Central Challenges of Current the Korean Conflict:

Ideological Imperatives, Defence Dependency, and Reunification

Name: Daniel Perritt

Date: December 10th, 2015

Class: 7SSWM117 15-16

Instructor: Dr. Anglim

Word Count: 4024

Introduction

There are many conflicts that are currently ongoing around the world, from the war in Afghanistan,

to the civil war in Syria, yet few are as long lasting as the conflict between North and South Korea. 1 In

answering the question of “war termination” it is the stance of this essay that although active

fighting or open warfare is not currently occurring, it is still a conflict without an end and has thus

not been terminated, thus the possibility for warfare to occur is still actively present. For the

purposes of this discussion, there will not be a lengthy discussion on the ramifications of the Korean

War from June 1950 to July 1953. This is not to dismiss it, but to stay focused on the central

challenges of today. Despite being under an armistice agreement since July of 1953, North and South

Korea have not truly had a lasting resolution to the separation that began prior to WWII and the

violence that followed thereafter. Identifying the central challenges herein seeks to assess the

current issues that are problematic in pursuing that resolution. However, first there must be an

understanding that North Korea is not a “crazy” regime without a rhyme or reason to its perceived

madness and rather unpredictable ways. As will be shown, it is a rational entity that pursues

interests through a very particular method of rationality which may be found through understanding

the complexity of North Korean ideology. The main central challenge to resolving this conflict

appears not to be about beginning negotiations and bargaining, but revolves around the

entwinement of regime and ideology that inhabits North Korean society as a whole. Around this

central challenge there are other sub-challenges on both sides pertaining to achieving a resolution to

the ongoing conflict. The structure of the paper will be as follows: First, there is going to be a brief

historical context on the development of the divide between the North and South. Second, the

relationship between regime then and ideology will be discussed, including an explanation of Juche,

followed by the regime now, and challenges of nuclear disarmament. Third will be an identification

of South Korean challenge regarding defence dependency. Last but not least are the challenges

associated with the concept of reunification.

1 "Global Conflict Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations.

Historical Context and Establishment of Divide

The conflict between the North and South can be traced back to before the end of WWII when the

U.S. and the USSR were analysing the region, looking at the imminent change within both the

political and economic spheres in the post WWII era following Japan’s ejection from the country. At

first neither country really had a vested interest in Korea, despite agreeing that it needed to be out

of Japanese control. This was problematic as Korea was not seen as stable enough to manage itself,

and also in part due to Japanese control that had lasted for generations, in both the economic and

public spheres of life. The significance behind the 38 th parallel meant different things for both the

U.S. and USSR but would have drastic polarizing effects due to the initiatives set forth respectively.

For the U.S., Korea came to be seen as an area to project influence and contain soviet ideology in the

region, as they didn’t want the USSR to manage the region uncontested in the post war era. U.S.

involvement was also influenced by the inability to rely on China to assist in managing Korean affairs

as social divisions within the country did not inspire confidence. For the USSR, Korea represented a

potential ideological and economic partner, as well as had historical relevance for wanting control of

the region as Japan had won a war earlier in the 20 th century that limited Russian influence in both

Korean and Manchuria.2

Why this is important has to do with the scope and aims of Russia in seeking to control

Korea. The country wasn’t seen as stable or in any shape to actually govern itself. Both the U.S. and

USSR understood that the region needed to be monitored/governed, eventually causing the US to

offer a notion of “trusteeship” in a quasi-patriarchal and neo-imperialist way. What’s interesting is

that the USSR and U.S. respectively understood that they were limited in their ability to manage the

peninsula, however, the U.S. thought the USSR wanted full control Korea, while the USSR thought

the U.S. wanted the same, neither knew the others true intention of keeping separate zones of

control.3

2 Stueck, William Whitney. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. 15.3 Stueck, 33.

“Division and Cold War Came to Korea First and Foremost because of the inability of outside power,

the United States and the Soviet Union, to devise a unification plan that would protect the interests

of both.”4

This is a summary of the complication experienced by both the U.S. and USSR in attempting

to come to an agreement of how to manage the future of Korea. What followed is a sharp division in

the domestic political parties and ideology that solidified itself over time. Ideologically speaking, the

separation of the 38th truly represented the respective ideologies of those states overseeing the

region. The U.S. represented freedom and democracy while the USSR was that of socialism and

communism. During this time there were Korean domestic groups that aligned based on those

ideological positions, thus further causing cleavages within the Korean population. U.S. presence in

the region was largely to contest the soviets from implementing and identifying a communist regime

from the exiled parties that sought refuge in China during Japanese occupation. In 1946, polarization

really solidified itself in the domestic sphere as parties shifted from being pro trusteeship to against

it, in response to the shift, soviet authorities arrested and detained the leading non-communist

figure in an attempt to truly galvanize influence in the North.5 By doing this the soviets asserted full

control of the North and vetted the communist party as well as installed Kim Il-sung as the chairman

of the People’s Committee. It is with the rise of Kim Il-sung that set in motion the establishment of

Juche ideology and the fundamental divide of North and South Korea that has persisted until today.

The Regime – Then

It wasn’t until after the armistice agreement that Sung proposed the implementation of Juche into N.

Korea in December of 1955. As the country sought to rebuild itself after the war, he used it at first to

motivate the populace and sought to re-establish N. Korean identity. During the 1960’s was when

Juche stated to become more integrated as a tool for political and social control. Implementation of

this goal was done through political education programs to indoctrinate the population into his

4 Stueck, 35.5 Ibid., 32.

brand of political ideology. Sung also sought further control of the party as in fighting and factions

had begun to arise. During this time the development of Sung’s image began to take on a “cult” like

status as socially engineered narratives idolized him in popular culture. This movement paved the

way for the party to also begin a transformation of Juche into a theological element in order to

cement its importance through tradition, as “religion was dismissed as either pro-American or

medieval”, there was an imperative to create one for political purposes.6

Through the establishment of Juche as a national religion, its integration into N. Korean

society was absolute, thereby providing the population an implicitly moral objection to outside

influences and giving regime a sort of legendary status among its people. Understanding how Juche

operates hasn’t been easy for the international community, often leading to frustration in

attempting to rationalize the seemingly irrational. So what exactly is it, and how does it work? Han

S. Park gives a summary:

“Juche is quite unique among communist ideologies. I argue that, in fact, Juche has developed into a

complex system of ideas with multiple functions. While Juche is first and foremost a political

ideology that provides regime legitimacy, it has also developed into a mass belief system and a

theology.”7

Understanding the ideological imperative of North Korea is essential in also understanding the

difficulty associated with changing the regime, both of which are central challenges to achieving a

lasting conflict resolution.

Juche Ideology “Self-Reliance” – An Explanation

Complete integration of society underneath the Juche ideology is the central goal of the DPRK as the

regime’s legitimacy and primacy is predicated off of this belief system in its entirety. There is no

6 Gothel, Ingeborg. "Juche and the Issue of National Identity in the DPRK of the 1960's." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 19-31. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996. 28.7 Park, Han S. "The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 9-19. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996. 5.

dissenting opinion as every member has been integrated into this belief system. The reinforcement

of Juche in its entirety causes issues when approaching regime change in that the wide majority of N.

Korean society is going to be resistant against change, as to change the regime is to challenge their

ideological, religious and personal identification.8 Through understanding the complex relationship

with N. Korean society and this ideology there is also an identification of why regime change and

ideology are a central challenge for terminating the conflict with a long lasting resolution. If North

Koreans see themselves as the representatives of all “oppressed peoples” as well as the leaders of

the world in their conception of the worldview, it becomes clear that fostering peace would mean an

upheaval of N. Korean society. There would have to be a comprehensive and fundamental change

away from this ideological “socio-political” system.

The idea of “self” within the context of Juche ideology doesn’t just include the individual, it’s

of a national level, a hyper ethnocentric and “uncompromising” way of viewing the world. However,

that is not to say that individuality isn’t present, as “man is the master of nature and society and the

main factor that decides everything”. 9 Understanding this is very important to the relation of how N.

Koreans see their place in the world, as the central “brain”, in their realm is the “Great Leader” who

decides the parameters that society operates. Park gives a good analogy by identifying the “brain”

being the Great Leader, the nervous system being the party, and the people being a body. 10 This

Clausewitzian viewpoint is furthered by the “creative” aspect of Juche where adopting outside ideas

and systems must “first study one’s own society scientifically and understand fully the historical and

cultural condition”. The aim of doing this is was to further integrate Marxist-Leninist ideas to N.

Korean society, and by altering those “foreign” ideas through N. Korean culture, it would not “exhibit

irregularities”.11

8 Park, 10.9 Ibid., 12.10 Ibid., 13.11 Ibid., 14.

“The eternal life proclaimed here is attained when a biological

(isolated) individual acquires a social life by overcoming innate

desires and egoistic life style through integrating himself thoroughly

into the life system of the national community, thus, becoming part

of the immortal social life.”12

This quote very succinctly identifies how N. Koreans have integrated the Juche ideology into

society as a theological principle on a societal level. This also is the methodology of the regime for

keeping Juche relevant inside of society, as the “brains” are indeed actually people and will die, this

is what has allowed the regime to stay in power despite the deaths of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong

Il. Why this ideology is problematic becomes clear once it’s properly understood, and also gives

context to the reasoning behind some of its seemingly “erratic” behaviours over time.

The Regime Now

In today’s North Korea, Kim Jong-Un is the “brain” and is no less prone to making irrational claims or

threats than his predecessors.13 There are a lot of fundamental differences in comparison to his

predecessors, namely that he widely wasn’t known in N. Korea prior to his naming as the heir to Kim

Jong-Il, nor did he have a repertoire to base a conception of how his policies may or may not change.

Since 2012, his consolidation of power has been complete through the further use of the monolithic

hierarchy and Juche ideology. Coupled with multiple military parades, putting emphasis on earlier

initiatives during meetings, and breaking of nuclear proliferation agreement with the U.S. indicate

that the policies established by his forefathers are there to stay.14

Mark Fitzpatrick points out that Un is a real problem in his attempt to create an issue with

the U.S. He sees this as a sign of weakness, in that a xenophobic agenda or a “threat from the

12 Park, “The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology”, 15.13 Freeman, Colin. "Kim Jong-un Threatens War with "US Imperialists" as North Korea Celebrates 70th Anniversary of Ruling Party." The Telegraph. October 10, 2015. 14 Park, Yong Soo. "Policies and Ideologies of the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea: Theoretical Implications." Asian Studies Review 38, no. 1 (2013): 8-11.

outside” may seek to bring the party and country together under tighter party control. This most

likely has to do with the issues at hand that the regime is facing , such as a lack of domestic market

control, a rising black market, and a population that is finally being able to see the disparity they

inhabit in comparison to the rest of the world.15 Why this is important is based on the understanding

that the party is willing to hold power at any cost. It is the imperative of the state to retain legitimacy

and authority.

Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear disarmament is a central challenge as the regime sees armament as its method for retaining

power and authority in the region. Over time there have been numerous instances and

developments since the original pursuit of this objective by Kim Il-sung. Thus far the record is

tattered with shattered agreements, broken promises and attempts to further this long lasting

objective.16 This also ties into how the Juche ideology has been integrated into society, as those who

are involved are also contributing to the greater good of N. Korea and thereby earning themselves

admittance into immortal life through developing a way of defence against aggression. It is morally

right to pursue nuclear weapons as self-defence is an inherent right. Within the context of N. Korean

society, by denying them the ability to defend themselves, they are justified on moral grounds

through Juche.17

From a strategic standpoint, the development of nuclear weapons is seen as advantageous

as they would allow for the use in either an offensive or defensive capability. Acquiring a nuclear

arsenal would also give the regime further bargaining power in the international spectrum by

making it a very real threat in the region, depending on whether or not they could actually deliver

such warheads. Expanding upon this, N. Korea would potentially be able to invest more in economic

development and less on conventional military means.18 If its intentions are truly for defence 15 Fitzpatrick, Mark. "North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer?" Survival 55, no. 3 (2013): 12.16 "North Korea Profile - Timeline." BBC News. December 9, 2015.17 Park, Han S. "The Conundrum of the Nuclear Program." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 221-233. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996. 223.18 Park, “The Conundrum of the Nuclear Program”, 226.

purposes, then the need for conventional forces may not be as heavily invested into. Contrasting

that, it may also cause an offensive. In either scenario the issue is problematic for a number of

reasons.

South Korean Challenges

For South Korea, there are also challenges associated with coming to a resolution, the main

challenge being the potential loss of U.S. protection and the deferment that it enjoys from the result

of their security treaty that was signed in 1954. To best illustrate the clear and stark contrast

between the two nations, currently, S. Korea has a GDP of 1.6 trillion, 40.5 times that of N. Korea’s

estimated 40Bn. As of 2008 S. Korea also spent approximately 2.8% of that GDP on defence spending

compared to N. Korea’s 22.3%, which even despite that large different in percentage S. Korea’s

yearly fiscal expenditure is a reported 26.1Bn, at that time it little over 3 times the size of N. Korea’s.

As of this year S. Korea has decided to further increase spending by a massive increase to total

approximately 214 Bn by 2020, nearly matching the U.S. yearly investment.19 Quite clearly it is no

longer in the incapacitated state that it was at the time of the armistice agreement.20 These figures

show that S. Korea could easily and totally outspend N. Korea should it truly have the incentive to do

so, however, since it spends nearly 40Bn on military aide for S. Korea, it becomes apparent that from

the S. Korean perspective it isn’t advantageous to do so despite massive increases. 21 Reasons for this

other than economic considerations may be the added security of having U.S. ground troops and

bases on S. Korean soil. Should the North actually attack, it would have an automatic ally in the

region that would be able to assist in defending against aggression. Along those lines, should the U.S.

incur casualties due to aggression, it most likely would result in a combined war effort, furthermore,

by staying the U.S.’s protectorate, it is also likely that should N. Korea use nuclear weapons, the U.S.

may retaliate in kind.

19 Panda, Ankit. "South Korea Is Planning a Huge Increase in Defense Spending." The Diplomat. April 20, 201520 Sedghi, Ami, and Simon Rogers. "South v North Korea: How Do the Two Countries Compare? Visualised." The Guardian. April 8, 2013.21 Shell, Elizabeth, and Matt Stiles. "Where Does U.S. Military Aid Go?" PBS. August 30, 2012.

Reunification Challenges

Discussing reunification is essential in considering the central challenges of the ongoing Korean

conflict as it’s a solution that has been suggested and sought after by both sides for nearly 60 years.

Reaching reunification is a subject fraught with challenges that have to be accounted for, without

addressing these concerns the likelihood of resolution becomes less possible through peaceful

means. As early as 1960, Kim Il-sung actually proposed the idea of having a federal system of

reunification with the South, where both North and South would retain their independent economic

spheres, thus concluding in a “Korea-wide election”.22 In 2000, on June 12th North and South Korea

held a summit to begin working towards reunifying the two nations. The goals of the summit were

to:

“…establish peaceful relations; begin allowing meetings between

some separated families from August 15 and resolve the issue of long

term prisoners; and promote balanced development of their

economies and build mutual confidence through cultural, athletic,

medical and environmental cooperation and exchange.”23

Identifying the historical pretext provides justification towards continuing to establish it as a primary

solution to the conflict. To bring the subject even more up to date, the new President of South Korea

has begun pushing for reunification as public support was shown to be waning due, most likely due

to a newer generation that has never known a united Korea.24 Timing for a negotiation isn’t just

essential when attempting to stop violence, over time with a conflict such as this, resolution is going

22Hong, Philip. "Reunification of Korea: A Social Development Approach to Resolving the Korean Conflict." Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 24, no. 1 (2008): 69.23 Hong, 70.24 Williamson, Lucy. "Why Is South Korea Plugging Unification?" BBC News. January 28, 2014.

to have to be approached sooner than later before younger S. Koreans become too disillusioned or

apathetic.25 Unlike waiting for an enemy to become willing to negotiate through attrition and war,

proactive conflict resolution within this context towards reunification may be mandatory.26

In order to move the N. Korean regime towards reunification Fitzpatrick gives the suggestion

of targeting the economic elements and also the emplacement of sanctions. Impacting the economy

of the DPRK would have a few different implications. First, it would negatively impact its ability to

advance its nuclear programs. A secondary effect is that the loss of income effects the legitimacy and

fosters disunity within the party. If the DPRK cannot financially support members, nor earn a place in

the ideologically defined “immortal” realm of society, then indigenous change may be more

possible.27

There are many challenges that will be associated with unification should it happen. First

and foremost is actually getting it to happen. Given the ideological perspective and socio-political

system, merging the two countries with separate ideas on what civic government looks like or is

would be fundamentally challenging for a number of reasons. N. Koreans may reject the new order

as it’s not only a foreign concept, but may be seen as a western invention, and therefore morally

repugnant. Furthermore, the theological aspect that permeates the whole of North Korean society

would be problematic in that removing Juche is in a way going to be stripping them of their sense of

person and self-identity. The migration of impoverished and malnourished N. Koreans into the

southern region of the peninsula may cause issues with crime, culture shock, or even security risks.

Insurgency is a real possibility given the ideological differences between the two populations.

Coupled with the potential loss of identity, some N. Koreans may take to terrorism as a method to

show political discontent with the loss of their way of life.

25 Williamson, Lucy. "Why Is South Korea Plugging Unification?”.26 Pillar, Paul R. "The Opening of Negotiations." In Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983. 49.27 Fitzpatrick, Mark. "North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer?", 13-15.

Philip Hong identifies three different “models” that reunification may happen under. The

first, is unification by war, where the North perceives itself as either collapsing or near collapse. The

move toward war thereafter would be seen as a solution for the regime, first through ideological

justification, and second, by ensuring internal party stability with a common, eminent enemy.

Averting this scenario may be done by utilizing the international community as well as third party

intervention tactics to provide the potential belligerents with an alternative for violence.28

The second model is the absorption of the North from the South. As addressed above, from

the N. Korean perspective this has challenges associated with integration into a different society. S.

Koreans would also have to cope with this change, as well as pay for the bulk of the reunification as

the N. Korean economy isn’t capable of contributing nearly as much as S. Korea can. The cost of

building infrastructure or industrial capabilities alone would cost an estimated 140 Bn. Arguably it’s a

cheaper alternative than military expenditure, however should reunification happen, S. Korea would

be paying for both. That drain on the economy in turn may impact the social welfare of all Koreans.

For South Korea, unification also has challenges associated with reunification other than the loss of

U.S. military assistance or defence cost deference.

The last recommended model is that of gradualism, a slow integration initiative enacted to

mitigate the issues associated with rapid absorption. Hong describes this method aptly:

“Gradualism, by offering a buffer zone for unexpected consequences

– whether it be financial, political, or social – to come into play at a

slower pace, will allow for the two Koreas and their neighbouring

countries to react appropriately to each situation.”

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are clearly numerous challenges pertaining to the ongoing Korean conflict. In

attempting to identify areas of issue, the contention of this paper is that the main challenge for

28 Cochrane, Feargal. "Third Party Intervention." In Ending Wars. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. 61.

resolving this conflict is that of the N. Korean regime and ideological imperative. Also, as shown

throughout the length of this paper there are challenges for ending S. Korean deference and

dependency on U.S. military aid, as well as numerous challenges in regards to reunification as a

solution. Although there are different scenarios upon which reunification and resolution may occur,

it is in the best interest of the world that it be done so without causing further strife or escalation of

force.

Bibliography

Books:

1. Cochrane, Feargal. "Third Party Intervention." In Ending Wars. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. 2. Gothel, Ingeborg. "Juche and the Issue of National Identity in the DPRK of the

1960's." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 19-31. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996.

3. Park, Han S. "The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 9-19. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996.

4. Park, Han S. "The Conundrum of the Nuclear Program." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 221-233. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996.

5. Pillar, Paul R. "The Opening of Negotiations." In Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.

6. Stueck, William Whitney. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Articles:

1. Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Ending South Korea's Unhealthy Security Dependence." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2009, 175-94.

2. Fitzpatrick, Mark. "North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer?" Survival 55, no. 3 (2013): 7-20.

3. Hong, Philip. "Reunification of Korea: A Social Development Approach to Resolving the Korean Conflict." Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 24, no. 1 (2008): 65-81.

4. Park, Yong Soo. "Policies and Ideologies of the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea: Theoretical Implications." Asian Studies Review 38, no. 1 (2013): 1-14.

Web Sources:

1. Feffer, John. "Korean Reunification: The View From the North." The Huffington Post. June 16, 2015. Accessed December 3, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/korean-reunification-the_b_7597430.html.

2. Freeman, Colin. "Kim Jong-un Threatens War with "US Imperialists" as North Korea Celebrates 70th Anniversary of Ruling Party." The Telegraph. October 10, 2015. Accessed December 4, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11923925/Kim-Jong-un-threatens-war-with-US-imperialists-as-North-Korea-celebrates-70th-anniversary-of-ruling-party.html.

3. "Global Conflict Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed December 2, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/?marker=5.

4. "North Korea Profile - Timeline." BBC News. December 9, 2015. Accessed December 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15278612.

5. Panda, Ankit. "South Korea Is Planning a Huge Increase in Defense Spending." The Diplomat. April 20, 2015. Accessed December 5, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-korea-is-planning-a-huge-increase-in-defense-spending/.

6. Sedghi, Ami, and Simon Rogers. "South v North Korea: How Do the Two Countries Compare? Visualised." The Guardian. April 8, 2013. Accessed December 6, 2015.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2013/apr/08/south-korea-v-north-korea-compared.

7. Shell, Elizabeth, and Matt Stiles. "Where Does U.S. Military Aid Go?" PBS. August 30, 2012. Accessed December 6, 2015. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/multimedia/military-spending/.

8. Williamson, Lucy. "Why Is South Korea Plugging Unification?" BBC News. January 28, 2014. Accessed December 3, 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25911981.