Central Organ of the Algerian National Liberation Front %

REVOLUTION BY THE PEOPLE FOR THE PEOPLE

THE FREEDOM FIGHTER

Special issue

C O N T E N T S ft

1) Preface. 2) Excerpts from the proceedings of the Congress held on August 20th 1956 3) Excerpts from the Political Platform of the National Liberation Front.

Published by "Algerian Resistance"

REVOLUT ION BY T H E PEOPLE FOR T H E PEOPLE

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THE FREEDOM FIGHTER Central Organ of the Algerian National Liberation Front

PUBLISHED BY "ALGER IAN RESISTANCE"

P R E F A C E On the occasion of the second anniversary of the Algerian

Revolution, the National Liberation Front brings to the atten-tion of the Algerian people and of the world at large the decisions arrived at by the Congress of August 20th 1956 which took place in the Soummam Valley.

French propaganda has attempted to spread, the idea that the Algerian Revolution has been decapitated as the result of the arrest effected under disgraceful conditions now known to all the world, of our brothers Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, Mo-hammed Khider, Lachref and Boudiaf. The organisation of the N.L.F. which has now been made public shows that this propaganda is completely false. Those who have had any ex-perience of resistance movements know that the arrest of one or two leaders has never been sufficient to destroy such mo-vements. This is particulary true in regard to the Algerian Revolution which is headed not by a single leader but by the National Council of the Algerian Revolution {known as C.N.R.A.).

The C.N.R.A., highest organ of the Revolution, guides the policy of the N.L.F. and is the sole body authorised in the last resort to take decisions relative to the country's futu-re. For example, only the C.N.R.A. is capable of ordering a cease-fire.

The H.Q. of the N.L.F. is called the Committee of Coor-dination and Execution (C.C.E.) and is composed of 5 mem-bers chosen from among the members of the CNRA. Its H.Q. is established somewhere in Algeria. The C.C.E. is a real War Council, and is responsible for guiding and directing all bran-ches of the Revolution : military, political or diplomatic. It controls all the organised bodies of the Revolution (political, military, diplomatic, social and administrative). The political-military leaders responsible J or all Revolutionary activities in the six districts or Wilayas are directly responsible to the C.C.E.

After three years of successful armed struggle, the N.L.F. comes out into the open. The Algerian people who have al-ways given it their trustitnd support know that the N.L.F. will lead them to final victory : the national independence of Algeria. The 17 Full Members are : The 17 Associate Members are :

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EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE

CONGRESS HELD ON AUGUST 20TH 1956 1) The Political Platform which follows has been unanimously approved by the

Congress.

2) Executive Bodies :

a) The National Council of the Algerian Revolution (C.N.R.A.) as elected is composed of 34 members, 17 full members and 17 associate members.

The 17 Full Members are : The 17 Associate Members are :

Ait Ahmed Hocine. Aissa Ben Tobbal Lakhdar, Assistant Commander

Abane, Ramdane of Wilaya II. Abbas, Ferhat Boussouf Abdel Hafid, Commander ot Wi-Abbas, Ferhat

laya V. Boudiaf, Mohamed Ben Yahia Mohammed, former President of Ben Boulaid, Mostepha the U.G.E.M.A.

Belkacem Dhiles Slimane, Asst. Commander of Wilaya

IV. Ben EHIa, Ahmed Francis Ahmed.

Ben M'hidi, Larbi Mohammedi Said, Commander of Wilaya III.

Bittat, Rabah Mezhoudi Brahim, Asst. Commander of Khider, Mohamed Wilaya II. Khider, Mohamed

Mellah Ali, Commander of Wilaya VI. Krim, Belkacem Mouloud. Lamine-Debaghine, Mohamed Mcurad. Mokrane Massas, Ahmed.

Ouamrane, Amar Mahri, Abdel Hamid. Ouamrane, Amar Said.

Tawfik El Madani Saddek. Yazid, M'Hamed Thaalbi Tayeb. Zirout, Youcef Zoubir.

N.B. — Mostepha Ben Boulaid and Youssef Zirout have since been killed on the field of battle. Belkacem, Mokrane, Aissa, Mouloud, Mourad, Said, Saddek and Zoubir are unknown to the French Police.

b) The Committee of Coordination and Execution (C.C.E.) is composed of 5 members wnose names remain secret. They have been elected from members of the CNRA inside Algeria. Their HQ is established in Algeria in a region which has been liberated.

c) The Committees :

The members of the Committees are appoin-ted by the CCE to which they are also res-ponsible.

3) Relations between the NLF and the NLA :

Priority for the political over the military organisation.

In the Political Committees the political-military leader must strive to maintain a ba-lance between all branches of the Revolution.

4) Relation between internal and external activities :

Priority for the internal over the external.

5) The Algerian Liberation Army :

Algeria is divided into six Districts (Wilayas).

Each Wilaya is divided into zones.

Each Zone is divided into regions.

Each region is divided into sectors.

a) The Post Commands : As collective lea-dership has been accepted as a basic princi-ple, all our consultative organisations should respect it without question. The Post Com-mand is composed of a leader (political-mili-tary) representative of the N.L.F. central au-thority. He is assisted by a Deputy and asso-ciates who are officers or non-commissioned officers, up to three in number, concerned with the following branches of activity : military, political, intelligence and liaison. There are P.C.'s at the Wilaya, Zonal, Regional and Sectional levels.

Promotions : Promotion is decreed by the organisational body immediately superior to that in which the man concerned belongs. The principle of promotion of all grades has been accepted.

b) Military :

Units : The group (fauj) is composed of 1 1 men including one sergeant and two corporals. The half-group equals 5 men and a corporal.

The Section (ferka) is composed of 35 men (three groups plus the head of the section ana his assistant).

The Company (katiba) consists of 1 10 men (3 sections plus 5 officers).

The Batallion (failek) consists of 350 men (three companies plus 20 officers).

The Grades : The grades accepted in the Kabylie have been adopted : El Jundi el Awwal a Red V Inverted worn on the the right .arm. El Arif (Sergeant) two inverted Red V's. El Arif El Awwal (Sergeant Major) : 5 inverted Red V's. El Moussaad (adjudant) : a V under-ligned by white stripe. Moulazen (Cadet) : White Star. Moulsam etthani (Second Liept.) : a Red Star. Dhabi El Awwal (5 Lieutenant) Red Star. White Star. Dhabat Etthani (Captajn) 2 Red Stars. Sagh el Awwal (Commandant) : two Red Stars, one White. Sagh Etthani (colonel) : three Red Stars.

Head of Wilaya : this will be a colonel ; his 3 assistants will be commandants.

Head of Zone : this will be a Captain, assisted by 3 Lieutenants.

Head of Region : This will be a Sub-Lieu-tenant assisted by 3 cadets.

H>ad of Sector : An adjutant assisted by 3 Sergeant Majors.

N.B. — The Political Commissars will have the same grades as the officers of the groups etc to which they are attached.

Badges : A star and Red Crescent worn on worn on the cap (for each Wilaya). The stripes will be made by Wilaya N° 3.

Decorations : The C.C.E. has been instructed to examine this question.

N.B. — All the grades are provisional. After the liberation of the country a mijitary commission will be instructed to study each case and to prepare for a re-classification of existing grades within a National Army.

The Rank of General will not come into use until after the liberation.

Appointments, dismissals and demotions of officers are made by the CCE on the propsoals of the Heads of Wilayas.

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Non-commissioned officers are named, dis-missed or degraded by the Head of Wilaya. Corporals are named etc by the Head of Zone.

Pay and Family Allowances : Each Resis tance Fighter will be paid according to the following scale : Soldier 1.000 Francs per month Corporal 1.200 Sergeant 1.500 Sergeant-Major . . . 1.800 Adjutant 2.000 Cadet 2.500 Sub-Lieutenant . . . 3.000 Lieutenant 3.500 Captain 4.000 Commandant . . . . 4.500 Colonel 5.000

The nurses both men and women are given the rank of sergeants and as such receive a pay of 1.500 Francs. Assistant Doc tors have the rank of cadets and are paid 2.500 per month. Doc tors are ranked as Lieutenants and receive a pay of 3.500 francs per month. Only toilet articles are to be paid for by the fighters; all other needs are met by the Army.

Family Allowances : All the freedom fighters with family responsabilities will be provided with monthly allowances. However, fighters are asked to answer the call to patriotism and to lighten the burden on the Movement's fi-nances as for as possible. Instructions to this effect will be issued to Group Leaders and Political Commissars. The Women Fighters will

receive the same pay and allowances as the men for the same work (30 days out of 30). They will receive half pay when employed one week per month.

Prisoners and the families of those fallen in battle will receive relief on the same basis as the freedom fighters.

Relief will be calculated on the following basis :

For the country : 2.000 francs basic plus 2.000 francs per person.

For the Cilies : 5.000 francs basic plus 2.000 francs per person. C) POLICY

The Political Commissars and their func-tions : the main tasks of the Political Com-missars will be :

a) Organisation and education of the peo-ple.

b) Propaganda and Information.

c) Psychological Warfare (contacts with the people), the European minority, prisoners of War). The Political Commissars will give their advice on all the military action plans of the N.L.A.

d) Finances and Food Supplies D) ADMINISTRATION, PEOPLES

ASSEMBLIES

The people's assemblies will be elected. They will be composed of 5 members including a President and will be concerned with : civic status, legal and Islamic affairs, financial and economic matters and the Police.

FOR THE TRIUMPH OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

IN THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

The following programme of action seeks to define in general terms the position of the

^'National' Liberation Front at this vital stage •in the Algerian Revolution. It is divided into two parts :

1) The present political situation.

2) The general outlook for the future.

3) The means of action and of propagan-da.

Present political situation

A) The Progress of the Algerian Revolution

Algeria for the last two years has been fighting heroically, for its national indepen-dence. The patriotic and anti-colonial revolu-tion now taking'place has won the admiration of world pubJic opinion. . a) The Armed Resistance

Within a relatively short period of time the Army of National Liberation, at first centered in the Aures and Kabyle regions, has proved its mettle without any shadow of doubt. It has successfully countered the campaign of encir-clement and annihilation effected by a power-ful, modern army at the service of the colo-nial enterprise of one' of the world Powers.

Despite the temporary scarcity of arms, this Liberation Army has organised guerilla opera-tions including harassing manoeuvres and sa-botage which are now extended over the whole national territory.

This Army has persistently consolidated its . positions . by improving its tactics, its techni-que and its efficiency, and as a : result has passed on from the stage of guerilla opera-

"tioris proper to that of partial warfare. The Army has succeeded in combining the usual

-methods of-anticolonial warfare with the clas-

sic tactics of general warfare by an intelligent adaptation to the special nature of the terrain. It has already given satisfactory proof - now that its military organisation is unified, that it possesses the strategic science necessary for a full-scale war over the whole of Algerian territory.

THE NAT IONAL L IBERATION A R M Y IS

F IGHTING FOR A JUST CAUSE

This Army has rallied to its ranks patriots, volunteers and fighters determined to continue the struggle selflessly un til the liberation of their martyred homeland is achieved.

This Army is strengthened by the patriotic response of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the line, both professional and national service elements, who have deserted en masse with their arms and equipment from the ranks of the French Army. For the first time in the annals of her military history. France could no longer depend on the «loyalty» of the Algerian troops and has been obliged to transfer these to France and Germany.

The Goum units (local armed forces) recrui-ted mainly among the unemployed who are frequently deceived by the nature of the « work » for which they are enlisted, today have disappeared into the ranks of the Resis-tance. Remaining units are being disarmed and dissolved by the French Authorities.

Thus the manpower reserves of the Natio-nal Liberation Army are inexhaustible. The Army is now frequently obliged to refuse to enrol Algerians of all ages, from town and countryside, who are anxious to share the honour of bearing arms in their own Army. This Army is further sustained by the sympa-thy of the Algerian people whose enthusiam, solidarity and support both moral and mate-rial is complete and unshakeable.

The General Staff officers, Zone Comman-ders, Political Officers and other ranks of the N.L.A. are looked up to by the people as national heroes - whose feats are extolled in popular songs now sung in the humblest huts and hamlets, the slums of the Kasbahs and the homes of the middle class.

The above are the basic reasons for what

has been described as the « Algerian mira-cle » : that the N.L.A. has been able to hold in check a colossal French Army, strengthened by « atomic » divisions transferred from NATO Forces stationed in Europe.

These are the reasons why despite the rein-forcements being rushed across the Mediter-ranean, despite the tactics of « quadrillage » which have proved as ineffective as the in-tensive raining down of fire - the French Ge-neral Staff have been forced to admit that the Algerian problem cannot be resolved by military operations.

It is also necessary to mention the forma-tion of numerous city Resistance groups which from now on will form a second-line army without uniform.

These Resistance groups in the cities and villages concentrate their activity on attacks against Police and Gendarmerie Posts, sabota-ge of public buldings, incendiarism and the elimination of police personnel, spies and traitors. These activities have the immediate effect of weakening the military and police organisation of the colonialist enemy, increases the dispersion of enemy forces throughout the territory and intensify the demoralisation of French troops forced to remain in a sate of constant alert, tension and fatigue.

There is now no shadow of doubt that the N.L.A. has completely transformed the politi-cal atmosphere in Algeria. It has provoked a psychological shock which has released the masses from their lethargy, their hesitations and their indifference, and has awakened the Algerian nation to a full realisation of its na-tional dignity. It has also brought about a political and psychological union of all sections of the people : it is this national unanimity of throught and action which infuses the Armed Resistance and ensures final victory, b) Effective political organisation.

The National Liberation Front, though ne-cessarily on undergound movement, has now become the only genuine national organisation. Its influence is incontestable and goes unchal-lengend throughout the lenght and breadth of the country. In fact, within a very short pe-riod of time, the N.L.F. has succeeded in absorbing and replacing all the political par-ties in existence for the last ten years. This has not occurred by mere chance. It is the result of the reunion of the following indispen-sable conditions :

1) The elimination of personal power and the acceptance of the principle of collective leadershiD in the hands of men recognised for their honesty, courage, incorruptibility and tried in their readiness to act in the face of danger, imprisonment or death.

2) The political doctrine is clear. The aim to be achieved is national independence. The means to that end is national revolution by the destruction of the colonial regime in Algeria.

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3) Unity of the people is brought about in the struggle against the enemy without inter-nal division.

The N.L.F. proclaimed at the very beginning of the revolution that « the liberation of Al-geria will be the work of ALL Algerians and not that of a fraction of the people whatever the importance of that fraction may be. « It is for this reason that that the NLF in the course of the struggle takes into account all the anti-colonialist forces even if these are at present outside its control ».

4) The explicit condemnation of the perso-nalty cult, the open struggle against adven-turers, spies, administrative agents and infor-mers, from this action the N.L.F. derives its power to unmask the political manoeuvres and plots of the French police organisation.

All this does not imply that all difficulties have been completely resolved. Our political action was handicapped at the beginning for the following reasons :

1) The scarcity of trained men and of ma-terial and financial resources.

2) The need for a long and difficult work of political clarification - of patient and per-sistent explanation in order to avoid the crises occasioned by « growing pains ».

3) The strategic necessity of subordinating everything to the Armed Struggle. This weak-ness — normal and inevitable at the beginning — has now been corrected. Following a pe-riod in which it confined itself to issue only orders for Resistance against imperialism, the N.L.F. has now firmly entrenched its position in the sphere of the political struggle.

This advance was manifested by the strike order on the Anniversary of the Ist November 1956 — considered as a decisive event both from its psychological aspect and on account of its positive proof of N.L.F. control over all sections of the population. Never before had a single Algerian political organisation succe-ded in launching a strike of such widesprand importance throughout the towns and villages of the entire country.

On the other hand, the success of the non-cooperation movement launched by the N.L.F. was no less striking. The avalanche of resi-gnations by the Algerian deputies was follo-wed by those of government servants and obliged the French Government to take urgent measures : the mandate of Algerian deputies to the French Parliament were not ^x 4 ^ ' 4 V and the Algerian Assembly was dissolved. The General, Municipal and local Councils have disappeared and this vacuum is accentuated by the resignation of numerous officials and paid agents of the colonial administration : Caids, etc. For lack of candidates or substi-tutes, the French administration is dislocated — its organisation is seriously weakened and cut off from all popular support; in almost all regions today this administration is obliged to submit to the authority of the N.L.F.

This slow but sure disintegration of the i French administrative machine has permitted

ij I the development of a dual system of authori-1U tv. A revolutionary administration already \\ functions with underground local councils and \\\ bodies concerned with food supplies, collection

:'of taxes, recrutment of Resistance fighters, security and intelligence services. The N.L.F. '$ administrative services will make a fiirther advance with the establishment of popular assemblies to be elected by the rural popula-tion before the second anniversary of our Re-volution.

The political appeal of the Front is further demonstrated in a remarkable manner by the mass adhesion of peasants for whom victory and independence signifies also those agrarian reforms which will assure to them the posses-sion of the lands which they by teir own efforts.

All this is infused with a revolutionary at-mosphere which has spread swiftly and in va-rious forms throughout the country.

\ The presence within our organisation of city ' elements, politically experienced and capable,

has enabled us under the guidance of the N.L.F. to awaken politcal awareness in for-merly backward regions. The support given by students — both men and women — in this sphere hos been of first rate importance espe-cially in the political, administrative and health departments.

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It is now a certainty that the Algerian Re-volution has achieved with full honours the first stage of its historical development. It is now a living reality which gives the lie to the French wager — launched in ignorance — that the movement would be criped out within a few months.

Ours is an organised revolution — it is not an anarchic revolt.

Ours is a national struggle to destroy an anarchic colonial regime — it is NOT a reli-gious war. It represents a march forward in the historical path of human progress — it is not a return to feudalism. Lastly, it is the struggle for the rebirth of the Algerian State in the form of a demotratic republic — it does not aim at the restoration of a monarchy or of an out-dated theocracy.

c) THE Collapse of Former Political Groups

The Algerian Revolution has hastened the political maturity of the Algerian people and sharpened their critical awareness. It has de-monstrated to the people in the pratical expe-rience of the liberating struggle, the failure of reformism and the bankruptcy of counter-revolutionary tacties and manoeuvres. The breakdown of the old parties has revealed this with brutal clarity. All the various groups orhich existed previously have succombed to their own internal weakness. The active mem-bers have rallied to the N.L.F. The old UDMA is dissolved and the Ulemas have courageously taken up their stand on the Front's platform. The UGEMA (General Union of Students), which now includes all university and college students, has in its last congress unanimously proclaimed its total support for the N.L.F. The Central Committee of the MTLD has com-pletely disappeared both in regard to its lead-ership and its political tendencies.

"Messaiism Routed" The M.N.A. (so-called « Algerian National

Movement » headed by Messali), despite its demagogy and pretentions, has failed to re- * solve the crisis precipitated by the collapse of %£

the MTLD. Today it only manages to maintain some organised existence in France owing to the presence in exile of its leader Messali Hadj and to some of the immigrants total igno-rance of internal conditions in Algeria. It Is from this group that orders, funds and agents are sent out from time to time to attempt to create armed dissident groups whose objective is not to particpate in the struggle against the colonial regime, army and police but by pro-vocation and sabotage to create disorder and defeatism in the ranks of the Algerian Resis-tance and its political and military leaders. The brief and sporadic activity of the M.N.A. was publicly demonstrated in a few towns such as Algiers as originating from a counter-revolutionary sect. Its aims were to create diversions and divisions such as the anti-Moza-bite movement or gangsterism (commercial ra-ckets) or confusion and false reports (for exam-ple the rumour spread that Messali was the initiator and head of the N.L.A. etc.).

The Messali group has thus lost all in-fluence as a politicc! force, and is petering out day by day. It is particulary significant that the most tenacious admirers and defenders of Messali are those journalists and intellectuals who stand closest to the French Government circles. These profess to denounce the ingrati-tude of the Algerian people for refusing to recognise « the exceptional merits of Messali, the creator — 30 years ago — of Algerian nationalism », etc. The attitude of the Messali group resembles that of the cock in the fable who refuses to admit that the dawn has come but insists on proclaiming that it is « I who make the sun rise » ;

The Algerian nationalism of which Messali claims to be the originator is no more than a natural evolution through which all peoples pass as they awake from their lethargy and indifference. The sun will rise whether the cock proclaims it or not — as the The Alge-rian Revolution of today will triomph whether Messali has or has not anything to do with it. This defence of Messalism in the French press was in fact a serious indication for us of an attempt to create an artificially favoura-ble atmosphere for French manoeuvres against the Algerian Revolution. And this manoeuvre was DIVISION — the classical weapon of co-lonial rule.

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The French Government has tried in vain to create groups in oppostion to the N.L.F. — as witness for example the so-called «Group of 61 » — (which collapsed). Unable to rely on the Sayah or the Fares, the yes-men were henceforth thoroughly and irreparably discredi-ted. Next the French colonial agents sought to use the leader of the M.N.A. as its last diabolical resort to deprive the Algerian people of their victory. In this respect Messali on account of his inordinate vanity and unscrupu-louness represents the perfect instrument for the political imperialist. It was not by accident that in November 1955 Jacques Soustelle told Professor Massignon : Messali is our last card» Moreover, the present Resident Minister, La-coste, openly expresses to the Algerian colo nial press his satisfaction at M N A attempts to weaken the influence of the N.L.F. The Socia-list weekly « Demain » describing the various divergences among the French government lea-ders openly stated that certain French Ministers were ready — in order to counter the growing influence ot the N.L.F. — to accord Messali full freedom of action — « the only problem being, how to protect the life of the Algerian leader ». When it is remembered that Messali indulged in a violent attack against the Arab countries, to the great satisfaction of Soustelle, Lacoste and Borgeaud, his removal from Angouleme to greater security in Belle Isle bears out the argument of the paper « Demain ». When the life of Messali becomes so precious for the French authorities, it is little wonder that he should begin to slip into conscience betrayal of his own country.

No comunism

Despite the Algerian Communist Party's new position as a banned organisation and the sensational publicity accorded it-by the colo-nial press as a means of justifying an imagi-nary collusion with the Algerian Resistance — it has not succeeded in playing the role which it had set itself. The Communist leadership, bureaucratic and without real contact with the Algerian masses, was unable to understand \ clearly the revolutionary situation. As a result

it" srarted out by condemning what it called « terrorism » and in the first months of the i.sing gave orders to its followers in the Aures Not to Take up Arms. The French Communisr Party for its part played the role of yes-men and kept silent when Algeria was subjected lo special Government powers. Not only did the Algerian Communists lack courage to de-nounce this opportunist attitude of their Parlia-mentary group but they have never given a word of explanation concerning their failure, to take action against the waging of the war in Algeria such as demonstrations against rein-forcements, or transport, merchant marine, port and dock strikes against the importation of war material.

In brief, the Algerian Communist Party has ceased to exist as a serious organisation lar-gely due to the overwhelming number of Eu-ropeans within its ranks whose artificial con-victions in favour of Algerian nationalism be-gan to falter especially when forced to face up to the Armed Resistance.

This absence of unity and the resulting political confusion is based on an even more fundamental doctrinal incoherence derived from their theory that the national liberation of Algeria was impossible before the triomph of the proletarian revolution in France. This theory — which closes its eye to real facts — recalls the attitude of the SFIO (French Socialist Party) which preached passive and opportunist political assimilation. By denying the revolutionary character of the Algerian peasants and Fellaheen, the Communist Party professes to « defend » the Algerian peasants and Fellaheen, the problematical danger of failing under the direct domination of the « Arab Bougeoisie » — as if the indepen-dence of Algeria was destined to follow the path of former and unsuccessful revolutions — or even to turn backwards to some sort of feu-dalism.

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The C.G.T. (French Trade Unign Federa-

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tion), being under Communist influence finds itself in a similar situation and desperately seeks to define its objectives and to find a line of action. The general passivity of the organised worker's movement, aggravated to some extent by the negative position of the F.O. and C.F.T.C. (other French T.U. organi-sations) is not due to a lack of militancy on the part of the city workers but to the apathy of the U.G.S.A. leaders who wait with crossed arms for orders from Paris.

The Algerian dockers gave proof of their

readiness to act by participating in the strike on the occasion of the political anniversary of November Ist 1956.

Many workers understood then that this day of patriotic action would have been more de-monstrative of national union, more dynamic and more effective if the working class organi-sations had been led with more intelligence and if they had for example been encouraged to work for a real national Trade union fede-ration. This view found ample justification in the complete success of the General Patriotic strike - called for by the N.L.F. on July 5th 1956.

These are the reasons which led the Alge-

rian workers to welcome with open arms the creation of the U.G.T.A. (General Union of Algerian Workers — affiliated to the ICFTU) which is now irresistible : il has given expres-sion to their impatient desire to take a more active part in the destruction of the colonial regime which is responsible for the poverty, unemployment, forced emigration and human indig nity characteristic of social conditions in Algeria today. This extension of national sen-timent — and its elevation from the moral point of view as well — has naturally had the effect of reducing mass support for the Alge-rian Communist Party, already decimated by the loss of hesitant or unstable European ele-ments.

However, there have been some individual attempts by certain Communists to infiltrate into the ranks of the N.L.F. and the N.L.A. It is possible that these represent individual attempts to return to a healthier conception of the national liberation struggle. It is also certain that the Algerian Communist Party will attempt in the future to exploit these « Infiltrations » with the aim of disguising its complete isolation and its absence from the ranks in the historic struggle of the Algerian Revolution.

B) French Imperialist Stategy

The Algerian Revolution which has shatte-red brutally all colonialist forecasts and false optimists continues to progress with vigour and along a steadily rising curve of success. This Revolution is shaking to ruins what remains of a French colonial empire in decline.

Successive French Governments are subjected to a political crisis without precedent. Forced to abandon their colonies in Asia, they still fondly believe that they will be able to main-tain their grip on those in Africa. Unable to face up to the deterioration of their position throughout all North Africa, they have now relaxed their grip on Tunisia and Morocco in order to cling on more tightly to Algeria.

a) The Lesson of the Tunisian and Moroccan Experiments.

This policy without realistic perspectives is characterised by the rapid series of moral de-feats in all spheres : discontent in France, workers, strikes protests by businessmen, agita-tion among the farmers. Budget deficits, infla-tion, under-production, economic slump, the Algerian question before the United Nations, abandon of the Sarre to Germany etc.

The North African revolutionary urge, des-pite the absence of common political strategy owing to the organic weakness of the former Maghreb Liberation Committee, has driven France to improvise a hasty defensive tactic,

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thereby overthowing the traditional repressive plans of colonial rulers.

The Franco-Tunisian Conventions which we-re intended to act as a sort of neo-colonial barrage were swept aside by pressure of popu-lar discontent and the blows struck against the imperialist regime by the three sister coutries of North Africa.

The rhythm of the evolution of the Moroc-co n crisis, the entry into the armed struggle of the mountaineers who flocked to join the ranks of the Resistance in the towns and above all the pressure exerted by the Algerian revolution were the main factors which led to a reversal of French official policies in regard to the question of Morocco's independence.

The abrupt change of methods used by the Colonialist Government — the change from « immobility » to the seach for a rapid solution was dictated in the first place by strategic considerations. These reasons were :

1") To prevent the creation of a veritable second front by severing the unified line of armed resistance in the RIFF and in ALGERIA.

2°) To bring about the destruction of fighting unity between the three North African countries. , j

3°) To isolate the Algerian Revolution whose popular character made it distinctly more dangerous.

All these calculations were doomed to failu-re. Negotiations carried out separately aimed at duping and corrupting certain leaders in sister countries by encouraging them to desert, consciously or unconsciously the true field of revolutionary battle.

The North African political situation is characterised by the fact that the Algerian problem is embedded in the Moroccan and Tunisian problems, so as to form one single problem.

Indeed, without the independence of Alge-ria, that of Morocco and Tunisian is merely a trap.

The Tunisians and Moroccans have not for-gotten that their countries were conquered by France after the conquest of Algeria.

The populations of the Maghreb are con-vinced today, by experience, that a seperate struggle against the enemy can only result in failure for all, as each can be crushed sepe-rate ly.

It is an illusion to believe that Morocco and Tunisia can enjoy true independence, while Algeria remains under the colonial yoke.

The Colonial rulers, who are experts in di-plomatic hypocrisy take back with one hand that which they have given with the other and would not hesitate to invent pretexts for re-conquering those countries as soon as the in-ternational situation appears to favour such an action.

It is important to stress that Moroccan and Tunisian leaders have, in recent statements ex-pressed points of view which have met with the full approval of the N.L.F.

b) The Governement's policy in Algeria. From February 6fh, after the fanatical Set-

tlers, demonstrations in Algeriers, the socialist led Government abandoned the electoral pro-mises made by the Republican front namely, to restore peace in Algeria by negotiation; to send back to their homes the soldiers of the Algerian contingent : to break the administra-tive, financial « feudal systems »; to release political prisoners and to close concentration camps.

Before his resignation, M. Mendes-France represented in the Government the tendency to negotiate, as opposed to the policies enfor-ced today. This war to the bitter end aims to isolate the « maquis » from the Algerian people, through extermination.

This aim having been accepted unanimously by the Government and the majority of the French Parliament, there can be no divergen-ces until such time as this policy of extermina-tion, so called « pacification » will have ended in failure. It is obvious that the political aims recently reaffirmed by Guy Mollet, serve only to camouflage the true objective, which is to annihilate completly our vital strength.

.15.

The military offensive is supported by a poli-tical offensive which is doomed in advance to failure.

The « recognition of the Algerian persona-lity » remains a vague formula, without any precise definition. Thevaguely described poli-tical solution was supported by only two moti-vating ideas : that of consulting the Algerians through free elections and that of the cease-fire. Fragmentary and ludicrous reforms were announced in an atmosphere of general indiffe-rence : provisionally, no parliamentary repre-sentation at the Palais Bourbon : the dissolu-tion of the Algerian Assembly, a timid police purge ; the replacement of « three » high officials; increases in salaries paid to agricul-tural workers, the admission of Algerians to public administration and to certain manage-rial posts : agrarian reforms, elections to the single chamber. Today the Mollet Government announces the existence of 6 or 7 draft sta-tutes for Algeria, the general line of which

would be the establishment of two Assemblies — one legislative, the second economic — with a Government composed of Ministers or Commissioners1 and presided over by a Minister of the French Government.

This indicates on the one hand evolution.—— thanks to our struggle . — of- public opinion, in France and on the other the insensate dream of the French rulers who persist in: the. belief that we would accept such a shameful com-promise.

The attempt to isolate the « maquis ». from the solidarity of the Algerian people,: which was favoured by Naogelen on •the home front, was completed by an attempt to -isolate, the Algerian Revolution from the solidarity, of an-ti-colonialist countries. This isolating action was taken abroad by Pinegu.

The N.L.F. will, as in the past, outwit the enemy's plans for the future.

W e shall refer to the international aspect of the situation in the third'part.

II Political prospects Proof has been established that the Alge-

rian Revolution is not an anarchist revolution, localised, un-coordinated, without political di-rection and doomed to failure.

Proof has been established, on the contrary, that it is a true revolution, organised, national and popular, centralised and led by a G.H.Q. capable of leading it to final victory.

Proof has been established that the French Government, convinced of the impossibility of a military solution, is compelled to seek a political settlement.

That is why the National Liberation Front must, inversely, be infused with the principle' that negotiation follows a fight to the end against a relentless enemy but never pre-cedes it.

Our position in this respect is based- on three essential1 consideration :

1)- To' have a clearly^defined political-doc-trine.

2) To develop the armed struggle uncea-singly till general insurrection is achieved.

3) To start a wide-scale political action.

A) W h y are we fighting ?

The Algerian Revolution is an historical mission to destroy finally and irrevocably the odious colonial regime which is an obstacle to peace and progress.

1) Wa r Aims. 2) Cease-Fire. 3) Peace Negotiations.

i \

1) _ W A R A IMS Our war aims are strictly to achieve the

end of war, at which point the peace aims can be fulfilled. The object of a war is to force the enemy into a situation which compels him to accept the peace aims, following uncondi-tional military victory (surrender, rout or cru-

. 1 6

shing the enemy force) or the request for o ceasefire or an armistice with a view to nego-tiation. Our war aims, which are politico-mili-tary are as follows :

1) The weakening of the French army, to make it impossible for if to achieve armed victory.

2) To cause a wide-scale deterioration of colonial economy, by sabotage, to bring about a break-down in the administration of the country.

3) Maximum perturbation in France, at the economic leyel,. so. as to render impossible the continuation of war.

4) The political isolation of France in Al-geria and in the world.

5) To develop the insurrection along such lines as to conform with international law (the establishment of ranks in the army, recogni-sable political authorities, respect of the rules of war and normal administration of the zones liberated by the N.L.A.)

6) To support the population unceasingly in the face of French efforts to exterminate it. II — CEASE-FIRE

Conditions : a) Political

1) Recognition of the indivisible Algerian J Nation.

This clause aims at destroying the colo-nialist myth of « French Algeria ».

2) The recognition of Algeria's1 indepen- , dence and' of her sovereignty - in all fields, I including national defence and diplomacy..,

3) The release of all- Algerian men and . women at present imprisoned, interned or I exiled because, of their, patriptjc ..activities be- 1 fore., and after the National.. Insurrection of * November 195.4.

4) . The .Recognition of the National Libe-% ration Front as the only organisation represen- \ ting the Algerian people and the only one en-titled to negotiate. The National Liberation Front alone will be responsible for and the

^guarantor of the cease-fire, in the name of the Algerian people.

b) military. Military conditions will be specified later.

III. — PEACE NEGOTIATIONE. 1) Once the cease-fire will have been de-

clared, the spokesman for Algeria will be the National Liberation Front. All questions con-cerning the Algerian people's representation will come under the sole jurisdiction of the National Liberation Front (Government, elec-tions etc.;) No interference in these matters on the part of. the French Government will be tolerated.

2) Negotiations will be carried out on a basis of independence (including questions of national defence and diplomacy).

3) Definition of points to be discussed : — the boundaries of Algerian territory (pre- I

sent boundaries including the Algerian Saha-ra).

— French Minority (on the basis of option A

between Algerian citizenship or foreign no 1 preferential treatment no dual nationality » (Algerian and French).

— French holdings (belonging to the French ^ State; belonging to French Citizens).

— transfer of.power (administration). t

— type of French assistance and coopera- & tion in the economic, monetary, social and I cultural fields etc...

— other points.

In a second phase the negotiations will be conducted by an Algerian Government direc-ted to expand the contents of the chapter-headings. This Government will be created by

a Constituant. Assembly established through general elections. THE NORTH AFR ICAN FEDERATION

Free and independent Algeria, having sha-ken off the shackles of racial colonialism based cn colonial despotism, will lay the new bases

, cf unity and fraternity of the Algerian Nation. \ The Algerian people , will never allow their \ patriotism — which is: a noble and generous

.7.

sentiment — to degenerate into a chauvinistic, narrow and blind nationalism.

For this reason they are, at the same time, sincere North-Africans passionately attached to the natural and necessary solidarity of the three Magreb countries.

North Africa is One, by its geographic histo-ry, its language, its civilisation and its future.

This solidarity must, therefore, be translated naturally into the creation of a Federation of the three North African States.

It is in the interests of the three sister coun-tries to organise a defence, orientation and diplomacy common to the three countries. Three must be free exchanges, a common, rational plan of equipment and industrialisation, a monetary policy, education and the exchan-ge of technical staffs; cultural exchanges, the exploitation in common of our mineral resour-ces and our Saharan regions.

The new task of the National Front of Libe-ration, in preparing general insurrection :

The possibility of Peace negotiations must not give rise toda feeling of facile optimism which would inevitably bring in its wake a relaxation of vigilance and the demobilisation of forces which would lead to the breaking down of the people's political cohesion.

On the contrary, the present phase of the, Algerian revolution calls for a relentless pursuit: of the armed fight, the strengthening of op-positions, the development of military and political Resistance forces.

The opening of negotiations and their sa-tisfactory conclusion depend in the first place on the relations between the two opposing forces.

For this reason we must, without leiting up, work in unison and with determination to make Algeria into an impregnable camp. This is the task that the National Liberation Front must carry out honorably and without delay, in cooperation with the National Army of Liberation.

With this object in view, the fundamental order is more valid than ever before :

Everything for the Wa r Front. Everything to obtain a decisive victory. Algerian independence is no longer a mere

political demand, or the dream which has for so long lulled the Algerian people, suffering under the yoke of French domination.

Today it is an immediate aim which is gro-wing nearer, every day, soon to become a reality.

The N.L.F. is striding ahead to dominate the situation on the military, political and di-plomatic levels.

New Objectives : to prepare at once and systematically the general insurrection, which is inseparable from national liberation.

a) to weaken the military, police, admi-nistrative and political organisation of colo-nialism.

b) To draw attention, continually to the technical side of the question, and particularly to the supply of materials.

c) strengthen and synchronise politico-mi-litary action.

To counteract the inevitable manoeuvres on the part of the enemy to divide us, by an

sed on the improvement and strengthening of the Popular Revolution for Liberation.

a) To consolidate the anti-imperialist na-tional Union.

b) To seek support in the numerically larger social strata — the poorest —. the most revolutionary, the fellahs — the agricultural workers.

c) To convince, with patience and perse-verance, the elements who are late in joining the ranks - encourage the hesitant, weak, mo-derate elements and enlighten the unaware.

d) Isolate the extreme colonialists by see-king alliance with liberal elements of European or Jewish origin, even if their action is still hesitant or neutralists.

Abroad — seek the maximum material, moral and psychological support.

.18-

a) By winning over the support of public opinion.

b) By developping diplomatic assistance by winning over to the Algerian cause those

countries which have been « neutralised » by

France or insufficiently informed on the na-

tional character of the Algerian war.

Ill Means of action The general political perspectives outlined

earlier bring into relief the value and the truth of the means of action \yhich the Natio-nal Liberation Front must exert in order to

and propaganda achieve complete victory in the noble fight for the independence of the martyred fatherland.

W e shall now outline these means for Al-geria, North Africa, France and abroad.

1 ) How to organise and lead millions of men in a gigantic battle

The psycho-political unity of the Algerian people, which has been wrought and streng-thened in armed battle is now a reality.

This national unity, which is patriotic and anti-colonialist, is the fundamental basis of the main political and military force of the Resistance.

This force must be kept intact and dyna-mic, and the unpardonable faults of sectaria-nism and opportunism which help the enemy in his diabolical manoeuvres must be avoided.

The best means to arrive at this is : a) To maintain the National Liberation

Front as the one and only guide in the Alge-rian Revolution : this condition must not be interpreted as egotistical vanity or as a spirit ol self-sufficiency which are as dangerous as they are despicable. It is the expression of the revolutionary principle unity of command in a Staff which has already given proof of its capability, of its clear-sightedness and of its fidelity to the cause of the Algerian people.

W e must never lose sight of the fact that'up to the outbreak of the Revolution, the force of French imperialism resided not only in its military power and police force but also in the weakness of a ill ruled country, which was divided, ill-prepared for organised fighting and above all, for a long time, in the political ina-dequacy of the leaders of the various units of the anti-colonialist movement.

The existence of the National Front of Libe-ration, which reaches all the strata of the po-pulation, is one of the indispensable guaran-tees.

1) To install the National Liberation Front organically in all the counties, each town, village, mechta, district, enterprise, farm, uni-versity, college, etc...

2) To give political education to the Ma-quis.

3) To have a policy for creating a staff on a political basis, of men who have been tested, who respect the structure of the orga-nisation, are vigilant, capable of initiative.

4) To reply rapidly and clearly to the lies, denounce the provocations and popularise the National Liberation Front mottoes by produ-cing abundant and varies literature to reach all sectors.

To multiply centres of propaganda and sup-ply them with typewriters, paper, duplicating machines (for the reproduction of national do-cuments and bulletins and local manifestoes).

To publish a brochure on the Revolution and an internal bulletin of directives and advice to members of the staff.

To become imbued with the following prin-ciples : that propaganda is not agitation cha-racterised by violent verbiage which is often sterile and fruitless. Now that the Algerian people is ripe for positive and productive action, the language of the National Libera-tion Front must express maturity, seriousness,

.19-

it must be measured and varied, without la-cking firmness, frankness and revolutionary fire.

Each pamphlet, statement, interview or pro-

2°) To Clarify the

In order to preserve the orientation of the

aside all obstacle placed in our way.

clamation made by the N.L.F. has an inter-national echo today. That is why we must act with a truly responsible spirit which does honour to the prestige of Algeria inithe world.

Political Climate

Resistance as a whole, we must brush

3") To Convert the popular torrent into creative energy

The N.L.F. must be able to canalise im-mense waves which carry upon them the pa-triotic enthusiam of the nation. The irresistible power of popular angor must not be lost like the power of a torrent which loses itself in the sands.

A) The peasant

The massive participation in the Revolution of the fellah population, of the khames, agri-cultural worers and their high representation in the moujahidines or moussebilines volunteers of the National Army of Liberation have moul-ded the popular character of the Algerian Re-sistance.

In order to grasp the exceptional impor-tance of their representation, one must study the spectacular reversal in the colonialist agrarian policy.

While this policy was previously based almost entirely on the theft of lands (habous, arch, melk) — expropriations continued till 1945-46 — today the French Government fa-vours agrarian reforms. It does not hesitate to promise to distribute part of the irrigation and, by applying the Martin Law which re-mained a dead letter after veto of a high official in the service of colonisation. Lacoste himself has dared to concemplate a revolutio-nary measure : the expropriation of part of the larger estates.

In order to maintain the balance, and to

In order to convert this anger into creative energy, the NLF has undertaken the colossal task of uniting millions of men.

All branches of human activity must be organised in multiple and often complex ways:

movement

appease the furious opposition of the powerful colonialists, the French Government decidedon the Khamesset reform. That was an insidious measure, aimed at causing internal rivalries between fellahs and khammes, at a time when metayage (a system by which the farmer pays in kind) had evolved naturally towards a more equitable process, without official inter-vention, finally to become, generally speaking a « chourka benes » or half-share association.

This change of tactics denotes the deep dis-may of colonialism trying mislead the peasant to draw him away from the Revolution.

This clumsy last-minute manoeuvre will not fool the fellahs who have already broken down the old myth of <* indege nous affairs » which artificially divided the Algerians into Berbers and hostile Arabs.

The peasant population is deeply convinced that its thirst for soil can be quenched only by the victory of national independence.

The true agrarian reform, which is the pa-triotic solution to the misery in the country-side, is inseparable from the complete destruc-tion of the colonialist regime.

20

The N.L.F. must devote itself completely to this just, legitimate and social policy. The re-sults of such a policy will be :

a) The unrelenting hatred of French colo-nialism, its administration, its army, its police and his treacherous collaborators.

b) The creation of inexhaustible human reserves for the National Liberation Army and the Resistance.

c) The spread of insecurity in the country-side (sabotage, the burning of farms, the destruction of tobacco and wine monopolies, which are symbole of the presence of colo-nialism.)

d) The creation of conditions suitable for

the strengthening and organisation of new free zones.

B) The Workers1 Movement

The working class can and must contribute more dynamically to help in the rapid evo-lution of the Revolution, to give it strengh and ultimate success.

The N.L.F. greets the creation of the Alge-rian Trade Unions as the expression of a healthy reaction on the part of the workers against the paralysing influence of the CGT, the FO and the CFTC.

The French Socialist Government and the neo-colonialist leaders of the FO are concer-ned at the Algerian Trade Union Organisation to the C1SL whose help to the Algerian Tra-de Unions and to the Moroccan Trade Unions has been positive both at home and abroad.

The birth and development of the Algerian Trade Union Organisation has had a resoun-ding effect. Its existence caused at once a violent upheaval in the CGT which the wor-kers deserted en masse. The Communist leaders tried in vain to retain the more active mem-bers, by attempting to revive the spirit of the old CGTU whose motto for the Independence of Algeria was buried following the merging of Trade Unions in 1935.

But it is not sufficient, in order to become a National Centre, for the Branch of the Pa-risian CGT to change its title, or the colour of its card or even to sever the atrophied umbilical cord.

In order to adapt itself to the new functions of the workers' movement which had already reached maturity, it was not sufficient for the UGSA to change its outward appearance. Anyone noticing the communist leanings can-not fail to find rhythm and the colonialist method which were attendant upon the con-

version of te financial delegations into the bastard Algerian Assembly.

The accession of certain militant elements to managerial posts in the Trade Unions re-calls the symbolic promotion of certain elected administrators.

In both cases the aims should have been changed, also the nature and the contents of the Foyer Civique and of the Palais Carnot.

The inability to control of the Algerian Communist Party in the political field was bound to be transferred to the Trade Unions field and to bring about its failure.

The UGTA reflects the deep change in the workers' movement following the long evolu-tion and especially after the revolutionary upheaval caused by the fight for national in-dependence.

The new Algerian centre differs from the other organisations — the CGT, FO, and CFTC in every field — especially in the absence of tutelage, the choice of its staff, its rational structure, its just orientation and the fraternal solidarity in Algeria, North Africa and in the whole world.

1) National character is expressed not only by organic independence, destroying the contradictions which are inherent in foreign domination, but also by absolute freedom in defending the workers whose vital interests cannot be separated from those of the Alge-rian nation.

2) The leaders must be chosen not from elements issued from an ethnic minority which has never suffered colonial oppression, who are always inclined towards paternalism, but from patriots whose national conscience increa-

2 1

ses combativity against the dual pressure of social exploitation and racial hatred.

3) The « back-bone » is formed not by a working class aristocracy (civil servants and railway officials) but by the most numerous strata and the exploited elements (miners, dockers, agricultural workers, veritable pariahs who have, up to the present, been at the mercy of the overlords).

4) The breath of the revolution purifies the Trade Union atmosphere, not only by cha-sing out the neo-colonialist spirit and national chauvinism which it engenders, but by creating the right conditions for the growth of working-class fraternity immune to recism.

5) Trade Union Action, which for so long has been restricted to the narrow framework of economic and social claims, isolated from the general perspective, has become not a brake in the anti-colonial struggle, but an accelerator.

6) The Algerian working class which has, up to now, been considered as a minor unde-serving of emancipation, is called upon, not to occupy a subsurvient rank in the French social movement, but to cooperate brilliantly with the North African and International Wor-kers7 movement.

7) The UGSA — CGT will inevitably find itself compelled to disband, as did similar or-ganisations in Tunisia and Morocco, to give way to the UGTA - the only authentic national centre grouping all Algerian workers without exception.

The National Liberation Front must not ne-

I gleet the political role it can play to help complete the Independent Trade Union action of the UGTA in order to consolidate and stren-gthen it.

Militant members of the N.L.F. must be among the most devoted, most active members,

j always anxious to respect democratic rules in accordance with the tradition of the Free Wor-kers7 movement.

There must be no vagueness : each con-crete situation must be taken into account and actions must be adopted to the particular subjective conditions of each corporation.

The spirit of combativity must be developed by organising without delay militant action, of a souple and varied kind, in accordance with conditions of the moment (limited cessa-tions of work, local strikes and the setting up of cooperatives for solidarity).

Involve European workers in this action. To strengthen sympathy for the National

Liberation Front by converting support of the Resistance into action : subscriptions, supplies to combatants, acts of sabotage, supporting strikes, political., strikes.

C) Youth movement

Algerian youth has natural qualities of dy-namism, devotion and heroism.

Another, rare fact, characterises it. It is very numerous, and represents half the total

population as a result of ah exceptional demo-graphic development.

One great quality of Algerian youth is that our young people mature precociously. As a result of poverty, and colonial oppression our

children pass quickly from childhood to adult-hood — the period of adolescence is greatly reduced.

Algerian youth follows with passion and a complete disregard for fear and death the activities of the revolutionary organisation which can lead it to its ideal of liberty.

The Algerian revolution, the exploits of the National Liberation Army and the underground activities of the National Liberation Front appeal to the temerity of youth which thrives on the noblest patriotic sentiment.

The Algerian Youth is, therefore, an infle-xible and powerful lever for the National Front of Liberation, a lever endowed with formidable powers of resistance.

22

D) Intellectuals and the liberal professions

The rallying of intellectuals to the Algerian fatherland — the fact that « frenchifying » has not succeeded in stifling the national con-science — the break with idealistic, indivi-dualistic or reformist positions, are proofs al a wholesome political orientation.

1) To form militant committees for inte1-

lectual patriots :

a) Propaganda : Algeria's independence.

b) Contacts with the French liberals.

c) Subscriptions.

E) Trade men

The National Front of Liberation will assign to boy and girl students, in an orderly man-ner, definite tasks in the fields in which they can give best results-political, administrative, cultural, health economic, etc...

2) To organise Health services : a) Surgeons, doctors, pharmacists working

in conjunction with hospital staff (interns and nurses).

b) medical care, medical supplies. c) field nurses — treatment of sick peopie

and convalescents.

and artisans

Apart from the Algerian Commercial Trade Union, dominated by the monopolist. Schiafti-ne, head of the Chambers of commerce and the Poujade racist and colonio-fascist move-ment, there was a complete absence of real control of trade and handicrafts led by pa-triots to ensure the defence of Algerian eco-nomy.

The UGCA will, therefore, assume an im-

portant role beside its sister organisation the UGTA.

The National Front of Liberation must help it to develop rapidly by creating the most fa-vourable political conditions.

1) By fighting against taxation. 2) By boycotting colonialist, poujadist

wholesales, who actively support the impe-rialist war.

F) The women's movement

Vast possibilities exist and are constantly growing in this field.

W e are deeply moved and greatly admire the exultant revolutionary courage of young girls and young women, wives and mothers, of all our « moujahidate » sisters who are taking an active part — sometimes bearing arms — in the sacred struggle for the libera-tion of the fatherland.

It is well known that Algerian women took an active part in the numerous uprisings which have been organised since 1830.

The principal explosions in 1864 in the Ouled Sidi Cheikh of South Oran : of 1871 in Balylia, of 1916 in the Aures and the Mascara Region illustrated the ardent patrio-

tism of Algerian women which often went as far as the sacrifice of their lives.

Algerian women are convinced today that the present Revolution will unquest ionably result in the conquest of independence.

The recent example of the young Kabyle girl who refused an offer of marriage because it did not come from a member of the Resis-tance, is a magnificent illustration of Alge-rian women's morale.

It is, therefore, possible to organise in this field, with original methods, suited to the customs of the country a formidable and effi-cient fighting organisation.

a) Moral support of the combatants and resisters.

b) hatred of stool-pigeons, and Contempt for cowards.

.23.

c) Information, liaison, supplies, refugees. d) Assistance to the families and children of members of the resistance, of prisoners

and interned men.

2°) To Seek Alliances

In order to liberate their fettered fatherland the Algerians rely firstly upon themselves.

Political action, like military science, tea-ches that no .factor must be overlooked howe-ver unimportant it may appear, in order to achieve victory.

For this reason the National Liberation

Front has successfully undertaken to mobilise

all national forces. But it will not allow the

enemy to seek support from the whole of the

us French public opinion and to deprive us ethnic minority in Algeria, to arouse against of international solidarity.

The Algerian Liberals

Unlike the cases of Tunisia and Morocco, the ethnic minority in Algeria, which is of European origin, is numerically important, and this must be borne in mind. This minority is

strengthened by permanent immigration which

is officially assisted and which contributes to the colonial regime an important part of its fiercest supporters, the most obstinate, and the most deeply racist.

Because of these unequal privileges, and of the role which they play in the economic, administrative and political hierarchy of the

colonial system, the population of European origin does not form an indissoluble block.

The spirit of race superiority is general, but it is expressed in a variety of ways, from the frenzy of the « • Southist » type to the paternalist hypocrisy.

French colonialism, which is the allpowerful master of the Algerian administration, police, of the monopolist press, of the radio, has often proved capable of exercising psychological pressure which rallied public opinion around one motivating reactionary idea. >

Soustelle's departure and the demonstration of August 6 were proofs of great ability in the art of provocation and plotting. It resulted in the surrender of the Head of the French Government.

In order to reach its goal, colonialism or-ganised panic. It accused the Government of abandoning the ethnical non-Moslem minority

to the « barbaric Arabs », to a « holy war » to a worse « Saint Bartholomew's massacre ».

The slogan,, thought up . by the master blackmailer Reygass and broadcast by the executioner, Benquet-Creveaux — the odious symbol « A trunk or a coffin .» seems anodine today.

Former nationalist parties did not always attribute to this question the importance it deserved. Devoting all their attention to Mos-lem opinion, they : often neglected to . draw

attention, as they should have done, to the clumsy statements of certain charlatans which brought grist to the mill of the principal ene-my.

At the moment the counter-offensive is still feeble. The liberal 'French- press cannot totally counteract colonialist poison. The means of expression at the disposal of the National Liberation Front are inadequate.

Fortunately the Algerian Resistance has not committed major misdeeds, which could justify the calumnies of the colonialist press, of the

psychological service of ..the . colonialist army convinced by the flagrants lies of French and foreign press reports.

That-is why the. colonialist and racist block, which was intact on February 6th, is begin-ning to split. . Panic .gave way, little by little, to a more realistic sentiment. The military solution which, it was claimed, would restore

24

the status qua, is an obvious mirage. The al<-important question today is to return to a ne-gotiated peace. What place will be reserved for those who consider Algeria as the ever-ge-nerous fatherland, even after the downfall of the Bourgeaud reign ?

Various tendencies transpire exist. 1) Neutralism is the most important cur-

rent. It expresses the desire to allow the ultra-colonialists to defend their privileges which are threatened by nationalist « extremists ».

2) Those in favour of an « intermediary » solution : negotiation for an Algerian commu-nity mid-way betwen French colonialism and the retrograde « Arab Imperialism », by the creation of a dual nationality.

3) The boldest tendency accepts the inde-pendence of Algeria and Algerian nationalism cn condition that American, English and Egyptian interference are strongly opposed.

This is a summary analysis, the object of which is to stress the different facets of Eu-ropean public opinion.

B) The j

It would, therefore, be an unpardonable error to place all Algerians, or European of Jewish origin in the same category. Just as it would be unpardonable toi harbour th,e illusion of winning them over completely to the cause of national liberation. The aim to achieve is the isolation of the colonialist enemy who is oppressing the Algerian people.

The National Liberation Front must, the-refore, seek to accentuate the evolution of this psychological phenomenon by neutralising an important section of the European popula-tion.

\ The aim of the Algerian Revolution is not ^ throw into the sea all Algerians of European, 'origin, but to destroy the inhuman colonial yoke.

The Algerian Revolution is not a civil war, \ nor is it a religious war. ii The Algerian Revolution aims to reconquer

national independence and to set up a demo-cratic and social Republic, ensuring complete equality for all citizens of one fatherland, wi-thout discrimination. ;

sh minority

This fundamental principle, accepted by universal conscience, favours the birth in Je-wish opinion of hope in the maintenance of lasting peaceful coexistence.

In the first place the Jewish minority was deeply affected by the colonialist campaign of demoralisation. Representatives of their community informed the Jewish World Con-gress in London of their attachment to French citizenship, which placed them above their Moslem compatriots.

But the unleashing of anti-Semitic hatred which followed the French colonio-fascist de-monstrations aroused deep uneasiness which led to a healthy reaction of self-defence.

The first reflex was one of sel-defence against the danger of being caught betwen two fires. It took the form of condemning the Jews, members of the 8th November organi-sation and of the Poujadist movement, whose

all too-obvious activity could give rise to vin-dicative discontent directed against the whole community.

The inflexible attitude of the Algerian Re-sistance which concentrated all its blows against colonialism appeared even to the most unsure as possessing a quality of noble anger of the weak against the tyrant. Intellectuals, students, businessmen took the initiative of rousing public opinion to take a position against the big settlers (colons) and the anti-Jewish groups. The latter have not forgotten the infamous Vichy regime : over a period of 4 years, 1 85 laws, decrees and ordinances we-re passed to deprive them of their rights, drive them from universities and government em-ployment, robbed them of their possessions their banking accounts and their jewellen.

The Jews of France were forced to pay a collective fine of a thousand millions francs :

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they were pursued, arrested, interned in a Camp at Drancy and sent in closed wagons to Poland where many perished in the cremation

ovens. The day after the liberation of France, the Algerian Jewish community soon saw its rights ans goods restored - thanks to the support of the Muslim deputies and despite

the hostility of the Petain administration. Are these same people naive enough to believe that the victory of the ultra colonialists who are

percisely the same people who persecuted them formerly will not bring back the same

evil conditions ? W e hope that the great ma-jority will join with those who have already replied to the country's appeal and support the Revolution by demanding with pride their right to Algerian nationality. This choice is based on wisdom, common sense and foresight. Despite the silence of the Great Rabbi of Al-giers — which contrasted with the courageous

attitiude of the Archbishop who publicly took stand against the current and condemned co-lonial injustice — the majority of Algerians do not consider that the Jewish community has gone over en massee to the enemy's camp. The NLF quickly put down the numerous pro-vocations in this respect which were perpetra-ted and planned by the French Authorities. Apart from individual punishment inflicted on police agents and counter-revolutionaries for crimes against an innoccent population, Alge-ria has remained free of pogroms. The pro-posal to organise a boycott of Jewish shops — following that of the Mozabite Sect — was scotched from the very outset. For these rea-sons the Arab-Israeli conflict never had very profound repercussions in Algeria, contrary to what our enemies would have hoped. Without going too deep into our national history for proofs of religious tolerance and intercommu-nity collaboration, the Algerian Revolution has demonstrated by its action its right to attract

the confidence of the Jewish Community its full share of happines in an independent Al-geria.

In fact, the disappearance of the colonial regime which has always used the Jewish com-munity as a buffer to ward off the shocks from the anti-imperialist forces does not ne-cessarily signify the country's impoverishment. It is however absurd to imagine that « Algeria would be nothing without France ». The eco-nomic properity of liberated peoples is self-

evident. The most important national revenue will assure a better standard of living to all Algerians.

In view of the above, the NLF recommends:

1) The encouragement of the creation of Committees and liberal Algerian groups even

those having limited aims : a) Committes for action against the War

in Algeria.

b) Committes for negotiationa and Peace. c) Committes for Algerian nationality.

d) Committes for aid to the victims of the repression.

e) Study Groups for the Algerian Problem.

f) Committes for the Defence of democra-tic freedoms.

g) Committes for the disbanding of civi-lian militia.

h) Aid to agricultural workers (support for trade union activity, strikes, defence of women and children against exploitation).

2) Intensification of propaganda among the call-ups and regulars.

a) by sending books, reviews, papers and anti-colonial pamphlets ;

b) Reception Committes for men on leave. c) Theatre : plays demonstrating the na-

t iona l struggle for independence.

3) By the creation of Committees of Wives

of enlisted men to demand the recall of their husbands.

M 26

C) The N.L.F. Activities in France

1) For the organisation of liberal opinion. The analysis of policies among the liberals

in Algeria is useful as a guide to the various shades of opinion in France which is constantly changing under the effect of popular pressu-res. The NFL attaches some importance to the aid which enlightened French opinion could bring to the cause of the Algerian Re-sistance. French opinion is too often ill infor-med of the indiscutable horrors perpreciate the contributions by members of the French liberal movements who have souht to bring about a political solution in order to avoid bloodshed. The N.L.F. Federation in France whose leader-ship has now been strengthened at Paris has the important political task of countering the negative effects of pressure from reactionary and colonialist groups.

1) Political contacts with organisations, movements and groups against the colonial war :

— press, meetings demonstrations and stri-kes against the departure of soldiers to Alge-ria, blocking of the transport and war material.

2) Financial support to the Resistance tighters;

3) Organisation of Algerian emmigration.

The task of the NLF in this respect has a two fold importance : it aims at the mobili-cntinn of all these forces and at the same time fights back against remaining vestiges of Messalism, by.

1) enlightening French and foreign public opinion by issuing news, articles for newspa-pers and reviews and by organjsing trained workers, intellectuals and students.

2) denouncing with firmness and patience the failure of Messalism — its connections with French Government circles which explains its tendencies, not against colonialism but against the NLF and the NLA.

D) North African Solidarity

The revolutionary determination of the N.L.F., the relentless pursuit of the armed struggle by the N.L.A., the unity of the Alge-rian people bound by the ideal of national in-dependence have successfully, countered the colonial tactics. The Tunisian and Moroccan Governments in particular and under growing pressure from our brothers in those countries taken a very firm stand on this problem which has a direct bearing on the whole stability of North Africa.

The N.L.F. should encourage :

1) The coordination of Government action in the 2 countries of North Africa with the object of exerting pressure on the French Go-vernment : diplomatic action etc.

2) The unification of political action by

the creation of a coordination Committee of the national parties of brother countries and the N.L.F.

a) creation of aid to Algerian Committees.

b) intervention in all sectors of activities.

4) Permanent liaison with the Algerians resident in Morocco and Tunisia (concrete action on public opinion, press and Govern-ment).

5) Solidarity of the three North African Trade Union Federations : U.G.T.T. (Tunisia), U.M.T. (Morocco) and U.G.T.A. (Algeria).

6) Cooperation between the three Student Movements of North Africa.

7) Coordination of the activity of the eco-nomic organisations of the three countries.

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Algeria in the international sphere

French diplomacy has for some time been waging a campaign to obtain moral and ma-terial support wherever possible — and if ne-cessary only provisionally — for their colonial system or at least a benevolent neutrality. The only more or less positive results achieved so far have been the rather embarrassed declara-tions forced out of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and NATO.

Nevertheless, the world press and particu-larly the American press has condemned in no uncertain terms French war crimes especially those of the Foreign Legion and the Paratroo-pers, the genocide of old folk, women and chil-dren, the ruthless shooting down of intellec-tuals and innocent civilians, the torture of political prisoners, the increase of concentra-tion camps and the execution of hostages. This press has demanded that France should formally recognise the Algerian people's right to manage their own affairs. The tremend ous struggle waged by the N.L.A. whose victory is assured by the unanimous support of the

Algerian nation in its fight for freedom, has shiifted the Algerian problem out of the French orbit in which it had been held fast up to now by the forces of imperialism. The Bandung Conference and the Tenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly destroyed once and for all the legalistic fiction of « French Algeria ». The invasion and occupation of a country by a foreign army can in no circumstances mo-dify the nationality of that country's inhabi-tants. Algerians have never accepted the title of « Frenchmen » - particuarly since this « label » has never prevented them from being less respected and free than the foreigners living in their own country.

The Arabic language which is the national language of the overwhelming majority of the people has been systematically suppressed. Its teaching in the higher institutes of learning disappeared after the French conquest of the country owing to the dispersion of competent teachers and their scholars, the closing of uni-

versities, the destruction of libraries and the theft of religious foundations The Muslim

faith is discouraged and religious personnel are appointed and paid by the French administra-tion. The French did all in their power to crush the progressive movement of the Ulemas

and gave every support to the obscurantist marabout sects corrupted by some of their

leaders. The glaring dishonesty of men such as Lacoste, Bidault, Soustelle and Cardinal

Feltin is revealed by their attempt to deceive French and foreign public opinion by decribing the Algerian Resistance as a fanatical reli-gious movement at the service of Pan-lslamism.

The dividing line of the Revolution does not cut across the religious communities in Algeria

but across those who uphold liberty, justice and human dignity and the colonialists and their agents whatever their religion or social standing. The best proof this is, the supreme punishment carried out against traitorous reli-gious personnel within the very precincts of the mosques.

On the other hand, thanks to the political maturity of the Algerian people and the wise and lucid guidance of the colothe traditional

provocations of the colonial administration pogroms anti-Christian and anti-foreign inci-dents have all been shown up and stifled at the first sign of activity.

The Algerian Revolution despite the lying propaganda of the French administration is a

patriotic struggle the basis of which is natio-nal, political and social. It is directed neither

from Cairo, nor from London, nor from Mos-cow, nor from Washington. It is a normal

historical development of the movement of all peoples to throw of foreign domination. For these reasons Algeria's independence has be-come an international problem and the key to peace in all North Africa.

Once again the Algerian question Will be brought up before the Un by the Asian and African countries. Though at the last session of the U.N. General Assembly these friendly

28

nations showed a rather exaggerated tenden-cy to conciliation even to the extent of with-drawing the Algerian problem from the UN Agenda, the position is radically altered today for France's promises have not been honoured and the whole world is aware of this.

This attitude was determined by the stand taken by the Arab states in general and

Egypt in particular. Their support for the Al-gerian people's struggle was limited and was subjected to the fluctuation of their diploma-cy in general. France exerted a special form of pressure on the Middle East by means of her economic and military aid and her oppo-sition to the Bagdad Pact. France attempted by every means in her power to paralyse the

psychological effect of the facility enjoyed by the N.L.F. on the Voice of the Arabs Radio. The attitude of the non-Arab states of the Asian-African group was apparently determi-ned by the desire to follow rather than lead the Arab States and by the desire to play a determining role in the problems of disarm-ament and peaceful coexistence.

The fact remains, nevertheiess : that the

internationalisation of the Algerian problem in its present phase has sharpened the gene-ral awareness in regard to the urgency of an armed conflict which threatens to affect

the whole Mediterranean basin and Africa, the Middle East and world peace in general.

Main lines of international activity

Our contacts with the leaders of friendly nations have never been anything more than j those between allies. W e must at all costs be

: a rful to maintain absolutely intact the inde- ( j pendence of the Algerian Revolution. W e must v j

destroy completely the French Government's \ false propaganda - in its diplomatic contacts,

press etc - which seeks to depict our move-ment as a rebellion artifically inspired from

abroad and having no roots in the Algerian masses.

W e should therefore : 1) Urge the Bandung Powers, in addition

to their activities at Un to exert direct diplo-matic and economic pressure on France ;

2) To seek the support of the countries and peoples of Europe including the Scandina-

vian countries, and the popular democracie also the Latin American States.

3) To arouse support among the Arab

immigrants in the countries of Latin America. To this end the N.L.F. has increased the

membership of the Algerian Delegation abroad: it now requires :

A) A permanent office at the UN and in the USA.

B) A delegation in Asia.

C) Mobile delegations able to visit various capitals and participate in international cultu-ral, student, trade union and other meetings.

D) Propaganda material published by our

own efforts : press offices, reports, documen-tation, films and photos.

Conclusion Few years ago, on the eve of the ending

of the second World War, a tremendous ex-plosion shook the structure of world imperia-lism. The long pent up and irresistable move-ment towards liberation aroused to action the dominated peoples. A chain reaction set in so that one country after another felt the impul-

se to take action for a new future of hope and happinness. In this short period of time, 18

nations emerged from the shades of colonial slavery and took their place in the sun of

national independence. Among these the peo-ples of Syria, Libenon, Viet Nam and Fezzan

have alreadv broken down the bars of French

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colonial rule. The three nations of North Afri-ca in their turn manifested their will and their ability to take their place among the free nations of the World.

The Algerian Revolution of November 1st 1954 is on the right path. The struggle will still be hard, and, cruel but under the unswer-ving leadership of the N.L.F. victory will crown the long armed struggle waged by the valiant

Algerian peoples. The humiliation of July 5th 1830 will be wiped out with the disappearance of the hated colonial regime. The moment is at hand when the Algerian people will reap the two harvests of their sacrifice and cou-rage :

The independence of the Country Over which will fly - symbol of full sovereignty the Algerian National Flag.

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