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People vs Andri Marti
Facts On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars
the NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Marti's Contention1.Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
2. appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
3. HE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
Issue Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's contstituional rights, be invoked against the state.
SC Held1. Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1)The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution
it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
2. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day
As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters
Burgos vs COS, AFP
FactsAssailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
People vs Chua Ho San
NatureChua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquittal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, finding him guilty of transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15,[1] Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R.A. No. 7659,[2] and sentencing him to "die by lethal injection." In view thereof, the judgment was brought to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.
FactsIn response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions thirty meters from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed sign language; he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial features of the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances which he and CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police authorities were satisfied that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station.
Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police, Region I, received a letter request[3] from CID incidentally her husband to conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,[4] she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, that the facts of the case could support an indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was subsequently amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport the same" in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659.
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter, Thelma Sales Go.
Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA.
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to establish the above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from the testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn, was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.
Expert witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also explained that they were unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.
Chua's DefenseFor the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latters 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at their destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with two bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him from China. While sailing, RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were riding. Apparently, the person on shore could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally, low on fuel and telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was missing much to RONGs dismay when he learned of it. When a crowd started to mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. The police immediately approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures and hand movements, they escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him, opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecutions story as a distortion of the truth. He denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his "constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel. Consequently, his arrest was tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away, as such thought failed to make an impression in his mind. Most significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG alone exercised dominion over the same.
Elmer Parong a Sangguniang Bayan member, recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach with the police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had chased the latters car. He additionally claimed that when the crowd became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to police headquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situation -- he opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police, he called for a forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and he ordered his officials to find an interpreter. Throughout the proceedings, photographers were busy taking pictures to document the event.
Arsenio CRAIGa farmer and resident of Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the beach when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach but not CID.
RTC's Ruling the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so.
the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti.
The RTC also noted the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the language barrier and the observation that such irregularity was rectified when accused was duly arraigned and (afterwards) participated in the trial of this case. The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details which did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the testimonies thus delivered.
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with several other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion, to wit:
The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine National Police to immediately form an investigating Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity, who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and attempted to take the remaining bag from accused, as well as the whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this Court a copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with the law.
The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine National Police, La Union Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations against all illegal seaborne activities.
CHUA's ContentionCHUA's contentions by asserting that:
(1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and contemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police action; and
(2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and seizures since he consented to the search.
Solicitor GeneralThe Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and contemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police action; and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and seizures since he consented to the search.
IssueWhether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua's illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua's suspecious behaviour, i.e, he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute probable cause.
(Whether the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.)
SC RulingWe reverse the RTC.
Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.[7] Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; otherwise such search and seizure become unreasonable within the meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of
(1) search of moving vehicles,
(2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consent searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUAs participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended. In short, there is no probable cause.
persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUAs illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUAs suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws (does not constitute probable cause).
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,[20] confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,[21] suspicious demeanor or behavior[22] and suspicious bulge in the waist[23]-- accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy,[26] a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition.
If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree[32] how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case - because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUAs conviction.
In Flagrante delictoIn cases of in flagrante delicto arrests,
1. a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person,
2. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
3. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact[14] or as recent case law[15] adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
Probabla CauseThe term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Rules of Court in Rule 112 that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to engender as well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondents probable guilt thereof.
Search Incidental to lawful arrestIn a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed
Consented Search/waiver of constitutional rights It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver,
1. it must first appear that the right exists;
2. that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and
3. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Paderanga vs Drilon
NatureIn this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public respondents from including the former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain them from prosecuting him.
FactsOn October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244.
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then.
In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The trial court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."
In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.
The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary investigation against petitioner at the instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated July 7, 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against herein petitioner.
In a resolution dated September 6, 1989,1 respondent State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment of the previously amended information to include and implead herein petitioner as one of the accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990.
From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review4 with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum,5 and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,6 attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of March 30, 1990 wherein he implicated herein petitioner.
On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respondent Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution No. 6487 dismissing the said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, petitioner then flied the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner's Contention(1) that the preliminary investigation as to him was not complete; and
(2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information.
SC RulingPreliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.9 Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.10 The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al.11 cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:
a.To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b.When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c.When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d.When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e.Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f.When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g.Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h.Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i.Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
j.When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed.
1.These contentions are without merit.
Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to the subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge against him and dismissed it as a malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link him to the crime. We hold that this is sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the Rules of Court, specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112 thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show that the subpoena issued on April 25, 1989 involved a separate complaint charging an offense different and distinct from that charged in the complaint attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.
Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters of defense best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and evaluation.
Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.:
(e)If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court."12
2. We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right was never available to him.
The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.
Nolasco vs Cruz Pano
NatureThe facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
FactsPrior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a)The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
(b)It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c)According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1
At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6
Prudente vs Dayrit
NatureThis is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
FactsOn 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. an application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant."
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14. commandeding to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that
(1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;
(2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers;
(3) the search warrant was a general warrant,for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and
(4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. After petitioner had filed his reply to the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash.
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the order dated 20 April 1988.
Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Petioner's Contention1. Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence.
2. Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.
3. Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses.
4. that the failure of the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August 1987
IssueWhether the allegations contained in the application of P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles in his deposition were sufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
HeldFor a valid search warrant to issue,
1. there must be probable cause,
2. which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
3. particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
2. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
3. the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge:
The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Describably, the servers did not search for articles other than firearms, ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore valid and enforceable.
4. it would suffice to state that the section of the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.
People vs Choi
NatureThis petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks the reversal of the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59587,
FactsOn April 27, 1999, Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence Operative of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance, applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 56, against respondent Christopher Choi for violation of Section 168, paragraphs 2 and 3 (a) and (c), in relation to Section 169 of RA 8293,[5] also known as the Intellectual Property Code.
Subject of search:
[r]eams and packs of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes, as well as cardboard cases of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes (each cardboard case contains two (2) [m]aster [c]ases of Marlboro and each [m]aster case contains fifty (50) reams) being distributed, kept and sold thereat in violation of Section 168, par. 2 and 3 (a) and (c) in relation to Section 169 of R.A. 8293
After examination of the applicant and his witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey, Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite issued Search Warrant No. 99-17 dated April 27, 1999.
The search was conducted on the same date.
On May 12, 1999, respondent filed a motion to quash search warrant[9] and a supplemental motion to quash on June 22, 1999. Both were denied by Judge Gatbalite in an order dated November 29, 1999. Reconsideration was likewise denied.
On June 19, 2000, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[13] before the CA.
This was granted by the CA in a decision dated April 10, 2002.
Choi's Contention1. that probable cause was not sufficiently established as the examination conducted was not probing and exhaustive and the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched. (CA)
2. prayed that Atty. Bennie Nicdao[14] be prohibited from using as evidence the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant. (CA)
CA RulingAccording to the CA, in determining whether there was probable cause to believe that the cigarettes purchased by Nieto were fake and in violation of RA 8293, Judge Gatbalite failed to ask searching and probing questions of witness David Lee Sealey.
the CA ruled that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion when she merely relied on the conclusion of Sealey that the cigarettes he received from Nieto were fake. She should have at least required Sealey to present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes and the genuine ones for comparison, instead of relying on his testimony alone. The CA reasoned that this was an absolute requirement under the Supreme Court ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
People Conention's on the ruling of CA1. The People of the Philippines aver that the CA erred in finding that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant allegedly because she failed to determine probable cause pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The People assail the finding of the CA that, in issuing the search warrant, Judge Gatbalite purportedly did not comply strictly with the requirement to determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses through searching questions and answers.
3. The People also assert that the CA erred in applying the doctrine in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation[20] since it had already been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
HELDSC rule for the People of the Philippines
Given the foregoing testimonies and applying the established standards in determining probable cause, we cannot say that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant. Her questions were sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent with each other and the narration of facts was credible. The testimonies and other evidence on record constituted adequate bases to establish probable cause that the alleged offense had been committed.Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses,[35] the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.[36] We thus find no reason to disturb Judge Gatbalites findings.
3. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, insofar as it required the presentation of the master tapes for comparison with the pirated copies for a search warrant to issue, had already been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a courts prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement cases.[37] (emphasis supplied)It is obvious that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation should not be applied to the present case since this involves the offense of unfair competition and not copyright infringement. More importantly, as pronounced by the Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc., the judges exercise of discretion should not be unduly restricted by adding a requirement that is not sanctioned by law.
Requisites for issuing Search Warrants
Examination of complaintSections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 state:Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Probable causeAccording to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[22] The determination of the existence of probable cause requires the following:
(1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally;
(2) the examination must be under oath and
(3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.[30] The entirety of the questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto must be considered by the judge.
Searching QuestionThe searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the witnesses. If the judge fails to determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, grave abuse of discretion is committed.
PICOP vs Asuncion
NatureBefore us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City;[2] and (2) the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist from proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
FactsOn January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating:
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles,
two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s],
two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s],
ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], ten (10) handgrenades.'
two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito,[12] as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno were attached to the application.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. (in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives).
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized various firearms and ammunition.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash[16] before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions.[18] On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order[19] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP et al filed a Petition for Certiorari.
PICOP's Contention1. Probable cause [has] not xxx been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general warrant.
2. that the Search Warrant was unlawfully served or implemented.
3. that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of discretion or exceeding his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
Respondent's Contention1. Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition merely assails the factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its implementation.
2
SC RulingPetition Granted, SW null and void
1. It is settled that there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.[23] In the present case, petitioners do not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only questions of law, which may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search WarrantThe search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination of the WitnessesChief Inspector Pascuas application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod, however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the applicants participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod
Pascuas failed to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod. Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives.
Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned no license certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the Place to Be Searched (Refer to Below Inforation)In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply authorizes a search of the aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur. The PICOP compound, however, is made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.[36] Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[42] As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.[43] Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
Validity of the Search WarrantThe fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
(3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Particularity of the pace to be searchedIn view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant.[33] Thus, this Court has held that this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.[34] Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a particular place.[35]
UNILAB vs ISIP
FACTSRolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.[1]
Appended thereto were the following: (1) a sketch[2] showing the location of the building to be searched; (2) the affidavit[3] of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and Security Agency hired by United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture, production and/or distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or distributor of Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the unauthorized production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted, for their seizure; (4) the letter-complaint[4] of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and Safety Group; and (5) the joint affidavit[5] of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra
After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of respondent Isip, contained ten (10) boxes of disudrin and atleast one (1) box of Inoflox.
NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which he declared that the search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in the warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of Search Warrant,[9] alleging that no ot