Cases on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

8/10/2019 Cases on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

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CASES ON PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January 27, 1997

Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia.Santiago already died when this controversy arose.

Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain anattachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot toSpouses Atayan, who are the respondents here.

Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was sold atpublic auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina.

Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming thatthey own 9/10 of the land.

The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% ofthe land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered theamendment of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%.

Both parties appealed.

The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive property of SantiagoGarcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.

Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased SantiagoWhats the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively.

Ruling: SC affirms CA in toto .All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership only when there

is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisitionduring the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of theconjugal partnership.

Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued during the marriage. The TCT does notsuffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.

Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts. Registration does notconfer title but merely confirms one already existing.

Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago and when he died leaving10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in thepublic auction was merely the rights of Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only survivingoffsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is thehusband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being


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settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson duringhis lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez whatapparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his

wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and voidand the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs oftheir deceased parents.

Petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the thenCourt of First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twiceamended. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailedthe evidence documents for being null and void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) andreversed that of the trial court's.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property of theirparents.

Held: NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage ofEmilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests hisclaim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, marriedto Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture.Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration doesnot confer title but merely confirms one already existing.It may be that the properties under disputewere acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriageto Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to thelatter. There being no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumptiondoes not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties ofEmilio Jocson.

FRANCISCO v. CA 299 SCRA 188 (1998) Facts:

Teresita (petit ioner), is Eusebios (private respondent) legal wife secondmarriage. ConchitaEvangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (privaterespondents) are children of Eusebioby his first marriage.


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Teresitas allegations: Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, theyve acquired properties in BarangayBalite, Rodriguez,Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.These properties were administered by Eusebio til he was invalidated onaccount of tuberculosis,heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them.

Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney whichauthorized Conchita to administer the house and lottogether with the apartments situated inRodriguez, Rizal.Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thus enjoiningits enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute.RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show thatsaid properties wereacquired during the second marriage, or that theypertained exclusively to her. As such, thoseproperties belong exclusively toEusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CAaffirmedthis decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that:oCA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title hasalready been repealed by

art. 253, FCoIt further erred in not applying art. 124, FC However, issue in Teresitas reply: WON Art. 1 16, FCapplies to this case as Art.253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of theCivilCode" 4

Issue: WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebioexclusively.

Held and Ratio:

Yes. Petition denied. Arts. 158 and 160, New CC have been repealed by the FC,specifically by Art.254, FC (not Art. 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 inrelation to Art. 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158&160 doesnt operate toprejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Right s accrued andvestedwhile these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then beresolved based onprovisions of New CC.

Art. 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to theconjugal partnership,unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to thehusband or to the wife". However, the party whoinvokes this presumption mustfirst show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). Thepresumptionrefers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operatewhenthere is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal wasacquired. Moreover, presumption

in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong,clear and convincing evidence showing exclusiveownership of one of the spouses.

In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that theproperties which sheclaimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriagewith Eusebio.

As regard land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebios testimony thathe inherited the samefrom his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio broughtinto their marriage the said land, albeit in


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the concept of a possessor only as itwas not yet registered in his name.

Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage isinconsequential as theproperty should be regarded as his own exclusively,pursuant to Art. 148, New CC.

Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously andinclude those acquired byeither spouse during the marriage by inheritance,devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it beassumed that Eusebio'sacquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage,theland would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him,"during the marriage,by lucrative title."

As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for thehouse and theapartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio and the business license forthe sari-sari store issued in her name alonein support of her claim that it was conjugal property.These, however, do notprove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage.Thefact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as towhether or not the

property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim asher documents all described Eusebio asthe owner of the structures (Art. 1431,New CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence).

Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio has therebybecome conjugal for want of evidence to sustain theproposition that it was constructed at theexpense of their partnership (Art.158(2), New CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence ofevidence onthe source of funding (Art. 160, New CC) cannot be invoked because there isalso lack inproof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage.

Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property atSan Isidro isinadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to

Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the propertywas acquired during the spouses coverture.Acquisition of title and registrationthereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms titlealready existingand phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio.

Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the propertiesconsidering that the assetsare exclusively his capital. Even if the properties areconjugal, petitioner cannot administer theminasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill asto incapacitate him to administer property

AGAPAY vs. PALANGG.R. No. 116668July 28, 1997

Facts:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July 16,1949. A few monthsafter the wedding, in October 1949, he left for work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child,


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Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. During his visit in 1964 to the Philippines, he stayed withhis brother in Zambales. The trial court found that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorceCarlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in1972, Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayedalone in a house in Pozorrubio,Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old Miguel contracted with secondmarriage with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a

parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan,Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee. On October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palangexecuted a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate theirconjugal property to their only child, Herminia Palang. Migueland Erlinda had a son, Kristopher A.Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of

Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, Miguel

died.On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an action for recovery ofownership and possession of the Riceland and house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinanallegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The RTC dismissed the caseand ruled in favour of Agapay. On appeal, the

respondent court reversed the trial courts decision and declared Carlina and Herminia

Palang the owners of the properties in question.

Issue(s):1.Whether or not the court erred in granting the ownership of the two parcels of land to Carlinaand Herminia Palang?

2. Whether or not the court erred in not declaring Kristopher Palang as Miguelsillegitimate son and thusentitled to inherit Miguels estate?

3. Whether or not Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant inthe civilcase?Decision:1.

No. Under Art 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, only properties acquired by both of the partiesthrough their actual joint contribution of money, property,or industry shall be owned by them incommon in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution isrequired in this provision. In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed moneyto thepurchase of the Riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, the court finds no basisto justify her co-ownershipwith Miguel over the same. Consequently, the Riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the

conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.2.

No. The issue is resolved in the respondent courts pronouncement regardingKristophers heirship and filiation inasmuch as question as to who are the heirs


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of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of thelatter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceedinginstituted for that purpose and cannot

be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action xxx.

3. Yes. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, wastherefore not a party tothe case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called hisguardian

ad litem

for he was not involved in the case at bar.Wherefore, the petition is DENIED and the decision of theCourt of Appeals is AFFIRMED

BA Finance Corp vs. CA

GR 61464, May 28 1988

FACTS:

Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by apromissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augustopresented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed thebusiness and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the husband

to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augustoleft Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation becamedue and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty offraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over aconstruction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writhereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed amotion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriffwere not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.

ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.


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HELD:

A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorshipwas established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it ispresumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for

the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligationcontracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Theobligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred suchobligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made itappear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from thepetitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare ofthe spouses.

Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against hisconjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the saidproperties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amounting to P660,000.00.

PISUENA vs. HEIRS OF PETRA UNATINGG.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999

Facts:

Petra Unating inherited Lot No. 1201 from her mother. During her marriage toAquilino Villar, sheregistered the lot in her name. They had two children Felix and Catalina.In 1948, Petra died. In 1949,

Felix and Catalina sold the entire lot to Agustin Navarra butrepossessed the same upon the lattersdeath in 1958. Meanwhile Aquilino died in 1953.In 1982, defendant Jessie Pisuena, son-in-law of Agustinwrested possession of theproperty from the heirs of Felix and Catalina. The latter filed a complaint forits recovery,assailing the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Agustin.

Issue:

Did the Deed of Sale in 1949 transfer the whole lot in favor of Agustin despite thefact that Aquilino didnot consent to the sale of his share?

Held:

No. In 1949, Felix and Catalinas interest in the share of their father is stillinchoate. They cannot disposesuch share without the consent of their father. At most theyconveyed only their 2/3 share over thelost. However, when Aquilino died in 1953withoutdisposing of his1/3 share, Felix and Catalinas interest on it was actualized becausesuccessionvested in them the title to their fathers share and consequently, the entire lot.Thus, the title passed t oAgustin pursuant to Art. 1434 of the present Civil Code, whichprovides: When a person who is not the


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owner of the thing sells or alienates or delivers it,and later, the seller of grantor acquires title thereto,such title passes by operation of law tothe buyer or grantee.

Title:

ANTONIO S. VALDEZ

, petitioner, vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,QUEZON CITY

and

CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ

, respondents.

Case:

Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the law that shouldgovernthe disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage isdeclared void ab initio because ofpsychological incapacity on the part of either orboth parties in contract.

Facts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begottenduring the marriage werefive children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdezsought the declaration of nullity of marriagepursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby delaring theirmarriage null and void onthe ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin was placedin thecustody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to staywith. Thepetitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property asdefined by Article 147 of the Family Code and tocomply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regardingtheprocedure for the liquidation of common property in un ions without marriage.During the hearingon the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressingdesire to stay with their father.

Issue:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the causethereof, the property relationsof the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired


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during the union is primafacie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party whodidnot participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered ashavingcontributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care andmaintenance of thefamily.

Villanueva vs. IAC

GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987

FACTS:

Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro,Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging ascollateral their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absoluteco-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure ofmortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, theAranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same landunto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot whenthe mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name ofModesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.

In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondentsspouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases,and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and toDorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victorias shares from the conjugalpartnership property; and second Modestos interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well ashis separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint,declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed thelower courts decision.

ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria whorendered the lot as conjugal property.

HELD:

The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modestos exclusiveproperty since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto,


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Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will ofotherwise to Consolacion.

Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on theseparate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry

of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of thepartnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making orconstruction of the improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in order to determine thecharacter of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouseseparately. What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusiveproperty of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only andthere is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongsexclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal incharacter.

Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect to beregular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquiredindefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequentlyarising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.

CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93 FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) toannul for lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipinowife (Criselda) of a residential lot andbuilding to Estelita Padilla

December 4, 1970 Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman weremarried but have been separatedsince February 15, 1981

June 4, 1974 a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights wasexecuted by Armando Altares,conveying a parcel of land in favor of CriseldaCheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas,although awareof thedeed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Taxdeclarations for the said property were issued in the name of CriseldaCheesman alone and she assumed exclusive management andadministration of the property


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July 1, 1981 Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledgeand consent of Thomas

July 31, 1981 Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on theground that the transaction hadbeen executed without his knowledge andconsent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the propertysold wasparaphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that

Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; thatEstelita was a buyer in good faith

During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took placeduring the existence of theirmarriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974

June 24, 1982 RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio andorderedthe delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of theconjugal property

Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelitas petitionfor relief and resolution ofmatters not subject of said petition; in declaringvalid the sale to Estelita without his knowledge andconsent. On January 7,1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decisionISSUE: Whether or not the wifecan dispose of the property in question; Whether ornot Cheesman, being an American citizen, canquestion the saleHELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that: save in casesof hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except toindividuals,corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of thepublic domain. Thus, assumingthat it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased byhim and his wife, he acquired no rightwhatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase

; and

in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, hewas knowingly v iolating the Constitution.

As such, the sale to him was nulland void. At any rate, Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY TOQUESTION THE SUBSEQUENTSALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THE THEORY THAT IN SODOING He


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IS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF A HUSBAND IN RESPECT OFCONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the Constitutional prohibition.

If the property were to bedeclared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantiallinterest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to itstransfer or disposition. This is

a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his recoveringandholding the property cannot be warranted as it is against the constitution.Consequently, Estelita is apurchaser in good faith since she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of thesaid property. AFFIRMED

Carino vs Carino

Facts:

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4contracted a second marriage , this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage , SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriagewith Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim atotal of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action forcollection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that hermarriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but

the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriagelicense as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about theprevious marriage on SPO4s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriagelicense. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnizedwithout the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage onthe basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolutenullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, thesole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but notlimited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validityof marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to


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question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In suchinstances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of groundsrendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlierfinal judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage isvoid due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common inproportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong tohim or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a copeven if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other forthere were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in theirsituation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything theyearned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party thisincludes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not havecontributed at all

Documents

Cases on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife