Central African Republic - Emergency Urban …documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/8219314972774… · Web view2017/06/05 · This analysis covers US$27.4 million of total investments

Document ofThe World Bank

Report No: ICR00003981

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(IDA-48050, IDA-H2910, IDA-H6110)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 12 MILLION(US$18 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND AN

ADDITIONAL FINANCING (GRANT AND CREDIT)

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 15.8 MILLION(US$23.9 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

INCLUDING SDR 6.7 MILLION(US$10.2 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

IN PILOT CRISIS RESPONSE WINDOW RESOURCES TO THE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FOR AN

EMERGENCY URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATIONAND MAINTENANCE PROJECT

June 1, 2017

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global PracticeCountry Department AFCC2Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective September 30, 2016)

Currency Unit = CFA FrancCFAF 1.00 = US$0.0017022

US$1.00 = CFAF 587.49US$1.00 = SDR 1.39581

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF Additional FinancingAGETIP-CAF Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Publique en Centrafrique –

Central African Public Works Implementing AgencyCAR Central African RepublicCD Country DirectorEPP Emergency Project PaperERR Economic Rate of ReturnESPF Economic and Social Policy FrameworkEUIRMP Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance ProjectFY Fiscal YearGoCAR Government of Central African RepublicICR Implementation Completion and Results ReportNPV Net Present ValueOP Operational PolicyPP Project PaperPRS Poverty Reduction Strategy SDR Special Drawing RightSODECA Société de Distribution de l’Eau de Centrafrique – the national water

utility company

Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez

Sector Manager: Meskerem BrhaneProject Team Leaders: Ana Paula Fialho Lopes and

Patrice Joachim Nirina RakotoniainaICR Team Leader: Christian Vang Eghoff

ICR primary author: Christian Vang Eghoff

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Central African RepublicEmergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project

CONTENTS

Data SheetA. Basic InformationB. Key DatesC. Ratings SummaryD. Sector and Theme CodesE. Bank StaffF. Results Framework AnalysisG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRsH. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes3. Assessment of Outcomes4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance6. Lessons Learned7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/PartnersAnnex 1. Project Costs and FinancingAnnex 2. Outputs by ComponentAnnex 3. Economic and Financial AnalysisAnnex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision ProcessesAnnex 5. Beneficiary Survey ResultsAnnex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and ResultsAnnex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICRAnnex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/StakeholdersAnnex 9. List of Supporting Documents

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A. Basic Information

Country:Central African Republic

Project Name:

CAR - Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation & Maintenance

Project ID: P104595 L/C/TF Number(s):IDA-48050, IDA-H2910, IDA-H6110

ICR Date: 06/01//2017 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower:CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 12.00M Disbursed Amount: XDR 27.26M

Revised Amount: XDR 27.26MEnvironmental Category: BImplementing Agencies: AGETIP-CAF Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Not applicable.

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 01/16/2007 Effectiveness: 09/18/2007 09/18/2007

Appraisal: 03/26/2007 Restructuring(s):

09/28/2010 03/17/201108/19/201106/13/201401/22/2016

Approval: 05/24/2007 Mid-term Review: 03/18/2010 11/08/2012 Closing: 01/31/2012 09/30/2016

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

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Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Major Sector/Sector Public Administration Other Public Administration 20 20 Transportation Urban Transport 20 20 Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Flood protection 25 25 Water Supply 23 23 Waste Management 12 12

Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Environment and Natural Resource Management Environmental Health and Pollution Management 5 5 Air quality management 5 5 Soil Pollution 5 5 Water Pollution 5 5 Water Resource Management 14 14 Water Institutions, Policies and Reform 14 14 Public Sector Management Public Administration 10 10 Administrative and Civil Service Reform 4 4

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Municipal Institution Building 10 10 Urban and Rural Development Urban Development 29 29 Services and Housing for the Poor 29 29 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 29 29

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli K. Ezekwesili Country Director: Ahamadou Moustapha Ndiaye Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly Practice Manager/Manager:

Meskerem Brhane Eustache Ouayoro

Project Team Leader(s): Ana Paula Fialho Lopes Kwabena Amankwah-Ayeh ICR Team Leader: Christian Vang Eghoff ICR Primary Author: Christian Vang Eghoff

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to assist the Recipient in rapidly rehabilitating, restoring, improving and expanding sustainable access to basic infrastructure services to the population of the most deprived districts of Bangui.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)The PDO was not revised, although the wording in the September 2010 additional financing Project Paper was aligned to the wording in the financing agreement.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Number of people with access to improved drainage in the areas served by the project.

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

6,000 58,000 70,000 168,400

Date achieved 03/26/2007 01/31/2012 07/31/2014 09/30/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target 241 percent achieved. Target valued increased with AF approval. Total length of drains rehabilitated was reduced compared to initial estimates, but number of beneficiaries was surpassed, as additional clogged drains were cleaned up.

Indicator 2: Number of people in urban areas provided with access to improved water sources

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under the project. Value (quantitative or qualitative)

10,000 110,000 34,300 39,300

Date achieved 03/26/2007 01/31/2012 01/31/2016 03/31/2017Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target 115 percent achieved. The AF changed the end target to 38,800, which was due to due to initial miscalculation of the indicator, not underperformance of the project. The target was reduced to 34,300 in the 2014 restructuring.

Indicator 3: Number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under the project.


50,000 470,000 310,254 568,100


Target 183 percent achieved because additional roads were rehabilitated through labor-intensive methods. AF changed end target to 420,000, reduced to 310,254 in the 2014 restructuring.

Indicator 4: Number of people in urban areas provided with access to regular solid waste collection under the project.


30,000 257,000 390,000 183,600


Initial target 71 percent achieved, final target 47 percent achieved. Target value increased with the approval of the AF.

Indicator 5: Establishment and operation of a solid waste management team in the Municipality of Bangui.


No Yes Yes Yes


Fully achieved. Moved to the intermediate level with approval of the AF in 2010.

Indicator 6: Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

670,605 (50%) Not applicable 722,168 (50%) 810,400 (49.4%)

Date achieved 06/01/2010 01/31/2016 03/31/2017Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target 112 percent achieved. This number reported excludes double-counting of people benefiting more than once in areas of intervention of two or more sub-components. Mandatory core indicator added when the AF was approved.

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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Number of newly constructed/rehabilitated water supply network.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0.00 11.00 6.00 6.27


End target fully achieved.

Indicator 2: Number of newly constructed boreholes.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 10 Not applicable 10

Date achieved 03/26/2007 01/31/2012 Not applicable 09/30/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

End target achieved. Dropped in AF and replaced with indicator on improved community water points.

Indicator 3: Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 Not applicable 55 55

Date achieved 06/01/2010 01/31/2016 03/31/2017


Indicator target fully achieved but eight water points not in operation as SODECA is in the process of selecting managers. Replaced indicator on boreholes in AF with target of 61. Target reduced from 61 to 55 in the 2014 restructuring.

Indicator 4: New piped household water connections constructed under the project. Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 Not applicable 2,000 1,978


Target achieved. Indicator introduced in AF to reflect new activities.

Indicator 5: Water utilities that the project is supporting.Value (quantitative or qualitative)



Fully achieved. Introduced in AF.

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Indicator 6: Drainage network constructed/rehabilitated.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0.00 km 7.00 km 9.30 km 7,66 km

Date achieved 03/26/2007 01/31/2012 01/31/2016 09/30/2016


Target 82 percent achieved. AF adjusted end target upwards. In addition, the project funded construction of 12 kilometers of roadside gutters along rehabilitated roads and cleaning of 21.77 kilometers of drainage to restore functionality.

Indicator 7: Number of jobs created under drainage in man/day. Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 230,000 428,450 420,900

Date achieved 03/26/2007 01/31/2012 01/31/2016 09/30/2016


Target achieved. AF adjusted target to 274,000, adjusted to 428,450 in 2014 restructuring. Of total, 157,900 were created through cleaning of drains as reported and 263,000 are estimated based on cost of drainage rehabilitation works and labor ratio.

Indicator 8: Number of transfer stations constructed and in effective use.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 41 54 38


Target 70 percent achieved. AF adjusted target to 54. A total of 51 stations were constructed, but 13 not in effective use.

Indicator 9: Number of sensitization activities undertaken.Value (quantitative or qualitative)



Target 645 percent achieved. Dropped in AF and replaced with indicator on person-hours of education provided to population in project area.

Indicator 10: Number of person-hours of education provided to population in project area.Value (quantitative or qualitative)



Target 115 percent achieved. Replaced indicator on number of sensitization activities undertaken in AF.

Indicator 11: Quantity of solid waste collected and disposed.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

24 m3/day 225 m3/day 500 m3/day 322 m3/day

Date achieved 03/26/2007 01/31/2012 01/31/2016 09/30/2016Comments Initial target surpassed, end target 64 percent achieved. AF adjusted end target to

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(incl. % achievement)

500 m3/day. The project attained a maximum collection of 430 m3/day during implementation.

Indicator 12: Percentage of solid waste collected / total waste produced.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

6% 40% Not applicable 43%


Target 108 percent achieved. Indicator dropped in AF.

Indicator 13: Number of jobs created under solid waste management activities.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

105 505 350 52


Target achieved 15 percent, temporarily surpassed with 466 jobs in 2009. AF adjusted target to 350.

Indicator 14: Establishment and operation of a solid waste management team in the Municipality of Bangui.


No Yes Yes Yes


Fully achieved. Moved from PDO level with approval of the AF in 2010.

Indicator 15: Roads rehabilitated, non-rural.Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0.0 66.0 48.0 82.1


Target achieved 171 percent. AF adjusted target to 51.6, further reduced to 48.0 in 2014 restructuring. Additional 34.1 kilometers of road rehabilitated by labor-intensive techniques are included in the final number.

Indicator 16: Number of jobs created under urban roads rehabilitation in man/day. Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 130,000 53,419 90,600

Date achieved 03/26/2007 01/31/2012 07/31/2014 12/31/2015


Target 170 percent achieved. AF reduced target to 91,253 due to cancellation of road works, further reduced in 2014 restructuring due to further cancellations. Target surpassed due to labor-intensive road rehabilitation after 2014 restructuring.

Indicator 17: Number of people trained in institutions involved in project implementation.Value (quantitative or qualitative)


x


Target 29 percent achieved. Dropped in AF. Final value not available, as monitoring was switched to person hours of training.

Indicator 18: Number of person hours of training provided to staff of agencies responsible for urban infrastructure development, operation, and maintenance.




Target 169 percent achieved. Replaced indicator on number of people trained in AF.

Indicator 19: Audited accounts of the Urban Infrastructure Investment Fund approved and published within 6 months after end of the fiscal year.




Target fully achieved. Introduced in AF.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements(US$ millions)

1 10/04/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 03/31/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.77 3 10/03/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.27 4 04/03/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.91 5 10/05/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.18 6 05/31/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 17.05 7 02/05/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 17.79 8 08/10/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 20.21 9 05/12/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.71

10 11/24/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.29 11 06/22/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 30.89

12 01/04/2014 Moderately Unsatisfactory

Moderately Unsatisfactory 31.66





15 03/27/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 36.08 16 10/05/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 37.17

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17 05/11/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 39.91

18 08/12/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 40.53

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in US$

millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadeDO IP

09/28/2010 No S S 17.79

Approval of the AF to scale up the Project, extension of the closing date from January 31, 2012 to July 31, 2014 and funding cost overruns.

03/17/2011 No S S 17.79

Reallocation of SDR 328,000 from Category 1 (Component A) to Category 2 (Component B) to allow for completion of Component B activities.

08/19/2011 No S S 20.21

Extend the deadline (from August 31, 2011 to December 31, 2011) for satisfying the dated covenant related to sealing the Kolongo landfill in accordance with the EMP.

06/13/2014 No MU MU 32.75

Restructuring to: (i) extend closing date from July 31, 2014 to January 31, 2016 to make up for implementation delays and to allow for the implementation of labor-intensive public works; (ii) update the results framework to reflect scaled-up labor-intensive drainage works; (iii) reallocate US$200,000 from Component B to Component A, allocate US$1.9 million of contingencies to Component A, adjust funds between Component A sub-components; (iv) include provision of water to camps for displaced persons and make other minor implementation adjustments; and (v) revise disbursement estimates.

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Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in US$

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadeDO IP

01/22/2016 No MS MS 39.69

Extension of closing date from January 31, 2016 to September 30, 2016, to make up for lost time due to the volatile country situation and a temporary disbursement suspension and cancel US$800,000 of client counterpart funding.

I. Disbursement Profile

.

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. The Central African Republic (CAR) had been affected by years of recurring conflict since 1996. Mutinies in the army, conflicts and attempted coups d’état had crippled economic activity and government finances. A coup d’état in March 2003 marked the beginning of a transitional period with adoption of a new constitution and leading to general elections in March 2005. Low-intensity violence continued to simmer in parts of the country.

2. The economic situation was difficult and revenue mobilization by the government was insufficient to pay civil service wages or sustain even basic public services. The government was thus not able to deliver “peace dividends” in the form of income opportunities, improved basic services, and involvement of communities in their own development. The analysis of the government and international community was that if these dividends were not delivered quickly, the risk of regression to violence was high, especially given a high level of youth unemployment.

3. A humanitarian crisis loomed over CAR’s cities and Bangui in particular. Badly dilapidated infrastructure services were put under additional stress from mass movement of rural populations to cities during the years of conflict. Access to water was a particular concern as CAR’s water utility company -Société de Distribution de l’Eau de Centrafrique (SODECA)- was on the verge of collapse and only 31 percent of Bangui households had access to safe drinking water. Nearly eight out of ten households in Bangui used latrines or rudimentary septic tanks, which polluted the water table. Only 6 percent of trash was collected and disposed of properly. In combination with inadequate drainage infrastructure this contributed to recurrent seasonal flooding. The road network was degraded and often impassable during the rainy season, affecting access to poor residential areas in particular.

4. In 2005, during a phase of post-crisis recovery, the government developed a draft interim poverty reduction strategy (PRS) and drew up an 18-month economic and social policy framework (ESPF). The ESPF was built around the four central themes of the interim PRS: (i) reinforcement of security and consolidation of peace; (ii) improvement of governance and public sector institutional capacity; (iii) promotion of macroeconomic stability and economic growth; and (iv) improvement of the population’s access to essential social services and rehabilitated infrastructure. The objectives of the ESPF were to be achieved through a series of reforms and the government called on its development partners to provide emergency assistance to support its efforts to stabilize the country.

5. The World Bank fully reengaged with CAR in November 2006, after the country had entered into non-accrual status in 2002. The Bank program was part of a broad and multi-dimensional effort by the international community to help consolidate political stability and security in CAR and to stimulate economic and social recovery.

6. The Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (EUIRMP) was an integral part of the Bank’s reengagement strategy and responded to the Bank’s expected role and strengths in providing multi-sector recovery support to countries emerging from

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conflict. The Bank worked closely with other partners to harmonize operations, including elaborating a joint FY07-08 Interim Strategy with the African Development Bank. This strategy supported: (i) economic recovery and strengthening public sector governance and technical capacity; and (ii) the development of human capital with emphasis on the poor. The EUIRMP was an integral part of the strategy and built on operational-level coordination with other donors.

7. The context at appraisal of the additional financing (AF) in 2010 was marked by continued fragile security and the impact of the global financial crisis with the twin effect of increasing price of basic imports and decreasing the value of main exports. Flooding problems had increased in Bangui and 15,000 people were made homeless due to flooding in 2009. The government developed a strategy to reduce flooding, with help from the World Bank and other donors.

8. The government’s ability to address the situation was limited, and the Bank was able to step in with emergency project funds, including from the Crisis Response Window. This allowed the government to cushion the impact of the financial crisis on poor and vulnerable households and protect spending in water and urban infrastructure, which were priority sectors in the PRS. The AF was included in the 2009-2012 Joint Country Partner Strategy of the African Development Bank and the World Bank Group to contribute to easing the infrastructure bottlenecks hindering the rehabilitation and development of key sectors, and to improve basic service delivery and the living conditions of the population.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

9. The PDO was, as stated in the financing agreement, to assist the Recipient in rapidly rehabilitating, restoring, improving and expanding sustainable access to basic infrastructure services to the population of the most deprived districts of Bangui. This differs from the statement of the PDO in the Project Paper (PP), which was: to support the government of the Central African Republic (GoCAR) to increase access to infrastructure and urban services in Bangui, the capital city. There are material differences between the two versions, as the first specifically retains rapidity of activities and their sustainability as parameters.1 The version of the PDO contained in the financing agreement will be used for the assessment in the present Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR). 10. The key indicators were, as presented in the financing agreement:2

Number of people protected against periodic flooding. Number of people getting access to potable water. Number of people getting access to all year passable roads. Number of people getting access to an operational solid waste management system.

1 Aspects of the version in the financing agreement are also included in the PDO explanatory remarks in the PP, according to which “the project will support GoCAR to rapidly rehabilitate, restore, improve and expand sustainable access to basic infrastructure services for the population of the most deprived districts of Bangui.”2 There are minor differences between the indicators in the financing agreement and the PP.

2

Establishment and operation of a solid waste management team in the Municipality of Bangui.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

11. The PDO was not revised. With the approval of the AF in 2010, the PDO was stated in the Emergency Project Paper (EPP) as in the original financing agreement. The key indicators were amended to reflect standard wording introduced for core sector indicators, include a mandatory indicator on direct project beneficiaries and move one indicator to the intermediate level. The indicators thus read as follows:

Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage). Number of people with access to improved drainage in the areas served by the project. Number of people in urban areas provided with access to improved water sources under

the project. Number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-

meter range under the project. Number of people in urban areas provided with access to regular solid waste collection

under the project.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

12. The main intended beneficiaries were the residents of Bangui that would get access to infrastructure services due to project investments. About 40 percent of residents were to benefit from improved solid waste management services. Populations of specific neighborhoods would benefit from investments in roads, drainage and water and the households connected to the SODECA network would benefit from more reliable service. The Municipality of Bangui would benefit from capacity strengthening, especially in solid waste management, and SODECA would benefit from improved infrastructure base to serve its customers and from capacity building.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

Component A: Infrastructure Rehabilitation (US$15 million equivalent)

13. Component A had four subcomponents:

1) Water Supply (US$4.2 million equivalent): Increasing potable water supply to the residents of Bangui, through support in: (i) rehabilitating parts of the SODECA network to reduce water losses; (ii) increasing SODECA’s water delivery capacity through improved pumping and electrical equipment, and (iii) providing deep boreholes powered by solar energy and constructing water kiosks for improved access to water in unserved neighborhoods.

2) Drainage Rehabilitation (US$4.2 million equivalent): Reducing the number of people affected by periodic flooding through support in: (i) rehabilitating drainage structures in

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particular the main Bouagba canal and feeder network; and (ii) piloting low cost drainage technologies through labor-intensive construction techniques.

3) Solid Waste Management (US$2.8 million equivalent): Creating an operational solid waste management system while building the foundations for a long term sustainable service through support in: (i) constructing transfer stations; (ii) improving the access to, and operation of, the existing dumpsite, and providing gradually declining funds for transfer of solid waste to the dumpsite; (iii) strengthening the capacity of the stakeholders in solid waste management; and (iv) increasing communities’ solid waste management awareness. Operating cost was to be funded by the project on a regressive basis, with the Municipality of Bangui gradually taking on the cost.

4) Urban Road Rehabilitation (US$3.8 million equivalent): Rehabilitating primary and secondary gravel and dirt roads in Bangui, through support in: (i) rehabilitating roads; and (ii) improving the drainage along these roads.

Component B: Institutional Strengthening (US$3 million equivalent including US$1.3 million contingencies)

14. This component aimed to strengthen the capacity of the institutions involved in the management of the project and responsible for the delivery of urban services to ensure some measure of sustainability of the activities to be financed by the project. The PP made it clear that the emergency operation would not be able to address all the important sustainability issues associated with the delivery services. Activities under this component were: (i) technical assistance to the Ministry of Urban Affairs; (ii) strengthening the fiduciary functions in the Technical Secretariat responsible for project coordination; and (iii) acquisition of software for financial and procurement management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), instituting environmental and social safeguards, and training technical staff of GoCAR agencies (Ministry of Urban Affairs, Ministries of Public Works and of Water, SODECA, AGETIP-CAF -the implementing agency- and Municipality of Bangui) and communities involved in the project.

1.6 Revised Components

15. The components were revised through an AF approved in 2010. The client’s high satisfaction with the project, with highly visible results on the ground, led the client to request additional financing to scale up the project. The AF funded additional activities under all components, but with a particular focus on drainage with the double objective of mitigating flood frequency and impact and creating additional short-term employment. The AF also funded cost-overruns related in particular to a sharp increase in the price of cement. Some of the originally planned activities in road rehabilitation and installation of water main lines had not been implemented due to the cost overruns and were scaled back to allow the project to focus on other priorities that had emerged. The activities were (with the additional amounts allocated):

Component A (US$21.6 million equivalent including US$1.9 million contingencies)

1) Water Supply (US$3.4 million equivalent): Finalization and scale up of increased water access through water kiosks and installation of household connections. Continued

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emergency works to improve the reliability of water service delivery to existing SODECA customers. Increased emphasis was put on securing access to safe drinking water in areas vulnerable to flooding by construction of water kiosks on the existing water main lines.

2) Flood Reduction and Mitigation of Flood Impacts (US$11.0 million equivalent): The subcomponent scaled up drainage works to reduce floods. However, it was also broadened to include a community-based flood preparedness and response program to reduce impacts of future floods in terms of loss of shelter, and exposure to water-borne diseases.

3) Solid waste management (US$2.8million equivalent, of which US$0.8 million GoCAR): Activities aimed to consolidate the city-wide solid waste management system established with original EUIRMP financing and also comprised upgrading of the Kolongo landfill and technical studies related to a larger landfill for the future.

4) Urban road rehabilitation (US$2.6 million equivalent): The additional activities would contribute to providing more people with access to all-season roads and fund part of the original program of works that had not been implemented due to cost overruns. Emphasis was put on sustainability of the road rehabilitating to be funded by the AF through consistent inclusion of roadside drainage.

Component B (US$3.1 million equivalent)16. The main change in Component B was a scale-up of institutional strengthening of the institutions responsible for the delivery of urban services (SODECA and the Municipalities of Bangui and Bimbo),3including through funding for developing a priority infrastructure maintenance program for the Municipality of Bangui and increased cost recovery. This program was fully coordinated with other donors.

1.7 Other significant changes

17. A total of five project restructurings were approved:

(i) Approval by the Board of the AF (scale-up, extension of closing date and funding cost overruns) on September 28, 2010. The AF formalized the government counterpart contribution of US$0.8 million to operation of SWM, initially foreseen to come from the Municipality of Bangui.

(ii) Reallocation of SDR 328,000 from Category 1 (Component A) to Category 2 (Component B) to allow for completion of Component B activities (level two restructuring approved by the Country Director (CD) on March 17, 2011).

(iii) Extension of the deadline (from August 31, 2011 to December 31, 2011) for satisfying the dated covenant related to sealing the Kolongo landfill (level two restructuring approved by the CD on August 19, 2011).

(iv)Multiple changes to: (i) extend the closing date from July 31, 2014 to January 31, 2016 to make up for implementation delays and to allow for the implementation of labor-intensive public works; (ii) update the results framework to reflect scale-up of labor-

3 Bimbo is a separate municipal entity but part of the Bangui urban area. Parts of Bimbo are served by the SWM services organized by the Municipality of Bangui.

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intensive drainage works; (iii) reallocate US$200,000 from Component B to Component A, allocate US$1.9 million of contingencies to Component A, adjust funds between Component A subcomponents; (iv) include provision of water to camps for displaced persons and make other minor implementation adjustments; and (v) revise disbursement estimates (level two restructuring approved by the CD on June 13, 2014).

(v) Extension of closing date from January 31, 2016 to September 30, 2016, to make up for lost time due to the volatile country situation following a coup d’état and large-scale outbreaks of violence in Bangui, which lead to a temporary disbursement suspension. The government counterpart contribution to SWM was also cancelled (level two restructuring approved by the Regional Vice President on January 22, 2016).

18. An undisbursed amount of SDR 10,101 was cancelled from the parent project (grant IDA-H2910) when it closed. Undisbursed amounts of SDR 25,550 and SDR 507,580 were cancelled from the AF credit (IDA-48050) and grant (IDA-H6110) when the AF closed.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

19. The Bank’s intervention in the project was fully justified by the priorities of the Interim Strategy and the institution’s comparative advantage in the provision of support to early recovery and reconstruction. The background analysis was sound and design of the project adequately reflected this analysis and incorporated lessons learned. The PP correctly identifies implementation capacity as a main constraint. For this reason, AGETIP-CAF was selected as a private-sector contract management agency to implement the project, with a ring-fenced fiduciary arrangement to safeguard the use of funds and support transparent procurement processes. The Ministry of Urban Affairs was responsible for overall coordination and relevant entities (in particular SODECA and the Municipality of Bangui) were charged with technical aspects to create avenues for learning by doing and gradually build their capacity. The project was designed to make the fullest possible use of labor-intensive construction techniques to assure that a high percentage of investments benefited the disenfranchised youth. 20. Project design was satisfactory, with only minor shortcomings. The PDO targeted not only delivering services, but doing so rapidly and sustainably to deliver the needed peace dividends and assure that benefits would remain after the project. The design of components was kept as simple as could be given the four sectors of intervention, which were determined by the multitude of issues to address simultaneously in Bangui. The project was implemented in a single locality and hence this complexity was manageable, also given that overall implementation and reporting responsibility was attributed clearly to AGETIP-CAF. The decentralized micro water systems were designed to be income-generating and thus contribute to the financial stability of SODECA. Given the post-conflict context the project was designed to address sustainability issues as well as could be expected. The PP clearly stated that the project would not address all the sustainability issues associated with the delivery of the urban and infrastructure services supported by the project, but rather contribute to building the foundations for sustainability.

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21. Use of Operational Policy (OP) 8.00 – Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergencies allowed the project to be prepared in only 4 months between the concept review and approval. In spite of this contracted preparation time, the tenders for the first contracts to clean up dump sites were already launched before Board approval of the project. No major safeguards issues were foreseen, although the rehabilitation of the Kolongo landfill would require a dedicated Environmental and Social Impact Assessment. Elaboration of safeguards documents was deferred to project implementation, as allowed by OP8.00.

22. The government was fully committed to the project, and engaged to gradually take on responsibility for funding the solid waste collection. Community involvement in design and outreach and communication during implementation were also built in to promote sustainability of investments. Investments were selected by a technical committee including all stakeholders, based on a long list of priorities submitted by the government and the beneficiary communities.

23. Risks specific to the project were adequately identified and mitigated. In particular, the risk of corruption and fraud was mitigated by keeping prior review thresholds for procurement low, requiring disclosure of bid results and contract awards, recruitment of additional qualified procurement staff, and provision of training. National competition was encouraged, but with close scrutiny of contractors’ effective capacity before award of contracts to mitigate risk of construction delays. Implementation capacity constraints were mitigated by designing adequate implementation arrangements as presented above, combined with technical assistance as necessary.

24. The AF was designed to scale up the results of the well-performing project, address in particular some of the problems related to flooding, and respond to the escalating cost due to increased cost of construction materials. In consequence, the indicator targets were modified. In addition, the use of labor-intensive construction techniques was increased through the choice of infrastructure to be funded, and support to improved governance of the water and urban sectors was increased. The AF was also prepared based on OP8.00 due to the urgency to address the impacts of the global crisis and tackle the flooding problems. The framework safeguards instruments developed for the parent project covered the activities of the AF.

2.2 Implementation

25. The project was declared effective on September 18, 2007, and implementation on the whole progressed well. The good performance, with disbursements above projections and continued need for project activities, justified the scale-up of the project with approval of the AF in 2010 and extension of the closing date to implement the additional activities. Minor changes (reallocations and extension of deadline for a dated covenant, as described in section 1.7) were made through two project restructurings in 2011.

26. During the latter part of 2011 implementation started to slow down. The volume of activities was not matched by an earlier strong engagement of institutional stakeholders. In combination with relaxation of communication and coordination by AGETIP-CAF and delays to contract processing and monitoring this resulted in delays to project implementation. The mid-term review was held in November 2012 and recommended certain priority actions to be taken immediately in order to ensure project completion before the closing date: (i) reinforce

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implementation capacity to commit all project activities, in particular the works contracts, before June 2013; (ii) put in place a strategy and mechanism to support sustainability of infrastructure and urban services; and (iii) reinforce the M&E system for the collection, analysis, and availability of data for decision-making.

27. A coup d’état in 2013 had major impacts on project implementation, with disbursement suspension, constraints to the implementing agency’s ability to implement activities and refusal by contractors and consultants to return to Bangui. Starting in December 2012 the rebel coalition known as Seleka started to move towards Bangui followed by a coup d’état in March 2013. The Bank’s country office was closed, staff relocated to Yaoundé and missions suspended. OP7.30 - Dealing with de-facto governments was triggered on March 25, 2013, the day after the coup. As a result, the project slowed down, disbursements were suspended between March and September 2013 and priority actions identified during the MTR could not be completed. In November 2013 the country office was reopened and the EUIRMP was authorized to resume disbursement. However, activities could not restart due to the challenging security conditions still prevailing in Bangui, with threats to the lives of contractors and workers from parties to the conflict. Due to the security situation, several contractors and consultants refused to return to Bangui to resume work. The suspension caused delays to payment of salaries to AGETIP-CAF staff, leading to temporary demotivation of staff, and the agency had to partially rebuild its implementation capacity as some of its equipment had been destroyed. No substantial project activities were carried out during the second half of 2013. To respond to the situation, the project was restructured in June 2014 to extend the project closing date to January 31, 2016, reallocate remaining funds between components to focus even more on labor-intensive works, and update the results framework in consequence. Three implementation support missions were carried out as reverse missions in Yaoundé until missions to Bangui were reauthorized in January 2015.

28. During the remaining project implementation period some neighborhoods of Bangui remained inaccessible due to security concerns. The project adopted an opportunistic approach, launching works in accessible areas, working with the UN peacekeeping force to assure safety of sites and increasing communication with stakeholders to improve understanding of and support to project activities, minimizing threats to workers’ lives. Three changes illustrate the approach, which allowed the multi-sector project to operate flexibly: (i) some of the drainage works included in the AF (on the Pinari main drainage canal) were dropped due to site insecurity and funds reallocated to labor-intensive road maintenance in accessible areas. When the original sites became accessible once again the Pinari canal was cleaned (but not rehabilitated as initially planned), assuring at least some of the initially intended benefits; (ii) project funds were redirected to halt the erosion and collapse of the Bouagba canal, following the collapse of a bridge linking a populous neighborhood to the city center; and (iii) a collapsed water main serving a large neighborhood in 6ème arrondissement was rehabilitated with funds diverted from works on the Kokoro drain, which could not be completed on time and was scaled down. These changes could be operated without project restructuring, as the multi-sector nature of the project operating in several neighborhoods in the city facilitated changes to project activities; also, changes remained within allocated funds. The good coordination and complementarity of actions supported by various donors also contributed to making the flexible approach possible.

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29. A project extension was approved on January 22, 2016, justified by the implementation delays caused by the context and to allow for completion of activities. All retained project activities were completed with the exception of an access road along the Kokoro drainage canal.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

30. The M&E design had some shortcomings flowing in part from the difference between the PDO in the PP and in the financing agreement. The PDO indicators to capture the outcome of the four infrastructure subcomponents were well selected, but there were no indicators to measure the parts of the PDO related to the rapidity and sustainability of interventions, apart from the indicator on the setting in place of an SWM unit in the Municipality of Bangui. Indicators were measurable as they were a mathematical function of implemented works, or, in the case of SWM, a system was to be set in place to monitor indicators. The target for the indicator related to access to water was calculated incorrectly in the PP. The project had as an effectiveness condition the recruitment of an M&E specialist for the Technical Secretariat of the Steering Committee but the actual arrangements for M&E are not presented in project documents, apart from mention of an intent for community participation in M&E, and generic Component B activities to strengthen M&E.

31. Collecting and aggregating indicator data for effective measurement of project implementation and its progress towards the PDO was a challenge because of the scarcity of data in CAR and staff instability in the Technical Secretariat charged with collecting data. Community participation in M&E was not implemented, in part due to focusing efforts on getting the overall project M&E system to work. On the Bank’s suggestion, in 2010, an international consultant was mobilized to assist in collecting data to track progress. The system was in place when the AF was approved, but quality of reporting suffered from continued instability in the M&E position in the Technical Secretariat. To incorporate the AF activities and respond to the changing context, changes were made to indicator values several times during the project.4 No substantial evaluation of impacts was carried out during implementation. A system is implemented in the Municipality of Bangui to track SWM performance and can be sustained after the project. A system also exists in SODECA to track performance of project outputs. Both require further strengthening.

32. Although data quality was of varying quality it did serve to inform project management. For example, data collected on the operation of water kiosks led to implemented technical solutions to improve quality of water from the drillings, and data on SWM was collected by the Municipality of Bangui, leading to proposals for a user-paid house-to-house collection system (but which has yet to be implemented). However, the majority of M&E activities served to monitor activity implementation rather than evaluating outcomes. The Bank commissioned a

4 The AF increased targets for access to drainage and SWM in line with additional funding and projections of outcome and reduced targets for access to water and roads. Regarding water, the initial target was a miscalculation, and for roads the initial target, based on 11 kilometers of road rehabilitation, could not be achieved due to cost overruns, but was in the end surpassed due to the later inclusion of labor-intensive road rehabilitation works. In the AF EPP the wording of several indicators was amended to align with the core sector indicators introduced after approval of the parent project, but the meaning remained unchanged. The 2014 restructuring again modified some target values for PDO indicators for access to water (due to cancellation of some water kiosks) and roads (as some road investments were transferred to the IDA-financed Transport and Transit Facilitation Project).

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beneficiary satisfaction and results survey after the closing of the project. This led to some adjustments to the final indicator values reported in the ICR based on rigorous application of indicator methodology and as confirmed by the survey and visual verification.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

33. The project was classified as environmental assessment category B. The required safeguards instruments -Environmental and Social Management Framework and Resettlement Policy Framework- were prepared and disclosed within six months of effectiveness as allowed by OP8.00. A safeguards specialist was recruited to the AGETIP-CAF in compliance with the dated covenant in the financing agreement. The safeguards instruments prepared also covered the AF and were re-disclosed prior to appraisal of the AF. Bank implementation support missions revealed some shortcomings in the implementation of Environmental and Social Management Plans and Resettlement Action Plans. These in particular concerned limited understanding of safeguards procedures by contractors and by the counterpart, which led to omission of cost of mitigation measures in the bidding documents. Implementation of agreed action plans, closely monitored by the Bank, accompanied by capacity building for AGETIP-CAF, staff of the ministry in charge of the environment and contractors, combined with and stronger involvement of the ministry in charge of the environment, led to correction of these shortcomings. For reasons somewhat beyond the control of the client (unresponsive tender and unavailability of winning bidder) the AF dated covenant regarding sealing of the Kolongo landfill could not be complied with by the deadline, and for this reason a level two restructuring was implemented to extend the deadline by 4 months. The covenant was complied with before the new deadline.

34. Fiduciary management was generally rated in the satisfactory range during implementation, furthered by regular procurement and financial management training to AGETIP-CAF staff. The project was implemented in compliance with the relevant Bank policy and procedural requirements, with two exceptions: (i) an instance of ineligible expenses in the total amount of FCFA 40 million was found by auditors (an ineligible personal guarantee for an AGETIP-CAF staff paid during the 2013 crisis) and the corresponding amounts reimbursed by the government; and (ii) a payment of advances to contractors in non-conformity with the contractual provisions. The payments were made by AGETIP-CAF in an attempt to help speed up the works and advances were recovered before project closing. Covenants in the financing agreement were complied with through recruitment of the internal and external auditors and a procurement specialist, and establishment of a computerized financial management and procurement information system. Financial reports and audits were submitted on time and were unqualified and audit recommendations were adequately implemented. Due to budget constraints and absence of mandated transfers from the government, the Municipality of Bangui, and later the government, were not able to provide the expected counterpart funding for the operation of the solid waste management system. Implementation support missions repeatedly sought a resolution to this issue, including through discussions with government and municipality. In spite of repeated engagements by the counterpart to make funds available, this did not happen and in the January 2016 restructuring the government was released from this obligation.

35. Regular post procurement reviews and annual procurement audits did not reveal any anomalies. Minor procurement delays were noted during implementation. The Bank’s Task Team supported a reorganization of AGETIP-CAF to speed up internal procurement processing

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and improve the quality of documents submitted for review. Constraints imposed by the crisis and security situation presented a challenge for contract management, but some slippages by contractors should have been addressed proactively by AGETIP-CAF to avoid an unfinished rehabilitation of a small access road.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

36. All infrastructure financed by the project are commissioned and transferred to the relevant owners. The results evaluation at the end of the project confirmed that the majority of infrastructure is functional and operational. SODECA is managing all water kiosks and has the technical skills to maintain the infrastructure. Eight water kiosks (out of 55 constructed under the project) are not in operation, as managers are to be appointed from among neighborhood residents and the utilities’ organizational skills should be strengthened further to assure optimal oversight and training of the kiosk managers. The African Development Bank and World Bank are supporting the government to prepare projects to help SODECA to address some of the institutional issues and the African Development Bank is posed to finance priority activities identified in the water supply master plan of the city of Bangui, prepared under the EUIRMP. The Bangui bypass road will be constructed under the Bank-funded Transport Project, based on the design study funded by the EUIRMP. Immediately after project closing and end of operational support through the project there was a decrease in the level of solid waste collection, leading to popular discontent. The municipality recruited a contractor in November 2016, with own funds, to continue solid waste collection in some parts of Bangui, getting collection up to the improved numbers reported in this ICR. The SWM unit in the municipality established under the project continues to be fully operational. The municipal SWM budget has increased from FCFA 55 million in 2016 to FCFA 120 million in 2017, demonstrating the municipal council’s willingness to prioritize SWM. Additional SWM equipment funded by other donors was delivered in April 2017 (three collection vehicles and 40 containers), which should allow the municipality to ramp up SWM collection. During the project the UN peacekeeping force contributed to operating the landfill, and this support continues. The drainage is operational, as confirmed through site visits and the beneficiary satisfaction and results survey. The French Development Agency is funding additional drainage works to improve the drainage of water towards the Bouagba canal funded by the EUIRMP. Roads and drainage are to be maintained by the municipality with funds from the Urban Infrastructure Maintenance Fund, but this funding mechanism is not yet receiving the required funds.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Rating: Substantial.

37. Relevance of objectives: Substantial. CAR continues to be in need of support to close the infrastructure gap. Access to water remains low, at about 35 percent in urban areas. The government’s 2016 5-year Recovery and Peace Consolidation Plan contains investments amounting to US$740 million in basic services, water and roads. Bangui houses 11 percent of the country’s poor and gradual return of displaced persons to neighborhoods wholly or partially destroyed in the 2013 conflict creates additional pressure for rapid restoration of access to basic

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infrastructure services, in line with the project’s PDO. The government has requested that the Bank continues to fund infrastructure investments in the capital under new projects. Intervention in CAR by the Bank is consistent with the IDA-18 focus on fragile and conflict-affected states. The World Bank’s FY16-17 Country Reengagement Note of July 13, 2015 explicitly retains the EUIRMP as a means to support livelihoods through creation of short-term jobs. The objectives of targeting rapid and sustainable improvements to services remain highly relevant in the current context.

38. Relevance of design: Substantial. The project included a program of activities to address the multitude of problems identified in the capital, consistent with the stated objectives. The causal chain between funding and outcomes was clear. Although there were differences between the stated objective in the financing agreement and the PP (which were resolved with the approval of the AF), the activities in each sector would lead to achievement of measurable improvements in access to services. The use of labor-intensive construction techniques was a design element to create employment opportunities for the disenfranchised youth to reduce risk of recurring violence. Furthermore, preparation of activities was sufficiently advanced to allow the first contracts to be signed shortly after project effectiveness to allow the project to respond rapidly to the post-conflict situation. The project also included activities under Component B to address questions of sustainability, designed with adequate flexibility in the face of pressure to approve the parent project. The project was not fully designed for sustainability of outcomes, given the rapid response intended, but the PP was transparent about the limited potential to assure sustainability of all investments given the project environment. The absence of indicators to measure pace of implementation and sustainability is a minor design shortcoming.

39. The AF was opportune in scaling up the public-works program to support sustained recovery through a labor-intensive program for the rehabilitation of urban roads and drainage as part of the 2013 crisis response and adding additional elements under Component B to support the sustainability objective and prepare the ground for future investments in the relevant sectors. The additional activities included support to programming of investments and maintenance in the Technical Unit of the Municipality of Bangui. The AF could have included indicators to measure the parts of the PDO related to rapidity and sustainability.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

40. Efficacy is rated Substantial. Assessment of the degree of achievement of the PDO is based on progress made against the various PDO indicators and targets in effect during project implementation, weighted against disbursements at the relevant time of restructuring (in 2010 in conjunction with the AF and in 2014).5 The main parameter for evaluation is the part of the PDO relating to access to basic infrastructure, which is captured by the PDO indicators, with considerations of rapidity of delivery of the outcomes and their sustainability also feeding into the evaluation.

5 Respectively SDR 11.55M (or 42.4 percent of final disbursements of 27.26M), SDR 21.2M (77.9 percent of total disbursements or additional SDR 9.7M and 35.5 percent for purpose of weighing), and SDR 27.3M (100.0 percent of total disbursements or additional SDR 6.0M and 22.1 percent for purpose of weighing).

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41. Several changes were made to indicator targets during implementation. These changes result from approval of the AF in 2010 to scale up in particular the drainage activities of the aspect and changes in the 2014 restructuring. In the end, most indicator target values were met or surpassed, in large part due to the flexible implementation (described in section 2.2), marked by continuous redirection of resources to the investments that were feasible given the security situation, while also being impactful. This approach contributed to assuring that the total number of beneficiaries surpassed the target set in the AF.6 The list numbering below corresponds to the PDO indicator numbering in the datasheet.

1. Number of people with access to improved drainage in the areas served by the project. The result of 168,400 beneficiaries surpassed all targets in effect during the project (58,000 and 70,000). Initial drainage works were largely completed by the approval of the AF, demonstrating rapid delivery of services. The results assessment at the end of the project confirmed that all 7.7 kilometers of drainage infrastructure constructed under the project are operational, in addition to the 21.8 kilometers of cleaned drains and 12.0 kilometers of roadside gutters constructed along rehabilitated roads. Most are self-cleaning due to steep slopes and thus the service is sustainable, although some smaller secondary drains are starting to be clogged by solid waste and vegetation. The project contributed to maintaining, rehabilitating and restoring drainage services by cleaning and rehabilitating existing drains and to improving and expanding services by constructing new drains, including along some stretches of the rehabilitated roads.

2. Number of people in urban areas provided with access to improved water sources under the project. The result of 39,300 additional beneficiaries fell short of the initial target of 100,000 (which was due to a miscalculation) but surpassed the restructured targets of 38,800 and 34,300. The result was achieved through the construction of 55 water kiosks and installation of 1,978 household connections in poor areas of the city. Approximatively half of these beneficiaries live in areas prone to flooding. In addition, the rehabilitation of a collapsed water main improved access to water for the 132,158 inhabitants of 6ème arrondissement which otherwise would have suffered substantially reduced water pressure. Initial activities to rehabilitate water services (pumping equipment and electrical installations) were implemented within the first two years, while rehabilitation of the network was somewhat delayed, but finalized by the initially foreseen project closing date. Almost all investments are operational at the end of the project, including the pumping and electrical installations and 6.3 kilometers of water mains. Eight water kiosks are to be attributed to managers to start operation. The project contributed to maintaining, rehabilitating and restoring water services to existing customers and expanding access in poor, flood-prone neighborhoods of the city. These services can be sustained by SODECA based on their present capacity.

3. Number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under the project. The result of 568,100 beneficiaries surpassed all targets in effect during the project (470,000, 420,000 and 310,254). Initial activities to rehabilitate roads were finalized before approval of the AF (but scaled down due to cost overruns). All roads were passable at the end of the project, including the 34.1 kilometers of

6 The total number of beneficiaries reported excludes double-counting of people benefiting more than once in areas of intervention of two or more sub-components.

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additional roads rehabilitated by labor-intensive methods following the 2014 restructuring for a total of 82.1 kilometers of roads rehabilitated. However, the quality of the first roads rehabilitated under the project is starting to deteriorate during the rainy season. The project contributed to maintaining and rehabilitating roads and restoring transport connectivity throughout the city.

4. Number of people in urban areas provided with access to regular solid waste collection under the project. The result of 183,600 beneficiaries fell short of the initial target (257,000) and the target set in the AF (390,000). The initial activities to remove waste from dump sites throughout the city started during 2008 and were finalized by 2009. Other activities (construction of transfer stations, delivery of collection equipment, regular collection) started during 2009. The collection efficacy at the end of the project is estimated at 43 percent of waste amounts generated, which is the level of service that the municipality can provide based on available funds, and above the initial target of 40 percent. During implementation, the project did achieve a collection of about 430 cubic meters per day, or 86 percent of the intermediate outcome target of 500 cubic meters, but this dropped to 322 cubic meters. It is expected that with the additional budget voted by the municipal council and ongoing support by donors the level of collection and the number of beneficiaries will substantially increase. The Kolongo landfill upgraded by the project is operational. The municipal SWM unit that the project helped establish is responsible for programming and implementing all SWM activities and has been instrumental in achieving these results; the work to fully implement the SWM strategy developed under the project will continue.

5. Establishment and operation of a solid waste management team. The indicator was dropped in the AF but was fully met. The team was established in the municipality in 2010, supported by Component B of the project, and contributes to the sustainability of services by coordinating and monitoring collection.

6. Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage). The result of 810,400 beneficiaries (of which 49.4 percent female) surpassed the target set in the AF (722,168). As for the other indicators, it can be considered that the pace of improvement of services was high in the initial phase of the project, but slower after the crisis due largely to exogenous factors and quicker again following the 2014 restructuring.

42. The table below summarizes the text above, and also considers the elements of rapidity and sustainability as secondary elements in the rating, as detailed below the table.

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Table 1: Calculation of weighed score of achievement of PDOIndicator Until approval of

the AF on September 28,

2010

Between AF approval and

restructuring on June 13, 2014

After 2014 restructuring and

until project closing on

September 30, 2016

Final target value

Final indicator

value

1 – Drainage Largely surpassed target 58,000

Largely surpassed target 70,000


70,000 168,400

2 – Water (additional beneficiaries)

Fell short of overly ambitious target 100,000

Surpassed target 38,800


34,300 39,300

3 – Roads Surpassed target 470,000



310,254 568,100

4 – SWM Achieved target 257,000 at 71%

Achieved target 390,000 at 47%

Achieved target 390,000 at 47%

390,000 183,600

5 – SWM team Achieved Achieved Achieved Yes Yes6 – Direct beneficiaries (of which female)

No target Surpassed target 722,168


722,168 (50%)

810,400 (49.4%)

Efficacy Rating Substantial Modest SubstantialPoint score(i) 3 2 3Disbursements SDR 11.6 million SDR 9.7 million SDR 6.0 million Weight 42.37% 35.48% 22.15%Weighed score 1.27 0.71 0.66Total score (1.27+0.71+0.66) = 2.65 – Substantial (score rounded to 3).(i) On a rating scale with Negligible 1, Modest 2, Substantial 3, and High 4.

43. The split evaluation is supported by the rapidity of implementation. There are no explicit indicators to measure the pace of implementation against and hence project disbursements are used as a proxy. Referencing sections G and I of the ICR Datasheet, the parent project was implemented with disbursements ahead of projections and project funds were largely disbursed by the time the AF was approved (supporting a rating of substantial). This also reflects the government’s high satisfaction with the parent project, which led to a request for additional financing. During the second period of the split evaluation disbursements were on track until the onset of the conflict, with a disbursement slowdown between November 2012 and June 2014 due to the conflict. Although all indicators were achieved apart from indicator 4 (SWM), the slower implementation supports a rating of modest. Following the 2014 restructuring, there was a slight delay in disbursements, but the project was closed with all infrastructures except one access road completed, the total number of beneficiaries was surpassed and only one indicator was not achieved, supporting a rating of substantial.

44. The substantial efficacy is further supported by the sustainability of infrastructure and services. Drainage infrastructure is largely self-cleaning, although some secondary drains are clogged by solid waste and vegetation. All water kiosks bar eight are operational and generate income to SODECA, contributing to the utility’s financial stability; the remaining water kiosks are in the process of being attributed to managers from the local neighborhood. SWM services can be maintained at the present level with the funds available to the Municipality of Bangui and

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future support from other donors will contribute to improving the equipment base and further improve service levels. The roads rehabilitated by the project are currently passable but would need regular maintenance to continue to be passable in all seasons. The project funded activities to support the sustainability of investments, e.g. through delivery of equipment for normal operation of services, training to SODECA, municipal and ministerial staff on maintenance and investment planning, operationalizing the Urban Infrastructure Maintenance Fund -which the municipality can use to fund maintenance- and on engaging communities in maintenance of infrastructure.

3.3 Efficiency

45. Efficiency is rated as modest. No ex ante economic analysis was carried out for the parent project or the AF, as allowed by emergency procedures. The overall economic reasoning in the PP remains valid, namely that the project contributed to progress in shared economic growth and improved access to urban services, thus diminishing resulting social stress and potential for reignited instability in turn leading to better economic outcomes for CAR (also see section 3.5(a) below). 46. A cost-benefit analysis was carried out for the ICR based on available data collected through a beneficiary satisfaction and results survey and combined with other available data. A discount rate of 8 percent was used for the analysis and investments analyzed over a time horizon ranging from 5 to 10 years, corresponding to the effective minimal lifespan in a likely maintenance regime. The results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Results of economic analysisInvestment Investment

cost (US$ million)

Economic rate of return (ERR)

Net present value (US$

million)

Robustness – benefits lower in 25

percent

Value switching – discount rate

for negative Net Present Value

(NPV)

Drainage 6.6 54% 1.7 ERR negative

NPV negative at US$1.9 million

54%

Water 16.3 19% 1.4 ERR 2%

NPV negative at US$0.7 million

19%

SWM 6.3 Not calculated Not calculated

Investment cost per beneficiary US$34.

Yearly operating cost US$0.42 per

beneficiary

Not calculated

Roads 4.5 42% 3.5 ERR 26%NPV US$1.8 million 43%

Institutional Strengthening 5.6 Not calculated Not calculated Not calculated Not calculated

Total 39.331.0 %

(weighted average)

6.6 NPV negative at US$0.8 million

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47. As shown in the table, the weighted average ERR of investments is 31.0 percent, with combined NPV of US$6.6 million. This analysis covers US$27.4 million of total investments of US$39.3 million, or 69.7 percent of investments. This is a substantial efficiency, but not robust to reductions in benefit streams by 25 percent; in this scenario the combined NPV becomes negative, at US$0.8 million. Given the quality of data material and necessary assumptions feeding the analysis (discussed in full in Annex 3), and combined with the project extensions necessary to complete activities following the crisis and the late commissioning of eight water kiosks, efficiency is rated modest.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

48. Split evaluation is carried out for the period before approval of the AF, between the AF approval and the 2014 restructuring, and after the 2014 restructuring. Table 3 below presents the split evaluation, which justifies an overall outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory.

Table 3: Split evaluation of outcomeIndicator Until approval of the AF

on September 28, 2010Between AF approval and restructuring on June 13,

2014

After 2014 restructuring and until project closing on September 30, 2016

Relevance Substantial Substantial SubstantialEfficacy Substantial Modest SubstantialEfficiency Modest Modest ModestOutcome Rating Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately SatisfactoryPoint score(i) 4 3 4Disbursements SDR 11.6 million SDR 9.7 million SDR 6.0 million Weight 42.37% 35.48% 22.15%Weighed score 1.69 1.06 0.89Total score (1.69+1.06+0.89) = 3.65 – Moderately Satisfactory (score rounded to 4)(i) On a rating scale with Highly Unsatisfactory 1, Unsatisfactory 2, Moderately Unsatisfactory 3, Moderately Satisfactory 4, Satisfactory 5, and Highly Satisfactory 6.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

49. Continuity of works investments during and immediately after the most critical moments of the crisis and the focus on labor-intensive public works were effective ways to stabilize critical neighborhoods, which security forces and even government agencies shied away from. The coordinated approach, common to the major donors, for the selection of beneficiaries of labor-intensive public works provided a platform and criteria to ensure equal treatment of various groups and mixing various religious groups in work crews with a view to reestablishing inter-communal relationships. The project generated over 510,000 person-days of employment. Those labor-intensive public works interventions and the social mobilization that accompanied them were fully supported and encouraged by the GoCAR as well as local authorities (mayor and arrondissement mayors), who saw the employment of youth as an emergency measure to de-

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escalate tensions, provide alternative sources of incomes for those populations, and a means to stabilize the city.7 The improvements in the security situation and stabilization of very polarized neighborhoods in Bangui can be attributed in part to donors’ decision to invest massively in labor-intensive public works to which the project made a contribution.

50. The project provided the intended beneficiaries in the poorest neighborhoods of Bangui with improved access to water. Based on experience elsewhere, this would have especially positively impacted women and girls, charged with fetching water; but the data to quantify any such benefits of the project are not available. The community consultations on the household water connections were successful and led to high acceptance of the methodology to select households, due to the presence of SODECA agents in the field. The awareness program related to drainage activities has worked well, implemented by an NGO, to increase the awareness of population living along the rehabilitated drains to reduce waste thrown in the drains, although the practice has not stopped altogether.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

51. The capacity of the Municipality of Bangui to plan and monitor SWM activities was improved by the project. This was also the case for SODECA, which was supported to strengthen communications, commercial and clientele management, planning, programming, and implementing the household social connection program.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

52. The pilots funded by the project to construct two flood-resistant houses with low construction cost (around CFAF 3 million for a three-bedroom house) showed good technical results and is being replicated by other partners.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

53. A beneficiary satisfaction and results survey was carried out after the closing of the project, mainly based on focus groups interviews. In some cases, investments were finalized several years ago, limiting the ability of respondents to recall the pre-project situation. Visual verification was carried out of the functionality of a selection of project investments.

54. The beneficiaries generally report positive impacts of the investments. Reduction in time to fetch water is reported by 69 percent of beneficiaries and 60 percent report a shorter distance. In the cases where beneficiaries do not report a change, or a negative change, this is attributed to the displacements following the 2013 crisis, leading to longer waiting times in the host areas. The tariffs, which are posted in the water kiosks, are reported as affordable by 71 percent of respondents, high by 23 percent and low by 6 percent. The level of satisfaction with the drainage infrastructure is high, at 95 percent. In the areas on higher ground, 86 percent of respondents have noted a reduction in frequency of flooding, while in low-lying areas 23 percent of respondents have noted a reduction in frequency of flooding. All the drainage infrastructure 7 An evaluation of labor-intensive public works carried out by the International Organization for Migration, covering the common approach used by donors, cites evidence from gendarmerie and community leaders confirming that providing employment opportunities to youth contributed to reducing delinquency.

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constructed by the project is still in good condition, no deformation or fissuring has been observed on the masonry walls. Some portions are clean and allow easy passage of the water. Others, on the other hand, begin to become clogged with waste and vegetation. Regarding SWM, 65 percent of respondents use the transfer stations to deposit their household waste, while 35 percent use other means. During the life of the project, 72 percent of households were satisfied with the regularity of collection from the transit station. Not all the constructed SWM infrastructure is operational due to reasons such as insecurity in the neighborhood or because they are not accepted by the population. The Kolongo landfill is operational, with perimeter fence and equipment in good condition. The beneficiaries report almost unanimously (98 percent) having saved time in the years following the rehabilitation of the roads. Presently, 90 percent still report time savings. The average time saving after the rehabilitation is reported as 35 minutes for a one-way trip to the city center. In terms of quality of the roads, 19 percent respond that they are in good condition, 52 find that the condition is average, while 29 report roads being in bad condition.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Substantial

55. The risk to development outcome is rated substantial. The project closed against a backdrop of gradual but uneven improvement in the security situation in the country and in Bangui. Recurrence of large-scale outbreaks of violence in Bangui is deemed unlikely, but if this were to happen, most project investments could be affected. The lack of history of maintenance and a constrained macro-economic context presents an overall risk, although various partners, including the Bank, are supporting the municipality to continue to improve services in SWM, drainage, and water (which the EUIRMP water kiosks contribute to, as they are income-generating). Risk to roads were reduced through inclusion of drainage, but improved maintenance would be required to fully support the continued flow of benefits from the rehabilitated roads in the longer term.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory

56. The Bank played a major role in facilitating preparation in a context of post-conflict transition. The preparation time of just over four months from the concept review to approval was highly compressed. In spite of the tight schedule the quality at entry was satisfactory and parts of the project were ready for implementation. The Bank brought expertise to the table to assure high relevance of the approach and sound technical design. The parts related to capacity building could, measured by regular project standards, have been developed more, but the project laid out the main capacity shortcomings to be addressed. Implementation arrangements were developed with due consideration to fiduciary aspects, making use of a well-performing private sector agent in the face of capacity constraints in the government apparatus, but with a well-

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designed approach to include relevant stakeholders in project implementation. Risk assessment and mitigation measures overall were adequate.

(b) Quality of Supervision


57. During implementation the Bank proactively identified implementation bottlenecks and developed solutions. The Bank also fulfilled its fiduciary role and assured that a case of ineligible expenditure was reimbursed by the government. During the mission suspension, reverse missions were carried out in Yaoundé to assure continuation of implementation support and the Bank proposed solutions to overcome the volatile security situation to assure continued progress towards service delivery objectives, among which measures were payment of an advance to AGETIP-CAF. Reporting in ISRs was candid and ratings for e.g. M&E were downgraded to the unsatisfactory range when justified, and solutions proposed. Shortcomings are noted during implementation, such as over two months taken to provide no objection during the initial project startup phase and a few instances later in the project. Also, the client expressed in its completion report that the number of Bank task team leaders, four in total, led to some level of discontinuity in the Bank’s implementation support, while still highlighting the professionalism of Bank staff. Supervision of safeguards was adequate and the Bank missions proposed solutions to identified problems, mainly through training and addition of additional physical mitigation measures such as protective railing along drains. The Bank consented to providing AF to the well-performing project, which was prepared in seven months, a very reasonable timeframe, and was flexible during implementation of the AF to assure that the project could demonstrate results at project closing.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


58. The rating of overall Bank performance is moderately satisfactory given the shortcomings noted above.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance


59. The inter-ministerial committee provided guidance during project preparation, but was less active during implementation and did not meet following the 2013 crisis, when a transitional government was in place. The government was open to try new ideas and implemented the Bank’s advice, to the extent this was within its means. Further, the government was flexible regarding implementation arrangements and implementation under very difficult circumstances. The Technical Secretariat set up under the Ministry of Urban Affairs played a positive role in coordination of investments, but was also responsible for the uneven performance in project M&E. Due to severe budget constraints, the government was not able to provide the counterpart

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funds for operation of the SWM system. More adequate government contributions to the Urban Infrastructure Maintenance Fund would have promoted sustainability of road and drainage investments.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


60. The implementing agency, AGETIP-CAF, generally assured good collaboration with stakeholders and assisted the Municipality of Bangui and SODECA in carrying out beneficiary consultations and developing technical specifications. The agency was instrumental in assuring rapid project implementation in the first years of implementation and it was one of the very few entities that continued to function during the crisis. This performance resulted in AGETIP-CAF becoming the implementing agency of other donor-supported projects. Throughout the project Bank fiduciary procedures were generally respected, with the exceptions noted in Section 2.4. The disbursement suspension in 2013 negatively impacted the agency’s ability to operate. Following the coup d’état, unclear responsibility for contract management also contributed to delays and partly explains why the access road along the Kokoro canal could not be completed. It should be noted that theft and destruction of part of the implementing agency’s equipment and materials, difficulties to pay staff timely due to the disbursement suspension, as well as power cut off, late arrival and early departure at the office for security reasons was not conducive to effective project management.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory.

61. With a rating of Moderately Satisfactory for government performance and Moderately Satisfactory for implementation agency performance, the overall borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

6. Lessons Learned

62. Flexible design and adaptive implementation in a fragile and conflict-affected environment can lead to satisfactory outcomes. The flexible reallocation of resources to feasible and impactful investments was made possible due to the multi-sector nature of the project and targeting of several neighborhoods within the same city, without increasing the level of project complexity inordinately. Using mainly labor-intensive construction techniques also meant that establishing and shifting work sites did not require moving around heavy construction equipment. This lesson is of wide application as the funds available under IDA-18 for projects in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence will substantially increase.

63. Using a performing contract management agency can contribute to mitigating capacity-constraints and achieve results. This should be coupled with flexibility on the Bank’s side to accommodate the needs arising from an evolving context and attention to rebuilding capacity following crisis situations. AGETIP-CAF was able to continue at a minimum operational level directly following the 2013 crisis due to the Bank’s flexibility to pay a management advance to

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AGETIP-CAF which would otherwise have come to a complete standstill during the suspension period. Special attention should be paid to restore pre-crisis levels of performance.

64. Incremental approaches to improving access to services and designing services to be financially sustainable and affordable, building on preexisting operational organization, can enhance the prospects of sustainability. As shown by the investments in water, SODECA is capable of maintaining investments and gradually improving the operation of services, in this case water kiosks. The Bank is supporting the government to prepare a water sector project, which will help address overall sector performance.

65. Intervening in SWM in a post-conflict situation can deliver immediate returns but is also a high risk proposition given the complex nature of sector organization and risks of popular discontent if the service breaks down. Absence of solutions to financing issues and considerations of user’s willingness to pay can lead to unrealistic targets for service levels. The Municipality of Bangui is making efforts to increase funding available for collection and landfilling, but beneficiary contributions or another source of funding dedicated to solid waste management could substantially contribute to increasing the available budget.

66. Simple tools and activities can be used to improve M&E in a fragile and conflict-affected environment. As shown by the light beneficiary satisfaction and results survey carried out after the closing of the project (a month of work by an individual consultant), useful information can be generated to verify or correct indicator values and to inform on the beneficiaries’ perception of project outputs. This type of process could feed into improved documentation of M&E methodology and calculation of indicator targets. This lesson applies to many countries in the Africa Region, as well as other countries suffering from M&E capacity constraints.

67. Designing outreach and communication activities in a conflict or post-conflict environment marked by low levels of social capital is an important element in assuring ownership by stakeholders. The community consultations on the household water connections were successful due to the presence of SODECA agents in the field, just as the awareness program related to drainage activities has worked well, implemented by an NGO.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

68. The draft ICR was shared with the client and responses were received from AGETIP-CAF, SODECA and the Municipality of Bangui. Apart from agreeing to the analysis in the ICR these entities provided updated information on the project, which has been incorporated in the final ICR to reflect the latest data.

(b) Cofinanciers69. There were no cofinanciers.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders 70. There were no other partners or stakeholders.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)Components Appraisal

Estimate (Parent Project)

Appraisal Estimate

(AF)

Total Estimate Parent

Project and AF

Disb.Parent Project

Disb. AF Total Disb. Percentage of

Appraisal

Component A 15.0 21.7 36.6 14.6 19.1 33.7 92.1%-A1 Water 4.2 3.4 7.6 4.2 2.4 6.6 86.8%-A2 Drainage 4.2 11.0 15.2 4.5 11.8 16.3 107.2%-A3 SWM 2.8 2.8 5.6 2.7 3.6 6.3 112.5%-A4 Roads 3.8 2.6 6.4 3.2 1.3 4.5 70.3%-Contingencies 0.0 1.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0%Component B 3.0 3.1 6.1 2.9 2.7 5.6 91.8%-Contingencies 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0%Total Project Costs 18.0 24.7 42.7 17.5 21.8 39.3 92.0%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

Additional Financing

Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of

Appraisal(US$ millions) (US$ millions) (US$ millions)

Borrower Parallel 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0%IDA Grant (IDA-H2910) 18.0 0.0 17.5 97.2%IDA Grant (IDA-H6110) 0.0 16.4 15.0 91.2%IDA Credit (IDA-48050) 0.0 7.5 6.8 91.2%Total 18.0 24.7 39.3 92.0%

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1. The following outputs were delivered by the project:

A1. Water supply:

Rehabilitation of 6.27 kilometers of the water network main lines. Separation of transport and distribution network by doubling pipes to R2 and R3

reservoirs. Construction of 10 water bore holes in neighborhoods not covered by the SODECA

network and installation 8 of micro-systems with pumps running on solar power and 3 water kiosks in each system and 2 bore holes equipped with manual pumps.

Construction of 29 water kiosks on the existing SODECA network. Rehabilitation and/or replacement of pumping equipment (power pumps and feed

pumps). Installation of chemical dosage pumps to improve the reliability of water production

facilities. Rehabilitation or replacement of defective electrical installations (old instrument

cabinets, etc.). Rehabilitation of the filters’ hydraulic partition system. Installation of 1,978 subsidized household water connections. Reestablishing the water main connecting the 6ème arrondissement to the network after

erosion caused a bridge to collapse.

A2. Drainage:

Rehabilitation of 7.66 kilometers of trunk drainage infrastructure. Cleaning of 21.77 kilometers of drainage. Developing and implementing a community-based flood preparedness and response

program. Construction of two flood-resistant homes as a pilot to demonstrate feasibility.

A3. Solid waste management:

Construction of 51 transfer stations. Provision of 62 containers. Provision of collection equipment. Upgrading of the existing uncontrolled landfill to adequate environmental standards. Installation of a weighbridge and control post on the landfill. Provision of materials for landfill management (charger, compactor, water storage) Funding secondary collection (from transfer stations to the landfill). Information, education, and communication activities.

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A4. Urban road rehabilitation:

Rehabilitation of 48.0 kilometers of the primary and secondary earth roads network in Bangui, and construction of 12.0 kilometers of drainage along rehabilitated roads.

Rehabilitation of 34.1 kilometers of roads by labor-intensive methods. Reinforcement works on the Sapéké bridge.

B. Institutional strengthening:

Training in fiduciary aspects, monitoring and evaluation, supervision of works and contracts, community participation techniques, etc.

Support to the Municipality of Bangui for improved regulation and maintenance of urban infrastructure services and strategic planning.

Management training for: (i) the Municipality of Bangui in the areas of SWM, drainage and urban roads; (ii) SODECA to better manage water systems in Bangui; and (iii) Ministry of Urban Affairs and Ministry of Water in strategic planning for project implementation.

Audit of the Urban Infrastructure Maintenance Fund and training of staff of the Ministry of Urban Affairs, Municipality of Bangui and AGETIP-CAF in the operation of the fund.

Provision of four vehicles, 14 motorcycles, ten computers, and standard office software, fiduciary and management software, and some tools for management (accounting, auditing and M&E systems).

Hiring of a procurement specialist (AGETIP-CAF), a communication specialist (SODECA), an urban specialist (Municipality of Bangui), and M&E specialist (Technical Secretariat).

Development of a solid waste management strategy for Bangui and Bimbo. Development of water supply master plan for Bangui. Development of detailed technical study of the bypass road of the city of Bangui.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. The objective of this annex is to assess the economic viability of the infrastructure investments carried out by the EUIRMP. As part of the economic assessment, this analysis estimates the ERRs and the NPVs of such investments in order to determine their economic acceptability. For each investment analyzed in the ICR a discount rate of 8 percent was used.8

Summary of Costs and Benefits

2. Costs: The project’s investments covered four different types of public works under Component A. This component represents 86 percent of the project’s total investment. It includes: the construction and expansion of the water network (US$6.6 million), drainage (US$16.3 million), solid waste management (US$6.3 million), and road rehabilitation (US$4.5 million). The analysis focused on those investments for which the direct benefits are both quantifiable and relevant for the purpose of this analysis. Subcomponents A1, A2, and A4 (70 percent of project cost) were subjected to cost-benefit analysis, while Subcomponent A3 (16 percent of project cost) was subjected to cost-effectiveness analysis. This task excludes investments in Component B (which covers capacity building and management cost). The benefits of these types of investment costs are usually unquantifiable and, hence, are not included in this analysis. These investments are equivalent to 14 percent of the project’s total cost.

3. Benefits: The project contributed to the improvement of the quality of life of approximatively 810,400 people. The most important beneficiary groups include 39,300 people getting access to water, 168,400 beneficiaries of drainage, 183,600 people benefiting from solid waste management, and 568,100 beneficiaries of road rehabilitation. The project also generated approximatively 511,500 person-days of temporary employment.

Water

4. Objective: The main objective of these investments was to contribute to the continued operation of SODECA and provide improved access to water for new beneficiaries. The component also reestablished previous network connection to 6ème arrondissement after the bridge supporting the water main collapsed.

5. Without Project Scenario: Without the project, it is likely that SODECA would have faced production problems, seriously affecting the availability of water for existing household customers. People living in areas not served by SODECA or where the mains passed but without any access to the residents would have continued to use water from vendors or improper water sources (surface water or from wells), with related health risk.

8 The discount rate is retained based on the World Bank Technical Note on Discounting Costs and Benefits in Economic Analysis of World Bank Projects (November 2015). The note recommends using a 5 percent discount rate in World Bank’s project evaluations, but also suggests that a higher value can be justified by the expectation that consumption per capita will be growing rapidly in the near future, for example, because a country or region is catching up after a specific shock (e.g., conflict, large-scale disasters, poor economic management), which is the case in CAR.

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6. With Project Scenario: The equipment installed in the SODECA production and pumping facilities contributed to maintaining access to water for the existing customers, and 55 new communal water points were installed (24 water kiosks connected to independent mini-networks with solar-powered pumps, 2 other stand-alone water kiosks and 29 water kiosks fed by the water mains). This has resulted in better and more stable access to water. Approximatively 39,300 persons benefited from access to safe drinking water due to project investments. Presently about 21 percent of the population of in project areas is connected to the SODECA network, while 43 percent use water kiosks as main source of water (data from the beneficiary satisfaction and results survey). The economic benefits have been evaluated for a 10-year period – though the effective life-time of the infrastructure will likely be substantially longer.

7. Economic Cost: The actual investment cost in financial terms has been estimated at US$6.6 million. The operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of the production and pumping equipment is considered as neutral and for the water points at 5 percent of the investment cost, yearly.

8. Socio-Economic Benefits: The main quantifiable and non-quantifiable socio-economic benefits are:

More regular access to water. Improved quality of life in the targeted areas, as a result of better living conditions. Reduced time to fetch water. Reduced cost to treat illness due to better access to water and better hygiene. Reduced morbidity and mortality. Reduced school absence due to time spent fetching water and better educational outcome. Increased economic activity made possible by time and cost savings on provision of

water. Employment generated from the management of water points.

9. Though these benefits have occurred, this economic analysis has focused on the net benefits directly related to the economic value of water to the users “with” the project. A beneficiary satisfaction and results survey was carried out to quantify the reduced time to fetch water, cost savings, and lessened health expenditures but the data material did not allow such a quantification. The selling price of water from a water vendor is used as proxy for the economic value of each additional liter of water. The estimated ERR may be considered a conservative indicator of the actual benefits.

10. Methodology: The calculation was based on the difference between production and consumption of water “without” and “with” the project. SODECA reports that each water kiosk sells on average 2,783 cubic meters of water per year, or a total of 130,792 cubic meters for all water kiosks in operation. The economic value is the set at price people pay for water from a vendor, FCFA 1,000. The benefits of household connections have been estimated based on 8 persons per household and daily consumption of 40 liters per person. The loss reduction in the SODECA system has been set at 5 percent due to system repairs, declining after 5 years.

11. Economic Rate of Return: The estimated ERR is 19 percent, corresponding to an NPV of US$1.4 million. A sensitivity analysis was performed in a scenario with lower benefits in 25

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percent, which makes these investments economically unviable, with ERR of 2 percent, below the opportunity cost of capital, at 8 percent. The NPV, in consistency with the above results, is negative, at US$0.7 million. Value switching shows that the discount rate would have to be above 19 percent to make the investment economically unjustifiable in the baseline scenario.

Drainage

12. Objective: The objective of these investments was to reduce the impact of recurrent flooding in the areas drained by the infrastructure.

13. Without Project Scenario: Without the project, the frequency and magnitude of flooding would remain unchanged.

14. With Project Scenario: The drainage contributed to reducing the frequency and magnitude of flooding for approximately 168,400 persons, reducing cost of repairs and time lost due to reconstruction. The economic benefits have been evaluated for a 10-year period.

15. Economic Cost: The actual investment cost in financial terms has been estimated at US$16.3 million. The O&M costs to clean and maintain drains is set at 2 percent of the investment cost, yearly.


Avoided flood damages to houses and goods. Property value appreciation. Increased business income. Improved quality of life in the targeted areas, as a result of better living conditions. Employment generation from flood protection works. Reduced cost to treat illness due to better environment (especially malaria). Reduced morbidity and mortality.

17. The economic analysis has focused on the net benefits directly related to the economic value of reduction in cost of repairs and property value appreciation. A beneficiary satisfaction and results survey was carried out to quantify the value of saved repairs and property value appreciation was estimated based on the cost of a low-cost house. The estimated ERR is subject to considerable uncertainty due to the lack of more reliable data but may be considered indicative of the actual benefits.

18. Methodology: The calculation was based on the difference between flooding “without” and “with” the project. The beneficiary satisfaction and results survey sets the damage at about US$202,000 per year in flood-affected areas, of which half is estimated to be avoided due to the project investments, and property value is estimated at FCFA 3 million per house. A 20 percent property value appreciation is factored into the analysis due to decrease in flooding.

19. Economic Rate of Return: The estimated ERR is 54 percent and the NPV is US$1.7 million. A sensitivity analysis was performed in a scenario with lower benefits in 25 percent, which makes the investment economically unviable, with negative ERR and negative NPV, at

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US$1.9 million. Value switching shows that the discount rate would have to be above 54 percent to make the investment economically unjustifiable in the baseline scenario.

Solid Waste Management

20. Objective: The objective of the investments was to improve the collection of solid waste in Bangui and Bimbo in terms of areas and population served and rate of collection.

21. Without Project Scenario: Without the project, solid waste would have continued to accumulate in the dumpsites throughout the city.

22. With Project Scenario: The investments in solid waste collection contributed to removing waste from dumpsites, increasing the area served by regular collection and also increasing the rate of collection from about approximatively 6 percent to approximatively 43 percent. The number of persons benefiting from regular solid waste collection substantially increased, to approximatively 183,600 persons.

23. Economic Cost: The actual investment cost in financial terms is US$6.3 million. The O&M costs to operate the collection system at the present level of service is US$76,600 according to the technical services of the Municipality of Bangui.


Improved environment. Improved quality of life in the targeted areas, as a result of better living conditions. Reduced cost to treat illness due to better environment (especially malaria). Reduced morbidity and mortality. Property value appreciation. Increased business income. Employment generation from collection activities.

25. Methodology: The economic analysis has focused on the net investments and operating cost per beneficiary.

26. Cost-effectiveness: With investments of US$6.3 million, annual operating cost of US$76,600 and 183,600 beneficiaries, the investment cost per beneficiary is US$34 and the annual operating cost is US$0.42. This is a reasonable investment cost, and a very low operating cost, also indicative of the level of service effectively provided.

Roads

27. Objective: The objective of the investments was to improve the access to all-season passable roads to the population of beneficiary neighborhoods of Bangui.

28. Without Project Scenario: Without the project, roads would have remained unpassable during at least part of the year due to stagnant water and the 6ème arrondissement would have remained cut off from direct access to the city center after the Bouagba bridge crumbled.

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29. With Project Scenario: The investments in road rehabilitation reduced transport time for residents in the neighborhoods served by the roads, benefiting approximately 568,100 persons living within 500 meters on either side of the rehabilitated roads. Some of these people also benefited from the 12 kilometers of roadside drains constructed to improve runoff of surface water. The economic benefits have been evaluated for a 5-year period, corresponding to the minimum effective life of rehabilitated roads, without maintenance.

30. Economic Cost: The actual investment cost is US$4.5 million. The O&M costs to maintain the roads have been set to zero, in line with the actual situation and estimated effective life span of the rehabilitated roads in the situation without maintenance.


Reduced transport cost. Improved access to services such as schools, health centers and markets. Improvement in the quality of life through improved overall physical living conditions. Increase in property value due to improved overall amenities. Improved health with reduction in waterborne disease and reduced medical costs. Employment generation from construction activities. Decreased production costs due to lower vehicle maintenance and transport costs

resulting from road improvements. Reduction in accidents. Increased business income.

32. The economic analysis has focused on the net benefits directly related to the reduction in transport cost. A beneficiary satisfaction and results survey was carried out to quantify the time savings. The estimated ERR is subject to some uncertainty due to the lack of fully reliable data but may be considered indicative of the actual benefits.

33. Methodology: The calculation was based on the difference in transport time between “without” and “with” the project. The beneficiary satisfaction and results survey sets the time savings at about 35 minutes per trip per beneficiary for road rehabilitation. This was converted to monetary terms by using the minimum wage of FCFA 2,500 per day in Bangui, and considering that one person per household is economically active and will use the roads twice weekly.

34. Economic Rate of Return: The estimated ERR is 42 percent, consistent with an NPV of US$3.5 million. A sensitivity analysis was performed for a scenario with lower benefits in 25 percent, and in this scenario road investments would still be economically viable, with ERR of 26 percent, above the opportunity cost of capital (8 percent). The NPV in this scenario is US$1.8 million. Value switching shows that the discount rate would have to be above 43 percent to make the investment economically unjustifiable in the baseline scenario.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending

Abdoul-Wahab Seini Senior Social Development Specialist GSU01

Africa Eshogba Olojoba Lead Environmental Specialist GEN05Agnes Albert-Loth Senior Finance Officer CTRLAAissata Z. Zerbo Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07 Armele Vilceus Senior Program Assistant LCC3CBarbara Weber Senior Operations Officer GTC07Ernestina Attafuah Senior Program Assistant GWA07 Evelyne Huguette Madozein Team Assistant AFMCF Helene Bertaud Lead Counsel LEGES

Kossi R. Eguida Economist AFTP3 - HIS

Kwabena Amankwah-Ayeh Senior Urban Specialist GSU19 TTLLydie Bodet Team Assistant AFMCF Mahine Diop Senior Municipal Engineer GSU19 Mark Zeydler-Zborowski Consultant GSU18 ImplementationMichael Ochieng Division Manager WFATF DisbursementOusseynou Guene Consultant AFTU2 SWMRenée Desclaux Senior Finance Officer CTRLAVentura Bengoechea Consultant GWA04 WaterZie Ibrahima Coulibaly Senior Infrastructure Specialist GSU19 Supervision/ICR

Abdoul-Wahab Seini Senior Social Development Specialist GSU01

Africa Eshogba Olojoba Lead Environmental Specialist GEN05 Agnes Albert-Loth Senior Finance Officer CTRLAAissata Z. Zerbo Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07 Aissatou Diallo Senior Finance Officer WFALNAlbert Francis Atangana Ze Consultant GEN07 Environment

Ana Paula Fialho Lopes Senior Social Development Specialist GSU19 TTL

Anthony Molle Senior Counsel LEGSGArmele Vilceus Senior Program Assistant LCC3C

Arsene Zia Koyangbo Consultant GSU19 Beneficiary Survey

Athanase Compaore Consultant GWA07 Water and sanitation

Babacar Dieng Consultant AFTUW Water supplyBarbara Weber Senior Operations Officer GTC07Beatrice Toubarot Mossane Team Assistant AFMCF Carine-Reine Mbedo Ngassia Team Assistant AFMCF

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Cheikh A.T. Sagna Senior Social Development Specialist GSU01

Christian Vang Eghoff Urban Specialist GSU19 ICR TTLEmeran Serge M. Menang Evouna Senior Environmental Specialist GEN07

Enagnon Eric Adda Senior Financial Management Specialist GGO31

Ernestina Attafuah Senior Program Assistant GWA07

Etienne Nkoa Senior Financial Management Specialist

AFTME - HIS

Evelyne Huguette Madozein Team Assistant AFMCF Gbetoho Joachim Boko Social Protection Specialist GSP07 Haoussia Tchaoussala Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07 Helene Bertaud Lead Counsel LEGESIain Menzies Senior Water & Sanitation Specialist GWA02 Irene Marguerite Nnomo Ayinda-Mah Team Assistant AFCC1

Jan Drozdz Senior Water & Sanitation Specialist GSU19

Kossi R. Eguida Economist AFTP3 - HIS

Lucienne M. M'Baipor Senior Social Development Specialist GSU01

Mahine Diop Senior Municipal Engineer GSU19 Mamadou Diedhiou Consultant GSU10 Social evaluationMaman-Sani Issa Regional Safeguards Adviser OPSPF

Maximilien Onga Nana Consultant AFRCE Urban development

Meike van Ginneken Practice Manager GWA06 Water and sanitation, TTL

Michael Ochieng Division Manager WFATF DisbursementMohamed El Hafedh Hendah Senior Procurement Specialist GGO07 Nadège Poulougou Team Assistant AFMCF

Nanan Palabé Consultant GGODR Financial management

Nestor Coffi Country Manager AFMBI Financial management

Ningayo Charles Donang Senior Procurement Specialist GGOGI Ousseynou Guene Consultant AFTU2 SWMPatrice Joachim Nirina Rakotoniaina Senior Municipal Engineer GSU19 TTL

Patrick Bongotha Consultant AFTFM Financial management

Peter J. Kolsky Senior Water & Sanitation Specialist LCSUW-HIS

Pierre Djocgoue Consultant AFTUW EnvironmentRacey Bingham Consultant AFTUW OperationsRenée Desclaux Senior Finance Officer CTRLA

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Stephane Raphael Dahan Senior Water & Sanitation Specialist GWASO Sung Heng Connie Kok Shun Senior Program Assistant GSU19 Tahirou Kalam Financial Management Specialist GGO26 Thierry Michel Rene Martin Consultant GSU19 SWMWolfgang Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRFCWolfhart Pohl Lead Environmental Specialist GEN2A Zie Ibrahima Coulibaly Senior Infrastructure Specialist GSU13

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks US$ Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

LendingFY07 41.8 244.6

Total: 41.8 244.6Supervision/ICR

FY08 50.5 254.3FY09 29.9 136.4FY10 16.6 102.8FY11 18.0 94.3FY12 28.7 95.5FY13 20.3 67.5FY14 8.0 15.2FY15 21.5 121.7FY16 27.6 142.5FY17 14.2 86.3

Total: 235.4 1,116.5

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

1. A beneficiary satisfaction and results survey was carried out after the closing of the project. This annex presents the methodology and the main findings of the assignment.

Methodology2. The survey was carried out through document review, focus group interviews, and interviews with representatives of key stakeholders (AGETIP-CAF, SODECA and the Municipality of Bangui). A total of 15 focus group interviews were carried out, with 12 participants in each focus group, based on predefined semi-structured interview questionnaires. Interviews were carried out in project areas as well as areas that have not benefited from the project. The results should be interpreted bearing in mind that in some cases investments were finalized several years prior to conducting the survey, limiting the ability of respondents to recall the pre-project situation. It should also be noted that the statistical basis is limited, so the results should be taken as general indication of trends. Visual verification was carried out of the functionality of a selection of project investments and the survey also served to reassessed the indicator values, to provide a more solid basis and methodological underpinning for the values reported in the ICR.9

Results 3. Water. In the areas served by SODECA water kiosks, the consumption of water by source is as follows: Water kiosk (43 percent), household connection (21 percent), wells (9 percent), other sources (27 percent). For cooking and washing, water from wells covers respectively 66 and 70 percent of needs. The water kiosks are functional but two of the surveyed kiosks are not operational due to absence of a manager in one case and payment arrears to SODECA in the other case. SODECA continues to be affected by technical difficulties, including water intake from the river during the dry season and the ageing network and losses in the network.

4. The beneficiaries generally report positive impacts of the investments. Reduction in time to fetch water is reported by 69 percent of beneficiaries and 60 percent report a shorter distance. In the cases where beneficiaries do not report a change, or a negative change, this is attributed to the displacements following the 2013 crisis, leading to longer waiting times in the host areas. Several of the respondents wish to have more water kiosks constructed.10 The tariffs, which are posted in the water kiosks, are reported as affordable by 71 percent of respondents, high by 23 percent and low by 6 percent. Among those reporting that tariffs are high, a reason offered is the long distance to the water kiosk, necessitating additional cost to transport water.

9 The indicator verification was reported separately from the results of the beneficiary survey and results are reflected in the ICR. 10 The report does not provide the specific number.

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5. Drainage. All the drainage infrastructure constructed by the project is still in good condition, no deformation or fissuring has been observed on the masonry walls. Some portions are clean and allow easy passage of the water. Others, on the other hand, begin to become clogged with waste and vegetation. The torrential nature of rains promotes soil erosion which leads to gradual clogging of drains. The general population’s habit of using the drainage to deposit household waste also contributes to diminishing their effectiveness.

6. The level of satisfaction with the drainage infrastructure is high, at 95 percent. Only 7 percent is satisfied with the number of infrastructures constructed and 13 percent are satisfied with the maintenance of main drainage canals. In the areas on higher ground, 86 percent of respondents have noted a reduction in frequency of flooding, while 14 percent report no change. The percentage reporting lesser impact of flooding is 90, while 10 percent report no change. In low-lying areas, 23 percent of respondents have noted a reduction in frequency of flooding, while 77 percent report no change. The percentage reporting lesser impact of flooding is 52, while 48 percent report no change. The study finds that the monetary value of the annual damages caused by flooding is about FCFA 119 million.

Solid waste management. The primary collection is carried out by micro-enterprises or NGOs responsible for collecting waste from households and transporting it to transit stations. This was a pilot activity, through the provision of small collection equipment to local associations in part of the project area. The pilot did not work well during the project for two main reasons: on one hand, the choice of micro-enterprises was made without considering their geographic base and area of intervention and, on the other hand, some households no longer wanted to pay for the household collection. As a result, the associations stopped collecting waste in some neighborhoods before the end of the project. The secondary collection was contracted to three companies paid by the project. An examination of the quantities collected from 2010 to 2016 showed that they have evolved irregularly with phases of increase and decrease; the lowest level is recorded in 2013 in full crisis and the largest amount in 2016. The Kolongo landfill is operational. The perimeter fence and equipment is in good condition. Not all the constructed infrastructure is operational due to reasons such as insecurity in the neighborhood or because they are not accepted by the population. The study sets the number of transfer points not in operation at 13.

7. According to the study, 65 percent of respondents use the transfer stations to deposit their household waste, while 35 percent use other means. The usage of transfer stations is higher in neighborhoods with functional primary collection. During the life of the project the population was largely satisfied. Overall, 72 percent of households were satisfied with the regularity of collection from the transit depot, 80 percent were satisfied with the cleanliness of the transit site and 64 percent with the location of the transit stations. Two reasons for dissatisfaction were advanced: distance to the transit station and closeness to schools or markets. All beneficiaries report being dissatisfied with the level of service after the project.

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8. Roads. Most of the roads constructed or rehabilitated by the project are still used by the population. Since completion of the works, they have not been maintained. Observations on the ground made it possible to divide them into two groups: one presenting slight degradation and the other more degraded where potholes and depressions have appeared and the lateritic layer has been eroded and water stagnates after heavy rains. Frequent passages of vehicles on these roads, which are not maintained periodically, will probably cause settlement which will further favor the creation of small closed depressions which may deepen or expand.

9. The beneficiaries report almost unanimously (98 percent) having saved time in the years following the rehabilitation of the roads. Presently, 90 percent still report time savings, although the study does not present the time passed since rehabilitation in the various areas surveyed. The average time saving after the rehabilitation is reported as 35 minutes for a one-way trip. In terms of quality of the road, 19 percent respond that they are in good condition, 52 find that the condition is average, while 29 report roads being in bad condition.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. No stakeholder workshop was held.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. The client’s ICR of 43 pages, in French, contains a short executive summary, which is presented below in the ICR team’s English translation.

Executive summary

2. At the closing on September 30, 2016, the Additional Financing of the Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project and the Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project have achieved satisfactory results.

3. The strong involvement of the various stakeholders in the implementation of the project (project management entities, local authorities, beneficiary populations) enabled AGETIP-CAF to achieve, in a generally satisfactory manner, the objectives assigned to the project.

4. The implementation of Components A and B for the improvement of urban infrastructure and capacity building have resulted in improved living conditions for the population of the city of Bangui.

5. SODECA, the Municipality of Bangui and the Urban Infrastructure Maintenance Fund are now expected to take on responsibility for the management and maintenance of this infrastructure to assure sustainability of the achievements of the project, in particular through: (i) continuing the management of the water kiosks; (ii) continued collection of household waste; (iii) maintenance of drainage canals; and (iv) road maintenance.

6. In relation to water supply, drainage maintenance, solid waste collection and road maintenance it is recommended that the government: (i) extend the geographical coverage of the SODECA water network; (ii) privatize secondary garbage collection; (iii) pursue the search for funds for studies for a new site for the landfill; (iv) maintain primary drainage canals; and (v) maintain the road network. Detailed analysis and recommendations are developed in the remainder of this report.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

1. There were no other cofinanciers or partners.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. The following documents are in the project file:

Project Paper (May 2007) Financing Agreement (June 2007) Environmental and Social Management Framework (December 2007) Resettlement Policy Framework (December 2007) Emergency Project Paper – Additional Financing (September 2010) Financing Agreement – Additional Financing (October 2010) Restructuring Paper (March 2011) Restructuring Paper (August 2011) Restructuring Paper (May 2014) Restructuring Paper (January 2016) Project aide-memoires (2007-2016) Implementation Status and Results Reports (2007-2016) Government ICR (January 2017) Beneficiary Satisfaction and Results Survey (April 2017)

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