Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

8/13/2019 Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus

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The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the

following orders of the RTC, to wit:

1. The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex

parte motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ

of execution cum writ of possession of GSIS);25

2. The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the

issuance of the writ of execution cum writ ofpossession in favor of GSIS);26

3. The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch

Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the

writ of execution cum writ of possession, and

dismissing the motions to hold GSIS, et al. in

contempt);27and

4. The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the

motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001

seeking the reconsideration of the order dated July 30,

2001).28

The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitionersmotion

for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, and motion

to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in

contempt; and declared GSISsmotion for issuance of break open

order and for designation of special sheriff from GSIS LegalServices Groupas premature. In turn, the motion forreconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution denied by the

order of July 30, 2001 hadmerelychallenged the orders of

October 8, 1999 and October 21, 1999 (granting the writ of

execution cum writ of possessionas a matter of course).

Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated

August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for

reconsideration vis--vis the orders dated October 21, 1999

and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001,

October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be

subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari

filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy forbeing made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section

4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended,29which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed

"not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,order or resolution," or, in case a motion for reconsideration

or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or

not, "the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice

of the denial of the said motion."

It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is

considered inextendible, because the limitation has beenprescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the

constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their

cases.30

RAMON C. GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO,

A.M. No. CA-10-49-J January 28, 2010

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

Facts: Ramon C. Gonzales (complainant), then amember of Alabang Country Club, Incorporated (ACCI) who was

vying for a seat in its Board of Directors (the Board), was

charged by the Board with having falsified proxy forms for

the 2004 election of Board members. That drew him to file a

complaint before the RTC Muntinlupa City(Civil Case No. 04

122-Ramon C. Gonzalez v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., fordamages)-(the civil case).

Complainant was later disqualified as a candidate and

ousted as a member of the ACCI. He thus amended his complaint

in the civil case by impleading the members of the Board at the

time material to his expulsion, the newly elected members, andthe members of the Nomination and Election Committee. And he

added, as cause of action, the nullification of his disqualification

and expulsion in the reliefs prayed for.

RTC: Br 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC decided the civi

case in complainants favor, and issued a writ of execution

allowing him to resume his rights as a member of ACCI.

The defendants in the civil case assailed the trial

courts decision before the CA via petition for review with

application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or

writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP. No. 89358). This

case was consolidated with related cases in which hereincomplainant was the respondent.

CA: The appellate court issued a TRO against the

execution of the decision in the civil case, drawing complainant

to move for its lifting, alleging that ACCI had already voluntarilyexecuted the decision in the civil case. His motion was, howeverdenied.

When the TRO expired, the 9th Division of the CA

issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Complainant challenged the appellate courts issuance

of the writ of preliminary injunction via petition for certiorar

filed before the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, complainant, through counsel, filed

before the appellate court a Motion for Inhibition o

respondentbecause, by his claim, the issuance of the writ was

against the law.

SC on the petition for certiorari: By Resolution(Apri

11, 2007), the Court dismissed complainants petition forcertiorari4"for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned

[appellate courts] Resolution is tainted with grave abuse o

discretion."

More than a year later or on August 20, 2008complainant filed a letter-complaint before the SC, alleging

that:

(1) On September 29, 2005, or almost three (3) years

ago to date, he asked his lawyer to file a Motion for Inhibition

against the ponente, Justice Amelita G. Tolentino because the

issuance of the injunction was obviously against the law. Up tothe present, the [motion for] inhibition has not been acted upon

(2) I also understand that cases involving intra

corporate controversy must be resolved as soon as possible

because of [their] nature. The affairs of corporations cannot be

suspended or left undecided longer than is necessary. In mycase, I ran x x x for the term June 2004-June 2006 and a decision

was rendered on April 4, 2005. The decision was raised to the

Court of Appeals in May 2005. At that time, if the Decision was

not restrained, or the case acted upon quickly as should have

been the case, there was still an opportunity for me to have beenduly elected and to have served as director. Because of the

inaction of Justice Tolentino which is against the rule governing

intra-corporate dispute, this opportunity was forever lost to me
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special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the

Sandiganbayan who commit less serious offenses:

1. Suspension from office without salary and otherbenefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three

(3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not

exceeding P20,000.00.

Under the circumstances, this Court deems it appropriate toimpose a fine of P15,000 on respondent.

Respondent is found GUILTY of undue delay in

rendering an order, and is FINED P15,000, with WARNING that

commission of the same or similar infraction shall be faulted

strictly.

G.R. No. 181643 November 17, 2010

MICHELLE I. PINEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth

Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

represented by Assistant Secretary CAMILO MIGUEL M.

MONTESA

MENDOZA,J.:

CASE: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by

petitioner Michelle I. Pineda (Pineda) seeking to annul and setaside the Decision of the CA, which reversed the Order of the

RTC, Br 153, Pasig City (RTC)directing the issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining respondent

Department of Education (DepEd)from enforcing its decision to

cancel a 5-year lease of the school canteen.

Facts: It appears from the records that on May 14,

2004, Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (May-

MOA)2with Lakandula High School (LHS)represented by its

principal, Dr. Alice B. Blas (Dr. Blas), for a 5-year lease of the

school canteen with a monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an

additional P4,000.00 monthly for the schools feeding program

as well as medicines for the school clinic. Thereafter, Pineda

renovated the canteen and equipped it with new utensils, tables,chairs, and electric fans.3

The faculty and personnel of LHS sent a letter to the

Division School Superintendent, Dr. Ma. Luisa Quiones (Dr.

Quiones), questioning the validity of the May-MOA.4Dr. Blas

sent a letter-reply and an exchange of correspondencefollowed.5Meanwhile, Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another

MOA (August-MOA)6superseding the May-MOA. This time, the

August-MOA followed the standard form under Department

Order No. 95, Series of 19987or the "Revised Implementing

Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers

Cooperatives."

In this regard, Assistant Schools Division

Superintendent Isabelita Santos (Ms. Santos)and AdministrativeOfficer Vicente N. Macarubbo (Mr. Macarubbo) wrote a letter to

Dr. Quiones relaying their observations on the controversy and

recommending that their findings "be submitted to the DepEd -

Central Office for its final word on the matter."8Ms. Santos and

Mr. Macarubbo were of the view that Dr. Blas did not violate any

rule in executing the August-MOA. They even found the lease to

Pineda beneficial to the school. Thus, Dr. Quiones wrote the

DepEd seeking its decision on the matter.

Respondent DepEd, through Undersecretary Jose Luis

Martin Gascon (Usec. Gascon),declared the August-MOA "null

and void ab initio" and ordered it "cancelled." Pineda was also

ordered to "cease and desist" from further managing and

operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that the management

and operation of the canteen should revert to the HomeEconomics Department of the School.9This prompted Pineda to

file a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or writ

of preliminary injunctionbefore the RTC.

RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of UsecGascons decision. DepEd, represented by Usec. Gascon, Dr

Quiones and Ms. Olympiada Camilo (Ms. Camilo),who

succeeded Dr. Blas as School Principal, sought the dismissal o

Pinedas petition before the RTC on the ground that the latter

failed to state a cause of action. The trial court denied its

motion.11For said reason, DepEd, this time represented byAssistant Secretary Camilo Miguel Montesa (Asec

Montesa),filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking

to set asidethe orders of the RTC.

CA on Petition for certiorari filed by DepEd: The CA

affirmed the order of the RTC denying DepEds motion to

dismiss but reversed its order granting the issuance of the Writ

of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. According to the CA

DepEds order cancelling the August-MOA had already been

partially implemented as Pineda herself recognized such fact in

her amended petition before the RTC. In effect, this was thestatus quo. In addition, the CA held that Pineda appeared to

have no clear or unmistakable right to be protected since the

MOA that granted her the right to operate the school canteen

was, in fact, invalidated by the DepEd for not being sanctioned

by its existing rules and regulations. Finally, the CA also held

that there was no pressing necessity to avoid injuriousconsequences which would warrant the issuance of the

injunctive writ as the purported damage to Pineda, if she would

not able to operate the canteen, was readily quantifiable.12

Hence, Pineda filed this petition for certiorari.

Issue (1) Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when instead of

dismissing the petition filed by DepEd, it gave due course to itnotwithstanding the fact that it was not a party at all and hence

with no locus standi.

Pineda argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion

in entertaining the petition for certiorari of DepEd considering

that Asec. Montesa was not the proper party to file the petition

She adds that, even assuming that DepEd had the locus standi to

file said petition before the CA, Asec. Montesa was not duly

authorized to do so.

Held (1): No. In her petition for certiorari before theRTC, Pineda impleaded Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiones and Ms

Camilo in their official capacities as Undersecretary of DepEd

Division Superintendent and Principal of Lakandula High

School, respectively. Although the petition mentioned that UsecGascon was merely a nominal party, it stated therein that DrQuiones and Ms. Camilo were being sued for "having been

tasked to immediately carry out" his order of February 11

2005. The Court is of the view that DepEd was the proper party

and Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo were just its

representatives. Thus, they were sued in their official capacities

A review of Usec. Gascons order discloses that the

cancellation of Pinedas August-MOA was pursuant to DepEds

existing guidelines on the turn over of school canteens to

teachers cooperatives, laid out in Department Order No. 95

series of 1998. He was simply applying a DepEd policy when he
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ordered the August-MOA cancelled. So, what was actually being

assailed by Pineda in her petition before the RTC was the

implementation of DepEds existing guidelines with thenullification of the August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then

principal of LHS.15As Asec. Montesa merely took over the

functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly authorized to institute

the petition before the CA in order to advance and pursue the

policies of his office DepEd. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of theRevised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it

will surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final

resolution of the case before the RTC.

Thus, it would be absurd not to recognize the legal standing of

Asec. Montesa, as representative of DepEd, but consider Dr.

Quiones and Ms. Camilo as the proper parties when they weremerely tasked to implement a directive emanating from a

superior official (Asec. Montesa) of the DepEd.

Issue (2) Whether CA committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when itdid not dismiss outright the petition since no motion for

reconsideration was filed from the orders of the RTC, in

violation of Section 4, Rule 65.

Pineda questions DepEds failure to move forreconsideration before going to the CA on certiorari.

Held: No. As previously discussed, the present case

concerns the implementation or application of a DepEd policy

which had been enjoined by the RTC. Certainly, there is an

urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any

further delay would prejudice the interest of the government.

Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the operationof the canteen of a public secondary school. This is of public

interest for it affects the welfare of the students, thus, justifying

the relaxation of the settled rule.

Ratio: The general rule is that a motion for

reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before apetition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an

opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error

attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual

circumstances of the case.16There are, however, recognized

exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action forcertiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the

case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,17it was written:

The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined

exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because

the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised

in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passedupon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and

passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent

necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further

delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of thepetitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable;where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration

would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due

process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a

criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the

grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where theproceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due

process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the

petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue

raised is one purely of law or where public interest is

involved.18(underscoring supplied)

Still on the second ground, Pineda points out that the

March 14, 2005 Order of the RTC was received by the DepEd on

March 16, 2005 and the latter filed its petition before the CA onJune 28, 2005, which was beyond the sixty (60)-day

reglementary period. Going over DepEds petition before the CA

it appears that DepEd reckoned the 60-day period from June 28

2005, the date of its receipt of the June 7, 2005 Order of the RTC

Pinedas Comment and Memorandum, however, did not raisethis procedural lapse as an issue. Instead, Pineda put forth her

own arguments in support of the two RTC orders.

The rule in pleadings and practice is that that no new

issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due

diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings.19Thus

it is too late in the day for Pineda to question the proceduralapse.

Issue (3) Whether CA committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it

dissolved the writ of injunction issued by the RTC, thereby

unjustifiably interfering with the lower court's discretion in

issuing writ of injunction in favor of petitioner.

Held: No. At any rate, the Court finds no cogent reason

for the reversal and setting aside by the CA of the writ o

preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the RTC. The very

writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could nolonger lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been

accomplished or consummated.20The DepEd already prohibited

Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by

the CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the

operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTCs

preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing moreto enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it explained:

Ratio: A preliminary injunction is a provisiona

remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and

protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an

action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until themerits of the case can be heard fully.

Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, anduncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that

which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably,

the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter

such status.

Finally, while the grant or denial of a preliminary

injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court, grave

abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the

status quo which is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested

status which preceded the actual controversy. If there is such acommission, it is correctible through a writ of certiorari.22In

this case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing

at the time of the filing of the case was that Pineda was already

prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said reasonthe trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to changesaid status. The petition is DENIED.
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G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and

DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of the

Board vs. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding

Judge of Br 87, RTC Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL

ROMERO,J.:

G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS andDR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of the

Board vs. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding

Judge of Br 87, RTC Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL

ROMERO,J.:

The U.P. administration conceptualized and

implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments

through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program

(STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program.

Spawned by the public clamor to overcome what was perceived

as the sharpening elitist profile of the U.P studentry, the STFAPaspired to expand the coverage of government educational

subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the

socio-economic ladder.After broad consultations with the various university

constituencies by U.P. President Abueva, the U.P. Board ofRegents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the

STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the

Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National

Budget for the implementation of the program.

In the interest of democratizing admission to the State

University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefitswhich include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and

student assistantships which give undergraduate students the

opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the

University.

Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnairewhere, among others, they state the amount and source of the

annual income of the family, their real and personal properties

and special circumstances from which the University may

evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which

they are categorized into brackets. At the end the applicationform, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn

statement.

From the early stages of its implementation, measures

were adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program. One

such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the

punishable acts under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations

on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University the

deliberate falsification or suppression/withholding of any

material information required in the application form.

To further insure the integrity of the program, a

random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a

student's application form is undertaken. Among those who

applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon

P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.

On March 14, 1991, a team conducted a home

investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive,Blue Ridge, Quezon City.

Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and

the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino,

Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the

report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M

Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and StudentServices, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on

Scholarships and Financial Assistance.2

In compliance with the said Committee's directive

Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the

investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only thefact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was

owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who

was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was

likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified

him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989

unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal wasrequired "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees"

with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to

settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration

privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript o

records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to

the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.3

Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things

that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but

because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had

not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-payingemployment." He also stated that his mother, jointly with his

brother Virgilio, was shouldering the expenses of the college

education of his two younger brothers. 4

Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's

application form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nada

before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) with voluntarilyand willfully withholding and not declaringthe following:

(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla

Model 1977); and

(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing

Nadal) in the U.S.A., in support of the studies of hisbrothers Antonio and Federico,

which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to

acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation o

paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on

Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by theB.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02 September 1976, amended at

the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31 January 1980, and further

amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988).

SDT Ruling: After hearing, the SDT rendered a

decision in SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the

charge. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty

of expulsionfrom the University and required him to

reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not

voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the

University thru outside legal action."

The SDT decision was thereafter automaticallyelevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review

pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and

Discipline.

Exec Committee Ruling: The Executive Committee

affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed tothe Board of Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the

agenda of the BOR meeting on January 25, 1993.9

On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the

Chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Education, thereby


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making her automatically a member of the BOR, Senator Leticia

Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a letter expressing her view that,

after a close review of Nadal s case by her legal staff, "it is onlyfair and just to find Mr. Nadal's appeal meritorious and his

arguments worthy of belief. Consequently, he should be allowed

to graduate and take the bar examinations this year." 10

Board of Regents Ruling: At its meeting, the BOR

affirmed the decision of the SDT but the penalty was modified"from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately,

plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP,

with legal interest."

Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of

the BOR decision. The U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion

for reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting.

At the said special meeting, the Board decided to go

into executive session where the following transpired:

xxx xxx

A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal

was guilty or not guilty as charged of willful withholding ofinformation in relation to his application for Socialized

Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits

which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991

which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in relation to hisstudies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules

and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as

amended.

The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action

during the Executive Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3)

voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes,

pending verification with Father Raymond Holscher of

Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's statement

in his STFAP application that he was granted scholarship

while he was in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that

Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the

conditional votes would be considered as guilty, and ifotherwise, then not guilty. The Chairman requested the

President to make the verification as soon as possible the next

day. In answer to a query, the Chairman clarified that once

the information was received from Ateneo, there would be no

need for another meeting to validate the decision.

The President reiterated his objections to the casting of

conditional votes.

The Chairman himself did not vote. 13

In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a

certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a

scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR

met again at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza

Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR

found Nadal "guilty" as the members voted as follows: sixmembers guilty, three members not guilty, and three

members abstained. 14Consequently, the BOR imposed on Nadalthe penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29,

1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character

during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not

reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12%

interestper annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance ofhis transcript of records until he has settled his financial

obligations with the university. 15

On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a

handwritten letter stating that "after learning of the latest

decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely concentrating on

(his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his) financial

obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now lettingnature take its course," Nadal begged President Abueva not to

issue any press release regarding the case. 16

However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition

for mandamuswith preliminary injunction and prayer for atemporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR

Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and

Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:

After trial on the merits, judgment be

rendered as follows:

a. Making the preliminary injunction

permanent;

b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and

implement their decision rendered on 28

March 1993, exonerating petitioner from al

the charges against him, and accordingly

dismissing SDT No. 91-026;

c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally

to pay petitioner litigation expenses of at least

P150,000.00.Other just and equitable reliefs are likewiseprayed for. 17

The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order

and the writ of preliminary injunction was immediately set for

hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court declared

that the only issue to be resolved was "whether or not the

respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal's) rightto due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty

of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting

After the respondents had presented their first witness, Dr

Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents' counse

whether they were amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said

counsel replied in the negative, asserting the University'sprerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its

rules of discipline.18

On the same day, the lower court 19issued the following Order:

The parties were heard on their respectivepositions on the incident (application for

preliminary injunction and prayer for

temporary restraining order and opposition

thereto). For lack of material time set this for

continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 both at

2:30 p.m.

In the meantime, in order that the proceedings

of this case may not be rendered moot and

academic, the respondents herein, namelyJose V. Abueva, President of the University of

the Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P

Board of Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A

Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella

members of the U.P. Board of Regents, Olivia

C. Caoili, the officers, agents, representatives

and all persons acting in their behalf, are

hereby temporarily restrained from

implementing their decision rendered on

March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case

No. 91-026 entitled University of the


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Philippines vs. Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in

the Minutes of the 1062nd meeting of the

Board of Regents, U.P. held at the RomblonRoom, Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further

order from this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana

Y. Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani andAntonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented

Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile witness. On May29, 1993, the lower court issued the following Order:

The petitioner complains that he was not

afforded due process when, after the Board

Meeting on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28,

1993 that resulted in a decision of "NOT

GUILTY" in his favor, the Chairman of the U.P.

Board of Regents, without notice to the herein

petitioner, called another meeting the

following day to deliberate on his (theChairman's) MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION, which this time resulted

in a decision of "GUILTY." While he main issue

of violation of due process raised in the

petition pends trial and resolution, thepetitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction prohibiting the

respondents from further proceeding with

SDT Case No. 21-026 and from suspending the

petitioner for one year.

It is a basic requirement in the issuance of thepreliminary injunctive writ that there must be

a right to be protected. As the issue in the case

at bar is due process in the March 29 Board

meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be

protected for, in administrative proceedings, arespondent's right to due process exists not

only at the early stages but also at the finalstage thereof.

With the circulation to the members of the

Board of Regents, as well as to other UP

personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29,

1993 meeting, even after this case had already

been filed, the Court is convinced that there

now exists a threat to the petitioner

(respondent in SDT Case No, 91-026) that the

decision of the Board of Regents finally findinghim guilty of willfully withholding information

material to his application for Socialized

Tuition and Financial Assistance Program

(STFAP) benefits, will be implemented at any

time, especially during the enrollment period,and this implementation would work injustice

to the petitioner as it would delay him in

finishing his course, and, consequently, in

getting a decent and good paying job. The

injury thus caused would be irreparable.

"Damages are irreparable

within the meaning of the

rule where there is no

standard by which their

amount can be measured

with reasonable accuracy

Where the damage is

susceptible of mathematicacomputation, it is no

irreparable." (Social Security

Commission v. Bayona, et al.

G.R. No. L-13555, May 30

1962).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to

render moot the issues in the instant

proceedings, let a writ of preliminary

injunction be issued restraining the

respondents, their officers, agent(s)

representatives, and all persons acting in theirbehalf, from further proceeding with SDT Case

No. 91-026, and from suspending petitioner

upon the latter's filing a bond in the amount of

P3,000.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 20

Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the

petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorariand

prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or

temporary restraining order, raising the following issues

whether or not Nadal was denied due process in theadministrative disciplinary proceedings against him, and

whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her

discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary

injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the

suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal.

Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of theinstant petition, we shall confront a threshold issue raised by

private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been

authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the

instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not

being the "Board of Regents" nor "the University of thePhilippines," they are not real parties in interest who should file

the same. 21A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the

suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means materia

interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as

distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a

mere incidental interest."22Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board o

Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue

here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a student

who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct andDiscipline by withholding information in connection with his

application for STFAP benefits, which information, if disclosed

would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the

financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left

unpunished, would have the effect of subverting a commendableprogram into which the University officials had devoted much

time and expended precious resources, from the

conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize

the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more

students may benefit from the public funds allocated to theState University.

Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as

respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed below

Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file

the instant petition.23Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter


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foregoing circumstances, we find that Nadal has been

sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge

all information needed when he applied for the benefits of theSTFAP.

Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks

of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that

justice may prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the portals

leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot beoverzealous in admitting only those who are intellectually and

morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days,

one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of

chicanery in the practice of his profession.

Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably

aware that the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Further on,

Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for

knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material

factin connection with his application for admission to the bar."

(Emphasis supplied for emphasis)

Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble

profession of law that honesty and integrity are requirements

no less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the

reason why a certification of good moral character is one of thedocuments that must be submitted in applying to take said

examination. In fact, a charge of immoral or deceitful conduct on

the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground for

disqualifying him.

To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown

sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonestyin withholding vital information in connection with his

application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the

Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of

petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority

to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfullyexercised.

As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline islike a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so

does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive

and continue operating. In more relevant terms, through its

power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational

institution is able to exercise its academic freedom which is, in

the case at bar, the right to suspend and refuse admission to a

student who has subverted its authority in the implementation

of the critically important STFAP.

At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to aUniversity is encompassed by the right of academic freedom.

In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of

Theology36the Court stated that a school or college which is

possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself itsaims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free fromoutside coercion or interference save possibly when the

overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide

sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of

students." Elucidating, inAteneo de Manila University

v.Hon.Ignacio M.Capulong, 37the Court further expounded:

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we

have consistently upheld the salutary

proposition that admission to an institution of

higher learning is discretionary upon a school,

the same being a privilege on the part of the

student rather than a right. While under the

Education Act of 1982, students have a right

"to freely choose their field of study, subject toexisting curricula and to continue their course

therein up to graduation," such right is

subject, as all rights are, to the established

academic and disciplinary standards laid

down by the academic institution.

For private schools have the right to establish

reasonable rules and regulations for the

admission, discipline and promotion o

students. This right . . . extends as well to

parents . . . as parents are under a social and

moral (if not legal) obligation, individually andcollectively, to assist and cooperate with the

schools.

Such rules are "incident to the very object o

incorporation and indispensable to the

successful management of the college. The

rules may include those governing student

discipline." Going a step further, the

establishment of rules governing university

student relations, particularly those

pertaining to student discipline, may beregarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth

and efficient operation of the institution, bu

to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is

the eruption of militancy in the academic

groves as collectively, the students demandedand plucked for themselves from the panoply

of academic freedom their own rights

encapsulized under the rubric of "right to

education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian

terms, they have a concomitant duty, thatis, their duty to learn under the rules laid down

by the school. (Emphasis supplied.)On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds

that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the

writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance ofthe said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the

implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on

Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay

him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent

and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the

situation of Nadal without taking into account the

circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into

such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely

disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which

provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a

disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution ofhigher learning.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court

should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over

the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamusis never issued in

doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the partof the petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an

official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise

of discretion or judgment. 39

Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower

court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by


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virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom

was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide

open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BORprohibited him from doing and that is, to violate the suspension

order by enrolling for the first semester of 1993-1994. It must

have been with consternation that the University officials

helplessly watching him complete his academic requirements

for taking the Bar. 40In the event that he be allowed to continuewith his studies he would, in effect render moot and academic

the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed upon

him by the BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is toprevent other aspirants for STFAP scholarships from misleading

the University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as

in instant case, withholding vital information and statingdownright falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity?

Not only would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to

discipline its students who violated the rules and regulations of

the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept

and lofty intent to give financial assistance to poor butdeserving students through the STFAP which, incidentally, has

not ceased refining and modifying it's operations.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower

court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition formandamus.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988

ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-

in-fact Trinidad S. Viado vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS,CALOOCAN City, et al.

NARVASA,J.:

A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable

exercise of government power than that manifested in this case

can scarcely be found in the sordid annals of the martial law

regime. Relief to the victims must be as it is hereby extended by

the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and

prohibition condemning as unconstitutional, and annulling and

perpetually enjoining the acts complained of.

Facts: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired publicschool teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their

retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel

Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land

measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision

in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale,

Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelledand a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons.

The Tuasons took possession of their property.

Some 8 years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke

up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were

no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with theirhard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the

subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to

the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.,

the present bona fide occupants thereof."

On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after thedeclaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president

of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued PD No.

293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the

title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier

purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently

subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasonsbeing among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part

of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carme

had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as

amended.

Said PD No. 293 made the finding 2that Carmel had failed tocomplete payment of the price. It adjudged that

... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neitherthe original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees

have made full payment of all installments of the purchase

money and interest on the lots claimed by the Carme

Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of themembers of said Association 3stand. Hence, title to said land

has remained with the Government, and the land now

occupied by the members of said association has never

ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the

Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and

purporting to segregate it from the said property of the

Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab

initio as against the law and public policy.

Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles o

Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, anddeclared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang

Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" o

the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them

for "disposition and sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No

32, as amended." 4

It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention thathis decree contained contradictory declarations. While

acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carme

Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the

latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other tha

the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc(are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots . The latter

averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the formerbut is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of

physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the

same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition isself-evident for persons not in possession of land, who probably

have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants"

thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants.

But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already

indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner

spouses and others similarly situated.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with the Supreme Court a

petition for certiorariassailing the Marcos decree as an

arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in

favor of a selected group, in violation not only of theconstitutional provisions on due process and eminentdomain 5but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act

on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that

the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory

inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the

alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the

Assurance Fund.

Mr. Marcos' Solicitor Generalsought to sustain the decree. In

his comment on the petition, 7 he questioned the propriety o

the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not

appearing that the public respondents were being sued as


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judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in

excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitions for interventionhave of late been filed by sixty-four(64) persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners

Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that

they, too, had been divested of their lands by the same PD No.

293, adopting as their own the allegations and prayer embodied

in the Tuasons' petition.

Issue: Whether the remedy of petition for certiorari is proper.

Held: Yes.

Ratio:

(1) It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari 9may

properly issue to nullify onlyjudicial or quasi-judicial acts,

unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed

against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of

the Rules of Courtdeals with the writ of certiorariin relation to

"any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions,

while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of

prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal,corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or

ministerial."

But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality

directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.

The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviouslyjudicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied

the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the

parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute

ajudicial function, 10or an exercise of jurisdictionwhich is the

power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a

cause. 11He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither theoriginal purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made

full payment of all installments of the purchase money and

interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including

those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the)

Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to

that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said landhas remained with the Government, and the land now occupied

by the members of said association has never ceased to form

part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that

'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate

it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void

ab initio as against the law and public policy.

These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ

of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of

what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts

were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with graveabuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with

judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in

the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be

established by law 12the judicial acts done by him were in the

circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction.The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive,

and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative

power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.

(2) In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the

petition for certiorarias one for prohibition if the averments ofthe former sufficiently made out a case for the

latter. 13Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an

executive officer had acted without jurisdiction exercised

judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the

laws and had furthermore performed the act in violation of

the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The

Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious inthe premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the

prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being

determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic

averments of the parties' pleadings. 14

There is no dispute about the fact that title to the landpurchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the

Government. This of course gives rise to the strong presumption

that official duty has been regularly performed,15that officia

duty being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the

Bureau of Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition

prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the payment in full ofthe price, together with all accrued interest. Against this

presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded

full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having

been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner

provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land

Registration Act." 16

Ruling: PD No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and

void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are directed

to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the

petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring theirtitles null and void and declaring the property therein

respectively described open for disposition and sale to the

members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do

whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and

efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from

implementing any provision or part of said Presidential DecreeNo. 293. No pronouncement as to costs.

RE: Material Data Rule

G.R. No. 146197 June 27, 2005

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION (formerly Security Bankand Trust Company) vs. INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY

THE BRANCH SHERIFF, RTC of Muntinlupa City, Br 256, and

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY,

CARPIO,J.:

The Case: Before this Court is a petition for review1assailingthe 2000 Resolutions2of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 56534.

The CA denied the petition of Security Bank and Trust Company

("Security Bank") for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule

46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by

Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98.3

Facts: On 20 September 1996, Security Bank as mortgagee andInnovatech Development and Management Corporation

("Innovatech") as mortgagor entered into a real estate

mortgage. Innovatech secured its P25,000,000 loan fromSecurity Bank with a mortgage on fourteen condominium units

located at Tito Jovy Tower, Buencamino St., Alabang

Muntinlupa City.

In a letter, Innovatechs Vice-President and Treasurer

respectively, informed Security Bank that Innovatech sold the

fourteen condominium units to Indiana Aerospace University

("Indiana") of Mactan, Cebu. Innovatech provided Security Bankwith copies of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage5i

made with Indiana as well as Indianas loan application with

Bank of Southeast Asia for P69,000,000. According to

Innovatech, part of the proceeds of Indianas loan with the Bank
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13/13

of Southeast Asia would be used to pay the loan with Security

Bank.

The loan with Security Bank matured on 19 September 1997without payment from either Innovatech or Indiana.

Consequently, Security Bank filed a petition for notarial

foreclosure of the fourteen condominium units under Act

No. 3135,6as amended by Act No. 4118. The public auction was

held on 29 January 1998, at 10:00 a.m., at the City Hall ofMuntinlupa City. During the public auction, the condominium

units were sold for P32,839,290 to Security Bank as the only

and highest bidder.

Innovatech filed an action against Security Bank for

Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Certificate

of Sale, Reconveyance of Properties and Damages withPrayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

RTC: On 26 March 1998, the RTC Muntinlupa City, Branch 256

("trial court") granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in

favor of Innovatech.

The 26 March 1998 Order became the subject of a petition

for certiorari(CA-G.R. SP No. 49326) filed by Security Bank

before the CA.

CA: In its Decision(24 August 1999), the CA dismissed SecurityBanks petition for lack of merit. However, in an AmendedDecision (8 June 2000), the CA set aside its 24 August 1999

Decision and nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issuedby the trial court.

Innovatech filed a MR of the Amended Decision but the CA

denied the motion in its Resolution. Innovatech filed a petition,

(G.R. No. 152157), before the Supreme Court. The SC denied the

petition and denied with finality Innovatechs MR.

Meanwhile, on 22 June 1998, Indiana filed a Complaint-in-Intervention with prayer for the issuance of Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Prohibitory and

Mandatory Injunction. The trial court issued an Order granting

the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

Security Bank moved for reconsideration of the Order, which

the trial court denied for lack of merit.

Security Bank went to the Court of Appeals for relief.

CA Resolutions:

In its assailed Resolution(22 Feb 2000) the CA denied due

course to Security Banks petition. The CA ruled that the

petition does not indicate the dates when petitioner received a

copy of the Order dated 01 February 1999 and when the Motion

for Reconsideration was filed in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular 39-

98.

Security Bank filed a MR, which the CA denied. Hence, the

recourse to this Court.

The Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing Security Banks

petition on mere technicality despite the banks substantial

compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure as amended by Circular No. 39-98.

Held: Yes.

The Rules clearly provide that non-compliance with any of the

requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of

the petition. If we apply the Rules strictly, we cannot fault the

Court of Appeals for dismissing Security Banks petition. The CAmerely followed the Rules. However, in the exercise of its equity

jurisdiction this Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a

case may be resolved on its merits based on the evidence

presented by the parties.17Rules of procedure should promotenot defeat, substantial justice.18Hence, the Court may opt to

apply the Rules liberally to resolve the substantial issues raised

by the parties.19

Ratio:

The material dates required to be stated in the petition

for certiorariunder Rule 65 are:

(1) the date of receipt of the notice of the judgment or

final order or resolution;

(2) the date of filing of the motion for new trial or for

reconsideration; and

(3) the date of receipt of the notice of denial of the

motion.20

Contrary to the CAs findings, Security Bank correctly asserted

that page 13 of its petition states the date of filing of the motion

for reconsideration on 23 February 1999, or thirteen days afterthe receipt of the Order.21The petition also states the date of

receipt of notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration filed

before the trial court. Hence, the petition only lacked the date oreceipt of the trial courts Order of 1 February 1999 that was the

subject of the motion for reconsideration.

The stamped date on the Order of 1 February 1999 annexed to

the petition is not clear enough for the Court of Appeals to

determine when Security Banks counsel received a copy of the

Order.22However, upon filing its motion for reconsideration

before the Court of Appeals, Security Bank attached another

copy of the Order of 1 February 1999.23This time, the stamped

date of receipt of the Order shows that the Security Banks

counsel received the Order on 10 February 1999.

When Security Bank furnished the CA with the copy of the trial

courts Order bearing the stamped date of its receipt, it showed

its willingness to rectify its omission. Security Bank, in effect

substantially complied with the Rules.

The rationale for requiring the statement of material dates

is to determine the timeliness of filing of the petition

Clearly, Security Bank filed the motion for reconsideration with

the trial court on time. Security Bank also filed the petitionbefore the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. The

Court reiterates that there is ample jurisprudence holding that

the subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may cal

for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.24

In the recent case ofGreat Southern Maritime Services

Corporation v. Acua,25we held that "the failure to comply

with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition

may be excused since the dates are evident from the records."

The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of

Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial courts order denying

the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly statedin the petition in the present case. The other material dates may

be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident

Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to

give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and

defenses.26
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Documents

Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus