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  • CEEPA Discussion Paper Series ISBN 0-9584508-1-1

    Discussion Paper ISBN 0-9584508-2-X March 2002




    Trevor Hutton Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

    and U.R. Sumaila

    Chr. Michelsen Institute, Fantoft, Bergen, Norway

    University of Pretoria

    No 1, 2002


    This study was carried under a research grant from The Resource Accounting Network for Eastern and Southern Africa (RANESA). RANESA is a non-profit network that aims to support capacity building and awareness in environmental economics and policy in Africa through research, training, networking and public education and awareness activities. The network is funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and coordinated jointly by CEEPA at the University of Pretoria and the Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics in Stockholm. For more information about RANESA visit the networks website at:

  • No 1, 2002


    Table of Contents Summary.. iii List of Tables.. iv List of Figures ... vi Acknowledgements.... vi 1. INTRODUCTION...... 1 1.1 Natural resource accounting and South African

    fisheries...... 1 1.2 Aim of Study.. 4 2. BACKGROUND: THE MANAGEMENT OF CAPE HAKES 5 2.1 Management of the fishery... 6 2.1 The long-line versus trawl debate ... 8 3. METHODS.. 11 3.1 Age-structured models and yield simulation .. 11 3.1a Life-history data utilized.. 13 3.1b Estimation of parameters.. 14 3.1c The regression approach.. 19 3.2 The bio-economic model. 20 3.2a Calculating the NPV... 20 3.2b A brief review of the literature. 21 3.2c Economic data utilized. 22

    4. PREDICTING GAME THEORETIC OUTCOMES 29 4.1 Using non-cooperative game theory.. 29 5. RESULTS. 32 5.1 Physical flow accounts: the biological model results 32 5.2 Bio-economic simulations of the west coast hake stock 36 6. DISCUSSION... 39 6.1 Trawling versus longlining... 39 6.2 Non-cooperative versus cooperative management 40 7. REFERENCES. 42

    No 1, 2002



    The cooperative versus non-cooperative management of the South African west

    coast hake stock is explored using game theoretic modelling in conjunction with an

    age-structured model. The age-structured model is used to produce a physical flow

    account for input into national resource accounts. Between 1989 and 1998, the

    average catch of hake on the west coast was 92000 tons, most of which was

    harvested by the demersal trawl sector. The physical flow account indicates that the

    conservative re-building management strategy pursued for the fishery over the

    same time period mentioned above, has resulted in a 29% increase in the demersal

    trawl catch over the last decade.

    We simulated the effects of alternative quota restrictions on two fishing

    sectors (the established demersal trawl fleet and the new longline sector) that

    compete for the rights to fish the stock. The results from the bio-economic analysis

    (which forms a basis for a monetary flow account as we calculate the Net Present

    Value of the stock) indicate that the greatest rent can be obtained by allocating a

    share of the total allowable catch (TAC) to longliners. This share that achieves the

    greatest benefits approximates the current TAC allocations to each sector under the

    present conservative management policy implemented by the management

    authority, assuming one takes into account the uncertainties inherit in a

    computational exercise like ours. This outcome implies that the current management

    initiatives by the government are such that they meet the objectives of the new

    Marine Living Resources Act. That is, the need to achieve optimal utilisation of

    resources is being adequately implemented.

    The results of the game theoretic analysis provide an indication of why the

    current introduction of longlining may affect the government-industry cooperative

    management arrangements. A difference of R50 million will accrue to longliners

  • No 1, 2002


    over the next thirty years if they engage in non-cooperative rather than cooperative

    strategies. The latter occurs under the assumption that the trawl sector reduces

    effort under a cooperative strategy. The results indicate that management policies,

    which ignore economic realities, could fail. However, a cooperative strategy is still a

    viable option for the trawl sector, because a difference of R1357 million can be

    obtained over the same time period if the trawl sector engages in cooperative


    These results are based on the assumption that benefits accrue to the quota holders

    under security of tenure allowing them to consider the long-term sustainability of

    the resource. Some form of security of tenure is still uncertain under the

    governments re-structuring program, although a number of new policies are now in

    place to help implement longer term rights. These policy initiatives should create a

    positive environment for all the stakeholders such that they can consider the long-

    term sustainable utilisation of the resource. Otherwise, rent will be forgone if the

    rules governing participation (i.e., rights) and the allocation of benefits for shared

    stocks are not well defined and constrained.

    No 1, 2002



    Table 1 The catches and economic value of the commercial fisheries in

    1994 ... 2

    Table 2 Estimates for MSY, BMSY and B(1997)/K and K (the pre-exploited

    biomass) . . 33

    Table 3 The physical flow account (all values in 000 tons) for the west

    coast Cape hake stocks over a ten year period (1989-

    1998)........ 35

  • No 1, 2002



    Figure 1 The distribution of Merluccius capensis and M. paradoxus off the coast

    of South Africa and Namibia. .... 6

    Figure 2 The total catch from 1917 to 1997 in ICSEAF division 1.6 . 7

    Figure 3 The hake CPUE from 1955 to 1997 in ICSEAF division 1.6 .... 10

    Figure 4 Selectivity versus age relationship for the trawl .... 16

    Figure 5 A typical fit of the Beverton-Holt stock recruitment relationship to the

    observed data .. 19

    Figure 6 The relationship between unit cost and production (tonnes landed) for a

    fishing firm harvesting hake with longliners in 1999 .. 24

    Figure 7 The relationship between cost and trawl fishing effort based on the

    assumption that it costs on average R30000 for a std boat day of trawl

    fishing effort in 2000 .25

    Figure 8 The relationship between total cost and fishing effort for the trawl

    Fleet . 28

    Figure 9 The theoretical outcomes of a two player model. . 31

    Figure 10 The fitted age-structured model predicted catch-per-unit effort to the

    CPUE data . 32

    Figure 11 The sustainable yield versus fishing mortality for the trawl fleet under the

    current effort levels being exerted by the longline fleet. ... 34

    Figure 12 The relationship between total benefit (NPV - Rands millions), and benefit

    to the trawl sector and longline sector and the proportion of the quota

    allocated to the longline sector ... 37

    Figure 13 Benefits to the trawl sector and longline sector under different scenarios

    of non-cooperative and cooperative strategies for the West Coast Deep-

    Sea Hake fishery .... 38

    No 1, 2002



    Prof Rashid Hassan, Prof A Leiman and Dr G-M Lange are all acknowledged for

    their support and valuable advice. Dr Rob Tilney and Dr Rob Leslie (Marine and

    Coastal Management, Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism) are both

    acknowledged for providing data on the Cape hake resource. The Resource

    Accounting Network for Eastern and Southern Africa (RANESA), the Swedish

    International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Beijer Institute (Sweden) are all

    gratefully acknowledged for providing funding for this project.

  • No 1, 2002



    1.1 Natural resource accounting and South African fisheries

    The new Marine Living Resources Act (1998) has sustainable fisheries management as its

    first objective. Policy reforms are also underway to re-structure the industry in order to

    address the inequities of the past. The Act focuses on maximum utilization of marine

    resources for the benefit of all South Africans while also increasing foreign earnings. The

    development costs of this policy still have to be assessed along with both economic and

    social benefits. The construction of a set of Natural Resource Accounts (NRA) would

    represent a necessary step towards assessing whether the current resource utilization is

    sustainable under the new policy initiatives in South Africa.

    South Africas coastline is over 3 000km long and the nation has an Exclusive Economic

    Zone (EEZ) of approximately 1 million km2 which contains a variety of fish species. The

    fishing industry is complex in terms of fishing sectors, processing capability, markets,

    capital investment, equipment and infrastructure. South Africa is a medium-sized fishing

    nation on global standards, l