Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 90501 August 5, 1991ARIS (PHIL.) INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B. NADALA,respondents.Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for petitioner.ZosimoMorillo for respondent Rayosdel Sol.Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy& Associates for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR.,J.:pPetitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said Interim Rules.The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as follows:SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows:ART. 223.Appeal.xxxxxxxxxIn any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the Article.Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code", which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August 1989, provide as follows:Section 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. In so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee shall immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employer, merely be reinstated in the payroll.The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.xxxxxxxxxSection 17. Transitory provision. Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the Commission.The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to this petition are not disputed:On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management's failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work that day with other employees and marched directly to the management's office to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints.On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who were identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the rally requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions.Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila, which was docketed therein as NLRC-NCR-00-0401630-88.After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a decision' the dispositive portion of which reads:ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, herein complainants Leodegario de Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez, MarietaMagalad, FlordelizaRayos del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto Besmonte, ApolinarioGagahina, Aidam (sic) Opena, Steve C. Sancho Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months except complainant Leodegario de Guzman.All other claims and prayers are hereby denied for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution2pursuant to the above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715.On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal.3On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except FlorRayosdel Sol, filed a Partial Appeal.4On 10 August 1989, complainant FlorRayosdel Sol filed a Partial Appeal.5On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition6to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect7and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. In their Reply8filed on 1 September 1989, complainants argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in this case since the decision to be executed pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law took effect on 21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989.Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989.9On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution10as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentence thereof.In this Order, the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules in this wise:Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these interim rules which must conform with the requirements as therein set forth (Section 9) or as may be directed by the Commission, it obviously treats of decisions of Labor Arbiters before March 21,1989. With more reason these interim rules be made to apply to the instant case since the decision hereof (sic) was rendered thereafter.11Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 October 198912raising the issues adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision under the following assignment of errors:A. THE LABOR ARBITER AQUOAND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION 2 OF THE INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS IT BEING OPPRESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE.B. GRANTINGARGUENDOTHAT THE PROVISION IN(SIC) REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS VALID, NONETHELESS, THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC STILL ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO PENDING LABOR CASES.In Our resolution of 7 March 1989, We required the respondents to comment on the petition.Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on 20 November 1989.13Meeting squarely the issues raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and the contested provision "is then a police legislation."As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that being merely procedural in nature, it can apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a vested right in a rule of procedure. Moreover, such a law is compatible with the constitutional provision on protection to labor.On 11 December 1989, private respondents filed a Manifestation14informing the Court that they are adopting the Comment filed by the Solicitor General and stressing that petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for a valid petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a Rejoinder15to the Comment of the Solicitor General.In the resolution of 11 January 1990,16We considered the Comments as respondents' Answers, gave due course to the petition, and directed that the case be calendared for deliberation.In urging Us to declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section 223 of the Labor Code introduced by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, as well as the implementing provision covered by Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules, allowing immediate execution, even pending appeal, of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, petitioner submits that said portion violates the due process clause of the Constitution in that it is oppressive and unreasonable. It argues that a reinstatement pending appeal negates the right of the employer to self-protection for it has been ruled that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer; the right of an employer to dismiss is consistent with the legal truism that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the oppression nor the destruction of the employer. For, social justice should be implemented not through mistaken sympathy for or misplaced antipathy against any group, but even-handedly and fairly.17To clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the oppressiveness of reinstatement pending appeal by portraying the following consequences: (a) the employer would be compelled to hire additional employees or adjust the duties of other employees simply to have someone watch over the reinstated employee to prevent the commission of further acts prejudicial to the employer, (b) reinstatement of an undeserving, if not undesirable, employee may demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may encourage and embolden not only the reinstated employees but also other employees to commit similar, if not graver infractions.These rationalizations and portrayals are misplaced and are purely conjectural which, unfortunately, proceed from a misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the relief of execution pending appeal.Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin18and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.19Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code already allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man.These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic life of the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare. Thus, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution,20which principally directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living wage, to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. Incidentally, a study of the Constitutions of various nations readily reveals that it is only our Constitution which devotes a separate article on Social Justice and Human Rights. Thus, by no less than its fundamental law, the Philippines has laid down the strong foundations of a truly just and humane society. This Article addresses itself to specified areas of concern labor, agrarian and natural resources reform, urban land reform and housing, health, working women, and people's organizations and reaches out to the underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Muoz-Palma, aptly describes this Article as the "heart of the new Charter."21These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms With equal intensity.22Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to the discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees. In such cases, the poor employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood, their only means of support for their family their very lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in his sound discretion, may determine. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal.The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits.23Then, by and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family.The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional.24To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.25InParades, et al. vs. Executive Secretary26We stated:2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism isapropos: To doubt is to sustain.27The reason for this:... can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the other departments. ... The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available grounds.28The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does not deserve a measure of attention. The reference to it in the Order of the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary since the procedure of the appeal proper is not involved in this case. Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC, promulgated on 8 August 1989, can validly be given retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect.29There are no vested rights in rules of procedure.30A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment.31WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila,petitioners,vs.HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION,respondents.G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA,petitioners,vs.HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.PADILLA,J.:These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve simple issues. if these issues have apparently become complicated, it is not by reason of their nature because of the events anddramatis personaeinvolved.The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044:a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue thepermit/licenseto operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC).b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994.c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue thepermit/licenseto Associated Development Corporation (ADC).The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC thepermit/licenseto operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are properly resolved:1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be granted in perpetuity.3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.1On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for prohibition,mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Guingona and then GAB chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71656, seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority that had earlier been granted to ADC. On the same day, the RTC of Manila, Branch 4, through presiding Judge Vetino Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from withdrawing ADC's provisional authority. This temporary restraining order was converted into a writ of preliminary injunction upon ADC's posting of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00.2Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Games and Amusements Board, filed a "Motion for Intervention; for Leave to File a Motion for reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer the case to the CourtEn Banc" and later a "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention and to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention".In anEn BancResolution dated 20 September 1994, this Court referred G.R. No. 115044 to the CourtEn Bancand required the respondents therein to comment on the aforementioned motions.Meanwhile, Judge Reyes on 19 October 1994 issued another order, this time, granting ADC a writ of preliminarymandatoryinjunction against Guingona and GAB to compel them to issue in favor of ADC the authority to operate jai-alai.Guingona, as executive secretary, and DominadorCepeda, Jr. as the new GAB chairman, then filed the petition in G.R. No. 117263 assailing the abovementioned orders of respondent Judge Vetino Reyes.On 25 October 1994, in G.R. No. 117263, this Court granted petitioner's motion forleaveto file supplemental petition and to admit attached supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court further required respondents to file their comment on the petition and supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court likewise set the case and all incidents thereof for hearing on 10 November 1994.At the hearing on 10 November 1994, the issues to be resolved were formulated by the Court as follows:1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper;2. assuming such intervention is proper, whether or not the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai;3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned temporary restraining order (later writ of preliminary injunction); and4. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned writ of preliminarymandatoryinjunction.On the issue of the propriety of the intervention by the Republic of the Philippines, a question was raised during the hearing on 10 November 1994 as to whether intervention in G.R. No. 115044 was the proper remedy for the national government to take in questioning the existence of a valid ADC franchise to operate the jai-alai or whether a separate action forquo warrantounder Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy.We need not belabor this issue since counsel for respondent ADC agreed to the suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all substantive issues raised by the parties in these cases. Moreover, this Court can consider the petition filed in G.R. No. 117263 as one for quo warranto which is within the original jurisdiction of the Court under section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution.3On the propriety of intervention by the Republic, however, it will be recalled that this Court inDirector of Lands v. Court of Appeals(93 SCRA 238) allowed intervention even beyond the period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in said case that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claim be proven to be true."In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the national government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which is a gambling operation) in favor of ADC. As will be more extensively discussed later, the national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void andultra viressince Republic Act No. 954, approved on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065, the latter approved 7 September 1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires alegislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Additionally, the national government argues that even assuming,arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revokedallexisting franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel for ADC contends that this Court should really rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able to determine whether ADC continues to possess a valid franchise.It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice tobothparties in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the verylismotain resolving the present controversy, in view of ADC's insistence that it was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate the jai-alai.The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the CourtEn Banchas that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.4And on the question of whether or not the government isestoppedfrom contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare.IIAnent the question of whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila, a statement of the pertinent laws is in order.1. The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18 thereof provides:Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:xxxxxxxxx(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races, cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating on any sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority toregulatejai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).3. On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation". The provisions of Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows:Sec. 4. No person, or group of personsotherthan the operator or maintainer of a frontonwith legislative franchiseto conduct basquepelota games (Jai-alai),shall offer, to take or arrangebetson any basquepelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basquepelota game or event. (emphasis supplied).Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a frontonwith legislative franchiseto conduct basquepelota gamesshall offer, take, or arrange bets on any basquepelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basquepelota game or eventoutside the place,enclosure, or fronton where the basquepelota game is held. (emphasis supplied).4. On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes."5. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling",in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.6. On 16 October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila Area," was promulgated.7 On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent legislative powers until the first Congress was convened, issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263 argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress.On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board under Section 18(jj) of Republic Act No. 409 and consequently it was within the power of the City of Manila to allow ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.On this point, the government counter-argues that the term "legislative powers" is used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to distinguish the powers under Section 18 of the law from the other powers of the Municipal Board, but that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely by Congress.Further, the government argues that Executive Order No. 392 dated 01 January 1951 transferred even the power to regulate Jai-Alai from the local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB), a national government agency.It is worthy of note that neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act No. 409) and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". Rep. Act No. 409 empowers the Municipal Board of Manila to "tax, license, permitandregulatewagers or betting" and to "grant exclusiverightsto establishments", while Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allowand permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila.It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if its has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another law is enacted byCongress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law. Among these form the reach of criminal law. Among these forms of gambling allowed by special law are the horse races authorized by Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling casinos authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1869.While jai-alai as a sport is not illegalper se, the accepting of bets or wagers on the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense punishable under Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code,unlessit is shown that a later or special law had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board certaindelegatedlegislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature.5The regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under Section 28 but also in this Court's ruling inPeople v. Vera(65 Phil. 56).InVera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation law-Act No. 4221) would or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power.From the ruling inVera, it would be logical to conclude that, if ADC's arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would give the latter the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling inapplicable or inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila.We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws. Thus, the relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer tocongressional franchises, as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai.We need not, however, again belabor this issue further since the task at hand which will ultimately, and with finality, decide the issues in this case is to determine whether PD No. 771 validly revoked ADC's franchise to operate the jai-alai, assuming (without conceding) that it indeed possessed such franchise under Ordinance No. 7065.ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, the government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of theinherentpolice power of the State.The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine saluspopuliestsupremalex(the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) In the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro(39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as follows:WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal gambling, these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of the country;WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance of the social and economic development program under the new society;WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from local government to the National Government.It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.InMagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation(20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibitedjuetengandmontebut permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court hasno authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. (Emphasis supplied)Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line betweenrightandprivilegein American constitutional law has no relevance in the context of these cases since the reference there is to economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions are questions primarily for the lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account national and local interests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is paramount.ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD Nos. 771. Clearly, however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black,J.)There is, the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that thenational governmentcan subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments, thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local governments) to consider and approve.On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.InRCPI v.NTC(150 SCRA 450), we held that:A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies.There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to thenational governmentthe exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revokedallfranchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty 920) years ago.Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and the requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are "riders" to the two 92) laws and are violative of the rule that laws should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title, as argued by ADC. InCordero v. Cabatuando(6 SCRA 418), this Court ruled that the requirement under the constitution that all laws should embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of the objective.IIIOn the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of preliminary injunction) and the writ of preliminarymandatoryinjunction, we hold and rule there was.Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise by the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered:1. allowing the Republic of the Philippines to intervene in G.R. No. 115044.2. declaring Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional.3. declaring that respondent Associated Development corporation (ADC) does not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and conduct the jai-alai under Republic Act No. 954 and Presidential Decree No. 771.4. setting aside the writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino Reyes in civil Case No. 94-71656.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149276.September 27, 2002]JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM,petitioners, vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM,respondents.D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution.The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs, follow.In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000.Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored check.When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818.On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for estafawith no bail recommended.On the same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against petitioners.The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574.Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners, thus:It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexes that probable cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued.No Bail Recommended.SO ORDERED.[1]On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest which was denied by the trial court.Likewise, petitioners motion for bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial court on the same day.Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the trial court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail.However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large.On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d),and qualified theft.Said Circular specifically provides as follows:xxxxxxxxx3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty isreclusion temporaltoreclusion perpetua, bail shall be based onreclusion temporalmaximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00;Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00.In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no longer be discussed.Thus, this decision will focus on whether or not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19of Article III of theConstitution, which respectively provide:Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.xxxSection 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x xx.We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.In this regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as follows:SECTION 1.Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:1st.The penalty ofreclusion temporalif the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years.In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termedreclusion perpetua;2nd.The penalty ofprision mayorin its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.3rd.The penalty ofprision mayorin its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos;and4th.Byprision mayorin itsminimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized withreclusion perpetuaor 30 years of imprisonment.This penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.[2]Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involvedis cruel and degrading.InPeople vs. Tongko,[3]this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like.The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties.Thus, the original amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have remained the same notwithstanding that they have become negligible and insignificantcompared to the present value of the peso.This argument is without merit.The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated in the following:WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases committed by means of bouncing checks;WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the peoples confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country;WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing penalties provided therefor.Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks.The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential.What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks.Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article IIIof the Constitution.Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.[4]The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette.This claim is incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders.[5]PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.[6]With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.WHEREFORE,the petition is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION,petitioners,vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents.TORRES, JR.,J.:In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of thestatus quo. Ligle do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoeveri.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank.The antecedent facts:On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits incustodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:

May 26, 1989Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino12 Pres. Osmena AvenueSouth Admiral VillageParanaque, Metro ManilaDear Ms. Carolino:This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking system which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.Very truly yours,(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDODirector1Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter:1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein awarded;5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus6. Costs of the suit.SO ORDERED.The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidenceex parte.In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain LiberatoMadulio, who gave the following testimony:Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year.In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen's age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call the police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so akin.Tulungann'yoakongmakalabasdito.Kinidnapako!" Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was "istorbo". Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call for the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to them. "Nakikipag-aregloposamgapulis," Karen added. "The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time of the incident but she subsequently transferred to ApolinarioMabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)xxxxxxxxxAfter the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad, (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class.Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition formandamusto require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief.2However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one formandamus.3Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.xxxxxxxxxThe reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is asnake, . . . .4If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate t