Caste & Class in Bihar-Anand Chakravarty

8/3/2019 Caste & Class in Bihar-Anand Chakravarty

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Caste and Agrarian Class: A View from BiharAuthor(s): Anand ChakravartiReviewed work(s):Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 17 (Apr. 28 - May 4, 2001), pp. 1449-1462Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410549 .

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S p e c i a l articlesC a s t e a n d Agrarian C l a s s

A V i e w f r o m B i h a rThe nexus that exists between class power and the state compoundsthe continuingoppressionof the 'underclass' in Bihar. State operationsfurtherperpetuate the connectionsbetween caste and class. Thus land reformsostensiblydesigned to benefit thedisadvantagedare subvertedby vested interests who dominate the state's politics andadministration.Any attempton the part of the underclass to politically mobilise has beenmet by brutal state repression by dominant caste militias. The all-pervasive gender biasthatallows the exploitationof women, and the raging illiteracy that afflicts theunderclass accentuates this oppression.

ANAND CHAKRAVARTIT hepurposeof thispaper s toanalysethesignificanceof caste forexplain-ing a person's location in the agrar-ian class structure n contemporaryBihar.By the term 'agrarian class structure' Imean hearrangement f groups(or classes)determinedby access, or denial of access,to land,theprincipalmeans of production.The differential access to land - whichgoverns how one class relates to another- is the basis of relations of productionor,in general terms, of class relations. Myargument s thatagrarianclass relations inBihar are embedded in caste, becausewhether a person controls land or not isconditioned by that person's caste status.I shallexamine the constellation of factorsthat underlie this connection. I am espe-cially interested n showing that due to thefactors in question caste determines whya substantialsegment of ruralBihar con-tinues to be subjectedto extreme forms ofexploitation. This segment, comprisingmainlylandlessagriculturalabourers,willbe referred to as the underclass.

The meaning that I attach to the term'class relations' conforms to Rudra' inter-pretation f theterm,whichseeks tocaptureits 'essence' fromthestandpointof Marx'sideas [Rudra 1978:916]. According toRudra, while

class elationsre elationsfproduction...notall relationsof productiondefine classes;they define various 'social groups'...Butonly such social groupsconstitute classes

as are ubjectocontradictionsfinterestsarisingrom heway heyare elatedothemeansof productionibid].Rudrathus implicitly distinguishesbetweenantagonistic'ndnon-antagonistic'relationsof production, ndconfines theuse of the term lasses o the socialgroupsconstitutingthe former.1It should bepointedout herethat,for Marx,the truecharacter f antagonistic lasses in capi-talist society is manifestedessentiallythrough truggle.Thus, it is only in thecourseof struggle gainst hebourgeoisie,precededby thedevelopment f politicalconsciousness and organisation, thatoppressedworkersundercapitalismbe-come agentsfor theiremancipation, r aclass or hemselvesMarx 975:159,160].Therefore, full exploration f the inter-face betweencaste andclassshouldhigh-light not only antagonisticrelations ofproduction arising rom he roleof casteindetermining,rdenying,accessto land- but also how these relations ranslateintoclass struggles.Needless to say thegroundworkor heanalysis f class trugglemustbe laid by identifyingantagonisticrelations of production,and thereforeRudra'sdiscussionon class is extremelysignificant.My concernwith the need to integratethe studyof caste andclass in Bihar s aconsequence f mydisagreement iththecompartmentalised anner n which thetwophenomena avefeaturednanalyses

of agrarianviolence in the state. Theexplanations f theviolence,especially ncentralBiharsince the late 1970s, haveswungbetweenunderscoringhe signifi-cance of class on the one handand casteon the other. Some examples are citedhere.In1977ArunSinha ought o amendwhat he perceived to be an erroneousinterpretationof agrarianviolence as'atrocitiesagainstHarijans':or him theviolence was symptomatic f 'class war'between 'landlords' and the 'landless'[Sinha1977:2037,2039; 1978a, 1978b].Similar nterpretationsrediscernible nthe accounts of other scholars.2On theother hand the violence has also beenprojectedssymptomaticf caste trugglesbetweendominant astes3 nd ubordinatecastes,principallydalits.4I find it problematico haveto choosebetween the two positionsbecausetheypostulate falsedichotomybetweencasteand class in rural Bihar. Indeed, theapparently contrasting representationsof theviolenceactually rticulate ifferentdimensions f thesamebasiccontradiction,which s located nthecastestructure. hemassacresof men, women,and childrenof the underclassperpetrated y militiasof dominant astes5 s closely connectedto caste,as a significantproportionf theunderclass redalitsand castes constitut-ing-the ower stratum f the otherback-ward lasses(OBC).6 Ishallusethe termdepressedsocial groupsto include both

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categories. urther,he erm dalit' mean-ing oppressed)will cover bothscheduledcastes (SC) and scheduledtribes(ST).7From ime o timemenof dominant asteshave been victims of retaliatory iolenceby Naxalitegroups.8These conflicts be-tween he underclass nddominant astes- who constitute the dominantclass - haveencompassedssues of statusanddignityas well as economic issues. The formerincludes the resistance against sexualassaultsby men of dominantcastes onwomen of depressedsocial groups;thelatter ncludesdemands or the paymentof statutorywages,or the distribution fpublic andandland above the ceiling tothe landless.For purposesof my argument' shallexamine certain crucial aspects of thecontemporaryoliticaleconomyof Biharthatcompel argesegmentsof its popula-tion to living conditions that are deter-mined by birth into a depressedsocialgroup.While certainbroadobservationswill be made about he state as a whole,I shall also use my study of a villagecommunity n Pumea district (in northBihar) o demonstrateheoperation f themacro processes under analysis[Chakravarti001].Thevillage, ictitiouslynamedAghanbigha,where I conductedintensive ieldwork,s located nthe com-mandareaof the Kosicanal nDhamdaharevenue ircle.Theprocedureamfollow-ing herethat of combining he criticaluse of both macroand microdata- im-plicitlyregards villageas 'aconjunctureof muchwiderprocesses ndrelationships'[Harriss1982:17].Accordingly, he ana-lytical ignificance f avillage-based tudytranscendshe boundaries f the commu-nity,andmaybe used as a testinggroundforobservingheoperation f wider ocialprocesses.

Caste: A Re-examinationMy formulation n caste9 runsagainstDumont's nfluentialnterpretationf theinstitution as a 'structureof ideas'.10

According o him,hierarchy articulatedthroughreligiousranking,which deter-mines tatus is the undamentalrinciplegoverning he arrangement f castes inHindu society. The applicationof theprincipledemandsthe subordination fpoliticalpowerand materialpositiontostatus.While Dumont s able to demon-strate he ogicof theprinciple ttheroyalorkingly evel, he is unable o apply t tothe local level fallingin the domainof a

dominant aste.Here,as admitted yhim,power 'counterbalances'll status. Aspointedoutby Srinivas,at the village orlocal evel'powersveryvisible,andwearsanuglyface,'and'thereforethebrahmins(whosestatus s thehighest)didnot havemuch elbow-room in dealing with thedominantcastes"[Srinivas1989:35].A dominant aste alsoplayeda crucialrole nupholdinghehierarchicalrrange-ment of castes - or the status order - inits territory. ndeed,the significanceofpoliticalpower ormaintaininghe statusorder- as shown by Srinivas[Srinivas1972:15-17;1989:26-40]andFukazawa12- runs against the grain of Dumont'spositionthatpowerwas subordinatedohierarchyn caste.Hence, hepreponderantcontrol over land and the exercise ofpoliticalpowerby a dominant aste arecrucial for structuringelationsbetweencastes. As such, class relationsmay besubsumed under caste relations. Thisconforms broadly to Beteille's obser-vation(thoughnot followed up consis-tently) hat"casteandclass in rural ndiasharecertain mportant roperties...and...can bemeaningfullystudied within a singleframework".13The precedingstatements uggest theneed to review heassumption n thepartof some authors,writing n the Marxianframework,hat astesignifiesa 'level' ofrealitythat is located n the 'superstruc-ture'.Accordingo thisassumption, gra-rian class relations,arisingfrom controloverland, heprincipalmeansof produc-tion, wouldbe located n the 'base'14or'infrastructure'.15 y argumentagainstsuch a dichotomisation f caste andclass(orsuperstructurendbase/infrastructure)is reinforced yGodelier's ejection f thenotionhat uperstructurend nfrastructurerepresentevels ofsocialreality: a ocietydoes not havea topanda bottom,or evenlevels" [Godelier1978:763].As arguedby him,superstructurendinfrastructurerepresentunctionalphereshatare oundin all societies.Thus,all societieshave aninfrastructure:a material componentcomprising i) the application f variousforces of production or exploiting thematerialenvironment nd (ii) the socialrelationsof production,whichdetermineaccess to the means of production, heallocationof labour,and the distributionof theproduct.Further, ll societies haveasuperstructure,omprising,or nstance,kinship relations, religious ideas, andpolitics. Adoptinga broadcomparativeperspective,it is possible to show, as

Godelier asdone, hat nsocieties ackingwell-defineddifferentiationetweenvari-ousinstitutions,he same nstitution,uchas kinshipor religion,could functionasbothinfrastructurendsuperstructure:sthe formerbecause he nstitutionnques-tion has a material unctionby orderingrelationsof production; ndas the latterbecause t wouldbefulfillingtsostensiblenon-materialfunction [Godelier 1978:763-65]. Godelieralsodrawsattention othe basic fact that it is only in modernsocieties, and particularly n capitalistsociety, hat he"distinction etween unc-tionshappens o coincide with a distinc-tionbetween nstitutions:thus)econom-ics, politics,religion,kinship, rt,etc,(areseparated)nto omanydistinctnstitutions"[Godelier1978:765].It could be argued,therefore, hatin a relativelyundifferen-tiated ocial milieucasteis likelyto func-tion as both superstructureand infra-structure.Hence, the functionof castewould not be limited to structuring nlythe relations between the pure and theimpure on the religious plane. Castewouldalso performcertaincrucial eco-nomic functionsby determiningaccesstoland theprincipalmeans fproduction),controlover the labourprocess,and theform of exploitation or the manner nwhich the surplusis appropriatedromthe directproducers). ndeed,Habibhasshown, on the basis of detailed histori-cal evidence for medievalIndia, hat hecastesystemwas "an mportant illarofthe system of class exploitation [Habib1995:176].Meillassoux is another scholar whounderscoredthe material significanceof castebyshowingitsroleinorganising3 "relations of production and repro-duction."Infact,heconceptualisedastein terms of class. From this standpoint,iccordingto him, the dominant aste,astheprincipaland-owning roup, ccupiesanimportant osition: tscontroloverthemeans of productionconfers on it thecapacity to exploit a "labouringclass"recruited romamong ow, usuallydalit,castes [Meiilassoux 1973:92, 100-101].Meillassoux also arguedthatthe struc-ture of exploitationunderlyingcaste isrationalised y theideologyof caste: therepressiveeffect of the 'castesystem'iscoherentlyrelated o the ideologicalandreligiousnotionsassociatedwith(it)...thenotion of 'purity'...(reinforced)he pre-existing relations of subordination ndalienation, ince one must be alienatedfone stoacceptbeing mpureMeillassoux

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1973:107]. nfact,as pointedoutby him,theassignment f impurityo the lowest,labouring, astes in such a hierarchicalarrangementwasonemoreweapon n therepressivedeologicalarsenalusedinonedirection nly, arbitrarilyndopportunis-ticallyas a meansof discrimination, p-pressionandexploitation" y thosewhocontrolledhesystem Meillassoux].16hesurplusappropriatedhrough his impli-citly classrelationshipwas the meansbywhich a dominant aste maintained hespecialistsand artisans or clients)com-prising hejajmaniystem Ibid:96, 02-3].Thus,thereare"bothclass relationshipsand relationsof clientshipbeneaththeideological epresentationf a . hierarchi-cal relationshipdescribedas the 'castesystem"'[ibid:93].On the basisof the aboveargumentssatisfactoryunderstandingf class rela-tionsin Indiademands synthesisof thebasic elementstypicallyassociatedwithcaste on the one hand and class on theother.Accordingly,while caste may beconceptualised s a 'religiouslyordainedhierarchy' in the sense defined byDumont[Dumont1972:104-5], t is alsoequallya framework f material xploi-tation.There s, therefore,a strongcaseforre-thinking he significance of castefor the studyof agrarianclass in Indiagenerally,17 houghthe analysishere isrestricted o Bihar.

Caste and Class in BiharThe Macro Scenario

My argumenthatcaste continues o beimportantorstructuringelations f pro-duction n agrarian iharmarks he stateas an exceptionto the changes Indiansocietyis generallyassociatedwith as aconsequencef British ule.Thereappearsto be a broadagreementhatthe impactof modernisationuringBritishruleun-dermined he economic significanceofcaste.18Forpurposesof my discussionIshall focus on the views of N K Bose[Beteille 1975:7-9,Bose 1975: 137-45].According o him the relationbetweencasteandoccupationonstitutedhebasicdesignofpre-BritishHindu ociety.Thus,a person's ife chances in the economyweredeterminedo a largeextentby birthinto a particular aste. Bose was of theviewthat hisdesignremainednforcetillthe colonisationof Indiaby the British,after which the characterof traditionalIndiansociety changeddrastically.The

typical connection between caste andoccupation was eroded by factors such asthe expansion of a cash economy,industrialisation, the spread of westerneducation, and the growth of occupationsbased on impersonalqualifications ratherthanhereditarycaste status.Hence, "when(the traditional) division of labour wasfinally disrupted, hebasicdesign of Hindusociety also changed" [Beteille 1975:7].It should be emphasised that the notionof thebasic design of Hindusociety-shouldnot imply that the traditionalsystem wasrigid, or that the position of groups in thecaste hierarchy (or status order) was im-mutably fixed. Srinivas has strongly ar-gued against viewing the "traditionalsys-tem [as]aclosed one [in which] nomobilitywas possible."'9 However, notwithstand-ing thesourcesof flexibility, thattherewasa broadcongruencebetween caste and theeconomy is undeniable. Indeed, the con-gruencewas very strongat the lower levelsof the caste hierarchy,especially amongdalit castes. Thus Habib underscores thefactthat 'untouchables' dalits)werebarredfrom holding land and were compelled towork as landless labourers [Habib1995:166, Dumont 1972:149].20It could be argued that Bose's concep-tion of the basic design of pre-colonialsociety in India is implicitly premised ona relatively underdeveloped economy. Asshown below, the degree of economicdevelopment is crucialfordeterminingtherange of occupational choice and thepossibilities of employment outside agri-culture. Where the pace of economicdevelopment is slow, or where the under-privileged sections of society have beenexcluded from its impact, thereis a stronglikelihood that the patternsof livelihoodof a significant segment of the populationwould continue to be influenced by thelimited range of occupational opportuni-ties in a predominantly agrarianeconomycontrolled by dominant castes. In such asetting it is caste that would still determinewhether or not a person or a group wouldhave access toproductiveresources.There-fore, a person's 'material destiny' as amember of the underclass - condemnedto labourfor othersor to depend on othersfor the lease of asmall tractof land- wouldinextricably be tied to caste.From this standpointBiharcontinues toconform, even today, to the basic designof traditionalHindu society, primarilydueto its dismal performanceon theeconomicfront. While the state as a whole is eco-nomically backward in this respect it has

been deemed as 'the most backward' inthe country21[Sharma 1995:2587, Prasad1987:848 Ahluwalia 2000-1640] - itshould be noted thatthereis some internalvariation. The region north of the Ganga(designated simply as northBihar) is rela-tively more backward than the other areasin terms of the population dependent onagriculture, the extremely low level ofindustrialisation, and the meagreinfrastructural acilities, covering aspectssuch as irrigation, power, rail and roadcommunications. The plains region southof the Ganga (designated here as centralBihar) is relatively more urbanised andindustrialised than north Bihar. Finally,the plateau region further south is richlyendowed with natural resources, whichhave contributed to the development ofmining and metal-based industries. Thelevel of urbanisationhere s thereforehigherthan in the other two regions [Roy 1987,Sharma 1995:2588].

However, the above-mentioned varia-tions do not in any way mitigate an overallscenario of backwardness in which agri-cultureis the principalmode of livelihoodfor most of the population: about 87 percent of the population are rural,as com-paredwith 74 percentfor Indiaas a whole22[Sharma1995:2587,Jha1997 b:5]. Clearly,an overwhelming proportionof the popu-lation continues to depend on agriculturefor a livelihood. Needless to say aperson'sclass position would be the decisive factorconditioning the characterof such depen-dence. To take two contrasting possibili-ties, whetherapersoncanexploit the labourof others, or is subject to exploitaton,would dependon access, or lack of access,to land. To the extent that caste and landcontrolareclosely connected, the materiallife chances of the landless in a predomi-nantly agrarianeconomy would inevitablybe controlled bydominant castes. It shouldbe remembered that this oppressive sce-nario is compounded for the landlessbecause the characterof theeconomy doesnot offer much scope for employmentoutside agriculture- be it industryor theservice sector. Thus, one's birth into alandless caste would be the major deter-minant for being at the receiving end ofa relationshipof exploitation. It is impor-tant to underscore the fact thatthe presentpatternof land control, or of landlessness,is, broadly speaking, a legacy of the co-lonial period, although it may have oper-ated in earlier times too.Even a cursory examination of the pat-ternof landcontrol n the stateduring he

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colonialperiodshowsthesignificanceofcastefordetermininghepattern f agrar-ianexploitation. yandarge hezamindarsand enure olders23elonged otheuppercastes, hemajorityfwhomwerebrahmin,bhumihar,ndrajput.24 he upper ayersof the tenantry, onstituted ypicallybyoccupancy'raiyats',25were also drawnfrom he samegroups,andto some extentfromthe upper ayersof thoseclassifiedtodayas OBC.In fact, fromthe pointofview of the exercise of power over thesubordinatetenantry and agriculturallabourers,he classification f a dominantcaste landholder s a tenureholderor asa raiyatwas of little import.These legalcategorisationswere relevant for deter-miningonlytherights,dutiesandobliga-tionsof such andholdersn relationothezamindar ndthe revenueadministration;butthey hardlyaffected he substanceofpower,derived rombelonging o a domi-nantcaste,by meansof whichthey con-trolled he local population Chakravarti1986:1851-52].The subordinateenantry- comprising he recordedunder-tenants(under-raiyatsr tenantsof raiyats)andunrecorded nder-tenantswho typicallycultivatedand on a sharecropping asis[batai]) were drawn from the middlecastes and dalits. Generally speaking,sharecroppingenants (bataidars)wererequired o provide all the inputs andundertakehe actual asks of cultivation.Inprinciple heywere entitled o halftheproduce the otherhalfbeingpayable othe superiorlandholderas rent - butnumerous rbitraryevies were imposedupon hem, eading oaquantumeductionin theirshareof the produce.They werethereforen a continuous tate of abjectdependency.26 t the lowest end of theagrarianpectrum ere andlessabourers,who belongedprimarilyo thedepressedsocialgroups.There s a highprobabilitythatmanyof them were indebted o theirrespective employers, and were there-foreobligedto workexclusively for thelatter as unfree labourers.27 [Mitra1985:166,170-71,192]. nmyviewthe ineseparating bataidarrom a labourerwasfluid.A bataidarwithout a plough team(due to the death of his oxen and be-causeof lack of resourcesoreplace hem)wouldbecompelledoworkasalabourer.Onthe otherhand,a labourerwho succ-eeded in raising a plough team mightbecome a bataidar.28The point to beunderscoreds thatlabouringandbeingsubjectto exploitation- whether as abataidar r as a labourer wasassociated

with occupying a depressed position inthe social hierarchy.While the low level of economic deve-lopment is a major factor for explainingtheclose association between membershipof a depressed social groupandthat of theunderclass in Bihar, several other factorsoperate to reinforce this relationship.Thefollowing, which appear to me to beimportant,will be examined here briefly(their implications will also be shown inthe context of my village study): (i) thefailure of agrarianreform;(ii) the unequalaccess to educational opportunities,which prevents the underclass from com-peting with the dominant groups for non-agricultural employment; (iii) the nexusbetween class power and state power;and (iv) the skewed impact of thedevelopment of agrarian capitalism insome areas.

Inequities and Failure ofReforms

Agrarianreformis a potent instrument,in principle, for breaching the close con-nection between caste and land control.However, it is ironical thatthe landreformprogrammein Bihar has failed dismally.Though zamindari was statutorily abol-ished in 1952, the programme did notsignificantly undermine the traditionalsocial base of landcontrol,which remainedin the grip of dominant castes. Owing tothe loose definition of 'personal cultiva-tion' (the definition did not demand cul-tivation by one's own labour)29 Banerjea1993:155], a landholder could get himselfrecordedas a cultivatorby simply dispos-sessing the actual tillers. Thus the princi-pal beneficiaries of land reform were theintermediaries of zamindars and theiroccupancy tenants. I have alreadypointedto the uppercaste base of these categories.Some land was also acquired by the upperlayers of middle rankingcastes, compris-ing yadav, kurmi,and koeri, partlydue totheir status as tenants during the colonialperiod and partly due to the operation ofthe land market [Prasad 1979:483,1980:217]. The only significant conse-quence of the land reformprogrammewastherefore o broaden he base of land controlto include, apart from the upper castes,elements fromtheupper ayersof the middlecastes. The programmefailed to providesuccour to the genuine cultivators wholaboured as insecure tenants-at-will. Fur-ther,as practicallyno headway was madein implementing the legislation on land

ceilings, the position of the landless didnot improve either.30 Accordingly, thehistorical connection between low castestatus, on the one hand, and landlessness,labouring, and being subject to exploita-tion, on the other,was largely maintained.The failure of the land reformprogrammeis attributable o the regressive role of thestate in Bihar. This point will be taken upwhile examining the nexus between classand state.The poor materialcircumstances of theunderclassrender tpractically impossiblefor them to avail of formal education,which aggravates their disadvantagedpositioni.It should be pointed out, though,that the lack of access to formal educationis a problem afflicting a substantial pro-portionof the generalpopulationin Bihar,as the literacy rate in the state in 1991 wasonly 39 percent, the lowest in the country- a position it shares with Rajasthan[GoI2000:480]. But the situation among dalitsis even worse. Census dSta for 1991 showthat the literacy rate among dalits, espe-cially that of the SC component, wassubstantially below that of the generalpopulation. Only data on ruralBihar willbe cited here, as this essay is concernedwith agrarian class. According to thecensus, the literacyrateof thegeneralruralpopulation (above six years in age)31was33.83 per cent, but it was only 17.49 percent among SCs and24.80 percent amongSTs [GoI 1996a:12, 1996b:13-14].Further,the literacy rates of dalit females wereconsiderably lower than those of dalitmales, implying thatgender compoundedone's disadvantaged situation in the edu-cational sphere. The literacy rate of ruralSC males was 28.30 per cent, but forfemales it was just 5.54 per cent. Thecorresponding figures for ruralST malesandfemales were 36.46 percent and 12.78per cent respectively [ibid].To add some substance to dalit depri-vation in the sphere of education, someexperiences at the grass roots level arementioned here. In a village in Jehanabaddistrict (in centralBihar)an inquiry by thePeople's Union for Democratic Rights(PUDR) found thatdalits did not send theirchildren to the regularschool because theywere humiliated. On the other hand, a'parallel' school runby a naxalite organis-ation was a"success" which was admittedby thedistrictmagistrate[PUDR 1992:18].Even when there is no overt social discri-mination, dalit children face other prob-lems, as I learnt during a visit to somevillages in Rohtas district (also in central



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Bihar)inOctober2000. Most dalitchildrenareunableto avail of the facility of a localschool becausetheycannotafford hebooksand stationery, which they are expectedto procure on their own. A particularlypoignant statementwas that of a Chamarlandless labourer who said:Even if there are some among us whomanageto send our sons to school andcollege (thesame does notapplytodaugh-ters)bydenyingourselvesthe 'basics' (theexpressionactuallyused was 'petkaatke'- literally,by cuttingour stomachs), wecannot afford the bribes,withoutwhich itis impossible to be offered a job (in theservice sector).32Therefore, in spite of the rare achieve-ment of ahigh school oruniversitydegree,a dalit manmaybe forced to earn his livingas anagriculturalabourer- verymuch likehis illiterate caste-fellows.Theadvantagesof belonging to anuppercaste are evident from a brief survey of

their entry into the formal, western, edu-cational system. While the kayasths ini-tially had a lead over the otheruppercastesin acquiringwestern education duringtheearlydecades of the 20th century, the gapwas narrowed over time [GoI Part II1980:155, Sengupta 1979: 86-88]. Mod-erneducationwas the means by which theupper castes, as a bloc, cornered all thepositions in the administration, variousprofessions, and politics during the colo-nial period. Their monopoly over suchpositions during British rule was erodedto some extent by the mobilisation of theupper layers of the middle castes (inparticular, adav,kurmi,andkoeri)againstupper caste dominance [GoI Part II,1989:56]. At the same time it has beenpointedout that "the forward castes havebeen too well entrenched in politics andtheeconomy to be ousted"by these middlecastes (ibid). Therefore,as a consequenceof the leverage provided by modem edu-cation, upper caste dominance signifiedmuch more than land control in the ruralareas. Their entry into the service sectorandpolitics was the means by which theyacquired a decisive grip over the entiresociety.33 Class power thus transcendedthe boundariesof rural Bihar. It should benoted,though,that since the late 1970s theyadavs in particularamong the OBC havea presence, especially in politics.34 [Blair1980:67]. Arvind Das made the followinginsightfulobservationon the significanceof Laloo Prasad Yadav for furtheringthepolitical interests of yadavs in Bihar [Das2000-506]:

Yadavshave ralliedbehindhim (LalooYadav) ecause ehasmadehem eel hattheyruleBiharas a caste,witheventheweakest adav lexingmusclephysicallyandmetaphorically...Class Power and State

Thenexusbetweenclasspowerandthestate compounds he oppressionof theunderclass n Bihar.Thereare two prin-cipalrespectsnwhich heoperation fthestate reinforces he connectionbetweencaste and class: (i) laws, such as landreform laws or those pertaining o thepaymentof minimumwages, which aredesigned n principleo benefit he disad-vantaged,are subvertedbecause of thesway of vested interestsover the state'spoliticsandadministration;nd(ii) wher-ever the underclasshas been politicisedand mobilised o demand he implemen-tationof the laws designed or theirben-efit,theyaresubjectedobrutal epressionbydominant aste militiasand hepolice.I have earlierdrawnattention o thefailureof theagrarianeformprogrammein Bihar o encompass hemassof actualcultivators. t is indeed ironicalthatthevery state that was instrumentaln theenunciationftheprogramme asalsothechief instrument f its subversion.Thesubversionappliedto all aspectsof theprogramme, ncluding the abolition ofintermediarynterests,enancy eform, ndland ceilings. Dhar makes the scathingobservation, n thebasisof a number fcasestudies, hat hrough various nscru-pulousmethods, uch as benamdarific-titious transfersof land),collusion withrevenueofficials andpoliticians, oupledwiththeir ocialstatusandpower...the x-zamindarsfBihar ucceeded, yandarge,in protecting heir class interests[Dhar2000:125].The failureof landreform salsoattributableotheenabling oleof thejudiciaryin protectingvested interests,though hisis notunique o Bihar.One ofDhar'scasesshowshowa largezamindarusedthelawcourts o tryandprevent hegovernment rom takingover his estate[ibid:128-32].Thoughhe ultimatelyostthecase,andwascompensatedmonetarily,Dhar pointedlyobserves that "this wasdonewell afterhe(zamindar),nd hroughhim hisclass,hadexhibited heirmight ouse legalandpolitical nstitutions o pro-tect their nterests ibid:131]. ndeed, hejudiciarynthecountry s a wholehasbeencategorically enounced yanotherwriterfor tstendencyo maintainhe statusquo:

"India s the only countrywheretheju-diciaryhas playeda crucialrole in frus-tratingand stultifying and reform aws[Appu 1993:53].The class character f the stateis alsostrongly rticulatedn thecourseof its rolein agrarian iolence.As mentioned t thebeginningof thisessay,theunderclass ncentralBiharhasclashed with the domi-nantclass overboth materialssues,suchas thepaymentof statutorywagesor thedistribution fceilingsurplusand,as wellas issues of status and dignity, such assexual assaults on dalit women. Theseissues, encompassinghe diversedimen-sions of theoppression f theunderclass,explainthe rationale or the presenceofvariousNaxalitegroups n centralBihar[Prasad1987:85].35nmy view the rootsof theviolence ranscendheovert ourcesof tension be it the denial of minimumwagesor thesexualmolestation f womenlabourers whichhappen o be only theapparentor immediateprovocation. n-deed, the politicisationand mobilisationof theunderclassntherelevant reas allsintoquestion he entire tructuref domi-nationandsubordination,oth deologicalandmaterial,hatgoverns heir ivestoday[PUDR1983:15]. n hisconnectionBhatiastates orcefully:"theNaxalitemovementcanbe consideredobe the irstawakeningof theagriculturalabourersBhatia 000:64]. Theconflicthasundoubtedlyssum-ed the form of class strugglesgeneratedby antagonistic elationsof production.Criticalaccountsof the agrarian itua-tionin centralBiharreveal thatthestate,especially ts coercivearm, he police, isa majoractor n suchstrugglesbecauseofthe support t providesto the dominantcaste militias. In fact, the connectionbetweenthe police andthe militias s soclose thatsomeobservershavepointed othe inter-penetrationf the two entities.For instance,Nathanargues hatthe mi-litias are instruments f the state, thusunderscoringheco-existence etween tatepowerandclass power:

Theseparationetweenuling lassesandstate, haracteristicfabourgeoisystem,is far rombeingachievednBihar.Land-lordsarenot ustaruling lass,gettinghestate,machineryo dotheir idding, utarethemselves artof, or extensions f, thestate.ThestatemachinerynBihar om-prisesnotonlyits officialapparatus,utalso henon-officialpparatusflandlordsand heir rmed angs militiasormed ydominantastes)...Givenhe factthat heofficialmachinerys limited n its rural



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reach,andlords'angsplayan mportantrole nopposingurallass truggleNathan1996:165].36Thereare otherswhose views resor-tewith hoseofNathan,ndicating,o usethephraseologyof the Rudolphs,the 'per-versepenetration f the countryside'bythestate Rudolf ndRudolf1987:8]Thus,Das describedhecomplicityof thepolicein the violenceagainst he underclass sthe privatisationf thecoercive unctionsof the state' [Das 1986:15]. Similarly,accordingo Prasad,he 'rural ligarchy'in Bihar re firmly ntrenchedn thestate'spolity' [Prasad 1987:852].A reportonsome incidentsof agrarianviolence incentralBihar n theearly1990ssuggestedthat he rural litesincontemporaryndiapossessed hecapacity o '(appropriate)...the paraphernaliaf the state" o furthertheir nterestsPUDR1992:30]. f thelaststatementimagines the state to be anextensionof the dominant lass (insofaras the atter scapable f appropriatingheformer), t undoubtedly uggeststhat thetwoentitiesareorganically inkedto oneanother. ronically, he phenomenondidnotescape he attention f no less a func-tionaryhan hedirector-generalf policein the state.37With the state, the mostpowerful nstrument f coercion,rangedagainstheunderclass,heoddsareheavilyagainst hem to breakout of the circum-stances associated with birth into anoppressed aste.Thegulfbetween he underclass nd hedominantlass has widened nthoseareaswhere agriculturehas developed alongcapitalistines. I will use my informationon an areacoveredby the Kosiproject,38where believeagrarian apitalism truckroot, o make omegeneral omments ere,whichwillbeelaboratedateronthe basisof my village study.No attempts madeto claimthat hesecommentsapply o thewhole of Bihar.39The logic of agrariancapitalism alls for theuse of land,as theprincipalmeansof production,oproduce'commodities' for profit. Landownerswho haveadopted capitalistorientationtendto becomerigorous n handlingandas a resource,and are liable to eliminatetraditionalorms ftenancy ssociatedwithdependent elationships nd subsistencefarming.Thus,petty andholders,r thoseamong he landless,who possess at leastthesubsidiarymeansof productionn theformof plough eams,are unable o leaseinany and. n suchcircumstanceshe vastmajority f bataidars re orced o becomelabourers. t is one of the ironies of un-

derdevelopmenthat hosewho labour orthe landeddo not function n a typicallyfree abourmarket..Theresence falargelabour force, the relative absence ofemployment pportunitiesutside gricul-ture,and the powerof dominant astesinhibit hefreedom f labourersobargainfor better erms andconditionsor to optfor otheremployers n a different etting.Hence, labourers recompelled o workon the termsandconditionsmposeduponthemby membersof the dominant lass.Unliketheclassical model of capitalism,where abourers hohaveonly heir abourpower o sell mayatleast n principle ptforemployerswho offer thebest termsofwork, hose na retardedabourmarket reforced o surrenderheirbargaining owerand heir reedom oemployerswhobarelyprovide them their basic subsistenceneeds.40Therefore, he life chances oflabourers reconditioned ytheculture fexploitation peratedby dominant astesrather hanby the forces associatedwitha free labourmarket.

Migration as EscapeA question hat needs to be examinedis whethermigration rovidesan 'escaperoute'41 o the underclass n ruralBiharfrom hestrangleholdf employers f thedominant lass. It is not possibleheretoexamine the differencesin patternsofmigration etween he various egionsofBihar.My main purpose s to considercritically, n generalterms,the emanci-patorypotential f migration n thebasisof a few selected studies.The fact that

members of the underclass do in factmigrate n largenumbers nsearch of betteremployment is undeniable on the basis ofboth village-based inquiries42and macroevidence.43 Further, an 'overwhelmingmajority' of the migrants belong to dalitand landless households [Jha 1997a:32].While in principle migration may beregardedas an escape route from oppres-sive employment conditions, its impactneeds to be assessed in the light of thefollowing facts. According to Jha, thespatial mobility of labourin Bihar,thoughsignificant in absolute terms, is neverthe-less not sufficient to affect the share ofagriculturalabourersnthe total workforcein the state as a whole, which continuesto be substantial. As pointed out by him,the proportion of agricultural labourersto total main workers in Bihar in 1991(37 per cent) was second after Andhra(41 per cent). Interestingly, thoughAndhra recorded the highest proportionof agricultural labourers, the rate ofgrowth of this componentof the workforcein the state has been slower than that ofBihar [Jha 1997a:111].In most cases the migrantsfrom Bihar,especially to other states, are individualsfrom the respective households reportingmigration and not entire households.Further,such migrantsarepredominantlymales [ibid:32,33].44By andlarge femalemigrants do not seek work outside thestate; in fact, the rangeof their movementmay be confined to the district of origin(ibid).Therefore,especially fromthepointof view of women, migration does notnecessarily providea means of escapefrom

Table 1: Social Profile of Aghanbigha In 1979Category Households LandOwned PercentageNumber Percentage (inacres)(1) (2) (3) (4)UppercasteBhumihar 47 12.7 1591.97 79.1Othersa 12 3.2 121.62 6.0Middle asteUppermiddleb 58 15.6 180.63 9.0Lowermiddle 126 34.0 30.78 1.5Dalit

Scheduled caste (SC)d 88 23.7 26.55 1.3Scheduled tribe ST)e 39 10.5 61.46 3.1Muslimf 1 0.3 - -371 100.0 2013.01 100.0a TheyincludeBrahmin,Rajput, ndKayasth.b Includednthiscategoryare fivecastes: Yadav,Kurmi,KesarbaniVaish,Halwai, nd Vaish Bania.Thelastthree are listedunder he same serial number nthe Bihar ist of OtherBackwardClasses (OBC)[Government f India'980: 178).c Thiscategorycomprises hefollowingix castes: Teli,Hajam,Tatma,Rajbhar,Ghatwar, nd Markande.d ThecategorycomprisesDhobi,Dusadh, Musahar,Chamar,and Dom.e Theonlytribal ommunitynthevillage s Santhal.f TheonlyIuslim caste is Laheri LacBanglemaker).Source: Chhkravarti2001:112-21).

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their employers. Moreover, the individu-als who migrate to other states, such asPunjab, Haryana, West Bengal, Assam,and Karnataka,do not necessarily expe-rience a spectacularimprovement in theirworkingconditions [ibid:31-33, 110-111].As they are illiterate and unskilled, theyfind employment only as 'drudge labour'[ibid:111]primarily n theagriculturalsec-tor, or in the urban informal sector. Theyare also liable to be exploited by themiddlemen who recruit them, and theirwages and working conditions may actu-ally be inferior to those of the local agri-cultural labourers. Some are forced intobondage, thus resurrectingthe oppressivesocial milieu from which they soughtescape. Individuals who happen to beindebted at thetime of migrationareliableto be regarded as absconders by theiremployers, thus rendering their familymembers, especially the women, vulner-able to the arbitrary xercise of power bythe latter [Brass 1993:289-90]. Finally,migration does not necessarily lead to amajor break from the work situation inone's residential village. As shown byWilson for Nalhndadistrict, local agricul-turalwage labour remained the 'primarysource of income' for both male and fe-male workers who were recruited forconstruction work and contract agricul-tural work in nearby areas [Wilson1999:339]. They returned o their villagesduring the paddy-transplanting season,when there is a high demand for labour.Further,ironically, the employment op-portunities outside their residential vil-lages did not really liberatethem becausethey were "exploited by employers fromthe same class and caste as the villagelandowners"[Brass 1993:339].

The Gender DimensionThe close connection between belong-

ing to a depressed social group and mem-bershipof the underclassalso has a genderdimension.Accordingto the 1991 Census,26 per cent of the agricultural labourersin Bihar were 'females'. The proportionof females among agricultural labourersvaries, of course, from district to district,but in a majorityof the 42 districts (25 outof 42) it was above 25 per cent (the pro-portionvaried between 25.5 per cent and48.2 per cent in the 25 districts in ques-tion). In 15 of these 25 districts, the pro-portion of females among agriculturallabourers was above 30 per cent [GoI1996a:40,46,52]. In the course of field-

work nPurneanoted hat emaleabourersinclude both young, unmarried, irls -someof whomcouldbe barely en in age- as well asadult,married, omen esidingin the villages of theirhusbands.A girlremainedn the labour orce in her natalvillageevenaftermarriage, ecausemar-riages, especially among the depressedsocial groups,werearranged eforegirlsreachedheageof puberty. t is onlyaftertheattainment fpubertyhatagirlmovedto her husband'svillage andjoined thelabour orce there.The exploitationof a femalelabourer,as a memberof the underclass,s com-poundedbecauseof hergender n variousways.Shemayreceive owerwagesthanhermale ounterparts.ccordingoBhatia,an equal wage for men and women isamong he issuestakenup bythe Naxalitemovementn centralBihar.Thishasbeenachievedto some extentin areas wherethere have been wage struggles[Bhatia2000:91].A female labourers also vul-nerableto sexual harassment, nd evenrape.As statedn a PUDR nquiry,womenwho work n thefields have to "bear hefull brunt of class, caste, and genderoppression"PUDR1992:11,Mukherjeeand Yadav 1980:35,36].46Caste and Class in AghanbighaMy study of Aghanbigha, he villagewhere I conducted ntensivefieldwork,

pointedly shows the close connectionbetweencasteand class.47 shall restrictmyselfhereto only those detailsthatarerelevanto the hemeof thispaper.Abroadsocial profileof the village is shown inTable 1. As Bhumiharsdominated hevillage- theyconstituted 2.7percent ofthe householdsn thecommunitycolumn2), butcontrolled ver three-fourthsf itsarable and(column4) - theyhavebeensingled out amongthe uppercastes. Asshown n thetable, he otherupper astesheldonly6percentof the and.Themiddlecastes,categorisednto uppermiddle'and

'lower middle,' togetherconstitutedabout50 percent of the households in thevillage,and controlled about 11 per cent of theland. While the proportionof land held bythe middle category as a whole was small,it should be noted that the lower middlesegment held a much lower proportionthan those constituting the upper middlesegment. Dalits constituted about 34 percent of the households in the community,but the proportion of land held was ex-tremely small (less than 5 per cent, asshown in column 4).A profile of the principal classes form-ing theagrarianpopulationof Aghanbighais shown in Table 2.48 It should be notedthat these classes do not explicitly conveythe notion of antagonistic groups, definedby contradictionsof interests- in the senseunderscoredby Rudra, as mentioned ear-lier. This issue will be taken up afterdescribing their major characteristics.Malikswere the dominantclass, control-lingabout79 percent of theland(column4).Significantly, they also belonged to thedominant bhumiharcaste.49They wieldedthree, inter-related or even overlapping,forms of power in the community, whichwas aconsequence of the blendingof classand caste dominance: social, economic,and coercive. These elements of powertogether formed what may be termed the'culture of exploitation': the complex ofnorms upheld by maliks, which governedthe relationship between them and thesubordinate population. The term socialpower is used to define the capacity ofmaliks to assert their common interests asa collective. These interests were bothmaterial - such as exercising economiccontrol over the labourersemployed - aswell as non-material- such as maintainingthe 'honour' of the caste, which was in-extricably bound up with ensuring theperpetuation of bhumihar dominance inthe community. The social power wieldedby maliks was reinforced by instrumentallinks with officials holding key positionsin the executive armof the state, including

Table 2: Profile of Principal Classes In Aghanbigha In 1979PrincipalClasses Number f Households Percentage LandOwned(inacres) Percentage(1) (2) (3) (4)Malik 42 11.8 1579.92 79.2Grihast 27 7.6 283.89 14.2Tenantcultivator 20 5.6 44.51 2.2Pettycultivator 69 19.4 86.04 4.3Landless abourer 198 55.6 -Totals 356 100.0 1994.36a 100.0a Thisfigureexcludes the landownedbythe residualclasses (18.65 acres):see n 97.Source:The same as forTable1.



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the police, revenue, labour, and develop-mentadministrations, hroughwhose con-nivance oractive support hey ensuredthattheir interests were upheld. Indeed, therewas a close connection between the socialpower of maliks and state power. Theexercise of economic power, the secondelement underlying their class position,was derived from their pre-eminent con-trolover land,which gave them the capac-ity to exploit hired labourersand perpetu-ate relations of dependence with plianttenants. It is importantto emphasise herethat maliks exercised economic power inspite of being internally differentiated interms of land control: some were rich,while others were poor. I maintain thattheir common social identity as membersof a dominant caste was instrumental inforging abroadsense of unity among them- in spite of differences in the amount oflandowned. The coercive power of maliks,the third element in the triad, was ar-ticulated through the oppressive condi-tions of work they imposed on theirlabourers,which included the extractionof labour under conditions of extremesurveillanceandthepaymentof low wages.Needless to say, the coercive power of'maliks' was based on their social andeconomic power.'Grihast', comprising about 8 per centof the households, controlled 14 per centof the land. The term is used here todesignate upper(otherthanbhumihar)andmiddle caste landholders49who relied sub-stantially on hired labour for undertakingagricultural operations. From this stand-point grihastsresembledmaliks. Therewas,however,afundamentaldifference betweenmaliks and grihasts because the latter didnot wield social power. Therefore, whilegrihastsexploitedtheir abourerseconomi-cally, on the same patternas maliks, theylackedthe latter'scapacity to dominate thecommunity as a collective and to definethepatternof exploitation. Infact, grihastsbenefited from the power of maliks in onecrucial respect because the latter deter-minedthe terms and conditions governingthe employment of labourers.Tenantcultivators,who weremostlyfrommiddle castes, occupied a minor positionin the class structure of the village. Themembers of this class owned a little over2 per cent of the land in the community(as shown inthetable).The amount of landleased in by the class as a whole was onlyabout4 per cent of the land owned in theaggregateby theprincipalclasses together.In a general sense tenant cultivators com-

binedheattributesfgrihastsnd bataidars'(sharecroppers).n conformitywith thegrihastmodel heyhired n labour nddidnot work for others. On the otherhand,likebataidars,heywerebeholden o well-placed landholders,especially amongmaliks, or leases of land.Thisreinforcedtheirpoliticalsubordinationo the latter.Pettycultivatorsaround19percent ofthehouseholds),omprisingmainlydalits,also held a marginal osition nthe struc-tureof landcontrol asshown n the able).The small amountof landoperatedby amemberof thisclass mightbepwned,orleased in, or mightbe partlyowned andpartlyeased n. Theworkingmembers fa pettycultivator'shouseholdwere com-pelled to hire themselvesout as agricul-tural labourersas the amount of landoperatedwas grossly inadequate or aliving.Thus, hough omemembers f theclass referred o themselves as 'chhotekisan' (small cultivators),and othersasbataidars,manysimplydescribed hem-selvesasperformersf mazdoorilabour).The precarious ositionof pettycultiva-tors was a consequence f the. hanges nproduction elationsassociatedwith thedevelopment f agrarianapitalismthesechangeswill be described ater).Beforethe 1960smanyofthemwere ikely o havebeen bataidars.But in 1979-80(theyearof myfieldstudy)a slender ineseparatedthemfrom the ranksof full-fledgedagri-cultural abourers. ndeed,the ominousprospect that the line could disappearaltogetherhauntedespeciallythose withholdingscomprising nly leasedin land.Significantly, romthe standpoint f thewomenof theclass,whospent heir ntireworking day labouring or others- in

contrast o themenfolk,whohad odevotesome time to the cultivation f theirhold-ings - the line in questionhad lost itsmeaning because they were, in effect,membersof the rural abour orce.Landless abourersabout56percentofthehouseholds)depended ntirelyon thesale of their labourpowerfor their sub-sistence.They weredrawn roma rangeof castes coveringboth the middleanddalit categories.However, it should benoted hatabout55 percentof the house-holds in the class belongedto the lowermiddlesegment,and 35 per cent of thehouseholds were dalits (the remainderbelongedotheuppermiddle egment).Asamong petty cultivators,all able-bodiedpersons n a household, ncludingmalesand emales,werepartof the abour orce.

Exploiters vs the UnderclassFor analyticalpurposesI have placed

fourof thefive classes described ere ntotwomaincategories: i) principal xploit-ers of labour, comprising maliks andgrihasts;and (ii) underclass, omprisingpetty cultivatorsand landless labourers(Table3). The basis of the firstcategoryis thatbothmaliksandgrihastshadaccessto land, and used the labour of pettycultivatorsand landless abourers o un-dertake ultivation orprofit.However, tshouldbe rememberedhat'maliks,as thedominantlass whoseattributesavebeendescribedearlier),were the most impor-tantcomponent f thiscategory.Thebasisof the secondcategory s that he survivalof both petty cultivators and landlesslabourersdependedon the sale of theirlabourpowerto theexploitersof labour.Table 3: Class Profile of Aghanbigha by Caste Category

Category Number f HouseholdsConstituting (2) as (3)as (4) asHouseholds Principal Tenant Under- PerCent Per Cent Per CentExploitersCultivators classb of (1) of (1) of (1)of Laboura(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)UppercasteBhumihar 44 42 2 - 95.5 4.5Others 12 12 - 100.0Category otal 56 54 2

- 96.4 3.6 -Middle asteUppermiddle 55 11 12 32 20.0 21.8 58.2Lowermiddle 126 4 2 120 3.2 1.6 95.2

Category otal 181 15 14 152 8.3 7.7 84.0DalitScheduled caste 80 - 4 76 - 5.0 95.0Scheduled tribe 39 - - 39 - - 100.0

Category total 119 - 4 115 - 3.4 96.6Allcategories 356 69 20 267 19.4 5.6 75.0a Comprisesmaliksandgrihasts.b Comprisespettycultivators nd landless labourers.Source:Thesame as forTable1.

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As such, they may properly be regardedas an exploited underclass (the salientfeatures of this class category will bedescribedpresently).The classification ofhouseholds in Aghanbigha into exploitersandexploitedconformstomybasicpremiseforidentifyingagrarian lasses on the basisof antagonisticrelations of production,asexplained earlier. Accordingly, those de-signated as tenant cultivators may be re-garded simply as a category, or as a re-sidualclass,astheyfall outsidethis scheme.The labouringpopulationof the village- the underclass - could be categorisedbroadly into 'jan' (labourers)and naukar(farm servants). The two categories to-gethernumbered704 persons.The former(621 persons) were employed to performa wide range of tasks relevant to cultiva-tion, such as sowing, transplanting,weed-ing, preparing channels for irrigation,erecting bunds, and harvesting.The latter(83 persons) were employed for specifictaskspertaining o therunningof a malik'sfarm. They comprised those who weredirectlyinvolved in cultivating operations- forexample, ploughmen, tractordrivers,and labour supervisors - and those whowere not involved in cultivating opera-tions - for example, herders of buffaloesandcows, bullock cartdrivers,and watch-men of standing crops.Typically,jan wereemployed by the day, for which they re-ceived a daily wage, comprising both acash component and a kind component(usually a specified amount of rice). Assuch,jan did not receive any wages on thedays that there was no work. On the otherhand naukarreceived a monthly wage, theraw ingredients of daily meals ('break-fast', 'lunch', and 'dinner'), and someitems of clothing biannually. In principle,the work of a naukar was deemed to beperennialin character,unlike that of janwho were employed from time to time inconformitywith the scheduling of agricul-tural operations.Among those categorised as jan, a sig-nificantproportion(444 out of 621 (71.5percent) were attachedto theiremployers(Ihavedesignated hem as unfree abourers)due to several factors, which includedindebtedness,residenceon the employer'sland,and the allotment of a small tract ofpaddy land from which a labourer wasentitled o one-thirdof theproduce.Thoughdebt alone was the explanation for theunfreedom of nearly one-fifth of thelabourers, t operatedin conjunction withthe other factors for the majority of theothers.Thus, debt was the most pervasive

sourceofunfreedommongabourers. hesamewastrueof farm ervants.Therefore,asignificant roportionf the abour orcein thevillage(thosecategorised s unfreelabourers nd farm servants espectively- 527 out of 704 workers (75 per cent) -were for all practicalpurposesexcludedfrom helabourmarket.Themostsignifi-cantconsequenceof unfreedomwas thatit obligeda labourer r a farmservant owork xclusively orhis/her mployer, ndprevented im/her romnegotiatingworkwith anotheremployer thus inhibitingthe operationof a free labour market.Further,as I have argued n my mono-graph, he denialof economic reedom omembersof the underclass lso had im-portant oliticalmplications,ecauseheyfaced severe constraintsn beingable todemandbetterworkingconditions.The labourforce in Aghanbighaalsoincluded a small proportionof casuallabourers177outof 704 workers25 percent),whohad, nprinciple,heoption ochange heir mployers. believe hat heircapabilityor reeparticipationna marketsituationwasonlynotional oroneimpor-tant reason. While they happened o beunencumbered y debt or otherobliga-tions to specificemployersat the time ofmyfieldwork, ventheywere iable o fallinto debt n a momentof crisis due to thelowwagespaid oallcategoriesflabourers(as shownlater).Accordingly, he entireunderclassnAghanbigha asactually, rpotentially,n a stateof abjectdependencyin relationotheir mployers. hispathetic

situation was aggravated by the absenceof opportunities for employment outsideagriculture - a direct consequence ofunderdevelopment. Further, none of thehouseholds of the labourerslocated in thevillage reported migration at the time ofmy fieldwork in the hope of negotiatingbetter working conditions elsewhere -though the situation could be differenttoday.The strongconnection between belong-ing to anuppercaste andbeing anexploiterof labour is evident from columns 2 and5 in Table 3: 54 of the 56 upper castehouseholds (96 per cent) used the labourof the underclass toundertakecultivation.Only two upper caste households (bothbhumihar)belonged to the class of tenantcultivators.50Among the middle castes asa whole there is evidently a decisive con-nection between caste status and beingsubject to exploitation: thus 84 per centof the members of this category belongedto the underclass (column 7). Within themiddle castes, however, it is the lowermiddle component that predominated asmembers of the underclass: they consti-tuted 120 out of the152 underclass house-holds in the middle category as a whole(column 4); further95 percent of the lowermiddle households belonged to theunderclass, as shown in column 7. On theother hand, one-fifth of the upper middlecomponent were exploiters of labour(col-umn 5), and a little over the same propor-tion were tenant cultivators (column 6).Thus, the proportion of upper middle

Table 4: Households Constituting the Underclass by Caste In AghanbighaCaste (by category)aNumber f HouseholdsConstituting (2) as (3) asHouseholds Underclass Otherclasses Per Cent of (1) Per Centof (1)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Middle1 Halwai 7 1 6 14.3 85.72 Yadav 11 4 7 36.4 63.63 Teli 6 3 3 50.0 50.04 Hajam 10 8 2 80.0 20.05 Kurmi 23 19 4 82.6 17.46 Markande 90 89 1 98.9 1.17 Tatma 16 16 0 100.0 -8 Vaish Bania 8 8 0 100.0 -9 Ghatwar 3 3 0 100.0 -10Rajbhar 1 1 0 100.0 -Category otal 175 152 23 86.9 13.1Dalit11 Dhobi 6 4 2 66.7 33.312 Dusadh 23 21 2 91.3 8.713 Chamar 3 3 0 100.0 -14 Musahar 48 48 0 100.015[Santhal(ST)] 39 39 0 100.0Category otal 119 115 4 96.6 3.4Grand otal 294 267 27 90.8 9.2a Thearrangement f castes ineach category s intheascendingorderof theproportion f households na caste that s partof the underclass,as shownincolumn4.Source:The same as forTable1.

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householdsonstitutingheunderclass58percent(column7) wasconsiderablyessthan the proportion f the lower middlecomponent n the underclass.The strongest onnectionbetween lowsocial status and membership of theunderclasss foundamongdalits,asshownin the sametable.Withthe exceptionoffour SC households who are tenantcul-tivators column 3), all the other dalithouseholds comprising oth SC andST)were partof the underclass column 4).Thus,about97 percentof thedalithouse-holdsbelonged o theunderclasscolumn7). It is significant hatthe proportion fSC households n the underclass 95 percent)corresponded iththeproportionflower middlecastehouseholds alling inthe same class.Accordingly, s ageneralrule, the connectionbetweenlow socialstatusand being subjectto exploitationapplied oall thosecategorised ssociallydepressedgroups.Table4 is an exercise n examining heapplicationf theabove-mentionedule oeach caste fromwhich the underclass srecruited.hehouseholdsomprisingachof the castes have been placed in twocategories:hosefallingin theunderclassand hose alling notherclasses.Insevenof the 15castesin the table(tatma,vaishbania, hatwar, ajbhar,hamar,musahar,andsanthal) ll thehouseholds repartofthe underclasscolumn4). In fourof theother astes hajam, urmi,markande,nddusadh) decisivemajority f households(80 per cent or above) fall into the

underclass.Amongthedhobi,two-thirdsof the householdsare underclass.Onlyamong three castes is the connectionbetweencaste statusandmembership fthe underclass ither moderateor weak:amongthe teli half the householdsareunderclass,and among the halwai andyadav ess thanhalf the householdsare nthe underclasssee columns4 and5). Ingeneral, t is evident hat or 12 of the 15groups n thetable,there s a strongcon-nection betweencaste status and beingsubject o exploitation.

Contradictions of StructureTheprincipalontradictionsnthe classstructureof contemporaryAghanbighaneed to be explained n the light of thefactorsoutlinedearlier or Bihar n gen-eral.As shownearlier,duetothese actorsthe life chances of the underclass are

largelydetermined y theircaste status.A briefhistorical ackgrounds necessary

to understand the context in whichthese factorsoperatedat the time of myfieldwork.Till the1960s hemaliksused he abourofsharecroppersbataidars)operformheactual asksofcultivation.Duringheearlydecades of the 20th century,for whichthere is definite information,santhalscompriseda substantial roportionf thebataidars. heycultiytedthe andsoftheir

maliksunder xtremely ppressive ondi-tions. n he ate1930s hesanthal ataidarsin alargenumber f villages nDhamdaharevenuecirclelaunched majoragitationagainst heirmaliks or duerecognition stenants.The maliks n Aghanbigha eta-liatedby replacing heirsanthalbataidarsby yadavimmigrantsromMonghyr,aswell as others drawnfrom the ranksofdalits, such as musahar, dusadh, andchamar. he requenthanging f bataidarsbecamea necessary trategy o pre-emptthem fromstakingclaimsas full-fledgedtenants whowereprotectedromarbitraryevictionunder herelevantenancyaws.51Therefore,whilesharecroppingemainedthe dominant roductionelationship,hepersonnelweresubject o turnover.Owing oaconjuncturefcircumstancesoccurring in the 1960s the maliks inAghanbigha nderwent major eorienta-tion towardscultivation.These circum-stancesincluded andreform,ostensiblydesignedto protect he rightsof tenants,aswellas newtechnologicalnterventionsin the form of canal irrigation andtractorisation.he formeraggravatedheongoing tensions in the malik-bataidarrelationship,while the lattermade culti-vation under the personal charge of alandholder profitableproposition.Themaliksresumedmuch of the landleasedto bataidars, n spite of tenancy lawsdesigned o protect helatter's ights,andundertook cultivation by employinglabourers signifyinga majorchange nthe character f production elations.Itneeds to be emphasisedhat his transfor-mationwas brought boutpartlybecausethenew echnologicalnterventionsreatedthe cpnditions or the maliks to pursueagriculture n capitalist ines, andpartlybecausethey neededto subvert enancylaws to maintain heirpreponderanton-trol over the land. While the supplyofcanal water duringthe kharif and rabiseasons induced majorchanges in thetraditional gricultural ycle, the use oftractors ed to a quantumncrease n thescale of cultivation.Landsfalling underthecommand reaof thecanalcouldnow

be double-cropped, and even triple-cropped.Theevolutionof thenew under-class in Aghanbighawas a directconse-quenceof these circumstances.With thewaning of tenancy as an institution,labouring or otherswas the only viablemeansof livelihoodnotonlyforthe land-less but also for those with marginalholdingsand those who leased in smallamountsof land.In fact, for the last twocategories marginalandholdersnd malltenants whom havedesignated s'pettycultivators')abouringorotherswas theonly stable means of livelihood.For thisreason both landless abourers ndpettycultivators truly constituted a vastunderclass75 percent of thehouseholdsamongthe principal lasses) that sharedin significantways the rigoursof an ex-ploitedexistence.Clearly,their sizeablepresencewas a directconsequence f thesubversion f tenancy aws and thelogicof agrarian apitalism.The most obviousmanifestation f theexploitationof the underclassn Aghan-bighawasthepayment f low wages.Theproblemwas compoundedby their illi-teracyandgeneral gnorance.Finally, hestatewaspartialo the interests f maliks.I shall commenton thesepoints briefly.Afterobservinga largenumberof ag-riculturalperations haveshown hat heremunerationf labourerswas consider-

ablybelow the statutorywages.The op-erations fall into two broadcategories:operations uch as sowing,transplanting,and weeding, for which labourerswerepaidpartly n cash andpartly nkind;andharvesting perationsorwhich heywerepaid entirely in kind. The former con-formed to a daily wage, because alllabourers erepaidastandardisedmountin cashandkind,whereas he lattercon-formed o piecework,because heamountreceivedby labourers ariedaccordingothequantity arvested. haveanalysedhewages underlying ach categoryof agri-cultural perationseparately, ndshownthe wide disparitybetween hemand thestatutorywages.Inbrief, hedailywagesof labourersorvariousagriculturalperationswere40 to46 percent of thestatutorywages preva-lent at the time of my fieldwork I havedesignated he formeras the 'contempo-rarywage').Itis ironical hat hecontem-porarywagewas alsomuch ower han hewagerate hatprevailedn thecommunityduring he 1930sand1940s(whichI havecalled he'remembered age'): he ormerwas 58 percent of the remembered age.



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Notsurprisingly,everal abourers nder-scored the deteriorationn the terms ofwork,with an unmistakable ostalgia orthepast.For nstance,heypointed ut hatthe'kothis' earthenontainersorstoringgrain)maintainedytheir orefathers ereusuallyfull, whereas t was commontofind hem mptynow.Undoubtedly, grar-iancapitalismhadintensified he exploi-tationof labourers. hough he wages offarmservantswererelativelybetter hanthose of agriculturalabourers, hey toowere unable o earnthe statutorywages.The shortfall ariedaccordingo thecate-goryof a farmservant,and also becausesomefarm ervants eceiveda smallallot-mentof land or hepaddy eason,whereasothersdid not. The wages of those whowere paid the lowest remuneration acategoryof ploughmen)was 44 percentof the statutorywage, whereas thosewho were best paid (tractor driverswho received small allotmentsof land)received 86 per cent of the relevantstatutorywage.Labourerseceived ow wagesevenforharvesting perations.My analysisof thewages for harvestingpaddy,which wasregarded s the most important rop bybothmalik nd abourerlike,contradictedtheassertion fsomemaliks hat hepaddyseason was one of abundance or theirlabourers.While most labourersdid in-deedearnmore orharvesting addy hanthecontemporary age at othertimes ofthe year, the equivalent amount was,generally speaking, still short of thestatutory age.Theexploitation f labourerswas mani-festednotonlyin the ow wagestheywerepaidbutalso in the harshdisciplinethatgovernedheirwork.Malikswereobsessedwiththe desire to extractas much workaspossible rom heir abourers, nd thusmaximise heirreturns.The rigoroususeoflabour imewas a critical lement n theprocessof profitgeneration.This objec-tivewas achievedby subjectingall agri-culturalperationso intense urveillance.The askof supervisionwasperformed ymaliksor grihasts hemselves,or by em-ployeesdesignateds'sepahi'.The ypicalworking aybeganacoupleof hoursafterdawnand stretched n till dusk. Severallabourersummedup the paranoid on-cernof theirmalikswith theextraction fwork yaccusinghemof 'kaamkabhook'(implying,appetiteor hunger or work).In the same breath heydrewattentionothepathetic ndifferenceof the latter totheirbasicneeds,whichcompelled hem

tobeperenniallyoncernedwiththeprob-lemofovercoming unger'petkabhook':hungerof the stomach).Burden of Illiteracy

The capacity of members of theunderclass o cope with the conditionsimposedupon hemwas affectedundoubt-edly by theirunfreedom nd their ack ofpoliticalagency.But theiroppressionwasrenderedvenworsedue o lliteracy,whichhandicappedhem nvariousways.Aboveall, they were incapableof readingforthemselvesthe rulesgoverning he pay-mentof minimumwages.In this connec-tionI recount he statement f a labourer,a woman,who asserted hathad she beeneducated she would not have allowedmaliks oget awaywithpaying owwages[Chakravarti001:265].Further,abourerswere incapableof fully comprehendingthe deductionsmade romtheirwagesonaccount of the cash or kind that theycontinually orrowedrom heirmaliks or.meeting day to day expenses. As direnecessity compelled hem to borrow re-quently rom the latter, heirdebtobliga-tions wereundoubtedly omplicated.Butthe lack of formal educationpreventedthemfrommaintainingheirown recordof theinnumerableransactions iththeiremployers,ncludingheadjustments iththeirwagesfrom ime to time.Therefore,theyWereconstrained o acceptthe cal-culationsof theiremployers, n spite oftheir doubtsto the contrary.On one oc-casion I witnesseda malik settling ac-countswithhis labourers. t was evidentthatthey were completelyat hiSmercy.Whena labourerxpressedmisgivingsonhis malik'sversionof an earlier ransac-tion,the latter lew into a rage,threw heaccountbook on the floor, and simplywalkedaway.All the labourerswho hadassembled to settle accountswere thenforced to return o their homes empty-handed,as such occasionsalso providedthemanopportunityo askforfresh oans.To a significantextent the power ofmaliks n Aghanbighawas reinforcedbytheir inkswithseveral ocalorgansof thestate,as mentioned arlier.Through hismeans heywere able to 'appropriate'heexecutivearmof the stateanduse it as apowerfulresource or maintaining heirdominance.Theconnection etween lasspowerandstatepowerat thevillage evelreplicatedhepatternor Biharasawhole,which was underscored arlier. A fewexamplesarecitedhere.The landrecords

didnotshowany andownerwithaholdingin excess of the ceiling, which was con-trary o the groundrealities.This is be-cause the land in excess of theceiling ina householdhad been fictitiouslydistri-butedamongminors,whoappearednthelandrecords sadultswiththeconnivanceof the ocalrevenue fficial.Severalmalikswho hadostensibly donated and underthe 'voluntary urrender cheme' of theBihargovernment uring he emergency(1975-77) continuedto be in de factopossession of the 'donated' land. Therecipientsrom heunderclassweredeniedaccessto theplotsallotted o them,whilethe revenueadministrationailed to actintheir favour. The labour administrationactuallyconnivedwith maliks to subvertthepayment f thestatutory ages.Finally,the leaderof the maliks n thecommunitymade t a pointto maintainriendlycon-tacts with officials of the local develop-ment and police administrations. uchexamplesconfirm he existenceof asym-biotic connectionbetween the dominantclass in a village and the local organsofthestate.Indeed, tatepower nBihar,bybeingappropriatedyvillage-basedlites,isactually mbodiednstructuresfpowerat the grassroots.

ConclusionsMy basicargumentn thisessay is thatcastecontinues o be the undamentalasisof social nequalityncontemporaryihar.Due to arangeof factors,whichhavebeenexaminedbriefly,boththe traditional ndnew dominant astes haveprivilegedac-cess to materialand politicalresources,and constitute he dominantclass. As a

consequence those who belong to thedepressed ocialgroupsaredeniedaccessto such resources.The circumstances fbirth nto a low-ranking aste, therefore,tend odetermineheir ocial andmaterialconditions.They thus constitutea vastruralunderclass,ubject o bothcaste andclass exploitation, s well as staterepres-sion. Inthe ultimateanalysis he continu-ing oppression f theunderclassn Biharis a consequenceof the organic inkagebetweendominant astes n thesocietyatlarge whoconstitute hedominant lass- andthe structures f the state. ArvindDas,anastuteobserver f the Bihar cene,writingn theearly1990s,was of the viewthat"a new era of agrarianelations hadbeen] created,"as the state had "openlyjoined the side of the landowners"[Das 1992:73].



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Inmy monographon Aghanbigha I haveexpressed my belief that the prospects ofany improvementin the grim condition ofthe underclass in the village were remotein theexisting politicalmilieu [Chakravarti2001:286-93]. It should be pointed outhere that the region in which the villageis located (north Bihar) is one where, byand large, the underclass has not beenpolitically mobilised againstthe dominantclass. In this respect north Bihar is verydifferentfrompartsof centralBiharwherethe naxalite movement has given a politi-cal voice to the underclass. Indeed, aspointed out by Bhatia, the naxalite move-ment is unique because no other move-ment in the region (such as the KisanSabha and Bhoodan movements) pene-tratedthe lowest segment of the agrarianorder: "A distinctive feature of the(naxalite) movementhas been its success-ful involvement of agriculturallabourers,who had been neglected by previousmovements,andtheuse of armedstruggle"[Bhatia 2000:159].However, in spite of certain tangibleachievements - such as enhanced wages,access to common lands (earlier in theillegal possession of powerful individu-als), andthe terminationof social exploi-tation in the form of untouchability andrape- Bhatia is constrained to admit that'the living conditions of labourers andtheir families remain abysmal' [ibid]. Bychallengingthehegemony of the dominantclass, the underclass in central Bihar hasbeen rendered vulnerable to a violentbacklash,which is borne out by the seriesof massacres (as mentioned at the begin-ning of thisessay). In the light of the nexusbetween caste, class, and state, it is notsurprisingthat,to quote Bhatia, "the statehas miserably failed to give (thelabourers) protection; instead it haspreferred to protect the property of theprivileged" [ibid 104-5]. Therefore, it isarguablethat unless a breach is created inthis nexus, any majorstructuralchange isinconceivable in the lives of theunderclassin ruralBihar.

The following inter-related questionsmay be.raised on the basis of the abovediscussion. Is the close connection be-tween caste and class in Bihar attributableto its uniquefailureto distance itself fromthe 'basic design' of pre-British Hindusociety? In states where this design hasbeenundermineddue to betterperformancein the economic sphere - resulting inoccupational diversification and expan-sion of non-agricultural employment,

amongotherchanges- has the hold ofcaste on agrarian lass weakened?Suchquestions can be answered only byanalysing n depth hepoliticaleconomyof various tates hathaveattained igherlevels of economic development thanBihar.Clearly, comparative tudiesarecalled for to clarify the basic argumentof this essay. =Notes

[An earlierversion of thisessay was presentedata seminar n theDepartment f Sociology, PanjabUniversity,Chandigarh,held in March 2000. Ithankthe participants f the seminar,especiallyGopal Iyer andS S Jodhka,for theircomments.I am deeply gratefulto Bela Bhatiafor giving athorough eading o thepen-ultimate ersion.Thequestions raisedby her have gone a long way inimprovingmy argument.Finally,I thankUmaforpatientlyreadingseveral draftsof the essay, andencouragingme to complete the presentversion.Needless to say, I am alone responsiblefor itslimitations.]1 For Rudra the principalantagonisticclassesare 'big landowners' on the one hand and'agricultural abourers'on the other (1978:999-1001). The formerare a 'hybridclass',because they combine those having pre-dominantly apitalist raitswith othershavingpredominantlypre-capitalist 'feudal') traits(ibid: 999). The latter comprise landlesslabourers,poor tenants,as well as labourerspossessingsmallamountsof landwho do nothire in labour 'to any considerable extent'(ibid: 1000). Among the non-antagonisticgroups perhaps hese shouldbe re-designatedcategories, because they do not necessarilyshare a sense of community) are smalllandholderswho, because of caste taboos,

indulge in cultivation almost exclusivelythroughhired labourers,and small farmerswhosedependenceon hired abour s minimal(ibid: r000-1001).2 Thus, Praveen Chaudhry, writing aboutagrarian nrest n Patnadistrict,pointed o theirrelevanceof caste ('the caste structure sbreaking up') and underscored the classdimension by stating that the struggle wasbetween 'landless poor peasants and middlepeasantson the one handand landlordson theother'(1988: 56). The sameemphasis s foundinasignificantpaperbyPrasad,whoattributedthe agrarian violence in Bihar to thecontradictionbetween the 'rural oligarchy'and directproducers' 1987:847).The formercomprisesmainly large landowners,and thelatter include marginal landholders, pettytenants, ndagriculturalabourers.Hisanalysisdoes not explicitly point to the significanceof caste in this contradiction.3 The dominant castes in question comprise:(i) 'traditional'dominantcastes, in particularbhumihar ndrajput; nd ii) theupper tratumof the other backwardclasses (OBC) com-prisingyadav,kurmi,andkoeri,amongwhomthe well-to-do sections are prominent n theagrarianeconomy and politics (see Prasad1980, 1991). Several among the latterwere

tenantsof zamindars, nd aterbecamedejurelandholders following the land reform pro-gramme n Bihar.It shouldbe noted,though,that in certain parts of Patna, Nalanda,andRohtas districts (in central Bihar), thezamindars were kurmis (see Nathan 1996:167-68).4 See, for instance, Hindwan (1996: 23-26);Mishra,S K(1999: 1-2);andMishra,C (1999:13-15). The last-mentioned,commenting onthe violence, statedcategorically: It is dalitsvs bhumihar,caste-basedkillings' (p 14). Itshould be pointedout here that the issue ofcaste conflict in Bihar had been addressedearlier by Prasad (1979), but his mainconcern then was the analysisof the "socialand economic roots" of the "contra-diction...betweenthe uppercaste Hindus andthe middle castes [those falling under theOBC]" (ibid: 481). The same contradictionforms the theme of his essay in 1991, whichis concerned with north India generally,with some pointed references to Bihar(1991: 1924-25).5 Jha (1997b: 18-19) provides information nchronological order on the formation ofdominant caste militias.6 For a comprehensive ist of the lower stratumof the OBCinBihar,categorisedas 'depressedbackwardclasses', see government of India(1980, Part II: 242).7 Hindwan (1996: 23, 25) provides a socialprofileof the underclass n Biharon the basisof a field survey.8 The Naxalitemovement ncentralBihar racesits origin to the militant tribal uprising inNaxalbari (in Darjeeling district, WestBengal) that took place in 1967. Themovement is deeply fragmented: in 1996,accordingto Bela Bhatia,nearly 17Naxalitegroups operated in various parts of Bihar.She also states thatall, except one, subscribebroadly to the ideology of the CommunistPartyof India(Marxist-Leninist)-CPI (ML).The prominent exception is the MaoistCommunistCentre MCC),which s identifiedwith Mao's path of agrarianrevolution inChina [Bhatia 2000: 53-63].Jha(1997b:12-17) ists 45 incidents overingthe two categories of violence mentioned.Although there are some gaps in the infor-mation, it is abundantlyclear that membersof the underclass were victims in an over-whelmingly large numberof incidents.Onlysix cases of retaliatoryviolence by Naxalitegroupsagainstbhumihar rrajputandholdershave been mentioned.See Harriss 1982:17),whose expressionI have used.9 My argumenthere conforms broadlyto thatof Nathan 1996: 158-63).Ihavealsobenefitedfrom Nandy (1995), who has incorporatedsomeofGodelier'sideas 1978)for nterpretingthe materialsignificanceof caste. The sameideas have been used in this essay.10 This is Beteille's expression (1974: 55) todenote Dumont's examination of Hindusociety in termsof the hierarchicalprinciple(1972).11 Srinivas 1989:34)used hisword orDumont'sphrase to the effect thatpower 'makes itselfthe equal of status at the interstitial evels'(1972: 197). Also Srinivas(1972: 15-17)andSrinivas (1989: 26-40).

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12 Fukazawa(1991: 91-113) cogently demon-stratedthe significance of state power formaintaininghecasteorderduring he Peshwairegimein western India(1713-1818), beforeit came under British rule.13 Beteille(1974:38;emphasisadded).However,at a differentpoint in his essay, there seemstb be a suggestion that the study of "theownershipandcontrolof landand he relationsderiving rom t"maybestudied ndependentlyof caste (ibid: 40-41).14 The erm base'refers ssentially o therelationsof production, or class relations; 'super-structure',on the other hand, includes legaland political institutions and, importantly,ideology; see Bottomore (1985: 42-45). Agood example, in the Indiancontext, of thedichotomisationbetween 'base' and 'super-structure' comprisingcaste ideology, as ex-emplified nhierarchy)s the workof DjurfeldtandLindberg 1975).Thefollowingstatementconveys theirposition aptly:"Jaticontinuestobe animportantdeologicalstructure. nthelast instance the groundsfor this persistencemust of coursebe soughtin its relations o theclass structure" ibid: 216).15 Godelier 1978:763-66)usedthis term nsteadof the more conventionalexpression, 'base'.16 Itshouldbepointedout here hatGodelierheldthe view that deology snotsimplyareflectionof socialrelations, ut s anessentialcomponent?of it: "all social relations contain, from theoutset, an ideel element which is not an a

posteriorireflection of it, buta condition forits emergence and ultimately an essentialcomponent"(1978:766).17 An apt observation, applied to the Indiancontext, s thefollowing:"inanyrealagrarianeconomythe economicstructure n relation owhich the class positions have been definedis itself embedded n a social matrix n a waythat annotbutaffect hosepositions" Bardhan1986: 173].18 The followingare some prominentexamples.According o Habib,"it will be futile to denythatmodern onditions[linkedto Britishrule]havegravelyshaken he economic basisof thecaste system"(1995: 178; emphasis added).Srinivaspointedout that"the ull implicationsof westernishtion the foundations of whichwere laidby the establishmentof Britishrule]are ndeedrevolutionaryorIndia...(1972:89;emphasis added). Among other changes, hedraws attention to "the new opportunitieseducational, conomic,political- [which]werein theory caste-free..." (ibid: 90). A thirdexample nthesamegenreare he observationsof N K Bose, which are examined in the text.Bose's views on the relationbetween casteand the economic order are derived fromBeteille (1975: 7-9), as well as his ownobservations(Bose 1975: 137-45).19 Srinivas (1972: 93). He draws attention totwo major sources of flexibility in thetraditional system: the fluidity of thepolitical systemand theavailabilityof arableland (ibid: 32-44).20 Dumontnotesthat"the ink between caste andprofession...is strongin the case of specialistcastes...andalso in the case of unfreelabour,generally untouchable."21 See Table 4, Ahluwalia shows that the per-centageof thepopulationnpoverty n 1993-94

(54.96 per cent) was the highest in Biharamong the 14 states examined.22 Jhadraws attention o the fact that Biharhasexperienced 'structural etrogression'as thepercentage f totalmainworkers nagricultureto thosein the main workforceas a whole hasincreased rom73.33 percent in 1961to78.83per cent in 1991.23 Tenure holders were rent farmerscreatedbyzamindars o facilitate the collection of rentfromraiyatstenants).Though heyrepresented,typically, ntermediaryentcollecting nterestsbetween a zamindar and his raiyats, for allpractical purposes they functioned likezamindars, though on a smaller scale,subjecting the tenantry under them to thearbitraryexercise of power [Girish Mishra1978: 64-65, 78, Mitra 1985: 8].24 For the broadconnectionbetween caste statusandlocationin theagrarian tructure n Biharsee Sengupta (1979: 86-87, 89, 90), Mitra(1985:166, 170-71, 192).25 An occupancy raiyat in Bihar was a tenantwith permanentheritablerights.He acquiredthis status by virtue of being in continuouspossession of a tractof land for 12 years atthetimeof a landsurvey.By implication,non-occupancy aiyatswere hosewhosepossessionwas less than 12 yearsat the time of a survey[Governmentof Bihar 1975: 23, 40].26 For a detailed examinationof the oppressivenature of the malik-bataidar elationshipinPurnea, Chakrabarty1986: 1853-55.27 It is also important o draw attentionto herobservation that "(landless) agriculturallabourwas no creation of colonial rule",andthat such a category 'existedeven in the so-called traditional grarian conomy in Bihar'(ibid: 188).28 The fluidity of the boundary separatingbataidars rom labourers n Purneahas beendiscussed in Chakravarti 1986: 1852-53).29 As pointedout by Banerjea,"personal abourshouldbe the essence of personalcultivation",whichmeans"theowner/tenant ranymemberof his family must work in thefield withhisfeet in the soil andhandsholdingtheplough"(ibid: 161; emphasis added).30 An aggregatepicturefor the whole of Biharin 1990 shows thatonly 21.7 percent of theestimatedsurplus andhadbeen acquiredbythe government. But the proportionof landdistributedwas considerably smaller:it wasonly 14.8 per cent of the estimatedsurplus(Bharti 1993: 136-38). It is also importantodistinguishbetweenformal distributionandactual possession. As shown by Iyer (1993:102-5), drawing on examples from somedistricts,hevulnerable ositionof theallottees,most of whom are dalits, is a critical factorthatpreventsthem fromtaking possession ofthe allotted land.31 For purposes of the census, the populationfalling in the age group 0-6 years has beendeemed as illiterate.32 Not unrelated is Alakh Sharma's statementthat in Bihar "almost invariablypostings in[the] bureaucracyare done on a caste andmoneybasis..." 1995:2592;emphasisadded).33 The following are some examples, based onmyexperience.Reporting n thevillageSenari(in Jehanabaddistrict),an inquiryby PUDR- with which I was associated- states: "This

village has produceda district udge, a highcourt lawyer, [and] block level governmentofficials..."(1999: 16). InAghanbigha,whereI did fieldwork,one Bbumiharresident wasa college teacher in a neighbouringdistrict,which entitledhim to be called a 'professor'in conformity with the practice in Bihar.Another was the head clerk in the adminis-trationof a local college - a fairly importantposition. Finally, in Rupaspur (in Purneadistrict),where I conducted fieldwork for abriefperiod,a leadingRajput andholderhadserved as Speaker of the Bihar assemblybetween 1962 and 1967.34 According to him, Yadavs held 35 per centof the generalseats in the Biharassemblyin1977, whereas the bania, kurmi, and koeritogether held only 14 per cent of the seats.35 See n 12; see also Prasad(1987: 851).36 It is debatable as to whether the officialmachinery s in fact 'limitedin its rural each'for opposing agrarianclass struggle.37 The statementof thepolice official, as quotedin (Prasad 1987: 852) is as follows:There was a tendency among the policefunctionariesoencourage hedefencegroups(the senas) to organisethemselves in orderto fight out the naxalites...thiswas the very

negation of police performance, whichactuallyresulted n theriseof differentcastesenas in Bihar.38 The Kosi project,whichcommencedin 1957,was designedto harness he riverKosi, whichwas notorious for causing disastrousfloodsbecause of its erratic course. It included theconstruction f abarrage boveHanumannagar(inNepal), floodprotectionbanks,and a canalsystem covering the districts of Purnea andSaharsa(see Biggs 1976).39 According o Prasad,Bihar s amongthestatesin northIndia where "capitalist ormation nagricultures on a low key..." (1991: 1925).40 There is a majordebate on the compatibilityof unfree abourwithcapitalism,whichcannotbe considered here. The issue has been dis-cussed in Chakravarti 2001: 282-86).41 This is an expression that I have borrowedfromJha(1997a:110),who examines hesigni-ficanceof migration oragriculturalabourersin Bihar.42 Brass (1993: 289) reports 'considerableout-migration' from the six villages in Pureadistrictthat he investigated;see also Wilson(1999: 336-39) for evidence on migrationpertainingto a village in Nalanda district.43 Jha(1997a: 3) cites evidence to the effect thatBihar is among the five states in the countrywhich show the highest incidence of rurallabour migration.44 See also Wilson (1999: 336-37), for evidenceon male migrationin Nalanda district.45 Wilson (1999: 339). For a discussion on theoperationof the labour market in Nalandadistrict, see Brass 1993: 336-39.46 These describe n detail the sexualexploitationof dalit women by dominantcaste employersin Bhojpurdistrict (in central Bihar).47 The material n this section is drawnmainlyfromChapters2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 in Chakravarti(2001).48 Thetable xcludes wocategories f householdsthat are not centralto my discussionon classrelationsin Aghanbigha: i) nine households

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that all outside the structure f class relations,and (ii) six households constituting 'residualclasses'. Of the 2013.01 acres of land ownedby both the principal and residual classestogether whichadds upto the landowned inthecommunityas a whole, as shown in Table1), 1994.36 acres was owned by the formerand 18.65 acres by the latter.49 Itshould be noted that not all bhumiharsweremaliks.Two households have been classifiedamong enant ultivators, nd hreehouseholdsare included among the residual classes[Cha

Documents

Caste & Class in Bihar-Anand Chakravarty