G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013 Land Bank of the Philippines vs Eduardo M. Cacayuran

G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013 Land Bank of the Philippines vs Eduardo M. Cacayuran

Facts: This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA affirming the RTC in declaring the nullity of the loan agreements entered into by Land Bank and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union.

Agoo SB passed a certain resolution to implement a redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza. To finance the plan, SB passed a resolution authorizing then Maor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank, incidental to it, mortgaged a portion of the plaza as collateral. It has also authorized the assignment of a portion if the IRA and monthly income in favor of Land Bank to secure the payment. 10 Kiosks were made at the plaza, then were rented out. Later, a commercial center on the Plaza lot was built too, with a loan from Land Bank, posting the same securities as the first loan.

The commercial loan was opposed by some residents of the municipality embodied in a manifesto launched through a signature campaign by the residents and Cacayuran. Invoking his right as taxpayer, Cacayuran filed a complaint against the officials and Land bank assailing the validity of the loans on the ground that the Plaza lot used as collateral is property of public dominion and therefore beyond the commerce of man.

RTC Ruling: declared the nullity of the subject loans, saying that the oans were passed in a highly irregular manner, as such, the Municipality is not bound by the same.

Aggrieved, Land Bank filed notice of appeal.

Ruling of CA: affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling, excluding the Vice Mayor from any personal liability arising from the subject loans. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and taxpayer in the municipality and the issue involves public interest. The plaza cannot be a valid collateral to a loans for it is of public dominion.

Land Bank filed this instant petition.

Issues:

(1) whether Cacayuran has locus standi (2) whether the subject resolutions were validly passed and (3) whether the subject loans are ultra vires. [The doctrine in the law of corporations that holds that if a corporation enters into a contract that is beyond the scope of its corporate powers, the contract is illegal.]

SC Ruling:

(1) Taxpayer is allowed to sue if: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.

In the case, the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipalitys receipt thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they are under official custody. Public plaza belongs to public dominion, Cacayuran need not to be a privy to the loans, as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question the contracts entered into by the government.

(2) While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a law making body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether. Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the SBs failure to submit the Subject Resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Section 56 of the LGC; and (2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of Section 59 of the LGC.

(3) Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra vires acts deemed as void. Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of the said plaza is beyond the Municipalitys jurisdiction considering the propertys nature as one for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the object of appropriation either by the State or by private persons. Nor can it be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking.

VALENTINO LEGASPI vs. CITY OF CEBU et al.

FACTS:On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City.

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.

Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;

That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.

He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.

The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void

The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.

Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.

DENIED.

BAGABUYO v. COMELEC December 8, 2008

573 SCRA 290 Political Law Local Government Reapportionment

Municipal Corporation Plebiscite

Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.SEVERINO B. VERGARA, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J. LAJARA, and VIRGINIA G. BARORO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 174567 March 12, 2009

FACTS:

The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where petitioner was a member, issued Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang, and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the public hearing, the choice for the new city hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba.

The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001, authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots owned by Pamana with a total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of P129,017,600. Mayor Lajara was also authorized to execute, sign and deliver the required documents.

The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor Lajara, entered into the following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).

The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City Council. Petitioner, however, alleged that all these documents were not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission on Audit.

The respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City Council of the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They cited Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which spoke of prior authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to negotiate and sign the subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to enact Resolution No. 280.

The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City Councils stamps of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Aggrieved by the Ombudmans findings, petitioner elevated the case before this Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear the ratification by the City Council of Calamba.

RULING: On the ratification by the City Council of all documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots, Petitioner contends that all the documents, like the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment, do not bear the ratification by the City Council.

In the assailed Order, the Ombudsman held that the various actions performed by Mayor Lajara in connection with the purchase of the lots were all authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod as manifested in numerous resolutions. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits.

In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolution No. 280 is the City Councils stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides:

Section 22. Corporate Powers. - x x x

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers, duties, and compensation of the Chief Executive. Specifically, it states that :

Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. -

x x x

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:

x x x

(vi) Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance; (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of prior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod and not ratification. It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No. 280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Resolution No. 280 states:

Resolution No. 280

Series of 2001

A Resolution authorizing the City Mayor of Calamba, Hon. Severino J. Lajara to purchase lots of Pamana Inc. with a total area of fifty five thousand square meters (55,000 sq. m.) situated at Barangay Real, City of Calamba for a lump sum price of one hundred twenty nine million seventeen thousand six hundred pesos (P129,017,600), subject to the availability of funds, and for this purpose, further authorizing the Hon. Mayor Severino J. Lajara to represent the city government and to execute, sign and deliver such documents and papers as maybe so required in the premises.

WHEREAS, the City of Calamba is in need of constructing a modern City Hall to adequately meet the requirements of governing new city and providing all adequate facilities and amenities to the general public that will transact business with the city government.

WHEREAS, as the City of Calamba has at present no available real property of its own that can serve as an appropriate site of said modern City Hall and must therefore purchase such property from the private sector under terms and conditions that are most beneficial and advantageous to the people of the City of Calamba;

NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Kagawad S. VERGARA duly seconded by Kagawad R. HERNANDEZ, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved to authorize the City Mayor of Calamba, Hon. Severino J. Lajara to purchase lots of Pamana, Inc. with a total area of fifty five thousand square meters (55,000 sq.m.) situated at Barangay Real, City of Calamba for a lump sum price of One Hundred Twenty Nine Million Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P129,017,600) subject to the availability of funds, and for this purpose, further authorizing the Hon. Mayor Severino J. Lajara to represent the City Government and to execute, sign and deliver such documents and papers as maybe so required in the premises.[][62] (Emphasis supplied)

As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the resolution issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue injury to Calamba City.

MELANIE P. MONTUERTO vs. HON. MAYOR ROLANDO E. TY and THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN, represented by HON. VICE-MAYOR RICHARD D. JAGUROS, all of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran,

(G.R. No. 177736 / October 6, 2009)

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision dated October 31, 2006 and Resolution dated March 29, 2007, which affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated June 7, 2005.

FACTS: On March 17, 1992, petitioner was issued an appointment as Municipal Budget Officer by the thenMayor Supremo T. Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. On March 24, 1992, her appointment was approved as permanent by Gerardo Corder, Acting Civil Service Commission Field Officer.On January 14, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan of Almeria, Biliran passed Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Resolution No. 01-S-2002 entitled " A Resolution Requesting the Civil Service Commission Regional Office, to Revoke the Appointment of Mrs. Melanie P. Montuerto, Municipal Budget Officer of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran for Failure to Secure the Required Concurrence from the Sangguniang Bayan."Consequently, the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran submitted the 201 file of petitioner to Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VIII (CSCRO No. VIII) which showed that petitioner's appointment lackedthe required concurrence of the local sanggunian. On the other hand, petitioner submitted to the same office a Joint-Affidavit executed on March 6, 2002, by the majority of the then members of the

Sangguniang Bayan of Almeria, Biliran, that only verbal concurrence on the appointment and also there is no record to show that there is appointment of Mrs Melanie P. Montuerto as Municipal Bidget Officer of Almeria.On March 11, 2002, CSCRO No. VIII issued an Order of recalled on the grounds that it lacks the required concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanguninang Bayan and On July 11, 2005, the Municipal Mayor issued a Memorandum terminating the services of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 050756.Petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA, which denied it for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer, without the written concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved by the CSC and after the appointee had served as such for almost ten years without interruption, can still be revoked by the Commission.

RULING: We resolve to deny the Petition. The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal government,such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan

members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. Per records, the appointment of petitioner was never submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for its concurrence or, even if so submitted, no such concurrence was obtained. Such factual finding of quasi-judicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by the CA, is deemed final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and generally, does not weigh anew evidence already passed upon by the CA. Absent a showing that this case falls under any of the exceptions to this general rule, this Court will refrain from disturbing the findings of fact of the tribunals below.Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian

,as postulated by the petitioner, is not the concurrence required and envisioned under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 7160. Without a valid appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title to the Office of Municipal Budget Officer, even if she had served as such for ten years. Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC

FACTS: During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.

ISSUE: Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?

RATIO: November 18, 2008 Ruling No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes. (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)

March 31, 2009 Ruling No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.

April 28, 2009 Ruling No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.

December 21, 2009 Ruling Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the SCs Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)

August 24, 2010 Ruling No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision, the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that no cityshall be createdexcept in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution, the Court held. The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)

February 15, 2011 Ruling Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.

April 12, 2011Ruling Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said. The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth. (GR No. 176951, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)