Ch 6 the Assault Begins on the Mavi Marmara

7/26/2019 Ch 6 the Assault Begins on the Mavi Marmara

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Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6 | 234

CHAPTER 6

CONTENTS

6.0 THE START OF THE ASSAULT ON THE MAVI MARMARA.................................................................. 235

6.1 PHASE ONE: THE ATTEMPTED BOARDING FROM THE SEA (THE DECOY) ............................237

6.2 THE FLOTILLA CHANGES COURSE ...............................................................................................................252

6.3 PHASE TWO: THE MAIN ASSAULT ...............................................................................................................255

6.3.1 The Black Hawk helicopters arrive .........................................................................................255

6.3.2 Stun grenades ....................................................................................................................................2576.3.3 Firing from the helicopters .........................................................................................................258

6.3.4 The first commandos land on the Navigation Deck .........................................................266

6.4 THE BATTLE IN WHICH THREE SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED......................................................271

6.4.1 Soldier 1 ................................................................................................................................................271

6.4.2 Soldier 3 (also known as Captain R) .....................................................................................280

6.4.3 Soldier 4 (radio operator) ............................................................................................................289

6.4.4 The captured soldiers equipment ...........................................................................................294

6.4.5 The battle for the Navigation Deck ..........................................................................................296

6.4.6 Ali Yunusolus film of the battle on the Navigation Deck...........................................298

6.4.7 The Schalit factor..............................................................................................................................305

6.4.8 Allegations of mistreatment of the soldiers in captivity ...............................................307

6.4.9 Comparison of the soldiers testimonies with available photographs...................310

6.5 FIRING FROM RIBS ...............................................................................................................................................318

Chapter 6 references .........................................................................................................................................................320


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6.0 THE START OF THE ASSAULT ON THE MAVI MARMARA

During the night before the attack Israeli boats had been appearing out of the darkness and then

disappearing back into the night, spreading fear among some passengers. 441Accounts vary on the

number of Israeli vessels following the Flotilla. Blent Yildirim has said there were 40 assault boats (i.e.

RIBs and other fast patrol boats), two submarines, and five naval vessels (although the Israelis say there

were four). He said there were ten helicopters (although aircraft would probably be more correctsince

there were also planes involved in the operation). 442

The first hostile act against the Mavi Marmara was effectively thwarted by the captain.

Fig. 6.1 A Saar class 5 corvette closes in on the starboard side of the Mavi Marmara on in the early hours of 31 May.

[David Segarra 31:11]

Early on the morning of the attack, a few hours before the attack, an Israeli corvette (the largest type of surface

vessel in the Israeli Navy) came up on the starboard side of the Mavi Marmara and tried to force it towards the

Israeli coast. The Mavi Marmara moved starboard instead, forcing the corvette to move away. 443

Fig.6.2 Less than six minutes before the

start of the attack ships defenders at the

stern of the Upper Deck are watching

Israeli boats. (Note the firehose on the

deck.) 444


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Fig. 6.3 Three RIBs and the Zaharon command boat are positioning ready for the start of the attack. (Photographed

from the missile ship INS Nitzachon.) [REUTERS/Uriel Sinai/Pool]

Fig. 6.4 One of the two Saar 5-class corvettes involved in the attack was also close by. [AFP/Pool/Uriel Sinai]


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6.1 PHASE ONE: THE ATTEMPTED BOARDING FROM THE SEA (THE DECOY)

Marcello Faraggi observed the attack on the Mavi Marmara from the Eleftheri Mesogeios. 445He

commented

It seemed like something in a movie but it was real. Real as in war.

The attack began during the Fajr, the pre-dawn prayers. All the lights on the ship were on and the men

lined up for prayer at the stern of the Boat Deck would have been clearly visible from the open sea. The

moment appears to have been deliberately chosen by the Israeli commanders.

Fig. 6.5 IDF infrared footage

filmed from the air (perhaps

from a Beechcraft plane)showing the start of the

attack. A Morena Rigid

Inflatable Boat (RIB) rapidly

approaches the Mavi

Marmaraon the port side. 446

Fig.6.6 A fire hose is spraying

at a RIB approached the stern

of the ship before the

commandos commenced

firing with riot guns. (This

footage is believed to have

been filmed from the Zaharon

fast attack boat.)447

RIBs came along both sides of

the ship simultaneously.


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Fig. 6.7 Image shot from Challenger I.

The commandos move close to the port side of the ship while strong lights are trained on them and the fire hose

at the stern of the Upper Deck continues to douse the RIB. At this stage no water jet can be seen from the fire

hose on the Boat Deck. It is not clear whether commandos have begun firing their pepper ball guns.

[Kate Geraghty ]

Fig. 6.8 The start of the attack, timed by Kevin Neish. [CoR @ 36.01]

The commandos made no attempt to issue any warning before opening fire. The riot guns were fired

randomly at open areas of the ship and stun grenades and tear gas was used indiscriminately.


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[In this context the Palmer Committee Report observed:

Following the principle of precaution, warnings must be given to the vessel prior to any attack.

The attack itself must be carried out in line with the basic rules of naval warfare, including theprinciple of distinction between combatants and civilians and the principles of precaution and

proportionality. This means that civilians may not be targeted, unless they take active part in

hostilities. 448]

The start time of attack as calculated by Kevin Neish was corroborated by the Eiland Committees

narrative. (Zero four-twenty-eight: beginning of the Marmara takeover.449) Eilands video narrative

shows two Zodiacs simultaneously attacking either side of the ship. 450While it is not possible to confirm

this from the video footage that has been released by the IDF, the CoR footage shows passengers at the

stern seeing Israeli boats on both sides of the ship [@ 32:00].

Eleven seconds later (at 36:12 on the CoR footage, and timed by Kevin Neish at 04:28:42) the first stun

grenade is heard, apparently exploding on one of the decks. This is immediately followed by a womans

scream.

Fig. 6.9 At least three of the commandos are firing riot guns (arrowed) at the

starboard side of the ship while an attempt is made to secure the boarding ladder

using a hook. The principal light source at this moment is from an Israeli stun

grenade which has just exploded on the ship. [CoR @ 36:20]


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Fig. 6.10 During the initial phase of the attack (still timed at 04:28 by Eiland) a commando aims a firearm at thepassengers on the stern of the Upper Deck. This weapon does not have the paintball magazine on top and has a

thicker barrel. This suggests the commando is already firing rubber bullets, live rounds or tear gas canisters.

[Eiland @ 09:20]

Fig. 6.11 (Footage probably filmed from the

Zaharon class command boat.)

[Eiland @ 09:25]

The ships defenders pushed off the

boarding ladder and sprayed the RIB with a

fire hose.

Fig. 6.12 The same incident filmed from the RIB. [IDF]

Hook for boarding ladder


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Figs. 6.13 & 6.14 A clearer view of one of the scaling ladders (used during the assault of the Eleftheri Mesogeios)

[Marcello Faraggi]


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Fig. 6.15 [IHH CCTV] 451

Passengers in the open working area at the stern of the Upper Deck, mounting a defence against the Israeli assault

using a fire hose and various rods and stakes that have been picked up around the ship. The electric lead appears to

go to the film lighting apparatus which was used to illuminate the RIBs and dazzle their occupants.

Some testimonies state that a chainsaw was used to cut the scaling ladder used by the commandos. 452The Eiland

video similarly claims that electric disc saws were used for this purpose. (There were no chainsaws on the ship

although angle grinders from the ships workshop were used to cut railings.) It seems unlikely that the hooks were

cut as no grinder appears in any of the photos. Passengers can be seen deflecting the hook for the scaling ladder

(see Fig. 5.24 below). A chainsaw would not be able to cut the solid metal hook and an angle grinder would be too

slow and cumbersome.

Fig. 6.16 The same area filmed

from a RIB.

Shortly after the RIBs draw

alongside an unidentified object is

thrown from the Upper Deck over

the starboard side. 453[This

appears to be an unexploded IDF

grenade. Activists had been issued

with asbestos gloves in order to beable to deal with these devices.454]


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Fig. 6.17 A second object isthrown over the side. 455The

trajectory (starting well inside

the deck) suggests that it is an

Israeli weapon being thrown

into the sea rather than an

object thrown at the RIB off the

starboard side.

Fig.6.18 A passenger with a long pole attempts to prod the RIB but it is too far below the deck and is out of reach.

(Pole marked in red.)456


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After their failure to board the commandos in the RIBs withdraw some distance from the ship, out of

range, where they wait their opportunity while continuing their indiscriminate fire with riot guns.

Fig. 6.20 Passengers continued to bombard the Zodiac with objects including bottles (circled). [CoR @37:21]

Fig. 6.19 Projectiles from the

riot guns were bouncing

against the side of the ship

(see shooting star type effect

highlighted within the blue

box). This suggests that

commandos were using solidnylon projectiles, which are

sold under the name Glass

Breaking. [CoR @ 37:07]


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A short sequence of film taken from the Bridge Deck (probably journalistic footage seized by soldiers)

was released by the IDF two days after the raid. 457The film, which had probably been carefully selected

and edited to support the Israeli narrative is reinterpreted here. It shows the commandos in a RIB

alongside the ship attempting to put a hook onto the ship in order to secure a light scaling ladder. They

are prevented from doing this by passengers who train two fire hoses on the RIB, repel the hook with

poles and a chain and throw various items of debris onto the attackers boat. The fire hoses seem to

have been effective in subduing the commandos activities.

There are two bright flashes in the clip, one of which the Israeli editors have labelled as a stun grenade

and circled where this has come from the ship. However this could only have originated from the

Israelis and have been thrown back at them from off the ship. Towards the end of the clip one

commando is seen to raise his pepperspray gun and prepare to fire at the passengers.

Fig. 6.21 One of the first RIBs is alongside the ship, port side aft. A box of plates (ringed) is thrown onto it from

the ship.


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Fig. 6.22 The IDF video circles a stun grenade which has been thrown from the Upper Deck. It is not

clear if this deliberately targetted the RIB or if it was being cleared from the deck after having been

thrown there by the commandos (see Figs. 6.16/7 above).

Fig. 6.23 The grenade explodes and the flash fills the screen.


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Fig.6.24 The aftermath of the explosion

Fig.6.25 A commando is trying to attach the scaling ladder. Passengers on the open area at the stern of the

Upper Deck are directing camera lighting on the RIB, spraying the attackers with a fire hose and deflecting

the scaling ladder with two metal poles. A passenger on the Boat Deck above them is trying to flick a chain

around the scaling hook. A second hose is employed from the right of the picture, also apparently from the

Boat Deck.

Hook for scaling ladder

Chain used

in attempt

to catch

scaling hook

Water jet from fire hose

Poles trying todeflect scaling hook.

Water jet from second hose

(probably on Boat Deck)


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Fig. 6.26 Passengers prevent the installation of the boarding hook

Fig. 6.27 This appears to be a second stun grenade but this time the flash is much less intense because it seems to

be coming from inside on the Upper Deck, suggesting that the commandos had thrown it on board. (The Israeli

editors ignored this explosion.)

Scaling hook

Pole used to deflect hook

Passenger on Boat Deck attempts to

wrap chain around scaling hook.


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Fig. 6.28 A soldier takes aim at the Mavi Marmara with his pepperball spray gun. The shadow of the gun can be

clearly seen.

Fig. 6.29 A passenger on the Boat Deck prepares to throw a stool at the RIB.


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Fig. 6.30 The start of the attack filmed from the Eleftheri Mesogeios by Marcello Faraggi. Two RIBs can be seen

(ringed), one on the starboard side and one astern. The open area astern on the Upper Deck is filled with smoke

from grenades. Challenger I is astern, but to port of the Mavi Marmaraand about to try to outrun the attackers. The

first helicopter has not yet arrived so the time is shortly before 04:30. [The Raid @ 25:52]

Fig. 6.31 Israeli infrared footage of the same period viewed from the port side of the two vessels. 458


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Fig. 6.32 Having been urged by the captain of the Mavi Marmara to avoid capture and tell the story, Challenger I

accelerates past the Mavi Marmara on the port side. [The Raid @ 25:54]


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6.2 THE FLOTILLA CHANGES COURSE

Fig. 6.33 Vessel tracker showing the courses taken by MV Mavi Marmara (blue)and MV Defne Y (green). The lastposition shown for MV Eleftheri Mesogeios (red) would be for around 03:50 local time.

The entire Flotilla had been travelling at 7 knots (the maximum speed possible by MV Eleftheri

Mesogeios) on a course of 185 at 04:27:52 local time (recorded on the chart as 1:27:52 UTC) i.e.

immediately before the start of the attack. Once the commandos started their attack from the RIBs both

vessels whose courses are shown here, veered towards the west, scattered and accelerated to their

maximum speeds.

Fig. 6.34 Enlargement of the chart at the moment of

attack.


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Fig. 6.35 The two ships turned very quickly and by 04:53:51 the Mavi Marmara had attained 12.5 knots heading

approximately WSW (i.e. away from Gaza and towards Tobruk in Libya). By the same time Defne Y had only

managed to accelerate to 7.9 knots.

The feint attack by the RIBs had caused the ships to turn away from Gaza and head in other directions at

top speed. Israel had suffered some wet, and perhaps some lightly injured commandos. But the attempt

to breach the blockade had, at least temporarily, been abandoned, and the IDF had achieved its

professed objective. Why then did the Israeli leadership decide to press ahead with the attack from the

helicopters which began with gunfire and resulted in deaths and injuries? The whole exercise of seizing,

abducting and abusing more than 700 civilians while seizing six vessels and their cargoes was highly

contentious legally. In retrospect it also appears to have been either utterly pointless, unless it wasintended as a vicious warning to future attempts at breaking the siege.


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Regrettably, none of the official inquiries chose to consider this question.

Fig. 6.36 According to the Eiland Report, commandos took control of the bridge of the Mavi Marmara at 05:04 local

time when they shut down both engines. At approximately that time vesseltracker shows that the ship had reached

13.8 knots and was heading due west.

Fig. 6.37 By 05:51:58 the Mavi Marmarawas dead in the water and was

facing north. MV Defne Y was almost stationary at 06:17:37.


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6.3 PHASE TWO: THE MAIN ASSAULT

6.3.1 The Black Hawk helicopters arrive

Fig. 6.38 The first Black Hawk hovers above the Navigation Deck at around 04:30, partially illuminated by a spotlight

from the ship. The Sfendoni is now between the Mavi Marmara and the cameraman. [The Raid @ 26:19]

In a TV interview for BBC Panorama, Gen Eiland claimed the helicopter attack was a reaction to the

defence of the ship:

Gen Eiland The resistance was huge, much above expectations. Someone had to say well,

the right conditions do not exist, lets do something else. Lets take plan B.

Jane Corbin: So they brought the helicopters in []

Gen Eiland: Exactly.459

Although General Eilands comment that the defence was much greater than expectations is credible,

the helicopter narrative constructed by general and interviewer is fraudulent. The helicopters arrived

less than two minutes after the attack started from the RIBs, yet Black Hawk helicopters are too large to

land on any Israeli Navy ship and would have flown to the attack from Israel, around 70 miles away.

(They are six metres longer than the Eurocopter which can just be stabled on the rear deck of the Saar

class 5 corvettes. 460461) This flight would have taken about 20 minutes once the soldiers had embarked.

So their departure took place well before the start of the attack and their arrival two minutes after,

must have been intentional.

This suggests the RIBs were merely a decoy to gain an element of surprise for the main assault. Nobody

on the ship had anticipated the airbourne boarding. Nevertheless the ruse failed because there were

already passengers (including two photographers) waiting on the Navigation Deck to defend the

communications antennae, although many were located at the front of the deck above the bridge.

Three Black Hawk helicopters were used to land a total of 41 soldiers (15, 12 and 14 respectively). 462

According to Israeli journalist Alon Ben David, the second Black Hawk arrived around 04:35. 463Kevin

Neishs timing of the CoR footage shows that the third Black Hawk arrived around 04:46.According to

Blent Yildirim (who was on the Bridge Deck and well placed to see) soldiers were shooting from one

helicopter while a second was unloading commandos onto the ship. 464


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Fig. 6.39 Blent Yildirim

on the Bridge Deck as

the first helicopter

arrives over the

Navigation Deck. Mr

Yildirilm is probably

pleased that the

boarding from the RIBs

has been repelled but

as yet unaware that

commandos are about

to fast rope onto the

ship. Stood next ot him

is Nicci Enchmarch,

whose hair is being

blown around by the

helicopter downdraft.

[Photo: efik Din]

Fig. 6.40 Snapshot from the Eiland video showing aerial infrared footage of the moment when the first Black Hawk

helicopter arrived above the Navigation Deck. The parapet of the deck has been marked here by the red line and the

X indicates approximately the point above which the helicopter hovered to let the commandos descend. The time on

the film (top right corner) has been partially obscured but it appears to confirm the time given by Eiland on the left

of the picture. 465It is assumed that the IDF (which would have used state of the art technology) has much better

quality copies of this film which have not been released to the public.

X


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6.3.2 Stun grenades

Israeli sources all admit that stun grenades were then thrown onto the deck, but they cannot agree on

how many. The Eiland video says a number. 466An ITIC report based on soldiers testimonies admits a

stun grenade was thrown. Yet in an appendix the same report quotes the platoon commanders

testimony saying that two grenades were ordered by the fleet commander, while another testimonydescribes throwing stun grenades (i.e. plural). 467The Turkel Commission also received contradictory

answers ranging from one, two and a number. (Testament from soldier no. 4 tells how soldier no. 5

threw a number of grenades, while soldier5 admitted to only throwing one.) Unfazed by the

discrepancies Turkel settled for two from one side and a third from the other side of the helicopter. 468

Israeli security services generally use the Mini-Banggrenade with a metal casing, which weighs 424g.469According to the platoon commander, the helicopter was hovering 25 metres above the deck 470

when the grenades were thrown: a dangerous act against a civilian ship without any prior warning.

At least one passenger, Osman alik, was injured by these grenades.

[]I saw that one bomb after another was being thrown at the ship from the helicopter. One of

those bombs hit my left leg and I was injured. They were throwing bombs onto nearly every deck.

After they had thrown the bombs they started to lower soldiers onto the ship.471

(Mr alik was also shot in the other leg and was reported to have been seriously wounded. 472)

Fig. 6.41 Aerial footage from the Eiland video showing a stun grenade thrown from the

first Black Hawk helicopter exploding on the Navigation Deck. This film is almost

concurrent with the image in Fig 6.41 but was filmed from the opposite side of the ship,

indicating that there were at least two aircraft filming. [@ 09:58]

On the poor quality footage released showing the stun grenade exploding at 04:30, the explosion is very

clear and unmistakeable. The IDF had filmed this whole attack from several angles, so there seems little

doubt that their photo interpreters, using the best quality footage available, would have known

precisely how many stun grenades were thrown from the helicopter. The variable testimonies reinforce

Mr aliks assertion that the soldiers threw more grenades than the IDF has admitted to.


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6.3.3 Firing from the helicopters

Israeli sources deny that there was any gunfire from any of the helicopters, and insist that no one was

shot until after the commandos were attacked on the Navigation Deck.

Fig. 6.42 The Turkel Commissions complete denial that the IDF fired any rounds from any helicopter, with its

sources listed as the Commander of the Commando Unit and the pilots of the three helicopters which ferried the

commandos to the ship. [Highlighting added]


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Fig. 6.43 ITICs denial of shooting from the helicopters. [Highlighting added, but emboldened type in original] 473

Photographic evidence gives the lie to these denials. Two photographs taken by journalist Mahir Tanin

show a helicopter arriving over the Navigation Deck. Although the details inside the aircraft are obscure

a laser sight beam can be seen in both pictures. No gun flashes can be seen in the photos but it is

inconceivable that the soldiers were ranging their weapons at the ship but never fired them. Coupled

with the autopsy evidence that victims on the uppermost deck of the ship were shot from above and

witness testimonies (discussed below), the evidence is overwhelming. In contrast, Turkels suggestion

that high angle of trajectory wounds resulted from victims being shot while they were bending over (see

Fig. 6.43) appears far-fetched, if not ludicrously so.

Fig. 6.44 Blackhawk helicopter arriving over the Mavi Marmara. The aircraft has not yet taken up position over

the Navigation Deck and yet a soldier is already training his laser sight onto that deck. [Manir Tanin 474]


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Fig. 6.45 A second shot of the same helicopter filmed from the same position on the Bridge Deck starboard side,

located to the stern of the bridge. Parts of three letters can be seen from the name Mavi Marmara which appears on

the parapet of the Navigation Deck. (The inset photograph shows the location of the lettering.) The aircraft has still

not arrived in position to offload commandos and no fast ropes have yet been dropped. It is reasonable to conclude

from this that firing took place from the helicopter before any commando landed on the deck. The laser sight is

ringed. [Manir Tanin 475]

Three helicopters offloaded commandos onto the ship and it is possible to deduce that the helicopter in

Manir Taninsphotographs is the first one:

Fig. 6.46 Underside of the helicopter

which appears in the Cultures of

Resistance footage (filmed from the

Bridge Deck port side). Kevin Neish has

deduced by cross referencing his own

still photos that this is the thirdhelicopter.

[CoR @ 40:32]


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Fig. 6.47 Underbelly of thehelicopter in Manir Tanins

photographs. The image has

been upended for the purposes

of comparison. The item which

has been ringed does not

appear on the third helicopter

meaning that this is either the

first or second helicopter to

arrive.

Fig.

Figs. 6.48 & 6.49 (left) Port

side of a helicopter which

does not have a projecting

part as seen on the third

helicopter (above). It also

does not have the

distinctive shape which

appears in Mr Tanins

photos. So the three sets

of photos are of three

different aircraft.

The photograph above shows ropes descending from both sides of the helicopter, and in the video it istaken from soldiers are descending on both ropes (see section 7.1 below). Section 6.3.4 below describes

how passengers tied up one rope of the first helicopter and prevented the soldiers from using it. So the

picture above is not of the first helicopter and as it is not the third it has to be the second aircraft.

By the same process of elimination the helicopter photographed by Mr Tanin has to be the first

helicopter. These photographs show that commandos were aiming (and therefore presumably firing) at

the Navigation Deck before they landed. That is to say the commandos instigated the violence on that

deck by shooting at the passengers first, and that the passengers violence was, at least in part, a

response to this shooting.

There is also corroborating evidence for this deduction.


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Fig. 6.51 [CIHAN 476]

Fig. 6.52 Muhittin Gilistands on the Mavi

Marmara at the point at

which he says he was shot

by live fire from a

helicopter while praying.

The top of the lifeboat

derrick at the right of the

picture and the bend in the

parapet identify the

location as the Navigation

Deck starboard side. 477

Figs. 6.50 Photograph taken from the Mavi

Marmara of the third Black Hawk helicopter

prior to the commandos descent (the fastropes have not yet been dropped). A soldier is

pointing what appears to be a gun barrel out

of the open port side doorway (ringed and

arrowed).


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Photographs of the injured Mr Gili can be seen in Chapter 7. He was hit by a single bullet which entered

his right thigh and exited lower down the leg. This indicates a live round fired from above, which on the

Navigation Deck could only be from an aircraft, i.e. a helicopter.

Two journalists, efik Din and Espen Goffeng have said that rubber bullets were fired first from the

helicopter, but that this only switched to live fire after the first commandos were attacked and disabled.

Both these reporters were on the Bridge Deck and were not able to witness the moment when

passengers were shot on the deck above them. Both reporters also made recorded errors about

contemporaneous events.

Mr Din claimed to have no respirator when the helicopters arrived, yet video evidence shows him

reporting to the TV camera with a respirator attached to his waist.iIn captions to the photographs in his

book on the raid he stated that the Sikorsky (Black Hawk) helicopters came from the Israeli surface

ships, yet as already discussed above, this helicopter is too big to land on Israeli naval ships. Similarly Mr

Din claimed that passengers tried to throw one of the soldiers overboard from the Bridge Deck, yet he

should have been aware that the deck below is some three to six metres wider so that it would not have

been possible to throw a person into the sea at that point. (This author also disputes the intentions of

the passengers to commit such a crime.) ii

Mr Goffeng is shown in the Cultures of Resistance footage (@ 39:11) explaining to the cameraman that

he thought the blood on the wall next to a vertical ladder was some paintball-looking substance. In

reality some of the first casualties had come down the ladder, including Muhittin Gili and Mehmet Ali

Zeybek who had been shot nine times and had stumbled down the ladder. Blood was not only on the

wall and dripping down the ladder, but it had been smeared on a nearby locker.

Both of these testimonies are therefore suspect.

Conversely, Captain Mamoud Tural had a clear view of the attack from the bridge and he is certain that

there was firing from the helicopter before any commando descended, although he did not know if live

rounds or rubber bullets were used. 478

Some of the survivors who were on the Navigation Deck also testified that there had been shooting of

live fire before the boarding. Ahmet Aydan Bekar said in his official testimony that various grenades

(including tear gas and smoke bombs) were thrown, and that this was followed by live fire before any

soldier descended from the helicopter. Cihat Gkdemir said that the helicopter hovered above the deckfor about a minute and then soldiers inside opened fire on passengers on the decks. Only after this

fusillade were the ropes dropped down for the commandos to descend. Erdin Tekir also testified that

soldiers shot at him from the helicopters, wounding him in the hip. Osman Kur was also wounded on

the Navigation Deck. He said that there was firing from the helicopters as the commandos descended,

and that he was shot multiple times in his abdominal area by this fire.

iIn a BBC commissioned translation of Chapter 3 of his book KANLI MAV MARMARA (obtained by the author) in

the section Helikopterlerle ikarma yapildi (Landing via helicopters) Mr Din is quoted as writing I didnt have any

equipment such as a bulletproof vest, respirator or any other protection apart from the life jacket. This iscontradicted here in Fig 5.21.iiThe BBC also commissioned a translation of all 25 photographic captions in Mr Dins book.


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Fig. 6.53 (above) The earliest footage released by the IDF. The time by the digital clock in

the right hand corner is 04:31:44 and the first helicopter is in position. Israeli sources say

the aircraft arrived at ship at 04:30. 479

Fig. 6.54 (below) 04:31:56 the fast rope is dropped onto the deck. 480This suggests there

was nearly two minutes between the arrival of the helicopter and the first attempt by

commandos to board. During that time there was firing from the helicopter onto the deck.


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Al Jazeerajournalist Jamal Elshayyal said in his witness testimony

[From the Bridge Deck] you could almost see the soldiers pointing their guns down through some

sort of hole or compartment at the bottom side of the helicopter, firing almost indiscriminatelywithout even looking where they were firing and those bullets were definitely live bullets . 481

Fig. 6.55 Hatchways (ringed) on underbelly of helicopter hovering over the Navigation Deck [efik Din 482]

Dror Filer is an ex-IDF paratrooper who was travelling on the Eleftheri Mesogeios which was on a course

parallel with the Mavi Marmara. On 6 November 2013 he told the court at Istanbul

Our boat was between 300 and 500 meters from the Mavi Marmara. I could see that people on

the Mavi Marmara using their lights to search the water to see if the boats coming. I could see the

helicopters, two helicopters, above the Mavi Marmara. I could hear shots. And I would like to

emphasize that I know the difference between live ammunition and other ammunition. I had beena soldier myself and it was live ammunition. And these shots was fired before any Israeli soldier

was on the boat. [Court records]

[The research agency Forensic Architecture, based at Goldsmiths, University of London has published an

online report entitled Nakba Day Killings which illustrates the difference in sound made by live bullets

and rubber-coated bullets. 483

The Israeli narrative which denies the initial shooting and claims that the passengers started the

violence is not only a fabrication. It is also a conspiracy allegedly involving (from the Turkel

Commissions references) at least the commander of the commando unit, the three helicopter pilots

and a number of the soldiers. This conspiracy has also been aided and abetted by the wilfully naveIsraeli commission of inquiry.


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6.3.4 The first commandos land on the Navigation Deck

The commandos descended from the helicopter by fast roping. This technique was developed for rapid

deployment and involves sliding down a thick diameter braided rope using heavy duty gloves. No

harnesses are used. 484

Fig. 6.56 Footage showing Royal Australian Navy

(RAN) personnel fast roping. Note the thickness of

the gloves and the rope.

Fig. 6.57 The same film shows the technique for

landing which involves keeping the hands at about

head height and bending the knees. 485Passengers

on the Mavi Marmara disrupted the first commandos

by initially preventing them from landing correctly.

Only a few Israeli units are trained to use the technique, but the IDF had previously deployed it during

the capture of other ships where there was an operational need for it . 486


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Fig. 6.58 The attack on the Navigation Deck was unforeseen by the defenders of the ship who were taken by

surprise. 487Although there were passengers allocated there to defend and to film, they were initially standing above

the bridge (and can be discerned in this enlargement by their red lifejackets to the left of the spotlight). When the

commandos dropped their ropes to descend onto the deck the defenders ran back to confront them.

[The Raid @ 26:19]

Fig. 6.59 Edited infrared footage released by the IDF shows volunteers on the Navigation Deck running from the area

above the bridge to the central area of the deck where the first commandos are landing.

Fig. 6.60 Some of the primitive weapons which remained on

the deck when the ship was released from Israeli custody.

[IHH]


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The commandos boarding operation began to go wrong when passengers tied the first rope to the

communications tower rendering it unusable. When the commandos dropped their second rope two

passengers were pulling it to the communications tower as the first commando descended.

Fig. 6.61 Portion of a snapshot from IDF infrared aerial

footage.

Time 04:31:50. The first commando is descending on the

second fast rope (in the yellow circle) while Fahri Yaldiz and

elebi Bozan (in the red rectangle) are pulling the standing

end that was thrown onto the deck.Ayhan Altunta, who was

in charge of internal organization, told them not to tie the

second rope because he feared it could unbalance the ship.488

Fig. 6.62 The same incident filmed from an

Israeli boat on the starboard side. The turkish

volunteers are running to tie the rope, while

one of them looks back to watche the

descending commando at the same time.

[IDF]

Fig. 6.63 Starboard side Viewed from the Eleftheri Mesogeios . The rope has been tied to the satellite transmitter

and can no longer be used for fast roping. [The Raid @ 26:41]


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Fig. 6.64 Footage filmed from a boat on the starboard side shows the first rope tied up and inoperable while the

second rope is nearly horizontal and dangerous to use. The first commando [Soldier 1] is more than two metres

above the deck and no longer in control of his descent. The commandos were only able to use this rope because it

was not tied. Time 04:31:51. [IDF]

If the passengers had continued to tie up the second rope, further boarding at this stage would have

been impossible. With one soldier in captivity, the subsequent Israeli reaction may have been extreme

(see section 6.4.5 below).

Fig. 6.65 The deflection of the rope left

Soldier 1 hanging with his arms in the air

and his head back. In this position he was

unprepared for the physical assault which

followed.

[IDF infrared footage]

First rope tied to tower and unusable.


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The unusable fast rope was later jettisoned by the helicopter and fell over the side of the parapet on the

port side.

Figs. 6.66 Fast rope (arrowed) discarded by the first helicopter hanging down onto

the Bridge Deck. This was later retrieved by the commandos and thrown down on

the Navigation Deck on top the body of Fahri Yaldiz. 489 [CoR @ 39:13 & 41:57]

Fig. 6.67 A vast amount of debris is blown about in the air by the down draught from

the helicopter. Abdullah Camiolu, travelling behind the Mavi Marmara on the Defne Y

reported seeing sleeping bags and life jackets on the surface of the water and feared

that the Mavi Marmara had been sunk. 490 [The Raid @ 27:06]


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6.4 THE BATTLE IN WHICH THREE SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED

[The numbering of the captive soldiers follows that used by Israels Turkel Commission.]

6.4.1 Soldier 1

IDF infrared video shows the first soldier to land on the ship was promptly overpowered and captured by the ships

defenders. (The soldier appears in dark clothing in the photos here.)

Fig. 6.68 Montage of the six seconds during which Soldier 1 landed on the Navigation Deck and was pushed overthe parapet onto the deck below. [efik Din& IDF 491]


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Figs. 6.696.72 Soldier 1 is pushed over the parapet on the

port side and falls on the deck among about ten passengers

standing there who disarm him and take him prisoner. 492

Fig. 6.73 (below) Time 04:31:57. As soldier 1 is

pushed over the parapet of the deck Soldier 2

descends onto the Navigation Deck. [IDF]


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Fig. 6.74 Scene on the Bridge Deck where

the photographer appears to have stood

on a locker (out of the way of the fighting)

to take this photograph. Soldier 1 has lost

his helmet but still has his pack on. He is

being struck on the arm with a stanchion.The fast rope from the helicopter hangs

immediately to the right of Soldier 1s

head. [Photo: efik Din]

Fig. 6.75 In the background of the

previous photograph Blent Yildirim and

another passenger have wrestled Captain R

onto the deck. This soldiers helmet can be

seen here.


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Fig. 6.76 Soldier 1s account to the Turkel Commission of his treatment once he was taken inside the ship. It is

quoted here verbatim with emphasis added to the section which compares to the photographs reproduced here,

which are all that have been found in the public domain.


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Time: 04:36:17

Fig. 6.77 Soldier 1 at the top of the stairwell on the

Bridge Deck. It is 4 minutes 26 seconds since he

landed on the ship. In that time he has beenoverpowered, stripped of his weapons and military

equipment and brought inside. At this stage he is

injured, frightened, crying and probably in a state of

shock and feeling very vulnerable.

[Photo: Kevin Neish]

Time 04:36:25

Fig. 6.78 Soldier 1 is guided downstairs from the

Bridge Deck by Murat Akinan, while Mr Akinan

remonstrates with a photographer taking pictures of

the injured man. [Photo: Kevin Neish]

[Mr Akinan had been entrusted with the care of the

soldiers by IHH president, Blent Yildirim. During his

interrogation in Israeli custody he was asked why the

soldier was hit despite his efforts, to which he

explained that he could not stop everybody. The

interrogator admitted that photographs showed that

he had acted with goodwill towards the soldier in his

care.493 ]

Fig. 6.79 Three passengers struggle with Soldier 1 as

he resists being taken down the stairs to the Boat

Deck. The vigourous activity appears to have

incrreased the bleeding from the wound on his

forehead. (There is no evidence from these photos

here that he has been hit on the head again at this

stage.)[efik Din]


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Time: 4:36:38

Fig. 6.80 Soldier 1 is put in an arm lock to force himdownstairs to the Upper Deck. There are no clubs tobe seen and it is not apparent that anyone isattacking him at this stage.


Figs. 6.81 & 6.82 [Photos: efik Din]


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The three soldiers were all attended by Dr. Hasan Huseyin Uysal, a Turkish eye specialist.[Once the Israeli forces had taken control of the ship Dr Uysal was treated like the rest of the passengers:

he was handcuffed tightly and made to kneel on the deck for three hours.494]

Fig. 6.83 Dr Uysal gives first aid to Soldier 1 in thefemale quarters on the Main Deck while Mr Akinanrests his hand on the soldiers left shoulder. Thesoldier looks with fear and hostility towards thecameraman.

[Photo: efik Din]

Fig. 6.84 Dr Uysal:

None of the soldiers had any fatal wounds thatwould cause organ loss or defects. There werescratches on their faces, but since facial skin issensitive and very likely to bleed in any trauma,there was blood on their faces which I cleaned

carefully to see what kind of injuries they had. Inthe end, they happened to be only scratches. 495

[Photo: efik Din]

Fig. 6.85

With my broken English I tried to tell them that Iwas a doctor and there was no need to be afraidand that nobody was going to hurt them. They

relaxed after a while and watched us running

around, jumping from one patient to another intears, faced with our friends bathed in blood. I alsoasked our assistants to keep an eye on them sothat they would not be threatened.

[]We asked photographers not to film in themedical centre and I have no idea how and whenthat picture was taken.496

[Photo: efik Din]


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Figs. 6.866.89 A confused and poor quality short video sequence 497498of the same incident was transmitted from

the ship shortly before its capture and broadcast byAl Jazeeraand Press TV. This shows a passenger with gas mask

and wooden stave attempting to prevent filming while Dr Uysal supported by Mr Akinan gave first aid to Soldier 1 on

the Main Deck.499


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There is no visible threat to the soldier at this stage. This location on the Main Deck had originally been

allocated for the exclusive use as a womens lounge and was now considered the best place to take the

soldiers for their safety.

In Section 135 on pages 161/2 of their report (Part 1) the Turkel Commission wrote

In a 34-second video taken by one of the flotilla participants, soldier no. 1 is seen inside the shipbelow deck, bleeding from his head and groaning in pain, while he is being guarded by an IHHactivist wearing a life jacket and a gas mask and holding a large wooden club.

This writer has not seen more than 17 seconds of this video, although some versions have repeated

sections, which may account for the length seen by Turkel. The video is very confused and jumpy

because the camera is trying to outmanouver the passenger standing guard and trying to prevent the

filming. It is important to note that this guard is not trying to prevent filming of abuse of the captive, but

is actually trying to prevent abuse by the filmmaker of the captives privacy.

As it is also clear that the images in the video do not fit Turkels interpretation, some explanatory

comments are in order.

1.

As can be seen from the caption on the contemporary footage broadcast, the dead and wounded

were rapidly accumulating and the doctors had far more serious cases to attend to. Despite this,

the Flotilla organizers had prioritized the welfare of the soldiers.

2. Regardless of what other evidence Turkel may have seen, this video shows that the soldier was not,

as Turkel claims, guarded by an IHH activist wearing a life jacket and a gas mask and holding a

large wooden club. The activist is as described but was in fact engaged totally in trying to preventthe photographer(s) from filming this humanitarian event.

3. Mr Dins still photographs of this same event (which he somehow managed to capture without

interference) show that the blood on the soldiers face is not fresh and the bleeding appears to

have stopped.

4.

It is not clear if Turkel did in fact see a video with sound (this writer has not done so) or if the

description of the soldier groaning in pain was artistic licence.


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6.4.2 Soldier 3 (also known as Captain R)

Fig. 6.90 Aerial footage shows Captain R was pushedover the parapet of the Navigation Deck on the port side

at 04:32:09, 12 seconds after Soldier 1. He was attacked

by about four passengers (the two persons showing

darkly at the top are standing on the deck below, i.e. the

Bridge Deck).

Captain R:

They came at me with knives, and tried to stab me. I kept getting hit on my head, on my whole

body. They caught me by the arms and legs to throw me to the deck below. I fought back

wildly and caught hold of the side. They beat my hands with clubs and I fell. 500

Figs. 6.91 & 6.92 Captain R holds onto the parapet port side. In order to dislodge him, the

passenger in white on the Navigation Deck beats his fingers while a passenger on the Bridge

Deck pulls his legs, forcing him to let go and fall among a group of around ten passengers.

[IDF 501]

Ken OKeefe

[Just as I got to the Bridge Deck] one of the commandos fell from the upper deck, just a metre

and a half from me, in front of my eyes.[]The first thing I saw was the 9 mm pistol he was

carrying, and I immediately tried to take it. The soldier was conscious but pretty much in shock,and it was easy to deal with him.


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Osama Qashoo was on the Bridge Deck:

I was filming and then suddenly something fell on top of my head and that was (later on I

realised) it was a soldier. [Captain R] He was looking at me and then he grabbed his Uzi and he

started shooting. I could see the vibration of the Uzi.

Fig. 6.93 Captain R, the second soldier pushed off the Navigation Deck, is pushed against the parapet on the port

side of the Bridge Deck as at least three passengers grapple with him. There have been claims that the intention

was to push him over the parapet but it is more likely that the melee fell aginst the parapet while passengers

struggle to overpower the soldier. The hand in the bottom right corner is pulling his vest, not pushing him.

Another passenger is filming. The cuff and tripod camera identify him as the same cameraman who Murat Akinan

later remonstrated with (see Fig. 6.78).

Fig. 6.94 Captain R has been brought inside on the

Bridge Deck and attempts are made to calm and

reassure him (note the body language of the finger

shown to his face and the hand upon his left knee).

His weapons have probably been thrown overboardoutside and his protective ammunition vest will shortly

be removed and disposed of. This appears to hold two

magazines for a Mini Uzi sub-machine gun (holding 20,

25 or 32 bullets each 502) and two magazines for a

Glock semi-automatic pistol (holding 17 or 19 bullets

each 503) which are visible below his left hand. Other

soldiers carried automatic rifles instead.

Captain R admitted to a reporter that he fired one

round from his sub-machine gun before he was

overpowered, 504but said two bullets to the Turkel

Commission. 505


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Figs. 6.95 & 6.96 (below)

SOLDIER 3 (CAPTAIN R)S TESTIMONY TO THE TURKEL COMMISSION

Of particular interest here is the claim that he has lost a lot of blood and that part of

his intestines were protruding. No sign of this injury can be seen in these photographs,

even in Fig. 6.100, and Israeli sources have not produced any photographic evidence to

support this claim, despite there having been cameras available at the scene.


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51/92


Time: 04:38:30

Fig.6.97 It was at this point that Kevin Neish saw an enraged

passenger hit this soldier. The activists in charge of the captive

soldier pulled the assailant away while scolding him severely

and then quickly took their charge downstairs out of the way

and to the doctor. 506 [Both photos:

Kevin Neish]

Time 04:39:03

Fig. 6.98 Captain R is taken down the port side stairs comingonto the landing above the Boat Deck. He does not appear to beunder restraint or attack at this stage.


Time: 04:39:47

Fig. 6.99 A doctor (left of picture) attends toSoldier 3 on the landing above the Boat Deck.



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Time: 04:40:26

Fig. 6.100 Captain R, obviously frightened, on the stair landing between the Bridge and Boat decks. Thepistol holster on his left leg has now been removed. There is fresh blood on his left hand and a blood stainshows on his underpants in the appendix region. [Photo: Kevin Neish]

The knife in the bottom right hand corner of the picture (ringed) appears to have been used to cut off his

ammunition vest. It is entirely free of blood and held loosely in a pen grip in a non-threatening way bysomeone not directly next to or facing the injured captive. It is not the reason for the soldiers fear sincehe is looking in the opposite direction. There are at least five people around the injured man, stood

apart from him and only one is seen to be holding him, although another may be holding his right foot.

Fig. 6.101 A close up of the previous photo shows the commandos fear.


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Fig. 6.102 After removal of his balaclava, now with fresh blood on his nose and still shocked and frightened(as shown by the wide eyes), Soldier 3 seems unaware of the arm over his right shoulder and the handtouching his right arm. His captors all seem intent on reassuring him rather than attacking him. Aphotographer (possibly the person previously admonished by Murat Akinan on the Bridge Deck) is filmingwith a cam corder.[Soldiers 3 and 4 were terrified and were struggling violently to get free from their captors as they were

brought inside the ship.507

This may account for the fresh blood on the nose here.] [Photo: efik Din]

Fig. 6.103 Captain R (identified by his epaulette) sits on the stairs above the Boat Deck, with his eyeswide with fear. His guardians seem to be waiting (possibly for the return of the medic) while trying tokeep him calm. [Photo: efik Din]


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Ken OKeefe:

I looked into the eyes of all three of these boys and I can tell you they had the fear of God inthem. They looked at us as if we were them, and I have no doubt they did not believe there wasany way they would survive that day. They looked like frightened children in the face of an

abusive father.508

Fig. 6.104 A still from a fewseconds of video broadcastby CIHAN again showing

Captain R sat at the foot ofthe stairs on the Boat Decklobby. The scene is calm

and without violence and

the body language of theattackers suggests that

they are trying to reassuretheir captive. 509

Fig. 6.105 Soldier 3 lies on the floor of the Boat Deck while another doctor attends to him. [Photo: Kevin Neish]


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Time: 04:44:07.

Fig. 6.106 Attention is being given to Soldier 3s wound to the abdomen. The white short-sleeved shirt, grey IHHwaistcoat and jeans correspond with the doctor who attended to soldier 1 thus identifying him as Dr Uysal, whostated that he attended to all three soldiers. [Photo: Kevin Neish]

Dr Uysal:

[Captain R] suffered a cut in his stomach that reached his stomach membrane but not the organitself. It was nothing fatal. As a doctor, I wouldnt want to guess the nature ofthis injury but itcould have been caused by either landing on a sharp pole from the helicopter or a blow from apipe with a sharp edge. I couldnt tell.

In either case, it was not fatal but it had to be stitched. However, since we did not ever expectsuch a confrontation, we had not brought any stitching equipment on board. All we had wassimple medical material to dress simple wounds, or drops to ease burning in case tear gas wasused. If I had stitching material with me, although I am an eye doctor, I would have treated the

boy properly in accordance with my general medical knowledge. I couldnt.510

Fig. 6.107 Captain R was given apiece of gauze to put on the cutand taken down to the women-onlylounge at the rear of the MainDeck. An injury on his right handcan be seen where he was knockedoff the parapet of the NavigationDeck. Although fairly calm his eyesstill look frightened.511


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6.4.3 Soldier 4 (radio operator)

Part of the testimonies of the three captured soldiers were also reproduced by ITIC. The testimony by

Soldier 4 (referred to as Soldier C by ITIC) has been reproduced here as it is more detailed that the

testimony reproduced by Turkel.

Fig. 6.108 First part of the testimony published by ITIC.

Commentary on this testimony:

1.

Israel has not released any film which shows the incident described in paragraph 30.

2.

Figs. 6.111 & 6.112 show that this soldier was pushed over the parapet by two passengers (not

three or four), although a third does ineffectively try to help push just at the moment the soldier

is about to fall off the parapet.

3.

There appear to be about four men on the Boat Deck, but the lifeboat obscures sight of the area

immediately below the falling soldier where others may be in wait.


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Fig. 6.109 Concluding part of the ITIC commentary by soldier 4512

Commentary continued:

4. The author has never seen any photographic evidence to support the claim that axes were used

as weapons on the ship. Nobody on the ship has ever admitted that axes were either issued or

used. The Mavi Marmara is equipped with a number of fire axes which were displayed for Israeli

publicity purposes, but none of them showed any sign of blood or any other indication of having

been used in a fight.

5. This soldier has a pistol holster on his right leg (Figs. C, D & E) indicating that he was armed with

a semi-automatic pistol. It is reasonable to assume that he was also carrying an automatic rifleor machine pistol (Ken OKeefe has testified that the soldier had a rifle) plus a knife. These

weapons were all taken from him and disposed of (the vast majority were thrown into the sea)

which of necessity required some degree of violence. However there is no evidence from the

available photographs of any gratuitous violence following his captivity.

6.

Below decks five passengers handling the soldier can be distinguished. None of them wears a

gas mask and one is not wearing a life jacket.

7.

Following removal of the soldiers balaclava the top of the soldiers head can be seen clearly.

There is no evidence of any open skull wound. It is obviously possible that this could have been

inflicted later, but the photographic evidence suggests that he would not have been assaulted in

this way, and no member of the passengers or crew have admitting seeing any such assault.8.

The question of firing from the helicopters is considered in detail in section 6.3.3 above.


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Fig 6.110 Time 4:32:56 Soldier 4 is

pushed head first over the parapet of

the Navigation Deck starboard side. 513

[IDF]

Fig. 6.111 Moments later his leg drops

and the soldier rolls forward falling feetfirst onto the Bridge Deck below.

Ken OKeefe

This soldier had an assault rifle and was fully conscious. It was a lot harder to cope with him than

with the first soldier.I and another Turk tried to take his firearm, but the strap was tied behind

his back and he lay on his back and fought us. I saw that he was trying to reach the trigger,

so we both made sure not to be opposite the barrel. He held the weapon so tightly that I had to

pry his fingers loose from it. In the end we managed to get the rifle away from him and the Turk

who was with me took it. [The weapon was thrown into the sea.]Another two people arrived

from midship and took this soldier inside, too. 514


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Time: 04:39:10 Time: 04:39:21Figs. 6.112 1 6.113 After his pack was removed, Soldier 4 is carried downstairs, port side between Bridge and Boat

Decks. This soldier can be recognised by the keffiyah which has been tied to him. The blood on the handrail is from a

wounded passenger who was carried down previously. [Photos: Kevin Neish]

Time: 04:39:40

Fig. 6.114 (At this moment

Soldier 3 was still on the samelevel on the opposite side.) In thephoto Soldier 4s protective vestand ammunition pouches arebeing removed using a knife tocut the straps. (There is noindication of intent to use theknife on the soldier.) Because of

the previous attack by apassenger this soldier was takendownstairs quickly and hisequipment vest was taken offwhile he was being carried.



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Figs. 6.115 & 6.116 Soldier 4, identified by the keffiyah

tied to his right wrist, has been stripped of his balaclava

and ammunition vest. The photographs were taken on the

Boat Deck (which has been identified by the pattern of the

blood stains on the wall which appear in earlier

photographs). Note the passengers hand which is

gripping his right shoulder in the first photograph.

Fig. 6.117 Soldier 4 sits in a foetal

position with his arm over his face. The

passenger in front of him appears to

trying to get him to stand up.

In these photographs there are no

visible signs of bleeding or injuries.

Israeli sources later reported that thissoldier had a fractured skull and

internal bleeding.515

[Photos:efik Din]


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6.4.4 The captured soldiers equipment

Fig. 6.118 (above) A commandos

helmet is requisitioned by one of the

passengers (and appears to be on

back-to-front). (Note Dr Hani Suleiman,

who was later shot in both legs, coming

in through the door.)

Fig. 6.119 (left) Soldier 4s radio pack is

checked out by another passenger.

Photos: [Kevin Neish]


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Passengers have consistently said they threw the weapons overboard which they had seized from the

soldiers. Photographic evidence shows that several objects (thought to be weaponry) were thrown

overboard, and because only very short sequences of film have been released by the IDF it is highly

likely that other unfilmed weapons were also thrown away.

Fig. 6.120 Time 04:32:02. The third soldier, Captain R, descends as something from one of the soldiers is thrown

overboard. [IDF]

Fig. 6.121 Another commando (possibly Soldier 5) descends. An object, about the size of a Mini-Uzi machine pistol,

has been thrown over the starboard side. [IDF]


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Figs. 6.122 1 6.123 Two more objects thrown over either side of the ship by passengers trying to overpower and

disarm the soldiers. (This is just before Soldier 4 was thrown over the starboard parapet.) The time is about

04:33. [IDF]

6.4.5 The battle for the Navigation Deck

After Soldier 4 was pushed off the deck there is a cut of unknown duration in the IDF footage filmedfrom the boats so that after this time it is no longer possible to identify the soldiers or calculate the

time.

Fig. 6.124 The soldiers with their

firearms begin to overpower the

passengers.

One soldier has just disabled two of

his assailants by shooting them in

the face with his pepper ball gun.

Another soldier appears to have

drawn a Glock pistol. [IDF]

Fig. 6.125 Another object is thrown

over the port side. Passengers are

still attacking the soldiers with rods,

chairs and other items. [IDF]


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Fig. 6.126 Two more objects go over

the port side. [IDF]

Fig. 6.127 A flash from a stun

grenade illuminates the deck.

[IDF]

Figs. 6.128 & 6.129 The passenger indicated suddenly falls down. Within the space of nine frames his head has

fell to just above the parapet, and within a further six frames the head is below the parapet. The full fifteen

frames amounts to just over half a second. No further information is available, although IHH sources indicate

that Fahri Yaldiz may have died very close to this spot. (See also Fig. 6.143 below.)


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Fig. 6.130 A group of soldiers has formed near the parapet on the starboard side and

is firing into the centre of the deck. [IDF]

Mehmet Al Zeybek

There was gunfre comng to us from the helcopter above on one sde, whle a group of three offour solders on board were frng at us from another. 516

6.4.6 Ali Yunusolus film of the battle on the Navigation Deck

A unique 20-second video sequence (filmed by Ali Yunusoluon the Navigation Deck while commandos

were still descending from the first helicopter) was broadcast via satellite transmission and thus

survived the Israeli censor. It shows the bitter hand-to-hand fighting that ensued in that brief period

before Israeli firepower won the battle on that deck which enabled the commandos to go on to take

control of the bridge.

(The film was made in poor light using a simple camera to record a scene of violent action, hence the

quality is poor. The best quality version of the footage has been cleaned-up and released by the IDF517but suffers from having been annotated, cut and deited with repeat sections inserted in order to give

a distorted account of the events portrayed. The full footage shows violence from both sides.)

Fig. 6.131 The footage starts as Ali follows a group of

passengers who had been stadning guard aabove the

bridge as they race towards the stern of the deck to

confront the commandos as they land. [CIHAN version]

Glock pistol

Pepper ball guns


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Fig. 6.132 A passenger swings what appear to be a metal bar and is about to hit the dark figure of a soldier.

[IDF version]

Fig. 6.133 (left) The passenger strikes the soldier twice.

Fig.6.134 (right) Another passenger follows carrying a chair as a

weapon. [IDF]


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Fig. 6.135 Another soldier descends (this is

the same moment shown in Fig. 6.121 and

is possibly soldier 5). [IDF]

Fig. 6.136 Passengers had pulled the rope as the soldier descended causing him to stumble on landing (blue box). A

passenger and a soldier are fighting on the deck (yellow). Another passenger appears to have fallen injured upagainst the parapet on the port side. [CIHAN]


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Fig. 6.137 A passenger lies on the centre of the deck left foreground. IHH sources believe the Ibrahim Bilgen was

shot and killed about here very early on in the raid.518 [CIHAN]

Fig. 6.138 A second view of the passenger lying on the centre of the deck. [CIHAN]


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Fig. 6.139 Moment of impact when a passenger hits a soldier with a metal bar. [IDF]

Fig. 6.140 The soldier, who is carrying a semi-automatic rifle in his hand, is chased and hit again with a metal rod.


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Fig. 6.141 having tried to go through a locked door the soldier turns and is stabbed by a second passenger.

[There are two points to note here. 1) Ken OKeefe said that at the pre-raid meetings to discuss the

defence of the ships it was said that the use of knives was prohibited. 2) By this stage passengers on this

deck had already seen some of their fellows shot by live fire, and as has already been mentioned this

commando had an semi-automatic firearm in his hands.]

Fig. 6.142 A passenger has gone down injured. This is the location where a passenger, possibly Fahri Yaldiz fell in

footage filmed from a boat (see Figs. 6.128 & 6.129). [CIHAN]


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Fig. 6.143 The injured passenger on the starboard side has turned round and is holding onto the parapet. [CIHAN]

Fig. 6.144 A soldier goes over and kicks the injured

passenger twice. [Press TV 519]

Fig. 6.145 The commandos are now

starting to form up on the starboard

side as can be seen in Fig. 6.131.

[Press TV @ 22:49]


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6.4.7 The Schalit factor

Gilad Schalit was a corporal in the Armour Corps of the IDF, deployed as the gunner in a tank near the

Kerem Shalom crossing to the Gaza Strip on 25 June 2006. In the early hours of the morning the tank was

attacked by a rocket-propelled grenade fired by Palestinian militants who had tunnelled out of the Strip.Largely as a result of irregular actions by the tank crew which contravened operational orders, two of

them were killed. Corporal Schalit was lightly wounded and taken captive after abandoning his M16 rifle

and leaving the tank. He offered no resistance to capture and was taken to Gaza.

Cpl Schalits captors demanded the release of 1300 Palestinians in Israeli jails in return for his freedom.

The demand was refused by the Israeli government and the soldier remained in captivity in Gaza. He was

refused visits from members of the ICRC since this would have betrayed his location through the

network of informants that the Israeli security services run in the Gaza Strip. (One method of

recruitment used is the threat to refuse entry into Israel patients whose condition cannot be treated in

Gaza.) Gilad Schalit was never tortured, and apart from minor mistreatment during the first week wastreated reasonably well although he lost weight during confinement, in a large part due to having to eat

the same poor diet available to most Gazans. 520521522

Fig. 6.146 Gilad

Schalit in captivity

in Gaza. 523

Fig. 6.147 In response the Israeli Air Force

attacked Gazas only power station with rockets

on 28 June 2006. All the plants six transformers

were destroyed. The disruption to electricity

supplies badly affected Gazas medical services,

water supply, sewage system and many small

businesses. [REUTERS 524]


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(The human rights NGO BTselem claimed that Israel could have reduced the supply of electricity from

the primary provider of electricity to the Gaza Strip, the Israel Electric Corporation, but the company had

objected to this threat to its commercial interests.525)

The following day Israel abducted sixty-four senior Palestinian officials, including twenty members of

parliament. During the next six months Israel also killed at least 400 Gazans, of whom eighty-eight were

children while six Israeli soldiers and four civilians were killed in the same period. Despite this reign of

terror the whereabouts of Gazas prisoner-of-war was never discovered and on 11 November 2006 a

ceasefire was declared. 526

The Israeli state has an unwritten contract with its people: whether dead or alive, everything will be

done to bring home a soldier missing in action. On 18 October 2011 Gilad Schalit was returned to Israel

as part of an Egyptian-brokered deal in which Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners.527

Fig. 6.148 Sgt Gilad Schalit arrives back in Israel on 18 October 2011. (He was promoted

while held as a prisoner-of-war.) [Reuters/Handout 528]

In 1986 the IDF introduced a rule requiring combat soldiers to prioritise the release of any soldier taken

captive. This objective should be pursued even at the risk of death of the captive. Since the Schalit case

the rule has since been publically and forcibly expressed. No Israeli soldier is to be taken prisoner by

armed militants, even if this should mean death or injury to that soldier. 529

On the day of the Flotilla raid Gilad Schalit was still missing somewhere in the confines of the Gaza Strip.

Despite nearly four years of searching by Israels security services his location was unknown and public

pressure was mounting both in Israel and the diaspora. Suddenly within the space of ten minutes the IDF

had seen three more soldiers, all members of an elite force, taken prisoner on a ship trying to reach

Gaza. The shock caused by this unexpected turn of events must have been profound. It was about this

time (between 04:35 and 04:40) that the sustained use of live fire began and a flood of serious injuries

arrived below decks, while commandos roamed the Navigation Deck committing war crimes against

unprotected casualties. The man who was ultimately responsible for those acts was Vice Admiral

Marom, who was in the Zaharon fast-attack boat seen in photographs as it circled the Mavi Marmara.


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6.4.8 Allegations of mistreatment of the soldiers in captivity

ITIC report

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center published a report in January 2011 whichcontained individual testimonies from each of the three soldiers who had been captured on the Mavi

Marmara. 530These documents appear to be English translations from the same originals used by the

Turkel Committee in their analysis and commentary of the raid (and quoted in their report). The two

texts present consistent narratives, but textual differences suggest that two different translations have

been made into English from the same original Hebrew text. Nearly one third of the paragraphs start or

end with an ellipsis, indicating some degree of editing of the original at some stage. The ITIC version of

the testimonies has been used in this analysis. The narrative alleges severe mistreatment of the soldiers

throughout their period of captivity on the ship.

Corroboration for some of the allegations can be found in a book by Turkish journalist efik Din 531who

sailed on the Flotilla reporting for the Turkish newspaper Habertrk. Mr Dins book also contains

photographs taken during the raid which he managed to conceal from the Israelis. However, as will be

shown here below, analysis of the photographic evidence shows that it is not consistent with his

testimony.

Kevin Neishs testimony

One further account of an attack on one of the soldiers has been provided by Kevin Neish who was also

able to conceal a number of images he took of the three soldiers during their captivity. In a personal

account of his experiences on the Flotilla Mr Neish wrote

At 4:37 I returned to the 5th deck [Bridge Deck] lobby. There I photographed the second

captured commando [Captain R/Soldier 3] as he was carried through the port side 5th deck door

onto the floor of the lobby. He was terrified, screaming, eyes as big as saucers and yammering

incoherently. He was being held by his arms and legs while aid workers removed his ammo vest.

At this point a large enraged passenger reached over the aid workers and tried to hit the

commando. Some of the aid workers who were holding the commando immediately pushed the

passenger away and held him against a wall, chiding him loudly. At 4:38 the aid workers quickly

hauled the commando down the stairway to the landing, safely away from the threatening

passenger.532

There is no photographic evidence to corroborate Mr Neishs testimony, but more importantly there is

no evidence to contradict his statement which relates to a single isolated incident. This testimony is

therefore accepted here as correct.


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efik Dins account

The account of the raid given in Mr Dins book533contains serious inaccuracies, suggesting that its

author is not a credible witness.

The book recounts Mr Dins experiences on the Flotilla. It is written in Turkish, but the captions to some

of the photographs have been translated into English by ITIC. 534 (Several of the photographs have been

reproduced here.)

One photograph (reproduced previously above and repeated here as Fig. 6.150) carries the caption

Several volunteers intervened and prevented other angry volunteers from throwing the soldier

into the sea.

Fig. 6.149

This photograph was shot from the deck below. Since Mr Din has admitted that he was on the Bridge

Deck at that stage, the incident illustrated must have occurred on the Navigation Deck. (The picture

actually shows Soldier 1 shortly before he was pushed over the parapet of that deck and dropped ontothe Bridge Deck.) As can be seen elsewhere on the IDF infrared footage, the passengers on the

Navigation Deck were all fighting to the same end, i.e. to get Soldier 1 off that deck. The IDF film shows

that there was no intervention by other passengers at this point. Furthermore having been on the Bridge

Deck Mr Din ought to know that it juts out beyond the Navigation Deck making it impossible to throw

anyone into the sea from that deck. This allegation is also false.

Fig. 6.150 The location of the action recorded in photograph Fig. 6.152.

There are similar discrepencies between another photograph of Soldier 1 (Fig. 6.152) and the caption

given to it in Mr Dins book.


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Fig. 6.151

Is this hand pushing the soldier or

pulling him back?

According to ITIC, that caption reads

The weapons of the soldiers who were taken to the lower deck were thrown into the sea. There

was also an attempt to throw one of the soldiers into the sea.

The prow of the lifeboat visible in the left of that photograph identifies the location of the cameraman asbeing on the port side of the Bridge Deck, i.e. the same location as the previous photograph discussed

above. This second photograph also features Soldier 1 and illustrates what

Documents

Ch 6 the Assault Begins on the Mavi Marmara