Casualties, Public Opinion and U.S. Military Intervention

8/3/2019 Casualties, Public Opinion and U.S. Military Intervention

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G -2 19400513 L I 9400513REFERENCECOPY

r

A S U A L T I E S PUBLICOPINION

&U.S.MILITARY INTERVENTION

Implications forU . S .RegionalDeterrenceStrategies

DO NOT DESTROY3 0 D A Y S LOANRETURNTOAFSAA /SAM I1777NORTHKENTSTREET,7thFLOORROSSLYN,A 2?20


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TheresearchdescribednthisreportwasponsoredjointlybytheUnitedStatesArmy,ContractMDA903-91-C-0006andbytheUnitedStatesAirForce,ContractF49620-91-C-0003.

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Casualties,publicopinion,andU.S.militaryinterventionimplicationsforU.S.regionaldeterrencestrategics / BenjaminC.Schwarz.

p. cm ."PreparedfortheU.S.ArmyandtheU.S.A irForce.""MR^31-A/AF."Includesbibliographicalreferences.ISBN0-8330-1526-5 1. UnitedStatesMilitarypolicy. 2. Militaryassistance,

AmericanPublicopinion. 3. BattlecasualtiesPublicopinion. 4. UnitedStatesPublicopinion. 5. VietnameseConflict,1961-1975Publicopinion. 6. KoreanWar,1950-1953Publicopinion. 7. PersianGulfWar,1991Public opinion. I. UnitedStates. rmy. II. UnitedStates. irForce. III. Tide.UA23.S369 1994355'.033'073dc20 4-7905

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RANDsanonprofitnstitutionthatseeksomprovepublicpolicythroughresearchandanalysis.RAND'spublicationsdonotnecessarilyreflecttheopinionsorpoliciesofitsresearchsponsors.

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7V-C50S-/3

CASUALTIESP U B L I CO P I N I O N

&U.S.MILITARYINTERVENTION

ImplicationsforU . S .RegionalDeterrence Strategies

BenjaminC .Schwarz

DONOT DESTROY30DAYSLOANRETURNTO AFSAA/SAFPENTAGON,RM1D363 ,5"

Preparedforthe UnitedStatesArmy/UnitedStatesAirForce

RAND ArroyoCenter/Project A I R FORCEA p p r o v e d forpublicrelease;distributionunlimited


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PREFACE

ThisreportassessespollingdatacollectedduringtheKorean,Viet-nam,andGulfWarsoanalyzehenfluenceofAmericanpublicopiniononU.S.militaryinterventionandtsmplicationsorU.S.regionaldeterrencestrategies.Thestudyshouldinterestpolicymak-ersandmilitaryleadersconcernedwithU.S.deterrencestrategiesandwiththeimplicationsofAmericanmilitaryintervention.Thisanalysis,partofalargerresearcheffortexploringtheproblemsofpost-ColdW arregionaldeterrence,wasconductedjointlyintheStrategyandDoctrineProgramsoftheArmyResearchDivision'sAr-royoCenterandProjectAIRFORCE.heArroyoCenterandProjectAIRFORCEaretw oofRAND'sfederallyfundedresearchanddevel-opmentcenters.


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CONTENTS

Preface iiFigures iiSummary x ChapterOneINTRODUCTION ChapterTwoAMERICA'SACHILLES'HEEL?ChapterThreeVIETNAM ANDKOREA

WithdrawalKoreaVietnam 0Escalation 2Korea 2

Vietnam 3ChapterFourTH E GULF WAR 7

ADividedPublic 7AGloomyPublic 8AResoluteandRuthlessPublic 0

ChapterFiveCONCLUSIONS 3Observations andPolicy Implications 3MassiveRetaliationRedux? 5


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F I G U R E S

3.1.asualtyand"Approval"LevelsKorea3.2.asualtyand"Approval"LevelsVietnam3.3.espondentsFavoring WithdrawalKorea 1 3.4.espondentsFavoring WithdrawalVietnam 23.5.espondentsFavoringEscalationKorea 43.6.espondentsFavoring EscalationVietnam 54.1.Support"fo r GulfIntervention 84.2.xpectationsofDurationofGulfIntervention 94.3.ltimateGoalsFavoredbyPublicGulfIntervention 04.4.ublic'sWillingnesstoUseNuclearWeaponsGulfW ar 1

vii


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SUMMARY

Aviewcommonlyheldby America'smilitaryandpoliticalleadersaswellasbyAmerica'spotentialadversariesisthattheU.S.publicsparticularlysensitivetocasualtiesandthat,ifmetwithagreatnum-berofcasualtiesinaregionalmilitaryintervention,heU.S.publicwilldemandawithdrawalofAmerica'scommitment.ensitivityto casualties,then,isbelievedtobeAmerica's Achilles'heel.America'sabsolutemilitarypowermakestextraordinarilyunlikelyhatanyregionaladversarycoulddefeatU.S.forcesiftheUnitedStatesweretomobilizefully.owever,potentialadversarieshopehat,fmetwithahighcostinU.S.lives,Americawillwithdrawfromamilitaryintervention,elievinghatanll-outeffortwouldntail ro-hibitivenumberofcasualties.Thisbeliefissupposedly supported bytheU.S.experienceduringtheVietnamandKoreanconflicts.ntheseconflictsitisbelievedthat,largelybecauseofmountingcasualties,U.S.publicopinionbecameincreasinglydisenchantedwithAmericanmilitaryinvolvement,pro-vokingpopularsupportfo rthewithdrawalofU.S.troopsfromthesewars. detailedanalysisofpollstakenduringbothwarsshowsthatastheconflictscontinuedandascasualtiesandothercostsofinter-ventionmounted,publicopiniondidndeedbecomedisillusionedwithAmerica'sinvolvement,withmoreandmoreAmericansregret-tingtheoriginaldecisiontointervene.Therewas,however,verylittlemovementinth epercentageofAmeri-canspolledwhowishedtheUnitedStatestowithdrawfromth econ-flict.nfact,agrowingnumberofAmericansfavoredescalationoftheconflictstobringthemtoaquickandvictoriousend.During


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x Casualties,PublicO pinion,andU.S.MilitaryIntervention

bothwarspollsshowedthatthepublic wouldhavesupportedstrate-giestheuse ofatomicweaponsinKorea,aninvasionofNorthViet-namdeemedtooriskyorextremebytheU.S.politicalleadership.Much"anti-war"sentimentduringheVietnamWar,ornstance,expressedadissatisfactionwiththeJohnsonAdministration'sdeci-siontointerveneandwithitsconductofthewarbut,nevertheless,favorednotawithdrawalfrom theconflictbutanescalationofit.PollstakenduringtheGulfW arsupportobservationsmadeinana-lyzingthetw oearlierregionalnterventions:ncecommitted,e-gardlessofitsopinionconcerningthenitialdecisiononterveneandregardlessofcostsincurredorcoststhatarefeared,hepublicshowslittleinclinationtoquitaninterventionandinsteadstronglysupportsanescalationoftheconflict andmeasuresitbelievesneces-sarytowinadecisivevictory.Atthesametime,however,pollstakenduringtheGulf W arhighlightpublicconcernabouthighcasualties,whichcoulddissuadethepub-licfromsupporting aninterventioninthefirstplace.Since onceU.S.forcesarecommittedoannterventionherewillikelybeittlepopularsupportforwithdrawal,hepotentialorcasualtiesmakesthepublic'spoliticalwillvulnerableprimarilybeforentervention.ThepublicwilllikelybemoresupportiveofadecisiontointerveneifitbelieveshatvitalU.S.nterestsrequirenterventionorhathecostinU.S.livesof interventionwillbelow.AproperunderstandingofpublicopinionregardingU.S.militaryinterventioncansupportU.S.regionaldeterrencestrategies.hisisbestillustratedbySaddamHussein'sthreats,maderepeatedlydur-ingtheGulfcrisis,oturnheKuwaitidesertintoakillingfieldforU.S.oldiers.heraqieaderhadhopedhatsuchhreatswouldturnU.S.publicopinionagainstmilitaryintervention.utSaddamwasprobablyveryuckyhathishreatsdidnotcomerue.admanyAmericanlivesbeenlostinthestruggleagainstIraq,theU.S.publicwouldlikelyhaveintensifieditsdemandstoescalateboththemeansandtheendsoftheconflict.UndersuchcircumstancestherewouldhavebeentremendouspressureontheU.S.politicalleader-shipnotoceasehostilitiesuntilheraqiregimewasoppledwhichwasclea-lythepublic'spreferenceevenwithout highnumbersofU.S.casualties.


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Summary x i

Regionaldeterrencestrategiescouldbeaidedifthefollowingcouldbecommunicatedopotentialregionaladversaries:nvolvingtheUnitedStatesinawarperforceignitespublicpassions.nthepast,thesepassionshaveleadtocriesfo rescalation.Thereisnoreasonto believethattheywillnotdosointhefuture,especiallyif thepublicisconfrontedwiththefactorlikelihoodofhighU.S.casualties.l-thoughtheremaybeadvantagesthattheU.S.politicalandmilitaryleadershiprecognizesinkeepingthemeansandendsofconflictlim-ited,oncewarbeginsthatis,oncedeterrencefailspublicfeeling takesonamomentumofitsownandcan,asithasoftenin thepast,easilyecomeotheaded,npredictablend,romhenemy'spointofview,ruthless.nshort,shoulddeterrencefail,publicpas-sionouldushecisionmakersoscalatequicklyandnpre-dictably,beyondthelimitationsdecisionmakersmightwishtoplaceonheconflict.nhissituation,hostileregimeswouldbeathemercyofanimpatientandruthlessU.S.public.


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ChapterO neIN TR ODU CTION

ThisreportanalyzestheinfluenceofU.S.publicopiniononAmeri-canmilitaryintervention.tspecificallyassessestheeffectofrising Americancasualties1onpublicsupportfo rU.S.military interventionandonpublicdemandsthattheUnitedStateswithdrawfrommili-tarycommitments.Thereport,partofalargerstudyontheproblemofdeterminingregionaladversariesnhepost-ColdW arera,ad-dresseshowperceptionsofthepublic'sreactionocasualtiescanthwartandaidU.S.deterrencestrategies.ThisstudyexaminesthethreemostrecentcasesofmajorU.S.mili-tary interventioninregionalconflicts:heKorean,Vietnam,andGulfconflicts.ConcerningKoreaandVietnam,itiswidelyheldthatU.S.publicopinionregardingcasualtiesledtoadeclineinpublicsupportfo rthenterventionand,concomitantly,asurgeinpublicdemandthatAmericawithdrawitsmilitarycommitments.ntheGulfWar,U.S.policymakersandmilitaryleaders,havinglearnedtheapparent"lessons"oftheVietnamconflict,fearedthat,ifconfrontedwithhighcasualtyrates,publicsupportfortheAmericaninterventionagainstIraqwoulddeclineandhepublicwoulddemandAmericanwith-drawalfromtheconflictbeforetheUnitedStatesachieveditsgeopo-liticalobjectives.

'Thisreportusescasualtyfigures,ratherthanhemorerestricteddeathigures,or tw oreasons.irst,hepublicreactstodeathsandtoinjuriesanddismemberment.Second,theliteratureonthissubjectexaminespublicreactiontocasualties,notonlydeaths.Comparisonsofthefindingsof thisstudywiththoseofotherstudiesrequirethatthesamefactorsbeused.


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2 Casualties,Public O pinion,andU.S.MilitaryIntervention

Perhapsevenmoreimportant,theIraqisalso learnedthe"lessons"ofU.S.public opinionandmilitaryintervention.raq embarkeduponastrategyofthreateningtheUnitedStateswithhighnumbersofcasu-alties,believingthatifAmericaweretontervene,ra qwouldpro-vokeadramaticncreasenU.S.publicoppositionoheU.S.n-volvementymposing eryig hricenhatnvolvement.Clearly,theU.S.hreattointerveneinregionalconflictlosesitsef-fectivenessasadeterrentiftheUnitedStatesoritspotentialadver-sariesbelievehateitherAmericawillbe"self-deterred"romn-volvementorthatsuchinvolvementwillbeforcedtoanendbecauseofpublicopinionregardingcasualties.hisreport,hen,analyzesAmerica'sexperienceinthesethreeconflictstounderstandthecon-straintsandopportunitiesthatU.S.publicopinionimposesuponpolicymakers,separatingapparentlessonsfrom realones.Inattemptingoassesspublicopinionregardingthesehreecon-flicts,hisstudyisacedwithanunavoidableobstacle:tcanelyonlyuponpollingdatacompiledduringtheconflicts.hismeansthat,often,hequestionshatpollstersnactdidaskarenotthequestionsthatthisstudywouldhaveaskedandthat,givenhistoricalhindsight,thetimingofcertainkeyquestionswas"off."pecifically,duringtheGulf War,therearenoreliablepollresultsfromtheperiodduringhedecisivegroundoperationsagainstraqiorces,incetheseoperationswerecompletedsoswiftly.DuringtheKoreanandVietnamWars,thepollingquestionaskedmostfrequently,andthatsohapedutureerceptionsfublicpinionuringhoseconflicts,wasquitevagueandidotanswerheundamentalquestionswithwhichthisstudyisconcerned.nshort,theanalysisinhisreportsimitedbyhequestionshatwereofinterestopollstersatthetimeoftheseconflicts,whichmayormaynotbethequestionsofmostvalueinassessing theissuesraisedbythisstudy.T hestudyreliesexclusivelyonpre-existingpollingdata.texplores,andinmanycases,synthesizes,theresultsofHarris,Gallup,Roper,NationalOpinionResearchCenter(NORC),SurveyResearchCenter,andationalewspapersNeworkimes,Losngelesimes,WashingtonPost)polls.


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ChapterTwoAMERICA'SACHILLES'H E E L ?

Astate'ssuccessinwaris notdueexclusivelytoitsabsolutepower.tisotnlyheconomictrength,ualityofweaponsystems,training,andleadershipthatdeterminemilitaryoutcomes.uchin-tangiblefactorsasmorale,popularsupport,andatoleranceforpainalsoplayaroleoftenadecisiverole. state'swarpowerispredi-catedonhesociety'swillingnessoufferwhatsoftenermed"costtolerance")aswellas onitsability toachievethestate'smilitaryobjectives.superiorcostolerance,ortheabilitytoexactasym-metricalcosts,ofanotherwiseweakerstatecansometimesoffsetthegreatermilitaryormaterialstrengthofthecountrywithwhichitiswagingwar.Abignationcanthusloseasmallwarifitspainthresh-oldisinsufficientlyhigh.America'spainthresholdspecifically,itsperceivedsensitivity toca-sualtiesisbelieved,bymanyU.S.policymakersandmilitarylead-ers,aswellasbypotentialadversaries,tobeitsAchilles'heel.asedlargelyupontheapparentlessonsof America'sinvolvementintheVietnamandKoreanWars,thereisawidelyheldperceptionthat,ascasualtiesmount,publicopinionwilldemandawithdrawalofU.S.militarycommitment.ThisperceivedvulnerabilityisoftenexploitedbyAmerica'spotentialenemies.nthemonthsprecedingtheGulfWar,Iraqileader,SaddamHussein,repeatedlyassertedthatAmerica"doesnothavethestomach"foracostlyandprolongedconflictwithIraq.ndSaddam'sstrategy,whileunsuccessful,wastoimposeex -traordinarilyhighcasualtiesontheUnitedStatesinthehopethattheresultingdomesticU.S.oppositionwouldorceacessationoftheconflictonermsavorableoraq.oreecently,BosnianSerbleaderRadovanKaradzic,haswarnedtheWest,andspecifically,the


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4 Casualties,PublicO pinion,andU.S.MilitaryIntervention

UnitedStates,thatNATO countries"cannotbearthepain"thattheSerbswouldinflictif thoseforces intervenedinBosnia.Americans,oo,believehatheirsocietysparticularlympatientwithlongandbloodywarsandthat,whenAmericansoldiersreturnfromforeigninterventioninbodybags,publicoutcrywilldemandawithdrawalromheseconflicts.uringpreparationsortheGulfWar,fo rinstance,thenArmyChiefofStaffGeneralCarlVuonoun-derstoodthatAmerica'smilitaryforcescouldprevailagainsttheIraqimilitary,buthenonethelessearedhatAmerica's"politicalwill"wouldbedealtasevereblow if U.S.casualtiesmounted,resultingin anendtohostilitiesbeforeU.S.militarygoalswerereached.Thebe-liefthatAmerica'sabilitytonterveneisweakenedbythepublic'sconcernforcasualtiesisperhapsbestsummarizedbyapassageina1984RANDreport:

Inthefuture,aPresidentmayelecttodelayorforgodirectUSmili-taryinterventioninaThirdWorldconflicteventhoughitmaybeneededtodefendlegitimateUSinterestsbecauseof concernthatpublicsupportmaydeclineorcollapseoncetheUnitedStatesisdeeplycommitted.Evenifpublicsupport foraspecificintervention isinitiallyhigh,itcanbedemonstratedthatcontinuingUScasual-tiesover timewillseriouslyerodepublic support.1

Clearly,hisperceptionadverselyaffectsAmerica'sregionaldeter-rencetrategies.fpotentialdversarieselievehat .S .nterventioncanbedefeatedbysimplyimposingahighpriceonhatintervention,thentheyareunlikelytobedeterredbyU.S.threatsto intervene.owever,U.S.publicreactiontocasualtiesishistoricallymoreomplexhanAmerica'sotentialnemieselieve;his reactionhasimplicationsthatcanenhanceratherthanhobbleU.S.deterrencestrategies.evertheless,fproperlyunderstood,publicopinionegardingasualtiesnurprisingwaysstillikelyoconstraintheoptionsavailabletopolicymakersandmilitaryleadersinregionalinterventions.

'MarkA .orell,harlesT.elley,r.,withDeborah ensler,asualties,ublicOpinion,ndresidentialolicyuringheietnamar,AND,-3060-AF,November1984.


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America'sAchilles'Heel?

ThebeliefthattheU.S.publicwilldemandawithdrawalfrom amili-taryinterventionbecauseofasensitivitytocasualtiesissomewhatsurprising.Afterall,Americansslaughteredeachother forfouryearsintheirCivilWar,producinghorrificandcompletelyunanticipatedcasualties. ndthatwarended,notwhentheSouthsuedfo rpeacebecauseofanintolerablenumberofdeaths,butonlywhenitwasin-vaded,rippedapart,andoccupied.nthiscentury,Japan'sstrategyagainsttheUnitedStateswasinmanywaysquitesimilartoIraq's.KnowingthattheywoulddefinitelyloseawariftheUnitedStatesmobilizedfully,theJapanesereasonedthattheironlychoicelayinapreemptivetrikeoripplexistingAmericanmilitaryorces.Japan'sleadershiphopedtoforcetheUnitedStatestonegotiateasettlementratherthanwageaprolongedwarrequiringgreatsacri-fice.2Thiscalculation,ofcourse,provedcatastrophicfo rJapan.TheUnitedStatesmadewaragainstJapanwithfullforce,culminatingintheonlyatomic attacksinhistory.O necanarguehatheCivilandSecondWorldWarswere total"wars,arousingpassions withintheAmericanpublicqualitativelydif-ferentro mhosearousedby"limited"orregionalwars.nact,however,thereisastrikingandlargelyignoredhistoricalcontinuityinhepublic'sattitudeduringheseearlierwarsandduringaterlimitedconflicts.DomesticdiscontentandfrustrationwiththewaywarwasconductedncreasednbothheCivilandSecondWorld Wars,3asitdidintheKoreanandVietnamWars.Thatfrustrationdid notleadtoincreasedcriesforAmericanwithdrawalfromtheformerwars.Diditinthe latterwars? 2NobutakaIke,ed.,Japan'sDecisions forWar:ecordsof the1941PolicyConferences,StanfordUniversityPress,Stanford,California,1967.3DuringtheCivilWar,popularsupportforLincolnandtheUnioneffortebbedandflowednotinresponsetocasualtiesbutbecauseofpublicperceptionhatdecisiveactionwasorwasnotunderway.Whentheconflictwastakentotheenemy,publicsupportorLincolnncreased,egardlessofhecasualtiesncurred.hispublicpreferenceisnotlimitedtothewar foughtfrom1861-1865


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ChapterThreeVIETNAM ANDK O R E A

InaNationalSecurityCouncilmeetingnuly1965,asPresidentLyndonJohnsonwasagonizingoverthedecisiontocommitAmeri-cangroundroopsohewarinVietnam,UndersecretaryofStateGeorgeBall,whoopposedU.S.commitment,showedthe Presidentabriefingchartdisplayingadeclinein"publicsupport"overtimefo rAmerica'sinvolvementintheKoreanW arasAmericancasualtiesin thatwarmountedFigure3.1).allarguedhathesamehingwouldhappeniftheUnitedStateschosetointerveneinVietnam.

RAND 2 0 J310294120,000

Cumulat ivecasualtiesercentapprovingintervention

I _ L -

-100,000

-0,0001 6was

60,000a>40,000

20,000

0ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMA1950951952953 Year

SOURCE:eorgeBall'sN SCbriefingchart,basedon Gallupan dNORCpolls.

Figure3.1Casualtyand "Approval"LevelsKorea


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Ball'schartshowedheessonhatAmerica'seadershadalreadylearnedfromtheKoreanWaralessonthattheywouldapplyinfullto theVietnamWar.Duringbothconflicts,pollstersaskedthepublicmanyquestionsregardingitsattitudetowardthewarsbeingfought,buttheonequestionaskedmostfrequentlyduringbothwarsanddisplayedonBall'schart"Givenwhatyounowknow,doyouap-proveofthedecisionogoowar?"isheprismhroughwhichpublicattitudestowardbothwarsareunderstood.Thelessonseemsclear:sthewarcontinues,ascasualtiesmount,public"support"forthewardeclines.Duringbothconflicts,theresultsof thesepollswerewidelyregardedasthewholestoryof thepublicattitude.hepublicattitudetowardthewarinVietnamisthusunderstoodtobeencapsulatedbytw olinesinFigure3.2adeclineinthoserespond-ingaffirmativelytothequestion"Inview ofthedevelopmentssince

7umulativecasualtiesercentapprovingintervention

RANDJ0M42-0294200,000180,000160,000

-140,000iC O120,000s 100,000m> 80,000I60,000|40,00020,000

0i SONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA

1965966967968YearNOTE:lthoughAmericanmilitarynvolvementnVietnamontinuedhrough 1973,hisstudydiscussespollesultsonlyfo rtheeriodfromu ly965whenU.S.groundtroopswerecommitted)throughAugust1968,whenitwasclearthatth eUnited StateswouldursueseriousnegotiationswithHanoitoendhewar.fterthisdate,thepublicunderstoodthatAmericanwithdrawalfrom Vietnam was onlyamatteroft imeandpollingquestionsregardingwithdrawalandescalation,whichwereconsistentfrom July1965throughAugust1968,wereaskedlessfrequently andwereofaqualitativelydifferentcharacter,makingcontinuityinanalysisofpublicattitudeimpossible.

Figure3.2Casualtyand"Approval"LevelsVietnam


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VietnamandKorea

weenteredhefightinginVietnam,doyouhinkheU.S.madeamistakeinsendingtroopsoightinVietnam?"ascasualtiesaccu-mulate.Thisisunfortunate,fo rthequestionisofverylimitedvalueinunder-standingpublicopinion.hequestiondoesnotask"WhatpolicyshouldheU.S.nowpursue?"nor"ShouldheU.S.nowwithdrawfromitscommitment?"tsimplyaskswhether theinitialdecisiontocommit forceswascorrect.However,itisnotsurprisingthatthiswasthemostfrequentlyaskedquestionduringbothconflicts.Domesticpoliticsandpoliticalnewscoveragerevolvesaroundthepercep-tionoftheAdministration'spopularityorapprovalrating.ortheAdministrationnpower,hen,pollresultsthatreporthepublic'sattitudeowardheAdministration'smostmportantolicythedecisiontogotowararevital.For the Administrationthatinitiatesconflict,hepublic'sattitudeowardhatdecisionwillargelyde-terminetheAdministration's politicalfortune.Inshowingtheabovechart,BallwasappealingtoJohnson'spoliticalinstincts.ewasarguingnotthatU.S.interventionwasorwasnotsoundpolicybutthatifthePresidentchosetocommitU.S.groundtroopstoVietnam,hispopularity wouldsuffertremendouslyasin-deeditdid.T hepollresultssummarizedintheabove chartsdonotindicatewhatthepublic'spreferenceswereduringheseconflicts.ortunately,pollstersaskedmanyquestionsregardinghepublic'spreferencesduringbothconflicts,eventhoughtheresultsofthosepollswerenotnearlyaswidelyreportedatthetimeaswerethe"approval"polls.Whentheresultsofthesepollsregardingpublicpreferencesareex -amined,aarmorecomplexpictureofpublicopinionegardingAmericanmilitary interventionemerges.W I T H D R A W A L KoreaItisacommonlyheldviewthatintheVietnamWar,andtoalesserextentnheKoreanWar,sU.S.casualtiesmounted,sublic"approval"of theconflictdeclined,increasingnumbers of AmericanswantedtheU.S.towithdrawitsforces.Thisunderstandingislargely


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10 Casualties,Public O pinion,andU.S.MilitaryIntervention

responsibleorAmericanpolicymakers'earandAmericanadver-saries'hopesthathighU.S.casualtieswillforceAmericanwithdrawalfromregionalinterventions.nexaminationofpollingdataduringtheseconflictspointstoadifferentconclusion.Notsurprisingly,in August1950,atthebeginningofU.S.nvolvementnKorea'swar,when66percentofthosepolledapprovedofAmerica'sintervention,only12percentofrespondentstoaGallupOrganizationpollwantedtheUnitedStatesto"pullout,stopfighting"inKorea.ourmonthslater,thepublic'sattitudetowardmanyaspectsofthewarhaddra-maticallyaltered.WiththeChineseinterventionintheKoreanWar,Americanasualtiesncreasedremendouslyndxtraordinarilyquickly.Confrontedwiththerealitythat interventioninKoreawouldbecostlyandprobablyprolonged,public"approval"ofAmerica'sdecisiontoinvolveitselfinKorea'swardeclinedprecipitouslyfrom66percentinAugusttoonly39percentinDecember.ut,askedbytheGalluporganization"WhatdoyouthinkweshoulddoobringthewarinKoreatoanend?"only11percentof thosepolledchosethe option"withdraw."Sixmonthslater,whenaN O R Cpollasked"D oyouthinkweshouldcontinuetokeepourtroopsinKorea,orshouldwepullthemout,"thenumberchoosingtheoption"pulloutnow"hadclimbedby3percentFigure3.3).lthoughonly37percent"approved"ofthedecisiontogotowarinKorea,76percentchosethe"continue"op-tion(10percentchose"noopinion").verthenext22months,ascasualtiesroseto120,000andas"approval"hoveredaround40per-cent(withabriefriseto45percentwhentrucetalksbeganin1951),variouspollsshowedhenumberofrespondentsavoringawith-drawalfromKoreafluctuatingbetween only12and17 percent.VietnamWhen,nJuly1965,heUnitedStatescommittedgroundroopsoVietnam,62ercentofhoseolledyheGallupOrganization"approved"ofthedecisiontointerveneandonly9percentwantedtheUnitedStatesto"pullout"ofVietnam.yApril1966,theUnitedStateshadsufferednearly20,000casualties,"approval"haddroppedto47percent,butonly11percentofthose polledbyN O R C wishedto seeanAmericanwithdrawalfrom Vietnam.yMarch1968,afterthe


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VietnamandKorea 1 1

70 60 50 -

S 40 S . 30

2010

0

umulat ivecasualtiesercentapprovingintervention

Percenttavonngwithdrawal

RAND *504-33-0294

//V *

120,000

100,000

80,000360,000 D>40,000|

3o

ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMA1950951952953 YearSOURCES:allup,Harris,Roper,an dNORCpolls.Figure3.3RespondentsFavoringWithdrawalKorea 20,000 0

publiclyperceiveddisasteroftheJanuary1968T etoffensive,with150,000cumulativeU.S.casualties,withtherateofcasualtiesaccel-eratingsignificantlyoverthepastyear,andwith"approval"ofthewardownto40percentofthosepolled,only12percentofrespon-dents,askedbytheRoperpoll"WhichofthefollowingdoyouthinkweshoulddorightnowinVietnam?,"chosetheoption"pulloutofVietnam."yAugust1968,public"approval"haddeclinedto32per-cent,casualtieshadrisento200,000,butonly9percentofrespon-dentsfavoredthewithdrawaloptionofferedbytheRoperO rganiza-tion.FromheperiodJuly1965toAugust1968,public"approval"oftheVietnamW arhaddeclinedby30percentagepoints,casualtieshadaccumulatedorrifically,utheumberofAmericansavoringwithdrawalfromVietnamwasnearly unchanged(Figure3.4).InboththeKoreanandVietnamWarsitisclearthat"disapproval"ofthewardidnottranslateintoapublicdesiretowithdraw.nfact,astrongmajorityregrettedhedecisionontervene,butanover-whelmingmajoritydidnotwishtoquit.Whatdid Americanswant?


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1 2 Casualties,PublicO pinion,andU.S.MilitaryIntervention

RAND#204-3 4-0294 200,000180,000160,000

ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA196596696 7968YearSOURCES:allup,Harris,Roper,an dNORCpolls.Figure3.4RespondentsFavoringWithdrawalVietnam

ESCAL AT IO N Inbothwars,farmoreAmericanspreferredtofight(harder)thanto quit.nbothconflicts,asthewardraggedon,ascasualtiesandothercostsaccumulated,andas"approvalfo rtheinitialdecisiontointer-venefell,pollsshowedanincreasingnumberofAmericanswishingtoescalatethefighting.nfact,pollsinbothwarsshowaninverserelationship between"approval"oftheinterventionandthepublic'sdesiretoescalatetoachievedecisiveresults.KoreaDuringtheKoreanWar,variousescalationoptionswerepresentedto thepublicbydifferentpollsatdifferenttimes.Sometimestheesca-lationoptionwasnotspecific(respondentsweregivenachoice,fo rinstance,inanApril1952N O R Cpoll,among:1)"pullour troops outofKorea"16percent;2)"keepourtroopsinKorea"31percent;(3)"goontheattackagainsttheCommunistChinese"49percent;andnoopinion"4percent). Othertimes,heescalationoption


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VietnamandKorea 13

wasclearlyspelledout(aDecember1951GallupOrganizationpoll'soption,ornstance,was"bombhemuseA-bomb").ndtillotherimes,heescalationoptionwasmpliedaFebruary952Roperpoll'soptionswere:1)pullourroopsoutofKorea"14percent;2)continuehear"34ercent;3)attackheCommunistorceswitheverythingwehave"47percent;and4)"noopinion"5percent).vertime,moreandmorerespondentspreferredtheescalationoption.Throughouttheconflict,aswehaveseen,roughly77percentofrespondentspreferrednottowithdraw(anaverageof10percentofrespondentsheldnoopinion).hosewhopreferredtoescalateratherthantocontinueatthepresentleveloffightinggrewfromjustover20percentathebeginningoftheconflicto40percentfollowingtheChineseinterventionandhenheldbetween45percentand49percent(exceptfo ramodestdropto 43percentatthe beginningofthetrucetalks)from July1951throughAugust1953.Thosefavoringescalationalwaysgreatlyoutnumberedthosefavoringwithdrawalfromamarginof2to atthebeginningofthe conflicttoalmost5to fo rtheperiodafterJuly1951.Clearly,asthewarcontinuedandcasualtiesrose,thepublicbecameincreasinglyfrustratedwiththewar(shownbythedeclineintheper-centage"approving"thewar).rustration,however,lednottocriestowithdrawbuttoadesiretoescalate(Figure3.5).VietnamVietnampresentsanevensharperpictureofthepublicpassionfo rescalationasconflictscontinue.swashecasewithheKoreanWar,differentpollingorganizationspresenteddifferentescalationoptionsandevenhesamepollinggroupwouldatdifferenttimespresentdifferentescalationoptions.heatomicoptionwasaskedonlythreetimesbythepollsexamined;thatoption,fo rreasonsdis-cussedinthenextchapter,waslesspopularthanduringtheKorean conflictpreferred,hough,by37percentofthosepollednApril1968). suallyescalationwasconfinedtooneoption;occasionally,however,pollshadwoescalationoptionsanAugust1968Roperpoll,orxample,aveespondentswoscalationhoices:"graduallybroadenandintensifyourmilitaryeffort"(24percent),or"startanall-outeffortowinhewarquickly,evenatheiskof


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1 4 Casualties,PublicO pinion,andU.S.Military Intervention

70 -Cumulativecasualties

ercentapprovingintervention ercentlavoringwithdrawal ercentfavoringescalation

MHO/204-350294

1ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMA1950951952953 YearSOURCES:allup,Harris,Roper,an dNORCpolls.Figure3.5RespondentsFavoringEscalationKorea

120,000 100,000

jj80,000I

s 60,000 a> 40,000 |

o20,000 0

ChinaorRussiaenteringthewar"(30percent)).hemostcommonescalationoptionwas"takeastrongerstand,evenifitmeansinvad-ingNorthVietnam"anoption,which,if taken,waswidelybelievedtoentailbothhighU.S.casualtiesandtheriskofChineseand/orSo- vietintervention.AswasthecasewiththeKoreanWar,astheconflictcontinued,asca-sualtiesmounted,andas"disapproval"ofthecommitmentgrew,anincreasingnumberofthosepolledfoundescalationthemostattrac-tiveoption.ro mJuly1965toAugust1968,anaverageof77percentofthosepolledpreferredremainingin Vietnamtowithdrawal(anav-erageof12percentavoredwithdrawaland1ercentheldoopinion).yJuly1966,andcontinuingtotheendofJuly1968,moreofthose77percentpreferredescalationtocontinuingthewaratthepresenteffort.yNovember1967,hoseavoringescalationex -ceededthosefavoringfightingatthesamelevelofeffortbynearly5to2,andhoseavoringescalationexceededhoseavoringwith-drawalbynearly5to1 .Approval"ofthewarwasinverselyrelatedtothedesiretoescalatetheconflict(Figure3.6).


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VietnamandKorea 1 5

RAND#2W36-flaW200,000180,000160,000m140,0002

-120,000w100,000a>

-0,000 a0|o

ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJ JA1965966967968YearSOURCES:arris,Roper,ORC,an dN ew YorkTimespolls.Figure3.6Respondents FavoringEscalationVietnam

Muchanti-warsentiment,nact,reflectedadisillusionmentwiththewarandtheconcomitantdesirenottowithdrawtroopsbutin-steadoescalatehewarogettoveronermsavorableoheUnitedStates.hisexplainsacuriousandoverlookedfact.nthe1968ewHampshirerimary,heovishnti-warandidateSenatorEugeneMcCarthypolledasurprisinglyhigh42percentofthevoteagainstPresidentJohnson,convincingthePresidentthathis popularsupporthadsoerodedthatreelectionwasimpossible.M c-Carthy'sstrongperformancewaswidelyinterpretedatthetimeasapro-peacevote.hosewhovotedforMcCarthyintheNewHamp-shireprimarywereverydissatisfiedwithJohnson's Vietnampolicies.ButamongheMcCarthyvoters,hosewhoweredissatisfiedwithJohnsonornotpursuingaharderinenVietnamoutnumberedthosewhowantedawithdrawalbyamarginof3to2.ndeed,ofthosewhofavoredMcCarthybeforetheDemocraticConventionnJunebutwhoswitchedtoanothercandidatebyNovember,aplural-


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ityhadswitchedohehardlinecandidateGovernorGeorgeWal-lace.1PublicopinionduringheVietnamonflictbecamencreasingly"anti-war,"butnotinthewaythat wordisgenerallyunderstood.n-deed,althoughAmericansweredisenchantedwiththewaythewarwasconducted,anincreasingnumberwantedtheUnitedStatesto wageakindofwarthatwasgenerallyunderstoodwouldbringmoredeathanddestructiontotheVietnamese.xpertpollstersin1970,examiningtheresultsofaHarrispollonpublicreactiontothemassrapesandmassacrebyU.S.troopsatMylai,concludedthatalthoughgeneraldiscontentwiththewarwasstrong,thatdisenchantmentwaspragmatic:eactionotheMylaimassacre,heyconcluded,could"bestbedescribedasbland."21 Philip.onverse,Warren.Miller,errold.usk,ndArthur.Wolte,"ContinuityandChangein AmericanPolitics:PartiesandIssuesinthe1968Election,"AmericanPoliticalScience Review,Vol.LXIII,December1969,p.1101.2PhilipE .ConverseandHowardSchuman,"'SilentMajorities'andtheVietnamWar,"ScientificAmerican,Vol.222,No.6,June1970.


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ChapterFourTHEGULFW A R

A D I V I D E DP U B L I C O ntheeveofAmericanmilitaryinterventionagainstIraq,heU.S.publicwasfarmoredividedconcerningthewisdomof interventionthantwasbeforeeitherheKoreanorVietnamWars.heresstrong evidencethatthepublic'sambivalencewaslargely becauseofaconcernhatmilitaryoperationsagainstraqwouldentailmanyAmericancasualties.hepublicdebatewithinCongress,onheop-edpages,and,accordingtohepolls,withinAmericanhouse-holdsrevolvedaroundanagonizingquestion:sejectingIraqfrom Kuwait worththelivesofagoodmanyAmericansoldiers?ThepublicbelievedthatIraqileader SaddamHusseinwasanunpleasantman;itcertainlybelievedthatimportantU.S.interestswereinvolvedintheGulfcrisis(althoughitwasfrustratedhattheBushAdministrationwasunabletoarticulatethoseinterests),butitwasleftwonderingifthosefactsmeritedtheU.S.wagingwhatwasalmostuniversallybe-lievedwouldbeabloodyandprolongedconflict.WithheGulfW arnowregardedasAmerica'smost"popular"warsinceWorldW arII,itiseasytoforgetthepublic'sambivalencedur-ing themonthsprecedingintervention.O ntheeveoftheleastpopu-larwarnU.S.history,he1964GulfofTonkinResolution,which gavethePresident broadpowerstodirectmilitaryoperationsagainstNorthVietnam,passedtheSenatebyavoteof88to2.ntheotherhand,theSenatevoteinfavorofmilitaryactionagainstIraqbeforetheGulfconflictbarelysqueakedby,withavoteof52navorofgrantingthePresidentauthoritytouseforceagainstIraqand48op-posedafourvotemargin.T hepublicwasslightlylessdividedthan

17


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1 8 Casualties,Public O pinion,andU.S.MilitaryIntervention

itsrepresentatives.AGalluppollconductedsix daysbeforetheSen-atevoteshowed52percentofrespondentsavoringhe"UnitedStatesgoing towarwithIraqtodrivetheIraqisoutofKuwait"and39percentopposingthatmeasure.ixweeksearlier,whenaskedthesamequestion,only37percentapprovedofAmericanintervention,and51percentdisapproved.OncetheUnitedStateswascommittedtoactionagainstIraq,however,thepublicquicklyralliedaroundtheflag.nheeveoftheairoffensiveagainstraq,hepublichadshiftedsignificantly:79percent in favor,15percent opposed.Alittle overtw oweekslater,thepublicwasevenmorefirmly behindthein-tervention:83percent infavor,15percent opposed(Figure4.1).A G L O O M Y PUBLICWhatsmostinterestingaboutthesepollresultsshat,despiteahighapprovalofintervention,hepublicirmlybelievedhatwaragainstIraqwouldbeaverybloodyaffairindeed.Althoughinretro-spectthiswasanunreasonablygloomyview oftheconflict,thepub-

90 80

RND?(K -0294

w0000."D oyo u favor 70 or opposetheU.S.goingto o>

c60 50

/ir campaignbeginswarwithIraq / " todrivethe cS 40 /Iraqis outof 9 30 -Kuwait?" 20

10n 11/18 12/2 12/9 12/16 1/6 1/16 1/20 1/22 1/26 2/3

1990991 YearSOURCE:alluppolls.

Figure4.1 "Support"forGulf Intervention


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The G u l f War 1 9

He,oncecommitted,wantedtoseethewarcometoanend.nearlyFebruary,83percentoftherespondentstoaGalluppoll"approved"ofU.S.intervention,eventhough:3percentbelieved"thesituationwilldevelopntoabloodyground warwithhighnumbersof casualtiesonbothsides." 2percentbelieved"Iraqwilluse chemical,biological,ornuclear

weapons."7percentbelievedhatU.S.citizenswillbecomevictimsofIraqiterrorism."1T hepublicalsobelievedthewaragainstIraqwouldnotbeanagonyquicklyover.ixty-twopercentofrespondentstothesamepollbe-lievedhewarwouldastmonths.ineteenpercentbelievedtwouldastayear.nly2percentbelievedtwouldbeovernweeks.ndaminuscule2percentforesawawarfinishedndays(Figure4.2).

HAND*204-42-0294

"Nowthatth eUnited Stateshastakenmilitary

actionagainstIraq,doyo u thinkth efightingwill

continuefo rjustafewdays,amatterofweeks,

severalmonths,orayearormore?"

N oopinion(5%) Davs2%)Year(18%)

Weeks(12%)

Months(62%)SOURCE:alluppoll,February3,991.

Figure4.2Expectationsof Duration of Gulf Intervention

Gallupp o l l ,February3 ,1 9 9 1 ,S u r v e y ,N o .G O T 2 2 0 1 5 .


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A R E S O L U T E A ND R U T H L E S S P U B L I C Perhaps,hen,becauseoftheVietnamandKoreanWars,heU.S.publicwasconditionedtoexpectthatamajormilitaryinterventionwouldnecessarilymeanaprotractedwarwithhighU.S.casualties.But,despitethese bleakexpectations,thepublicshowedlittlesignofwantingtowithdrawfromtheconflict.nfact,believingfirmlythatwarwithraqwouldbeahorribleexperienceorAmerica,mostAmericansneverthelesswantedtocontinuemakingwaragainstIraq evenafterSaddam'sorceswereejectedromKuwait.vincingathirsttogowellbeyondtheUNmandate,aswellasitsgovernment'spolicygoals,67percentofrespondentsdidnotwantheUnitedStatestostopthewarifIraqremoveditsforcesfromKuwaittheywantedAmericatopressonuntilSaddamwasremovedfrompower.Clearly,the publicwantedadecisivevictory(Figure4.3).Moreover,alongwithadesirefo rcompletevictory,hepublicin-creasinglysupportedtheuseofwhatevermeanswouldbenecessarytodefeatIraqandthussave Americanlives.AskedbytheGallupO r-ganizationnearlyJanuary,whenU.S.militaryactionagainstraqwasavaguepossibility,iftheyfavoredoropposedAmericanuseof

"D oyo uthinktheUnitedStatesshouldstopits militaryactionagainstIraqifIraqpullsitstroopsou tofKuwait,or only

ifSaddam Hussein isalsoremoved

from power?"

N oopinion(5%)RAND#204 - < 3-0294

En dwarwithIraqipullout(28%)

SOURCE:allupp o l l ,February3,1991.Figure4.3Ultimate GoalsFavored by PublicG ulf Intervention


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TheG u l f W a r 2 1

nuclear weaponsagainstIraqif itmightsavethelivesofU.S.troops,only24percentofrespondentsapproved.ythelastweekinJan-uary,however,whentheUnitedStateswasalreadyatwarwithIraq,respondents'answersweredramaticallydifferent.orty-six percentnowapproved.nearlyFebruary,beforegroundoperationsagainstIraqhadbegun,48percentapproved,andonly46percentopposed(Figure4.4).ItisimportanttonotethattheGallupquestiondidnotaskwhetherAmericansapprovedofusingnuclearweaponsinresponsetoIraqiuseofweaponsofmassdestruction.tmerelyaskedwhetherAmeri-cansapprovedofnuclearweaponsusefitmightspareU.S.ives.T hepublic,hen,wasexpressingsupportoranuclearfirststrikeagainstIraq;apositionatvariancewithbothU.S.policyandinter-nationallaw.TheGulf W arexperienceshowsthattheU.S.publicisperhapsmorecautioustosupportaninterventioninthefirstplace thanithadbeenbeforetheKoreanandVietnamWars(althoughintheseearlierwarsasignificantpercentageofpublicopinionhad,too,beenskepticalofinvolvementonheeveofconflict). Publicopiniondatafromhe

100 90

MH0I2O4-44-0294

_ Don'tknow I I80 - Approve"Would yo u favoror

sntnavor

oooopposetheU.S.use

ofnuclearweaponsinthePersianGulfifitmightsavethelives 2 40 o 1OpposeofU.S.troops?" - 30 -20 "

100 1 l _

aliy/91 Late1/91 Elrly2 7 9 1 SOURCE:alluppoll,February3 ,1991 .

Figure4.4Public's Willingnessto UseNuclearWeaponsGulfWar


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GulfWar,however,einforcearendclearlyevidentnAmerica'searlierregionalconflicts:ncenvolved,egardlessofitsopinionconcerningtheinitialdecisiontointervene,andregardlessofcostsincurredorcostsfeared,thepublicshowslittleinclinationtoquitaninterventionandinsteadstronglysupportsanescalationofthecon-flictand measuresitbelievesnecessaryto winadecisive victory.


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Chapter FiveCONCLUSIONS

O B S E R V A T I O N S ANDP O L I C Y I M P L I C A T I O N S InboththeKoreanandVietnamWars,adeclineinpublic"support"fo rthoseconflictscoincidedwithmountingcasualties.utinnei-therconflictdidafallinthepublic's"approval"forthewartranslateintoapubliccrytowithdraw.nthecontrary,ascostsgrew,hepublic'scrythatgrewloudestwasthecrytoescalate. lthoughtheGulfW arwasovertooquicklyforthistrendtorepeatitselfexactly,theconflictagainstraqshowedapublichat,despiteuneasinesswiththedecisiontointervene,despiteitsstrongbeliefthatinterven-tionwouldmeanalongandbloodystruggle,neverthelesscommitteditselffirmlytowagingwarwithfullforceagainstIraq.T hecalculationofmanyofAmerica'sactualandpotentialadver-sariesthattheU.S.publicisimpatientandintolerantoflongandcostly warsandthat,whenbodybagsbegintoreturnto America,thepublicwillrespondwithdemandsowithdrawfromaconflictisnotsupportedby theevidence.Althoughthepubliccan,perhaps,becharacterizedasmpatient,hatmpatiencesarmoreikelyomanifestitself insupportfo rescalatingconflictratherthanforwith-drawingfrom conflict.1

'Thisreportdoesnotargue,basedonhecasesoftheKorean,Vietnamese,andPersianGulfconflicts,thatthepublicisnotextremelyconcernedwithU.S.casualties. Rather,intheseconflictsthepublic'sstrongdesiretolimitAmericancasualtieswas reconciledwithtsequallystrongdesiretose ethestrugglehroughoasuccessfulconclusionbytsavoringratherunlimited trategieshatpromisedoendheseconflictsonermsavorableoheUnitedStatesasquicklyaspossible,herebysparingAmericanives. T hepublic'scallousnessowardcasualtieswasimitedo

T. \


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24 Casualties,Public Opinion,andU.S.Military Intervention

Inshort,concernoverntra-waresolveshouldnotposeagreatproblemforAmericanpolicymakersandmilitaryleadersintheircal-culationsregardingAmericaninterventionandregionaldeterrence.However,hepublicislikelytobequiteskepticalofintervention,largelybecauseofanxietyregardingU.S.casualties,beforeacom-mitmentismade.Topolicymakers,thisisgoodnewsandbadnews.PotentialenemiescouldhwartAmericandeterrencestrategiesbymakingcredible threatsthat,if theUnitedStatesweretointervenein agivenconflict,U.S.casualtieswouldbeveryhigh.uchhreatswouldlikely makepublicsupportforadecisiontointervene ambiva-lentatbest.fcourse,givenrendsnpublicopinionnearlier,"unpopular"U.S.interventions,evenanambivalentpublicwillnotfavorwithdrawalandwillsupportdecisiveactiontoseethewartoasuccessfulconclusion,onceAmericaiscommittedtoconflict.Win-ningpublicsupport,then,islikegettingone'sfootinthedoortheinitialeffortmaybeextremelydifficult,but,if successful,subsequentwithdrawalsveryunlikely.Aswillbediscussedbelow,however,althoughthepublicwillnotlikelydemandwithdrawal,itislikelyto demandotheractionsthatmaynotbetopolicymakers'liking.)Policymakershaveseveraltoolsattheirdisposaltohelpthepublicmakethedifficultdecisiontosupportintervention.fthepubliccanbeconvinced,eitherduringacrisis(or betteryet,beforeacrisis),thatthesecurityofaparticularregion,resource,orstateisamatterofvi-talAmericaninterest,thenthepublicismorelikelytosupportinter-ventionif thatsecurityisthreatened,evenif interventionmighten-casualtiessufferedby theenemy.Other casesofU.S.military intervention,in conflictsthatwerenotperceivedatthetimeasinvolving AmericanintereststothesameextentasinKorea,Vietnam,andthePersianGulf,maypointtodifferentlessonsregardingpublicopinionandcasualties.uttheseinterventionsmustbeexaminedcarefullybeforelessonsaredrawn.nthecaseof Somalia,fo rinstance,it is widely believedthattheAmericanpublicdemandedawithdrawaloftheU.S.commitmentthereafterasmallnumberof Americancombatdeaths.nfact,however,pollresultsshow amorecomplex publicattitude. pollconductedby theUniversityofMaryland'sProgramonInternationalPolicy Attitudesfoundthatonly 28percentofthosesurveyedfavoredimmediatewithdrawal;43percentpolledwantedtoremaincommittedinaccordwithU.S.policy;27percentwishedtohaveU.S.troopsremaininSomalia"untilwehavestabilizedheountry,"veneyondhe.S .eadlineorroop ithdrawal.Furthermore,other pollsfoundmajoritysentimentsfavoringincreasedinvolvementinSomalia,at leastin theshortrun.CNN/USA TodayandABCNews pollsfound55to56 percentof respondentsfavoredsendingmoretroops.BeforeU.S.hostagesheldby theSomaliwarlordMohammadFarahAididwerereleased,ABCfoundthat75percentofthosepolls favoreda"majormilitary attack"against Aidid.


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Conclusions 25

tailhighU.S.casualties.hepublicisalsomorelikelytosupportadecisiontointerveneif itbelievesthat interventionislikelyto exactalowcostintreasureand,farmoreimportant,inblood.Manypoli-cymakersareconcernedhat,becauseofthelowU.S.casualtiesinOperationDesertStorm,hepublicwillexpectowcasualtiesnafutureU.S.militarynterventionandf,nstead,hepublicsmetwithunexpectedlyhighcasualtiesonceconflicthasbegun,twillwantowithdraw.hisscenariosunlikely.onfrontedwithashockingrisein casualtieswhenChina intervenedin theKoreanWar,justthreemonthsaftertheconflictbegan,theU.S.publicrespondedwithadeclineinsupportfortheoriginaldecisiontointervene,butnooutcryorU.S.withdrawaland,nstead,mountingbeliefthatAmericashouldescalatethewar.f,inthefuture,anexpectationoflowcasualtiesmakesthepublicsupportanintervention,butthatex -pectationisnotfulfilled,the"difficult"taskofrallyingpublic opinionwillalreadyhavebeendoneand,withhecommitmentalreadymade,thepublicisveryunlikelytodesirewithdrawal.ThepoliticalfortunesoftheAdministrationnthiscaseareanothermatterandwillbe examinedbelow.) Finally,anAmerican"forwardpresence"inanarearegardedasim -portanttoU.S.interestscanalsoaideffortstowintheall-importantinitialpublicsupportorntervention.forwarddeployedU.S.forcesareengaged,thatis,if Americaissuddenlycommittedtocon-flict,thenthepublicislikelytorespondasithasinprevioussitua-tions:Onceacommitmentisundertaken,regardlessofthewisdombehindit,thepublicisveryunlikelytocallforawithdrawal.O fcourse,heabovediscussionofthemeansowinnitialpublicsupportsuggestshatsucheffortscouldeasilyentailcynical,andeven dishonest,manipulationbypolicymakers.M A S S I V E R E T A L I A T I O N R E D U X ?ThenatureofU.S.publicopinion,onceAmericascommittedomilitaryntervention,canbeapowerful,fpotentiallydangerous,toolindeterringregionaladversaries.fpotentialadversariescouldbeconvincedthattheU.S.public'slikelyresponsetoregionalinter-ventionisnotacalltowithdraw,butinsteadacalltoescalate,thenregionaldeterrencecouldbegreadyaided.


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In away,thelessonpotentiallyhostileregimeshavelearned fromtheGulf W aristhat,if theytanglewiththeUnitedStatesandthegambledoesnotpayoff,theyinfactloseverylittle.nthecaseofIraq,whileSaddamHusseinfailedtogainKuwait,havinglostthewar,hewasleftwiththestatusquoante: isregimewasuntouched.TheIraqileaderwasveryluckythathisstrategydidnotwork.adSaddamHusseinbeenabletoturn theKuwaitidesertintoakillinggroundfo rAmericansoldiers,ashehadpromised,heU.S.publicwouldverylikelyhaverespondedwithacrytoescalatetheconflict,asisindi-catedbythepublic'spredilection,evenwithoutIraqinflictinggreatdamagetoU.S.forces,toemploynuclearweaponsagainstIraq.A nd with67 percentof respondentsfavoringtopplingIraq'sregimebefore thegroundwarbegan,hadthegroundoperationsprovedcostlyin termsofU.S.lives,thatpercentagewouldlikelyhavegrownconsid-erably.Thereisatendency fo rwartobecomeabsolute.ThisisborneoutbyAmerica'sexperience duringtheKoreanand Vietnamconflicts,whenthepublicrespondedtoalimitedwarwithpollingresponsesfavor-ingescalation.DuringtheVietnamWar,PresidentJohnsonrepeat-edly toldhisaidesthatwhat scaredhimmostwaswhat hecalled"thegreatbeast"ofAmericanpublicreactionwhichwoulddemandadangerousescalationof theconflict.Johnson,perhapsmoreattunedtothevotingpublicthananyPresidentinU.S.history,understoodthatmany"anti-war"votesthatwouldbecastagainsthimwere,in fact,pro-escalationvotes.ohnsonunderstoodthathecouldhavesalvagedhispoliticalfortunesby"takingtheglovesoffinVietnam.But,attheheightoftheColdWar,Johnsonfoundthatanyescalationoftheconflictthatwouldsatisfyhispublicriskedawiderwarpos-siblyleadingtoa superpowernuclearwar.Inthepost-ColdW arworld,futurepolicymakersareunlikelytobe-lievethatescalatoryactionthatwouldsatisfythepublicandbringaninterventiontoasuccessfulconclusionwouldcarrythesamerisksas theywerebelievedtohavecarriedduringtheVietnamWar.olicy-makers,then,wouldfindgreatdomesticincentivestoretaliatemas-sively inaregionalintervention,evenif therewerevaguegeopoliticalorinternationaldisincentivestodoso .T hepublichasshowninWorldW arII,theKorean,Vietnam,andGulfWarsthatitembracesan"allornothing"approachtowar.Adminis-


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Conclusions 27

trationsthatwereunabletowagewaraccordingtothisconceptionsufferedolitically.henaccedingoublicdemandsossiblymeantuclearar,Administrationseptnterventionimited.Withoutthatconstrainingfear,futureAdministrationsmayfindthedomestic politicalcostoflimitinginterventionmoreprohibitivethanunlimitedintervention.Suchaview,if properlyexplained,couldaidU.S.deterrencestrate-gies.tis,essentially,deliveringtopoliticaladversaries"athreatthatleavessomethingtochance."2twouldbeexplainedtopotentialad-versarieshatinvolvingtheUnitedStatesnawarperforcegnitespublicpassions.nthepast,thesepassionshaveleadtocriesfo res-calation.Thereislittlereasonthattheywillnotdosointhefuture,especiallyif thepublicisconfrontedwiththefactorlikelihoodofhighU.S.casualties.AlthoughtheremaybeadvantagesthattheU.S.politicalandmilitaryeadershiprecognizesnkeepinghemeansandendsofconflictlimited,oncewarbeginsthats,oncedeter-rencefailspublicfeelingtakesonamomentumofitsownandcan,asithasofteninthepast,easilybecomehotheaded,unpredictable,and,from the enemy'spoint ofview,ruthless.nshort,shoulddeter-renceail,ublicpassioncouldushecisionmakersoescalatequicklyandunpredictably,beyondheimitationsdecisionmakersmightwishtoplaceontheconflict.nthissituation,hostileregimeswouldbeatthemercyofanimpatient andruthlessU.S.public.SuchanunderstandingofAmericanpublicopinioncouldpowerfullyaiddeterrencestrategies.uchanunderstandingalso,however,demonstratesthatmultilateralapproachestoregionaldeterrenceareinherentlydifficultfortheUnitedStates.heAmericanpublichasconsistentlyshowntsrustrationwithanyrestrictionsonheU.S.abilitytoescalate.Giventhatallies'concernsinthePersianGulf,fo rinstance,maywellleadtoa"limited"approachtoconflict,theU.S.publicislikelytorespondangrilytowardbothAmericanalliesandtheAmericanpoliticalleadership.hepublic'spressuretoescalate,moreover,couldeadoseriousnter-allieddisputes,whichcouldhaveveryseriousconsequencesif futureU.S.regionalsecuritydutiesaretrulymultilateral.2S eeThomasSchelling,77ieStrategyofConflict,OxfordUniversityPress,New York,1960;andArmsandInfluence,YaleUniversity Press,New Haven,Connecticut,1966.

Documents

Casualties, Public Opinion and U.S. Military Intervention