ASSIGNMENT IN LEGAL ETHICS 2012

I.READ:1. Canons 1-6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 2. Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution3. Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court4. Rules 138- A, Revised Rules of Court5. CASES:

In Bar Matter No. 914, 1 October 1999Bar Matter No. 730, 10 June 1997Cruz vs. Atty. Cabrera, AC 5737, October 25, 2004Yumol Jr. vs. Atty. Ferrer Sr., AC 6585, April 21, 2005Cayetano vs. Monsod, 101 SCRA 210Aguirre vs. Rana, BM 1036, June 10, 2003In RE Atty. Marcial Edillion, AM 192, August 3, 1987In the matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr., BM 1370, May 9, 2005Santos Jr. vs. Llamas, AC 4749, January 20, 2000Leslie Ui vs. Atty Iris Bonifacio, AC 3319, June 8, 2000Dantes vs. Atty. Dantes, AC 6486, September 22, 2004Tolentino, et al vs. Atty. Mendoza, AC 5151, October 19, 2004Moreno vs. Atty. Araneta, AC 1109, April 7, 2005Cojuangco vs. Atty. Palma, AC 2474, September 15, 2004Barrios vs. Atty. Martinez, AC 4585, November 12, 2004In RE Luis Tagorda, March 23, 1929Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic Inc., BM 553, June 17, 1993Khan vs. Atty. Simbillo, AC 5299, August 19, 2003B.R. Sebastian Enterprises Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR L- 41862, February 7, 1992Consolidated Farms Inc. vs. Atty. Alpon Jr., AC 5525, March 14, 2005Viriolo vs. Atty. Dasig, C 4984, April 1, 2003Artezuela vs. Atty. Maderazo, AC (), April 22, 2002Pimentel Jr. vs. Attys. Llorente and Salayon, AC 4680, August 29, 2002Lim and Tan vs. Atty. Barcelona, AC 5438, March 12, 2004

II. BRING 1 EXAM BOOKLET (White Notes)

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPINESCODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITYCHAPTER I. THE LAW AND SOCIETYCANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVE-NESS OF THE PROFESSION.Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latters rights.Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanrobles virtual law library

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Rule 138 - Rules of CourtAttorneys and Admission to BarATTORNEYS & ADMISSION TO BAR Rule 138 Section 1.Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.chanrobles virtualawlibrarySec. 2.Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 3.Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. - Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary"I, _________________________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God." Sec. 4.Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. - Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.chanrobles virtualawlibrarySec. 5.Additional requirements for other applicants. - All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 6.Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics. Sec. 7.Time for filing proof of qualifications. - All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within sections 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship. Sec. 8.Notice of applications. - Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination. Sec. 9.Examination; subjects. - Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleading and Conveyancing). Sec. 10.Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. - Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone. Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time, the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used. chan robles virtual law library

The committee of bar examiners shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given. Sec. 11.Annual examination. - Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be designated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon). Sec. 12.Committee of examiners. - Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports. Sec. 13.Disciplinary measures. - No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provision, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 14.Passing average. - In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent; Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent. Sec. 15.Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. - Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its reports on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be fixed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report. Sec. 16.Failing candidates to take review course. - Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show to the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject. Sec. 17.Admission and oath of successful applicants. - An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. Sec. 18.Certificate. - The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 19.Attorneys' roll. - The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate. Sec. 20.Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines;

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. Sec. 21.Authority of attorney to appear. - An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 22.Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. - An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. Sec. 23.Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. Sec. 24.Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Sec. 25.Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. - When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Sec. 26.Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client. Sec. 27.Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Sec. 28.Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. - The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. Sec. 29.Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order or suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 30.Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. - No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. Sec. 31.Attorneys for destitute litigants. - A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown. Sec. 32.Compensation for attorneys de oficio. - Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensated in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall not be less than thirty pesos (P30.00) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50.00) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100.00) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200.00) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five hundred pesos (P500.00) in capital offenses. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 33.Standing in court of persons authorized to appear for Government. - Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect. Sec. 34.By whom litigation conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Sec. 35.Certain attorneys not to practice. - No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Sec. 36.Amicus curiae. - The court may, in special cases, and upon proper application, permit the appearance, as amici curiae, of those lawyers who in its opinion can help in the disposition of the matter before it; or it may, on its own initiative, invite prominent attorneys to appear as amici curiae in such special cases. Sec. 37.Attorneys' liens. - An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Rule 138-A - Rules of CourtLaw Student Practice RuleLAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE Rule 138-A

SECTION 1.Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Privileged communications. - The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.

SEC. 4.Standards of conduct and supervision. - The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (SC Circular No. 19, prom. Dec. 19, 1986).

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCBAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,vs.VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.R E S O L U T I O NKAPUNAN, J.:Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.The facts of this case are as follows:Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official documents;3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age ofmajority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where we held:We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.xxx xxx xxxThe filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.Footnotes1 Citing Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 89 Phil. 473, 476 (1951).2 Citing CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., p. 359.3 Citing Cuenco.vs. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 108, 110 (1962).4 Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office;(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship;(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.5 Sec. 1(1), Article III, 1973 Constitution.6 Sec. 1(3), Article IV, 1987 Constitution.7 BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines;First Ed. (1987), p. 502.8 Ibid.,citing Convention Session of November 27, 1972 and noting that it is also applicable to the 1987 Constitution.9 Art.402, Civil Code.10 Lim Teco vs. Collector of Customs, 24 SCRA 84, 88 (1912).11 Muoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 SCRA 494: 498 (1911); Lorenzo vs. Collector of Customs, 15 SCRA 559, 592 (1910).12 5 SCRA 108 (1962).13 Id., at 110.14 Id.15 59 SCRA 45 (1974)16 Id., at 52.17 Id.18 199 SCRA 692 (1991).19 Id., at 707-709 (Emphasis supplied).20 Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364, 379 (1989)BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997Gentlemen:Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.Section 2.Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 31. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;Section 34.By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance.Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.Very truly yours,(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNOClerk of courtFootnotes1 Consulta, p. 2.2 Comment, p. 9.3 Comment, p. 5.4 Agpalo, Legal Ethics (Fourth Edition, 1989), pp. 39-40.5 134 SCRA 252 (1985).

[A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004]FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx.Thereafter, the respondent said:Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!To this the complainant remarked:Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent stated: Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied: The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka muna out of indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable Courts Third Division which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainants actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated: After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondents averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court. Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them.Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[2]In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases.[3] This case falls within the exception.We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5]Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:SEC. 34.By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorneyby acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7]On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.[9]WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur

[1] 357 SCRA 406 (2001).[2]Id., p. 412.[3]Id., pp. 412-413.[4]Rollo, p. 9.[5] In re: Gomez, 43 Phil. 376, 377 (1922).[6] 413 SCRA 313 (2003).[7]Id., pp. 324-325.[8]Reyes vs. Chiong Jr., 405 SCRA 212, 217 (2003).[9]De la Rosa vs. Sabio, Jr., 407 SCRA 213, 220 (2003).

[A.C. No. 6585. April 21, 2005]TOMAS B. YUMOL, JR., FELIX S. VENTIC, ELMER L. MANIEGO and JAKE M. MAGCALAS, complainants, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR., respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Tomas B. Yumol, Jr., Felix S. Ventic, Elmer L. Maniego and Jake Magcalas against Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., for grave misconduct.At all time material to the controversy, complainants were employees of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Atty. Yumol as Officer-in-Charge,[1] Mr. Ventic, as Supervising Special Investigator, Mr. Maniego as Special Investigator III and Mr. Magcalas as Special Investigator I. Respondent Atty. Ferrer, Sr., held the position of Attorney IV, also of the Commission.On 17 September 2001, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy sought the assistance of the CHR for the alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy by her husband, John Burt Dy, and the coercive act of the latter in the transfer of her account with the Porac Rural Bank. Acting on this, Atty. Ferrer, a Senior Legal Officer of the CHR, issued the two (2) Orders quoted below.The facts as above stated resulted in the heated altercation that took place on 28 September 2001 between respondent and one Mr. John Burt Dy, whereby the latter accused the CHR of conniving with his wife, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Dy, and of destroying his reputation and good name at the Porac Rural Bank. Atty. Yumol, being the OIC Head of the Office, asked Mr. Dy if he could substantiate his accusations. The latter showed him two (2) alleged Office Orders dated 18 and 19 September 2001, both signed by respondent.The Order dated 18 September 2001,[2] reads:Acting on the Complaint of Ma. CECILIA M. DY, and pursuant to the provision of the Family Code that children five (5) years and below should remain under the custody of the mother, in relation to the provisions of the Constitution vesting powers unto this Commission and in particular, Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the respondent is hereby ordered to give custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY to the maternal custody of the aforementioned mother.Wherefore, premises considered, pending investigation of the above-entitled case, the custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY is hereby awarded to the mother MA. CECILIA M. DY.SO ORDERED.City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 18, 2001.(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.Senior Legal CounselThe Order dated 19 September 2001,[3] reads:Before this Commission is the Complaint filed by complainant wife for alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy which happened last August 22, 2001 and the coercive mean (sic) of respondent JOHN BURT DY in the transfer of the complainants cash deposit with the Porac Rural Bank.Finding the allegations to (sic) sufficiently established, custody of the child was awarded to the Complainant and properly executed with the aid [of] the Sangguniang Barangay of Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga and the elements of the Porac PNP.Likewise, we find that there had been coercion in the transfer of complainant (sic) deposit in bank, which was already effected by the aforementioned Rural Bank.NOW, THEREFORE, pending the final determination of this above-entitled case and by virtue of the powers and authority granted this Commission under Sec. 18, Article 13 of the Constitution, the Rural Bank of Porac is hereby ordered to reinstate the account of complainant MA. CECILIA M. DY.SO ORDERED.City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 19, 2001.(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.Senior Legal Counsel IVComplainants Yumol and Magcalas, together with their staff, witnessed the incident and were surprised to see the two (2) orders allegedly issued by respondent. Mr. Dy also informed Atty. Yumol that the two (2) orders were already enforced by respondent himself and his co-employees V. Rigor and E. Enolpe, Police Officer Larucom and the Barangay Captain of their place.Concerned by the acts of respondent, Atty. Yumol tried to clarify the matter by writing a letter[4] to the Bank Manager stating, thus:In reference to the order of Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., Attorney IV of this Regional Office, the undersigned would like to inform your good office that the Commissions participation on the matter is limited only to extend legal guidance/assistance considering that the disagreement of spouses John Burt Dy and Ma. Cecilia M. Dy is a family matter. Hence, you are being advised to disregard Atty. Ferrers order dated September 19, 2001.Moreover, the said case is not officially docketed as part of Human Rights cases handled by the Commission.I hope this will clarify any misinterpretation of the Commissions mandate.On 28 September 2001, Yumol required[5] respondent to explain within seventy-two (72) hours the unauthorized issuance of the said Orders.It turned out later that respondent was engaged in private practice by handling private cases in courts and other quasi-judicial bodies as shown by the following pleadings:PleadingsWhere Filed

Motion for Reconsideration in Sp. Proc. No. 01-01MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba, Pampanga.[6]

Motion for Issuance of Mandatory InjunctionMTC, San Fernando, Pampanga[7]

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Issuance of Preliminary InjunctionRTC-58, Angeles City[8]

PetitionMTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba, Pampanga[9]

Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Motion for PostponementRTC-58, Angeles City[10]

Motion for Reconsideration- do -[11]

Motion for Reconsideration On Denial of the Release of Vehicle- do -[12]

Addendum to Motion For Re-Investigation- do -[13]

Motion to Set Motion For Release of Vehicle- do -[14]

Several documents were also notarized by respondent, viz:DocumentsWhere Used

Reply of Norberto San Angel dated October 16, 2001MTC, Branch 1, San Fernando, Pampanga[15]

Sworn Statement dated October 15, 2001 of May Paule, et al.Civil Case No. 8509 filed with the MTC San Fernando, Pampanga[16]

Criminal Complaint of Myrna Bulaon Criminal Case No. 01-1401 MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga[17]

Reply Affidavit of Myrna Bulaon - do-[18]

Affidavit of Renato P. Canlas Special Proceeding No. 01-01 at MTC, Sta. Ana, Pampanga[19]

Respondent also attended court hearings as shown in the following Minutes of Hearings, Orders, and Transcripts of Stenographic Notes:DateTimeCase No.Court

March 2, 20019:00 A.M.01-01 (Ejectment Case) MTC/Sta. Ana, Pampanga[20]

April 23, 20011:30 P.M.Crim. Case No. 00-1164RTC-58 Angeles City[21]

March 6, 20012:15 P.M.Crim. Case No. 00-1164- do -[22]

August 3, 20019:00 A.M.Crim. Case No. 01-1401MTC, Sta. Ana. Pampanga[23]

Sept. 7, 2001- do -- do -[24]

October 15, 20018:30 A.M.Civil Case No. 17360RTC 42, San Frdo., Pamp.[25]

Nov. 5, 20012:00 P.M.Civil Case No. 8509MTC Branch 1, San Fernando, Pampanga.[26]

Nov. 27, 2001Civil Case No. 8509RTC 58, Angeles City[27]

Dec. 6, 20012:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509MTC Br. I, San Fernando, Pampanga.[28]

During those times that respondent attended hearings, he declared in his Daily Time Records (DTRs) that he was present at the Office as shown by the DTRs attached to the complaint.The actuations of the respondent provoked the filing of several criminal cases against him, to wit:(1) Falsification of Public Documents,[29](2) Usurpation of Functions,[30] and(3) Violation of Republic Act No. 6713.[31]Still, despite the cases filed against him, respondent continued attending hearings in different courts as demonstrated by the following photostatic copies of the Minutes of the trials of the cases:[32]DatesTimeCourt

October 24, 20022:00 PMMTC Arayat, Pampanga[33]

November 7, 20022:00 PM- do -

January 17, 20039:00 AMMTC Sta. Ana, Pampanga[34]

February 10, 20039:00 AMMTC Arayat, Pampanga[35]

March 10, 20039:00 AM- do -[36]

March 24, 2003- do -[37]

March 28, 20039:00 AMMTC Sta. Ana, Pampanga[38]

May 9, 20039:00 AM- do -[39]

May 29, 20038:30 AMRTC-54, Macabebe, Pampanga[40]

June 12, 20032:00 PMMTC Arayat, Pampanga[41]

June 17, 2003MTC-4, San Frdo., Pampanga[42]

July 17, 20038:30 AMRTC-54, Macabebe, Pampanga[43]

August 26, 2003 9:00 A.M.MTC-4, San Frdo., Pampanga[44]

Complainants maintained that all these acts constitute grave misconduct.We referred the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and investigation.On 04 November 2003, respondent filed a motion[45] for extension of twenty (20) days within which to file his answer, which was granted by the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP, Pasig City.[46]In his answer,[47] respondent admitted that Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy dropped by at the CHR to seek assistance regarding the recovery of her minor son and the restitution of her time deposit. He also acknowledged having issued the two orders but maintained that the same were in consonance with the powers and functions granted to all CHR lawyers. He argued that CHR lawyers, pursuant to CHR Resolution No. A-88-056 dated 8 October 1988 and CHR Resolution No. A89-109-A dated 19 July 1989, can file, appear, prosecute and represent the Commission for underprivileged victims and persons whose human rights have been violated or in need of protection in civil, criminal and administrative matters which are properly cognizable by the Commission. He likewise claimed that he was allowed by the CHR to file a petition for commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 01 December 2000. He denied having falsified his DTRs as the same were certified by complainant Atty. Yumol as Officer-In-Charge of their office and that his appearances in courts were for legal assistance as allowed in CHR Resolution No. A-88-056. Lastly, respondent insisted that the instant complaint was an offshoot of the administrative case filed by Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy against Atty. Yumol and the other complainants, which prevented the issuance of a certificate of clearance to Atty. Yumol relative to his impending retirement.In their reply,[48] complainants claimed that respondents commission as notary public was granted only by the CHR on 29 October 2001, and received by the CHR Region 3 on 07 November 2001, hence, the belated authority granted to him cannot be made to retroact to the notarized documents which were all done before 07 November 2001. Complainants likewise argued that respondents act of appearing in courts as counsel is a form of private practice which is expressly prohibited by Republic Act No. 6713.[49] They further explained that the CHR has no authority to issue the questioned orders as it cannot try and decide cases which courts of justice or quasi-judicial bodies do. Finally, they pointed out that the complaint filed by Mrs. Dy against them was already dismissed in an Order dated 15 October 2003.After investigative hearings, IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her report, the dispositive portion of which reads:[50]IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, there is merit in the complaint and it is hereby recommended that respondent ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR. be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the bar.On 30 July 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty imposed: [51]RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent can be held liable for falsification for making it appear that he was at the CHR office by logging in at the DTR when actually he was attending a hearing in some courts, Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent has committed gross misconduct arising from the following alleged acts:1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government employee;2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for engaging in private practice.Relative to the first ground, respondent contends that CHR lawyers are authorized to engage in private practice by invoking CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133.CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to the following conditions,[52] to wit:NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to adopt the following policy:Lawyers employed in the Civil Service Commission, upon written request, may be authorized to practice their profession subject to the following conditions:1. It shall not entail any conflict of interest insofar as the functions of the Commission are concerned;2. It shall not be in representation of a client whose cause of action is against the government;3. It shall not involve the use of government funds or property;4. It shall not impair the lawyers efficiency in the discharge of his/her regular functions in the office, and absences incurred, if any, shall be covered by duly approved vacation leaves and pass slips;5. It shall be subject to the provisions of RA No. 6713 and such other relevant Civil Service Laws and Rules;6. The lawyers can appear only in courts of law, offices of state prosecutors (Department of Justice), Office of the Ombudsman and quasi-judicial agencies decisions of which are rendered by presidential appointees;7. Authority is for one year subject to renewal after review of the lawyers office performance;8. Provided, that, the commission reserves its right to revoke the said authority.Recognizing that the dearth of lawyers committed to the civil service is due to the . . . huge disparity in the income of government lawyers as compared to those employed in the private sector, the Commission on Human Rights is convinced that CHR lawyers may be authorized to engage in the practice of their profession to augment their income so as to encourage them in the government service.NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Human Rights adopts the above-cited conditions to authorize, upon written request, to practice their profession. However, it is the Commission (sic) position that said authority should be strictly construed to maintain efficient and effective delivery of Commission programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the practice and approved leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied[53] for commission as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000.[54] However, the CHR authorized[55] respondent to act as notary public only on 29 October 2001.[56] Considering that acts of notarization are within the ambit of the term practice of law, for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are required, the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.Practice of law has a settled meaning. It refers to any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[57] Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainants, the belated authority granted to respondent cannot be made to retroact to the notarized documents dated prior thereto.As to the alleged falsification of DTRs, records show that respondent has been actually attending hearings in different courts as shown by the minutes of hearings and/or orders issued by different courts. Since it has been amply established that he was not properly authorized to do so as no written request by him and approval thereof of his request and of his leave of absence was made by the CHR, it is an ineluctable conclusion that he falsified his DTRs when he certified thereon that he was at the office on the same days and time. Needless to say, he could not be at two different places at the same time.We shall now discuss respondents authority to issue the two (2) Orders. The following are instructive:. . . The [1987] Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission [on Human Rights] the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. . . But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.Investigate, commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of investigate is to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.The legal meaning of investigate is essentially the same: to follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry; to inquire; to make an investigation, investigation being in turn described as (a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing . . .Adjudicate, commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge. And adjudge means to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x.In the legal sense, adjudicate means: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense; and adjudge means: To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.[58]The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate, cannot and should not try and resolve the subject matters involved in the Order dated 18 September 2001, which awarded the custody of the child to her mother, and Order dated 19 September 2001, which ordered the Rural Bank of Porac to reinstate the account of the mother of the child. These matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the judicial and adjudicatory powers of a regular court.As to the fourth charge, suffice it to state that despite the cases filed against respondent in courts, he continued without the proper authority and approved leave of absence, to engage in the private practice of his profession as shown by certified true copies of the minutes and orders of the different courts where he attended hearings.In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr.,[59] we explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicia