CD 11 Republic vs Dela Rosa

7/27/2019 CD 11 Republic vs Dela Rosa

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104654. June 6, 1994.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA

ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28,MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

FACTS:Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of theirestates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, andgrandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the defacto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgadoby one LucioCampo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. FelisaDelgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-bloodsiblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo wasnot the first and only man in Felisa Delgado. Before him was Ramon Osorio withwhom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgadobut whether a marriageinfact took place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumptionthat a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took intotheir home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. Thesechildren, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the localdialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, GuillermoRustia did managet o father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondentGuillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

ISSUES:1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?


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2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado caninherit by right of representation?3. Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?

RULING:

1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa DelgadoIt was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.Hence, all the Children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with RamonOsorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario,Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamedDelgado, were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were allillegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled

to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces,grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the newCivil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only infavor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently,it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the onlycollateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestateestate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at thetime of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participatein the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial

court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children)of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, theyare entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of thenew Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with thewidow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance andthe brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo RustiaGuillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may beentitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition ofpaternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together withGuillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceasedspouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shallsucceed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs ofGuillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, niecesand nephews. Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit halfof the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a)


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the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the childrenof any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her,also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews andgrandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered todetermine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to

share in her estate. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share ofJosefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damianand Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and thechildren of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whoserespective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective sharesshall pertain to their estates.

SYLLABUS

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW; PROCEDURAL

REQUIREMENTS, JURISDICTIONAL; CASE AT BAR. Private respondent,having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under theRevised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed bythe said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select therequirement which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case anddiscard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipinocitizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a specialprocedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizensakin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship byreason of her marriage to an alien. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to

hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedingsconducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, arenull and void or failure to comply with the publication and posting requirementsunder the Revised Naturalization Law. Under Section 9 of the said law, both thepetition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be publishedonce a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and anewspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bov. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of thepetition and the order must be in its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction(Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]). The petition for naturalization lacksseveral allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised NaturalizationLaw, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that heresided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able tospeak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he willreside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petitionuntil his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declarationof intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. Theabsence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205SCRA 400 [1992]). Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at


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least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of privaterespondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Privaterespondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petitionas required by Section 7 of the said law. The proceedings of the trial court wasmarred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set

ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the orderadvancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heardwithin six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner wasallowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4)petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waitingperiod. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines andtherefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of theProvince of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDERthe same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decisionbecomes final and executory.

2.ID.; ID.; DECISION THEREON BECOMES FINAL ONLY AFTER THIRTY (30)DAYS FROM PROMULGATION. A decision in a petition for naturalizationbecomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as theSolicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receiptof the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA195 [1974]).

3.ID.; ID.; DECISION GRANTING NATURALIZATION SHALL BE EXECUTORYAFTER TWO (2) FROM PROMULGATION; REASON. Section 1 of R.A. No.530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedingsshall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able

to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant hasdedicated himself continously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicanthas not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgatedrules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest ofthe country or contrary to government announced policies.

4.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; QUO WARRANTO; PETITIONNOT COVERED BY THE TEN (10) DAY PERIOD FOR APPEAL PRESCRIBEDIN SECTION 253 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. In Frivaldo v.Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quowarranto, questioning the respondent's title and seeking to prevent him fromholding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period forappeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.

5.POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; QUALIFICATIONS THEREON ARECONTINUING REQUIREMENTS. We explained that "qualifications for publicoffice are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time ofappointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire


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tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonablychallenged."

6.ID.; ID.; ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS CAN RUN AND BE ELECTED THERETO. Petitioner's argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate,

is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require thatonly Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmisethat the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of themistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

7.ID.; ELECTIONS; WHERE THE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THEHIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS DISQUALIFIED, THE CANDIDATE WHOGARNERED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS NOT ENTITLEDTO BE DECLARED WINNER. Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that thevotes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that he, beingthe candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner.

In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC , 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where thecandidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to bedisqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate whogarnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declaredwinner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v.Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

D E C I S I O N

QUIASON, J p:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Courtdeclared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualifiedfrom serving as Governor of the Province of the Sorsogon.

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in these petitionsdocketed as G.R. No. 104654, G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. Thepetitions were consolidated since they principally involved the same issues andparties. LibLex

I

G.R. No. 104654

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inrelation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by theRepublic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 ofthe Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization


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Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath ofallegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "Inthe Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the

Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearingon March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition inthe Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutiveweeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the saiddate of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and thepetition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RegionalTrial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24- 26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of

Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacywas March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearingset on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The Motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein thehearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was notpublished nor a copy thereof posted. cdrep

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the solewitness. He submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of

Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of ThePhilippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued by theNational Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1");(4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club with privaterespondent's picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issuedby the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy of a Plaque of

Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7)Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association(Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and ArchivesOffice that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and(9) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh."H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailedDecision, disposing as follows:


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"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, therebyvesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen"(Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiancebefore respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion forReconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that theproceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial toconform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor Generalinterposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. 105715

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of theRevised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitutionwith prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the enbanc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed asSPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the proclamation ofprivate respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon.

Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino(LDP) for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-NationalUnion of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.

Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul theproclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province ofSorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of theProvincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that privaterespondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questionedby the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a dulyregistered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes cast in favor of privaterespondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of theremaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner. llcd

On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution whichdismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A.


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No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board ofcanvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was threedays.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of

discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent'sdisqualification in the guise of technicality.

Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent's name in the list ofregistered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the timehe registered as a voter in 1987, he was an American citizen.

Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondentis not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us.

Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent's proclamation as

Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondent'sname from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamationof the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of thevotes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order toenjoin private respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) theissuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pendingdisqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against privaterespondent. LLphil

G.R. No. 105735

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court inrelation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer fortemporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the parties inG.R. No. 105715.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC's immediate resolution of SPACase No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondent'scertificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, theintervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an Americancitizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor ofthe Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court's decision re-admitting privaterespondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it nulland void; (3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondent's oath ofallegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned decision waspromulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-yearwaiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and


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(4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than fourmonths from the date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petitionprayed for the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy andthe deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena,Sorsogon.

In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied theallegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidatefor the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing tofile the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship waspresumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name asa registered voter. LLjur

Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondent'scertificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37).

On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition forcancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides thatall petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacymust be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of

Alonto v. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that allpre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo, p. 50).

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired hisFilipino citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet finaland executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualificationof a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a pre-proclamation

controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed outof time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much ofits time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It arguesthat under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it isexcused from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by lawfor reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action wassubsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quowarranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings soughtprivate respondent's disqualification because of his American citizenship. LLjur

II

G.R. No. 104654

We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent's citizenship.


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In his comment to the State's appeal of the decision granting him Philippinecitizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the precariouspolitical atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seekpolitical asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippinecitizenship.

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for hisreacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippinecitizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he waslater informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters orFilipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage toforeigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a billallowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize,notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House ofRepresentatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers ofhis political rivals.

He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlierdate, without publication, was made without objection from the Office of theSolicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the courtwas jampacked. LLphil

It is private respondent's posture that there was substantial compliance with thelaw and that the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due tothe publicity given by the media.

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of

the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the lawimposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate thebackground of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship ifthere is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that suchrequirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public,was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighterand a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines ismeritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full ofprocedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly. LLphil

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thrunaturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow theprocedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide forhimself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, areapplicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or


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merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicantwho was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It doesnot provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship byformer Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost herPhilippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization ofprivate respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and theoath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with thepublication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the ordersetting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeksin the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliancetherewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its

full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is ofgood moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for atleast ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of theprincipal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from thedate of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and(5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing,the justification therefor.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205SCRA 400 [1992]).

Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two crediblepersons who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent asrequired by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent alsofailed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required bySection 7 of the said law. LLphil

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1)the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing,without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petitionitself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of thepetition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finalityof the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observingthe two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from itspromulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is


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counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Courtof First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship innaturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its

promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left thecountry; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continously to a lawful calling orprofession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation ofgovernment promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any actprejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announcedpolicies. prcd

Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implementany decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.

G.R. No. 105715

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet aFilipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating itas a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petitionassails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondent's proclamation onthree grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board ofCanvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is analien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R.No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. TheCOMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the

three-day period for questioning the proceedings and composition of theProvincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. prcd

The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification ofprivate respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipinocitizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v.Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quowarranto, questioning the respondent's title and seeking to prevent him fromholding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period forappeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore,we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements andmust be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumptionof office but during the officer's entire tenure; once any of the requiredqualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."

Petitioner's argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, isuntenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require thatonly Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise


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that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of themistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of privaterespondent be considered stray and that he, being the candidate obtaining the

second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC ,176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highestnumber of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which hewas elected, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes isnot entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435[1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]). prLL

G.R. No. 105735

In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find thepetition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are bothGRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Privaterespondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and thereforeDISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province ofSorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same tothe Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes finaland executory. No pronouncement as to costs. cdll

SO ORDERED.

Documents

CD 11 Republic vs Dela Rosa