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AHS HUMS/CBM
Certification of HUMS as primary
mean for continuing airworthiness
process: EC225 lessons learned and
present key topics
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AHS HUMS/CBM – Airbus Helicopter HUMS/FDM
2
CONTENT
• “Lessons learned from EC225 in-flight monitoring – 1st time experience for the certification of
HUMS as primary mean for continuing airworthiness process”
– lessons learned from EC225 bevel gear in-flight monitoring :
- how it was certified with EASA
- lessons learned for « in-flight » monitoring functionality (advantages vs drawbacks)
- lessons learned for HUMS performance demonstration (how to, limits and difficulties)
• Some key points with regard to Airbus Helicopters function policy:
– consideration of operators processes and organizations for CBM set-up
– regulation for maintenance credit : main difficulties
February 2015
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Lessons learned from EC225 in-
flight monitoring
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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: certification objectives
- Justify performance and robustness/reliability of the Health Indicator (MOD45) for the crack
detection of the bevel gear of the EC225
- Demonstrate the safe remaining flight time after MOD45 alert in order to comply with CS29
safety objectives
apply and comply with CS29.1465
Define the process and design solution to comply with safety objectives using existing HUMS
(MARMS system)
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HUMS-CP
Control Panel
MFDAUs
System
management
Ground Tool
Result
Card
TGB accelerometers
(Tail Gear Box)
Tail Drive Shaft
accelerometers MGB
accelerometers
(Main Gear Box) Engine
accelerometers
Accelerometers on the floor
(Rotor Tuning) VPU
Vibration Process Unit
connected with all
accelerometers
DTU
Data Transfer
Unit
EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: HUMS used
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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: design objectives
• From time of detection using indicator MOD45 (modulation indicator of the 45 teeth bevel gear)
define the remaining time before rupture
set-up the optimum threshold allowing to insure a Probability of no detection of 10-4 and this
whatever the scattering of the measure
Ensure the highest possible time to failure to allow to reach a safe landing area
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6 February 2015
Assess errors to be included
Define distribution of slope
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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: variability & distribution
• Three causes of variability on MOD45 have been identified
– Accelerometer sensitivity
– Torque
– Transfer function between the excitation and the accelerometer, including the bevel shaft and
the gearbox casing
Tests were performed with different torques, different gearboxes/accelerometers to assess and
prove the variability
• Assess the distribution on the crack propagation time
– Compute mean and standard deviation, identify the most appropriate distribution model
Tests were performed on bench and confirmed in flight with different crack types
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7 February 2015
9 bevel gears were broken on bench
+ 1 in flight test + 2 real in-flight cases
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Indicator MOD45 – bench and flight tests at MCP-15%
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8 February 2015
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Indicator MOD45 – bench and flight tests at MCP
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9 February 2015
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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: results obtained
In-Flight MOD45 monitoring was certified based on following results :
- Real time MOD45 monitoring with fixed threshold
- 2FH ensured for safe flight until safe landing area after detection
- False alert rate demonstrated at the required level (based on statistical fleet analysis - 46
aircrafts during two years / 59360 flight hours)
- Detection rate in due time demonstrated with a probability of 10-4
- MARMS is a DAL C system
And necessary following design changes:
- Increase the frequency of MOD45 computation on-board (every 5 minutes)
- Install warning lights in the cockpit
- Define the appropriate MMI to be provided to the crew in case of HUMS lights switch-ON
- Implement degraded modes (in case of no MOD45 computation…)
- Define means to reduce accelerometers dormant failures (set-up of dedicated checks on
indicators)
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10 February 2015
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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: solution
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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: lessons learned
• In order to perform In-flight alerting, for flight safety, using HUMS following rules should
be applied:
- this is mainly applicable to degradation cases that are detectable late or fast degradations, for
which on-ground analysis frequency does not allow to insure safe margin for the flight
- This can be activated only if the emergency procedure can be defined and certified (this means
that « time to failure » is known and mastered)
- This should be activated only if the emergency procedure consequence is at worst MAJor
(system not compatible with procedure « land immediatly ») false alert is not worse than
MAJor
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Some key points with regard to
Airbus Helicopters function policy
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Objective with HUMS: Maintenance & Operation Optimization
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Optimization
Operate H/C Maintain H/C
Monitor H/C
Health & Usage
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Maintenance, Operation and Monitoring Processes
Integration
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Mission
Planning
Maintenance
Planning
Health &
Usage
Monitoring
Maintenance
Control
(CMMS)
Maintenance
Execution
Mission
Execution
Decision
Support
Mission
control
Prognostic
Diagnostic
Level H/C
Immediate : 1 sec. to 1
day
Level Work Center
Operational
Short-term: 1 to 30 days
Level Area Fleet
Tactical
Mid-term: 1 to 12 months
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16 February 2015
AIRBUS
HELICOPTERS
Operator structure
SMS
OPS
… Customer
ERP
Embedded
analysis
Data analysis, internal &
external restitutions H/C Local analysis
Data collection
and storage
CUSTOMER
GROUND
STATION
HUMS
management
HUMS
data
PART M
Operator management
Restitution
Aircraft data
HUMS
remote
application
Maintenance
data
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HUMS integration in the Maintenance & Operation
new processes have to be defined
• In order to get credit from HUMS/FDM it is mandatory that HUMS integrates fully the
operator processes and organizations
– The solution need to adapt as much as possible to the different processes and organizations :
for e.g. not all operators have a HUMS manager, many operators delegate PART M and
PART145 activities to another entity…
– The OEM need to understand the operator processes and organization in order to bring relevant
solutions - until now HC manufacturers were very focused on flight phase of the HC, providing
« passive products » like documents for maintenance and continuing airworthiness… this is
changing and in order to provide « active products » for maintenance and continuing
airworthiness users we need also to connect processes and systems (HUMS integrated with
MIS for e.g.)
– This will impact operators existing processes and means
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18 February 2015
AIRBUS
HELICOPTERS
Aircraft data
HUMS
data
HUMS
remote
application
PART M
Operator structure
SMS
OPS
…
GROUND
STATION
Restitution
Maintenance
data
Customer
ERP
Embedded
analysis
Data analysis, internal &
external restitutions H/C Local analysis Operator management
Data collection
and storage
CUSTOMER
HUMS
management
COMPLIANCE PART M/ PART 145 / OPS
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HUMS integration in the Maintenance & operation
impact on airworthiness approval
• Getting maintenance credit using HUMS implies to address data integrity assurance all along
the functional chain: from sensors until results displayed through PC, tablette, Web applications
• Embedded part is covered by CS/FAR 29
• …but the rest of the system concerns functions and processes today covered by PART M /
PART 145 regulations when AC29-MG15 intends also to address those parts when HUMS is
used
As a consequence many topics are key:
Links and clear frontiers between regulation have to be defined: CS should address the
function/system until data on the ground and PARTM/145 adresses requirement for use on
ground (typically other means of compliance than DO178 should be acceptable)
Web applications have to be considered as possible solutions
adequate performance of the system has to be demonstrated but correct integration in the PART
M process is also crucial and has to be demonstrated as well
Such demonstration need to master the design from the monitored part until the ground segment
applications
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