ChallengingtheNewInterpretivistApproach ... · is argued that critical realism can be used to generate a practical–analytical ... positivism and empiricism paves the way for presentation

Challenging the New Interpretivist Approach:

Towards a Critical Realist Alternative

Stuart McAnullaSchool of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK.

E-mail: [email protected]

This article provides a critique of the new interpretive approach to studying Britishpolitics as pioneered in the recent work of Rod Rhodes and Mark Bevir.Furthermore, it develops the case for an alternative ‘postpositivist’ approach topolitical analysis grounded in critical realist social theory. Both the philosophicalassumptions and practical–analytical vocabulary of the new interpretive approachare examined. The approach is evaluated at both a theoretical level as well as inanalysis of the case studies of Thatcherism and New Labour. Drawing on criticalrealist insights, it is proposed that Rhodes and Bevir offer an ultimatelyunsatisfactory account of the relationship between agents and context. Finally, itis argued that critical realism can be used to generate a practical–analyticalvocabulary with advantages over the more established positivist, poststructuralistand interpretivist approaches to political science.British Politics (2006) 1, 113–138. doi:10.1057/palgrave.bp.4200013

Keywords: positivism; interpretivism; critical realism; agency; ontology; epistemology

Introduction

One of the most substantive and innovative recent additions to British politicalscience literature is that produced by Rod Rhodes and Mark Bevir (Bevir andRhodes, 2002, 2003a, b; Bevir et al., 2003).1 In a series of both joint and singleauthored pieces they have set out a new type of interpretive approach tostudying politics. The work is exceptional in offering both a consideredphilosophical grounding for the approach, as well as a practical–analyticalvocabulary, which they apply in analysing a range of empirical case studies inBritish politics. The approach was originally forged outside of political sciencein Bevir’s philosophical monograph ‘The Logic of the History of Ideas’(hereafter referred to as ‘Logic’). Rhodes and Bevir take the assumptions andconcepts developed in this work to formulate a new type of interpretiveapproach to studying politics. Rhodes and Bevir make at least three significantcontributions to political science literature: They:

� Highlight the inadequacy of positivist and ‘modernist empiricist’ approachesthat have dominated postwar British political science.

British Politics, 2006, 1, (113–138)r 2006 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1746-918x/06 $30.00

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� Generate both the philosophical foundations and conceptual vocabulary toground a new type of interpretive political analysis.

� Demonstrate the use of such an interpretive approach to analysing issues inpostwar British politics including Thatcherism, New Labour and governance.

This article offers a critique of each of these contributions, focusingprimarily on the latter two. The following discussion sympathizes with theauthor’s criticism of the domination of positivism and concurs with the broadarguments in favour of a postpositivist political science. Nonetheless, it isargued that critical realist philosophy may provide a better road to thisdestination than does Rhodes and Bevir’s interpretivism. It is proposed that thephilosophical assumptions and conceptual vocabulary adopted by Rhodes andBevir offer an ultimately inadequate understanding of the relationship betweenagents and context. The implications of using such an approach are examinedby reviewing Rhodes and Bevir’s account of debates on Thatcherism andexplanations of New Labour’s ‘Modernizing Government’ agenda. Thiscritique is driven through contrasting the assumptions and analysis of theinterpretivist approach with that of a (posited) critical realist approach.2 It isargued that interpretivism has limitations in its ability to explain change and isill equipped to account for continuity in political processes. Subsequently, a setof alternative analytical concepts are forwarded, based on critical realism. It isargued that this analytical vocabulary can assist practical research approacheswhich are avowedly ‘postpositivist’ yet resist the philosophies of interpretivismand poststructuralism.

The Development of Political Science: Positivism and Empiricism

In recent years many political scientists have become more reflexive about thenature and history of their discipline. Bevir notes that while positivistapproaches like behaviouralism and rational choice theory came to dominateUS political science, there was resistance to these new pretenders in the Britishcontext. Indeed, while institutional approaches became regarded as outmodedby many in the US, institutionalism survived as a dominant approach inBritain. Large numbers of British academics eschewed the new highlyquantitative methods available in favour of more traditional descriptive andnarrative methods of studying key political institutions. Bevir points out howaccounts of the development of British political science often emphasize the‘anti-positivist’ attitude of many political analysts. British approaches tostudying politics have frequently been described as ‘committed to agency,hostile to scientism and grand theory, and sensitive to history and contingency’(Bevir, 2001, 470). However, Bevir also perceptively points out that there wasin fact much more shared ground between the positivists and their

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British Politics 2006 1

institutionalist rivals than is often acknowledged. While rejecting overtpositivism, many institutionalists (and others) were highly empiricist in theirapproach. This empiricism was shaped increasingly by ‘modernist’ or quasi-scientific trends emanating from then contemporary intellectual currents.Consequently, what Bevir refers to as a ‘modernist empiricism’ dominated,lacking the precision-techniques of statistical analyses but using methods ofclassification and typology and specialization. Bevir argues that the distinctionmade between positivism and modernist empiricism ‘obscures as much as itreveals’, ignoring some shared intellectual origins as well as ‘obscur(ing) theway in which modernist empiricism has absorbed aspects of the positivistagenda’ (2000, 477). He argues that both:

� Postulate a value-free discipline with a discrete empirical domain.� Tend to divide the political world into discrete units to be reassembled

through comparison and classification leading to the discovery of correla-tions and regularities.

� Believe in comparison across time and space as a means of uncoveringregularities and probabilistic explanations against neutral evidence (2000, 478).

According to Bevir these features undermine the frequent claim that Britishpolitical science is ‘committed to agencyyhistory and contingency’ (Bevir,2001, 470). For the aim of modernist empiricist literature is to uncoverempirical regularities or quasi-‘laws’ of political behaviour. As such thereappears limited role for agents to reflect creatively on their circumstances andalter their circumstances through reason and reflection.

The flaws of positivism/modernist empiricism mean that political sciencefaces something of an intellectual crisis. Few are now willing to raise their headabove the parapet to properly defend positivism. Rhodes and Bevir (hereafterBR) note that while in some disciplines academics have faced up to similardilemmas, in political science they have barely begun to do so. BR’s rejection ofpositivism and empiricism paves the way for presentation of their newinterpretive approach to political analysis.

The New Interpretivism: a Conceptual Vocabulary

Rejecting the positivist and modernist empiricist belief in pure experience, andthe possibility of value-free enquiry, BR begin by considering how it is we cometo acquire particular beliefs about the world. They argue that we inherit webs ofbelief from the world around us. However, we are not restricted in our beliefs bythese webs. Unlike positivists, BR argue there is no way we can ‘read-off’people’s beliefs and preferences from objective facts about them (BR, 2003a,19). Therefore, we cannot look to an individuals’ economic or social status andinfer what their particular beliefs or preferences may be. However, individuals


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may be influenced by webs of belief, or what BR call traditions. A tradition isconceptualized not as a fixed set of beliefs but as ‘ya group of ideas which maybe shared by groups of individuals though no one idea was shared by them all.Orya set of ideas handed from generation to generation, changing a little eachtime so no idea persisted across all generations’ (BR, 2003a, 33).

Of course, earlier theorists have been concerned to examine how beliefs areshaped, perpetuated and transformed. Foucault argued that over-arching websof belief or discourses shape identity, creating forms of regulation anddomination (e.g. through discourses of sexuality and punishment). WithinFoucault’s work the subject is the contingent product of particular discourses.‘The individual is not a pre-given entityy(t)he individual is the product of arelation of powery’ (Foucault, 1980, 73–74). This notion of discourse hasbeen influential on later theorists, including poststructuralists and postmoder-nists, notably the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). However, BR are criticalof Foucault and similar positions for appearing to grant no meaningful role forindividuals to alter their webs of belief through creative reasoning.

For this reason, BR prefer to use the term tradition, rather than discourse todenote the webs of belief that may influence individual belief. Overtlydistancing themselves from the Foucauldian model, they argue ‘tradition is astarting point, not something that fixes or limits later actions’ (BR, 2003a, 33).Crucially, BR also distance themselves from some of the conventionalunderstandings of the term ‘tradition’ within political science literature. Inparticular, they wish to avoid ‘idealist’ conceptions that view traditions asentities that embody essential characteristics across space and time. Greenleaf(author of The British Political Tradition) is cited as such an idealist — theBritish political tradition is viewed as a dialectic of individualist versuscollectivist ideas (BR, 2003a, 33). However, BR contend it is unacceptable toargue that there are essential core features of a tradition which somehowpersist over time. Such a view permits no significant role for actors to influenceand adjust their webs of belief in accordance with their experiences. This formof essentialist thinking is rejected. For BR a tradition is not something thatconsists of essential characteristics against which we can assess variations. Theyare keen to stress that traditions do not exist independently of the beliefs andactions of individuals. Traditions are sustained by individual belief. When anindividual comes to form particular beliefs, and to act, traditions are a‘backdrop’ which may influence them. However, they are keen to assert theprimacy of agency, since ‘[i]ndividuals can reason creatively in ways that arenot fixed, nor even strictly limited by, the social contexts or discourse in whichthey exist’ (BR, 2003a, 32). In other words traditions do not constrain whatagents either believe or (directly) do. Individuals may form beliefs quiteindependent of any given tradition, or may choose to redefine or alter thattradition in response to new ideas. In this way, BR set out a position to


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contrast starkly with their presentations of positivism, modernist empiricismand postmodernism which each, in their own ways, fail to give due centrality toagency and the role of actors in reasoning, reflecting and forming beliefs.

Given the key role for agency within BR’s world-view, they are concerned tolook at how ideas and traditions change through the creative reasoning andactions of individuals. The key concept introduced here is that of the dilemma.For BR a dilemma occurs where a new idea forms which stands in oppositionto existing beliefs or practices — ‘an authoritative understanding that poses aquestion for one’s existing webs of belief’ (Bevir, 1999, 203). This tension forcesa reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated traditions. In suchcircumstances traditions are a ‘background’ against which new ideas or beliefsmay be formed. Reflection on new ideas may lead to the transformation ormodification of traditions so that those traditions subsequently continue toexist in a changed form. However, traditions may only ‘hint’ at how actorsshould deal with new ideas or beliefs — they do not act as a constraint on thebeliefs subsequently held or (strictly) the actions taken.

These concepts form the basic vocabulary of BR’s new interpretiveapproach. In principle, the approach can be used to interpret and accountfor changes in political belief and in political processes themselves. Beforelooking at how BR apply these concepts to empirical case studies sometheoretical criticisms are offered.

A Critical Realist Critique of the New Interpretive Approach

The following section provides a critique of the above vocabulary and thephilosophical assumptions informing it. This analysis draws on ideas fromcritical realist social theory. Critical realism is now a cross-disciplinaryintellectual movement, associated with the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar (1994)(though now perhaps increasingly less so).3 In particular, critical realist ideasare used to challenge BR’s account of the relationship between agents and theircontext. BR are criticized on three broad grounds:

� Neglect of ontology.� Agency privileged at the expense of social structure (and/or discourse).� Consequently, the proposed practical–analytical vocabulary has significant

limitations.

The new interpretivism and conventional political science — some common

ground

Despite deep differences, there are some similarities between BR’s perspectiveand the positions it criticizes above. Although the positivist assumptions of


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behaviouralism and the interpretivist assumptions of BR are usually regardedas polar philosophical opposites (and in most senses are), there can be said tobe some shared terrain. To explain this, some broad trends in 20th centuryphilosophy must be observed. As Bhaskar (1994) notes, from the rise of logicalpositivism through to the emergence of postmodernism there has been agrowing obsession with language and how we come to gain knowledge ofthe world. In Archer’s view, 20th century social theory embarked on a‘torrid affair with epistemology’ from which it is still trying to disentangleitself (Archer, 1998, 193). Emblematically, one could argue the affairreached its culmination with Derrida’s claim that ‘there is nothing beyondthe text’ and the belief that there is no extradiscursive dimension to socialreality.4 Bhaskar argues that during the 20th century the epistemic fallacytook root. The epistemic fallacy refers to the idea that statements about beingcan be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge. In theview of critical realists the torrid affair was conducted at the expense ofontology. Or, put more directly, ontology became seen as coterminous withepistemology. For positivists, this manifested itself in the stress on empiricalobservation — the world is at it appears to us through our senses, appearanceand reality are one. Any appeal to entities beyond what can readily be observedis to be dismissed, ‘committed to flames’ as metaphysical nonsense. For somepoststructuralists, the world is indeed ‘text’, and appeals to a reality beyond oroutside discourse are similarly dismissed. In very different ways, positivism andpoststructuralism define the limits of the world to be the limits of ourapprehension of it.

However, one can argue that how things are in reality is a different questionfrom how agents take them to be. The limitations of human perception meanthat our knowledge of the world is necessarily partial. If it is accepted thatthere is a gap between the political world as it is and how it may appear toagents then we need to keep a clear distinction between ontological andepistemological concerns. However, one can argue that BR’s interpretivismalso struggles to retain this distinction. Individuals understand the worldthrough traditions and webs of beliefs, drawing on them toward particularends. In so far as individuals are influenced within the BR schema the influenceresults from the culture and traditions readily understandable and available tothem. Yet this context that agents find themselves in is not taken to be a causeof particular beliefs or actions. Change results from individual responses to‘dilemmas’ that emerge in the minds of those individuals. The notion that othersocial phenomena such as discourses or structures may causally shape belief oraction is ruled out. As is argued below, little theoretical room is permitted forextradiscusive constraint, or for social factors which may work independentlyof agents’ conceptions of them. Moreover, BR’s advocacy of the epistemicfallacy appears quite overt — the approach is designed to generate accounts of


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the political world (being) through statements regarding individuals’ beliefs(knowledge).5

But what are the negative consequences of this (arguable) philosophicalerror? From a critical realist angle it is possible to argue that positivism,poststructuralism and BR’s interpretivism lack stratified or depth ontology.Each limits discussion of the nature of the world to statements regardingexperience or conceptualizations of it. However, critical realism suggests thatthe world as we both experience and conceptualize it is not exhaustive ofreality.6 Indeed, what generates events in the world may not be directlyaccessible to us through our senses or concepts. What we experience in theworld may result from the exercise of mechanisms or structures, which areunobservable. However, BR are repeatedly scathing about any appeal to socialphenomena beyond the empirical and conceptual realms. The theoreticaldifficulties this creates, most notably the denial of social structure, arediscussed in the next section. The practical implications of conflatingepistemology and ontology are explored in the later case study of Thatcherism.

Agents, context and the denial of structure

BR argue that tradition is ‘a starting point, not something which fixes or limitslater action. Tradition is not an unavoidable influence on all we do, for toassume that would be to leave too slight a role for agency’ (BR, 2003a, 33).This formulation seeks to avoid the errors of other approaches in theirconceptions of social structure (and the implications of structure for people’sbeliefs and actions). Again, both positivism and poststructuralism are targetsfor criticism.

Positivist/empiricist studies frequently invoke certain notions of structure,such as ‘class’ or ‘gender’. In such work structure usually refers to observableaggregates (e.g. wage level, housing status), which the researcher treats as‘variables’. What BR find objectionable is when researchers ‘read-off’ or inferwhat people’s beliefs are through their position within such structures. Forexample, it might be inferred that a voter believes in socialism from the factthat he has a working class occupation or is a member of a trade union (Beviret al., 2003, 4). Appropriately, they argue such a notion leaves no significantroom for agency or space in which actors reflect on circumstances and exercisereason to form their own beliefs. Rather, individual beliefs are locked into acausal model, which can be researched by analysing objective facts aboutpeople. Thus, if a meaningful role for agents is to be defended then this causalnotion of structure must be rejected.

Of course, the positivist use of the term ‘structure’ differs greatly from thatfound in the broad ‘anti-humanist’ movement. In structuralist literaturenotions of structure (or discourse) refer to social influences which may not be


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observable or measurable. Moreover, they are conceived of as causal factors intheir own right, with powers that are independent of agents as individuals. InAlthusser’s vision, change is the product of the interaction (bricolage) ofeconomic, political and ideological structures which are not the productsindividual choice as such (Althusser, 1979). BR’s objection to such positions(and specifically Foucault’s, as outlined above) is that they reify or hypostatizethe role of context or structure. Structure is raised to the status of a causal forceexisting independently of actors themselves, ‘as transcendent and independentfrom agency and reified in natural laws or properties of human natureimpervious to agency’ (Gimenez, 1999, 22). Thus, individuals’ beliefs andactions are shaped by forces beyond their own control and/or consciousawareness. Various types of Marxism, poststructuralism and postmodernismcan be viewed as guilty of such reifications. BR are keen to avoid any notionthat structure or context can determine belief or action.

BR’s dismissal of both positivist notions of structure and the reified versionsof other approaches is surely welcome. For such versions of structure doundermine conceptions of individuals as possessing reflexive and causal powerswith which to influence and reshape their context. Indeed, if we wish to assert asignificant causal role for agency reification must be avoided. BR’s resolution isto adopt a form of ‘procedural individualism’ in which the past affects thepresent through tradition, but agents are not constrained in their beliefs by thatpast. Thus, BR’s notion of tradition does thus not reify social context.

However, while BR’s rejection of empiricist and reified notions of structuremay be welcomed, their wholesale rejection of structure as a potentiallyconstraining influence on agency is problematic. Having dismissed the abovenotions of structure they are quick to nail their colours very much to anindividual-centred understanding of the ‘structure-agency’ relationship. In sodoing, they do not forward crudely atomistic notions of the individual, or themethodological individualism of forms of Rational Choice Theory. BR rejectthe notion that individuals are fully autonomous, arguing that tradition, (orwebs of belief) may influence individual thought or action. Tradition will formthe backdrop to creative reasoning. However, that context does not constrainor limit the beliefs adopted or actions taken. Yet actors will have a preferencefor consistency within their webs of belief and for their beliefs to be consistentwith their experiences. These assumptions underpin the methodology of‘procedural individualism’ which characterizes the interpretive approach.

It will now be argued that this ‘procedural individualism’ does not offer asatisfactory account of the relationship between agency and context. Tosupport this claim it will be proposed that a notion of social structure can besustained which does act as a constraint on agency but which avoids the errorsof reification. Here I draw on the work of Porpora (1998); Archer (1995, 1996,1998) and Collier (1994).


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In BR’s schema tradition is ‘an initial influence on people’ (Bevir, 1999, 201)but remains a background which does not constrain subsequent belief.Tradition may influence, but does not cause, changes in belief. Thus, ‘there areno compelling causes forcing individuals to change their beliefs and actions’(BR, 2002, 141). However, the question this raises is whether agents and theirpowers of reasoning can bear the theoretical weight being placed on theirshoulders by BR’s approach. Certainly, one would want to insist thatindividuals have reflexive powers to change beliefs and actions — such powersare necessary to support the idea that individuals can alter their inheritedcircumstances. However, these may not be the only causal powers that shapebelief and action. BR’s view is that traditions or webs of belief are present onlythrough the activities of human agents, and that ‘discourse, ideologies ortraditions have no existence apart from the contingent beliefs of particularindividuals’ (BR, 2003a, 2). However, current activity and acts of reflexivityalways take place within a pre-structured context. That is, the positions fromwhich individuals act in the present, and the traditions constituting thatcontext are the consequence of past agential activity. They arise from activityof agents in the past (possibly now dead). The features of the positions agentsfind themselves in and the traditions surrounding them thus cannot be reducedto the practices or beliefs of current agents (Archer, 1998, 201). Furthermore,these past activities generate relations between individuals (in terms ofpositions, roles, practices) and well as relations between ideas (within traditionsor discourses). The pattern of such relations emerges from past activity, butcannot simply be reduced to the beliefs or actions of individual agents. In thissense, a notion of social structure is viable, indeed necessary, to account for therelations which emerge from past action. This notion does not entail reification,as the emergence of structure is fully dependent for existence on agentialactivity.

It can be argued that structure is distinguishable from agency in virtue of thedistinct properties each possesses. The properties structures hold derive frominternal relations which are irreducible to the interactions producing them.Agents find themselves cast into material relationships, roles or practices thatthey did not choose but which will subsequently condition their future actions.While agents have properties such as intentionality and rationality, structuremay have properties such as ‘relative endurance, natural necessity and thepossession of causal powers’ (Archer, 1995, 167). Understood another way, theactions of individuals produce emergent properties (whether conceived asstructure, discourse, tradition or culture) which can later serve to ‘act back’ onpeople (Archer, 1996, 144). Thus understood, the context agents act within canindeed do more than serve as an ‘influence’ on belief and action as BR wouldcontend. Once structure is ontologically distinguished from agency it becomespossible (and necessary) to discuss the conditioning, causal powers which


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structure can express in relation to agency. Moreover one can speak ofstructure and agency as having relative autonomy from one another, hence alsoof there being interplay between them. The generative powers of structure maybe actualized in the form of constraints or enablements. Both materialrelationships (e.g. in the workplace) and ideational relationships (e.g.components of a particular theory) can serve to constrain or facilitatesubsequent beliefs or actions. Archer argues:

Emergent structures represent objective limitations upon the situations andsettings which agents can encountery.doctrines, theories, beliefsetc...circumscribe(s) that which can impinge upon agents as their ideationalenvironment. Objectively, it delimits that which can be reproduced, re-formulated, rejected or transformed. There may be the most sophisticatedconversations in so-called primitive societies, but they will not be aboutatomic physics. Similarly material structures have to exist before agents canengage in practices which sustain or change them: industrial action isdependent on factory production and wage labour. (y) The constraints andenablements of the situations we confront are not the same as our powers ofdescription or conceptualization (Archer, 1995, 196–197).

Without this distinction between agency and structure we would be left withBR’s schema in which all causal weight is burdened onto agency. However, thiswould leave us with an implausibly narrow view of how individual beliefs andactions are generated. Moreover, it would restrict our ability to account forcomplex patterns of social change and continuity. The BR account of therelationship between context and agency leads logically, in their own words, tobelieve in the ‘ubiquity of change’. BR’s stress is on how political circumstancesare characterized by change, how traditions and practices are continuallymodified or overhauled. This flows from the fact that structural context is notconceived as a constraint on belief or action. Where individuals can expresstheir powers as agents unencumbered by constraint, free from external causes,it is understandable that they can and should constantly seek to alterconditions in the light of their experiences. However, it is surely the case thatsocial systems are featured by significant patterns of continuity as well aschange. BR’s schema lacks the resources to comfortably explain continuity(indeed they are keen to stress their belief in change even where it is not of a farreaching nature and/or where it may not radically alter chains of beliefs inparticular traditions). The emphasis on change within their approach can beviewed as a necessary theoretical consequence of their unwillingness toembrace a notion of causal social structure. For without such a causal source itis difficult to explain why the outcome of social and political action is oftensystemic continuity. Accounting for continuity and change suggests the needfor an alternative conception of the structure–agency relationship. Discussion


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of theoretical and methodological implications of adopting a critical realistunderstanding of this relationship will be developed later in the paper.

The absence of a notion of social structure means the BR approach strugglesto theorize about the impact of the external world on actors. Unlike somepostmodernists, BR do accept that there is a ‘real world’ beyond ourconceptions of it (BR, 2003a, 40). However, as highlighted above, there is littletheoretical recognition of this. BR refer to the impact of external factors onindividuals and traditions only loosely as ‘pressures’ which can provokedilemmas. The limitations of this vocabulary for practical analysis will now beexamined.

Applications of interpretive theory: Thatcherism and New Labour

Informed by the above theoretical critique, this section reviews how BR applythe interpretive approach to the empirical case studies of Thatcherism and NewLabour. First, BR’s reading of the debate on Thatcherism is analysed. It isargued that the focus on tradition as backdrop can serve to cloud somesimilarities and differences between different versions of Thatcherism.Furthermore, the explanatory limitations of the ‘dilemma’ concept areexplored. Second, BR’s account of New Labour and the ‘modernizinggovernment’ agenda is analysed. Here the drawbacks of the ‘proceduralindividualism’ of the interpretive approach are highlighted. Furthermore, BR’snotion of the ‘ubiquity of change’ is challenged.

Thatcherism

BR choose to examine this literature in part because of the alleged tendency ofmany authors to treat ‘Thatcherism’ as a given, single notion which must beexplained. In contrast, BR seek to show that there is no ‘monolithic, unifiednotion of Thatcherism’. Instead, they suggest that there are a variety ofnarratives of Thatcherism which are constructed in ‘complex and contradictoryways’ (BR, 2003a, 107). The implicit target of this stance is analyses ofThatcherism that might seek to boil Thatcherism down to a set of essentialfeatures which political scientists could then seek to explain. Potential essentialcharacteristics might include a distinct policy programme, or, politicalhegemony, or a political style. Such an enterprise would, in BR’s view, befutile as Thatcherism is in fact constructed by authors in particular ways whichare influenced by the traditions they identify with. They argue that what issignificant about Thatcherism thus depends on the traditions informing aparticular analysis and the research questions posed. Thus, ‘Thatcherismconsisted of competing narratives of what it was’ (BR, 2003a, 122).


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BR choose to unpack interpretations of Thatcherism in relation to fourbroad traditions in British government. These are, respectively, Tory, Liberal,Whig and Socialist traditions. Influenced by such traditions, authors haveforwarded rival accounts which mean they have very differing views as to thecontent and significance of Thatcherism (see Table 1). Furthermore, andimportantly, Thatcherism presents dilemmas to these rival traditions. Testa-ment to the significance of the Thatcher era of government is the range ofdilemmas it posed which led to the adaptations or alterations within particulartraditions.

BR’s approach to the literature on Thatcherism helps dramatize the manyways in which the phenomenon has been constructed and why it continues toprovoke controversy. The observation that there are many rival under-standings of Thatcherism may not be new but the approach draws attention tohow important understandings of the history of British politics are in shapingviews as to the significance of Thatcherism. However, BR’s position has morecontentious implications. They argue that ‘Historical storiesyconstruct thephenomenon of Thatcherism in radically different ways’ (BR, 2003a, 148).Consequently, they argue that there are significant restrictions on the extent towhich we can relate different interpretations of Thatcherism to one another.BR issue a warning against other established approaches to studyingThatcherism. Calls for a ‘multi-dimensional approach’ are, in their view,‘doomed from the outset’. The implied targets of this warning would includeauthors such as Marsh (1995) and Marsh and Kerr (1999) who argue thatadequate accounts of Thatcherism should be sensitive to the numerous

Table 1 Narratives of Thatcherism

Tory tradition — believes in conserving the fabric of society, favouring continuity over radical

change. Bulpitt (1986) argues Thatcherism was an adaptation of statecraft strategies used by

Conservatives in the past to win elections and appear competent.

Liberal tradition — believes state intervention in postwar period undermined the market activity

necessary for prosperity. Willetts (1992) believes Thatcherism was about restoring free-market

liberalism as a key strand of Conservative thought and practice.

Whig tradition — believes in evolutionary change. King (1988) argues that due to her exceptional

personality Thatcher was able to push out the frontiers of her prime ministerial authority.

Socialist tradition — believes in the importance of economic factors and class conflict. Gamble

(1988) argues Thatcherism sought to reform the state and civil society to construct a free market

capitalism in which British companies would be internationally competitive.

Adapted and summarized from BR, 2003, pp. 108–117


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ideological, political and economic factors which could help explain thephenomena. Marsh and Kerr argue that significant parts of the literature tendto focus on one set of factors to the detriment of others, whether this be Hall’sfocus on ideology, or King’s focus on Thatcher’s personality (Marsh and Kerr,1999). They argue that effort should be devoted to looking at how the variousinfluential factors appealed to by different authors might be related to oneanother.7 However, BR argue this is quite misguided:

It is not a question of identifying the several political, economic andideological factors and determining their relative importance. It is not aquestion of levels of analysis. It is more fundamental. The maps, questionsand language of each narrative prefigure and encode different historicalstories in distinctive ways’ (BR, 2002, 148).

Consequently, ‘There is no Thatcherism’ as such, only competing narratives(BR, 2003a, 122). Therefore, for BR it is not the case that particular accountsstress particular dimensions of a given Thatcherite phenomenon. Rather, thoseaccounts developed from stories underpinned by different histories andpresuppositions. Understood in the latter way it makes no sense to seek tolink aspects of the alternative accounts in the belief that this can build asuperior account. The different stories contain incommensurable elements andoffer varying notions of the topic under discussion.

However, BR’s argument that a multi-dimensional account is inherently‘doomed’ seems hasty, if not pessimistic. The BR conclusion seems effectivelyto be ‘let a thousand Thatcherisms bloom’, for Thatcherism is no more thanthe various narratives of it. However, this risks two negative consequences: (i)unnecessarily exaggerating the differences (and incommensurability) ofdifferent accounts of Thatcherism, and; (ii) rendering comparison of rivaltheories more problematic than may be necessary.

BR’s conclusion arises from their particular approach to reading theliterature on Thatcherism. The reading is of course conducted through theepistemological perspex forged in Bevir’s ‘Logic’, and the attendant concepts oftradition, dilemma, and agency discussed above. Through this perspex,accounts of Thatcherism are (re)interpreted as historical stories with a logicof development consistent with Bevir’s broad schema. This involves placingreviews of authors in the context of broad intellectual traditions they areconsidered to identify with and be influenced by. In each case the authors areunderstood to have grappled with the particular dilemmas presented to thattradition by Thatcherism, leading to formulation or reconstruction of ideas inthat tradition (BR, 2003a, 121). Particular and rival narratives of Thatcherismare thus produced. It is the stress on the different historical stories influencingvarying narratives that leads to pessimism regarding ‘multi-dimensional’accounts.


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However, the literature on Thatcherism can be read through other lenses.Most of the literature discussed by BR (and other texts not covered here) arecentrally concerned with accounting for and explaining changes in politicalrelations in the 1980s and perhaps beyond. However, many authors are doingmore than providing a narrative with which to accommodate the ‘facts’ of theera — much of the concern is to try and explain changes in political relations.In doing so, the aim (though not always expressed as such) is to attempt tospecify causal factors — to identify key mechanisms which generated thetransformations (and perhaps continuities) often associated with Thatcherism.

Understood in this way there is more scope for ‘dialogue’ between thedifferent accounts of Thatcherism than BR allow. For example, BR reviewGamble as an exemplar of responses to Thatcherism from the Socialisttradition. They make clear the influence of the work of Stuart Hall (1979)(coming from a post-Marxist tradition) and his notion of ‘authoritarianpopulism’ on Gamble’s account (BR, 2003a, 116–117). However, they do notexplicitly acknowledge that Gamble’s perspective is also strongly influenced byBulpitt’s (1986) work (outlined by BR as exemplary of the Tory tradition). Theposition Gamble adopts demonstrates that despite the incompatible ‘historicalstories’ within which Hall and Bulpitt view Thatcherism, much of what theyargue about the politics of the 1980s can be brought together into an internallycoherent account. The historical roots of such theories thus do not necessarilypreclude productive multi-dimensional synthesis.

The differences and similarities between authors on Thatcherism canperhaps be better illuminated and accounted for as differences in the causalfactors they introduce to explain events. For some, individuals such asThatcher herself, her personality and leadership skills drove change in theperiod (Kavanagh, 1987; King, 1988). Others argue change emerged form theConservatives purposive formulation of a new governing strategy to maximizecentral control over key issues (Bulpitt, 1986; Gamble, 1988). Alternativelysome propose that salient ideologies or discourses were crucial in reshapingpolitical identities and relations (Hall, 1979; Hay, 1996). Still others proposethat key causal mechanisms are to be found in changes to the internationaleconomic structure, creating pressures for particular change (Jessop et al.,1988; Taylor, 1992).

A key contention in the literature is which of the posited mechanisms canbest explain such changes. However, this is a debate which BR cannot help usenter as for them Thatcherism is no more than the narratives of it. Within BR’s‘logic’ there is little room for discussion of causal mechanisms (indeed, whereconceived of in terms of structures or dominant discourses they are explicitlydismissed). In the interpretive approach, change is conceptualized in terms ofresponses to dilemmas posing challenges to webs of belief. As highlightedabove, factors leading to dilemmas are not theorized beyond the broad


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category of ‘pressures’ which may be material or theoretical in nature.However, this results in BR positing particular dilemmas for traditions withlittle analysis of the source of those dilemmas. They argue that Thatcherismposed four general dilemmas for traditions regarding ‘welfare-dependency’,‘overload’, ‘inflation’ and ‘globalization’ (BR, 2003a, 119–121). However, theeconomic, social and political pressures which issued these dilemmas are barelyunpacked. There is little discussion of the scale and nature of these pressuresbeyond how they were constructed within particular traditions of belief. It is atthis point one can argue BR in effect ‘smuggle in’ causal mechanisms into theirdiscussion of Thatcherism. There is an implicit acknowledgement that thesecausal mechanisms were effacious irrespective of how they were constructed byparticular traditions, yet there is no theorization of them. Thus, despite BR’scall for decentred and non-essentialist accounts of Thatcherism, in the end theirown account calls in particular ‘givens’ (overload, inflation, globalization) tosupport their critique. Ironically then, many of the issues contested within theliterature on Thatcherism are treated as obvious givens within an interpretiveaccount.

Thus it may be that, without care, an interpretive approach to under-standing Thatcherism may move the debate backwards rather than forwards.Rather than opening up lines of enquiry, as BR hope, it may serve to stifleinter-perspective dialogue. The above discussion indicates that politicalanalysts may require an approach which enables one to posit the significanceof causal mechanisms in an overt, rather than covert manner. Critical realism,in stressing the importance of a stratified ontology is able to accomodate theexistence of social forms which may not be directly observable, but cannonetheless be causally significant.

New Labour

BR seek to account for New Labour’s reform of government through anapplication of the interpretive approach. Methodologically, the focus is on howthe beliefs of key actors (and, subsequently actions) were influenced bytradition but also by their responses to dilemmas. Thus BR state ‘elite actorsbeliefs about their governmental traditions shape public sector reformy’(Bevir et al., 2003 3). The discussion is framed by reviewing the transition from‘old’ to ‘new’ Labour.

One of the clear benefits of BR’s approach is the focus it gives to theinfluence of particular ideas on New Labour, including ideas influenced by thesocialist tradition. Attention is given to sets of ideas such as the ‘third way’which draw on the socialist tradition and adapt many of its ideas in response tothe dilemmas thrown up by Thatcherism. For example, the new right’s critiqueof welfare-dependency creates a dilemma for ‘old’ Labour’s belief that


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universal welfare provision helps create virtuous and independent citizens. Inresponse to this dilemma ‘new’ Labour comes to accept the need for bothcarrots (e.g. training in the form of the New Deal) and ‘sticks’ (e.g. threats towithdraw benefits from those who will not take-up training opportunities) totry and tackle the problem of welfare-dependency (BR, 2003a, 126).

In setting out the response of centre-left thinkers to Thatcherism, BR areable to offer a nuanced account of both the similarities and differences betweennew right and New Labour thought. As we will see, this clears the ground forlater explaining some of the new policy trends that have emerged since 1997.This offers the approach advantages over other accounts of New Labour whichposit a broad ‘paradigm-shift’ in British politics in which both main politicalparties have become neo-liberal in belief (e.g. Heffernan, 2001). The stress insuch accounts is on a new consensus in which neo-liberal ideas dominate andthere is large-scale policy convergence between the Labour and Conservativeparties. The interpretive approach has the means to both recognize thesimilarities in party stances, but also elucidate and help explain the differenceswhich owe much to the divergent traditions influencing each. Withoutrecognition of such differing ideational influences the temptation will be tounduly conflate the beliefs, policy stances and actions of recent Conservativeand Labour governments. In contrast, BR view the third way as ‘an attempt tokeep many strands of the social democratic vision while accepting a need fornew policies in response to dilemmas highlighted by Thatcherism’ (BR, 2003a,125).

The third way argues that neither fully public nor fully private ownership ofcontrol offers the prospect of accountable and responsive public services(Giddens, 1998). In contrast, it is proposed that institutions and individualswork together in partnerships sustained by trust. Individuals are not merelyself-interested but are capable of cooperation and altruism. There should notbe a dichotomy of public and private sectors, collaboration is needed to ensurethe best possible services for citizens. BR move from a consideration of thetraditions of belief influencing New Labour to examination of their‘Modernizing Government’ programme. They demonstrate that the thirdway vision has been influential in shaping this agenda. BR then seek to explainthe substantive policy initiatives in the modernizing government agenda asresponses (within the socialist tradition) to the dilemmas thrown up by the(broadly unintended) consequences of the Conservative reforms of the publicsector. It is here that the significance of BR’s ‘procedural individualism’ may beassessed. These dilemmas include fragmentation, steering, accountability andmanagement change (see Table 2).

However, there are elements of the ‘Modernizing Government’ agenda nothighlighted by BR, which cannot be so straightforwardly linked with the thirdway vision. For instance, the introduction of Public Service Agreements (PSAs)


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detailing performance targets for individual departments to meet, tied toprovision for withholding funds if they are not (Modernizing Government, Cm431, 1998, Chapter 4, 2). The introductions of PSAs, as well as the creation ofnumerous new mechanisms of audit and inspection, sit uneasily with the thirdway focus on ‘partnership’ and ‘trust’ between public bodies.

Following their analysis, BR reflect on the goals of New Labour’s policesand how far the ‘modernization’ project may be realized. They highlight that anumber of factors may make the third way vision of a ‘joined up’ system ofgovernance based on networks and trust difficult to achieve. These include twoelements of New Labour’s governing style:

� ‘New Labour lacks the trust it seeks to inspire.’ (BR, 2003a, 137) BR notethat the pressure being applied to local authorities to promote the agenda ofthe centre risks a loss of flexibility in dealing with localized problems.

� ‘ymanagement by negotiation means agreeing the objectives with others

not just persuading them that you were right all along, let alone resorting to

sanctions when they disagree’ (ibid.) BR criticize the practice of New Labour

to assume that its own prescribed solutions are best, and even penalizing

opposing views.

Arguably, what BR’s account lacks is the ability to explain whyNew Labourshould behave in such a way given their third way beliefs regarding mutuality,networks and trust as outlined above. As much public policy literaturedocuments, there are indeed clear tensions between the third way discourse(and much of the modernizing government discourse and policy agenda) andthe often centralizing and interventionist practice of New Labour in power(Richards and Smith, 2004). These tensions in New Labour’s actions wouldsuggest multiple, often-conflicting influences on New Labour. BR’s modelapproach generates an account in which New Labour’s beliefs and actions are

Table 2 New Labour responses to dilemmas

Fragmentation and steering– in response to the fragmented nature of policy delivery, combining

voluntary, public and private groups. In line with a third way stress on ‘networks’ and

collaboration New Labour sets out to ‘join-up’ policy delivery. A more coordinated ‘corporate’

approach to foster horizontal decision making is set out.

Accountability — fragmentation is viewed as having eroded accountability — complexity

obsfucates who is accountable to whom. In line with a third way stress on citizenship the White

paper sets out a range of measures designed to make public bodies more responsive to citizens.

Management change — fearing the erosion of a public sector ethos through the Conservative

market-oriented reforms, New Labour seeks to balance the need for public sector reform with

commitment to a public service ethos (BR, 2003a, b, 135).


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influenced by third way discourse which in turn shape their response toparticular dilemmas. Yet neither the third way discourse, nor the response todilemmas outlined above links clearly to the centralizing, interventionistaspects of New Labour’s governing style. To explain the complex pattern ofNew Labour’s behaviour we would need to bring in other influencing factorsnot highlighted in BR’s account.

BR’s account of New Labour would appear to lack sufficient acknowl-edgement of how both the practice of previous governments and their ideashave both impacted on and constrained their successors. The ‘proceduralindividualism’ of the new interpretive approach means it struggles to give thepast appropriate explanatory weight. BR are keen to avoid the notion that thepast has a causal influence on current government belief or action:

the policies a state adopts are not necessary responses to given pressures, butrather perceived solutions to one particular conception of thesedilemmasythe policiesyreflect the triumph in a political contest of oneparticular tradition and its understandings of the salient dilemmas’ (BR,2003a, 139).

However, the policies outlined in Modernizing Government are notnecessarily the product of ‘one particular conception’ of issues but arguablyof competing conceptions and different traditions. As indicated above, not allof the Modernizing Government agenda can be explained with reference tothird way ideas — some elements link much more directly to the new right. Thewhite paper is not merely a product of ‘the triumph in a political contest of oneparticular tradition’. It is a product both of multiple influences includingdifferent political ideas but also an institutional context shaped by eighteenyears of Conservative government (Newman, 2001). Furthermore, arguably theagenda was influenced by a core-executive with interests and ideas shaped notjust by Conservative rule but by a culture and ethos with a much longerpedigree.

Thus, consideration of the structural context within which the ModernizingGovernment agenda was constructed may help explain the items within it. Adetailed examination of relevant contextual issues is not possible here, howeversome broad contours can be sketched. Richards and Smith (2002) argue thatthe British polity is characterized by a strong executive which retains a positionwithin the polity in part through ‘asymmetries’ of power, including greateraccess to resources. This means the executive is often at an advantage in itsexchange relationships with other public bodies, including local government.Moreover the executive is structurally strong, with central governmentdepartments retaining dominant powers to initiate public policy. New Labouralso entered power in the context of an ideational struggle between variouspolitical discourses. This struggle did not end with the election of New Labour


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in 1997, though the balance of forces was altered significantly. A neo-liberaldiscourse had dominated Conservative party belief and inspired their agendafor public service reform. Conservative governments had attempted, with somesuccess, to imbue the public sector with neo-liberal ideas, though a contrasting‘public service’ ethos persisted in competition with such ideas. Significantly, abroadly elitist culture persisted within much of the core executive — with thebelief that (central) government ‘knows best’ and that accountability to thepeople is secured through the notion of parliamentary sovereignty (Marshet al., 2001). Meanwhile in opposition New Labour in the 1990s had becomeinfluenced by certain new right ideas while also adopting (and to some extentre-formulating) revisionist social democratic discourse such as ‘stake-holdingand the ‘third way’ (Hutton, 1995; Giddens, 1998, 2000; Gamble and Wright,1999).

On gaining power, New Labour was thus conditioned by a variety ofstructural and discursive factors. It inherited a polity featured by resourceinequalities and a centralized structure. Furthermore, it was bequeathed a setof institutions imbued (to varying degrees) by neo-liberal, elitist and traditional‘public service’ discourses. Its interpretation of this context was mediated to anextent by ‘third way’ ideas stressing the need for more decentralization,networks (rather than markets) and trust between partners.

The influences of each of these conditions on the agency of New Labour canbe inferred by an examination of the tensions and paradoxes in the whitepaper. For it is not only third way discourse and the concepts of network,partnership and trust which inform the agenda.8 As highlighted above,elements of the paper owe more to the new right ideas prevalent in governmentthinking in the pre-1997 years. Moreover, an elitist ‘government know best’ethos is detectable. Despite ‘third way’ commitments to localized priorities andlocal decision-making, these are balanced against centrally imposed targets forperformance improvement in local authorities. The ‘third way’ stress onpartnership and networking influences many aspects of the agenda. Yetestablishment of new inspection and regulatory bodies to monitor how publicservices operate undermines such promotion of ‘trust’ and mutuality. These areappointed by, and accountable to, central government. Furthermore, they aregiven unprecedented powers to intervene in local authorities and potentiallystrip them of powers. TheModernizing Government white paper was issued by acore executive already holding ‘balance of power’ in relation to other elementsof the British polity. Despite the stress on partnership and performanceimprovement within the white paper it is not difficult to find evidence of ‘vestedinterest’ in the reform agenda. Government documents are notably a ‘softertouch’ in the demands they place on central government (in terms of bothservice improvement and accountability) compared to local government (apoint acknowledged by BR). Thus, the agenda which New Labour formulated


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was shaped by multiple contextual factors which cannot be boiled down to‘third way’ responses to dilemmas in the socialist tradition.9 The white paperwas a product not only of such thought but also of rival political discoursesand institutional pressures and interests. Moreover, if we evaluate NewLabour’s reform against the broad structural features of the British polityidentified earlier than the picture appears more one of continuity, rather thanchange.

Towards an Alternative Analytical Vocabulary

It has been noted that one of the major contributions of BR’s work is that itdraws on a dense philosophical thesis (Bevir’s own), selecting a set of relativelystraightforward concepts which are capable of being readily used by politicalscientists carrying out research. The challenge for those wishing to posit analternative to BR’s approach is therefore not just to mark out the relevantphilosophical grounding, but also posit a different vocabulary, which could, inprinciple, be of use to the practical researcher.10

To begin with, a framework designed for practical analysis must provide asense of the ontology informing the approach. In BR’s case this is providedthrough the key terms provided: tradition, webs of belief and agency. Thesedenote the ontology being adopted: social and political processes are conceivedof as driven by reflexive, empowered actors who act influenced by beliefsformed against the backdrop of inherited traditions and webs of beliefs. Incontrast, critical realism sets out a stratified social ontology. Within such aframework, agency is also a key concept. Agents have their own irreduciblecausal powers, and ability to interpret and affect the world around them.However, the ontology is more complex than that outlined by BR. Foralthough agents possess causal powers they are also constrained (and enabled)by other social strands which can express different generative powers.Interaction between agents can generate structures which subsequently possesssui generis emergent properties which can ‘act back’ on agents. Therefore anon-reified but causally significant concept of structure can be part of analternative practical vocabulary. For our purposes structure will be taken torefer broadly to relations of a broadly material nature.

However, at this stage some refinement of concepts is required. It must berecognized that the relations that emerge as a consequence of social interactioncan be broadly either material or ideational in nature. BR discuss the ideationalin terms of tradition rather than discourse, partly to distance themselves from aFoucauldian understanding of the webs of belief influencing us. However, thereare alternative understandings of the term discourse.11 A critical realistontology can help sustain a notion of discourse which (akin to BR, andFoucault/Laclau and Mouffe) make the fundamental assumption that we have


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no unmediated access to reality, there is indeed no ‘gods eye’ view of the worldavailable to us. Furthermore (akin, in a sense, to Foucault/Laclau and Mouffe,contra BR) critical realism can sustain the sense in which discourse exists at asystemic extra-individual level, which can act as a constraint on actors.However, for critical realists this constraint is explained in terms of theemergent properties which discourses possess. In this view (unlike poststruc-turalists) agents have their own causal powers independent of a prevalentdiscourse which enable them to transform or challenge the discursive context.In this sense, discourse is more than the ‘backdrop’ against which agents act asBR believe, but a less than the all-constitutive social force envisioned bypoststructuralists.12 A critical realist view can support an ontology in which theworld is stratified with agents, discourses and social structures constitutingdistinct but related layers of reality.

As highlighted above, BR’s notion of the ‘dilemma’ can be a useful conceptin examining change, helping pinpoint moments at which (and reasons why)actors may come to reconsider or modify webs of belief. In BR’s schema ithelps explain the evolution or transformations of traditions over time as well asaccounting for different political responses to events. However, the concept isvery broad referring to a ‘new belief that...can lie anywhere on an unbrokenspectrum passing from views with little theoretical content to complextheoretical constructs only remotely linked to views about the real world’(BR, 2003a, 36). They can arise both from experience of events or fromtheoretical or moral reflection. Thus dilemmas may not result from a change inperception due to theoretical re-evaluation, they may reflect ‘materialcircumstances’ (BR, 2003a, 40). While stressing that there is no unmediatedaccess to the ‘real world’ BR grant that this world is the source of ‘pressures’that can provoke dilemmas.

However, due to the ontological restriction of BR’s perspective (outlinedabove) they are unable to unpack the likely form that such ‘pressures’ maytake. Thus pressures as diverse as a modification of religious scripturalinterpretation, through to an international economic crisis could createdilemmas. The problem is that the degree and scope of such pressures willvary enormously, presenting challenges of different types for reflective actors.Now while the magnitude and significance of particular pressures can of courseonly be established by practical research — one can theorize and distinguishbetween broad categories of possible pressures. The critical realist ontologyoutlined above enables such differentiation through the concept of emergentproperties. The three strata identified above — agents, social structures anddiscourses possess emergent properties each of which is a possible source of‘dilemmas’ or a causal force within social and political processes. Furthermore,we can distinguish between the types of emergent properties and theirconditioning influences. For discourses possess particular emergent properties


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due to the distinctive place of the ideational in social life. The emergentproperties of discourses are of a different order to those that emerge from therational actions or intentions of individuals. For example, the influence of thediscourse of Catholicism is of a different order of that of the Pope arguing fordevelopment aid for the third world. Of course in different ways both maycreate dilemmas — the discourse of Catholicism may provoke dilemmas for agovernment seeking to reorganize state education. This dilemma would be of adifferent type to that which might be confronted when the Vatican lobbiesministers for a revision of development policy. Critical realism argues for athird set of emergent properties, namely structural emergent properties. Again,these can and should be distinguished from the properties emerging fromdiscourse and agents. For example, properties emerge from the structure of theCatholic Church that is the structured relations between elements of churchorganization. These properties may also provoke dilemmas — for example, theChurch’s growing domination of physical and human resources in a givenregion may create dilemmas for government in the delivery of public policy. Itis primarily through the notion of structured emergent properties that criticalrealism is able to theorize about the particular impact of material pressures asagainst others, a distinction the BR model is unable to make.

There are yet further implications of the notion of emergent properties. Forit is not only through dilemmas that the causal force of emergent properties isfelt. As outlined above discourses, social structures and agents may serve togenerate dilemmas which in BR’s terms leads to actors forming new beliefs thatmay lead to a revision of pre-existing webs of belief. However, it is also the casethat discourses and structures may have emergent properties which do notprovoke dilemmas. Indeed emergent properties of social structures ofteninclude durability and endurance — that is, they can be a causal force forstability and continuity in social systems. Similarly dominant discourses maybe forces for long-term stability. The discourse of Catholicism may exert causalpressures for continuity despite strong demands for secularization in a givensociety.

However, as BR are unwilling to grant discourses (or traditions) as havingany extra-individual existence they are unable to accept that discourses canhave this causal role. This leaves their explanatory focus almost exclusively onagency and contingency, with discourses (traditions) seen as a resource to bevariously leant upon, reformed or ignored as reflexive actors choose. Incontrast, a critical realist ontology is able to account for both structure andagency through distinguishing between the causal powers possessed by each. Itcan sustain such a distinction through acknowledging that social structureemerges from the interaction of agents but subsequently possess sui generisproperties. Furthermore, through acknowledging that any action always takesplace within a pre-existing structural and discursive context it is able to theorize


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about the interaction of structure, agency and discourse. Social structures anddiscourses possess distinct emergent properties which condition (constrain andenable) subsequent action. Agents are conditioned but their subsequent beliefsand actions are not determined by this conditioning; agents possess their owncausal powers including rationality and action. As a consequence the structuralcontext may be elaborated — that is, material relations between people may bealtered in ways intended or unintended by agents. Similarly the discursivecontext may be altered; there may be change in the dominant ideas held byparticular groups. Alternatively structural or discursive contexts may bereproduced — that is social interaction may lead to the pre-existing structurebeing reproduced, leading to continuity within the social system generally.Thus, in contrast to the ‘procedural individualism’ of BR, a critical realistapproach would stress the need for analytical dualism. The structural anddiscursive context should be treated as analytically prior to the exercise ofagency.

Thus in place of BR’s vocabulary stressing: tradition, webs of belief, agencyand dilemma, a critical realist approach can champion a vocabulary stressing:structure, discourse, agency and emergent properties.

Conclusion: Towards a ‘Big Conversation’

A key aim of this paper has been to join in the conversation provoked by BRon where political science might go following positivism’s intellectual demise. Ithas been argued that there are viable alternatives to the interpretive approachand the analytical vocabulary outlined by BR. However, while this paper hasfocused on the differences between critical realist and interpretive assumptions,it is important to point out some shared terrain. Both approaches make clearthe importance of philosophical precepts in political analysis. Such preceptsregulate the concepts and vocabulary used by analysts as well as the type ofexplanations subsequently developed. In different ways both interpretivism andcritical realism challenge the idea that political events should be analysed basedon assumptions of underlying empirical regularity. Each offers concepts thatcan be used to analyse the multiple ways in which actors may understand andconstruct the world around them. Furthermore, both perspectives providestances on the ‘structure-agency’ (or context-conduct) debate which seek toavoid reification of structural factors.

However, while both approaches ‘face up’ to the problems of positivism/empiricism, they offer alternative roads away from these difficulties. Therestrictive ontology adopted by BR leads to accounts of political change inwhich agents are key, backed-up only by traditions which they may (or maynot) draw upon as an intellectual resource in deciding upon beliefs and actions.Traditions can be only a backdrop rather than a constraint. In contrast, a


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critical realist view argues that agents are conditioned by their material andideational context, such that what they believe and/or do may be enabled orconstrained by that context. This ability of social structure to both enable andconstrain agents is crucial in explaining patterns of both change and continuityin political life.

Notes

1 I would like to thank Mark Bevir and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier

versions of this paper. Usual disclaimers apply.

2 This is certainly not to suggest that there is only one possible kind of critical realist approach.

3 For helpful introductions to critical realism see in particular Collier (1994) and Archer (1998).

4 Not necessarily the position of Derrida himself, but of course many have interpreted his work

this way.

5 BR are not denying that there is a world external to thought but they decline to theorize

regarding its nature.

6 This is not to imply that our experiences and conceptualizations are somehow less real that

other layers of reality that are not directly accessible to us.

7 For an inspired attempt to do this through ‘evolutionary’ theorizing see Kerr (2001).

8 BR would no doubt be the first to agree with this statement, however the question is how far the

interpretive approach may help us grasp these influences and their impact on what New Labour

does.

9 There is insufficient space here to examine Driver and Martell’s (2002) interesting argument that

the third way itself is not a coherent set of beliefs or values as such but a combination of

different, sometimes contradictory value-sets.

10 As Bevir argues in ‘Logic’, ‘for criticism to be effective it must usually be positive ‘there is little

point attacking a web of theories unless they champion a suitable alternative’ (Bevir, 1999, 103).

11 Indeed increasingly discourse analysis, or related approaches are being practised by political

scientists sceptical or in many ways hostile to the poststructuralism of Foucault or Laclau and

Mouffe (e.g. see Jessop, 1990; McAnulla, 2002; Marsh et al., 1999; Townshend, 2003). Notably,

topics such as the progress of New Labour have been analysed using Norman Fairclough’s

(2000) brand of critical discourse analysis. Such authors seek to relate analysis of discourse to

other aspects of social life and to examine how actors can utilize discourse towards particular

ends. Consequently it may be both pragmatic (in terms of the current inter-disciplinary debates)

and theoretically defensible (based on a stratified social ontology) to discuss the ideational in

terms of discourse, whilst making clear the limits of its ontological status.

12 On this latter issue see debate between Laclau and Bhaskar (1998).

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