table1)2009
ndash2011figuresarefrom
NBS(2010
2011
and2012a)Earlierfiguresareestim
ates
inLuet
al(2002)
andthey
may
notbe
fully
comparableto
recent
NBSfiguresFEstim
ates
derivedfrom
Chan(2012aTable1)GFexpressedas
apercentage
ofHHNBSfigurescompiledby
Chan(2012a)2011
figure
isfrom
Ma(2012)
190 KW Chan
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higher reaching 230 million in 2011 (NPFPC 2012) Again to put the number in perspec-tive the total number of international migrants is estimated by the United Nations (2012Table 1) to be 214 million in 2010 which is smaller than Chinarsquos non-hukou population inurban areas The rapid expansion of Chinarsquos essentially disenfranchised population primarilyin urban areas has become its hallmark in the last quarter century
Based on the above two broad categories of migrants can thus be identified in China(Chan Liu amp Yang 1999)
(a) Migration with lsquolocalrsquo residency rights (hereafter hukou migration) This is usuallyopen only to a select group (currently the rich or the highly educated) and immediatefamily members of residents with local hukou (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
(b) Migration without hukou residency rights (non-hukou migration)
Officially only hukou migration is considered qianyi (migration) Migrants in that categoryare eligible for the same array of social benefits and rights other local residents have Othertypes of moves are considered renkou liudong (population movements or lsquofloatingrsquo popula-tion) implying a lsquotemporaryrsquo move to a destination where the person is not supposed to andis legally not entitled to stay permanently Chinarsquos exceptionally large numbers of peoplemoving internally as well as the circulatory and temporary nature of some of them havehugely complicated the efforts to measure the movement consistently and to address accu-rately its many implications (Chan 2007 2012b)
Based on the above understanding and a careful differentiation of migration urbanizationand hukou statistics gleaned from a variety of sources and surveys2 in accordance with theirnature (flow or stock) and temporal and geographic coverage a matrix set up in Table 1allows us to make good sense of those numbers and gain an understanding the overall vol-ume of migration its variety and trends in the last 30 years Despite the diverse sources andthe varying quality of these data sets when analyzed side by side they not only becomemeaningful and useful information but also display some notable broad consistencies asexplained next
Hukou Migrants Series (A) This series refers to hukou migrants and is the only lsquoflowrsquodata series presented in Table 1 The figures refer to the number of in-migrants who are for-mally granted hukou status in the destination (city town and township) each year The dataare from Ministry of Public Security They represent the total number of all types officiallyapproved changes in hukou (residence) within a particular year from townships to cities fromcities to cities from townships to townships etc most probably excluding moves within cit-ies towns and within townships A portion of hukou migration is rural-to-rural migrationmainly involving marriage
Non-Hukou Population Series (Series BndashG) This refers to the people staying in anadministrative unit (usually city town street or township) other than their place of hukouregistration This group is also commonly known as the liudong renkou (floating population)The lsquofloating populationrsquo is not the de jure population In some cases (such as Shenzhen) thesize of the floating population is far larger than that of the de jure population (Chan 2009b)The non-hukou population series are migrant lsquostockrsquo figures ie the number of non-hukoumigrants who reside in a certain locale at a given point in time
Owing to the different purposes coverage and criteria used in defining the geographicboundary and the minimum duration of stay the statistics for the non-hukou population ineach series may be expectedly quite different even for the same year
Series B This is a systematic series of non-hukou population based on actual registrationstatistics kept by the Ministry of Public Security By law anyone staying in places other than
Migration and Development 191
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hisher place of household registration for three days or more is required to register with thepolice and apply for a zanzhu zheng (temporary resident permit) Consequently this group isalso categorized as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (zanzhu renkou) by the police authorities In real-ity a large number of lsquofloatersrsquo fail to comply with this requirement that helps to explain partof the large discrepancies between Series B and C
Series C and D These are statistics collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)through censuses and mini-censuses (1 national surveys) The population is definedbasically on a de facto basis The de facto definition stipulates a minimum residence require-ment (6months or one year) to define a changzhu population (de facto resident population)the residence period is far longer than the one used in Series B The series are also commonlyreferred to as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (Yang 1996) although many in this group stay farlonger that what would commonly be considered as lsquotemporaryrsquo These two series howeverexclude the truly temporary such as tourists and shorter-term migrant workers Because Calso includes people moving within the same cities who are not truly lsquonon-hukou populationrsquoas we generally understand it D is the better statistic for representing the non-hukoupopulation
Series E This series refers to what is known as lsquorural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong)which is the largest constituent group of the non-hukou population This group includes onlythe working population with rural-hukou (and without local hukou in the destination)3 almostall of them work in cities and towns and are away from home villages for usually six monthsor more The figures are estimates based on large-scale sample surveys conducted in the ruralareas Despite this grouprsquos importance systematic and consistent national surveys of thisgroup by the NBS did not take place until the early years of the 21st C Estimates for thepre-2000 period are less systematic and based on smaller samples and somewhat differentdefinitions The majority of rural migrant laborers are unskilled or low-skilled workers Someof these rural migrants are seasonal and are therefore prone to move between the city and thecountryside 2ndash3 times in a year They are also harder to be enumerated using standard popu-lation counting procedures4
Series F and G F is an estimate of those carrying rural-hukou but staying in the urbanarea The number is computed as the difference between the de facto urban population (SeriesH) and the lsquononagricultural-hukou populationrsquo published by the Ministry of Public SecurityThe latter is commonly considered as the urban-hukou population (see Table 1 in Chan2012a) Series F is closely related to Series E broadly the former is the sum of E (ruralmigrant laborers) and their dependents (non-working population) Series F also overlaps withthe urban population without local hukou to a large extent The latter figure in 2010 asreported by NPFPC (2011) for instance is 221million which is very close to the figure in Ffor the same year (206million) G is F expressed as a percentage of H
Urban Population Series (H) This is added here to show the growth of the urban popula-tion an important metric of Chinarsquos urbanization This de facto urban population is the com-mon perhaps only statistic of lsquourban populationrsquo known at the national level in almost allcountries in the world In China however there are multiple series of lsquourban populationrsquoincluding several defined based exclusively on the de jure population counts (see Chan 20072012a)5 The series presented here refers to the number of people counted based on a de factocriterion6
3 Trends and geography of migration since 1982
Based on the figures presented in Table 1 one can identify some broad migration trends Theannual number of hukou migrants recorded by the Ministry of Public Security remained
192 KW Chan
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relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
Dow
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Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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12
ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
198 KW Chan
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
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ded
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Kam
Win
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han]
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30
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embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
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United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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system China has also managed to turn this vast number of rural-urban migrants into thelargest army of cheap industrial labor the world has ever seen Moreover Chinarsquos simulta-neous use of a de jure hukou-based population registration system and de facto populationstatistical counts have greatly complicated the task of counting especially migrants and mea-suring migration There are all kinds of conceptual and technical complexity plus a plethoraof lexicon both of which serve mostly to mislead and confuses some researchers (see Chan2007 Liang 2007 Liu amp Chan 2001) This requires some explanation before one cananalyze the trends and patterns The concluding section of this paper highlights the latestimportant migration issues affecting Chinarsquos development and the world
2 The hukou system1 and migration
After the Communist Revolution in 1949 China opted for the traditional Stalinist growthstrategy of rapid industrialization centered on heavy industry in cities and extraction of agri-cultural surplus from the peasantry (Chan 1994) This strategy was predicated upon exploit-ing the rural labor by denying it geographic mobility and access to state welfare From themid-1950s the government repeatedly introduced measures to stem rural outflows culminat-ing in 1958 in the formal codification of a comprehensive registration system to control pop-ulation mobility (Chan 2009a Wang 2005) The regulation decreed that all internalmigration be subject to approval by the relevant local government From that point Chinesecitizens lost the freedom of residence and migration within their own country Each person isassigned a hukou (registration status) classified as lsquoruralrsquo or lsquourbanrsquo in a specific administra-tive unit The hukou mechanism served a central instrument of the command system designedfor the big-push industrialization to prevent peasants from exiting from the countryside Thisindustrialization strategy led China to create in effect two very different societies on the onehand the urban class whose members worked in the priority and protected industrial sectorand who had access to (at least basic) social welfare and full citizenship and on the otherhand the peasants who were tied to the land to produce an agricultural surplus for industriali-zation and who had to fend for themselves Hukou conversion referring to change from therural to the urban category was tightly controlled and permitted only under very limitedconditions usually when it was in accordance with state industrialization plans The hukousystem was not merely a means of limiting rural-urban population and labor mobility as ithas been commonly depicted but also a system of social control aimed at excluding the ruralpopulation from access to state-provided goods welfare and entitlements so that the ruralpopulation segment remains cheap and easily exploited
It was under this socioeconomic context that China in the late 1970s launched its eco-nomic reform After some experimentation as China latched onto a labor intensive export-oriented growth strategy in the mid-1980s rural labor was allowed en masse to the cities tofill industryrsquos labor demand which later became a major state industrialization strategy Bythe mid-1990s rural-hukou labor had become the backbone labor force of the export industrybased on manufacturing Today rural hukou labor also staffs almost all of the low-end ser-vices in urban areas In coastal export centers such as Shenzhen and Dongguan migrant labornow accounts for by far the greater part (70ndash80) of the labor force (Chan 2009b Liang1999)
lsquoRural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong) as the term comes to be known in China has a spe-cific meaning in the country it refers to industrial and service workers with rural hukouThese village-origin laborers though working on urban jobs and residing for the most part intowns and cities are not considered legally to be urban workers Neither are they (nor underthe current system will they one day be) treated as lsquolocalsrsquo rural migrant is not a probational
188 KW Chan
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status but permanent (Wu 2011) They are not eligible for regular urban welfare benefits andsocial services (access to local schools urban pension plans public housing etc) and otherrights that are available to people with urban hukou Instead rural migrant workers are treatedofficially as part of the rural hukou population even though they may have worked and livedin an urban area for many years In short they are trapped through institutional mechanismin a permanent social lsquohalf-arrivalrsquo situation belong to the netherworld of rural or urban andwith little hope of acculturating into the urban permanent population (Saunders 2012 Zhang2012) This also applies to their children even some of them are born in the city The legallylsquotemporaryrsquo status of this grouprsquos members and their permanent ineligibility for locallsquocitizenshiprsquo in the form of urban hukou make them forever vulnerable and easily expendable(Solinger 1999 Wu 2011)
Onersquos hukou classification remains unchanged no matter where heshe moves unless heshe effects a formal hukou conversion which is almost impossible to get for an ordinary ruralmigrant As a result of this institutional design they are consigned to low-end factory andservice jobs In many cities and export zones local decrees have also forbidden migrantsfrom taking up jobs other than those in the low-skilled 3-D (dangerous dirty and demeaning)category The denial of local urban hukou to migrant workers combined with their plentifulsupply and lack of access to legal support has created a large easily exploitable yet highlymobile and flexible industrial workforce for Chinarsquos export economy The internal migrantlabor force is equivalent to the cheap migrant labor in the classical Lewis model of theunlimited supply of labor It has greatly contributed to Chinarsquos emergence as the worldrsquoslsquomost efficientrsquo ndash ie the least-cost ndash producer Figure 1 outlines the main components of Chi-narsquos dual society with particular reference to position in the social (and economic) hierarchy(pyramid) type of hukou (urban or rural) and ruralurban location in two different historicalperiods ndash Maorsquos (pre-1979) era and the present
Alarmingly their numbers have been swelling rapidly even excluding those employed intownship or village enterprises close to their home villages the size of the rural migrant laborforce has expanded from about 20ndash30million in the 1980s to close to 160 million in 2011(see Table 1 later) The total number of (urban) population without local hukou was even
Figure 1 Main components of Chinese society with reference to the social hierarchy hukou type andlocation in ruralurban area
Migration and Development 189
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Table
1Major
aggregatemigratio
nandurbanpo
pulatio
nstatistics19
82ndash2011(inmillions)
HukouMigrants
(Yearlyflow
figures)
Non
-HukouPop
ulation
(Stock
figures)
Defactopopulatio
nin
urbanareas
lsquoTem
porary
Populationrsquo
lsquoRural
Migrant
Laborrsquo
Rural-hukou
populatio
nin
urbanareas
Policestatistics
Registeredwith
MPS(m
id-year)
NationalCensusesMini-Censuses
NBSestim
ates
basedon
samplesurveys
Authorrsquosestim
ates
NBSstatistics
Geographicboundary
(tocross)
Citytownor
township
Township-
levelunit
Countyor
city
Tow
nship
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Minim
umlength
ofstay
(for
those
with
outlocalhukou)
Nominim
um3days
6months
6months(unless
otherw
isespecified)
Away
foroutsidework
(for
6monthsor
more)
6months
6months
Series
AB
CD
EF
G(
)H
1982
1730
66(1year)
465
217
2145
1987
1973
152
a260
c640
231
2767
1990
1924
216
(1year)
663
220
3020
1995
1846
497
291
b750
694
197
3517
2000
1908
448
1444
1210
1366
298
4591
2001
1701
551
1486
309
4806
2002
1722
598
1047
1528
304
5021
2003
1726
699
1139
1495
285
5238
2004
1949
780
1182
1514
279
5428
2005
1933
867
1531
1258
1531
272
5621
2006
2060
953
1321
1564
271
5771
2007
2084
1044
1370
1630
275
5938
2008
1892
1166
1404
1670
275
6067
2009
1677
1222
1453
1716
276
6219
2010
1701
1314
2614
2214
1534
2056
309
6656
2011
1554
1586
6908
Notes
andsources
MPS=Ministryof
Public
Security
NBS=NationalBureauof
Statistics
a the
geographic
boundary
isbasedon
citycounty
ortown
bthegeographic
boundary
isbasedon
county-level
units
c refersto
1988
AMPS(1988ndash
2010)NBSamp
MPS(1988)BMPS(1997ndash
2011)C
andDNBS(1988)SC
ampNBS(1985
1993200220072012)andNPSSO
(1997)E2002
ndash2008figuresarefrom
NBS
compliedby
Cai
andChan(2009
Table1)2009
ndash2011figuresarefrom
NBS(2010
2011
and2012a)Earlierfiguresareestim
ates
inLuet
al(2002)
andthey
may
notbe
fully
comparableto
recent
NBSfiguresFEstim
ates
derivedfrom
Chan(2012aTable1)GFexpressedas
apercentage
ofHHNBSfigurescompiledby
Chan(2012a)2011
figure
isfrom
Ma(2012)
190 KW Chan
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higher reaching 230 million in 2011 (NPFPC 2012) Again to put the number in perspec-tive the total number of international migrants is estimated by the United Nations (2012Table 1) to be 214 million in 2010 which is smaller than Chinarsquos non-hukou population inurban areas The rapid expansion of Chinarsquos essentially disenfranchised population primarilyin urban areas has become its hallmark in the last quarter century
Based on the above two broad categories of migrants can thus be identified in China(Chan Liu amp Yang 1999)
(a) Migration with lsquolocalrsquo residency rights (hereafter hukou migration) This is usuallyopen only to a select group (currently the rich or the highly educated) and immediatefamily members of residents with local hukou (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
(b) Migration without hukou residency rights (non-hukou migration)
Officially only hukou migration is considered qianyi (migration) Migrants in that categoryare eligible for the same array of social benefits and rights other local residents have Othertypes of moves are considered renkou liudong (population movements or lsquofloatingrsquo popula-tion) implying a lsquotemporaryrsquo move to a destination where the person is not supposed to andis legally not entitled to stay permanently Chinarsquos exceptionally large numbers of peoplemoving internally as well as the circulatory and temporary nature of some of them havehugely complicated the efforts to measure the movement consistently and to address accu-rately its many implications (Chan 2007 2012b)
Based on the above understanding and a careful differentiation of migration urbanizationand hukou statistics gleaned from a variety of sources and surveys2 in accordance with theirnature (flow or stock) and temporal and geographic coverage a matrix set up in Table 1allows us to make good sense of those numbers and gain an understanding the overall vol-ume of migration its variety and trends in the last 30 years Despite the diverse sources andthe varying quality of these data sets when analyzed side by side they not only becomemeaningful and useful information but also display some notable broad consistencies asexplained next
Hukou Migrants Series (A) This series refers to hukou migrants and is the only lsquoflowrsquodata series presented in Table 1 The figures refer to the number of in-migrants who are for-mally granted hukou status in the destination (city town and township) each year The dataare from Ministry of Public Security They represent the total number of all types officiallyapproved changes in hukou (residence) within a particular year from townships to cities fromcities to cities from townships to townships etc most probably excluding moves within cit-ies towns and within townships A portion of hukou migration is rural-to-rural migrationmainly involving marriage
Non-Hukou Population Series (Series BndashG) This refers to the people staying in anadministrative unit (usually city town street or township) other than their place of hukouregistration This group is also commonly known as the liudong renkou (floating population)The lsquofloating populationrsquo is not the de jure population In some cases (such as Shenzhen) thesize of the floating population is far larger than that of the de jure population (Chan 2009b)The non-hukou population series are migrant lsquostockrsquo figures ie the number of non-hukoumigrants who reside in a certain locale at a given point in time
Owing to the different purposes coverage and criteria used in defining the geographicboundary and the minimum duration of stay the statistics for the non-hukou population ineach series may be expectedly quite different even for the same year
Series B This is a systematic series of non-hukou population based on actual registrationstatistics kept by the Ministry of Public Security By law anyone staying in places other than
Migration and Development 191
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hisher place of household registration for three days or more is required to register with thepolice and apply for a zanzhu zheng (temporary resident permit) Consequently this group isalso categorized as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (zanzhu renkou) by the police authorities In real-ity a large number of lsquofloatersrsquo fail to comply with this requirement that helps to explain partof the large discrepancies between Series B and C
Series C and D These are statistics collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)through censuses and mini-censuses (1 national surveys) The population is definedbasically on a de facto basis The de facto definition stipulates a minimum residence require-ment (6months or one year) to define a changzhu population (de facto resident population)the residence period is far longer than the one used in Series B The series are also commonlyreferred to as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (Yang 1996) although many in this group stay farlonger that what would commonly be considered as lsquotemporaryrsquo These two series howeverexclude the truly temporary such as tourists and shorter-term migrant workers Because Calso includes people moving within the same cities who are not truly lsquonon-hukou populationrsquoas we generally understand it D is the better statistic for representing the non-hukoupopulation
Series E This series refers to what is known as lsquorural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong)which is the largest constituent group of the non-hukou population This group includes onlythe working population with rural-hukou (and without local hukou in the destination)3 almostall of them work in cities and towns and are away from home villages for usually six monthsor more The figures are estimates based on large-scale sample surveys conducted in the ruralareas Despite this grouprsquos importance systematic and consistent national surveys of thisgroup by the NBS did not take place until the early years of the 21st C Estimates for thepre-2000 period are less systematic and based on smaller samples and somewhat differentdefinitions The majority of rural migrant laborers are unskilled or low-skilled workers Someof these rural migrants are seasonal and are therefore prone to move between the city and thecountryside 2ndash3 times in a year They are also harder to be enumerated using standard popu-lation counting procedures4
Series F and G F is an estimate of those carrying rural-hukou but staying in the urbanarea The number is computed as the difference between the de facto urban population (SeriesH) and the lsquononagricultural-hukou populationrsquo published by the Ministry of Public SecurityThe latter is commonly considered as the urban-hukou population (see Table 1 in Chan2012a) Series F is closely related to Series E broadly the former is the sum of E (ruralmigrant laborers) and their dependents (non-working population) Series F also overlaps withthe urban population without local hukou to a large extent The latter figure in 2010 asreported by NPFPC (2011) for instance is 221million which is very close to the figure in Ffor the same year (206million) G is F expressed as a percentage of H
Urban Population Series (H) This is added here to show the growth of the urban popula-tion an important metric of Chinarsquos urbanization This de facto urban population is the com-mon perhaps only statistic of lsquourban populationrsquo known at the national level in almost allcountries in the world In China however there are multiple series of lsquourban populationrsquoincluding several defined based exclusively on the de jure population counts (see Chan 20072012a)5 The series presented here refers to the number of people counted based on a de factocriterion6
3 Trends and geography of migration since 1982
Based on the figures presented in Table 1 one can identify some broad migration trends Theannual number of hukou migrants recorded by the Ministry of Public Security remained
192 KW Chan
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relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
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Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
196 KW Chan
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
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embe
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12
belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
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embe
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United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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status but permanent (Wu 2011) They are not eligible for regular urban welfare benefits andsocial services (access to local schools urban pension plans public housing etc) and otherrights that are available to people with urban hukou Instead rural migrant workers are treatedofficially as part of the rural hukou population even though they may have worked and livedin an urban area for many years In short they are trapped through institutional mechanismin a permanent social lsquohalf-arrivalrsquo situation belong to the netherworld of rural or urban andwith little hope of acculturating into the urban permanent population (Saunders 2012 Zhang2012) This also applies to their children even some of them are born in the city The legallylsquotemporaryrsquo status of this grouprsquos members and their permanent ineligibility for locallsquocitizenshiprsquo in the form of urban hukou make them forever vulnerable and easily expendable(Solinger 1999 Wu 2011)
Onersquos hukou classification remains unchanged no matter where heshe moves unless heshe effects a formal hukou conversion which is almost impossible to get for an ordinary ruralmigrant As a result of this institutional design they are consigned to low-end factory andservice jobs In many cities and export zones local decrees have also forbidden migrantsfrom taking up jobs other than those in the low-skilled 3-D (dangerous dirty and demeaning)category The denial of local urban hukou to migrant workers combined with their plentifulsupply and lack of access to legal support has created a large easily exploitable yet highlymobile and flexible industrial workforce for Chinarsquos export economy The internal migrantlabor force is equivalent to the cheap migrant labor in the classical Lewis model of theunlimited supply of labor It has greatly contributed to Chinarsquos emergence as the worldrsquoslsquomost efficientrsquo ndash ie the least-cost ndash producer Figure 1 outlines the main components of Chi-narsquos dual society with particular reference to position in the social (and economic) hierarchy(pyramid) type of hukou (urban or rural) and ruralurban location in two different historicalperiods ndash Maorsquos (pre-1979) era and the present
Alarmingly their numbers have been swelling rapidly even excluding those employed intownship or village enterprises close to their home villages the size of the rural migrant laborforce has expanded from about 20ndash30million in the 1980s to close to 160 million in 2011(see Table 1 later) The total number of (urban) population without local hukou was even
Figure 1 Main components of Chinese society with reference to the social hierarchy hukou type andlocation in ruralurban area
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Table
1Major
aggregatemigratio
nandurbanpo
pulatio
nstatistics19
82ndash2011(inmillions)
HukouMigrants
(Yearlyflow
figures)
Non
-HukouPop
ulation
(Stock
figures)
Defactopopulatio
nin
urbanareas
lsquoTem
porary
Populationrsquo
lsquoRural
Migrant
Laborrsquo
Rural-hukou
populatio
nin
urbanareas
Policestatistics
Registeredwith
MPS(m
id-year)
NationalCensusesMini-Censuses
NBSestim
ates
basedon
samplesurveys
Authorrsquosestim
ates
NBSstatistics
Geographicboundary
(tocross)
Citytownor
township
Township-
levelunit
Countyor
city
Tow
nship
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Minim
umlength
ofstay
(for
those
with
outlocalhukou)
Nominim
um3days
6months
6months(unless
otherw
isespecified)
Away
foroutsidework
(for
6monthsor
more)
6months
6months
Series
AB
CD
EF
G(
)H
1982
1730
66(1year)
465
217
2145
1987
1973
152
a260
c640
231
2767
1990
1924
216
(1year)
663
220
3020
1995
1846
497
291
b750
694
197
3517
2000
1908
448
1444
1210
1366
298
4591
2001
1701
551
1486
309
4806
2002
1722
598
1047
1528
304
5021
2003
1726
699
1139
1495
285
5238
2004
1949
780
1182
1514
279
5428
2005
1933
867
1531
1258
1531
272
5621
2006
2060
953
1321
1564
271
5771
2007
2084
1044
1370
1630
275
5938
2008
1892
1166
1404
1670
275
6067
2009
1677
1222
1453
1716
276
6219
2010
1701
1314
2614
2214
1534
2056
309
6656
2011
1554
1586
6908
Notes
andsources
MPS=Ministryof
Public
Security
NBS=NationalBureauof
Statistics
a the
geographic
boundary
isbasedon
citycounty
ortown
bthegeographic
boundary
isbasedon
county-level
units
c refersto
1988
AMPS(1988ndash
2010)NBSamp
MPS(1988)BMPS(1997ndash
2011)C
andDNBS(1988)SC
ampNBS(1985
1993200220072012)andNPSSO
(1997)E2002
ndash2008figuresarefrom
NBS
compliedby
Cai
andChan(2009
Table1)2009
ndash2011figuresarefrom
NBS(2010
2011
and2012a)Earlierfiguresareestim
ates
inLuet
al(2002)
andthey
may
notbe
fully
comparableto
recent
NBSfiguresFEstim
ates
derivedfrom
Chan(2012aTable1)GFexpressedas
apercentage
ofHHNBSfigurescompiledby
Chan(2012a)2011
figure
isfrom
Ma(2012)
190 KW Chan
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higher reaching 230 million in 2011 (NPFPC 2012) Again to put the number in perspec-tive the total number of international migrants is estimated by the United Nations (2012Table 1) to be 214 million in 2010 which is smaller than Chinarsquos non-hukou population inurban areas The rapid expansion of Chinarsquos essentially disenfranchised population primarilyin urban areas has become its hallmark in the last quarter century
Based on the above two broad categories of migrants can thus be identified in China(Chan Liu amp Yang 1999)
(a) Migration with lsquolocalrsquo residency rights (hereafter hukou migration) This is usuallyopen only to a select group (currently the rich or the highly educated) and immediatefamily members of residents with local hukou (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
(b) Migration without hukou residency rights (non-hukou migration)
Officially only hukou migration is considered qianyi (migration) Migrants in that categoryare eligible for the same array of social benefits and rights other local residents have Othertypes of moves are considered renkou liudong (population movements or lsquofloatingrsquo popula-tion) implying a lsquotemporaryrsquo move to a destination where the person is not supposed to andis legally not entitled to stay permanently Chinarsquos exceptionally large numbers of peoplemoving internally as well as the circulatory and temporary nature of some of them havehugely complicated the efforts to measure the movement consistently and to address accu-rately its many implications (Chan 2007 2012b)
Based on the above understanding and a careful differentiation of migration urbanizationand hukou statistics gleaned from a variety of sources and surveys2 in accordance with theirnature (flow or stock) and temporal and geographic coverage a matrix set up in Table 1allows us to make good sense of those numbers and gain an understanding the overall vol-ume of migration its variety and trends in the last 30 years Despite the diverse sources andthe varying quality of these data sets when analyzed side by side they not only becomemeaningful and useful information but also display some notable broad consistencies asexplained next
Hukou Migrants Series (A) This series refers to hukou migrants and is the only lsquoflowrsquodata series presented in Table 1 The figures refer to the number of in-migrants who are for-mally granted hukou status in the destination (city town and township) each year The dataare from Ministry of Public Security They represent the total number of all types officiallyapproved changes in hukou (residence) within a particular year from townships to cities fromcities to cities from townships to townships etc most probably excluding moves within cit-ies towns and within townships A portion of hukou migration is rural-to-rural migrationmainly involving marriage
Non-Hukou Population Series (Series BndashG) This refers to the people staying in anadministrative unit (usually city town street or township) other than their place of hukouregistration This group is also commonly known as the liudong renkou (floating population)The lsquofloating populationrsquo is not the de jure population In some cases (such as Shenzhen) thesize of the floating population is far larger than that of the de jure population (Chan 2009b)The non-hukou population series are migrant lsquostockrsquo figures ie the number of non-hukoumigrants who reside in a certain locale at a given point in time
Owing to the different purposes coverage and criteria used in defining the geographicboundary and the minimum duration of stay the statistics for the non-hukou population ineach series may be expectedly quite different even for the same year
Series B This is a systematic series of non-hukou population based on actual registrationstatistics kept by the Ministry of Public Security By law anyone staying in places other than
Migration and Development 191
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hisher place of household registration for three days or more is required to register with thepolice and apply for a zanzhu zheng (temporary resident permit) Consequently this group isalso categorized as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (zanzhu renkou) by the police authorities In real-ity a large number of lsquofloatersrsquo fail to comply with this requirement that helps to explain partof the large discrepancies between Series B and C
Series C and D These are statistics collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)through censuses and mini-censuses (1 national surveys) The population is definedbasically on a de facto basis The de facto definition stipulates a minimum residence require-ment (6months or one year) to define a changzhu population (de facto resident population)the residence period is far longer than the one used in Series B The series are also commonlyreferred to as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (Yang 1996) although many in this group stay farlonger that what would commonly be considered as lsquotemporaryrsquo These two series howeverexclude the truly temporary such as tourists and shorter-term migrant workers Because Calso includes people moving within the same cities who are not truly lsquonon-hukou populationrsquoas we generally understand it D is the better statistic for representing the non-hukoupopulation
Series E This series refers to what is known as lsquorural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong)which is the largest constituent group of the non-hukou population This group includes onlythe working population with rural-hukou (and without local hukou in the destination)3 almostall of them work in cities and towns and are away from home villages for usually six monthsor more The figures are estimates based on large-scale sample surveys conducted in the ruralareas Despite this grouprsquos importance systematic and consistent national surveys of thisgroup by the NBS did not take place until the early years of the 21st C Estimates for thepre-2000 period are less systematic and based on smaller samples and somewhat differentdefinitions The majority of rural migrant laborers are unskilled or low-skilled workers Someof these rural migrants are seasonal and are therefore prone to move between the city and thecountryside 2ndash3 times in a year They are also harder to be enumerated using standard popu-lation counting procedures4
Series F and G F is an estimate of those carrying rural-hukou but staying in the urbanarea The number is computed as the difference between the de facto urban population (SeriesH) and the lsquononagricultural-hukou populationrsquo published by the Ministry of Public SecurityThe latter is commonly considered as the urban-hukou population (see Table 1 in Chan2012a) Series F is closely related to Series E broadly the former is the sum of E (ruralmigrant laborers) and their dependents (non-working population) Series F also overlaps withthe urban population without local hukou to a large extent The latter figure in 2010 asreported by NPFPC (2011) for instance is 221million which is very close to the figure in Ffor the same year (206million) G is F expressed as a percentage of H
Urban Population Series (H) This is added here to show the growth of the urban popula-tion an important metric of Chinarsquos urbanization This de facto urban population is the com-mon perhaps only statistic of lsquourban populationrsquo known at the national level in almost allcountries in the world In China however there are multiple series of lsquourban populationrsquoincluding several defined based exclusively on the de jure population counts (see Chan 20072012a)5 The series presented here refers to the number of people counted based on a de factocriterion6
3 Trends and geography of migration since 1982
Based on the figures presented in Table 1 one can identify some broad migration trends Theannual number of hukou migrants recorded by the Ministry of Public Security remained
192 KW Chan
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relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
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Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
196 KW Chan
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
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embe
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12
belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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Table
1Major
aggregatemigratio
nandurbanpo
pulatio
nstatistics19
82ndash2011(inmillions)
HukouMigrants
(Yearlyflow
figures)
Non
-HukouPop
ulation
(Stock
figures)
Defactopopulatio
nin
urbanareas
lsquoTem
porary
Populationrsquo
lsquoRural
Migrant
Laborrsquo
Rural-hukou
populatio
nin
urbanareas
Policestatistics
Registeredwith
MPS(m
id-year)
NationalCensusesMini-Censuses
NBSestim
ates
basedon
samplesurveys
Authorrsquosestim
ates
NBSstatistics
Geographicboundary
(tocross)
Citytownor
township
Township-
levelunit
Countyor
city
Tow
nship
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Minim
umlength
ofstay
(for
those
with
outlocalhukou)
Nominim
um3days
6months
6months(unless
otherw
isespecified)
Away
foroutsidework
(for
6monthsor
more)
6months
6months
Series
AB
CD
EF
G(
)H
1982
1730
66(1year)
465
217
2145
1987
1973
152
a260
c640
231
2767
1990
1924
216
(1year)
663
220
3020
1995
1846
497
291
b750
694
197
3517
2000
1908
448
1444
1210
1366
298
4591
2001
1701
551
1486
309
4806
2002
1722
598
1047
1528
304
5021
2003
1726
699
1139
1495
285
5238
2004
1949
780
1182
1514
279
5428
2005
1933
867
1531
1258
1531
272
5621
2006
2060
953
1321
1564
271
5771
2007
2084
1044
1370
1630
275
5938
2008
1892
1166
1404
1670
275
6067
2009
1677
1222
1453
1716
276
6219
2010
1701
1314
2614
2214
1534
2056
309
6656
2011
1554
1586
6908
Notes
andsources
MPS=Ministryof
Public
Security
NBS=NationalBureauof
Statistics
a the
geographic
boundary
isbasedon
citycounty
ortown
bthegeographic
boundary
isbasedon
county-level
units
c refersto
1988
AMPS(1988ndash
2010)NBSamp
MPS(1988)BMPS(1997ndash
2011)C
andDNBS(1988)SC
ampNBS(1985
1993200220072012)andNPSSO
(1997)E2002
ndash2008figuresarefrom
NBS
compliedby
Cai
andChan(2009
Table1)2009
ndash2011figuresarefrom
NBS(2010
2011
and2012a)Earlierfiguresareestim
ates
inLuet
al(2002)
andthey
may
notbe
fully
comparableto
recent
NBSfiguresFEstim
ates
derivedfrom
Chan(2012aTable1)GFexpressedas
apercentage
ofHHNBSfigurescompiledby
Chan(2012a)2011
figure
isfrom
Ma(2012)
190 KW Chan
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embe
r 20
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higher reaching 230 million in 2011 (NPFPC 2012) Again to put the number in perspec-tive the total number of international migrants is estimated by the United Nations (2012Table 1) to be 214 million in 2010 which is smaller than Chinarsquos non-hukou population inurban areas The rapid expansion of Chinarsquos essentially disenfranchised population primarilyin urban areas has become its hallmark in the last quarter century
Based on the above two broad categories of migrants can thus be identified in China(Chan Liu amp Yang 1999)
(a) Migration with lsquolocalrsquo residency rights (hereafter hukou migration) This is usuallyopen only to a select group (currently the rich or the highly educated) and immediatefamily members of residents with local hukou (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
(b) Migration without hukou residency rights (non-hukou migration)
Officially only hukou migration is considered qianyi (migration) Migrants in that categoryare eligible for the same array of social benefits and rights other local residents have Othertypes of moves are considered renkou liudong (population movements or lsquofloatingrsquo popula-tion) implying a lsquotemporaryrsquo move to a destination where the person is not supposed to andis legally not entitled to stay permanently Chinarsquos exceptionally large numbers of peoplemoving internally as well as the circulatory and temporary nature of some of them havehugely complicated the efforts to measure the movement consistently and to address accu-rately its many implications (Chan 2007 2012b)
Based on the above understanding and a careful differentiation of migration urbanizationand hukou statistics gleaned from a variety of sources and surveys2 in accordance with theirnature (flow or stock) and temporal and geographic coverage a matrix set up in Table 1allows us to make good sense of those numbers and gain an understanding the overall vol-ume of migration its variety and trends in the last 30 years Despite the diverse sources andthe varying quality of these data sets when analyzed side by side they not only becomemeaningful and useful information but also display some notable broad consistencies asexplained next
Hukou Migrants Series (A) This series refers to hukou migrants and is the only lsquoflowrsquodata series presented in Table 1 The figures refer to the number of in-migrants who are for-mally granted hukou status in the destination (city town and township) each year The dataare from Ministry of Public Security They represent the total number of all types officiallyapproved changes in hukou (residence) within a particular year from townships to cities fromcities to cities from townships to townships etc most probably excluding moves within cit-ies towns and within townships A portion of hukou migration is rural-to-rural migrationmainly involving marriage
Non-Hukou Population Series (Series BndashG) This refers to the people staying in anadministrative unit (usually city town street or township) other than their place of hukouregistration This group is also commonly known as the liudong renkou (floating population)The lsquofloating populationrsquo is not the de jure population In some cases (such as Shenzhen) thesize of the floating population is far larger than that of the de jure population (Chan 2009b)The non-hukou population series are migrant lsquostockrsquo figures ie the number of non-hukoumigrants who reside in a certain locale at a given point in time
Owing to the different purposes coverage and criteria used in defining the geographicboundary and the minimum duration of stay the statistics for the non-hukou population ineach series may be expectedly quite different even for the same year
Series B This is a systematic series of non-hukou population based on actual registrationstatistics kept by the Ministry of Public Security By law anyone staying in places other than
Migration and Development 191
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hisher place of household registration for three days or more is required to register with thepolice and apply for a zanzhu zheng (temporary resident permit) Consequently this group isalso categorized as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (zanzhu renkou) by the police authorities In real-ity a large number of lsquofloatersrsquo fail to comply with this requirement that helps to explain partof the large discrepancies between Series B and C
Series C and D These are statistics collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)through censuses and mini-censuses (1 national surveys) The population is definedbasically on a de facto basis The de facto definition stipulates a minimum residence require-ment (6months or one year) to define a changzhu population (de facto resident population)the residence period is far longer than the one used in Series B The series are also commonlyreferred to as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (Yang 1996) although many in this group stay farlonger that what would commonly be considered as lsquotemporaryrsquo These two series howeverexclude the truly temporary such as tourists and shorter-term migrant workers Because Calso includes people moving within the same cities who are not truly lsquonon-hukou populationrsquoas we generally understand it D is the better statistic for representing the non-hukoupopulation
Series E This series refers to what is known as lsquorural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong)which is the largest constituent group of the non-hukou population This group includes onlythe working population with rural-hukou (and without local hukou in the destination)3 almostall of them work in cities and towns and are away from home villages for usually six monthsor more The figures are estimates based on large-scale sample surveys conducted in the ruralareas Despite this grouprsquos importance systematic and consistent national surveys of thisgroup by the NBS did not take place until the early years of the 21st C Estimates for thepre-2000 period are less systematic and based on smaller samples and somewhat differentdefinitions The majority of rural migrant laborers are unskilled or low-skilled workers Someof these rural migrants are seasonal and are therefore prone to move between the city and thecountryside 2ndash3 times in a year They are also harder to be enumerated using standard popu-lation counting procedures4
Series F and G F is an estimate of those carrying rural-hukou but staying in the urbanarea The number is computed as the difference between the de facto urban population (SeriesH) and the lsquononagricultural-hukou populationrsquo published by the Ministry of Public SecurityThe latter is commonly considered as the urban-hukou population (see Table 1 in Chan2012a) Series F is closely related to Series E broadly the former is the sum of E (ruralmigrant laborers) and their dependents (non-working population) Series F also overlaps withthe urban population without local hukou to a large extent The latter figure in 2010 asreported by NPFPC (2011) for instance is 221million which is very close to the figure in Ffor the same year (206million) G is F expressed as a percentage of H
Urban Population Series (H) This is added here to show the growth of the urban popula-tion an important metric of Chinarsquos urbanization This de facto urban population is the com-mon perhaps only statistic of lsquourban populationrsquo known at the national level in almost allcountries in the world In China however there are multiple series of lsquourban populationrsquoincluding several defined based exclusively on the de jure population counts (see Chan 20072012a)5 The series presented here refers to the number of people counted based on a de factocriterion6
3 Trends and geography of migration since 1982
Based on the figures presented in Table 1 one can identify some broad migration trends Theannual number of hukou migrants recorded by the Ministry of Public Security remained
192 KW Chan
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relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
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Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
196 KW Chan
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
198 KW Chan
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12
the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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12
belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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higher reaching 230 million in 2011 (NPFPC 2012) Again to put the number in perspec-tive the total number of international migrants is estimated by the United Nations (2012Table 1) to be 214 million in 2010 which is smaller than Chinarsquos non-hukou population inurban areas The rapid expansion of Chinarsquos essentially disenfranchised population primarilyin urban areas has become its hallmark in the last quarter century
Based on the above two broad categories of migrants can thus be identified in China(Chan Liu amp Yang 1999)
(a) Migration with lsquolocalrsquo residency rights (hereafter hukou migration) This is usuallyopen only to a select group (currently the rich or the highly educated) and immediatefamily members of residents with local hukou (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
(b) Migration without hukou residency rights (non-hukou migration)
Officially only hukou migration is considered qianyi (migration) Migrants in that categoryare eligible for the same array of social benefits and rights other local residents have Othertypes of moves are considered renkou liudong (population movements or lsquofloatingrsquo popula-tion) implying a lsquotemporaryrsquo move to a destination where the person is not supposed to andis legally not entitled to stay permanently Chinarsquos exceptionally large numbers of peoplemoving internally as well as the circulatory and temporary nature of some of them havehugely complicated the efforts to measure the movement consistently and to address accu-rately its many implications (Chan 2007 2012b)
Based on the above understanding and a careful differentiation of migration urbanizationand hukou statistics gleaned from a variety of sources and surveys2 in accordance with theirnature (flow or stock) and temporal and geographic coverage a matrix set up in Table 1allows us to make good sense of those numbers and gain an understanding the overall vol-ume of migration its variety and trends in the last 30 years Despite the diverse sources andthe varying quality of these data sets when analyzed side by side they not only becomemeaningful and useful information but also display some notable broad consistencies asexplained next
Hukou Migrants Series (A) This series refers to hukou migrants and is the only lsquoflowrsquodata series presented in Table 1 The figures refer to the number of in-migrants who are for-mally granted hukou status in the destination (city town and township) each year The dataare from Ministry of Public Security They represent the total number of all types officiallyapproved changes in hukou (residence) within a particular year from townships to cities fromcities to cities from townships to townships etc most probably excluding moves within cit-ies towns and within townships A portion of hukou migration is rural-to-rural migrationmainly involving marriage
Non-Hukou Population Series (Series BndashG) This refers to the people staying in anadministrative unit (usually city town street or township) other than their place of hukouregistration This group is also commonly known as the liudong renkou (floating population)The lsquofloating populationrsquo is not the de jure population In some cases (such as Shenzhen) thesize of the floating population is far larger than that of the de jure population (Chan 2009b)The non-hukou population series are migrant lsquostockrsquo figures ie the number of non-hukoumigrants who reside in a certain locale at a given point in time
Owing to the different purposes coverage and criteria used in defining the geographicboundary and the minimum duration of stay the statistics for the non-hukou population ineach series may be expectedly quite different even for the same year
Series B This is a systematic series of non-hukou population based on actual registrationstatistics kept by the Ministry of Public Security By law anyone staying in places other than
Migration and Development 191
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hisher place of household registration for three days or more is required to register with thepolice and apply for a zanzhu zheng (temporary resident permit) Consequently this group isalso categorized as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (zanzhu renkou) by the police authorities In real-ity a large number of lsquofloatersrsquo fail to comply with this requirement that helps to explain partof the large discrepancies between Series B and C
Series C and D These are statistics collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)through censuses and mini-censuses (1 national surveys) The population is definedbasically on a de facto basis The de facto definition stipulates a minimum residence require-ment (6months or one year) to define a changzhu population (de facto resident population)the residence period is far longer than the one used in Series B The series are also commonlyreferred to as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (Yang 1996) although many in this group stay farlonger that what would commonly be considered as lsquotemporaryrsquo These two series howeverexclude the truly temporary such as tourists and shorter-term migrant workers Because Calso includes people moving within the same cities who are not truly lsquonon-hukou populationrsquoas we generally understand it D is the better statistic for representing the non-hukoupopulation
Series E This series refers to what is known as lsquorural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong)which is the largest constituent group of the non-hukou population This group includes onlythe working population with rural-hukou (and without local hukou in the destination)3 almostall of them work in cities and towns and are away from home villages for usually six monthsor more The figures are estimates based on large-scale sample surveys conducted in the ruralareas Despite this grouprsquos importance systematic and consistent national surveys of thisgroup by the NBS did not take place until the early years of the 21st C Estimates for thepre-2000 period are less systematic and based on smaller samples and somewhat differentdefinitions The majority of rural migrant laborers are unskilled or low-skilled workers Someof these rural migrants are seasonal and are therefore prone to move between the city and thecountryside 2ndash3 times in a year They are also harder to be enumerated using standard popu-lation counting procedures4
Series F and G F is an estimate of those carrying rural-hukou but staying in the urbanarea The number is computed as the difference between the de facto urban population (SeriesH) and the lsquononagricultural-hukou populationrsquo published by the Ministry of Public SecurityThe latter is commonly considered as the urban-hukou population (see Table 1 in Chan2012a) Series F is closely related to Series E broadly the former is the sum of E (ruralmigrant laborers) and their dependents (non-working population) Series F also overlaps withthe urban population without local hukou to a large extent The latter figure in 2010 asreported by NPFPC (2011) for instance is 221million which is very close to the figure in Ffor the same year (206million) G is F expressed as a percentage of H
Urban Population Series (H) This is added here to show the growth of the urban popula-tion an important metric of Chinarsquos urbanization This de facto urban population is the com-mon perhaps only statistic of lsquourban populationrsquo known at the national level in almost allcountries in the world In China however there are multiple series of lsquourban populationrsquoincluding several defined based exclusively on the de jure population counts (see Chan 20072012a)5 The series presented here refers to the number of people counted based on a de factocriterion6
3 Trends and geography of migration since 1982
Based on the figures presented in Table 1 one can identify some broad migration trends Theannual number of hukou migrants recorded by the Ministry of Public Security remained
192 KW Chan
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relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
Dow
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12
Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
198 KW Chan
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
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ded
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Kam
Win
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han]
at 1
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30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
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ded
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Win
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30
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embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
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ded
by [
Kam
Win
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han]
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217
30
Dec
embe
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United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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hisher place of household registration for three days or more is required to register with thepolice and apply for a zanzhu zheng (temporary resident permit) Consequently this group isalso categorized as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (zanzhu renkou) by the police authorities In real-ity a large number of lsquofloatersrsquo fail to comply with this requirement that helps to explain partof the large discrepancies between Series B and C
Series C and D These are statistics collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)through censuses and mini-censuses (1 national surveys) The population is definedbasically on a de facto basis The de facto definition stipulates a minimum residence require-ment (6months or one year) to define a changzhu population (de facto resident population)the residence period is far longer than the one used in Series B The series are also commonlyreferred to as lsquotemporary populationrsquo (Yang 1996) although many in this group stay farlonger that what would commonly be considered as lsquotemporaryrsquo These two series howeverexclude the truly temporary such as tourists and shorter-term migrant workers Because Calso includes people moving within the same cities who are not truly lsquonon-hukou populationrsquoas we generally understand it D is the better statistic for representing the non-hukoupopulation
Series E This series refers to what is known as lsquorural migrant laborrsquo (nongmingong)which is the largest constituent group of the non-hukou population This group includes onlythe working population with rural-hukou (and without local hukou in the destination)3 almostall of them work in cities and towns and are away from home villages for usually six monthsor more The figures are estimates based on large-scale sample surveys conducted in the ruralareas Despite this grouprsquos importance systematic and consistent national surveys of thisgroup by the NBS did not take place until the early years of the 21st C Estimates for thepre-2000 period are less systematic and based on smaller samples and somewhat differentdefinitions The majority of rural migrant laborers are unskilled or low-skilled workers Someof these rural migrants are seasonal and are therefore prone to move between the city and thecountryside 2ndash3 times in a year They are also harder to be enumerated using standard popu-lation counting procedures4
Series F and G F is an estimate of those carrying rural-hukou but staying in the urbanarea The number is computed as the difference between the de facto urban population (SeriesH) and the lsquononagricultural-hukou populationrsquo published by the Ministry of Public SecurityThe latter is commonly considered as the urban-hukou population (see Table 1 in Chan2012a) Series F is closely related to Series E broadly the former is the sum of E (ruralmigrant laborers) and their dependents (non-working population) Series F also overlaps withthe urban population without local hukou to a large extent The latter figure in 2010 asreported by NPFPC (2011) for instance is 221million which is very close to the figure in Ffor the same year (206million) G is F expressed as a percentage of H
Urban Population Series (H) This is added here to show the growth of the urban popula-tion an important metric of Chinarsquos urbanization This de facto urban population is the com-mon perhaps only statistic of lsquourban populationrsquo known at the national level in almost allcountries in the world In China however there are multiple series of lsquourban populationrsquoincluding several defined based exclusively on the de jure population counts (see Chan 20072012a)5 The series presented here refers to the number of people counted based on a de factocriterion6
3 Trends and geography of migration since 1982
Based on the figures presented in Table 1 one can identify some broad migration trends Theannual number of hukou migrants recorded by the Ministry of Public Security remained
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relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
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Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
194 KW Chan
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
196 KW Chan
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
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Dow
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ded
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g C
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at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
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12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
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ded
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g C
han]
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217
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embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
nloa
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Kam
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han]
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relatively stable hovering between 17 and 21million in the last three decades In fact the rateof hukou migration as a percentage of Chinarsquos total population has declined significantlyfrom 17 in 1982 to only 13 in 2010 Hukou migrants include mainly rural-rural andrural-urban migrants Systematic information about the composition is not available but it isquite sure that hukou conversion for many migrants remains very stringent in especially largecities (Chan amp Buckingham 2008)
On the other hand the non-hukou migrant population ndash no matter how you measure it ndashhas increased rapidly in the last twenty years For example Series D has expanded from about30million in 1995 to 121million in 2000 and increased by another 100million in the first dec-ade of the 21st C The average annual (net) flow of non-hukou migrant population has been onthe rise since the early 1980s Reflecting the same process the number of those in the urbanareas but with rural hukou increased from 66million in 1990 to 205 million in 2010 ndash a jump145millions in two decades As a percentage of the urban population the number increasedfrom 20ndash23 in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to 31 in 2010 (Series G)
Between 1987 and 1995 the average annual increase in the number of people who stayedin a place different from their hukou registration place was less than 2 million (calculationsbased on Series D) This figure surged to about 10million per year in 2000ndash2010 A similarlyupward trend is seen in the number of rural migrant workers The average increase was aboutabout 6million in 2002ndash2011 compared to an annual average of 5million in the previoustwo decades (based on Series E)7 Furthermore the gap both in absolute and relative termsbetween the de facto urban population and those without rural hukou has widened in the last10ndash15 years suggesting a rather disturbing trend that more and more people in cities andtowns fall into the disadvantaged category lsquoin the city but not of the cityrsquo (Chan 2011) Therapid swelling of the non-hukou population in the city coincides with Chinarsquos ascendency tobeing the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo
As far as the geography is concerned these flows are labor migrations in response to dis-parities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and between regions in China (Cai1999 2000 Fan 2005) The lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside inmany agricultural provinces has pushed many rural-hukou workers to leave home They moveto make monetary gains through employment as wage-workers or self-employment Many goto nearby towns outside the villages and most of them move within provinces but about aquarter to one third migrates to big cities on the coast (Chan 2012b)
Drawing on the long-form sample data from Chinarsquos last two censuses and two mini-cen-suses (One Per Cent National Population Surveys) Table 2 provides a summary of the majorinterprovincial migration statistics covering four 5-year periods between 1990 and 2010 forthe population aged 5 and above8 and the aggregate pattern The table permits an examina-tion of the overall pattern of the interprovincial migration flows as well as the changes overtime
As part of the Great Migration interprovincial migration has increased significantly toosince 1990 from only 107 million in 1990ndash1995 to 552 million in 2005ndash20109 Thesecross-province flows are almost totally village-to-city migrations The total interprovincialmigration in those two decades (based on those four 5-year periods) totalled 1363 millionThis number counts more than once of those same interprovincial migrants who moved morethan once in those four periods In 2010 858 million people lived in a place with a hukouregistered in another province compared to only 424 million in 2000 (SC amp NBS 20022012) The doubling of the out-of-province hukou population mirrors the same level ofchange in the overall non-hukou population in the same period (from 121 to 221 million seeD in Table 2)
Migration and Development 193
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Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
196 KW Chan
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
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embe
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12
belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
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Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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Table2
InterprovincialMigratio
nin
China19
90ndash201
0(inthou
sand
s)
Provincial-levelunit
1990
ndash1995
1995
ndash2000
2000
ndash2005
2005
ndash2010
1990
ndash2010
Aggregate
Net
migratio
n
aRank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
Net
migratio
n
Rank
In-m
igratio
nOut-m
igratio
nNet
migratio
n
Rank
Net
Rank
Guangdong
1799
196
111063
343
110281
270
113890
1613
12277
222
135420
249
1Zhejiang
273
30
241745
54
34021
106
28407
1339
7067
128
212560
88
2Shanghai
610
66
22005
62
22650
70
34934
401
4533
82
39798
69
3Beijin
g606
66
31715
53
41916
50
53851
406
3445
62
47682
54
4Jiangsu
319
35
5667
21
71963
52
44895
1894
3002
54
55951
42
5Fujian
104
11
10722
22
61132
30
62515
1114
1401
25
63359
24
6Tianjin
171
19
7388
12
8802
21
71499
213
1286
23
72647
19
7Xinjiang
437
48
4925
29
5395
10
8841
287
554
10
82311
16
8Liaoning
248
27
6375
12
9257
07
91181
685
495
09
91375
10
9Hainan
3804
1288
03
1133
01
10339
236
103
02
11262
02
10Nei
Mongol
159
17
81
160
418
23
01
14829
648
181
03
10201
01
11Ningxia
40
1541
01
137
00
11239
151
8902
12141
01
12Tibet
2703
1335
01
146
00
1292
6229
01
1485
01
13Qinghai
1702
144
60
116
12
00
13183
150
3301
138
00
14Yunnan
104
11
9335
10
101
320
315
632
1089
457
08
161
500
115
Shanxi
8709
1149
02
121
350
416
499
794
295
05
152
940
216
Shandong
90
116
2601
151
990
517
1341
2015
674
12
198
560
617
Jilin
134
15
222
750
919
315
08
18345
854
509
09
171
233
09
18Shaanxi
25
03
172
960
920
572
15
21735
1347
613
11
181
506
11
19Gansu
77
08
203
571
121
376
10
19260
1047
787
14
201
597
11
20Hebei
74
08
191
020
317
378
10
20925
2017
1092
20
211
646
12
21Chongqing
NA
NA
NA
655
20
231
010
27
23737
1844
1107
20
222
772
19
22Heilongjiang
188
20
236
392
022
825
22
22323
1463
1140
21
232
792
20
23Guizhou
107
12
219
703
024
1235
32
24592
2681
2088
38
244
400
31
24Guangxi
450
49
261
551
48
251
726
45
25600
2821
2221
40
255
948
42
25Hubei
44
05
181
604
50
262
214
58
27846
3804
2958
54
276
820
48
26Jiangxi
347
38
252
445
76
281
977
52
26699
3483
2784
50
267
553
53
27Hunan
532
58
282
899
90
302
827
74
28690
4592
3902
71
28 1
0160
71
28Henan
514
56
271
839
57
273
154
83
29432
5430
4999
91
311
0506
74
29Anhui
662
72
292
579
80
293
165
83
30824
5526
4702
85
301
1108
78
30Sichuan
1294b
141b
303
806
118
313
178
84
311055
4988
3933
71
291
2211
86
31To
talinterprovincialmigratio
n10661
32330
38042
55228
136261
Notesa asapercentage
ofthenatio
nrsquostotalinterprovincialmigratio
nbincludes
Chongqing
SourcesNPSSO
(199
7)SCamp
NBS(200
220
0720
12)
194 KW Chan
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
Dow
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han]
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embe
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
196 KW Chan
Dow
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ded
by [
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han]
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embe
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
198 KW Chan
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
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ded
by [
Kam
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han]
at 1
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30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
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Dow
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ded
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Win
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han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
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Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
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Win
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han]
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12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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Table 2 also shows the ranks of the provinces according to the net migration volumes indifferent periods At this level major in-migration and out-migration flows between provincesare largely unidirectional (Chan 2012b) That means the major players in interprovincialflows were essentially either export provinces (such as Sichuan) or import provinces (such asGuangdong) Because of that the net migration statistics can readily capture the importanceof each province in the interprovincial flows
Table 2 arranges provinces by the aggregate volume of net migration in the two decadeswith Guangdong (the largest net importer) topping the list and Sichuan (the largest net expor-ter) at the bottom The predominant flows are from the inland to the coast In Table 2 thetop seven provinces are all from the coast and the bottom eight from the inland This samepattern is also borne out by the latest census data reporting the flows in 2005ndash2010 as inFigure 2 which maps the largest 20 interprovincial flows in that period
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the net in-migration is dominated by two prov-inces Guangdong and Zhejiang They accounted for 35ndash40 of all interprovincial migrationsince 1995 This dominance is also evident in the latest period as illustrated in Figure 2Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial migrants for the entiretwo decades At its peak share in 1995ndash2000 the provincersquos net migration accounted forabout one third of the nationrsquos total interprovincial migration Its share has declined steadilysince 2000 though net migration volume has actually increased The slack has been filled byZhejiang which had a dramatic reversal of role from being a net exporter in 1990ndash1995 tobeing the third largest net importer in 1995ndash2000 and climbed to be the second largestthereafter In the late 20th C the storied Zhejiang migrants were known for their entrepre-neurial skills and ubiquity in the country (and later even in Europe) the high economicgrowth of the province since the mid-1990s has turned it into a major and increasinglypopular destination of migrants in the 21st C
At the sending end there are more plentiful players In 2005ndash2010 there were sevenprovinces with each contributing to 4ndash9 of the total interprovincial migration or more andno single one predominated Sichuan was the largest net exporter of migrants over the twodecades since 1990 (eg in 1990ndash1995 the province outmigration accounted for 1410 ofthe nationrsquos total interprovincial migration) and is no longer so Sichuan dropped to the thirdin net outmigration in 2005ndash2010 In 2000ndash2005 and 2005ndash2010 the share of total migrationfrom the largest four net population exporters (Sichuan Anhui Henan and Hunan) was veryclose (7 to 9) In other words in those 20 years while there was greater convergence ofinterprovincial migration flows into two provinces (Guangdong and Zhejiang) origins ofthese flows became more diverse The changes reflect the intensification of regional industrialrestructuring beginning in the late 1980s whereby inland provinces lost proportionally moremanufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s and onwards(Yang 2004) giving rise to the emergence of Guangdong (and to a less extent Zhejiang) asthe lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo in the last 10 years At the same time many more poor provinces (boththeir governments and people) have actively pursued labor exports as an economic strategymodelled after Sichuan This greater geographic spread of labor migration over longer dis-tances is consistent to what Skeldon (1990) calls the lsquodiffusionrsquo of migration in the case ofPeru
The relative rankings of the provinces over time in Table 2 show remarkable stability in1995 through 2010 Indeed the rankings in 2005ndash2010 are almost exactly the same as thosefor the entire two decades They reflect strongly the economic regional specialization in thatperiod There is a somewhat different picture in the earliest period (1990ndash1995) in Table 2 asdemonstrated by the phenomenal reversal of Zhejiang from a major net exporter in
Migration and Development 195
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
196 KW Chan
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
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embe
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12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
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Win
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at 1
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30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
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ded
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Win
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han]
at 1
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r 20
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Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
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by [
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Win
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han]
at 1
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30
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embe
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United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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1990ndash1995 to a top net importer thereafter Another point worth noting is that there was anoticeable though still small but increasing amount of outmigration from the major netimporters (eg Guangdong) in the first decade of the 21st C often directed towards provincesof origin of the in-migrants such as Hunan Sichuan and Guangxi This outmigration is likelyreturn flows of migrants who came to the coastal cities in the earlier periods
4 Current migrant issues
While the world economy was still mired in recession in 2010 Chinarsquos economy continuedto grow albeit at a slower pace In that year China also overtook Japan to become theworldrsquos second largest economy At present with Europersquos serious debt crisis and the USand Japan struggling to maintain growth many have looked to China as the savior of theworld economy (eg Drysdale 2011) As pointed out before Chinarsquos success in being theworldrsquos factory relies heavily on its own mammoth army of low-cost migrant workers madepossible by its unique hukou system In recent years a series of rather dramatic and signifi-cant events related to migrant labor in China has alerted us to an emerging new reality ndash thatthe ingredients that make the lsquoChina modelrsquo tick may be on the verge of a tectonic change
Figure 2 The 20 largest interprovincial migration flows 2005ndash2010
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
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Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
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r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
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Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
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Win
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han]
at 1
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United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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Moreover the model also looks more fragile than outsiders have portrayed (Chan 2011)These issues have serious implications for both China and for the global economy
41 The global financial crisis and the vulnerability of migrant labor
Occupying the bottom of global supply chain migrant labor was badly hit when the globaleconomy tanked Thousands of factories were closed in Guangdong and Zhejiang as the glo-bal economic crisis unfolded in the open in the last quarter of 2008 and 2009 This led tomassive layoffs of factory workers almost all of whom were migrants without local hukouMany of these factories were folded almost overnight without any warning to their workersand without paying the workers in full and the required severance Guangdongrsquos Dongguanwhich was the core center of Chinarsquos export industry was devastated by the slump Angryworkers staged numerous mass protests demanding full payment of wages and layoff compen-sation Even the international media succeeded in filming and reporting rather unusual scenesof tense confrontations and scuffles with police (Foreman 2008)
Drawing on data from NBS in late March 2009 based mainly on a large national samplesurvey at the end of 2008 Chan (2010d) estimated that the total unemployment of the ruralmigrant labor in early 2009 was about 23million or 164 The sharp loss of 16 of jobsheld by migrants constrasts to only 43 for the urban-hukou workers in formal employmentin March 200911 Indeed more than 95 of the newly laid-off workers in the nonagriculturalsector were rural migrant workers pointing to the extreme vulnerability of this particulargroup Such a situation put China dangerously on the verge of a major crisis (Chan 2010dCsanaacutedi 2010) Fortunately China was able to avert this crisis through implementing agigantic stimulus package and a conciliatory approach to labor disputes by local governments(Csanaacutedi 2010) The massive investment in high-speed train projects for example createdmillions of jobs in 2009 and was able to reemploy some of the laid-off workers fairly quicklyand reverse the situation
42 Shortages of labor and the Lewis turning point (LTP)
As Chinarsquos economy began to recover in the early months of 2010 Chinese factories in afew coastal cities were reported to have difficulties in finding workers to help fill exportorders Some factories in Guangdong resorted to hiring even illegal workers from Vietnamand elsewhere (Sing Tao Daily 2010a) This came as a surprise to many observers becausejust about a year earlier the situation was completely the opposite 23million migrant workerswere laid off as the global financial crisis spread to Chinarsquos manufacturing cities It is alsohard to conceive that severe labor shortages would occur at a time when Chinarsquos working-agepopulation the worldrsquos largest has climbed to a new high (reaching 981million in 2010) andis projected to continue expanding until 2015 (Hu Fang amp Du 2010 Kroeber 2010) Theshortages and the abundance appear to be rather contradictory
Furthermore in May 2010 the world was also shocked by news of a serial tragedyrelated to the treatment of labor in Chinarsquos famed export-processing zones A total of 14ndash16suicide attempts of migrant workers (resulting in 12 deaths) took place in just the first fivemonths of the year in a single giant factory complex Foxconn in Shenzhen the worldrsquos larg-est assembler of electronic products12 for major brand names such as Apple Dell and Toshiba(Moore 2010) The mediarsquos frantic reports have revealed to the world a great deal moreabout the harsh conditions experienced by young Chinese migrant workers13 In the sameweek as Foxconn moved into damage-control mode by offering raises of about 25 to work-
Migration and Development 197
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
198 KW Chan
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
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at 1
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embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
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ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
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Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
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ded
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at 1
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Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
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by [
Kam
Win
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at 1
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30
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embe
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United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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ers multiple serious strikes took place at several Honda assembly plants in the nearby citiesof Foshan and Zhongshan in the Pearl River Delta Those strikes ended after two to threeweeks with the workers winning 10ndash30 raises but they were not the last ones workers atanother Honda subsidiary in Foshan went on strike in July and later (Sing Tao Daily 2010b)
The increasing wages and the militancy of the migrant workers have led both the Chineseand international media in late 2010 to pronounce a labor lsquoshortagersquo and lsquothe end of surpluslaborrsquo in China (eg Demick amp Pierson 2010) More critically some observers have arguedthat China has reached a LTP (Hamlin 2010 Zhang Yang amp Wang 2010)
The LTP hypothesized by Nobel laureate Arthur Lewis (1954) is the point when thedualistic rural-urban labor market in a country begins to break down and merge into one It isalso the point where a labor surplus economy is transformed into a full-employment lsquonormalrsquoeconomy (Huang amp Jiang 2010) According to Lewis a developing countryrsquos industrialwages begin to rise quickly at that point when the supply of surplus labor from its rural areastapers off In the case of China reaching this point would signal that its notorious and tena-cious dualistic rural-urban socioeconomic structure which has existed for the entire six dec-ades of the Peoplersquos Republic era and which is the root cause of a host of social andeconomic ills is beginning to end Reaching the LTP would bring real hopes of closing thehuge rural-urban economic and social chasm in China in the near future And obviously thesignificance of the change would extend far beyond China as the country is the worldrsquos larg-est exporter (Garnaut 2010 Huang amp Jiang 2010)
However it is clear that there is still an abundance not a shortage of surplus rural laborin the country (see eg Yao 2010) This is seemingly a China paradox of migrant laborshortages amidst rural labor supply abundance According to some authors (eg Green 2008Han Cui amp Fan 2009) rural labor supply remains plentiful and the rural sector is stillgrossly overstaffed Rural labor surplus is estimated to be in the order of about 100millionalmost totally in the age group 35 and above at the end of the last decade14 This paradoxcan be explained by reference to Chinarsquos special socioeconomic contexts which are oftenoverlooked in the literature
First because of the lack of local hukou migrant workers are in a weak bargaining posi-tion employers in the export industry are able to lsquocherry-pickrsquo workers with the most lsquodesir-able attributesrsquo ndash often in stark Dickensian terms the physical abilities of young workerssuch as easily trainable dexterity to handle fast-paced sometimes military-style repetitiveassembly work (especially in electronics industry) and endurance for longer hours of work(routine overtime work daily and often for 28ndash29 days per month) and lsquowork attitudesrsquo suchas obedience and capacity for long periods of residence in dormitories or barrack-type shelters(Chan 2001a Lee 1998 Pun 2005) These qualities are mainly found in young mostlyunmarried workers Indeed the great majority of Foxconnrsquos employees in China fit very wellthe above description As a result rural migrant labor hired in the export sector falls over-whelmingly in a highly selective age cohort between ages 16 and 30 with new workers hiredtypically before they reach 20 With their good eyesight and high manual dexterity and toler-ance of dormitory-type environment combined with the increasing prevalence of educationbeyond elementary school in the countryside young rural migrants are more educated thantheir predecessors and better suited for assembling modern electronics which often involvessmall parts and exacting specifications
Secondly Chinarsquos 30-year long one-child policy has also depressed fertility The annualsupply of young rural labor has dropped by about 40 in the last ten years from about 18million to only 11 million (Chan 2010b p 520) Moreover the rather deplorable (mis)treat-ments of migrant labor by employers during the global crisis times in the Pearl River Deltaand Zhejiang also discouraged some of the rural migrants from coming back to seek work in
198 KW Chan
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
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at 1
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embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
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Win
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r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
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ded
by [
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Win
g C
han]
at 1
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30
Dec
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r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
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ded
by [
Kam
Win
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han]
at 1
217
30
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embe
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United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
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the coastal region later even when jobs were available In other words some were simplynot eager to return to the highly exploitative grind of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo This had the effectof reducing the labor supply that otherwise would have been available for those factories Atthe same time the general improvement in rural economic conditions in the inland region inthe last few years owing to the policy taken by the Hu-Wen administration (Chan amp Wang2008) and especially the millions of new jobs created by the fiscal stimulus package in 2009in projects such as high-speed rails in the interior also kept many young rural laborers closerto home Overall labor shortages have happened in specific age segments and are mostlyconfined to the coastal region There is still an immense rural labor surplus in the range of80ndash100million With dwindling supply of young migrant workers interprovincial flows fromthe inland to the coast may slow down in the coming years
43 The lsquosecond generation migrantsrsquo and social unrest
In recent years rural laborers tend to exit the countryside for the first time in the young adultages much earlier than their predecessors These young migrants are dubbed lsquosecond-genera-tion migrantsrsquo in the literature being born between 1980 and 1995 (Liu Cheng amp Dong2009) According to an authoritative report compiled by Chinarsquos All-China Federation ofTrade Unions (ACFTU 2010) the average age of first departure from the countryside ofthose born in the 1980s and 1990s was 18 and 16 respectively This lsquosecond-generationrsquocohort is the source from which the export industry draws heavily its workforce
Being younger and better educated than their parents this new cohort of migrantworkers has also greater aspirations to stay in the city They are also far more aware oftheir rights and what unsatisfactory conditions they face than the previous generation ndashand are demanding change These demands have often translated into lsquocollective actionrsquoof protests and social unrest which has become more prevalent since 2000 Indeed themigrants have many grievances ranging from unpaid wages unfair treatments and brutal-ity of police against migrants (Hasija 2012) These conflicts are often played out on thebackdrop of stark economic social and institutional divide between migrants and localsHowever the support from family government and social organizations is almost totallylacking Many migrants feel that government officials police and security personnel dis-criminate against them Lacking local hukou migrants cannot access the basic package ofurban services (including education for their children especially beyond middle school)and urban social housing The great difficulty of finding affordable family housing pre-cludes the family moving into the city as one cohesive unit Many married couples areoften separated from spouses and children
In recent years there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China every year Many ofthem are organized by migrants Some recent demonstrations and riots such as those inZengcheng (2011) Chaozhou (2011) and Zhongshan (2012) all in Guangdong have alsoturned violent (Buckley amp Pomfret 2012) It is clear that there is a lot of pent-up angeramong this new generation of migrant workers If these frustrations cannot be diverted theywill pose a serious threat to Chinarsquos social and political stability Worryingly China does notappear to be able to address these grievances satisfactorily under its current labor manage-ment and the hukou systems (Butollo amp ten Brink 2012)
5 Concluding remarks
The volume of internal migration in China has increased steadily since the early 1980s AsChinarsquos urbanized rapidly rural-urban migration also accelerated in the first half of the 1990s
Migration and Development 199
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and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
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han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
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at 1
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r 20
12
and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century While the volume of annual hukoumigration remained quite stable in the last 30 years non-hukou migration has expandedsignificantly lsquoRural migrant workersrsquo numbering at 1667million in mid-2012 are the majorconstituent group of non-hukou migrants whose size reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS2012b SC amp NBS 2012) This Great Migration has supplied China with a mammoth armyof low-cost human labor to power its economic machine
Data in Table 1 show that the annual average net increase of the rural migrant laborin latest decade was about 6million compared to an annual average of about 4million inthe 1990s Because of the rapid industrial growth since Chinarsquos accession to the WTOlsquoshortagesrsquo of migrant labor began to surface in 2004 in the Pearl River Delta wheredoubt-digit industrial growth was recorded every year until 200815 Global financial eventssince the summer of 2008 however have drastically altered the economic landscape ofthe Chinese export industry at least temporarily where most migrant labor was employedAbout 23million migrant workers lost their jobs in late 2008-early 2009 but Chinarsquos mas-sive fiscal stimulus program was able to create many jobs (especially in the constructionsector such as building railways) and helped re-absorb most of the unemployed As Chi-narsquos export sector recovered in early 2010 migrant labor lsquoshortagersquo has resurfaced in thecoastal region partly also because major manufacturers have also relocated some of theirplants to the inland However the shortage is limited to the cohort of age 16ndash35 there isenormous surplus labor in the older age in the countryside
Long-distance interprovincial migration has also increased rapidly since the early 1990sspurred by significant wage differentials between inland provinces and coastal provinces wheremajor centers of industrial growth are located Guangdong which has since the early 1990srisen to become the core of the lsquoworldrsquos factoryrsquo is the major hub of long-distance migrantsOver time the number of inland provinces from which large numbers of labor migrants origi-nate has also increased In fact the idea of migrating long-distance for a better job has gainedpopularity over time in many provinces including those in the West region of China The ris-ing internal migration trends in the 1990s are also associated with the trends of narrowing eco-nomic disparities among provinces at least in statistical terms if not in substantive terms(Chan amp Wang 2008)16 Migration has helped alleviated poverty in the countryside but sim-ply migration is not enough when institutionalized exclusion and discrimination through thehukou system remains effective
The hukou system is a major hurdle in narrowing rural-urban and inland-coastal inequali-ties The various hukou reform initiatives launched in the last decades have so far onlymarginally weakened the foundation of that exclusionary system ie the separation of twosegments of the population and the discrimination against the rural segment (Chan ampBuckingham 2008) Greater strides on implementing the hukou reform and ultimately abol-ishing the system are needed This is especially urgent as more women and children fromthe countryside participate in migration to cities and are staying for increasingly long periodsof time Non-hukou residents in cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access toreasonable education health care services social security and housing in addition to the gen-eral discrimination they face in the city
Several recent events ndash the serial suicide attempts of migrant workers at Foxconn inShenzhen industrial strikes by migrant workers in several automobile plants and frequentprotest and riots involving migrants ndash have not only highlighted the plight of young lsquosecond-generationsrsquo migrant workers but are also strong signs of rising yearning of migrants to fightfor better pays and rights These migrant issues remain crucial for China to tackle in the post-financial crisis era Further delays in responding to these demands would be far more costlyThose events also suggest that the low lsquoChina pricersquo that the world has been accustomed to is
200 KW Chan
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ded
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Win
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at 1
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30
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belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
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ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
belatedly rising If lsquoMade in Chinarsquo is getting more expensive the global economy will haveto take note too
Notes on contributorKam Wing Chan is Professor in Geography at the University of Washington His research focuses onChinarsquos migrant labor and urbanization
Notes1 The description of Chinarsquos hukou system draws heavily on Chan (2009a) and Chan (2010a)2 Some of these data were collected at the destination others at the origin (mainly villages)3 A broader definition of lsquorural migrant laborrsquo which is not used here includes also those who work
in township and village enterprises within the same township This group was estimated to be about80 million in 2009 (NBS 2010)
4 They are similar to the lsquocirculating populationrsquo studied by Chapman amp Prothero (1985) before5 This has led to multiple layers of misunderstanding and confusion in the literature see especially
Chan (2007 2010c) Chan and Wang (2008)6 In the last two censuses (2000 and 2010) de facto resident counts include those without local hukou
but staying at the destination for more than 6 months7 There was a slowdown in the rural outflows in the second half of the 1990s See Chan and Hu
(2003)8 The 1990ndash2005 statistics are compiled by Chan (2012a) the 2005ndash2010 statistics are estimates
computed from the 2010 Census long-form data in SC amp NBS (2012 Tables 7 and 8) based on thesample percentage (10) The accuracy of Chinarsquos population and migration counts is a rather com-plex issue deserving further research On this issue pertaining to 2000 Census see Chan (2003)
9 Some of the increases are attributable to the changes in definitions and procedures used for collect-ing the data but the bulk of the increase is real
10 This was partly because Chongqing was split from the Sichuan province in 199711 For the urban-hukou group the unemployment rate only inched up by 06 million from the 40 in
September 2008 (Cai amp Chan 2009 Chan 2010d)12 Foxconn employed about 800000 workers in China in 2010 with 400000 at the complex in
Shenzhen (Barboza 2010)13 Foxconn is known for its military-style efficiency and strict rule-based management of labor
(Barboza 2010) See also a detailed investigative report about the factory by Chang (2010)14 Chinarsquos rural labor force is estimated to be about 360 million in 2010 Excluding the 80 million
who work in non-farm jobs in nearby townships the remaining 280 million on the farm is still fargreater than can be absorbed by Chinarsquos 120 million ha of arable land Many estimates done before2009 show that the minimum work force needed to sustain Chinarsquos agriculture at the then level oftechnology was about 150 million (eg Green 2008 Han et al 2009) Higher numbers are used byothers such as Cai and Wang (2009 Table 72) they range from 178 million to 228 million Forcomparison the US employs about 10 million farm workers (illegal migrant workers included) on atotal acreage slightly more than Chinarsquos (see DeSilver 2006)
15 In Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta the average growth rate of migrant labor reached an extraor-dinary level of 18 per year in 2000ndash2004 (Dongguan Statistical Bureau nd)
16 See further comments at httpwwweastasiaforumorg20120812rising-regional-inequality-in-china-fact-or-artefact
ReferencesAll-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2010) Quanzong guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong
wenti de yanjiu baogao [Research report on the problems of the new generation of rural migrantlabor] Retrieved from httpwwwchinanewscomcngnnews201006ndash212353235shtml
Barboza D (2010 May 26) Electronics maker promises review after suicides The New York TimesRetrieved from httpwwwnytimescom20100527technology27suicidehtml
Buckley C amp Pomfret J (2012 July 7) China migrant unrest exposes generational faultline ReutersJune 29 2012 Retrieved from httpinreuterscomarticle20110629idINIndia-57978320110629
Migration and Development 201
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Butollo F amp ten Brink T (2012) Challenging the atomization of discontent Patterns of migrant-worker protest in China during the series of strikes in 2010 Critical Asian Studies 44(3) 419ndash440
Cai F (1999) Spatial patterns of migration under Chinarsquos reform period Asian and Pacific MigrationJournal 8(3) 313ndash327
Cai F (2000) Zhongguo liudong renkou [Floating Population in China] Zhengzhou Henan RenminChubanshe
Cai F amp Chan K W (2009) The global economic crisis and unemployment in China EurasianGeography and Economics 50 513ndash531
Cai F amp Wang M (2009) The counterfactuals of unlimited surplus labor in rural China In F Cai ampY Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approaching lewis turningpoint and its policy implications (pp 121ndash136) Leiden Brill
Chan KW (1994) Cities with invisible walls Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China HongKong Oxford University Press
Chan A (2001a) Chinarsquos workers under assault The exploitation of labour in a globalizing economyArmonk NY ME Sharpe
Chan K W (2001b) Recent migration in China Patterns trends and policies Asian Perspectives 25(4) 127ndash155
Chan K W (2003) Chinese census 2000 New opportunities and challenges The China Review 3(2)1ndash12
Chan K W (2007) Misconceptions and complexities in the study of Chinarsquos cities Definitions statis-tics and implications Eurasian Geography and Economics 48(4) 382ndash412
Chan K W (2009a) The Chinese hukou system at 50 Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(2)197ndash221
Chan K W (2009b) Measuring the urban millions China Economic Quarterly March 21ndash26Chan K W (2010a) The Chinese household registration system and migrant labor in China Notes on
a debate Population and Development Review 36(2) 357ndash364Chan K W (2010b) A China paradox migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51 513ndash530Chan K W (2010c) Dangqian zhongguo de chengzhen renkou tongji wenti jiqi du jingji fenxi de
yingxiang [Chinarsquos city population statistics and implications for economic analysis] In F Cai YDu amp Z Zhang (Eds) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash Hou jinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Reports on Chinarsquos population and labor No 11 ndash Labor marketchallenges in the post-crisis era] (pp 236ndash247) Beijing Social Science Academic Press
Chan K W (2010d) The global financial crisis and migrant workers in China There is no future as alabourer returning to the village has no meaning International Journal of Urban and RegionalResearch 34(3) 659ndash677
Chan K W (2011) Urban myth South China Morning Post August 24 p A13Chan K W (2012a) Crossing the 50 percent population Rubicon Can China urbanize to prosperity
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(1) 63ndash86Chan K W (2012b) Internal labor migration in China Trends geography and policies In United
Nations Population Division Population distribution urbanization internal migration and develop-ment An international perspective (pp 81ndash102) New York NY United Nations
Chan K W amp Buckingham W (2008) Is China abolishing the hukou system China Quarterly 195582ndash606
Chan K W amp Hu Y (2003) Urbanization in China in the 1990s New definition different series andrevised trends The China Review 3(2) 49ndash71
Chan K W Liu T amp Yang Y (1999) Hukou and non-hukou migration Comparisons and contrastsInternational Journal of Population Geography 5(6) 425ndash448
Chapman M amp Prothero R M (Eds) (1985) Circulation in population movement Substance andconcepts from the Melanesian case London Routlege amp Kegan Paul
Chan K W amp Wang M (2008) Remapping Chinarsquos regional inequalities 1990ndash2006 A new assess-ment of de facto and de jure population data Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1) 21ndash56
Chang C (2010 May 20) Undercover report from Foxconnrsquos hell factory Gizmodo AustraliaRetrieved from httpwwwgizmodocomau201005undercover-report-from-foxconns-hell-factory
Csanaacutedi M (2010) Institutional reactions to the impact of global crisis at source and destination citiesof migration in China Budapest Hungary Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of SciencesDiscussion Paper MT-DP 201013
202 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Demick B amp Pierson D (2010 March 28) People people everywhere in China and not enough towork Los Angeles Times Retrieved from httparticleslatimescom2010mar28worldla-fgchina-labor28-2010mar28
DeSilver D (2006) Low-paid illegal work force has little impact on prices Seattle Times September19 2006 Retrieved from httpseattletimesnwsourcecomhtmllocalnews2003265139_imprices19html
Dongguan Statistical Bureau (nd) Retrieved from httptjjdggovcnwebsitewebzhctjnj2005TJNJ02sheet004htm
Drysdale P (2011 November 28) South Asia and Asiarsquos middle-class future East Asia ForumRetrieved from httpwwweastasiaforumorg20111128south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future
Fan C C (2005) Modelling interprovincial migration in China 1985ndash2000 Eurasian Geography andEconomics 46(3) 165ndash184
Fan C C (2008) China on the move Migration the state and the household New York NY RoutledgeForeman W (2008 December 20) Restless migrants challenge order in difficult economy Post-Intelli-
gencerGarnaut R (2010 April 6) Macro-economic implications of the turning point Paper presented at Inter-
national Workshop on Debating the Lewis Turning Point in China Beijing ChinaGreen S (2008 January 14) On the worldrsquos factory floor How Chinarsquos workers are changing China
and the global economy Standard Chartered Special ReportHamlin K (2010) China reaching a Lewis turning point as inflation overtakes low-cost labor Bloom-
berg News Retrieved from httpwwwbloombergcomappsnewspid=20601068ampsid=aOEXbd09bloM
Han J Cui C amp Fan A (2009) Rural labor-force allocation report-an investigation of 2749 villagesIn F Cai amp Y Du (Eds) The China population and labor yearbook volume 1 The approachingLewis turning point and its policy implications (pp 137ndash152) Leiden Brill
Harney A (2008) The China price The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage London PenguinBooks
Hasija N (2012 Jan 17) Migrant unrest in China An analysis (IPCS Special Report 119) New DelhiHu Y Fang C amp Du Y (2010) Shierwu shiqi renkou bianhua ji weilai renkou fazhan qushi yuce
[Population changes and forecast of population development trend in lsquothe Twelfth Five-Year-Planrsquoperiod] In F Cai (Ed) Zhongguo renkou yu laodong wenti baogao No11 ndash houjinrong weiji shiqide laodongli shichang tiaozhan [Report on Chinese population and labor problem No11 ndash Chal-lenge of the labor market in the post-financial crisis period] (pp 48ndash77) Beijing Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe
Huang Y amp Jiang T (2010) What does the Lewis turning point mean for China Beijing China Cen-ter for Economic Research Peking University Working Paper Series 2010-03
Kroeber A (2010) The end of surplus labor China Economic Quarterly 1 35ndash46Lee C K (1998) Gender and the south China miracle Berkeley University of California PressLewis W A (1954) Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies 22 139ndash191Liang Z (1999) Foreign investment economic growth and temporary migration The case of Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone China Development and Society 28(1) 115ndash137Liang Z (2007) Internal migration Policy changes recent trends and new challenges In Z Zhao amp
F Guo (Eds) Transition and challenge Chinarsquos population at the beginning of the 21st century(pp 197ndash215) Oxford Oxford University Press
Liu T amp Chan K W (2001) Internal migration in China and its database An assessment ChinaInformation 15(2) 75ndash113
Liu C Cheng J amp Dong Y (2009) Zhongguo dierdai nongmingong yanjiu [Research on Chinarsquos sec-ond-generation rural migrant labor] Shangdong renmin chubanshe
Lu M Zhao S amp Bai N (2002) Woguo nongmingong laodongli liudong di huigu yu yuce [The pastand future of the movement of the rural labor force in China] In M Hong amp W Mengkui (Eds)Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu [China development studies] (pp 555ndash587) Beijing Zhongguo chubanshe
Ma J (2012) National economy maintained steady and fast development in the year of 2011 httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishnewsandcomingeventst20120117_402779577htm
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) (1988ndash2010) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo fenxianshi ren-kou tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on population of counties and cities of the Peoplersquos Republicof China] Beijing Qunzhong
Migration and Development 203
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Household Administration Bureau (1997ndash2011) Quanguo zanzhurenkou tongti ziliao huibian [Collection of statistical materials on temporary population in China]Beijing Zhongguo gongan daxue chubanshe
Moore M (2010 May 27) Inside Foxconnrsquos suicide factory Telegraph Retrieved from httpwwwtele-graph coukfinancechina-business7773011A-look-inside-the-Foxconn-suicide-factoryhtml
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (1988) Zhongguo 1987 nian 1 per cent renkou chouyan diaochaziliao [Tabulations of Chinarsquos 1987 1 per cent Population Sample Survey] Beijing Zhongguo tongjichubanshe
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2010) 2009 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report onrural migrant labor in 2009] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20100319_402628281htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2011) 2010 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor report ofrural migrant labor in 2010] Retrieved from httpwwwsnzgcomcnReadNewsaspNewsID=3936
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012a) 2011 nian nongmingong jiance baogao [Monitor reporton rural migrant labor in 2011] Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcntjfxfxbgt20120427_402801903htm
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012b July 13) Overall economic development was stable in thefirst half of 2012 Retrieved from httpwwwstatsgovcnenglishpressreleaset20120713_402817907htm
National Bureau of Statistics amp Ministry of Public Security (NBS amp MPS) (1988) Zhonghua renmingongheguo renkou tongji ziliao huibian [Collections of Statistical Materials on Population of thePeoplersquos Republic of China] Beijing Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe
National Population Sample Survey Office (NPSSO) (1997) 1995 Quanguo 1 percent renkou chouyangdiaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in 1995] Bei-jing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2011) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2011 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2011] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
National Population Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) (2012) Zhongguo liudong renkou fazhanbaogao 2012 [Report on Chinarsquos Floating Population Development 2012] Beijing Zhongguo ren-kou chubanshe
Pun N (2005) Made in China Women factory workers in a global workplace London Duke Univer-sity Press and Hong Kong University Press
Saunders D (2012) Arrival city How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world NewYork NY Vintage Books
Sing Tao Daily (2010a July 3) Yuexin shuizhang waiji heigong yongru [Wage Raises in GuangzhouLed to Influx of Foreign Illegal Labor] p A11
Sing Tao Daily (2010b July 16) Foshan bentian qipeichang caibao gongchao (Strike Broke Out Againin Honda Subsidiary in Foshan) p A10
Skeldon R (1990) Population mobility in developing countries London BelhavenState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1985) Zhongguo 1982 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 1982 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (1993) Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Solinger D (1999) Contesting citizenship in Urban China Berkeley University of California PressState Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2002) Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha
ziliao [Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2007) 2005 nian quanguo 1 percent ren-kou chouyang diaocha ziliao [Data on the Sample Survey of 1 percent of the National Population in2005] Beijing Zhongguo tongji chubanshe
State Council amp National Bureau of Statistics (SC amp NBS) (2012) Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou puchaziliao [Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the Peoplersquos Republic of China] BeijingZhongguo tongji chubanshe
Tilly C (1976) Migration in modern history In W H McNeill amp R S Adams (Eds) Human migra-tion Patterns and policies (pp 48ndash72) Bloomington Indiana University Press
204 KW Chan
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12
United Nations (2012 August 3) International migration and development Report of the Secretary-General
Wang F-L (2005) Organizing through division and exclusion Stanford Stanford University PressWu J-M (2011) Yongyuan de yixiangke Gongmin shenfen chaxu yu zhongguo nongmingong jieji
[Strangers forever Differential citizenship and Chinarsquos rural migrant workers] Taiwanese Sociology21 51ndash99
Yang Y (1996) lsquoTemporary residentsrsquo in China Causes and characteristics Chinese Environment andDevelopment 7(1ndash2) 103ndash117
Yang Y (2004) Jiushi niandai yilai woguo renkou qianyi de ruogan xin tedian [New features of popu-lation migration in the 1990s in China] Nanfang renkou [Southern Population] 75 13ndash20
Yao Y (2010 July 16) The Lewisian turning point has not yet arrived The Economist httpwwweconomistcomeconomicsby-invitationquestionsera_cheap_chinese_labour_over
Zhang P (2012 September 7) Exam rules anger migrant families South China Morning Post pA6Zhang X Yang J amp Wang S (2010) China has reached the Lewis turning point Washington DC
International Food and Policy Research Institute (Discussion Paper 000977)
Migration and Development 205
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Kam
Win
g C
han]
at 1
217
30
Dec
embe
r 20
12