G.R. No. 89609 January 27, 1992

G.R. No. 89609 January 27, 1992NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP,petitioner,vs.HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations; and the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW)-FGT-KMU,respondents.Zoilo V. De la Cruz, Jr., Beethoven R. Buenaventura and Pedro E. Jimenez for petitioner.Manlapao, Drilon, Ymballa and Chavez for private respondent.MEDIALDEA,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariseeking the nullification of the resolution issued by the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations Pura Ferrer-Calleja dated June 26, 1989 setting aside the order of the Med-Arbiter dated February 8, 1989 denying the motion to dismiss the petition and directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank and file employees or workers of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co. situated at Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. Respondent Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja is impleaded in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment, while private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three hundred (300) on off-milling season.On November 14, 1984, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term of three (3) years, which was to expire on November 14, 1987.When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years with reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment.However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and convened, with a representative of the Department of Labor and Employment, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.On December 5, 1988, petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct certification or certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon.On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds, to wit:IThe Petition was filed out of time;IIThere is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation between forced intervenor and respondent-central. (Rollo, p. 25)On February 6, 1989, Dacongcogon filed an answer praying that the petition be dismissed.By an order dated February 8, 1989, the Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and directed the conduct of certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss the present petition is, as it is hereby DENIED. Let therefore a certification election among the rank and file employees/workers of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., situated at Kabankalan, Neg. Occ., be conducted with the following choices:(1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP);(2) National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW);(3) No Union.The designated Representation Officer is hereby directed to call the parties for a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of the election and to conduct and supervise the same within twenty (20) days from receipt by the parties of this Order. The latest payroll shall be used to determine the list of qualified voters.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 34)On February 9, 1989, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal alleging that the Honorable Med-Arbiter misapprehended the facts and the law applicable amounting to gross incompetence. Hence, private respondent prayed that the order of the Med-Arbiter be set aside and the motion to dismiss be reconsidered.On February 27, 1989, petitioner filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the motion for reconsideration and/or appeal be denied for lack of merit.On June 26, 1989, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered a resolution reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter, to wit:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 8 February 1989 is hereby set aside and vacated, and a new one issued dismissing the above-entitled petition for being filed out of time.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46)Hence, this petition raising four (4) issues, to wit:I. RESPONDENT HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING HER RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 REVERSING THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1989 OF MED-ARBITER FELIZARDO SERAPIO.II. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT PURA FERRER-CALLEJA IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.III. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA DENIES THE RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE DACONGCOGON SUGAR & RICE MILLING COMPANY, AND THE HEREIN PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP, THEIR LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.IV. THAT RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN RENDERING HER SAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 WAS BIASED AGAINST PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP. (Rollo,p. 2)The controversy boils down to the sole issue of whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period.Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Calleja committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in rendering the resolution dated June 26, 1989 setting aside, vacating and reversing the order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Serapio, in the following manner:1) by setting aside and vacating the aforesaid Order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Felizardo Serapio and in effect dismissing the Petition for Direct or Certification Election of Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP (Annex "A" hereof) without strong valid, legal and factual basis;2) by giving a very strict and limited interpretation of the provisions of Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, as amended, knowing, as she does, that the Labor Code, being a social legislation, should be liberally interpreted to afford the workers the opportunity to exercise their legitimate legal and constitutional rights to self-organization and to free collective bargaining;3) by issuing her questioned Resolution of June 26, 1989 knowing fully well that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715 on 21 March 1989 she had no longer any appellate powers over decisions of Med-Arbiters in cases of representation issues or certification elections;4) by ignoring intentionally the applicable ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case ofKapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-FOITAF vs.Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977;5) by clearly failing to appreciate the significance (sic) of the fact that for more than four (4) years there has been no certification election involving the rank and file workers of the Company; and,6) by frustrating the legitimate desire and will of the workers of the Company to determine their sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative through secret balloting. (Rollo, pp. 9-10)However, the public respondent through the Solicitor General stresses that the petition for certification election was filed out of time. The records of the CBA at the Collective Agreements Division (CAD) of the Bureau of Labor Relations show that the CBA between Dacongcogon and private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU had expired on November 14, 1987, hence, the petition for certification election was filed too late, that is, a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.The public respondent maintains that Section 6 of the Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 111 commands that the petition for certification election must be filed within the last sixty (60) days of the CBA and further reiterates and warns that any petition filed outside the 60-day freedom period "shall be dismissed outright." Moreover, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code enjoins the filing of a representation question, if before a petition for certification election is filed, a bargaining deadlock to which the bargaining agent is a party is submitted for conciliation or arbitration.Finally, the public respondent emphasizes that respondent Director has jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration interposed by respondent union from the order of the Med-Arbiter directing a certification election. Public respondent contends that Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6715 is not applicable, "(f)irstly, there is as yet no rule or regulation established by the Secretary for the conduct of elections among the rank and file of employer Dacongcogon; (s)econdly, even the mechanics of the election which had to be first laid out, as directed in the Order dated February 8, 1989 of the Med-Arbiter, was aborted by the appeal therefrom interposed by respondent union; and (t)hirdly, petitioner is estopped to question the jurisdiction of respondent Director after it filed its opposition to respondent union's Motion for Reconsideration (Annex'F,' Petition) and without, as will be seen, in any way assailing such jurisdiction. . . ." (Rollo, p.66)We find the petition devoid of merit.A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that:Sec. 6. Procedure . . .In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election.xxx xxx xxxThe clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement i.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Estrella, G.R. No. 45323, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 378, 382) It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule as embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is applicable.This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. (Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 77539, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 49, 57 citing Associated Trade Unions (ATU v. Trajano, G.R. No. L-75321, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA 318, 322-323)Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need only to stress what was held in the case ofLopez Sugar Corporation v.Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association(G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 179, 191) quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall be the duty of both parties to keep thestatusquoand to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its answer stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that the deadlock was submitted to the Labor Management Council.All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the resolution of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby AFFIRMED.G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP),petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY. ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS UNION (APCWU), Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and PORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal Private Respondents,respondents.CRUZ,J.:There was muffled excitement among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) because its collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as follows:In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement and supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions.1PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP's appeal.2Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, which was concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit,i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent in the application of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter shouldautomaticallyorder election by secret ballot when the petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with the law when they submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing the petition. The petitioner complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own petition for intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI employees.Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and unappealable.ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v. Inciong:3We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor General, while the petition of TUPAS for a certification election may have the written support of 30 per cent of all the workers of the bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS) has a clear majority of the said workers, as shown by the fact that 499 workers out of the total working force of 641 have not only ratified the collective bargaining agreement concluded between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI so thatthere is no more need for holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures in its petition, and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA or PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an affirmation of their membership in the union that negotiated that agreement.In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating as follows:Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings and finds for the petitioner.We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and collective bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this Court" has been "to require a certification election as the best means of ascertaining which labor organization should be the collective bargaining representative."4The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working.5As we stressed inBelyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja,6the holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.This Court also held inWestern Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs. Trajano:7. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30% requirement. (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984])In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election,8subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.This interpretation is consonant withPhilippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,9where we declared:. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly complied with, respondent Director is still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which (of the contending labor organizations) shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative. (National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. We so held inPAFLU v. Ferrer-Callejathus:10It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only and not to motions for intervention. . . . As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to participate in the Certification Election. After all, the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the principal petitioners which had not appealed the dismissal order is also not acceptable. We repeat that the certification election is not litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character where the rules of procedure are not strictly applied.11Technical rules and objections should not hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of confidence of the majority of the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with management.The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for the holding of the election although it was initially only an intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that the other petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in fact being reversed here. The petition for intervention wasviableat the time it was filed because the principal petitions had complied with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its intervention should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be deemed automatically dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of the workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization and collective bargaining.Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the Court has modified that decision inAssociated Labor Unions vs. Calleja,12where we held:Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Director on the ground that "the ratification of the collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election moot and academic."This contention finds no basis in law.The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the holding of certification elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the holding of a certification election.Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative.13Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we stated inPhilippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella,14any stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real representative.The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic and conclusively barring the holding of a certification election thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the mere ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. The second requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record does not show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the representation case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement orduring the pendency of the representation case.As the new CBA was entered into at the time when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on certification election is final and inappealable, this Court held inSan Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor15that:It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercisingquasi-judicialor legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. (73, C.J.S. 506, note 56). . . . judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion. error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v. Secretary of Public Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of majority representation thus remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding of a certification election.It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification election, in which event the new CBA it concluded with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union will be chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its own negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption of a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of the workers with the management. For this reason, the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall remain effective between the parties, subject to the result and effects of the certification election to be called.The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the crucial question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a collective bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there be no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous management and a union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval and support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over substantial justice.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold certification election among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.G.R. No. 96635 August 6, 1992ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; HON. TOMAS F. FALCONITIN MED-ARBITER, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPT. OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA AG & P-SMSG-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (LAKAS-NFL),respondents.Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for petitioners.Jose C. Espinas for private respondent.NOCON,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to annul and set aside the Order dated December 11, 1990 of the Department of Labor and Employment affirming its Resolution dated November 22, 1990 and the Order of the Med-Arbiter in ordering that a certification election among the regular project employees of the herein petitioner Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. at its Steel and Marine Structures Group (AG&P-SMSG) be conducted immediately.The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:Petitioner Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. is engaged in the construction and fabrication business and conducts its construction business in different construction sites here and abroad while its fabrication operations are conducted by its Steel and Marine Structures Group at its Batangas Marine and Fabrication Yard ("BMFY," for brevity) in Bauan, Batangas where the steel structures and other heavy marine works are fabricated.In the exercise of its management prerogative, petitioner has adopted the practice of hiring project employees when existing fabrication capacity cannot absorb increases in job orders for steel structures and other heavy construction works. Said project employees are covered by the Project Worker/Reliever Employment Agreements which indicate the specific projects to which they are assigned and the duration of their employment. Upon the expiration of their contracts/agreements, the employment of these employees is automatically terminated unless the projects to which they are assigned have not yet been completed, in which case, they are rehired for the remainder of the project. The positions occupied by the regular rank-and-file employees and the project employees are basically similar in nature and are directly related to the main line of petitioner's business.On June 8, 1990, petitioner executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the AG&P United Rank & File Association ("URFA," for brevity) which is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.1Said Collective Bargaining Agreement was subsequently registered on July 9, 1990 with the Bureau of Labor Relations and Certificate of Registration No. BLR-90-0131 was issued.On June 29, 1990, private respondent Lakas ng Manggagawa sa AG&P-SMSG-National Federation of Labor ("LAKAS-NFL," for brevity) filed a Petition for Certification Election with the Med-Arbitration Unit to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the regular non-project employees of the Steel and Marine Structure at the BMFY representing approximately 1,000 employees or that a certification be conducted among said employees.2On September 25, 1990, public respondent Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that certification election among the regular "Project Workers"/employees of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. at its Steel and Marine Structures Group (AG&P-SMSG) be conducted immediately. The Representation Officer is hereby directed to conduct the usual pre-election conference in connection thereof with the following choices to consider:1 Lakas Ng Manggagawa Sa AG&P-SMSG National Federation of Labor (LAKAS-NFL); and2 No Union.SO ORDERED.3On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed an appeal with the Department of Labor and Employment.4On October 26, 1990, 691 alleged project employees sought to be represented by private respondent LAKAS-NFL were formally issued regular employment appointments by the petitioner effective November 1, 1990 which were accepted by said project employees.Thereafter, in a Resolution dated November 22, 1990, public respondent Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.On November 28, 1990, petitioner's project employees at its SMSG site who were not given regular employment appointment on October 26, 1990 went on strike and completely paralyzed petitioner's operations in Bauan, Batangas. Said strike was settled in a conciliation conference convened by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on December 8, 1990 when an Agreement was reached by the petitioner and private respondent LAKAS-NFL wherein petitioner agreed to formally regularize all the remaining alleged project employees with at least one year of service pending the final outcome of the certification election case.5Thereafter, 686 additional regular project employees were regularized effective December 1, 1990 in pursuance to said Agreement.On December 6, 1990, petitioner received a letter from URFA informing the former about the admission into URFA of the membership of 410 regular project employees who were formally regularized by the petitioner effective November 1, 1990.On that same date, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Resolution dated November 22, 1990 alleging that the employees sought to be represented by the private respondent LAKAS-NFL are regular employees of the petitioner and are deemed included in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement of the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner which motion was subsequently denied by the public respondent Undersecretary Laguesma in an Order dated December 11, 1990.Hence, this petition assailing said Order and Resolution on the following grounds:I. RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1990 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 DECEMBER 1990 IN THAT THEY FAILED TO HOLD THAT THE CONTRACT-BAR RULE APPLIES TO THE INSTANT CASEII. RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1990 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 DECEMBER 1990 IN THAT THEY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SUPERVENING FACT THAT THE BARGAINING UNIT OF THE ALLEGED REGULAR PROJECT WORKERS HAS CEASED TO EXIST BY VIRTUE OF THE REGULARIZATION OF ALL THE ALLEGED PROJECT WORKERS WITH AT LEAST ONE YEAR OF SERVICE6The contentions of the petitioner are meritorious.Section 1 of Article II of petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with URFA defined appropriate bargaining unit as follows:ARTICLE IISCOPESec. 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit The appropriate bargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of those regular rank-and-file employees of the COMPANY who have remained as such up to the date of execution of this Agreement, as well as those who may hereafter acquire the same status. It is hereby understood and agreed that the following are not within the appropriate bargaining unit and, therefore, this Agreement is not applicable to them, to wit:a Executives, division department and section heads, staff members, managerial employees, and executive secretaries;b Workers hired by the COMPANY as project employees as contemplated by existing laws including relievers of regular employees who are sent abroad are not covered by this Contract.Provided, however, that regular employees who are assigned as relievers shall continue to be covered by this Contract, andprovided furtherthat relievers who are assigned to regular positions which may become vacant shall be duly considered for such regular positions after attaining the six months probationary period.c Security personnel.7Although the aforementioned definition does not include petitioner's regular project employees in the coverage of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and the URFA, the regularization of all the regular project employees with at least one year of service and the subsequent membership of said employees with the URFA mean that the alleged regular project employees whom respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent are, in fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in the appropriate bargaining unit of said Collective Bargaining Agreement consequently, the bargaining unit which respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased to exist.The Labor Code provides:Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.Paragraph 2 of Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations likewise provides:If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective Bargaining Agreement between the petitioner and URFA, which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner including the regular project employees with more than one year of service, bars any other labor organization from filing a petition for certification election except within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the enactment of Article 232 of the Labor Code which was designed to ensure industrial peace between the employer and its employees during the existence of the collective bargaining agreement.WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious, the assailed Resolution of November 22, 1990 and the Order dated December 11, 1990 are hereby annuled and set aside. This temporary restraining order issued is made permanent. Costs against respondents.[G.R. No. 135806.August 8, 2002]TOYOTA MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION,petitioner,vs.TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, and THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,respondents.D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO,J.:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to set aside the Resolution of 5 June 1998 and the Order of 10 August 1998 both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment in OS-A-5-58-98 (NCR-OD-M-9704-0311) which affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter dated 24 February 1998.The assailed decision dismissed both thePetition for Certification Electionfiled by respondent Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Employees and Workers Union (TMPCEWU) and thePetition-in-Interventionfiled by petitioner Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor Union (TMPCLU).

On 24 April 1997 respondent TMPCEWU filed aPetition for Certification Electionbefore the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of the manufacturing division from Levels 1 to 4 of Toyota Motor Philippines Corp.(TMPC).

On 13 May 1997, while the case was pending hearing, petitioner TMPCLU claiming to be the legitimate labor organization, filed aMotion to Intervene with Opposition to the Certification Electionpraying that it be allowed to intervene and, thereafter, the petition by TMPCEWU be denied for lack of merit.It claimed that the petition was premature due to an earlier resolution by the Secretary of Labor ordering the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of TMPC represented by petitioner which was the subject of certiorari proceedings before the Supreme Court and still awaiting final resolution at the time; and, that the collective bargaining unit which respondent TMPCEWU sought to represent violated the "single or employer" unit policy since it excluded the rank-and-file employees in the other divisions and departments in respondent TMPC.[1]In its motion petitioner TMPCLU outlined the antecedent events prior to the TMPCEWU's filing of itsPetition for Certification Electionon 24 April 1997 thus -

1. On 26 November 1992 it (TMPCLU) filed a petition for certification election before Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap, docketed as NCR-OD-M-9211-053;

2. On 8 March 1993 Med-Arbiter Adap dismissed TMPCLU's petition on the ground that the labor organization's membership was composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in violation of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, and that at the time of the filing of its petition, TMCPLU had not even acquired legal personality yet;

3. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor, in a Resolution dated 9 November 1993 signed by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and directed the holding of a certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of TMPC. In setting aside the assailed order, the Office of the Secretary argued that:

Contrary to the allegation of herein respondent-appellee, petitioner-appellant was already a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the petition on 26 November 1992.Records show that on 24 November 1992 or two (2) days before the filing of the said petition, it was issued a certificate of registration.

4. Acting on TMPC's motion for reconsideration the Secretary of Labor set aside his earlier resolution and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter concluding that the issues raised by TMPC both on appeal and its motion for reconsideration were factual issues requiring further hearing and production of evidence;

5. Pursuant to the order above-mentioned, the Med-Arbiter on 28 September 1994 dismissed TMPCLU's petition for certification election for failure of petitioner to acquire legal personality at the time of the filing of the said petition;

6. The motion for reconsideration filed by TMPCLU before the Secretary of Labor, which was treated as an appeal from the order of the Med-Arbiter dated 28 September 1994, was granted and the said order was set aside.In lieu thereof, a new order was issued giving due course to the petition and directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of TMPC;

7. The Secretary of Labor, in his order dated 14 July 1995, denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration filed by TMPC;

8. On 20 April 1996 the Secretary of Labor issued a new resolution directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of TMPC; and

9. TMPC lodged a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the 20 April 1996 Resolution of the Secretary of Labor; and on 19 February 1997, the Supreme Court[2]set aside the assailed Resolution of the Secretary of Labor and reinstated the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 28 September 1994.In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled that since TMPCLU's membership list contained the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five positions, "the union could not, prior to purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification election."

At the time respondent TMPCEWU filed itsPetition for Certification Electionon 24 April 1997 the decision of the Supreme Court had not ripened into a final and executory judgment.Thus petitioner invoked as among the grounds for opposition thereto in itsMotion to Intervene with Opposition to the Petition for Certification Electionthat the "pending proceeding before the Supreme Court may be said to be a pre-judicial question which should be resolved first before the instant petition can prosper."[3]TMPC also filed a similar comment on 9 June 1997.Hence, on 2 July 1997, the Med-Arbiter ordered the provisional dismissal of TMPCEWU'sPetition for Certification Electionpending a final ruling by the Supreme Court on thePetition for Certification Election.

On 3 June 1997 the decision of the Supreme Court dated 19 February 1997 became final and executory.

In view of respondent TMPCEWU's revival of itsPetition for Certification Election, petitioner also filed on 30 October 1997 itsPetition-in-Intervention[4]alleging that (a) it was representing only the rank-and-file employees; (b) it enjoys the supportof the regular rank-and-file workers at large in TMPC, an unorganized establishment, and not only among the rank-and-file employees in the manufacturing division thereof; (c) while respondent TMPCEWU professed itself as a legitimate labor organization, there was serious doubt on such claim inasmuch as there was a pending petition for the cancellation of its certification of registration on the ground of fraud; (d) respondent TMPCEWU's representation of the rank-and-file employees, Levels 1 to 4, within the manufacturing division only to the exclusion of those in the other departments and divisions violated the"single or employer" unit policy; and, (e) the establishment of the proposed bargaining unit in the manufacturing division composed of employees from Levels 1 to 4, should respondent's petition be allowed, would induce the proliferation of unions in a single employer.[5]On 24 February 1998 the Med-Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing for lack of merit TMPCEWU'sPetition for Certification Election, since it failed to include all rank-and-file employees from Levels 1 to 4 in other departments of TMPC in violation of the"one-union in one-company"policy and likewise dismissing TMPCLU'sPetition-in-Interventionfor lack of legal personality.[6]Anent the issue on whether TMPCLU has the legal personality to file thePetition-in-Intervention, the Med-Arbiter explained thus -

The uncontroverted fact in this case is that at the time intervenor TMPCLU filed its application for registration and subsequently thereafter was issued a certificate of registration on November 24, 1992 (Annex A, Intervenor's petition-in-intervention), its union membership is (sic) composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.

From this we could infer that the registration certificate issued by the Department of Labor and Employment isvoid ab initiobecause at the time of the issuance the constitution of intervenor union TMPCLU is (sic) a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees as per finding of fact of Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap in his Order dated March 8, 1993 (Annex A, respondent's Answer to Petition-in-Intervention).

On 14 March 1998, dissatisfied with the unfavorable decision, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor contending that contrary to the finding of the Med-Arbiter it had the legal personality to intervene in the certification election proceedings as shown by its Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-11-996-92.

In a Resolution dated 5 June 1998, the Secretary of Labor justified his affirmance of the Med-Arbiter's decision in this wise -[7]On the first ground raised on appeal, it is true that the employer is a mere by-stander during the conduct of a certification election.Prior to the election, however, the employer is not precluded from ascertaining the legitimacy of the union in order that it can be assured that the union it will be dealing with is a duly registered labor organization which legally represents the bargaining unit sought to be represented.There is therefore no error in allowing the employer to question the status of appellant as in the case at bar.

On the second issue, it had earlier been finally ruled by the Supreme Court (G.R. No 121084) involving herein employer and appellant that since the bargaining unit of the rank-in-file which TMPCLU is seeking to represent is a mixture of supervisory employees which is prohibited under Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended, the union prior to purging itself of supervisory employees-members, had not attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.Appellant now simply asserts that it has purged its membership of supervisory employees and therefore is now a legitimate labor organization of the rank-and-file employees.Appellant has not however shown that it registered anew because admittedly some of its officers are supervisory employees.The need to register anew is necessary and the purging by itself of its officers who are holding supervisory position is imperative.One of the requirements for registration is the submission of the list of officers.Under the circumstances obtaining, appellant has not as yet attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.It has therefore no legal authority to oppose the instant petition.

On 10 August 1998 the Secretary issued an Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration; hence, petitioner now comes to us assailing the aforementioned Resolution and Order of the Secretary of Labor arguing that -

First.At the time it filed itsPetition-in-Interventionon 30 October 1997 it was clothed with legal personality as abona fidelabor union.Petitioner contended that when it filed theMotion to Intervene with Opposition to the Petition for Certification Electionfiled by TMPCEWU and itsPetition-in-Intervention, it did have a Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-1199692 which was based on its compliance with the requisites for union registration.Hence, it had the legal personality when it filed thePetition-in-Interventionand had all the rights as well as obligations of a legitimate labor organization.There was therefore no necessity for petitioner to register anew when it was already a registered labor organization.

Second.The Med-Arbiter had no authority to declare that petitioner's certificate of registration wasvoid ab initioin a certification election proceeding; neither was the representation proceedings before the Med-Arbiter the appropriate remedy to ventilate such issue.

To buttress its stance, petitioner drew attention to the fact that theImplementing Rules of the Labor Code of the Philippines, particularly Book V, Rule 1, Sec. 1 (kk) thereof, and the Med-Arbiter's authority were limited to hearing, conciliating, mediating and deciding representation cases, internal union and intra-union disputes.Considering that the case before the Med-Arbiter was aPetition for Certification Electionby respondent TMPCEWU, the only task of the Med-Arbiter was to determine the employees' choice of their bargaining representative, and nothing more.

Third.The Supreme Court inToyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Corporation Philippines Labor Union and Secretary of Labor,[8]limited the finding of petitioner's lack of personality only to the time when it filed itsPetition for Certification Election.

In this regard, petitioner decries the decision of the Secretary of Labor affirming that of the Med-Arbiter on the basis of the ruling in the aforecited case.It must be stressed, according to petitioner, that contrary to the interpretation given by the Med-Arbiter as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, the Supreme Court's ruling that it did not have legal personality was limited to the time when it filed itsPetition for Certification Electionon 26 November 1992.Neither did the Supreme Court, in that case, rule on the validity of the certificate of registration.

More importantly, according to petitioner, it was erroneous for the Secretary to assume that inasmuch as petitioner failed to purge itself of its supervisory employee-members when it filed its previousPetition for Certification Electionon 26 November 1992, it could not have possessed the appropriate legal personality when it filed itsPetition-in-Interventionon 30 October 1997.The truth of the matter is that with the purging completed, absent any finding of the Supreme Court or any other court or tribunal declaring the invalidity of the certificate of registration, petitioner possessed the legal personality when it filed itsPetition-in-Intervention.

This Court is called upon to resolve the issue of whether petitioner had legal personality on 30 October 1997 when it filed itsPetition-in-Intervention.Corollary thereto, should petitioner register anew despite its alleged purging of the supervisory employee-members as directed by this Court inToyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union[9]and the issuance in its favor of a certificate of registration after it was found to have violated Art. 245 of the Labor Code?

To find solution to the question in the instant case, we need only refer to the earlier case ofToyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union and the Secretary of Labor and Employment,[10]which sprang from aPetition for Certification Electionfiled by TMPCLU among the rank-and-file employees of TMPC.On 8 March 1993, however, its petition was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter for the reason that the labor organization's membership was composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employee-members.On appeal, the Secretary of Labor remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter upon his finding that factual issues remained unresolved.Pursuant to the order of the Secretary of Labor, the Med-Arbiter, in his decision dated 28 September 1994, dismissed TMPCLU'sPetition for Certification Electionon the basis of the following factual findings:

(T)he (in)controvertible fact is that petitioner could not have been issued its Certificate of Registration on November 24, 1992 when it applied for registration only on November 23, 1992 as shown by the official receipt of payment of filing fee.As Enrique Nalus, Chief LEO, this office, would attest in his letter dated September 8, 1994 addressed to Mr. Porfirio T. Reyes, IndustrialRelationsOfficer of Respondent company, in response to a query posed by the latter, it is unlikely that an application for registration is approved on the date that it is filed or the day thereafter as the processing course had to pass through routing, screening, and assignment, evaluation, review and initialing, and approval/disapproval procedure, among others, that a 30-day period is provided for under the Labor Code for this purpose, let alone opposition thereto by interested parties which must be also given due course."

Another evidence which petitioner presented is the"Union Registration 1992 Logbook of IRD"and the entry date 25 November 1992 as allegedly the date of the release of its registration certificate.On the other hand, respondent company presented a certified true copy of an entry on page 265 of the Union Registration Logbook showing the pertinent facts about petitioner but which did not show that petitioner's registration was issued on or before 26 November 1992.

The Med-Arbiter also found that TMPCLU had not acquired legal personality for the reason that its composition, being a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, was in direct violation of Art. 245 of the Labor Code.[11]Although there is a divergence of factual backdrops betweenToyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union and the Secretary of Labor and Employment[12]and the instant petition in the sense that in the former the filing of aPetition for Certification Electionby petitioner gave rise to the controversy while the present case arose from the filing of aPetition-in-Intervention, the bottom-line issue in both cases nonetheless involves the legitimacy of petitioner TMPCLU to file petitions.

We recall that in the firstToyotacase, although there was no categorical pronouncement on the validity of petitioner's certificate of registration considering that we deemed it entirely irrelevant in the light of the finding that petitioner was not entirely a rank-and-file labor organization, we sustained however in the same decision the entire factual findings of the Med-Arbiter when we observed -

The foregoing discussion, therefore, renders entirely irrelevant the technical issue raised as to whether or not respondent union was in possession of the status of a legitimate labor organization at the time of filing, when, as petitioner vigorously claims, the former was still at the stage of processing of its application for recognition as a legitimate labor organization.The union's composition being in violation of the Labor Code's prohibition of unions composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, it could not possess the requisite personality to file for recognition as a legitimate labor organization.In any case, the factual issue, albeit ignored by the public respondents assailed Resolution, was adequately threshed out in the Med-Arbiters September 28, 1994 Order (underscoring supplied).In effect therefore, we already impressed our stamp of approval on the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter in his 28 September 1994 decision, i.e., that petitioner had no valid certificate of registration and therefore no legal personality to file thePetition for Certification Electionand in the absence of any attempt on its part to rectify the legal infirmity, likewise the disputedPetition-in-Intervention.

It is thus fatuous on petitioner's part to resurrect the issue of legitimacy in the instant case notwithstanding our earlier ruling sustaining the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter.

We cannot also accede to petitioner's submission that the issuance of a certificate of registration in its favoris an adequate and unassailable proof that it possesses the requisite legal personality to file aPetition for Certification Election.Not necessarily.As we emphasized inProgressive Development Corp. - Pizza Hut v. Laguesma,[13]if a labor organizations application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization.And if a certificate of registration has been issued, the propriety of its registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Arts. 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election.We believe the procedural requirements to impugn the registration by petitioner were more than adequately complied with as shown in the 1997 case ofToyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union.[14]There is no reason to belabor the primordial importance of strictly complying with the registration requirements of the Labor Code.As we have explained in a long line of cases, the activities of labor organizations, associations and unions are impressed with public interest, hence, must be protected.

WHEREFOREthe petition isDISMISSED for lack of merit.Accordingly, the assailed Resolution dated 5 June 1998 and Order dated 10 August 1998 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment affirming the decision of the Med-Arbiter dated 24 February 1998 which dismissed both thePetition for Certification Electionfiled by respondent Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Employees and Workers Union (TMPCEWU) and thePetition-in-Interventionof petitioner Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor Union (TMPCLU) are AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 152094.July 22, 2004]DHL PHILIPPINES CORPORATIONUNITED RANK AND FILE ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (DHL-URFA-FFW),petitioner,vs.BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG DHL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:

False statements made by union officers before and during a certification election -- that the union is independent and not affiliated with a national federation -- are material facts likely to influence the election results.This principle finds application in the present case in which the majority of the employees clearly wanted an independent union to represent them.Thus, after the members learned of the misrepresentation, and after a majority of them disaffiliated themselves from the union and formed another one, a new certification election should be held to enable them to express their true will.

The late filing of the Petition for a new election can be excused under the peculiar facts of this case, considering that the employees concerned did not sleep on their rights, but promptly acted to protect their prerogatives.Petitioner should not be permitted to use legal technicalities to perpetrate the betrayal foisted by its officers upon the majority of the employees.Procedural technicalities should not be allowed to suppress the welfare of labor.

The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul theDecember 17, 1999Decision[2]and theJanuary 30, 2002Resolution[3]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53270.The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due course.Accordingly, the decision of Rosalinda Dimapilis-[B]aldoz, Undersecretary of Labor, in behalf of [the] Secretary of Labor and Employment, is herebyANNULEDandSET ASIDEandDECLAREDto haveNO EFFECTwhatsoever.

Public respondent and its representatives are hereby enjoined to refrain and desist from implementing the said decision.[4]The challenged Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The FactsOnNovember 25, 1997, a certification election was conducted among the regular rank and file employees in the main office and the regional branches of DHL Philippines Corporation.The contending choices were petitioner and no union.

OnJanuary 19, 1998, on the basis of the results of the certification election, with petitioner receiving 546 votes and no union garnering 348 votes, the election officer certified the former as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the corporation.[5]Meanwhile, onDecember 19, 1997, Respondent Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corporation (BUKLOD) filed with the Industrial Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for the nullification of the certification election.The officers of petitioner were charged with committing fraud and deceit in the election proceedings, particularly by misrepresenting to the voter-employees that it was an independent union, when it was in fact an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).

This misrepresentation was supposedly the basis for their selection of petitioner in the certification election.Allegedly supporting this claim was the fact that those whom it had misled allegedly withdrew their membership from it and subsequently formed themselves into an independent union.The latter union, BUKLOD, was issued a Certificate of Registration by DOLE onDecember 23, 1997.

OnMay 18, 1998, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin nullified theNovember 25, 1997certification election and ordered the holding of another one with the following contending choices:petitioner, respondent, and no choice.

Setting aside the Decision of Med-Arbiter Falconitin, DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz held on appeal that the issue of representation had already been settled with finality in favor of petitioner, and that no petitions for certification election would be entertained within one year from the time the election officer had issued the Certification Order.

Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe CA held that the withdrawal of a great majority of the members of petitioner -- 704 out of 894 of them -- provided a compelling reason to conduct a certification election anew in order to determine, once and for all, which union reflected their choice.Under the circumstances, the issue of representation was not put to rest by the mere issuance of a Certification Order by the election officer.

According to the appellate court, broader considerations should be accorded the disaffiliating member-employees and a new election held to finally ascertain their will, consistent with the constitutional and labor law policy of according full protection to labors right to self-organization.The CA added that the best forum to determine the veracity of the withdrawal or retraction of petitioners former members was another certification election.

The appellate court also held that the election officers issuance of a Certification Order onJanuary 19, 1998was precipitate because, prior thereto, respondent had filed with the med-arbiter a Petition for nullification of the election.Furthermore, the Certification was not in accordance with Department Order No. 9 (DO 9), Series of 1997. The charges of fraud and deceit, lodged immediately after the election by petitioners former members against their officers, should have been treated as protests or issues of eligibility within the meaning of Section 13 of DO 9.

Hence, this Petition.[6]IssuesIn its Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

I

Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it annul[l]ed, set aside, and declared to have no effect whatsoever, the Decision of Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, which in effect, reinstated and affirmed the Decision of the Med-Arbiter, nullifying the result of the certification election as well as ordering the conduct of a new certification election at DHL Philippines Corporation, considering that:

(A)The Court of Appeals, as well as the Med-Arbiter, ignored the undisputed fact that petitionera quo(herein respondent) has not yet existed before, during and shortly after the conduct of certification election on November 25, 1997, and not yet even registered at the time of the filing of its Petitiona quoon December 19, 1997, therefore, has no legal personality to institute an action.

(B)The Court of Appeals, as well as the Med-Arbiter ignored and unjustifiably refused to apply Section 13, Rule XII of Department Order No. 9, there being no protest nor challenge raised before, during and even after five (5) days have lapsed from the conduct of the certification election on November 25, 1997, as the Petitiona quowas only filed on December 19, 1997 a week before herein respondent was able to obtain its Certificate of Registration.

(C)The Court of Appeals ignored and unjustifiably refused to apply Section 3, Rule V of Department Order No. 9, or commonly know[n] as the Certification-Year Rule, which means that no certification election should be entertained within one (1) year from the time the Election Officer issued the Certification Order.

II

Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Decision promulgated on December 17, 1999, as the same was rendered without the [Office of the] Solicitor General having filed its comment on the Petitiona quo, despite having filed a Manifestation with Motion to the effect of not having received the Petition filed by petitionera quo, which [h]as remained unacted upon; as well as the Resolution promulgated on January 30, 2002, which denied herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, which was rendered without the required comment thereon by the Petitionera quo, thus, due process was violated.

III

Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the resignation, withdrawal, retraction of the great majority of the former members of United DHL should be treated as disaffiliation from such union.

IV

Whether or not, the Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that x x x while in the February 28, 1996 x x x decision of Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin provides for a certification election among two (2) specific choices: the private respondent (then as petitioner), and No Union as the contending choices, what was conducted on November 25, 1996 (sic) was a referendum on a choice of yes or no and not certification order of the Election Officer reflecting the results in the number of yes votes and no votes, without indicating the name of the contending choices.

V

Whether or not the Court of Appeals placed both parties in Limbo, as the dispositive portion of the Decision or thefallo,which x x x actually constitutes the judgment or resolution of the court, failed to specify what should be done by the parties after the rendition of the said Decision and Resolution, thus, there can be no subject of execution.[7]In simpler terms, the issues being raised are as follows: 1) the validity of the CA Decision and Resolution; and 2) the validity of the certification election.

The Courts RulingThe Petition lacks merit.

First Issue:Validity of the CA Decision and ResolutionPetitioner assails the validity of the CA Decision for having beenrenderedwithoutreceiptoftherequiredcommentofthe OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG) on respondents Petition; and the CAResolution forhavingbeenissuedwithoutreceipt of respondents comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

This contention is untenable.

The applicable provision is Section 8 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 8.Proceedings after comment is filed. -- After the comment or other pleadings required by the court are filed,or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda.If after such hearing or submission of memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled. x x x. (Italics supplied)

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that the Petition may be resolved, notwithstanding the failure of the adverse party to file a comment.Its failure to do so despite due notice is its own lookout.Indeed, when a respondent fails to file its comment within the given period, the court may decide the case on the basis of the records before it, specifically the petition and its attachments.[8]Petitioner insists that the failure of the OSG to receive a copy of the Petition filed before the CA was the reason for the OSGs failure to file a Comment thereon.Be that as it may, as correctly pointed out by respondent, petitioner is not the proper party to invoke such failure.

At any rate, it is the duty of petitioner to defend its position, as well as those that upheld it -- the tribunal, the board and the officer -- because it is the party that is ultimately interested in sustaining the correctness of the disposition or the validity of the proceedings.[9]Petitioner further assails the validity of the CA Decision, on the ground that its dispositive portion orfallofailed to specify what should be done by the parties after its promulgation.

All that the law requires is that the judgment must be definitive.That is, the rights of the parties must be stated with finality by the decision itself, which must thus specifically deny or grant the remedy sought by the action.[10]For review by the CA was Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldozs Resolution reversing the Decision of Med-Arbiter Falconitin.

Parenthetically, the ultimate question presented before the appellate court was whether a new certification election should be conducted among the employees of DHL Philippines Corporation.As correctly pointed out by respondent, in reversing the undersecretarys Resolution, the CA necessarily reinstated the med-arbiters earlier Decision to conduct a new certification election.

A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision; it encompasses matters necessarily included in or are necessary to such judgment.[11]The Decision of Med-Arbiter Falconitin and Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz should be read in the context of and in relation to the assailed Decision of the CA.The setting aside of the undersecretarys Resolution necessarily implies the holding of a new certification election by the med-arbiter upon receipt of the records of the case and the motion of the interested party.

Second Issue:Validity of the Certification ElectionUnder Section 13 of the Rules Implementing Book V (Labor Relations) of the Labor Code,[12]as amended, the election officers authority to certify the results of the election is limited to situations in which there has been no protest filed; or if there has been any, it has not been perfected or formalized within five days from the close of the election proceedings.

Further, Section 14 of the same Rules provides that when a protest has been perfected, only the med-arbiter can proclaim and certify the winner.Clearly, this rule is based on the election officers function, which is merely to conduct and supervise certification elections.[13]It is the med-arbiter who is authorized to hear and decide representation cases.[14]Consequently, the decision whether to certify the results of an election or to set them aside due to incidents occurring during the campaign is within the med-arbiters discretion.

Petitioner argues that the CA gravely erred in rendering its assailed Decision, considering that no protest or challenge had been formalized within five days, or raised during the election proceedings and entered in the minutes thereof.Petitioner adds that respondent did not file any protest, either, against the alleged fraud and misrepresentation by the formers officers during the election.

We disagree.When the med-arbiter admitted and gave due course to respondents Petition for nullification of the election proceedings, the election officer should have deferred issuing the Certification of the results thereof.Section 13 of the Implementing Rules cannot strictly be applied to the present case.

Respondents contention is that a number of employees were lured by their officers into believing that petitioner was an independent union.Since the employees had long desired to have an independent union that would represent them in collective bargaining, they voted yes in favor of petitioner.Having been misled, a majority of them eventually disaffiliated themselves from it and formed an independent union, respondent herein, which thereafter protested the conduct of the election.Having been formed just after such exercise by the defrauded employees who were former members of petitioner, respondent could not have reasonably filed its protest within five days from the close of the election proceedings.

Notably, after it had applied for registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), respondent filed its Petition to nullify the certification election.Petitioner insistently opposed the Petition, as respondent had not yet been issued a certificate of registration at the time.Because such certificate was issued in favor of the latter four days after the filing of the Petition, onDecember 23, 1997, the misgivings of the former were brushed aside by the med-arbiter.Indeed, the fact that respondent was not yet a duly registered labor organization when the Petition was filed is of no moment, absent any fatal defect in its application for registration.

The circumstances in the present case show that the employees did not sleep on their rights.Hence, their failure to follow strictly the procedural technicalities regarding the period for filing their protest should not be taken against them.Mere technicalities should not be allowed to prevail over the welfare of the workers.[15]What is essential is that they be accorded an opportunity to determine freely and intelligently which labor organization shall act on their behalf.[16]Having been denied this opportunity by the betrayal committed by petitioners officers in the present case, the employees were prevented from making an intelligent and independent choice.

False Statements of Union OfficersThe making of false statements or misrepresentations that interfere with the free choice of the employees is a valid ground for protest.A certification election may be set aside for misstatements made during the campaign, where 1) a material fact has been misrepresented in the campaign; 2) an opportunity for reply has been lacking; and 3) the misrepresentation has had an impact on the free choice of the employees participating in the election.[17]A misrepresentation is likely to have an impact on their free choice, if it comes from a party who has special knowledge or is in an authoritative position to know the true facts.This principle holds true, especially when the employees are unable to evaluate the truth or the falsity of the assertions.[18]The fact that the officers of petitioner especially its president, misrepresented it to the voting employees as an independent union constituted a substantial misrepresentation of material facts of vital concern to those employees.The materiality of such misrepresentation is self-evident.The employees wanted an independent union to represent them in collective bargaining, free from outside interference.Thus, upon knowing that petitioner was in fact an affiliate of the FFW, the members disaffiliated from petitioner and organized themselves into an independent union. Additionally, the misrepresentation came from petitioners recognized representative, who was clearly in a position to hold himself out as a person who had special knowledge and was in an authoritative position to know the true facts.

We are not easily persuaded by the argument of petitioner that the employees had sufficient time between the misrepresentation and the election to check the truth of its claims.They could hardly be expected to verify the accuracy of any statement regarding petitioner, made to them by its officers.No less than its president stated that it was an independent union.At the time, the employees had no reason to doubt him.

We sustain the following findings of Med-Arbiter Falconitin:

x x x It must be noted at the outset that [respondent] has charged [petitioners] officers, agents and representative with fraud or deception in encouraging its members to form or join and vote for DHL Philippines Corporation United Rank-and-File Association which they represented as an independent labor union not affiliated with any labor federation or national union.Such serious allegations, supported with affidavits under oath executed by no less than seven hundred four (704) DHL Philippines Corporations employees nationwide, cannot just be ignored.

x x xx x xx x x

Notwithstanding the fact that [petitioner] union was duly furnished copy of the petition and the affidavits as its attachments, it surprisingly failed to question, much less contest, the veracity of the allegations contained in such affidavits, more than just harping in general terms that the allegations are simply incredible and [interposing] vehement denial.Beingunassailed and unrefuted, the allegations in the affidavitswhichareconsideredas x x xofficialdocumentsmustbegivenweightandconsideration by this Office.Furthermore, with the failure of [petitioner] to rebut the affidavits, more than just denying the allegations, they give rise to the presumption that [petitioner] has admitted such allegations in the affidavit and with the admission, it is inescapable that indeed there was fraud or machination committed by the [petitioner] that seriously affected the validity and legitimacy of the certification election conducted on November 25, 1997 which gives rise to a ground to annul or void the said election, having been marred by fraud, deceptions and machinations.[19]This finding of fact of a quasi-judicial agency of DOLE is persuasive upon the courts.[20]Although petitioner won in the election, it is now clear that it does not represent the majority of the bargaining employees, owing to the affiliation of its members with respondent.The present uncertainty as to which union has their support to represent them for collective bargaining purposes is a salient factor that this Court has seriously considered.

The bargaining agent must be truly representative of the employees.[21]At the time of the filing by respondent of the Petition for nullification, allegiances and loyalties of the employees were like shifting sands that radically affected their choice of an appropriate bargaining representative.The polarization of a good number of them followed their discovery of the fraud committed by the officers of petitioner.At any rate, the claim that 704 of the employees are affiliated with respondent is not sufficiently rebutted by any evidence on record.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees choice of an appropriate bargaining unit -- to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, by which one.[22]Once disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which union should be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees.[23]WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIED, and the assailed DecisionAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.HON. BIENVIENIDO E. LAGUESMA. in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, CHRISTIAN LABOR ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CLOP), NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU-TUCP),respondents.Gaspar V. Tagalo for petitioner.Jose Torregoza for Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines.Joji Barrios for intervenor ALU-TUCP.Villy Cadiz for National Federation of Labor Unions.QUIASON,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside the Resolutions of the Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) dated July 22, 1992, affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election, and August 25, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP), filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of the petitioner (NCR-OD-M-91-01-002).On April 8, 1991, Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors and conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and washerboys.On May 10, 1991, respondent. CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification election,which included all the rank and file employees of the company, who hold non-managerial. and non-supervisorial positions.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition and contended that the dismissal of the first petition constitutedres judicata. Petitioner argued that respondent CLOP should have interposed an appeal to the dismissal of the first petition and its failure to do so barred it from filing another petition for certification election.On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter R. Parungo rendered a decision, which ordered that a certification election among the regular rank and file workers of petitioner company be conducted (Rollo, pp. 87-91).On October 16, 1991, the Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) filed a motion for intervention (NCR OD-M-91-01-002) and alleged that it has members in the proposed bargaining unit. Subsequently, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) filed a separate petition for certification election (NCR-OD-M-91-10-058) and a motion to consolidate related cases to avoid confusion.Dissatisfied with the Decision dated July 3, 1991 rendered by Med-Arbiter R. Parungo, petitioner appealed to the DOLE Secretary, who, through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, affirmed the Med-Arbiter in its Resolution dated July 22, 1992 calling for the conduct of the certification election (Rollo, pp. 25-28). The Resolution, in pertinent part, reads as follows:xxx xxx xxxThe defense ofres judicatais not obtaining in the present petition for certification election. It is settled that forres judicatato apply there must be a final judgment on the merits on matters put in issue.In the instant case, it could not be said that there is a final judgment on the merits of the petition simply because the composition of the present proposed bargaining unit is different from that in the first petition. Moreover, there are now other parties involved, and therefore, it would not be correct to say that the parties in the said two cases are identical.xxx xxx xxxWith regard however, to the question on propriety of consolidation, th