Cases Partial

7/31/2019 Cases Partial

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Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Company

37 Phil. 644

Facts:

The Compaia Agricola Filipina bought a considerable quantity of rice -cleaning machinery companyfrom the defendant machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure paymentof the purchase price. It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which themachinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood. The indebtedness securedby this instrument not having been paid when it fell due, the mortgaged property was sold by the

sheriff, in pursuance of the terms of the mortgage instrument. A few weeks thereafter, on or about the14th of January, 1914, the Compaia Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale of the land upon whichthe building stood to the machinery company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a publicdocument, was not registered. The machinery company went into possession of the building at or aboutthe time when this sale took place, that is to say, the month of December, 1913, and it has continued inpossession ever since. At or about the t ime when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of themachinery company, the mortgagor, the Compaia Agricola Filipina executed another mortgage to theplaintiff upon the building, separate and apart from the land on which it stood. Upon the failure of the

mortgagor to pay the amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, the plaintiff secured judgment for that amount, levied execution upon the building, bought it in at the sheriffs sale on orabout the 18th of December, 1914.This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover possession of thebuilding from the machinery company. The trial judge gave judgment in favor of the machinery

company. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial judge erred in sustaining the machinery company on the ground that it had its

title to the building registered prior to the date of registry of plaintiffs certificate.

Held:


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We conclude that the ruling in favor of the machinery company cannot be sustained on the groundassigned by the trial judge. We are of opinion, however, that the judgment must be sustained on theground that the agreed statement of facts in the court below discloses that neither the purchase of thebuilding by the plaintiff nor his inscription of the she riffs certificate of sale in his favor was made ingood faith, and that the machinery company must be held to be the owner of the property Article 1544

of the New Civil Code, it appearing that the company first took possession of the property; and further ,that the building and the land were sold to the machinery company long prior to the date of the sheriffssale to the plaintiff. But it appearing that he had full knowledge of the machinery companys claim of ownership when he executed the indemnity bond and bought in the property at the sheriffs sale, and itappearing further that the machinery companys claim of ownership was well founded, he cannot besaid to have been an innocent purchaser for value. He took the risk and must stand by the

consequences; and it is in this sense that we find that he was not a purchaser in good faith.

The decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

Sibal v. Valdez et.al.

50 Phil. 512

Facts:

The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac on the 14th day of December 1924. The facts are about as conflicting as it is possible for facts to be, in the trial causes. As afirst cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of theProvince of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and histenants on seven parcels of land described in the complaint in the third paragraph of the first cause of action; that within one year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem

said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid bythe latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after thepurchase, and the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the money and toreturn the sugar cane to the plaintiff.As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendantEmiliano J. Valdez was attempting to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels mentioned inthe first cause of action; that he had harvested and taken possession of the palay in one of said seven


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parcels and in another parcel described in the second cause of action, amounting to 300 cavans; and

that all of said palay belonged to the plaintiff.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the sugar cane in question was personal propertyand as such, was not subject to redemption.

Held:

It is clear from the provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that growing cropsare personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion hereinbefore stated, thatparagraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act No. 190 and by ActNo. 1508 in the sense that ungathered products as mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have thenature of personal property. In other words, the phrase personal property should be understood to

include ungathered products.

At common law, and generally in the United States, all annual crops which are raised by yearly

manurance and labor, and essentially owe their annual existence to cultivation by man, . may be leviedon as personal property. (23 C. J., p. 329.) On this question Freeman, in his treatise on the Law of Executions, says: Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, whenproduced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty. They are, therefore, liable to voluntary transfer aschattels. It is equally well settled that they may be seized and sold under execution. (Freeman on

Executions, vol. p. 438.)

We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified bysection 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered productshave the nature of personal property. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in holding that

the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such, was not subject to redemption.


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Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and the Board of Tax Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City

116 Phil. 501

Facts:

Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioners above -mentionedequipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the groundthat the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City sustained the city assessor, sopetitioner herein filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the assessment. TheCourt of Tax Appeals having sustained the respondent city assessors ruling, and having denied a motion

for reconsideration, petitioner brought the case to this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Tax Court erred in its interpretation of paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New CivilCode, and holding that pursuant thereto the movable equipments are taxable realties, by reason of their

being intended or destined for use in an industry.

Held:

The law that governs the determination of the question at issue is as follows: Art. 415. The

following are immovable property:

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for anindustry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to

meet the needs of the said industry or works; (Civil Code of the Phil.)


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Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted provision also requires that the industry orworks be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus in the case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng,supra, the machinery, liquid containers, and instruments or implements are found in a building

constructed on the land. A sawmill would also be installed in a building on land more or lesspermanently, and the sawing is conducted in the land or building. But in the case at bar the equipmentsin question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried on in abuilding or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. Said equipments may not,

therefore, be deemed real property.

Resuming what we have set forth above, we hold that the equipments in question are not absolutelyessential to the petitioners transportation business, and petitioners business is not carried on in abuilding, tenement or on a specified land, so said equipment may not be considered real estate within

the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition for review is hereby set aside and the equipment in

question declared not subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of the real estate tax.

Usero v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005

Corona (J.)

Facts of the Case:

This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and theprivate respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a

low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain, the watertherein would flood thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build aconcrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their house and riprapped the soil in

that portion. The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but thePolinars never heeded believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the Polinars offered to pay forthe land. As the parties still failed to settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible entry. The


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Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the regional trial court reversed and ordered

the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of the creek between the lots.

Issue: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the creek hence part of public domain

Ruling:

Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code provides for properties which are part of public domain. Acreek is included in the phrase "and others of similar character". A creek, which refers to a recess or armof a river is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership.Being a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the name of any

individual.

Involuntary insolvency of Paul Strochecker v. Ramirez

[G.R. No. 18700. September 26, 1922.]

First Division, Romualdez (J): 7 concur

Facts: Half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another mortgage wasmade with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in thelower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference overthat of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez

did.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from with costs against the appellant.

1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage

With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, suchinterest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of realproperties in articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property

may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)


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2. Description of mortgage property sufficient

The description contained in the document is sufficient. The law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only adescription of the mortgaged property shall be such as to enable the parties to the mortgage, or anyother person, after reasonable inqu iry and investigation, to identify the same. In the case at bar, hishalf interest in the drug business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and

125, District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient.

3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in possession

Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as neither the debtor, norhimself, is in possession of the property mortgaged, which is, and since the registration of the mortgage

has been, legally in possession of the surety company (Sec. 4, Act. 1508; Meyers vs. Thein, 15 Phil., 303)

4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property

In no way can the mortgage executed be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question;as there was a mere stipulation about personal security during said date, but not a mortgage upon

property, and much less upon the property in question.

Documents

Cases Partial