Catastrophe, Autonomy and the Future of Modernism in Adorno

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CATASTROPHE, AUTONOMY AND THE FUTURE OF MODERNISM: Trying to UnderstandAdorno's Reading of "Endgame"Author(s): Matthew HoltSource: Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui, Vol. 14, After Beckett / D'après Beckett (2004),pp. 261-275Published by: Editions Rodopi B.V.

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CATASTROPHE,

AUTONOMY AND THE

FUTURE

OF

MODERNISM:

Trying

to

Understand

Adorno's

Reading

of

Endgame

Matthew Holt

Theodor Adorno's

essay

"Trying

to

Understand

Endgame"

never

refuses

the

challenge

to

interpret

Endgame

but

it

does

not

for

one

moment

pretend

that

theory

can

unlock the

meanings

of

an

aesthetic

object

without

putting

its own

processes,

concepts

and

style

into

ques

tion

-

a

challenge

that

is

posed

by

the aesthetic

object

itself

The

autonomy

of

Beckett's

art must

be

acknowledged

yet

at

the

same

time

be

seen

to

engage

in

the

most

demanding

questions

of

our

time.How

Adorno

manages

to

keep

the

critical

force of

these

axioms

together

is

the

subject of

this

essay.

Far

from being

rendered

irrelevant

by

post

modernism,

I

argue

in

the

conclusion that such

a

critical

project

pro

vokes the

question

of

the

future

of

modernism,

not

its

demise.

Adorno's

reading

of

Endgame

(Adorno, 1992)

is

a

crystallisation

f

his

approach

to

modernist

art

in

general:

it

attempts

to

retain

the

autonomous

and radical

aspects

of Beckett's

aesthetic

while

also im

puting

to

it

a

highly charged

constellation

of social and

political

meanings.

But

according

to

Adorno,

Beckett's

play

neither reflects

nor expresses any of these

meanings.

The relation between modernist

art

and the

political

and

social

world

in

which

it is

embedded

is for

Adorno

an

oblique

one;

it is

difficult,

nigmatic

(rdtselhaft)

nd,

moreover,

non-programmatic.

The theorisation

of

this

oblique

relation

too

is difficult. This is

because Adorno attends

to

the

problematic

and

complicated

nature

of

his

object

of

study

in

a

way

that

does

not

reduce

that

difficulty.

In order

to

understand

modernist

art,

theory

cannot

take

on

those

categories

of reflection

and

understanding actually

left

be

hind

by

modernist art. It can no

longer

rely

on the direct presentation

of

meaning.

As

such,

theory

has

its

own

autonomy

arising

from

its

responsibility

not to

falsely promise

reconciliation

and

atonement







(Versohnung)

where there is

none.

Thus what Adorno

says

of the

awkwardness

of

interpreting

Beckett

goes

for his work

as

well:

Beckett

shrugs

is

shoulders

t

the

possibility

f

philosophy

today,

at the

very

possibility

of

theory.

The

irrationality

of

bourgeois society

in

its late

phase

rebels

at

letting

tself

e

understood;

those where

the

good

old

days,

when

a

critique

of

political

economy

of this

society

could

be

written

that

judged

it

in

terms

of

its

own

ratio. For

since

then the

society

has thrown its

ratio

on

the

scrap

heap

and

replaced

it

with

virtually

unmediated control. Hence

interpretation inevitably

lags

behind Beckett... One could almost

say

that the

criterion

of a

philosophy

whose hour has struck is that it

prove

equal

to

this

challenge.

(Adorno

1992,

244)

Adorno conceives

his

own

work

as

an

attempt

to

prove

equal

to

this

challenge.

But

this is

not

limited

to

a

dialogue

between

a

thinker

and

an

artist. This

is

a

challenge

for

the

interpretation

of

all

difficult works

of

art.

It

is also

a

challenge,

more

specifically,

for Beckett

studies

which,

akin to

nearly

all of

literary,

cultural and aesthetic studies to

day

has the

tendency

o

fall

into he

trap

f

merely

seeing

the

bject

of

study

as

a

depository

of

non-aesthetic

meaning:

there is little

proper

reference

to,

or

negotiation

of,

the

aesthetic form of the

object.

Rather,

form

not

only

mediates

the social

meanings

to

be found

in it

but,

in

fact,

is the first

(and last)

point

of

access

to

them.

In

other

words,

the

primacy

of

form is

paramount

and

must

be

taken

seriously

in

any

ex

amination of

'content'.

This 'axiom'

(of

the constitutive

difficulty

of the

object

of in

terpretation)

nd

this

'challenge'

(to

respond

to

that

difficulty)

lso

extends

to

the

analysis

of

the

social

and the

historical. In

other

words,

there is also

a

sociological

reason

for this

emphasis

on

the essential

opacity

of

modernist

works

of

art.

Society

too,

for

Adorno,

can no

longer

be

rendered

by

'clear

and

distinct'

concepts;

it

does

not

admit

of

rationality

ecause

it

is

no

longer

if

it

ever

was,

but this s

another

matter,

another

debate)

itself

rational.

Or,

to

be

more

exact,

if

society

can stillbe said tobe rational then it is a

rationality

hichAdorno

exhorts

us

to

critique

and

to

a

large

extent

abandon: for

this

same

ra

tionality

has

degenerated

into

the

total

administration

of

culture

and

262







the total

reification

of

nature. In

this

situation,

one can

not

simply

rationalise the

irrational,

or

apply

administrative and reified

concepts

to

an

administered and reified

society

-

this would

be

to

deepen

the

tendencies of that

society,

not

resist

it

and

challenge

it.

In

order

to

formulate ideas about contemporary

society,

then, one has to intro

duce

concepts

which

are

themselves

cognisant

of

this

cynical

indiffer

ence

to

conceptualisation

on

the

part

of

society

and

also,

in

this

case,

the

mocking

indifference

to

interpretation

on

the

part

of

Endgame.

Such

concepts

would be themselves

opaque

and indirect. Adorno is

thus hard

to

read and Beckett

arduous

to

interpret.1

If

Adorno's

assessment

of

Endgame typifies

his

general

argu

ment

about the

difficulty

f

taking

social,

political

or

philosophical

position in regard to a modernist work of art, then how does he write

about the

play?

How

can

Adorno

find

in

Endgame

a

critique

of exis

tentialism,

a

testimony

to

the

destruction

of the

bourgeois

subject (and

any

philosophy

that

ttempts

o

resuscitate

t),

nd,

finally

nd

perhaps

most

importantly,

an

examination

and indictment of

post-Holocaust

culture? To

begin

to

answer

these

questions,

I

would like

to turn

first

to

thenotion of

catastrophe

hat dorno

imputes

o

the

play

(like

all

other

commentators)

and

which

organises

his

reading

of it.

But before

I do, a final word for this introduction: Adorno grows in importance.

If,

as

Richard Wolin

argues,

he has become

a

necessary

ballast

to

the

current

tendency

for

art to

be the

"uncritical mirror

image

of

the

happy

consciousnessof

late

capitalism",

Wolin

1990,

48)

then his s

also

true

in the realm

of

the social.

When

Adorno

writes

in

regard

to

the characters

of Nell and

Nagg

that

"Endgame

prepares

us

for

a

state

of affairs

in which

everyone

who lifts the lid of

the

nearest

trashcan

can

expect

to

find

his

own

parents

in

it",

(Adorno

1992,

266)

he

would notbe at all surprised ofind thattodaytheelderlywould be

lucky

to

even

get

a

trashcan.

And

perhaps

for similar

reasons

Beckett

too

is

assuming

a

new

importance.

The world is

certainly

absurd

enough

at

the

moment,

potentially

facing

new

catastrophes,

and

in

the

need of

"liberated

orm"

Adorno

1997,

2552).

1.

Catastrophe

For

Adorno,

Endgame

is traced

through

and

through

by

catastrophe.

In fact, there are a number of catastrophes he ascribes to the play, both

social

and

aesthetic

(and

he

would

have been well

aware

of

its

central

place

in

Aristotle's

theory

of

tragedy,

where

it

means

a

'change

in

263







fortune').

But

importantly,

he

does

not

attempt

to

fix

a

sole

meaning

or

event to

the

catastrophe

that

the characters

constantly

refer

to

but

never

define.

First

there

is

a

literal but

unspecified catastrophe

that

forms

not

only the background to the play but is the constant shadow of all the

dialogue

and of all the action.

Some

event

of

utter

destruction

has

taken

place

of

which

the characters

in

the

play

are,

it

is

implied,

the

sole survivors. Adorno believes

it is

foremost

the

total destruction

of

nature.

He

writes:

The situation

in the

play

...

is

none

other

than that inwhich

"there's

no more

nature".

[Beckett, 16]

The

phase

of

com

plete reification (Verdinglichung) of theworld, where there

is

nothing

left

that has

not

been made

by

human

beings,

is

indistinguishable

from

an

additional

catastrophic

event

caused

by

human

beings,

in

which

nature

has been

wiped

out

and after which

nothing

grows

anymore.3

(245)

The method of and

reason

for this

destruction,

however,

is

not

re

vealed by the play. Thus Adorno can expand upon this theme to also

make

the

play

an

authentic

response,

as

it

were,

to

post-Holocaust

culture.

But

in

keeping

within

the obscure

parameters

of

Endgame,

Adorno does

not

refer

to

the

Shoah

in

a

consistent

manner,

assuming

that it

is

part

of the

play's

meaning

but

not

its

direct

content.

As

is

often

argued,

the

play

could

also

take

place

in

a

post-Nuclear

world,

though,

again,

there is

no

direct

evidence

for

this.

But

what

is clear is

that

there has

been

devastation;

of what

kind and for

what

reasons we

are not told. Furthermore, the play does not take place in a completely

wasted

space

(unlike

Waiting

or Godot).

The

action

takes

place

in

an

interior

which

echoes the

interiors of

bourgeois

drama.

There

are

win

dows

and

an

eyepiece

to

see

out

of

them. There

are

doors,

a

ladder,

a

toy.

Clov

can

come

and

go

between

rooms.

The

larder

is

accessible.

Nagg

and Nell still

have

lodgings,

however

ghastly.

In

other

words,

the

more

universal

disaster

which

the

play

obliquely presents

remains

refracted

through

what

is

in

many

respects

a

quite

traditional domestic

farce.

What is

more,

the

outside

disaster is

so

entwined with

the

'game'

that

exists

between

Clov

and

Hamm

that it

becomes

difficult,

264







if

not

impossible,

to

separate

the

implied,

overarching

sense

of devas

tation from

the

obviously

well-versed and

repetitive

moves

of

those

two

characters.

Clov,

one

feels,

goes

to

the

window

everyday

to

tell

Hamm

-

after the

requisite

banter

-

that, outside,

everything

is

"corpsed". (Beckett, 25).

This is confirmed

when,

after a

pause,

Clov

continues:

"Well? Content?" The

pause

is

part

of the

dynamic

of their

relationship,

not

a

moment

taken

by

Clov

to

consider

the

immensity

of

the disaster.

In

this

sense,

Clov

never

really

looks outside:

his

atten

tion

is ever-bound

to

Hamm

and his

demands,

whether he

resists them

or

not.

Thus

it is

no

wonder that

perhaps

the

most

startling

evidence of

outside

catastrophe

occurs

inside. Not

long

after the

episode quoted,

Clov discovers

a

flea. Real distress

seems

to set

in.

CLOV:

{anguished, scratching

himself).

I

have

a

flea

HAMM:

A

flea

Are

there till leas?

CLOV:

On

me

there's

one.

{Scratching.)

Unless it's

a

crablouse.

HAMM:

{very

perturbed).

But

humanity might

start

from

there

all

over

again

Catch

him,

for the love

of

God

CLOV:

I'll

go

and

get

the

powder.

Exit Clov.

HAMM:

A

flea This

is

awful

What

a

day

Enter Clov with

a

sprinkling-tin.

HAMM: Let

him

have

it

(27)

This

one

of the

few,

if

only,

references

in

the

play

to

theHolocaust

(as

Adorno

too

notes

[270]),

if

indeed

that is what is

it

is,

for

the refer

ence is quickly set in the strange jelly of Beckett's humour: Clov's

flea

is

in

his

pants.

The insecticide

hat e

pours

into hem ill

kill the

flea

and

also,

metaphorically

at

least,

his

ability

to

propagate

-

to

lay

eggs.

Any

hope

that

ife could be

reborn

s

considered

by

both

Clov

and

Hamm

-

this is where

they

seem

to

depart

momentarily

from the

game

-

with

absolute

horror.

Once

the

prospect

has

passed,

they

re

turn

to

their rituals.

Second,

there

is

a

sense

of

philosophical,

metaphysical

catas

trophe. As Lambert Zuidervaart points out, Adorno interprets End

game

(Endspiel

in

German)

as

the

Endgeschichte

(the

final

history)

f

the

category

f

the

subject.

Zuidervaart,

56f)

The

play

for

Adorno

is

265







a

much

more

thoroughgoing

exploration

of the destruction

of the

Cartesian

subject

which forms

the basis of modern

philosophy

than

that

of

contemporary

existentialist

philosophy.

It

is

also

a

much

more

important

testament

to

the

destruction

of

the

heroic

bourgeois subject

in and after the Second World War

(the

"atomic

age",

as he calls it

[245]),

than that

of,

for

example,

Sartre's

absurdist drama

with

its

emphasis

on

the

subjective

freedom

to act

even

without the

objective

conditions

to

allow such action.

Beckett

takes the

philosophical

(and

dramatic)

subject

all

the

way

to

its

most

pitiful

state

-

and

refuses

any

reconstruction of

it.

We

will

return to

these issues

in

more

detail later.

Third,

there is aesthetic

catastrophe.

The

play,

in

a

profound

but

nonetheless ambivalent

manner,

is

a

kind

of

catastrophe

of theatrical

convention,

indeed amore

genuine,

truthful

experience

of the crisis of

theatrical

form,

expression

and

tradition

than that of

expressionist,

dadaist,

surrealist

and,

above

all,

absurdist drama.

This

is

because,

according

to

Adorno,

all the

parts

of

the

play

relate

to

each other

-

there is

a

definite

coherency, especially

in

technique

-

but

nonetheless

its

overall

meaning

remains obscure.

An

overall

meaning

and

'con

tent' is

suggested

-

and

thus

a

'whole'

to

relate the

parts

-

but

it is

never

revealed.

It

is shut

up

like

a

"mollusk".

(246)

Here Adorno

leaves behind the convention that Beckett can be

lumped together

with other

absurdist

(and

existentialist)

dramatists,

as

if

Beckett

was

merely

reproducing

a

theme of the

day,

a

fashion

of his

time

(what

better

way

to

deny

the

true

absurdity

of the absurd?

What better

way

to

domesticate

the

anxieties

of

Endgame?).

Instead,

Beckett

cuts

through

such

comforting

categorisation. Endgame

not

only

denies

us

our

tools for

understanding

but blunts the

ones we

have

already

tried

on

it. But this

resistance

to

interpretation

is

not

willful

obscurantism

according toAdorno, but absolutely integral to the dramatic form of

Beckett's

play

and

to

Beckett's

modernism

in

general.

To

explain

this

further,

I

will

now

turn

to

Adorno's

reading

of

the

play

in

more

detail

and

explore

the

autonomy

of

meaning

(or

non-meaning)

and form

that

Adorno

ascribes

to

it.

266







2.

The

Autonomy

of Form

Adorno first

argues

that

while Beckett's works share

much

with Sa

trean

existentialism,

predominately

the

notion of the

absurd

(and

its

attendant

notions of

isolation,

alienation and

nothingness,

etc.),

it

is

not an illustration of any category or thesis. The "literary method" of

Beckett,

as

Adorno calls

it,

is

not

one

in

which

an

ulterior

or

exterior

motive

or

concept

is

expressed.

"Whereas

in

Sartre",

he

writes,

"the

form

-

that

of the

piece

a

these

-

is

somewhat

traditional,

by

no

means

daring,

and

aimed

at

effect,

in

Beckett the

form

overtakes what is

ex

pressed

and

changes

it".

(241)

There

are

a

number of

consequences

Adorno draws from this notion that form exceeds

content

-

that

it

is

not

reducible

to

content

and that

it

does

not

express

it

but

I

will

con

centrate on the implications of the autonomy of artisticmeaning which

he

pits against

any

existential

reading

of

Beckett.

In

the face of

catastrophe

and

according

to

the

demands of

the

modernist work of

art to

operate

on

its

own

terms

and

not

merely

re

flect

either

the

concept

or

the

social,

form

withdraws into itself. But

Adorno does

not

consider this

a

continuation of

some

principle

of

/

art

pour

I'art,

even

less the

autonomy

traditionally

conferred

on

the

aes

thetic

category

of

beauty

nor

to

actual

objects

of

beauty.

This

particu

lar idea of art's self-immanence can only occur over and against an

onto-social

background

of

meaningfulness

-

of

being

able

to

give

sense

to

things,

whether

in

art

or

in

life,

or

both. He

writes: "The less

events

can

be

presumed

to

be

inherently meaningful,

the

more

the idea

of aesthetic

substance

(dsthetischen

Gestalt)

as

the

unity

of

what

ap

pears

and what

was

intended

becomes

an

illusion".

(242)

This absence

of

meaning,

or

at

least

privation

of

meaning,

is

expressed,

then,

on

two

levels:

that f form

tself

no

unity

in

life;

no

unity

in

art)

and in

intention (the desire to give unity or meaning is contrived and ulti

mately

illusionary

because the

intentional

subject

is itself

no

longer

unified).

The social

conditions

for

cogent,

coherent

and

enfranchised

art

are

no

longer

evident

and

viable,

and

categories

invented

to

illus

trate

this

-

like the

absurd

-

actually

reintroduce

sense-making

(a

new

ratio)

rather

than

doing

justice,

as

it

were,

to

the

true

brokenness

of

our

times. For

example,

the

absurd

explains

this

irrationality.

It

be

comes

a

category

or a

concept

for

it.

Beckett,

instead,

makes

the

ab

surd n absurdconceptand thepurity fhis form in thesense of its

simplicity,

its

lucidity,

but

also,

as we

have

said,

its

coherency

be

tween

parts)

is

in fact

impure

-

it is

damaged,

incomplete

and

frag

267







mentary.

It

arcs

out

as

if

to

draw

a

unity

and

a

completeness

of

mean

ing

to

itself but it

never

achieves this.

It

necessarily

falls short of this

completion.

With

Beckett,

Adorno

insists,

there

is

then

no

transfigu

ration of

deprivation

into

meaning.

Beckett

stops

short of

this false

reconciliation, this

safety-valve

for our own disturbed conscience. In

Endgame,

this

is confirmed

(amongst

other

things)

by

the

staggered,

amputated

dialogue.

The maimed characters and their maimed lan

guage

reach for

meaning

but

are

consistently

frustrated;

indeed

they

even

show self-awareness of this

arbitrary

and

game-like

search for

meaning

and

react

as

if

it has been

forced

upon

them

(and

of

course,

this is the

joke

on

interpreter

and audience

alike):

"We're

not

begin

ning

to

...

to

...

mean

something?"

(27)

Hamm

asks Clov

in

a

slightly

worried tone. But forAdorno, Beckett's work is not the embodiment

of anti-sense

nor

anti-meaning;

rather,

it

speaks

from

a

place

where,

in

fact,

there is

no

sensible

or

meaningful place

from which

to

speak (or

to

interpret). Aphasia

and ataxia arise from

atopia.

There is

nothing

anthropologically

universal about this lack

of

a

place

from

which

to

make

sense.

It is

not

a

general

description

of

an

inevitable

'condition humaine\

Nor

is

it

a

dramatic

reenactment

of

the

roots

of French existentialism

-

primarily

Heidegger's

Being

and

Time (see 249, 252). Instead Adorno argues: "Modern ontology lives

off

the

unfulfilled

promise

of

the

concreteness

of

its

abstractions,

whereas

in

Beckett the concreteness

of

an

existence

that

is shut

up

in

itself like

a

mollusk

[...]

is

revealed

to

be

identical

to

the

abstractness

that is

no

longer

capable

of

experience".

(246)

What Beckett

ex

presses

without

expressing,

if

I

may

put

it

like

that,

is that

experience

can

no

longer

be

transmitted

meaningfully,

including

the

very

loss

or

privation

of

meaning.

In

the demise

of

ontological

surety

there is

no

restoration of the ontological nor any of its substitutes (like ground

lessness,

or

anxiety

or

nothingness):

this

would be

a

form of

negative

theology.

We

cannot,

then,

ascribe

to

Beckett the

"notion that

he

de

picts

the

negativity

f

the

ge

in

negative

form",

248)

for this

would

amount to

two

spurious positions:

first,

that

art

merely

reflects

society

(or

an

ontological precondition

of

society,

like

the

existential

notion

of

'anxiety',

or

even

'freedom')

and,

second,

that

society

is

itself

rep

resentable

(and

thus

inherently

cogent

and

meaningful).

Thus accordingtoAdorno there sno philosophicalsubjectivity

that

the

play

-

and

Beckett's work

in

general

-

displays

or

performs

as

theme

to

be

expressed,

nor,

as

we

have

intimated,

is

there

any

theatri

268







cal

expression

of the notion of

the individual

as

the

absolute residue of

the

process

of Cartesian

reduction

(but

this time

around

in

Sartre's

anthropology,

reduced

not to

thought

nor

the

thinking

thing,

the

res

cogitans,

but

to

freedom):

The

catastrophes

that

inspire

Endgame

have

shattered

the

individual

whose

substantiality

and absoluteness

was

the

common

thread in

Kierkegaard, Jaspers,

and

Sartre's version

of

existentialism. Sartre

even

affirmed the

freedom of

vic

tims of the

concentration

camps

to

inwardly

accept

or

reject

the

tortures

inflicted

upon

them.

Endgame destroys

such

il

lusions. The individual

himself

is

revealed

to

be

a

historical

category,

both the outcome of the

capitalist

process of al

ienation

and

a

defiant

protest

against

it,

something

transient

himself.

(249)

Actually

I

could

envisage

Sartre

agreeing

with this

double

arrange

ment

-

or

derangement

-

of

the

modern,

uncertain

subject;

one

that is

both

deprived

of

subjectivity

(I

presume

Adorno

also

means

agency

here) and defiant against deprivation (and so always 'transient' be

tween

these

two

options

or

states).

Sartre would also ask: from where

does

one

remain

defiant

if

not

from

our

irreducible freedom and

our

condemnation

to

it?

But

Adorno detaches

this

arrangement,

this

de

stroyed

architecture of

subjectivity,

from its

remaining

support:

if

bourgeois society produces

a

torn

subject,

then

at

least

we can

avoid

this truth

and

ascribe

it

to,

as

he

argues

both

early Heidegger

and Sar

tre

do,

an

ontological

condition;

to

a

"figure

of

Being (Chiffre

es

Seins)". "But", Adorno argues, "this is precisely what is false". In

stead,

"Endgame

assumes

that the

individual's claim

to

autonomy

and

being

has lost its

credibility".

(249)

In

other

words,

the

subject

in

cri

sis

is

not

a

general,

ahistorical condition

of

either

Dasein

or

'man'

(some

condition

humaine)

but

has

a

historically

locatable

significance

and

fate: the

(self)destruction

of the

ratio of

bourgeois society.

This

is

not,

then,

an

ahistorical

argument

about

the

possibility

or

impossibility

of

representation,

rather

there is

a

sociological

reason

for this luck of representability of the social and the consequent cri

tique

Adornomakes of

any

philosophy

f

art

nd

any

art

that

ttempts

269







to

either

ignore

this crisis

-

this

"catastrophe"

of

experience

as

he

calls

it

or

that

blithely

attempts

to

represent

it.

We

now

can

understand

Adorno's

problem

with

Sartre and

any

existentialist

reading

of Beckett

more

clearly.

For

Adorno,

Sartre

takes a theme, in this case the absurd, and writes a play about it. There

is

nothing

absurd about that.

The

sense-making

subject

retains its

po

sition;

it

is

not

affected

by

the

object

and, further,

either

s the

form

affected

by,

in

this

case,

the

absurd

-

the

style

of the

text

or

play

re

mains

classical

in

essence.

As

we

have

begun

to

see,

to

present

a

theme

or a

social condi

tion

in

art not

only

denies art's

autonomy

but

also

assumes

that

the

idea

or

social

condition

to

be

presented

is,

in

itself,

homogeneous

and

self-identical enough to be presented, displayed, etc., without contra

diction.

Hence

Adorno's

debate with

Lukacs and

the

denunciation of

socialist realism

(if

not

realism

per

se).

Realism

can

only

occur

when

there is

a

justified

belief in

the

real

-

only

then

can

it

be

'reflected'

in

art

without

mystification.

But

when the real

itself is

distorted

and irra

tional,

then

realism,

in

particular

social

realism,

truly

becomes

ideol

ogy:

it

falsely promises

or

evokes

the

reconciliation of social

and

ar

tistic

ends.

"An

unreconciled

reality",

Adorno

says,

"tolerates

no

rec

onciliation with the object in art", while "Realism ... only mimics

reconciliation".

(250)

"Today",

he

writes,

"the

dignity

of

art

is

meas

ured

not

according

to

whether

or

not

it

evades this

antinomy

through

lack

or

skill,

but

in terms

of

how

it

bears

it.

In

this,

Endgame

is

exem

plary". (250)

Here

we

approach

what

is essential

about

Adorno's

reading

of the

play

and

of

modernist

art

in

general:

art

bears

equivo

cation,

complexity,

antinomies

and

so

on;

it does

not

express

them,

reflect them

and,

most

importantly,

reconcile

them.

The autonomy of art forAdorno is a contradictory phenome

non.

On

the

one

hand,

it

is

immutable

and,

on

the

other,

impossible.

In

other

words,

autonomy

is

not to

be

understood

as a

formalist

attitude

or

device

which,

like

Clement

Greenberg's

thesis

concerning

the

vis

ual

arts,

is

to

hone and

perfect

the

defining

features

of

one's

particular

art-form

(two-dimensionality,

for

instance,

in

the

case

of

painting).

Nor is it

to

assert

the

purity

of

art

over

and

against

its

social

relations.

This is

no

Flaubertian

'religion

of

beauty'.

Rather,

autonomy

for

Adorno means a certain oblique relation that art has to its social

meaning

or

content,

and

that

obliqueness

not

only

has

a

historical

raison

d'etre

(the

loss

of

a

coherent

rationale

to

society

and

thus the

270







lack of

an

fluent

connection

existing

between the

social

and

aesthetic

domains),

an

aesthetic

one

(modernist

art

is

defined

by

this

autonomy,

this

'self-rule')

but

also

an

ethical

one

(the

keeping

to

this

'self-rule'

requires

consistent

formal invention and

the

highest

degree

of

effort

and exactitude, harder than following any convention, any "custom

and

costume",

as

Malevich

would

say).

This is

because

the

rule of

one's

art,

or

one's

particular

work,

has

to

be

invented

at

the

same

time

as

the work

itself.

If

anything,

this defines the

modernist

artwork

and

distinguishes

it

from

both

premodern

works

(or

realist

works

in

Adorno's

understanding

of

the

term)

and,

perhaps, postmodern

ones.

This,

at

least,

is the

issue

to

which

we

will

now

turn.

3. The Future ofModernism

I

would like

to

retain

a

number of

aspects

of

Adorno's

arguments

epitomised y

his

reading

fBeckett

in

order

to

broach

the

subject

of

the

contemporary

relation

between

art

and

politics

and

art

and

society

and

thus,

inevitably,

the

subject

of

postmodernism.

First,

that

the

indi

rect

relation between

art

and the social is itself

an

historical

phenome

non

and

occurs

when

the

autonomy

of

art

becomes

part

of the self

understanding

of modern

art.

Second

and

intimately

related

to,

but

not

entirely

reducible to the first

point,

this indirect relation occurs when

society

itself

no

longer

has

coherency

-

a

ratio

-

which allows it be

understood,

or

at

least

immediately

understood.

(This

is Adorno's

primary

ontribution

o

thinking

he

difficulty

f themodernist

work

of

art.)

In

these

two

senses,

modern

art

is

necessarily post-realist

and

necessarily post-positivist

(in

the

Saint-Simonian,

Comtean under

standing

of

positivism,

which

aligns

social and artistic

progress

with

scientific

progress).

The

term

avant-garde

in

Adorno's

reframing

of

modern art retains little of itsmartial character, rather, it becomes a

witness

to

disaster

(to catastrophe),

albeit

a

witness whose

testimony

is almost

impossible

to

read. This

is the

political

'content'

of

such

works of

art

-

that

there

is

no

direct

political

programme

to

be

derived

from

them,

as one

would

derive

meaning

and

instructions

from

a

road

sign.

Such

a

situation,

however,

should

be conceived

as

a

spur

to

fur

ther

thought

and

action,

rather than

resignation

or a

retreat

from

re

sponsibility.

t

is

a

recognition

f

the essential

difficulty

f

things

ot

an elitist subjugation of the vita activa.

It

seems

to

me

that

this

notion of the

incoherency

of

the

social

which

Adorno

ascribes

to

modernity

is also

central

to

postmodernism

271







and

in

fact

is the

most

common

definition of

it

(by

detractor

and de

fender

alike).

"Postmodern

theory",

Fredric

Jameson

writes,

"is

one

of

those

attempts

to

...

take

the

temperature

of the

age

without instru

ments

and

in

a

situation

in

which

we are

not

even sure

there is

so co

herent a

thing

as an

'age',

or

Zeitgeist

or

'system'

or 'current situation'

any

longer". (Jameson

1991,

xi)

If

this is

attempt

to

grasp

what is

difficult

to

grasp

is

more or

less Adorno's definition of the

responsi

bility

of

thought

and,

in

a

different

key,

that of

art,

one

wonders

why

it is then

specific

to

postmodern theory.

If

the

contemporary

social world is

without

coherency,

then

how

can we

claim

that

certain cultural artifacts

coherently

express

the

postmodern

condition

(Jameson's

examples

range

from architecture

through

contemporary

art to the fractured

group

politics

of

today)?

Is

it

any

wonder

then,

when

we

find lists

of ideas and works of

art

which

are

modern and those

which

are

postmodern,

the

postmodern

list

seems no

different

to

what

we

would

expect

from

a

modernist

one

(or

rather

it

appears

as

one

tendency

of

modernism,

rather

than

any

kind

of break from

or,

in

fact,

amplification

of

it).

For

Adorno,

Beckett

does

not

'represent'

his

age

nor

does his work

reflect

it

or

embody

the

'incoherency'

which

we

have

mentioned.

Rather,

his

form which is

difficult,

oblique

but also

rigorously

attentive and

just

to its own laws

-

makes

a

transversal

cut

through

the

tissue of

meaningful,

accessible

content,

thereby

obscuring

that content

but nonetheless

initiating

the

very

challenge

of

interpretation

itself

and therefore the

very

challenge

of

interpreting

the

society

we

live in.

In

this

distancing

of

content

that

the form of

modernist

art

produces

we

are

in

fact drawn

to

content,

to

interpretation:

as

Baudelaire exclaims in Les

fleur

du

mal

(CXXVI

-

Le

voyage,

VII):

au

fond

de

VInconnu

pour

trouver

du

nouveau

(This

'cut' produces the chiasmus between the

autonomy

of form - of art -

and that of

theory

which

I

have

suggested

is

Adorno's

'project'.)

Most versions

of

postmodernism,

including

Jameson's,

boil

down

to

defining

t

s

modernism

without

the

dialectical

struggle

rom

out

of

which the

new

emerges

(either

'naturally',

as

in

progression,

or

in

a

quantum

leap

or

change

of

state).

Insofar

as

dialectics

is

also

a

theory

of

history,

in

postmodernism

we

have

instead the

undialectical

appearance

of

phenomena

all

at

once

-

everything

occupies

the

same

zone of

appearance

without

change

or transformation over time.4 This

leads,

in

Jameson's

'celebrated'

formulation,

to

a

kind of

historical

and

aesthetic

and

social

"schizophrenia"

(not

to

be

confused with

the

272







clinical

meaning

of

the

term

he

keeps

telling

us;

but

how could

it

not?).

Postmodernism is

a

timeless

time,

or a

time where

everything

happens

and

appears

at

once

(as

it

supposedly

does for the schizo

phrenic): "Everything

has reached the

same

hour

on

the

great

clock of

development

or rationalisation (at least from the

perspective

of the

'West')". (Jameson,

310)

The

past

has been

absorbed

into the

present

and

no

longer

appears

as

'past',

and the future is

always already

here,

as

it

were.

Future shock

no

longer

rushes

over

the

present

from afar.

It

is

already

in

the

present,

always

part

of

it,

forming

a

invariable force

of

anxiety

and doubt. Time

comes

to

resemble

space,

and

space

be

comes

neutral,

global, rendering everything equivalent

and instanta

neously self-present.

This is the condition of 'late

capitalism',

and,

despite

protestations

to the contrary, art in

postmodernity

is bound to

reflect this. Its

defining

motif,

then,

is

pastiche,

which is

interpreted

to

mean

the simultaneous

presence

of

any

and all

art

forms

(whether

in

the

one

work

or

across

the

globe

at

any

given

moment).

Beckett's

anatomy

of theatrical

form, however,

and

to

keep

to

what

concerns us

in

this

essay,

is

by

no means

understandable

on

the

horizon

of

postmodern

exhaustion of

invention,

nor on

the

pastiche

model which follows

it,

as

a

donkey

supposedly

follows

a

carrot.

A

critical relation to past forms and the desire to

expand

them and in

deed

invent

new ones

is

very

different from the

sigh

of the

fatigued

in

the face

of

a

totally

reified world

(a

notion

that Jameson retains

while

calling

for

an

art

beyond

realism and

modernism).

If

we were

to

put

in

Adorno's

terms,

in

Beckett

we

indeed have

an

oblique

and sustained

response

to

reification

and the loss of

nature,

a

partial recognition

of

it

and

a

partial

negation

of

it in form. Indeed

Beckett's

work

may

take

us

all the

way

to

the

edge

of

this

world,

discarding

all the

weighing

stations for our concepts, interpretations and our hopes along theway,

but

it

is

not

an

ultimately

bereft

and

meaningless

gesture

of

hopeless

ness

in face of

it. For

example,

and

moving

beyond

Endgame,

we

could

say

that the

increasingly

minimalist

nature

of his

works

are

tes

tament

to

that

spirit

of

invention

which

goes

against

such

an

interpre

tation;

this is

the

same

aspect

which Adorno

recognises

as

Beckett's

unwavering

commitment

and

autonomy.

Such

minimalism

is

actually

an

amplification

f form nd

technique

into

film,

the

use

of

sound,

tape, other means of presentation, etc.), not the running down of a

creative

clock

-

of

either Beckett

himself

or

of

modernism.

The works

become

shorter,

stranger,

because there

is still

so

much

to

do,

so

much

273







to

invent,

so

many

possibilities

to

explore.

It

is

not

resignation.

End

game

is

not

the

endgame,

it

is

just

the

beginning.

I

would

like

to

suggest

that

the

term

postmodern

has

gained

such

currency

not

because

it describes

a

new

period

which

had

been

lacking

a

name,

nor even

a

significant

shift

in

history

or

culture,

but

a

weariness

in

the

face

of the

kind of tasks Adorno

offers

us as

true art

and

true

thought:

to

think

the

complexity

of

our

times

without

reduc

ing

that

complexity;

to

realise

that

the relation between

art

and

politics

(and

hence

politics

and

desire,

art

and social

meaning,

and

so

on)

is

oblique

and

refractory.

Far

from

abandoning

modernism,

we

should

endeavour

to

continue

this

task

which

Adorno

finds

so

compelling

displayed

by

Endgame:

that of

a

disturbed,

fractured

but nonetheless

potent

autonomy

of

form.

Notes

Cf. Adorno

(1997, 27)

where he writes: "Beckett's refusal

to

in

terpret

his

works,

combined

with the

most

extreme

consciousness

of

techniques

and of the

implications

of the

theatrical

and

linguis

ticmaterial, is notmerely a subjective aversion: As reflection in

creases

in

scope

and

power,

content

itself becomes

ever more

opaque.

Certainly

this does

not

mean

that

interpretation

can

be

dispensed

with

as

if there

were

nothing

to

interpret;

to

remain

content

with

that

is

the

confused

claim

that all

the

talk about the

absurd

gave

rise

to".

The full

context

of

the

phrase

"liberated form" is

as

follows:

"The

liberation of

form,

which

genuinely

new

art

desires,

holds enci

phered

within itabove all the liberation of

society,

for form- the

social

nexus

of

everything particular

-

represents

the social rela

tion

in

the

artwork;

this is

why

liberated form is

anathema

to

the

status

quo".

This sentence

can

be

considered

to

encapsulate

much,

ifnot

all,

of

Adorno's Aesthetic

Theory.

The

English

translation of

this

sentence

leaves

out

"die

perma

nente

Katastrophe"

which

follows and

qualifies

the

phrase

"...

where there is nothing left that has not been made by human be

ings,

..."

It

is

important

to

retain this

qualification

for it

is

essen

tial for

Adorno's

argument

that

the

more

obvious

catastrophe

that

shadows the entire

play

-

some

"catastrophic

event"

which

is

274







never

named

-

also

accompanied by

a more

general

catastrophe

which does

not

take

the form of

an

event

but is

a

general

attribute

or

condition

of

society

itself

("complete

reification").

4. Here, unfortunately, I have to leave aside Jameson's sustained

engagement

with

Adomo,

including

his remarks in

Late

Marxism

(Jameson 1990)

that

Adorno

not

only

has become

increasingly

relevant

to

the

'postmodern

period'

but

also

challenges

some

of

its

central features

-

precisely

on

the issue of dialectics

(242ff).

Suf

fice

to

say,

in his well-known work

on

postmodernism,

before and

after this

book,

Jameson

does

not

tend

to

elaborate

on

these

pro

ductive assertions.

Works

Cited

Adorno, Theodor,

Aesthetic

Theory,

trans.

Robert Hullot-Kentor

(London:

Athlone

P,

1997).

-,

"Trying

to

Understand

Endgame",

inNotes

To

Literature,

Vol.

2,

ed.

Rolf

Tiedemann,

trans.

Shierry

Weber Nicholsen

(New

York: Colum

bia

UP,

1992),

241-275.

-, "Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen", inNoten zur Literatur, Gasammelte

Schriften,

Bd.

II,

ed. Rolf Tiedemann

(Frankfurt

am

Main:

Suhrkamp,

1974),

281-321.

Beckett, Samuel,

Endgame

(London:

Faber,

1958).

Jameson,

Fredric,

Late Marxism:

Adorno,

or,

the

ersistence

of

the ialectic

(London:

Verso,

1990).

-,

Postmodernism,

or,

the Cultural

Logic of

Late

Capitalism

(London:

Verso,

1991)

Wolin,

Richard,

"Utopia,

Mimesis,

and

Reconciliation:

A

Redemptive

Cri

tique of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory," Representations 32

(Autumn, 1990),

33-49.

Zuidervaart,

Lambert,

Adorno's

Aesthetic

Theory:

The

Redemption

of

Illu

sion

(Cambridge,

Mass.:

MIT

P,

1991).

275

Documents

Catastrophe, Autonomy and the Future of Modernism in Adorno