Cases, Numbers, Models – by Sprinz & WolinskyChapters 10-12

Three bullet points:• Formal models are increasingly useful in

developing theory in international politics• These include logical, mathematical, and

simulation approaches, with borrowing from microeconomics and other quantitative fields

• Remember that models are never “true” but can be useful.

Who are the writers? Who is the audience?(a recap)

• Detlef Sprinz– Professor, Department of Economic and Social Sciences, The University of Potsdam– Senior Research Fellow I, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo– Previously Chairman/Member, Scientific Committee, European Environment Agency (2004-2012)– Ph.D./M.A (Political Science), University of Michigan. Dissertation: “Why Countries Support International

Environmental Agreements: The Regulation of Acid Rain in Europe”– M.A. (Economics), University of the Saarland– Journals:

• Global Environmental Politics (Editorial Board)• Journal of Environment & Development (Editorial Board)• Weather, Climate, and Society (Associate Editor for Political Science)

– Self-description: “His areas of research and publications encompass long-term policy, inter/national institutions & the evaluation of their performance, European & international environmental policy, and modeling political decisions.”

• Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias– Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University– Co-director, Northwestern Environmental Field School– Director, Program In Environmental Policy and Culture– Ph.D. Political Science, University of Chicago– M.A. Political Science, University of Pennsylvania– B.A. International Relations and East Asian Studies, Cum Laude, Hebrew University of Jerusalem– Field of active study appears to be environmental policy and its international relations aspects.

• Intended Audience: Practitioners of Research in International Relations

Formal Models of International Politics

• Duncan Snidal (Prof. of IR at Oxford; Assoc. Prof. of Int’l Politics, Econ., and Security at U Chicago)

• Formal/Mathematical models are useful because they enhance precision and can aid in use of deductive reasoning.

• Models create shorthand which combines description and conclusions

• This shorthand is part of an iterative process within the field, which is linked with the development of theory

Formal Models of International Politics(cont.)

• Models are always abstractions. Do we know enough to simplify?

• Types: physical representations, computer simulations, causal maps, game theory cases.

• Physical: immediacy, viscerality, useful in teaching.• Simulation: handles many/complex assumptions easily; can

be altered quickly• Mathematical: symbolic manipulation increases power of

deductive logic• Game theory: easily incorporates changing motivations and

multi-period analysis of multiple actors.

Formal Models of International Politics(cont.)

• Remember, we are using “stylized facts” and not “fact facts”

• Test of a model is a joint test of predictions and assumptions

• Tension between looking for face validity, and also looking to see if we can produce “surprising” predictions.

International Political Economy and Formal Models of Political Economy

• Helen Milner– Stanford u/g; Harvard Ph.D– Prof. of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton– Director of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and

Governance; President of the International Political Science Association.

• What is International Political Economy (IPE)?– Issues related to the intersection of politics and economics– “seems to have appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s”– IPE research must have an independent or dependent

economic variable

IPE and formal models (cont.)

• Rational choice theory– Individuals are not random, they have clear preferences which

they pursue consistently– Generally assumes perfect information– Focused on efficiency

• Rational choice models can be informal, but increasingly they are formal and mathematical—this has been much more true of security studies and is now becoming true of IPE– Does this produce obscure models with little added advantage?– Are results unoriginal and untestable?

IPE and formal models (cont.)

Key examples within the field:• Hegemonic stability theory (HST)– Do hegemons prefer free trade? (maybe) Are

there even hegemons at all (Pahre)?• Explanations of foreign economic policy– Driven by trade and monetary policies

• International institutions and cooperation– How does cooperation emerge and evolve?

Consumption, Production and Markets: Applications of Microeconomics to International Politics

• John A.C. Conybeare– Chair/Prof. of Political Science, University of Iowa,

1988-present– BA (Econ. + Poli. Sci.), Australian Nat’l Univ.; MA,

Ph.D (Gov’t), Harvard• Microeconomics– Rational choice for individuals– Application in IR is to make analogy from

individuals or firms to states or blocs

Applications of Microeconomics to IPE (cont.)

• Utility functions and risk aversion– Apply to both supply and demand– Dependent on inputs or factors– Greater (but uncertain) consumption is not always preferred to

lesser (but certain) consumption• Can microeconomics explain governmental and IR choices?

– Feudalism replaced by markets– Mercantilism and isolation replaced by modern international

system of trade– Microeconomics appears to be good at explaining sectoral

demands for certain government policies