Zamboanga Del Norte vs. Zamboanga City

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-2440. March 28, 1964

Bengzon, J:

Doctrine: In the case of state properties, properties for public service are of public dominion;

this is not so in the case of provinces, cities, etc., said properties for public service are

patrimonial since they are not for public use.

Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be

the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth

Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City.

Sec. 50 of the said Act also provided that —Buildings and properties which the province shall

abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the

City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.

The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed

thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of

title in the name of Zamboanga Province.

It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

Subsequently, Republic Act 286 was approved. creating the municipality of Molave and making

it the capital of Zamboanga Province.

Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga

del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur.

The Auditor General, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of

Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.

The Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del

Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned

in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga

City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots and

buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital

of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

Issue: Whether all the properties concerned are patrimonial properties.

Held: There are two conflicting applicable laws in the case at bar. Applying the New Civil Code,

if the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and

governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if

the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress

has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and

payment of just compensation. Under the said law, all the properties in question, except the two

(2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the

former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the

school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under

the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis

rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the

preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however,

would fit into this category.

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of

Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public

service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered

public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local

administration, public education, public health, etc. Under the aforementioned law, Republic Act

3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds,

hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since

these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore

are subject to the absolute control of Congress.

The records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former

Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been

erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that

provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at

bar at their own expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National

Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in

the same manner that it did with the lots in question.

But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere

accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands,

i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use

and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The

province then — and its successors-in-interest — are not really deprived of the benefits thereof.

But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the

value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not

being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes.

The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private

in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also

registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.

In fine, the Court ordered herein defendant Zamboanga City to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del

Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of

the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter. Secondly, the defendants were ordered to

effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff’s 54.39% share in

the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of

Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor

General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner

originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held

liable under the law of Karma. 

US V. CARLOS

FACTS:

Mr Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court

issued warrant for arrest. Mr. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that

what he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny

applied only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited

away.

Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year in

jail. Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy can’t be stolen (how can one steal an

incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance affirmed

the decision. The case reached the supreme court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not larceny can be committed against an intangible such as electricity.

HELD:

Yes, larceny of incorporeal objects is possible. The right of ownership of electrical current was

secured by

Art 517 and 518 of the Penal Code which applies to gas.

Analogically, electricity can be considered as ‘gas’ which can be stolen. However, the true test

of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or

incorporeal, but whether is is capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. It is a

valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of science. Mr.

Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used jumper

cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny. 

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated

in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The

spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management

Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but

they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members

of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last

twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all

over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.

Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and

property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due

process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in

the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the

decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?

RULING:

YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual

possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private

respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or

illegality of possession.

Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against

petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and

never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is

undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners

nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not

in any way justify their act of ―forcible entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual

condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned

out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can

recover such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his

possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain

on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana

or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to justify

their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time of

actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones

who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells

us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means

to recover the property from another person who possesses the land.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the

recovery of property. As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired

through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who

believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke

the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.‖