1UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and MAXINE BRADFORD,petitioners,vs.HON. LUIS R. REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of Cavite, and NELIA T. MONTOYA,respondents.

Petition forcertiorariand prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners would have Us annul and set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the Resolution of 17 July 1987 of Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

FACTS: Nelia Montoya, respondent, is an American citizen who, at the time material to this case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner Maxine Bradford, hereinafter referred to as Bradford, is likewise an American citizen who was the activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG Headquarters. Respondents body and belongings were searched by Yong Kennedy, also an ID checker, upon the instruction of the store manager, Ms. Maxine Bradford while she was already at the parking area in the presence of the defendant and numerous curious onlookers; she was informed by the defendant that the search is to be made on all Jusmag employees that day; but checking the records, its only she. Montoya formally protested the illegal search on February 14, 1987 in a letter addressed to Mr. R.L. Roynon; but no action was undertaken by the said officer;

Process: Montoya filed complaint with RTC-Cavite for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager Bradford filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file her Answer which were both granted by the trial court, but instead of answering, she, together with USA, filed Motion to Dismiss on ff. grounds: (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended. Checking of purchases at the NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise, cash and equipment pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.7Thus, Bradford's order to have purchases of all employees checked on 22 January 1987 was made in the exercise of her duties as Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG.

Montoya filed her opposition alleging: Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongingsoutsidethe NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers, had committed an improper, unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority having exceeded her authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public petitioner because her liability is personal Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who had committed the challenged act outside the U.S. Military Bases; such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine courts Philippine courts can inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of her authority.

They exchanged replies until Bradford was declared in default for failure to answer, so Montoya presented her evidence ex-parte. This default also showed admission of truth of allegation.

ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: The complaint in Civil Case No. 224-87 is in effect a suit against the public petitioner, a foreign sovereign immune from suit which has not given consent to such suit and Bradford is immune from suit for acts done by her in the performance of her official functions as manager of the U.S. Navy Exchange of JUSMAG pursuant to the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended.

HELD: Petition denied for lack of merit. Montoya has a sufficient and viable cause of action that Bradford acted not only outside the scope of her authority or more specifically, in her private capacity but also outside the territory where she exercises such authority, that is, outside the NEX-JUSMAG particularly, at the parking area which has not been shown to form part of the facility of which she was the manager.. the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule.

Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners vs.Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi, respondents

Second DivisionDoctrine: official v. personal capacityKeywords: void for overbreadthDate: November 27, 1990Ponente: Justice Regalado

Facts:Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent.

Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

Held:No they are not immune.WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio:They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.

It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction

Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.

There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.

She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology/guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.

In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..

There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.

SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs.HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, ET. AL.

FACTS:At about 7am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot (owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino Velasquez), and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

Petitioner raised as one of its defenses the non-suability of the State.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Fernando is immune from suit.

HELD: YES.Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."

We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.ERNESTO CALLADOvs.INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO,J.:

Facts:Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him.However,IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620,5and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, theLabor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity,"and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

TheNLRCfound merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue:Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?

Held:No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.

Theraison d'etrefor these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

Holy See vs RosarioG.R. No. 101949238 SCRA 524December 1, 1994

Petitioner:The Holy SeeRespondent:Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge ofRTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS:Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as TropicanaProperties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD:The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an actjure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern isnon-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is herebyGRANTEDand the complaints were dismissed accordingly.

GRN L-35645 May 22, 1985.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES B. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.

FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. The company filed a complaint against the defendants herein demanding specific performance that the company be allowed to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages.

ISSUE: WON the US is immune from suit having dealt with a private corporation.

HELD: YES.A State may be said to have descended the the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest

These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

FACTS:

1.USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2.USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

3.USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latters acts that he lost his job.

4.USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons.The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant.For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred.The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.

2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto) Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

Republic vs. Sandoval(Two petitions consolidated.)

En BancCampos, Jr., March 19, 1993

Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of AuthorityFacts: The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre (background:Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform" The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands such as: giving lands for free to farmers zero retention of lands by landlords stop amortizations of land payments Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January 15, 1987 On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting Tension mounted the next day The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML) Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place; "pandemonium broke loose" After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo) 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of marchers Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor physical injuries The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February 27, 1987 as follows The march did not have any permit The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire (prohibited by law) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law It is not clear who started the firing The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because: there was no order to use them they were incorrectly prepositioned they were out of range of the marchers The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally without permit and for inciting sedition Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola: Gen. Ramon E.Montao Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz Col. Cezar Nazareno Maj. Filemon Gasmin Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver Motion for Reconsideration was also deniedIssues:1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is a suit against the State with its consent) Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the StateHolding:1. No. This is not a suit against the State with its consent.2. No.Ratio:1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State immediately President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State2. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:2. When the Republic is sued by name;2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency2. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official functions during the incident, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms.. Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired at the crowd insteadNo reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.1