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Challenges and Choices inGerman–American RelationsJackson JanesPublished online: 22 Feb 2008.

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THE GERMAN POLITICS LECTURE 2007

Challenges and Choices in German–AmericanRelations

JACKSON JANES

Many observers were surprised at the severity of the confrontation in German–

American relations during the Schroder Chancellorship. From a historical perspective,

however, this downturn in the relationship appears less surprising. Tensions are a recur-

ring theme in a relationship that is rooted in common interests but is often disrupted by

competing visions of how best to realise those interests. This lecture explores the simi-

larities and differences in German–American relations between 1979 and today. More

than ever before, the United States and Germany are confronted with the same chal-

lenges, and neither country can deal with these challenges on its own. Cooperation

is therefore crucial, but it will only be achieved if we understand our respective narra-

tives. With its predisposition to forming consensus across multilateral networks, it is

argued, German foreign policy can help the US to build alliances around common prin-

ciples. Moreover, Angela Merkel has re-established trust in Washington, and is well

placed to act as interlocutor between the US and Europe. There is no room for compla-

cency, however. Whichever leaders are in power after the elections of 2008–09 will

have to nurture the relationship, marshalling shared resources in the pursuit of

common values.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN GERMAN – AMERICAN RELATIONS

The last time German–American relations were as difficult as they have been during

the Schroeder government was in 1979. Of course one could pick other points of refer-

ence to measure the congruence or lack thereof within the German–American dialogue

during the past half-century. But the fact is that any of them would yield a combination

of friction, continuity as well as change in the content of the relationship. Pick your

year, pick your chancellor, pick your president! The erection of the Berlin Wall in

August 1961 saw Kennedy and Adenauer argue about what to do but Kennedy

becomes Ein Berliner. The 1973 Yom Kippur war in the Middle East saw Nixon

and Brandt trading barbs over Germany’s refusal to allow Bremerhaven to be used

to transport arms to the Middle East but Kissinger declares the Year of Europe. The

debate over the double track decision in 1982 saw Schmidt lose his job as Chancellor

but Kohl kept US–German relations on course. German unification in 1990 saw Kohl

and Bush Sr. managing the high point of post-World War II German–American

relations. With 9/11 in 2001 and the 2003 clash over Iraq, Bush Jr. and Schroder

German Politics, Vol.17, No.1, March 2008, pp.1–9ISSN 0964-4008 print/1743-8993 onlineDOI: 10.1080/09644000701855093 # 2008 Association for the Study of German Politics

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managed themselves from unlimited solidarity into what Condoleezza Rice called a

poisoned relationship.

Along the way, we saw divisions both across the Atlantic as well as within each

country when it came to dealing with all these issues and making choices about how

to respond. But they raise the central question as to what really made and makes a

difference is determining the course of the debates and dialogues. Has it been the lea-

dership in Bonn/Berlin and in Washington and their chemistry or lack of it? Has it been

simply events and their unpredictable impact on the dialogue? Or has it been the tra-

ditional definition of interests, which more or less shape the course of the relationships

between any two countries? The ways through which nations manage conflict and

cooperation are influenced greatly by the underlying trust between those charged

with making policy, and how they talk to each other and their respective publics. It

also has to do with a transparent exchange of national interests. Finally, it has to do

with the choices to be made about dealing with threats, goals, and opportunities. Ques-

tions about future choices will be circling around the next phase of German–American

relations no matter who is President and who is Chancellor. And their answers will

determine the course of the dialogue in the post- Bush era. Whether that coincides

with a post-Merkel era is left to the German voters in 2009.

INTERDEPENDENCE AND RELIANCE

The situation in 1979 illustrates the ups and downs of German–American dialogue. It

provides valuable lessons for today, along with some interesting comparisons and con-

trasts in making choices and drawing their consequences. German–American relations

were not exactly at their high point. There was a President in the White House who was

unpopular at home and not terribly popular in Germany. Chancellor Schmidt made no

secret of his dislike for Jimmy Carter. Disputes over defence strategies, arms control,

trade and macroeconomic policies, and human rights policies increasingly marked the

dialogue across the Atlantic. Jimmy Carter’s style, the peanut farmer from Georgia, did

not sit well with the German public. And Schmidt came across as an Oberschullehrer in

the White House. Dealing with an aggressive Soviet Union which was already active in

Africa and was about to invade Afghanistan led to confrontation over the course of

detente policies and accusations from both sides about the lack of predictability and

commitment to the transatlantic alliance. President Carter was dealing with a crescent

of crises in the Middle East, watching Iran become an Islamic Republic and take

American diplomats hostage without the ability to do anything about it until he left

office in January of 1981. The continuing crisis over oil sent the price of a barrel to

over $80 with reverberations all over the world adding to the tensions across the

Atlantic. And despite the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Israeli–Palestinian

conflict continued to rage.

Chancellor Schmidt did not like Carter’s choices in responding to these crises but

there was little he could do to change them. In turn, Carter felt that Schmidt and his

European colleagues were an ungrateful bunch and indeed ruthless in their pursuit of

their own interests. Drawing a parallel to 2003/04 is not far-fetched. But running

through all this was a red line within the German–American relationship, effectively

drawn by the Berlin Wall. The bargain struck across the Atlantic from the founding

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of the Federal Republic in 1949 remained in place amidst differences of opinion over

policies, politics, and choices. The presence of the largest concentration of American

forces in the world spread throughout Germany guaranteed German and West

European security in the face of Soviet forces on the other side of the Wall and the

opportunity to grow into one of the most politically vibrant and economically

wealthy regions in the world. In return, Germany became a key partner across a

wide spectrum of transatlantic initiatives and institutions including NATO. Eventually

that collaboration led to the unification of Germany, the biggest success story of

German–American relations in the past half-century.

The Carter years in the White House matched by the Schmidt years in the Kanzler-

amt illustrated how that larger framework of German–American relations kept many

of the disputes across the Atlantic for the most part in check. The Federal Republic

of Germany was indeed not a completely sovereign country at that point, three

decades after its founding. The equation between the US and Germany was a

unique, asymmetrical one of interdependence and reliance in the name of a goal

which few people thought would be soon achieved and no one would have expected

a decade later to be reality.

THE GLOBAL FULDA GAP

Many of the challenges from 1979 are still with us. Of course, the entire geopolitical

situation has been altered in the interim 28 years. The Berlin Wall is no more, nor is

the Soviet Union. The EC nine is now the EU of 27. But we remain confronted with

problems with Iran, throughout the Middle East, with energy security, oil prices, and

nuclear proliferation. We also face tensions with leadership in Moscow. The more

things change, as the old saying goes. . .New problems since 1979 such as the re-emergence of nationalist and ethnic con-

flicts in the Balkans, Africa and the Caucuses, the implosion of failed or failing states,

and the emergence of a militant Islam capable of terrorist campaigns all over the world,

as well as accelerating threats like climate change, the spread of HIV/Aids, and other

pandemic potential challenges, have recast the parameters in which we must think and

act and make choices. To draw a comparison from the Cold War days, the threats once

associated with a particular place in Germany, the Fulda gap have spread around the

world. And they all have a bearing on the relationship between Germany and the

United States.

The relationship in 2007 is a mixture of partnership and competition immersed in a

large network of political, economic, and cultural connections making it one of the

most intense bilateral relations for both countries. It has evolved in a unique way

over a long period of time into one which can be defined by the reverse of how the

first President Bush described it in 1989: Partners in Leadership. Today, it is rather

‘Leaders in Partnership’. During the past 17 years, Germany has emerged as not

only a strong leader in Europe but also as a stronger global player exercising leadership

in multiple multinational frameworks. During the Cold War, Germany was an object of

American foreign policy. It is now a subject among many others in dealing with the

twenty-first century agenda, particularly within the framework of an increasingly influ-

ential European Union. There is a new equation between Germany and the United

CHALLENGES AND CHOICES IN GERMAN – AMERICAN RELATIONS 3

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States defined by needs, expectations, capabilities, and interests which encompass an

agenda which goes far beyond the transatlantic theatre and some of which will not

necessarily overlap.

A NEW SET OF CHOICES

These new equations have also resulted in clashes over the Atlantic as Germany has

adjusted to a new set of choices it did not have while the Berlin Wall stood and

Germany and Europe were divided. The German path since 1990 has not been an

easy one. Germany began a long effort to regain the bonds across the former Wall

with 17 million citizens, still a work in progress. It struggled with the effort to reassure

anxious neighbours that it was as committed to a strong Europe as it had been during

the Cold War. It strained under the pressures of its social market economy trying to

compete in a much larger marketplace. And it was challenged to redefine and

rethink its foreign policy responsibilities in a world in which far more was going to

be expected from it.

Germany was facing choices it had not been confronted with and it was not always

clear which ones to make. One could see it unfolding within weeks of the 3 October

celebrations of unification in 1990. Germany was unwilling to send troops into the

1991 Desert Storm operation against Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, preferring cheque-

book diplomacy. It agonised over sending soldiers off to wars in ‘out of area’ theatres.

The latter issue eventually culminated with the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe

having to make a decision as to whether participation was constitutional, even as gen-

ocide was occurring within a few hundred miles of the German border. Germany

worried about having to give up its holy Deutsch Mark and accept the Euro, and

about having to act as a leader in helping to secure stability and challenge threats

expanding well beyond Europe. All of this was being compressed within a very

short time span, and it is still very much in transition. The debate over whether

German troops could be – should be sent to Lebanon in summer 2006 is a most

recent demonstration.

Germany is a different country – politically, economically, and psychologically –

from what it was back in 1979 or 1990, both in the way it sees itself and the way others

see it. At the same time, the United States has also been going through a transformation

during these recent years in terms of its understanding and exercise of leadership and its

use of the power it wields as no country has in world history. Just as most Germans had

not expected unification, as it was always phrased, ‘to occur in my lifetime’, Americans

were also not prepared for the end of the Cold War and what that meant for the role it

inherited as the sole remaining superpower. The first President Bush declared a New

World Order to have emerged but was then promptly commanding a major war

against Iraq, witnessed the turbulence at Tiananmen Square, as well as escalating

violence in Africa and the Middle East.

ADAPTING TO NEW ROLES: GLOBAL ACTORS

During the Clinton years in the White House, there was a tendency at first to conflate

the end of the Cold War with the beginning of globalisation, and to cash in the peace

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dividend with America as the leader of that wave. The end of the Cold War was

celebrated over a bonfire of the vanities. The failure of communism meant that now

the world could aspire to the political and economic goals which the US embodied.

Yet not everyone either wanted to make that choice or could make it. Europe was

busy with its own brand of social democracy as it expanded its membership. China

slammed the door at such a choice with tanks in Tiananmen Square. And neither

Germany nor its European colleagues nor the United States were particularly enthusias-

tic about getting involved in bloody conflicts brewing in the Balkans or in Africa while

they were busy building their European order.

By the end of the 1990s, Europe and NATO were able to celebrate seeing a Europe

actually becoming whole and free amidst the celebration in Prague in 1999 marking the

new memberships of the alliance. NATO had actually taken action to stop genocide in

the Balkans without the blessing of the world community in the United Nations. The act

was controversial but Germany, Chair of the G8 and President of the EU, committed

itself, even with a SPD–Green Party coalition. However, the US was still at odds

with itself about what its responsibilities should be as a world leader, how it should

interact with its partners, and how it should use its unrivalled power. Even before

George W. Bush took office, relations with Germany and with Europe already

showed signs of tension over the approaches to dealing with multilateral decision-

making, as demonstrated in the rejection of the ICC, the Kyoto protocol, or the ban

on landmines. One could see increasing impatience in Washington with a Europe

which had announced its European moment but appeared unable to act on it. It was

seen as more preoccupied with itself in either protecting its markets or incapable of

speaking with one voice on non-economic issues. In Washington, on the other hand,

the discussion was about the unipolar moment for the US and what it should do with it.

Part of this picture was competing narratives coming out of the Cold War. Where

many in Washington drew the conclusion that American hard power had forced the col-

lapse of the Soviet Union, kept Europe safe and was now an unassailable resource

around the world, Europeans drew the conclusion that soft power – the power of

example – has been the central factor in bringing down the walls in Europe. There

is obviously truth on both sides of that equation but the balance was thrown out of

sync particularly after 9/11. The parameters of the Cold War’s web of interdependence

were loosening even though the alternatives to that web remained unclear.

A TRANSATLANTIC DISORDER

By the time President George W. Bush took office, there was already a widespread

anxiety about the uses of American power and influence around the world. In the

land of checks and balances, many saw unchecked power with no balances available

on the foreign policy stage. American hegemony was becoming a source of anxiety

even for its allies. Apart from global governance conflicts there was an immediate

spat over American decisions to develop new missile defence policies. But it took

9/11 and the shock waves sent throughout the world to put the US on a track which

would at first generate a huge wave of global sympathy and support but would ulti-

mately lead toward a major meltdown in foreign policy relations with Germany,

many of its neighbours, and create a global maelstrom of hate and distrust towards

CHALLENGES AND CHOICES IN GERMAN – AMERICAN RELATIONS 5

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Washington as well at the United States in general. This was anything but a new world

order.

The world is characterised by American hegemony and a global anti-American

backlash, a shift in the locus of action away from nation states toward non-state

actors and other transnational forces, a disintegration of sovereignty both in principle

and reality, and an emergence of weak and failed states that are the increasing sources

of global problems. The clash over the Atlantic became one over the definition of

threat, security, and the response to these challenges, and in particular the use and

legitimacy of force in dealing with them.

There is no need at this point to dissect the reasons that meltdown occurred in the

wake of the war in Iraq. On the American side, the analyses of mistakes made and

opportunities lost are emerging like a great river which is running through the

current debates in Congress and are going to be a central theme in the run-up to the

elections next year and well beyond. Whoever wins that election will be burdened

with a legacy which will take years to repair at home and abroad. The fact is the

United States has lost an enormous resource in the wake of the decision to invade

Iraq – first and foremost being its claim to have a balanced relationship between

power and legitimacy. No one questions the enormous presence of different kinds of

power and outreach available to the US in the twenty-first century. And I would

argue that the world in this century is at least as dangerous as the one of the last

century and therefore the judicious use of that global reach, power, and influence

will continue to be needed. There is no other country that can do that.

But the American goliath unbound by another superpower has come to be seen as

being as much a threat in many places around the world as the many dangers we all

face. Iraq was a catalyst for those concerns, multiplied by the intelligence failures,

undermining the credibility of the administration arguing about the imminent threat

posed by Saddam Hussein, not to speak about the rhetoric of preventive warfare as a

basis for action, and then the pictures of Abu Ghraib and the practices of Guantanamo.

All this seemed in stark contrast to how – amidst many mistakes made along the way –

the US role had been perceived following World War II.

REDEFINING CHANCES AND CHALLENGES

After 1945, the United States led the way in creating both capabilities and institutions

which were designed to avoid the catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century.

That was done in the name of principles as well as self-interest in the framework of the

bipolar conflict with the Soviet Union. This was the basis of the transatlantic bargain

which lasted throughout the Cold War. During the 1990s, this bargain began to

evolve in ways which were not immediately clear. Without a threat of Soviet troops,

the need for the American shield began to look less needed in Europe. Indeed, the

mandate for NATO was now being defined as ‘out of area’, but that was not easy to

implement as we saw in the Balkans. After 9/11, the Afghanistan theatre became

the next test for NATO’s new mandate but even that remains somewhat shaky, with

arguments over deployments causing tensions among NATO members.

The question lurking through the debates was: in what name do we take decisions to

intervene in other states, to use force and fight? We had said that it was always in the

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name of peace and freedom, sometimes arguing which should take priority. The peace

of the Cold War did not help many in Eastern Europe to have freedom. Yet the freedom

promotion efforts would not necessarily always yield peace as we witnessed now in

Iraq. While the first George Bush was able to mobilise a huge force to throw

Saddam out of Kuwait, the second Bush was able to topple Saddam but leave an

alliance fractured.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the US and Europe missed an opportunity to

forge a consensus with a new mandate to make the Wilsonian pledge – to make the

world safe for democracy. While there were efforts to deal jointly with the challenges

we face in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, it did not result in the larger blueprint for

dealing in the long term with both strategic dangers around the world and with plotting

the course for a global economic justice. Yes, we witnessed a significant expansion of

NATO and the EU, but in both cases there is a struggle resulting over how to find the

right balance between maintaining the effectiveness of these organisations with their

institutional legitimacy. The EU has that problem with the debate over its constitution.

NATO has that problem with trying to determine how to maintain its unity of command

decision-making, as witnessed now in Afghanistan. The debate over the effectiveness

and legitimacy of the United Nations is also part of this transatlantic debate.

The 9/11 milestone made the situation more difficult because it generated different

responses in the US and in Europe, Germany being a good illustration. The American

debate was driven by a sense of imminent threats spreading around the world, all of

which called for immediate response with all tools available. The result was an

effort not only to act to trying to pre-empt threats but to prevent them. And the Bush

administration illustrated this with the war in Iraq. In Europe, the approach to prevent-

ing dangers remained on the course of containment and detente, which clashed with the

Bush view that there was no more time for that in the post-9/11 world.

Four years later, what is perhaps more useful for us today is to take stock of what

both Germany and the United States are facing as they confront the threats and oppor-

tunities which have emerged not only from the Iraq war but from the continuing effort

to understand the world as it emerges in the coming years. It is about choices we think

we have and also about necessities we define. How the German–American relationship

will evolve depends on how these line up.

COOPERATION AS CONDITIO SINE QUA NON

As we look at the challenges both countries face, let us keep a few things in mind. For

the foreseeable future, there will remain a significant asymmetry in transatlantic

relations. The US impact on Europe and the rest of the world does not come with a

similar reciprocal impact on the US. Nevertheless, there is a web of multilateral insti-

tutions which act as coordinating bodies – be it the United Nations or NGOs – which

serve our interests and needs. As long as we understand what their capabilities and

limitations are, we can improve their effectiveness. The German and the American

role in most of them is critically important.

On the one hand, I believe – perhaps I should say I hope – that the next President of

the US, republican or democrat, will recognise these ties, if for no other reason than to

differentiate him- or herself from George W. Bush. The list of those crises we will be

CHALLENGES AND CHOICES IN GERMAN – AMERICAN RELATIONS 7

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facing is extensive: a volatile Middle East, an unstable Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq,

nuclear ambitions of Iran, an unpredictable course in Moscow, increasing dangers of

proliferation, continued bloodshed in Africa, the threat of disease – HIV deaths will

soon surpass all those who have died in wars during the entire twentieth century –

and of course the carbon catastrophe awaiting us if we do nothing. The linkages

across the Atlantic when it comes to drawing on the resources we have to deal with

these challenges are unique. There is a mutual need to use them.

Despite the dislike for the current President, there is widespread awareness of the

need for cooperation in Europe. That has been most recently and clearly articulated in

the German EU presidency as well as in the agenda for the G8 meeting in

Heiligendamm, Germany. Most Europeans will want to see a US engaged with them

on all these issues rather than turning inward in a funk after the Iraq decision. The

US needs to define its relations with the EU as its most important partner and under-

stand that a stronger Europe is in American interests, despite the competition which

comes with it. The next President has to give a strong voice to that, not only to

signal to the Europeans that Americans grasp that need but also to underscore to the

country at large how important it is. This was something President Clinton was able

to do more readily to Europeans than to his countrymen, particularly in the Congress.

That was the reason why his receipt of the Karls Prize in Aachen drew so little attention

in the United States.

The EU needs to decide how to increase its unity of purpose and capabilities to deal

with its own problems as well as those it shares with the US. That has been a slow and

sluggish process and continues to be so. There may be a telephone number in Brussels

for Washington to use now, but when Solana finishes that call he needs to follow it up

with 27 more calls to see what consensus there is to act.

COMMON HORIZONS? GERMAN – AMERICAN PROSPECTS

Within that effort, the German–American dialogue will play a central role. No one

country embodies the goal of a stronger Europe more than Germany. That has been

part of its political DNA since it was founded. The strategy of creating a balanced

Europe has Bismarckian roots. German foreign policy is very experienced and success-

ful in forging consensus and coalitions across many multilateral networks. In contrast

to Great Britain and France, Germany’s identity has been much more defined by its

European aspirations. I do not see that changing: Chancellor Merkel has articulated

it all through her EU presidency. Merkel has gained trust in Washington across the pol-

itical aisle. As far as dealing with Brussels is concerned, Washington will have an

effective interpreter in her to help understand both the possibilities and constraints in

that complicated network.

Can things go wrong again in the German–American relationship? It would be silly

to exclude frictions from the Berlin–Washington dialogue. There will be arguments

down the road, be it about Turkey’s membership in the EU, defence policies, or the

solutions to the Middle East crisis. There will be disagreements about many things,

no doubt. And Washington has to take notice that Germany’s decisions and choices

are, along with its other 26 fellow members in the EU, going to be increasingly

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framed with a European context, for better and perhaps on occasion for worse as far as

the US is concerned.

But where else can the US turn when it needs to shape policies around common

principles? As mentioned earlier, relations are about the choices we make. The import-

ant message to the next President is to say that our choices on both sides of the Atlantic

matter to each other in ever more complex, ever more integrated, and indeed ever more

frustrating ways. The boundaries between domestic and foreign policies are becoming

increasingly porous. Chancellor Merkel lives that every day in Berlin within the EU. I

think she also knows that, despite asymmetry across the Atlantic, a better understand-

ing of our respective domestic debates about each other are as important as the discus-

sions we have with each other. This is particularly the case for Merkel as long as she is

in the current coalition in Berlin. And if a Republican president is elected next year –

not a totally unlikely outcome – he will most likely be dealing with a democratic

Congress, turning decision-making in Washington into a challenge to say the least.

Even if the Democrats take the White House, there will still be some uncertainty

about how the administration will manoeuvre through the legacy of Iraq, cope with

Iran, work toward a settlement in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, figure

out how to deal with the new leadership in Russia, manage relations with a Beijing

flexing its muscles around the world and still maintain a full focus on dealing with ter-

rorist threats at home and abroad. And that is just the short list. But on each one of those

fronts, the new President is going to need help in Europe.

We need to understand our respective narratives as well as those which define our

relationship as we try to come to grips with our choices. For the past half-century the

German–American narrative has been a mostly positive one, a story of mutual support

and accomplishments. Now we need to write new chapters which will have different

reference points than the stories about the Berlin Airlift or the Marshall Plan.

Americans, Germans, and all Europeans can be justifiably proud of the legacy in a

Europe which overcame centuries of war and hostility for 27 countries now under

one roof and with more knocking on the door. Yet the many new reference points of

transatlantic relations will lie well outside the transatlantic corridor.

We will have no lack of opportunity to deal with continuing challenges: the ques-

tion is whether we can assemble the needed and shared resources in the service of a

shared set of ideas whose time has come. That happened when Europe was the

central arena and the stake for the transatlantic relationship was embodied by Berlin.

Today that arena lies elsewhere. But we still need the ideas and the staying power to

pursue them.

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