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Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ ANDPRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ,
G.R. No. 171972
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR.,
- versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, and PEREZ, JJ. TERESITA V. SALVADOR,
Respondent. Promulgated:
June 8, 2011x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person
alleging it.
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails
the August 24, 2005 Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 86599.However, per Resolution of this
Court dated August 30, 2006, the instant petition shall be treated as a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
Factual Antecedents
On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 330, against petitioners Lucia
(Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that
she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-27140 issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 2646 in the
name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador; that
petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her
predecessors-in-interest; and that despite several verbal and written
demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.
In their Answer, petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural
tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered
the subject land with the consent and permission of respondents
predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the
agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural
production and share the produce with the Salvadorsiblings. Since there is a
tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has
jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.
On July 10, 2003, the preliminary conference was terminated and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers together with
the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence to support their respective
claims.
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court
On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the
existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties, and
thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Pertinent portions of
the Decision read:
Based on the facts presented, it is established that
defendant Lucia Rodriguez and her husband Serapio Rodriguez were instituted as agricultural tenants on the lot in question by
the original owner who was the predecessor-in-interest of herein plaintiff Teresita Salvador. The consent given by [the]original owner to constitute [defendants] as agricultural tenants of subject landholdings binds plaintiff who as successor-in-interest of the original owner Cristino Salvador steps into the latters shoes acquiring not only his rights but also his obligations towards the herein defendants. In the instant case, the consent to tenurial arrangement between the parties is inferred from the fact that the plaintiff and her successors-in-interest had received their share of the harvests of the property in dispute from the defendants.
Moreover, dispossession of agricultural tenants can only
be ordered by the Court for causes expressly provided under Sec. 36 of R.A. 3844. However, this Court has no jurisdiction over detainer case involving agricultural tenants as ejectment and dispossession of said tenants is within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Board (DARAB). ([S]ee Sec. 1(1.4) DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure[.])
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. AV-
1237, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision remanding the case
to
the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship
exists between the parties.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a
preliminary hearing was served by the parties submission of their respective
position papers and other supporting evidence.
On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed
the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. The fallo of the new
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Decision dated September 10, 2003 of the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO DECIDED.
Respondent sought reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in an
Order[23] dated August 18, 2004.
Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA, docketed as
CA G.R. SP No. 86599.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties
because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-
interest consented to the tenancy relationship. The CA likewise gave no
probative value to the affidavits
of petitioners witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to establish
petitioners status as agricultural tenants. If at all, the affidavits merely
showed that petitioners occupied the subject land with the consent of the
original owners. And since petitioners are occupying the subject land by mere
tolerance, they are bound by an implied promise to vacate the same upon
demand by the respondent. Failing to do so, petitioners are liable to pay
damages. Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us SETTING ASIDE, as we hereby set aside, the decision rendered by the RTC of Argao, Cebu on June 23, 2004 in Civil Case No. AV-1237 and ORDERING the remand of this case to the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu for the purpose of determining the amount of actual damages suffered by the [respondent] by reason of the [petitioners] refusal and failure to turn over to [respondent] the possession and enjoyment of the land and, then, to make such award of damages to the [respondent].
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE SUBJECT LAND.
II.WHETHER X X X SUCH RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS AND IS SUPPORTED WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners contend that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, tenancy may be
constituted by agreement of the parties either orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly. In this case, there was an implied consent to constitute a
tenancy relationship as respondent and her predecessors-in-interest allowed
petitioners to cultivate the land and share the harvest with the landowners for
more than 40 years.
Petitioners further argue that the CA erred in disregarding the affidavits
executed by their witnesses as these are sufficient to prove the existence of a
tenancy relationship. Petitioners claim that their witnesses had personal
knowledge of the cultivation and the sharing of harvest.
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners are not agricultural
tenants because mere cultivation of an agricultural land does not make the
tiller an agricultural tenant. Respondent insists that her predecessors-in-
interest merely tolerated petitioners occupation of the subject land.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case.
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are
present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest
is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.
In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists
between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of
petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. In her affidavit, petitioner Lucia declared
that she and her late husband occupied the subject land with the consent and
permission of the original owners and that their agreement was that she and
her late husband would cultivate the subject land, devote it to agricultural
production, share the harvest with the landowners on a 50-50 basis, and at
the same time watch over the land. Witness Alejandro Arias attested in his
affidavit that petitioner Lucia and her husband, Serapio, have been cultivating
the subject land since 1960; that after the demise of Serapio, petitioner Lucia
and her children continued to cultivate the subject land; and that when
respondents predecessors-in-interest were still alive, he would often see them
and respondent get some of the harvest. The affidavit of witness Conseso
Muoz stated, in essence, that petitioner Lucia has been in peaceful possession
and cultivation of the subject property since 1960 and that the harvest was
divided into two parts, for the landowner and for petitioner Lucia.
The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not
sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.
As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. Except
for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to
show that respondents predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy
relationship with petitioners. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice
to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is necessary.
Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of
harvest. The affidavits of petitioners neighbors declaring that respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not
sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence
to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed
system of sharing between them and the landowners.
As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural
land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. It is incumbent
upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial
evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.
In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of
harvest between the parties. Consequently, their defense of agricultural
tenancy must fail. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. No error can
therefore be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal
of respondents complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of
the case to the MTC for the determination of the amount of damages due
respondent is proper.
Respondent is entitled to the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the subject land.
We must, however, clarify that the only damage that can be recovered
[by respondent] is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that [in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases], the only issue raised in ejectment
cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be
recovered are those which the [respondent] could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which [she] may have suffered but which
have no direct relation to [her] loss of material possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 24, 2005
Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 86599 are AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the
Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, to determine the amount of
damages suffered by respondent by reason of the refusal and failure of
petitioners to turn over the possession of the subject land, with utmost
dispatch consistent with the above disquisition.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989
GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES,respondents.
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.
Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reading as follows;
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5, 1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law,
2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and
3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)
The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.
On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th
Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
The question certainly calls for a negative answer.
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of
the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139592. October 5, 2000]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 1998 that reversed the Order of petitioner, the Department of Agrarian Reform (petitioner DAR), by exempting the parcels of land of private respondent Green City Estate and Development Corporation (private respondent) from agrarian reform. Also assailed in this instant petition is the Resolution dated May 11, 1998 issued by the same court that denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner DAR.
The five parcels of land in issue has a combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. M-45856, M-45857, M-45858, M-45859 and M-45860 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Private respondent acquired the land by purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja vda. De Torres. The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural.
On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
On July 21, 1994, private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from agrarian reform, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994[2] and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. Administrative Order No. 6 provides the guidelines for exemption from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage while DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, authorizes the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA 6651 to non-agricultural uses effective June 15 1988.
In support of its application for exemption, private respondent submitted the following documents:
1. Certified photocopies of the titles and tax declarations.
2. Vicinity and location plans.
3. Certification of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the Office of the Mayor of Jala-Jala.
4. Resolution No. R-36, series of 1981 of the HLURB.
5. Certification from the National Irrigation Administration.
On October 12, 1994, the DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the said petition, on the ground that private respondent failed to substantiate their (sic) allegation that the properties are indeed in the
municipalitys residential and forest conservation zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable.
On February 15, 1995, private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage. This time, private respondent alleged that the property should be exempted since it is within the residential and forest conservation zones of the town plan/zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala. The amended petition for exemption showed that a portion of about 15 hectares of the land is irrigated riceland which private respondent offered to sell to the farmer beneficiaries or to the DAR. In support of its amended petition, private respondent submitted the following additional documents:
1. Certification letter from the HLURB that the specific properties are within the residential and forest conservation zone.
2. Certification from the HLURB that the town plan/zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala was approved on December 2, 1981 by the Human Settlements Commission.
3. Undertaking that the landowner is ready and willing to pay disturbance compensation to the tenants for such amount as may be agreed upon or directed by the DAR.
4. Vicinity plan.
5. Amended survey plan which indicates the irrigated riceland that is now excluded from the application.
6. Certification of the Jala-Jala Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator to the effect that the properties covered are within the residential and forest conservation areas pursuant to the zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala.
On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption of private respondent, on the grounds that the land use plan of Jala-Jala, which differs from its land use map, intends to develop 73% of Barangay Punta into an agricultural zone; that the certification issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is not definite and specific; and that the certification issued by the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) that the area is not irrigated nor programmed for irrigation, is not conclusive on the DAR, since big areas in the municipality are recipients of JICA-funded Integrated Jala-Jala Rural Development Projects. The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was likewise denied by the DAR Secretary.
Private respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the course of the appeal, said court created a commission composed of three (3) members tasked to conduct an ocular inspection and survey of the subject parcels of land and to submit a report on the result of such inspection and survey. To verify the report of the commission, the DAR constituted its own team to inspect and report on the property in question. The verification report of the DAR, duly filed with the Court of Appeals, objected to the report of the commission mainly due to the lack of specific boundaries delineating the surveyed areas.
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision that reversed the assailed DAR orders, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the respondent Secretary dated October 19, 1995 and November 15, 1995 are hereby REVERSED, and judgement is hereby rendered declaring those portions of the land of the petitioner which are mountainous and residential, as found by the Courts (sic) commissioners, to be exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, subject to their delineation. The records of this case are hereby ordered remanded to the respondent Secretary for further proceedings in the determination of the boundaries of the said areas.[3]
Hence this petition for review wherein petitioner DAR seeks the reversal of the foregoing decision on the ground that the honorable Court of Appeals erred:
1. WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO DEFINITE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTIES INVOLVED WHEN, PER THE CORRESPONDING TAX DECLARATIONS, THEY ARE GENERALLY CLASSIFIED AS AGRICULTURAL.
2. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE LAND AS OF 1980 OR BEFORE AS APPEARING IN TABLE 3-3 OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS THE PRESENT CLASSIFICATION OF THE LANDHOLDINGS INVOLVED; and
3. WHEN IT MADE A RULING ON HOW SUBJECT LANDHOLDING BE CLASSIFIED (WHETHER COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM FOR BEING AGRICULTURAL LAND OR NOT) AND DISPOSED OF SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE LAND IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LEGAL ISSUE RAISED ON THEIR LEGAL CLASSIFICATION, A FUNCTION THAT IS VESTED IN CONGRESS.[4]
The petition has no merit.
Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1998 covers all public and private agricultural lands. The same law defines agricultural as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.[5]
Private respondent sought exemption from the coverage of CARL on the ground that its five parcels of land are not wholly agricultural. The land use map of the municipality, certified by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) of Jala-Jala and the report of the commission constituted by the Court of Appeals established that the properties lie mostly within the residential and forest conservation zone.
Petitioner DAR maintains that the subject properties have already been classified as agricultural based on the tax declarations.[6] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and petitioner DAR are one in contending that the classification of lands once determined by law may not be varied or altered by the results of a mere ocular or aerial inspection.[7]
We are unable to sustain petitioners contention. There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP.[8] In Halili vs. Court of Appeals[9], we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration. The classification of the Board in said case was more recent than that of the tax declaration and was based on the present condition of the property and the community thereat.[10]
In this case, the Court of Appeals was constrained to resort to an ocular inspection of said properties through the commission it created considering that the opinion of petitioner DAR conflicted with the land use map submitted in evidence by private respondent.Respondent court also noted that even from the beginning the properties of private respondent had no definite delineation and classification.[11] Hence, the survey of the properties through the court appointed commissioners was the judicious and equitable solution to finally resolve the issue of land classification and delineation.
The OSG stresses that to be exempt from CARP under DOJ Opinion No. 44, the land must have been classified as industrial/residential before June 15, 1988. [12] Based on this premise, the OSG points out that no such classification was presented except the municipalitys alleged land use map in 1980 showing that subject parcels of land fall within the municipalitys forest conservation zone.[13] The OSG further argues that assuming that a change in the use of the subject properties in 1980 may justify their exemption from CARP under DOJ Opinion No. 44, such land use of 1980 was, nevertheless, repealed/amended when the HLURB approved the municipalitys Comprehensive Development Plan for Barangay Punta for the years 1980 to 2000 in its Resolution No. 33, series of 1981.[14] The plan for Barangay Punta, where the parcels of land in issue are located, allegedly envision the development of the barangay into a progressive agricultural community with the limited allocation of only 51 hectares for residential use and none for commercial and forest conservation zone use.[15]
The foregoing arguments are untenable. We are in full agreement with respondent Court when it rationalized that the land use map is the more appropriate document to consider, thus:
The petitioner (herein private respondent) presented a development plan of the Municipality of Jala-Jala, which was approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on December 2, 1981. It also presented certifications from the HLURB and the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Jala-Jala that the subject properties fall within the Residential and Forest Conservation zones of the municipality.Extant on the record is a color-coded land use map of Jala-Jala, showing that the petitioners land falls mostly within the Residential and Forest Conservation zones. This notwithstanding, the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform denied the petitioners application on the ground that the town plan of the municipality, particularly Table 4-4 thereof, shows that Barangay Punta is intended to remain and to become a progressive agricultural community in view of the abundance of fertile agricultural areas in the barangay, and that there is a discrepancy between the land usemap which identifies a huge forest conservation zone and the land use plan which has no area classified as forest conservation.
However, a closer look at the development plan for the municipality of Jala-Jala shows that Table 4-4 does not represent the present classification of land in that municipality, but the proposed land use to be achieved. The existing land use as of 1980 is shown by Table 3-3,
wherein Barangay Punta is shown to have a forest area of 35 hectares and open grassland (which was formerly forested area) of 56 hectares. The land use map is consistent with this.[16]
Moreover, the commissioners report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the properties are not wholly agricultural. In essence, the report of the commission showed that the land of private respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree slope containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares.[17] The finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides another cogent reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on this point when it provides that all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner DAR and the OSG contest the finding of the Court of Appeals that the subject parcels of land have a mountainous slope on the ground that this conclusion was allegedly arrived at in a manner not in accord with established surveying procedures.[18] They also bewail the consideration given by the Court of Appeals to the slope issue since this matter was allegedly never raised before the DAR and the Court of Appeals.[19] Petitioner DAR and the OSG thus claim that laches had already set in.[20]
As pointed out earlier, the crux of the controversy is whether the subject parcels of land in issue are exempt from the coverage of the CARL. The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore material in the disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners[21] when it very well knew that the survey and ocular inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the subject parcels of land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed persons who were mutually acceptable to the parties.[22] Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon said report.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131481. March 16, 2011.]
BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC., petitioner, vs. E. M. RAMOS and SONS, INC., respondent.
[G.R. No. 131624. March 16, 2011.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,petitioner, vs. E. M. RAMOS and SONS, INC.,respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by the Buklod
nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. (Buklod) and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), assailing the Decision 1 dated March 26, 1997 and the Resolution 2 dated November 24, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950. The Court of Appeals declared the parcels of land owned by E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON), located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite (subject property), exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), thus, nullifying and setting aside the Decision 3 dated February 7, 1996 and Resolution 4 dated May 14, 1996 of the Office of the President (OP) in O.P. Case No. 5461. Quoted hereunder are the facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals:
At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) which form part of a larger expanse with an area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Originally owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club, the property was acquired by the [herein respondent EMRASON] in 1965 for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes".
Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise known as the "Local Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No. 1, entitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof".
In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and develop its aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, attaching to the application detailed development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting thereon, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance No. 29-A, for brevity), approving [EMRASON's] application. Ordinance No. 29-A pertinently reads:
"Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the application for
subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two (372)
Hectares situated in Barrios Bocal and Langkaan, named as Traveller's
Life Homes. EHSAaD
Resolved that the Municipal Ordinance regarding subdivision regulations
existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by the subdivision".
Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to
proceed with property development.
It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision
project suffered delay owing to the confluence of events. Among these
was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and
the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila,
which during the period material was under liquidation.
On June 15, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a
new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution.
On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite
addressed a letter to [EMRASON], stating in part, as follows:
"In reply to your letter of June 2, 1988, we wish to clarify that the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite, has approved the development of
your property situated in Barrios Bukal and Langkaan, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, with a total area of 372 hectares, more or less, into residential,
industrial, commercial and golf course project.
This conversion conforms with the approved Development Plan of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas Cavite".
Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted
neighboring property of the National Development Company (NDC) into
an industrial estate to be managed through a joint venture scheme by
NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall conversion
package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the
NDC property, with three (3) hectares each. However, the size of the
NDC property turned out to be insufficient for both the demands of the
proposed industrial project as well as the government's commitment to
the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands
from the nearby areas. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject
property of [EMRASON].
On August 29, 1990, then DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the
first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest
from [EMRASON]. All told, these notices covered 303.38545 hectares of
land situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite owned by
[EMRASON].
In the meantime, [EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila,
separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices.
Collectively docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92, these petitions
were subsequently referred to the Office of the Regional Director, Region
IV, which had jurisdiction thereon. In his referral action, the Provincial
Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV, through its Operations
Division, to conduct a hearing and/or investigation to determine whether
or not the subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition.
Forthwith, the DAR regional office conducted an on-site inspection of the
subject property.
In the course of the hearing, during which [EMRASON] offered Exhibits
"A" to "UU-2" as documentary evidence, [EMRASON] received another
set of notices of acquisition. As to be expected, [EMRASON] again
protested.
On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through
Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision declaring as null and
void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered
thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44,
series of 1990, exempt from CARP. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing . . ., considering that the
notices of acquisition dated August 29, 1990 relative to the 39 hectares
partly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19298; notices of
acquisition all dated April 3, 1991 relative to the 131.41975 hectares
partly covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. . . .; notices of
acquisition all dated August 28, 1991 relative to the 56.9201 hectares
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. . . .; and notices of
acquisition all dated May 15, 1992 relative to the 76.0456 covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. . . ., all located at Barangay Langkaan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite and owned by petitioner E.M. RAMOS and SONS,
INC. are null and void on the ground that the subject properties are
exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series
of 1990, therefore, the aforesaid notices of acquisition be cancelled and
revoked."
The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin
Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses
before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.
On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu
propio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian Reform Secretary,
it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to
the department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same
properties and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries
particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of
the government to deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine
hectares . . .".
On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto
Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)] issued an order, the decretal portion
of which partly reads: SEHaTC
"WHEREFORE, in the interest of law and justice, an order is hereby
rendered:
1. Affirming the Notices of Acquisition dated August 29, 1990, April
3, 1991, August 28, 1991 and May 15, 1992 covering 303.38545
hectares of the property owned by the E.M. RAMOS & SONS, INC.,
located at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite . . .;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Directing the DAR field officials concerned to pursue the coverage
under RA 6657 of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for which
subject Notices of Acquisition had been issued.
SO ORDERED".
Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied
by the [DAR Secretary Garilao] in his subsequent order of January 6,
1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the President where the
recourse was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5461.
On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President,through herein
respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona [(Deputy
Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision . . .,
dismissing [EMRASON's] appeal on the strength of the following
observation:
"To recapitulate, this Office holds that [EMRASON's] property has
remained AGRICULTURAL in classification and therefore falls within
the coverage of the CARP, on the basis of the following:
1. [EMRASON] failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements and conditions of
Municipal Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A,
specifically, among others, the need for
approval of the National Planning Commission
through the Highway District Engineer, and the
Bureau of Lands before final submission to the
Municipal Council and Municipal Mayor;
2. [EMRASON] failed to comply with
Administrative Order No. 152, dated December
16, 1968; and
3. The certification of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) in
1981 and the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLRB) in 1992 that the
property of [EMRASON] is agricultural".
Undaunted, [EMRASON] interposed a motion for reconsideration,
followed later by another motion whereunder it invited attention to legal
doctrines involving land conversion recently enunciated by no less than
the Office of the President itself.
On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out
with his second challenged issuance denying [EMRASON's]
aforementioned motion for reconsideration . . . . 5
From the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by the OP,
EMRASON filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40950. ADScCE
On July 3, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), 6 which enjoined then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao and
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona 7from implementing the
OP Decision of February 7, 1996 and Resolution of May 14, 1996 until
further orders from the court. On September 17, 1996, the appellate
court issued a Resolution 8 granting the prayer of EMRASON for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The writ of preliminary
injunction 9 was actually issued on September 30, 1996 after EMRASON
posted the required bond of P500,000.00.
The DAR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated September 17, 1996 of the Court of Appeals, with the
prayer that the writ of preliminary injunction already issued be lifted,
recalled and/or dissolved.
At this juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property to farmer-
beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Court of Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of
the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property, filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed
to intervene as an indispensable party in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950; that the
writ of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved, having been
issued in violation of Section 55 of the CARL; and that the Petition for
Review of EMRASON be dismissed since the appropriate remedy should
have been a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
On March 26, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision.
The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of Buklod because the
latter's participation was "not being in any way prejudicial to the interest
of the original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal
complexion of the case."10 The appellate court, however, affirmed the
propriety of the remedy availed by EMRASON given that under Section 5
of Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May
16, 1995, appeals from judgments or final orders of the OP or the DAR
under the CARL shall be taken to the Court of Appeals, through a verified
petition for review; and that under Section 3 of the same Administrative
Circular, such a petition for review may raise questions of facts, law, or
mixed questions of facts and law.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because
the subject property was already converted/classified as residential by
the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of the CARL. The
appellate court reasoned:
For one, whether or not the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite had in
place in the early seventies a general subdivision plan is to us of no
moment. The absence of such general plan at that time cannot be taken,
for the nonce, against the [herein respondent EMRASON]. To our mind,
the more weighty consideration is the accomplished fact that the
municipality, conformably with its statutory-conferred local autonomy,
had passed a subdivision measure,i.e., Ordinance No. 1, and had
approved in line thereto, through the medium of Ordinance No. 29-A,
[EMRASON's] application for subdivision, or with like effect approved the
conversion/classification of the lands in dispute as residential.
Significantly, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite, in his letter of
September 23, 1988 to [EMRASON], clarified that such conversion
conforms with the approved development plan of the
municipality. EDCIcH
For another, the requirement prescribed by the cited Section 16[a] of
Ordinance No. 1 relates to the approval in the first instance by the
National Planning Commission of the final plat of the scheme of the
subdivision, not the conversion from agricultural to residential itself. As
[EMRASON] aptly puts it:
". . . the final plat or final plan, map or chart of the subdivision is
not a condition sine qua non for the conversion . . . as the
conversion was already done by the Municipal Council of
Dasmariñas, Cavite. Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A merely required
that the final plat, or final plan . . . of the subdivision be done in
conformity with Municipal Ordinance No. 1, the same to be followed
by the subdivision itself. [EMRASON] therefore did not have to
undertake the immediate actual development of the subject parcel
of lands as the same had already been converted and declared
residential by law. . . ." (Petition, pp. 17 and 18).
[EMRASON's] pose has the merit of logic. As may be noted, Ordinance
No. 29-A contained two (2) resolutory portions, each inter-related to, but
nonetheless independent of, the other. The first resolution, reading —
"Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the application for
subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two
(372) Hectares situated in Barrios Bocal and Langkaan, named as
Travellers Life Homes"
approved the application for subdivision or the conversion of the
372-hectare area into residential, while the second, reading —
"Resolved that the Municipal Ordinance regarding subdivision
regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by
the subdivision"
provides that the subdivision owner/developer shall follow subdivision
regulations. It will be noted further that the second resolution already
referred to the [EMRASON's] property as "subdivision", suggesting that
the Municipal Council already considered as of that moment
[EMRASON's] area to be for residential use.
Another requirement which [EMRASON] allegedly failed to comply with is
found in Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 152, series of 1968, which
pertinently provides —
"1. All Municipal Boards or City Councils, and all Municipal
Councils in cities and municipalities in which a subdivision
ordinance is in force, shall submit three copies of every proposed
subdivision plan for which approval is sought together with the
subdivision ordinance, to the National Planning Commission for
comment and recommendation".
This Court is at a loss to understand how [EMRASON] could be expected
to heed a directive addressed to local government legislative bodies.
From a perusal of the title of A.O. No. 152, it is at once obvious from
whom it exacts compliance with its command, thus: "REQUIRING THE
MUNICIPAL BOARDS OR CITY COUNCILS AND MUNICIPAL COUNCILS TO
SUBMIT PROPOSED ORDINANCES AND SUBDIVISION PLANS TO THE
NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION FOR COMMENT AND
RECOMMENDATION, BEFORE TAKING ACTION ON THE SAME, AND TO
FORWARD A COPY OF THEIR APPROVED SUBDIVISION ORDINANCES TO
THE SAID COMMISSION".
To be sure, [EMRASON] cannot be made to bear the consequences for
the non-compliance, if this be the case, by the Municipal Council of
Dasmariñas, Cavite with what A.O. 152 required. A converse proposition
would be antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play. 11aHTDAc
As for the other requirements which EMRASON purportedly failed to
comply with, the Court of Appeals held that these became obligatory
only after the subject property was already converted to non-
agricultural, to wit:
Foregoing considered, this Court holds that everything needed to validly
effect the conversion of the disputed area to residential had been
accomplished. The only conceivable step yet to be taken relates to the
obtention of a conversion order from the DAR, or its predecessor, the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) under its rather intricate procedure
established under Memorandum Circular No. 11-79. But then, this
omission can hardly prejudice the [herein respondent EMRASON] for the
DAR/MAR guidelines were promulgated only in 1979, at which time the
conversion of [EMRASON's] property was already a fait accompli.
Like the conversion procedure set up under Memorandum Circular No.
11-79, the revised methodology under the CARL cannot also be made to
apply retroactively to lands duly converted/classified as residential
under the aegis of the Local Autonomy Act. For, as a rule, a statute is not
intended to affect transactions which occurred before it becomes
operational (Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON
THE CIVIL CODE, Vol. I, 1983 ed., p. 23). And as the landmark case
of Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 225
SCRA 278, teaches:
"Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than respondent DAR . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error
to include the underdeveloped portions . . . within the coverage of
CARL". cHSIDa
It may be so, as the assailed decision stated, that inNatalia the
lands therein involved received a locational clearance from the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB, formerly the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission [HSRC], as residential or commercial, a factor
[EMRASON] cannot assert in its favor. This dissimilarity, however, hardly
provides a compelling justification not to apply the lessons ofNatalia.
This is because the property involved in this case, unlike that in Natalia,
underwent classification/conversion before the creation on May 13, 1976
of the HSRC, then known as the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (P.D. No. 933). Furthermore, what is recognized as the
HSRC's authority to classify and to approve subdivisions and
comprehensive land use development plans of local governments
devolved on that agency only upon its reorganization on February 7,
1981, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 648 known as
the Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.
Section 5 of the same executive order invested the HSRC with the above
classifying and approving authority. In fine, the property of [EMRASON]
went into the process of conversion at the time when the intervention
thereon of the HSRC, which was even then non-existent, was
unnecessary. Shortly before the creation of the HSRC, it would appear
that to provincial, city, or municipal councils/boards, as the case may be,
belong the prerogative, albeit perhaps not exclusive, to classify private
lands within their respective territorial jurisdiction and approve their
conversion from agricultural to residential or other non-agricultural uses.
To paraphrase the holding inPatalinghug vs. Court of Appeals, 229
SCRA 554, once a local government has, pursuant to its police power,
reclassified an area as residential, that determination ought to prevail
and must be respected.12
The Court of Appeals further observed that the subject property has
never been devoted to any agricultural activity and is, in fact, more
suitable for non-agricultural purposes, thus:
It is worthy to note that the CARL defines"agricultural
lands" as "lands devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial lands" (Sec. 3[c]). Guided by this definition, it is clear
that [herein respondent EMRASON's] area does not fall under the
category of agricultural lands. For, let alone the reality that the
property is not devoted to some agricultural activity, being in fact
unirrigated, and, as implied in the decision of the DAR Hearing
Officer Victor Baguilat, without duly instituted tenants, the same
had been effectively classified as residential. The bare
circumstance of its not being actually developed as subdivision or
that it is underdeveloped would not alter the conclusion. For,
according to Natalia, what actually determines the applicability of
the CARL to a given piece of land is its previous classification and
not its current use or stages of development as non-agricultural
property.
As a pragmatic consideration, the disputed area, in terms of its
location in relation to existing commercial/industrial sites and its
major economic use, is more suitable for purposes other than
agriculture. In this connection, this Court notes that the property is
situated at the heart of the CALABARZON, and, as Annex "C" of the
petition demonstrates, lies adjacent to huge industrial/commercial
complexes. The San Miguel-Monterey meat plant, the NDC-
Marubeni complex and the Reynolds Aluminum plant may be
mentioned. For sure, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite,
obviously cognizant of the economic potential of certain areas in
the Municipality of Dasmariñas has, by Resolution No. 105, series of
1988, declared defined tracts of lands in the Municipality of
Dasmariñas as "industrial-residential-institutional mix." 13
As a last point, the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the OP Decision
dated February 7, 1996 and Resolution dated May 14,
1996, viz.: SCcHIE
As a final consideration, we will address the [herein petitioners] DAR
Secretary's and Buklod's joint concern regarding the propriety of the
preliminary injunction issued in this case. They alleged that the issuance
is violative of Section 55 of the CARL which reads:
"SEC. 55. No Restraining Order or Preliminary
Injunction. — No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated
agencies in any case, dispute, controversy arising from, necessary
to, or in connection with the application, implementation,
enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws
on agrarian reform". (Underscoring added.)
As will be noted, the aforequoted section specifically mentions the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) of which the DAR Secretary
is the Vice Chairman, or any of its duly designated agencies as protected
from an injunctive action of any court. These agencies include the PARC
Executive Committee, the PARC Secretariat, which the DAR Secretary
heads, and, on the local level, the different Agrarian Reform Action
Committees (Secs. 41 to 45, R.A. No. 6657).
From the records, there is no indication that the
[petitioner] Agrarian Reform Secretary acted vis-à-visthe present
controversy for, or as an agency of, the PARC. Hence, he cannot
rightfully invoke Section 55 of the CARL and avail himself of the
protective mantle afforded by that provision. The PARC, it bears to
stress, is a policy-formulating and coordinating body (Sec. 18, E.O. 229,
July 22, 1987) without express adjudicatory mandate, unlike the DAR
Secretary who, as department head, is "vested with primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform" (Sec. 50, R.A. 6657). Thus, it is easy to accept the
proposition that the [petitioner] Agrarian Reform Secretary issued his
challenged orders in the exercise of his quasi-judicial power as
department head. 14
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the challenged decision dated February 7, 1996 and
the resolution of May 14, 1996 of the Office of the President in O.P.
Case No. 5461 are herebyNULLIFIED, VACATED and SET ASIDE,
and the notices of acquisition issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform covering the 372-hectare property of the [herein
respondent EMRASON] at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite
declared VOID.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on September
30, 1996 is hereby made permanent. 15
Buklod and DAR filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of
the foregoing Decision but both Motions were denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated November 24, 1997.
Aggrieved, Buklod and DAR filed the instant Petitions, which were
consolidated by this Court in a Resolution 16 dated August 19, 1998.
In G.R. No. 131481, Buklod raises the following arguments:
1] THE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE INVOKED BY [EMRASON] AS
CONVERSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION ENACTED ON JULY 9,
1972 BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE IS
IMPOTENT BECAUSE THE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE IMPOSED
CONDITIONS WHICH [EMRASON] NEVER COMPLIED. NO
COMPLIANCE NO CONVERSION.
2] AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED ORDINANCE WAS ENACTED, A
LAND REFORM LAW WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT GRANTING SECURITY
OF TENURE TO THE FARMERS SO THAT A LANDOWNER CANNOT
ARBITRARILY CONVERT AN AGRICULTURAL LAND INTO A DIFFERENT
CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
(R.A. 3844). aATHES
3] A MERE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE CANNOT NEGATE LAND
REFORM RIGHTS GRANTED TO THE FARMERS BY LEGISLATIVE
ENACTMENT UNDER R.A. 3844 AND SUBSEQUENT LAWS. LAND
REFORM LAW BEING A SOCIAL LEGISLATION IS PARAMOUNT.
4] LAND REFORM IS A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THE LANDLESS FARMERS SO THAT THE LAND REFORM
LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND APPLIED IN ORDER TO ATTAIN
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF RELIEVING THE FARMERS FROM THEIR
POVERTY AND BONDAGE. THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THIS
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO FAVOR THE LANDLORD [EMRASON].
5] THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUED A RESTRAINING
ORDER/INJUNCTION AGAINST THE CLEAR PROHIBITION IN THE CARL
(SEC. 55 RA 6657) AND SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL
COURSE OF BY REFUSING TO GRANT THE PETITIONER FARMERS A
HEARING INSPITE OF THE PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY RA 7902
(SEC. 1). 17
In G.R. No. 131624, the DAR ascribes the following errors on the
part of the Court of Appeals:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, WAS AUTHORIZED,
UNDER THE LOCAL AUTONOMY ACT, TO CLASSIFY AND/OR
RECLASSIFY LANDS CONSIDERING THAT WHAT WAS CONFERRED
THEREUNDER WAS ONLY ZONING AUTHORITY, THUS, RENDER THE
EXERCISE THEREOF BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS,
CAVITE, ULTRA VIRES;
II.
EVEN ASSUMING, IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI,THAT THE AUTHORITY TO
CLASSIFY AND RECLASSIFY LANDS IS POSSESSED BY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS, STILL THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED PASSAGE OF ORDINANCE NO.
29-A OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, AS A
VALID MEASURE RECLASSIFYING SUBJECT AGRICULTURAL LAND TO
NON-AGRICULTURAL USE CONSIDERING THAT THE SAID APPROVAL
OF THE SUBDIVISION, PER LETTER OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR,
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH EXISTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ON
THE MATTER AND, THEREFORE, NONCOMPLYING AND
INEFFECTUAL; AND
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE
RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE NATALIA REALTY
CASE DUE TO SUBSTANTIAL DISSIMILARITY IN FACTUAL SETTING
AND MILIEU. 18
At the crux of the present controversy is the question of whether the
subject property could be placed under the CARP.
DAR asserts that the subject property could be compulsorily acquired
by the State from EMRASON and distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries under the CARP since it was still agricultural land when the
CARL became effective on June 15, 1988. Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A,
approved by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 13, 1971 and July 9,
1972, respectively, did not reclassify the subject property from
agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to reclassify lands is an
inherent power of the National Legislature under Section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended, which, absent a specific delegation, could not be exercised by
any local government unit (LGU). The Local Autonomy Act of 1959 — in
effect when the Municipality of Dasmariñas approved Ordinance Nos. 1
and 29-A — merely delegated to cities and municipalities zoning
authority, to be understood as the regulation of the uses of property in
accordance with the existing character of the land and structures. It was
only Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which extended to cities and municipalities
limited authority to reclassify agricultural lands. DHIETc
DAR also argues that even conceding that cities and municipalities
were already authorized in 1972 to issue an ordinance reclassifying
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural, Ordinance No. 29-A of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas was not valid since it failed to comply with
Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, Section 16 (a) of Ordinance
No. 1 of the Municipality of Dasmariñas, and Administrative Order No.
152 dated December 16, 1968, which all required review and approval of
such an ordinance by the National Planning Commission (NPC).
Subsequent developments further necessitated review and approval of
Ordinance No. 29-A by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC), which later became the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).
DAR further avers that the reliance by the Court of Appeals
on Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform 19 (Natalia
Realty case) is misplaced because the lands involved therein were
converted from agricultural to residential use by Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637, issued pursuant to the authority delegated to
the President under Section 71, et seq., of the Public Land Act. 20
Buklod adopts the foregoing arguments of DAR. In addition, it
submits that prior to Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, there were already laws
implementing agrarian reform, particularly: (1) Republic Act No. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, in effect since
August 8, 1963, and subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 6389 on
September 10, 1971, after which it became known as the Code of
Agrarian Reforms; and (2) Presidential Decree No. 27, otherwise known
as the Tenants Emancipation Decree, which took effect on November 19,
1972. Agricultural land could not be converted for the purpose of
evading land reform for there were already laws granting farmer-tenants
security of tenure, protection from ejectment without just cause, and
vested rights to the land they work on.
Buklod contends that EMRASON failed to comply with Section 36 of
the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which provided that the conversion of
land should be implemented within one year, otherwise, the conversion
is deemed in bad faith. Given the failure of EMRASON to comply with
many other requirements for a valid conversion, the subject property
has remained agricultural. Simply put, no compliance means no
conversion. In fact, Buklod points out, the subject property is still
declared as "agricultural" for real estate tax purposes. Consequently,
EMRASON is now estopped from insisting that the subject property is
actually "residential."
Furthermore, Buklod posits that land reform is a constitutional
mandate which should be given paramount consideration. Pursuant to
said constitutional mandate, the Legislature enacted the CARL. It is a
basic legal principle that a legislative statute prevails over a mere
municipal ordinance.
Finally, Buklod questions the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the distribution of the subject
property to the farmer-beneficiaries in violation of Section 55 of the
CARL; as well as the refusal of the appellate court to hold a hearing
despite Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7902, 21 prescribing the procedure
for reception of evidence before the Court of Appeals. At such a hearing,
Buklod intended to present evidence that the subject property is actually
agricultural and that Buklod members have been working on said
property for decades, qualifying them as farmer-beneficiaries.
EMRASON, on the other hand, echoes the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that the subject property is exempt from CARP because it had
already been reclassified as residential with the approval of Ordinance
No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 9, 1972. EMRASON
cites Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust
Co. 22 (Ortigas case) where this Court ruled that a municipal council is
empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959. TaISEH
Still relying on the Ortigas case, EMRASON avows that the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, taking into account the conditions prevailing
in the area, could validly zone and reclassify the subject property in the
exercise of its police power in order to safeguard the health, safety,
peace, good order, and general welfare of the people in the locality.
EMRASON describes the whole area surrounding the subject property as
residential subdivisions (i.e., Don Gregorio, Metro Gate, Vine Village, and
Cityland Greenbreeze 1 and 2 Subdivisions) and industrial estates (i.e.,
Reynolds Aluminum Philippines, Inc. factory; NDC-Marubeni industrial
complex, San Miguel Corporation-Monterey cattle and piggery farm and
slaughterhouse), traversed by national highways (i.e., Emilio Aguinaldo
National Highway, Trece Martirez, Puerto Azul Road, and Governor's
Drive). EMRASON mentions that on March 25, 1988, theSangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite passed Resolution No. 105 which
declared the area where subject property is located as "industrial-
residential-institutional mix."
EMRASON further maintains that Ordinance No. 29-A of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas is valid. Ordinance No. 29-A is complete in
itself, and there is no more need to comply with the alleged requisites
which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon. EMRASON quotes
from Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals 23 (Patalinghug case) that "once a
local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that
determination for zoning purposes must prevail."
EMRASON points out that Ordinance No. 29-A, reclassifying the
subject property, was approved by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on
July 9, 1972. Executive Order No. 648, otherwise known as the Charter of
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC Charter) — which
conferred upon the HSRC the power and duty to review, evaluate, and
approve or disapprove comprehensive land use and development plans
and zoning ordinances of LGUs — was issued only on February 7, 1981.
The exercise by HSRC of such power could not be applied retroactively
to this case without impairing vested rights of EMRASON. EMRASON
disputes as well the absolute necessity of submitting Ordinance No. 29-A
to the NPC for approval. Based on the language of Section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959, which used the word "may," review by the NPC of
the local planning and zoning ordinances was merely permissive.
EMRASON additionally posits that Ordinance No. 1 of the Municipality of
Dasmariñas simply required approval by the NPC of the final plat or plan,
map, or chart of the subdivision, and not of the reclassification and/or
conversion by the Municipality of the subject property from agricultural
to residential. As for Administrative Order No. 152 dated December 16,
1968, it was directed to and should have been complied with by the city
and municipal boards and councils. Thus, EMRASON should not be made
to suffer for the non-compliance by the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas
with said administrative order.
EMRASON likewise reasons that since the subject property was
already reclassified as residential with the mere approval of Ordinance
No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmariñas, then EMRASON did not have
to immediately undertake actual development of the subject property.
Reclassification and/or conversion of a parcel of land are different from
the implementation of the conversion.
EMRASON is resolute in its stance that the Court of Appeals correctly
applied the Natalia Realty case to the present case since both have
similar facts; the only difference being that the former involves a
presidential fiat while the latter concerns a legislative fiat.
EMRASON denies that the Buklod members are farmer-tenants of the
subject property. The subject property has no farmer-tenants because,
as the Court of Appeals observed, the property is unirrigated and not
devoted to any agricultural activity. The subject property was placed
under the CARP only to accommodate the farmer-tenants of the NDC
property who were displaced by the NDC-Marubeni Industrial Project.
Moreover, the Buklod members are still undergoing a screening process
before the DAR-Region IV, and are yet to be declared as qualified
farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property. Hence, Buklod members
failed to establish they already have vested right over the subject
property.
EMRASON urges the Court not to consider issues belatedly raised by
Buklod. It may be recalled that Buklod intervened in CA-G.R. SP No.
40950 just before the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in said case.
When the appellate court promulgated its Decision on March 26, 1997
favoring EMRASON, Buklod filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
judgment, to which EMRASON, in turn, filed a Comment and Opposition.
In its Reply to the aforementioned Comment and Opposition of
EMRASON, Buklod raised new factual matters, specifically, that: (1)
EMRASON has not even subdivided the title to the subject property 27
years after its purported reclassification/conversion; (2) EMRASON never
obtained a development permit nor mayor's permit to operate a
business in Dasmariñas; and (3) the farmer-tenants represented by
Buklod have continuously cultivated the subject property. There was no
cogent or valid reason for the Court of Appeals to allow Buklod to
present evidence to substantiate the foregoing allegations. The DAR
Region IV Hearing Officer already conducted extensive hearings during
which the farmers were duly represented. Likewise, Buklod raises for the
first time in its Petition before this Court the argument that the Tenants
Emancipation Decree prescribes a procedure for conversion which
EMRASON failed to comply with. DECSIT
Lastly, EMRASON defends the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a
writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950. Section 55 of the
CARL is inapplicable to the case at bar because said provision only
prohibits the issuance by a court of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction "against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated
agencies." As the Court of Appeals declared, the PARC is a policy-
formulating and coordinating body. There is no indication whatsoever
that the DAR Secretary was acting herein as an agent of the PARC. The
DAR Secretary issued the orders of acquisition for the subject property in
the exercise of his quasi-judicial powers as department head.
The Court, after consideration of the issues and arguments in the
Petitions at bar, affirms the Court of Appeals and rules in favor of
EMRASON.
CARP coverage limited to
agricultural land
Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended, 24 particularly defines
the coverage of the CARP, to wit:
SEC. 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a total
area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for
acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by
law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits
as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or
suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.
A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national
land use plan shall be instituted by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), in accordance with the Local Government Code, for
the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands within
one (1) year from effectivity of this Act, without prejudice to the
implementation of the land acquisition and distribution." (Emphases
supplied.)
Section 3 (c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the
definition of agricultural landthat is subject to CARP to "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the
CARP, the subject property should have already been reclassified as
residential prior to said date. HSDaTC
The Local Autonomy Act of 1959
The Local Autonomy Act of 1959, precursor of the Local Government
Code of 1991, provided:
SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal
boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized
municipal district councils. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances.— Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City
Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are
hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject
to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case
may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the
National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to
planning and zoning. (Emphases supplied.)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the Municipal Council of
Dasmariñas approvedOrdinance No. 1 on July 13, 1971, which laid
down the general subdivision regulations for the municipality;
and Resolution No. 29-A on July 9, 1972, which approved the
application for subdivision of the subject property.
The Court observes that the OP, the Court of Appeals, and even the
parties themselves referred to Resolution No. 29-A as an ordinance.
Although it may not be its official designation, calling Resolution No. 29-
A as Ordinance No. 29-A is not completely inaccurate. In the Ortigas &
Co. case, the Court found it immaterial that the then Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong declared certain lots as part of the commercial and
industrial zone through a resolution, rather than an ordinance, because:
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law
does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an
ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the
intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the
provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the
power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding
. . . ." 25 (Emphases supplied.)
Zoning and reclassification
Section 3 (c), Chapter I of the CARL provides that a parcel of land
reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 shall no
longer be considered agricultural land subject to CARP. The Court is now
faced with the question of whether Resolution No. 29-A of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas dated July 9, 1972, which approved the
subdivision of the subject property for residential purposes, had also
reclassified the same from agricultural to residential.
Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police
power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined
as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. 26
The Court gave a more extensive explanation of zoning in Pampanga
Bus Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac, 27 thus:
The appellant argues that Ordinance No. 1 is a zoning ordinance
which the Municipal Council is authorized to adopt. McQuillin in his
treaties on Municipal Corporations (Volume 8, 3rd ed.)
says: DEaCSA
Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings
according to districts or zones. It is comprehensive where it is
governed by a single plan for the entire municipality and prevails
throughout the municipality in accordance with that plan. It is
partial or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the
municipality or to certain uses. Fire limits, height districts and
building regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use
regulation that are antecedents of modern comprehensive zoning.
(pp. 11-12.)
The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of
comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental
regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or
zones. This regulation must and does utilize classification of uses
within districts as well as classification of districts, inasmuch as it
manifestly is impossible to deal specifically with each of the
innumerable uses made of land and buildings. Accordingly, (zoning
has been defined as the confining of certain classes of buildings
and uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones.) It has been
stated that zoning is the regulation by districts of building
development and uses of property, and that the term "zoning" is
not only capable of this definition but has acquired a technical and
artificial meaning in accordance therewith. (Zoning is the
separation of the municipality into districts and the regulation of
buildings and structures within the districts so created, in
accordance with their construction, and nature and extent of their
use. It is a dedication of districts delimited to particular uses
designed to subserve the general welfare.) Numerous other
definitions of zoning more or less in accordance with these have
been given in the cases. (pp. 27-28.) 28
According to Section 1 (b) of Ordinance No. 1, "[s]ubdivision means
the division of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, sites or
other divisions for the purpose, whether immediate or future, o[f] a sale
or building development. It includes resubdivision, and when appropriate
to the context, relates to the process of subdividing as to the land of
territory subdivided." Subdivision ordinances or regulations such as
Resolution No. 29-A, in relation to Ordinance No. 1, constitutepartial or
limited zoning, for they are applicable to a specific property in the city
or municipality to be devoted for a certain use.
Section 9 of the Public Land Act — cited by the DAR and Buklod as
the purported delegation by the National Legislature of the power to
reclassify — is immaterial to the instant cases. Said provision reads:
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes
to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public
uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make
the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time
and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
(Emphasis supplied.) TCHcAE
The power delegated to the President under the aforequoted
provision of the Public Land Act is limited to the classification of lands
of the public domain that are alienable or open to disposition. It
finds no application in the present cases for the simple reason that the
subject property involved herein is no longer part of the public domain.
The subject property is already privately owned and accordingly covered
by certificates of title.
The concept that concerns this Court in the instant cases is
the reclassification of agricultural lands. In Alarcon v. Court of
Appeals, 29 the Court had the occasion to define and
distinguishreclassification from conversion as follows:
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of
agricultural land into some other use as approved by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other
hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized
for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial,
as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion. . . . . 30(Italics supplied.)
Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands
to agricultural use. 31
Under the present Local Government Code, it is clear that the
authority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily resides in
the sanggunian of the city or municipality. Said provision reads in full:
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. — (a) A city or municipality
may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearing for the purpose, authorize the
reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1)
when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes,
as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the
total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the
ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component
cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class
municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent
(5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to
agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657),
otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the
conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed
by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and
upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to
reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next
preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with
existing laws, continue toprepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases
for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the
requirements for food production, human settlements, and
industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.
(d) When approval by a national agency is required for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the
same shall be deemed as approval thereof. DASCIc
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing,
amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657. (Emphases supplied.)
Prior to the Local Government Code of 1991, the Local Autonomy Act
of 1959 was silent on the authority to reclassify agricultural lands. What
the earlier statute expressly granted to city and municipal boards and
councils, under Section 3 thereof, was the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances, and regulations.
DAR and Buklod insist that zoning is merely the regulation of land use
based on the existing character of the property and the structures
thereon; and that zoning is a lesser power compared to reclassification
so that the delegation of the former to the local government should not
be deemed to include the latter.
Such arguments are easily refuted by reference to the definitions of
zoning and reclassification earlier presented herein, which support a
more extensive concept of zoning than that which DAR and BUKLOD
assert.
By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange,
prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction
into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on
the future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing character
of the property and the structures thereon would completely negate the
power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality.
Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only
the rubber-stamping by the local legislature of the current use of the
land.
Moreover, according to the definition ofreclassification, the specified
non-agricultural use of the land must be embodied in a land use plan,
and the land use plan is enacted through a zoning ordinance. Thus,
zoning and planning ordinances take precedence over reclassification.
The reclassification of land use is dependent on the zoning and land use
plan, not the other way around.
It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and
municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an
area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential, commercial,
or industrial zone, pursuant to the power granted to them under Section
3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the same time,
reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural
use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and compliance with their
zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality behind such a presumption
is more evident when considering the approval by local legislative
bodies of subdivision ordinances and regulations. The approval by city
and municipal boards and councils of an application for subdivision
through an ordinance should already be understood to include approval
of the reclassification of the land, covered by said application, from
agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use. Otherwise, the
approval of the subdivision application would serve no practical effect;
for as long as the property covered by the application remains classified
as agricultural, it could not be subdivided and developed for non-
agricultural use.
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal
boards and councils, as to include the power to accordingly reclassify
the lands within the zones, would be in accord with the avowed
legislative intent behind the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, which was to
increase the autonomy of local governments. Section 12 of the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959 itself laid down rules for interpretation of the said
statute:
SEC. 12. Rules for the interpretation of the Local Autonomy
Act. —
1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall
be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt
as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of
the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. DaTISc
2. The general welfare clause shall beliberally
interpreted in case of doubt so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare
and material progress of the people in the community.
3. Vested rights existing at the time of the promulgation of this
law arising out of a contract between a province, city or
municipality on one hand and a third party on the other, should be
governed by the original terms and provisions of the same, and in
no case would this act infringe existing rights.
Moreover, the regulation by local legislatures of land use in their
respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification is an
exercise of police power. In Binay v. Domingo, 32 the Court recognized
that police power need not always be expressly delegated, it may also
be inferred:
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute
of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is
founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non
laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex." Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience
of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182).
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there
must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is
the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid
delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation
of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule,
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within
the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are
reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to
do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and
desirable for the safety of the people.(62 C.J.S., p. 277). The
so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much
delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the
inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation
of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the
corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by
exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849).
Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental
agencies, must have such measures of the power as are
necessary to enable them to perform their governmental
functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public
necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate
its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the
municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general
welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority
to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to
provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity
and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149,
177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and
proper for governance such as to promote health and safety,
enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order
in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful
attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719).
On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the
citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated
community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the
beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very
foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., p. 896)
However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal
progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC,
supra).
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power
is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled
in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensiveness. Its scope,
over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. HDCAaS
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to
provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad
sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the
municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and,
while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is
not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which
exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people
by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is
deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power. 33 (Emphases
supplied.)
Based on the preceding discussion, it cannot be said that the power
to reclassify agricultural land was first delegated to the city and
municipal legislative bodies under Section 26 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. Said provision only articulates a power of local
legislatures, which, previously, had only been implied or inferred.
Compliance with other requirements
or conditions
Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its approval on
July 9, 1972, immediately effected the zoning and reclassifying of the
subject property for residential use. It need not comply with any of the
requirements or conditions which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon.
DAR and Buklod aver that Resolution No. 29-A was not reviewed and
approved by the NPC, in violation of the line in Section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959, stating that "[c]ities and municipalities may,
however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters
pertaining to planning and zoning." Consideration must be given,
however, to the use of the word "may" in the said sentence. Where the
provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but
discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity,
permission and possibility. 34The use of the word "may" in a statute
denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. The
"plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. 35 Since consultation with the NPC was
merely discretionary, then there were only two mandatory requirements
for a valid zoning or subdivision ordinance or regulation under Section 3
of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, namely, that (1) the ordinance or
regulation be adopted by the city or municipal board or council; and (2)
it be approved by the city or municipal mayor, both of which were
complied with by Resolution No. 29-A.
Section 16 (a) of Ordinance No. 1 of the Municipality of Dasmariñas
likewise mentions the NPC, to wit:
a. Final plat of subdivision. — As essential requirements before a
subdivision is accepted for verification by the Bureau of Lands, the
final plat of the scheme of the subdivision must comply with the
provision of this ordinance. Application for plat approval shall
be submitted to the Municipal Mayor and shall be forwarded
to the National Planning Commission thru the Highway
District Engineer for comment and/or recommendations,
before action is taken by the Municipal Council. The final
approval of the plat shall be made by the Municipal Mayor upon
recommendation of the Municipal Council by means of a resolution.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The aforementioned provision of Ordinance No. 1 refers to the final
plat of the subdivision. The term plat includes "plat, plan, plot or
replot." 36 It must be distinguished from the application for subdivision.
The Court concurs with the analysis of the Court of Appeals that
Resolution No. 29-A actually contains two resolutions. The first reads:
Resolved, as it is hereby Resolved to approve the application for
subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two
Hectares (372) situated in barrio Bocal and Langkaan, named as
Travellers Life Homes. 37 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is manifest, even from just a plain reading of said resolution, that
the application for subdivision covering the subject property was
categorically and unconditionally approved by the Municipality of
Dasmariñas. As a consequence of such approval, the subject property is
immediately deemed zoned and reclassified as residential. SHAcID
Meanwhile, the second resolution in Resolution No. 29-A states:
Resolved, that this municipal ordinance regarding subdivision
regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed
by thesubdivision. 38 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, this second resolution already refers to a "subdivision,"
supporting the immediately executory nature of the first resolution. The
municipal ordinance which the subdivision must follow is Ordinance No.
1, the general subdivision regulations of the Municipality of Dasmariñas.
Most provisions of Ordinance No. 1 laid down the minimum standards for
the streets, roadways, sidewalks, intersections, lots and blocks, and
other improvements in the subdivision, with which the final plat must
comply or conform. Irrefragably, the review of the final plat of the
subdivision calls for a certain level of technical expertise; hence, the
directive to the Municipal Mayor to refer the final plat to the NPC,
through the Highway District Engineer, for comments and
recommendation, before the same is approved by the Municipal Council,
then the Mayor.
In relation to the preceding paragraph, Administrative Order No. 152
dated December 16, 1968 required city and municipal boards and
councils to submit proposed subdivision ordinances and plans or forward
approved subdivision ordinances to the NPC. The OP imposed such a
requirement because "it has come to the attention of [the] Office that
the minimum standards of such ordinances regarding design, servicing
and streets, and open spaces for parks and other recreational purposes
are not being complied with[.]" 39 Review by the NPC of the proposed
subdivision plan was for the purpose of determining "if it conforms with
the subdivision ordinance." 40 ACSaHc
It is apparent that Section 16 (a) of Ordinance No. 1 and
Administrative Ordinance No. 152 contained the same directive: that the
final plat of the subdivision be reviewed by the NPC to determine its
conformity with the minimum standards set in the subdivision ordinance
of the municipality. A closer scrutiny will reveal that Section 16 (a) of
Ordinance No. 1 and Administrative Order No. 152 related to the duties
and responsibilities of local government and NPC officials as regards the
final plat of the subdivision. There is no evidence to establish that the
concerned public officers herein did not follow the review process for the
final plat as provided in Section 16 (a) of Ordinance No. 1 and
Administrative Order No. 152 before approving the same. Under Section
3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, there is a presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed. Thus, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, there is a presumption that public officers performed their
official duties regularly and legally and in compliance with applicable
laws, in good faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment. 41 And — just
as the Court of Appeals observed — even if it is established that the
accountable public officials failed to comply with their duties and
responsibilities under Section 16 (a) of Ordinance No. 1 and
Administrative Order No. 152, it would be contrary to the fundamental
precepts of fair play to make EMRASON bear the consequences of such
non-compliance.
Although the two resolutions in Resolution No. 29-A may be related to
the same subdivision, they are independent and separate. Non-
compliance with the second resolution may result in the delay or
discontinuance of subdivision development, or even the imposition of
the penalties 42 provided in Ordinance No. 1, but not the annulment or
reversal of the first resolution and its consequences.
The Court again agrees with the Court of Appeals that Resolution No.
29-A need not be subjected to review and approval by the HSRC/HLURB.
Resolution No. 29-A was approved by the Municipality of Dasmariñas
on July 9, 1972, at which time, there was even no HSRC/HLURB to
speak of.
The earliest predecessor of the HSRC, the Task Force on Human
Settlements, was created through Executive Order No. 419 more than a
year later on September 19, 1973. And even then, the Task Force had
no power to review and approve zoning and subdivision ordinances and
regulations.
It was only on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of
Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit
their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems,
and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and
ratification.
The HSRC was eventually established onFebruary 7, 1981. Section
5 (b) of the HSRC Charter 43 contained the explicit mandate for the HSRC
to:
b. Review, evaluate and approve or disapprove
comprehensive land use development plans and zoning
ordinances of local government; and the zoning component of
civil works and infrastructure projects of national, regional and local
governments; subdivisions, condominiums or estate development
projects including industrial estates, of both the public and private
sectors and urban renewal plans, programs and projects: Provided,
that the land use Development Plans and Zoning Ordinances of
Local Governments herein subject to review, evaluation and
approval of the commission shall respect the classification of public
lands for forest purposes as certified by the Ministry of Natural
Resources: Provided, further, that the classification of specific
alienable and disposable lands by the Bureau of Lands shall be in
accordance with the relevant zoning ordinance of Local government
where it exists; and provided, finally, that in cities and
municipalities where there are as yet no zoning ordinances, the
Bureau of Lands may dispose of specific alienable and disposable
lands in accordance with its own classification scheme subject to
the condition that the classification of these lands may be
subsequently change by the local governments in accordance with
their particular zoning ordinances which may be promulgated later.
(Emphases supplied.) ASEIDH
Neither the Ministry of Human Settlements nor the HSRC, however,
could have exercised its power of review retroactively absent an
express provision to that effect in Letter of Instructions No. 729 or
the HSRC Charter, respectively. A sound cannon of statutory
construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made
manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implication. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that: "Laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." Hence,
in order that a law may have retroactive effect, it is necessary that
an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise
nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law.
Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule
established to guide our actions without no binding effect until it is
enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to
future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future
only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have
formally given that effect to some legal provisions. 44
Subsequent zoning ordinances
Still by the authority vested upon it by Section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Act, the Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmariñas subsequently
enacted a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, ratified by the HLURB
under Board Resolution No. 42-A-3 datedFebruary 11, 1981 (1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmariñas). Upon the request of
the DAR, Engr. Alfredo Gil M. Tan, HLURB Regional Technical
Coordinator, issued a certification 45 dated September 10, 1992 stating
that per the 1981 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmariñas, the
subject property was within the agricultural zone. Does this mean that
the subject property reverted from residential to agricultural
classification?
The Court answers in the negative. While the subject property may
be physically located within an agricultural zone under the 1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmariñas, said property retained
its residential classification.
According to Section 17, the Repealing Clause, of the 1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmariñas: "All other ordinances,
rules or regulations in conflict with the provision of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed: Provided, thatrights that have vested before the
effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired."
In Ayog v. Cusi, Jr., 46 the Court expounded on vested right and its
protection:
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by
the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present interest"
(16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested,
to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by
the existing law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or
interest in property which has become fixed and established and is
no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount, 170
Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights.
"A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution
of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78). AcTDaH
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right"
expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5,
citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl.
2nd 587). 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that protection of vested rights is not absolute and must
yield to the exercise of police power:
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern
certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect
and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to
those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested
rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people. . . . . 48
Nonetheless, the Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmariñas in this case, in
its exercise of police power through the enactment of the 1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, itself abided by the general rule and
included in the very same ordinance an express commitment to honor
rights that had already vested under previous ordinances, rules, and
regulations. EMRASON acquired the vested right to use and develop the
subject property as a residential subdivision on July 9, 1972 with the
approval of Resolution No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmariñas. Such
right cannot be impaired by the subsequent enactment of the 1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmariñas, in which the subject
property was included in an agricultural zone. Hence, the Municipal
Mayor of Dasmariñas had been continuously and consistently
recognizing the subject property as a residential subdivision. 49
Incidentally, EMRASON mentions Resolution No. 105, Defining and
Declaring the Boundaries of Industrial and Residential Land Use Plan in
the Municipalities of Imus and Parts of Dasmariñas, Carmona, Gen.
Mariano Alvarez, Gen. Trias, Silang, Tanza, Naic, Rosario, and Trece
Martires City, Province of Cavite, approved by theSangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cavite on March 25, 1988. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan determined that "the lands extending from the said
designated industrial areas would have greater economic value for
residential and institutional uses, and would serve the interest and
welfare for the greatest good of the greatest number of
people." 50Resolution No. 105, approved by the HLURB in 1990, partly
reads:
Tracts of land in the Municipality of Carmona from the People's
Technology Complex to parts of the Municipality of Silang, parts of
the Municipalities of Dasmariñas, General Trias, Trece Martires
City, Municipalities of Tanza and Naic forming the strip of land
traversed by the Puerto Azul Road extending two kilometers more
or less from each side of the road which are hereby declared as
industrial-residential-institutional mix. 51 (Emphases supplied.)
There is no question that the subject property is located within the
afore-described area. And even though Resolution No. 105 has no
direct bearing on the classification of the subject property prior to the
CARL — it taking effect only in 1990 after being approved by the
HLURB — it is a confirmation that at present, the subject property
and its surrounding areas are deemed by the Province of Cavite
better suited and prioritized for industrial and residential
development, than agricultural purposes.
CARP exemption
The Court reiterates that since July 9, 1972, upon approval of
Resolution No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmariñas, the subject
property had been reclassified from agricultural to residential. The tax
declarations covering the subject property, classifying the same as
agricultural, cannot prevail over Resolution No. 29-A. The following
pronouncements of the Court in the Patalinghug case are of particular
relevance herein:
The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision
was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation
purposes as residential. It is our considered view, however, that
a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the
property for zoning purposes. A property may have been
declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation
purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. A
discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of
property for real estate taxation purposes vis-à-vis the
determination of a property for zoning purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is
commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened
by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the
questioned area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if
Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as
residential,once a local government has reclassified an area
as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes
must prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned
vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents
have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their
claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was
constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the
operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose," as
gleaned from Ordinance No. 363. 52 (Emphases supplied.) aECSHI
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land
by virtue of Resolution No. 29-A dated July 9, 1972, it is no longer
agricultural land by the time the CARL took effect on June 15, 1988 and
is, therefore, exempt from the CARP.
This is not the first time that the Court made such a ruling.
In the Natalia Realty case, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637
dated April 18, 1979 set aside land in the Municipalities of Antipolo,
San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, as townsite areas. The
properties owned by Natalia Realty, Inc. (Natalia properties) were
situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. The
developer of the Natalia properties was granted the necessary
clearances and permits by the HSRC for the development of a
subdivision in the area. Thus, the Natalia properties later became the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Following the effectivity of the CARL on June
15, 1988, the DAR placed the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision under the CARP. For having done so, the Court found that
the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion, thus:
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
"agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural
lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their
inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the
areas in question continue to be developed as a low-cost housing
subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. . . . The enormity of the
resources needed for developing a subdivision may have
delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact
that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit
of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside
the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted
to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than respondent DAR.In its Revised
Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural
Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined "agricultural land"
thus —
". . . Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity
as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and
zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities
prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error
to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
within, the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion that lands
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637,inter alia, of which
the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite
purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the proper
land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands'
within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657."
Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the
coverage of CARL. 53 (Emphases supplied.)
That the land in the Natalia Realty case was reclassified as
residential by a presidential proclamation, while the subject property
herein was reclassified as residential by a local ordinance, will not
preclude the application of the ruling of this Court in the former to the
latter. The operative fact that places a parcel of land beyond the ambit
of the CARL is its valid reclassification from agricultural to non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, not by
how or whose authority it was reclassified.
In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 54 (Pasong Bayabas case), the Court made the following
findings: CaAcSE
Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to
lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not
classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands
which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides
that it covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But
long before the law tools effect, the property subject of the
suit had already been reclassified and converted from
agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land by the
following administrative agencies: (a) the Bureau of Lands,
when it approved the subdivision plan of the property consisting of
728 subdivision lots; (b) the National Planning Commission which
approved the subdivision plan subdivided by the LDC/CAI for the
development of the property into a low-cost housing project;(c) the
Municipal Council of Carmona, Cavite, when it approved
Kapasiyahang Blg. 30 on May 30, 1976; (d) Agrarian Reform
Minister Conrado F. Estrella, on July 3, 1979, when he granted the
application of the respondent for the development of the Hakone
Housing Project with an area of 35.80 hectares upon the
recommendation of the Agrarian Reform Team, Regional Director of
Region IV, which found, after verification and investigation, that the
property was not covered by P.D. No. 27, it being untenanted and
not devoted to the production of palay/or corn and that the
property was suitable for conversion to residential subdivision; (e)
by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development;
(f) the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission which issued a
location clearance, development permit, Certificate of Inspection
and License to Sell to the LDC/private respondent; and, (g) the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board which also issued to the
respondent CAI/LDC a license to sell the subdivision
lots. 55 (Emphases supplied.)
Noticeably, there were several government agencies which
reclassified and converted the property from agricultural to non-
agricultural in thePasong Bayabas case. The CARL though does not
specify which specific government agency should have done the
reclassification. To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid
reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly
authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL
took effect. All similar actions as regards the land subsequently rendered
by other government agencies shall merely serve as confirmation of the
reclassification. The Court actually recognized in the Pasong Bayabas
case the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands
through a zoning ordinance:
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264, amending the Local
Government Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or
city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as
present and future projection of needs. The power of the local
government to convert or reclassify lands to residential
lands to non-agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to
the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Section
65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner applies only to
applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of
lands previously placed under the agrarian reform law after the
lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to agricultural
lands already converted as residential lands prior to the passage of
Rep. Act No. 6657. 56(Emphases supplied.)
At the very beginning of Junio v. Garilao, 57 the Court already
declared that:
Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or
residential before June 15, 1988 — the date of effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) — are outside the
coverage of this law. Therefore, they no longer need any conversion
clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).58
The Court then proceeded to uphold the authority of the City Council
of Bacolod to reclassify as residential a parcel of land through Resolution
No. 5153-A, series of 1976. The reclassification was later affirmed by the
HSRC. Resultantly, the Court sustained the DAR Order dated September
13, 1994, exempting the same parcel of land from CARP Coverage.
The writ of preliminary injunction
Any objection of Buklod against the issuance by the Court of Appeals
of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining then DAR Secretary Garilao
and Deputy Executive Secretary Corona from implementing the OP
Decision of February 7, 1996 and Resolution of May 14, 1996 during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 40950, had been rendered moot and
academic when the appellate court already promulgated its Decision in
said case on March 26, 1997 which made the injunction permanent. As
the Court held in Kho v. Court of Appeals: 59
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court in the
case for final injunction and damages. The dispositive portion of
said decision held that the petitioner does not have trademark
rights on the name and container of the beauty cream product. The
said decision on the merits of the trial court rendered the issuance
of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot and academic
notwithstanding the fact that the same has been appealed in the
Court of Appeals. This is supported by our ruling in La Vista
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy
which may be granted at any time after the commencement of the
action and before judgment when it is established that the plaintiff
is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint
shows facts entitling such reliefs . . . and it appearing that the trial
court had already granted the issuance of a final injunction in favor
of petitioner in its decision rendered after trial on the merits . . . the
Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered
moot and academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it
has already made a clear pronouncement as to the plaintiff's right
thereto, that is, after the same issue has been decided on the
merits, the trial court having appreciated the evidence presented,
is proper, notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is not
yet final . . . . Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for
preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed
independently of the decision rendered on the merit of the main
case for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already
determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination
of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect. (italics
supplied)
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final
injunction renders any question on the preliminary injunctive order
moot and academic despite the fact that the decision granting a
final injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a decision denying
the applicant-plaintiff's right to a final injunction, although
appealed, renders moot and academic any objection to the prior
dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction. 60 HTAEIS
Issues belatedly raised
Buklod sought to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950, then pending
before the Court of Appeals, by filing a Manifestation and Omnibus
Motion in which it argued only two points: (1) the writ of preliminary
injunction be immediately dissolved for having been issued in violation
of Section 55 of the CARL; and (2) that the Petition for Review of
EMRASON be dismissed for being the wrong remedy.
It was only after the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated
March 26, 1997 unfavorable to both DAR and Buklod did Buklod raise in
its Motion for Reconsideration several other issues, both factual and
legal, 61 directly assailing the exemption of the subject property from the
CARP. The Court of Appeals refused to consider said issues because they
were raised by Buklod for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration.
Buklod persistently raises the same issues before this Court, and the
Court, once more, refuses to take cognizance of the same.
As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought
before the lower tribunal for its consideration. Higher courts are
precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time
only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. 62The issues were first
raised only in the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, thus, it is as if they were never duly raised in that court at
all. Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, entertain
these issues, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play,
justice and due process. The Court reiterates and emphasizes the well-
settled rule that an issue raised for the first time on appeal and not
raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by
estoppel. 63
Indeed, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question
may be raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below, the
issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered
by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage. The said court
may also consider an issue not properly raised during trial when there is
plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there are
jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues
raised present a matter of public policy. 64
Buklod, however, did not allege, much less argue, that its case falls
under any of these exceptions.
Nonetheless, even when duly considered by this Court, the issues
belatedly raised by Buklod are without merit.
Contrary to the contention of Buklod, there is no necessity to carry out
the conversion of the subject property to a subdivision within one year,
at the risk of said property reverting to agricultural classification.
Section 36 (1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, in effect
since August 8, 1963, provided:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. —
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that
is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in
addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is
not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of
at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are
filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year
after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed
that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the land and recover
damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions; . . . . (Emphasis supplied.) cDCSET
On September 10, 1971, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was
amended and it came to be known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms.
After its amendment, Section 36 (1) stated:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of
the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years.
At the time Resolution No. 29-A was enacted by the Municipality of
Dasmariñas on July 9, 1972, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was already
in effect. The amended Section 36 (1) thereof no longer contained the
one-year time frame within which conversion should be carried out.
More importantly, Section 36 (1) of the Code of Agrarian Reforms
would apply only if the land in question was subject of an agricultural
leasehold, a fact that was not established in the proceedings below. It
may do well for the Buklod members to remember that they filed their
present Petition to seek award of ownership over portions of the subject
property as qualified farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP; and not
payment of disturbance compensation as agricultural lessees under the
Code of Agrarian Reforms. The insistence by Buklod on the requisites
under Section 36 (1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code/Code of
Agrarian Reforms only serves to muddle the issues rather than support
its cause.
Buklod likewise invokes the vested rights of its members under the
Agricultural Land Reform Code/Code of Agrarian Reforms and the
Tenants Emancipation Decree, which preceded the CARP. Yet, for the
Buklod members to be entitled to any of the rights and benefits under
the said laws, it is incumbent upon them to prove first that they qualify
as agricultural lessees or farm workers of the subject property, as
defined in Section 166 (2)65 and (15) 66 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms;
and/or they are tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and corn, under a system of share-crop or lease tenancy,
and are members of a duly recognized farmer's cooperative, as required
by the Tenants Emancipation Decree. None of these determinative facts
were established by Buklod.
Buklod counters that it precisely moved for a hearing before the
Court of Appeals so that it could present evidence to prove such facts,
but the appellate court erroneously denied its motion.
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err on this matter.
In the recent case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, 67 the Court
expounded on the rules on intervention:
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to
Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The
permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the
court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
intervention, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave
of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not
originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject
matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or
interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and
by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole
controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two
requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should
the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in
a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to
intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose
by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. 68 ITDHSE
To apply the rules strictly, the motion of Buklod to intervene was filed
too late. According to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
"a motion to intervene may be filed at any timebefore rendition of
judgment by the trial court." Judgment was already rendered in DARAB
Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92 (the petition of EMRASON to nullify the notices
of acquisition over the subject property), not only by the DAR Hearing
Officer, who originally heard the case, but also the DAR Secretary, and
then the OP, on appeal.
Buklod only sought to intervene when the case was already before the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in the exercise of its discretion,
still allowed the intervention of Buklod in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950 only
because it was "not being in any way prejudicial to the interest of the
original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal
complexion of the case." 69 The intervention of Buklod challenged only
the remedy availed by EMRASON and the propriety of the preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals, which were directly and
adequately addressed by the appellate court in its Decision dated March
26, 1997.
The factual matters raised by Buklod in its Motion for Reconsideration
of the March 26, 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals, and which it
sought to prove by evidence, inevitably changes "the factual legal
complexion of the case." The allegations of Buklod that its members are
tenant-farmers of the subject property who acquired vested rights under
previous agrarian reform laws, go against the findings of the DAR Region
IV Hearing Officer, adopted by the DAR Secretary, the OP, and Court of
Appeals, that the subject property was being acquired under the CARP
for distribution to the tenant-farmers of the neighboring NDC property,
after a determination that the latter property was insufficient for the
needs of both the NDC-Marubeni industrial estate and the tenant-
farmers.
Furthermore, these new claims of Buklod are beyond the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, being within the primary jurisdiction
of the DAR. As Section 50 of the CARL, as amended, reads:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.— The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In fact, records reveal that Buklod already sought remedy from the
DARAB. DARAB Case No. IV-CA-0261, entitled Buklod nang Magbubukid
sa Lupaing Ramos, rep. by Edgardo Mendoza, et al. v. E.M. Ramos and
Sons, Inc., et al., was pending at about the same time as DARAB Case
No. IV-Ca-0084-92, the petition of EMRASON for nullification of the
notices of acquisition covering the subject property. These two cases
were initially consolidated before the DARAB Region IV. The DARAB
Region IV eventually dismissed DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92 and
referred the same to the DAR Region IV Office, which had jurisdiction
over the case. Records failed to reveal the outcome of DARAB Case No.
IV-CA-0261.
On a final note, this Court has stressed more than once that social
justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving, whether
he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that,
in case of reasonable doubt, the Court is called upon to tilt the balance
in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to
the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice must always be served for poor and
rich alike, according to the mandate of the law. 70 Vigilance over the
rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice
cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who
under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. 71 DTAcIa
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review filed by the Buklod Nang
Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. in G.R. No. 131481 and the
Department of Agrarian Reform in G.R. No. 131624 are herebyDENIED.
The Decision dated March 26, 1997 and the Resolution dated November
24, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, Perez and Mendoza, *JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, namely: JOSEFA DELESTE, JOSE RAY DELESTE, RAUL HECTOR DELESTE, and RUBEN ALEX DELESTE,Petitioners,
- versus -
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), as represented by its
G.R. No. 169913 Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,VELASCO, JR.,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,DEL CASTILLO, and
Manager, LAND VALUATION OFFICE OF LBP COTABATO CITY; THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR REGION 12 OF COTABATO CITY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION X CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, represented by MCMILLAN LUCMAN, in his capacity as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of DAR Lanao del Norte; LIZA BALBERONA, in her capacity as DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO); REYNALDO BAGUIO, in his capacity as the Register of Deeds of Iligan City as nominal party; the emancipation patent holders: FELIPE D. MANREAL, CUSTUDIO M. RICO, HEIRS OF DOMINGO V. RICO, HEIRS OF ABDON T. MANREAL, MACARIO M. VELORIA, ALICIA B. MANREAL, PABLO RICO, SALVACION MANREAL, HEIRS OF TRANQUILIANA MANREAL, HEIRS OF ANGELA VELORIA, HEIRS OF NECIFURO CABALUNA, HEIRS OF CLEMENTE RICO, HEIRS OF MANTILLANO OBISO, HEIRS OF HERCULANO BALORIO, and TITO BALER,Respondents.
PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated:June 8, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to reverse and set aside the October 28, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 13, 2005 Resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin
(Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in
Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property). Said
spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman
(Virgilio) by another woman. Virgilio had been raised by the couple since
he was two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and
Caridad, by still another woman.
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the
subject property. On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the
subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed
of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2,
1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and
a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. The arrears in
the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and from
then on, he paid the taxes on the property.
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman,
was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the
regular administrator of the joint estate.
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate
estate of the deceased spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance,
Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action against Deleste for the reversion of
title over the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 698. Said case
went up to this Court in Noel v. CA, where We rendered a Decision on
January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the CA that the subject property
was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and
that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject
property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the
intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject
property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI,
particularly on October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was
issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to
farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the
said program. However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners.Concomitantly,
the notices and processes relative to the coverage were sent to these
heirs.
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known
as the Zoning Regulation of Iligan City, reclassifying the subject property
as commercial/residential.
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land
Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and
actual cultivators of the subject property. The CLTs were registered on
July 15, 1986.
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed. The survey of a
portion of the land consisting of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No.
1407, was approved on January 8, 1999. The claim folder for Lot No.
1407 was submitted to the LBP which issued a Memorandum of
Valuation and a Certificate of Cash Deposit on May 21, 2001 and
September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents
(EPs) and Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1,
2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents
over their respective portions of Lot No. 1407.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for
the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed
as Special Civil Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued
a Decision granting the expropriation. Considering that the real owner of
the expropriated portion could not be determined, as the subject
property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs
of Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the expropriated
portion of the subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was
deposited with the Development Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in
trust for the RTC in Iligan City.
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a
petition seeking to nullify private respondents EPs. This was docketed as
Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) rendered a Decision declaring that the EPs were null and void in
view of the pending issues of ownership, the subsequent reclassification
of the subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the
violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process of law.
Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of
Appeal on July 22, 2003. Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners
filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 2, Rule XII of
the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was granted in an Order dated
August 4, 2003 despite strong opposition from private respondents. On
January 28, 2004, the DARAB nullified the Order dated August 4, 2003
granting the writ of execution.
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the
ruling of the PARAD in its Decision dated March 15, 2004. It held, among
others, that the EPs were valid as it was the heirs of Deleste who should
have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time
the subject property was placed under the coverage of the OLT Program
considering that DAR was not a party to the said case. Further, it stated
that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has
been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and
held that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT
Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies
exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latters authorized
representative. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the DARAB in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85471, challenging the Decision and
Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners failure to attach the
writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such
material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other
supporting papers, as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated September 13, 2005 for being pro
forma.
On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with
this Court. In Our Resolution dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to
deny the said petition for failure to show sufficiently any reversible error
in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.
On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. On April 11, 2008, they also filed a Supplement to the
Motion for Reconsideration.
In Our Resolution dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to
grant petitioners motion for reconsideration and give due course to the
petition, requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The Issues
I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN
DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.
II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IS JUSTIFIED; AND [WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION IS JUST CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.
X X X X
III. [WHETHER PETITIONERS LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM GIVEN THAT THE CITY OFILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313 RECLASSIFYING THE AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.
IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN
PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO AGRARIAN REFORM.
V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY
DAR AND LBP IS CORRECT GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN REPEALED.
VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION
PATENTS [IS] LEGAL GIVEN THAT THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING.
VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID
GIVEN THAT THEY WERE DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(E) OF R.A. 6657 X X X.[31]
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Effect of non-compliance with the requirementsunder Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments,
final orders, or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions, it is required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order, or
resolution appealed from, with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting
papers. As stated: Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review
shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed
from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements
concerning the contents of the petition, as well as the documents that
should accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for its
dismissal as stated in Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the Rules: Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with
requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, andthe contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
85471 for petitioners failure to attach the writ of execution, the order
nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record
referred to in the petition and other supporting papers.
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show
that the foregoing documents required by the appellate court are not
necessary for the proper disposition of the case. Specifically: Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program]? Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the landowner?
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land Bank? [I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering that EPs were already issued on the basis of CLTs]? Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43
of the Rules of Court when they appended to the petition filed before the
CA certified true copies of the following documents: (1) the challenged
resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy of petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration dated April 6, 2005; (3) the assailed decision
dated March 15, 2004 issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal the
decision of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the order of execution
pending appeal; (4) the Order dated December 8, 2003 issued by the
PARAD reinstating the writ of execution earlier issued; and (5) the
Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original
proceedings for the cancellation of the EPs. The CA, therefore, erred
when it dismissed the petition based on such technical ground.
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the
appeal, the appellate court, instead of dismissing outright the petition,
could have just required petitioners to submit the necessary documents.
In Spouses Espejo v. Ito, the Court held that under Section 3 (d), Rule 3
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, the Court of
Appeals is with authority to require the parties to submit additional
documents as may be necessary to promote the interests of substantial
justice.
Moreover, petitioners subsequent submission of the documents
required by the CA with the motion for reconsideration constitutes
substantial compliance with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. In Jaro v. CA, this Court held that subsequent and substantial
compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
Particularly: The amended petition no longer contained the fatal
defects that the original petition had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of Appeals reasoned that non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the court for it to depart from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The hard stance taken by the Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under the circumstances.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the
subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions the appellate court clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid
application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice. As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses
Carpo:
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily andthe parties right to an opportunity to be heard.
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is
instructive: We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere
technicality is unwarranted in the instant case.
On the coverage of the subject propertyby the agrarian reform program
Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No.
1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of
the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City
of Iligan reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land.
Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is
bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the
HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the
reclassification over the subject property. It further noted that whether
the subject property is exempt from the OLT Program is an
administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively
with the DAR Secretary, not with the DARAB.
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with
the primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program. However, this will not
prevent the Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition
considering that the issues raised in it may already be resolved on the
basis of the records before Us. Besides, to allow the matter to remain
with the Office of the DAR Secretary would only cause unnecessary
delay and undue hardship on the parties. Applicable, by analogy, is Our
ruling in the recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph
International v. Department of Labor and Employment Secretary, where
We held: But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue
hardship, to the point of injustice, would result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in the position to resolve the case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of
the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the CA could not validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its dismissal ruling, where appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We
agree with petitioners that the subject property, particularly Lot No.
1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of
the enactment by the City ofIligan of its local zoning ordinance, City
Ordinance No. 1313.
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to
reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands. InPasong Bayabas
Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA, his Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code,
municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National
Planning Commission. It was also emphasized therein that [t]he power of
the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to
non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to
the approval of the [DAR].
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313,
which was enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject
property into a commercial/residential area. DARAB, however, believes
that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification
to be valid.
We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was
enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975. Significantly, there was still no
HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on Human
Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was already in
existence at that time, having been created on September 19, 1973
pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be noted, however, that
the Task Force was not empowered to review and approve zoning
ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9,
1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local
governments were required to submit their existing land use plans,
zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry
of Human Settlements for review and ratification. The Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory arm of
the Ministry of Human Settlements.
Significantly, accompanying the Certification dated October 8,
1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo, Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City
Planning and Development Office, Iligan City, and the letter dated
October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional Officer of the
HLURB, is the Certificate of Approval issued by Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, then Minister of Human Settlements and Chairperson of the
HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on
September 21, 1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that City
Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was approved by the
HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said local zoning
ordinance is, therefore, beyond question.
Since the subject property had been reclassified as
residential/commercial land with the enactment of City Ordinance No.
1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an agricultural land
within the ambit of RA 6657. As this Court held inBuklod nang
Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., To be
exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the
land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized
government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect.
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the
subsequent reclassification by the local zoning ordinance cannot free the
land from the legal effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be already
taken as of October 21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly,
they assert that the rights which accrued from said date must be
respected. They also maintain that the reclassification of the subject
property did not alter its agricultural nature, much less its actual use.
Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be
taken away by the expedience of issuing a local zoning ordinance
reclassifying an agricultural land into a residential/commercial area. As
this Court extensively discussed inRemman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA: In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for
exemption on the ground that the subject lands had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmarias, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC, specifying them as residential.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture,
this Court resolved the issue of whether lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e., National Housing Authority and Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June 1988, are covered by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. We answered in the negative, thus:
We now determine whether such lands are covered
by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural
land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential land.
xxx xxx xxx Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity
are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land thus
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15
June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. . . . .
However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light
of Administrative Order 04, Series of 2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands from CARP Coverage under Section (3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. It reads:
I. Prefatory Statement
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), Section 3, Paragraph (c) defines agricultural land as referring to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990, (or DOJ Opinion 44-1990 for brevity) and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12 August 2993, 225 SCRA 278) opines that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-
agricultural uses shall not operate to divest tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to
non-agricultural cannot be applied to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante, where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein is agricultural in nature on the ground that the same had been classified as park since 1979 under the Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB. Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by
the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and parks for open spaces. It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not disclose any provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into residential or light industrial. While it declared that after the passage of the measure, the subject area shall be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not provided therein that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have
actually accrued in the instant case. In this respect, We reckon that
under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were deemed owners
of the land they till as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to
emancipate the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil, is given
effect by the following provision of the law: The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed
estate or not, shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are
deemed owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as
automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership
over the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also be
complied with, such as payment of just compensation, before full
ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers. This was elucidated by the
Court in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec.
of Agrarian Reform: It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the
emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1
that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed
full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
it was obviously referring to lands already
validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives
and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-
farmers have, at most, an inchoate right over the land they were tilling.
In recognition of this, a CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve as a
provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is
awaiting full payment of [just compensation] or for as long as the
[tenant-farmer] is an amortizing owner. This certificate proves inchoate
ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn
production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the
land he was tilling.
Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government,
tenant-farmers cannot be considered as full owners of the land they are
tilling unless they have fully paid the amortizations due them. This is
because it is only upon such full payment of the amortizations that EPs
may be issued in their favor.
In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD
27 is effected in two (2) stages. The first stage is the issuance of a CLT
to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to
the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its deemed
owner. And the second stage is the issuance of an EP as proof of full
ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual
amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary.
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore,
for all intents and purposes, it was only in 1984 that private
respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have
an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance
with the prescribed requirements. Considering that the local
zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently
approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no
vested rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in
1984 that private respondents were issued the CLTs and were
deemed owners.
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in
2001, since reclassification had taken place twenty-six (26)
years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights
accrued prior to reclassification and its approval. Consequently,
the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the
coverage of the agrarian reform program.
On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is
subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian
reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was
violated. Citing De Chavez v. Zobel, both the DAR and the private
respondents claim that the enactment of PD 27 is a statutory notice to
all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn
production, implying that there was no need for an actual notice.
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in
subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be
underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential
requirements of administrative due process of law. Our ruling in Heirs of
Jugalbot v. CA is particularly instructive: Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in
violation of constitutional due process. The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
x x x x In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa
was followed by a DAR certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due process.
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals applies to the case at bar since there was likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and
identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential
Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and
private respondents does not show that this Court ever made mention
that actual notice may be dispensed with under PD 27, its enactment
being a purported statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands
devoted to rice and/or corn production that their lands are subjected to
the OLT program.
Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt. Corp. v. DAR, this
Court underscored the significance of notice in implementing the
agrarian reform program when it stated that notice is part of the
constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the
States intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just
compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that
his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian
law.
The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB
that petitioners were not denied the right to due process despite the fact
that only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. Particularly: Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners
were denied the right to be given the notice since only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The fault lies with petitioners who did not present the tax declaration in the name of Dr. Deleste as of October 21, 1972. It was only in 1995 that Civil Case No. 698 was finally decided by the Supreme Court dividing the 34.7 hectares between the Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr. Deleste died in 1992 after PD 27 was promulgated, hence, the subject land or his share was considered in his name only (see Art. 777, New Civil Code). Even then, it must be borne in mind that on September 26, 1972, PD No. 2 was issued by President Marcos proclaiming the whole country as a land reform area, this was followed by PD 27. This should have alarmed them more so when private respondents are in actual possession and cultivation of the subject property.
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the
landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of
sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole
world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue
of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the
registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the same property. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is to
notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving
the property has been entered into. There was, therefore, no reason for
DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject
property.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and
not to the Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in
the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the
name of Deleste. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or, at least, constructive possession.
Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when
the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property
under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc.
v. CA, where, despite a finding that there was a violation of due process
in the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform program
when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and
investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquiring the property,
thereby effectively depriving petitioner the opportunity to at least
choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be
acquired, this Court nonetheless ruled that such violation does not give
the Court the power to nullify the certificates of land ownership award
(CLOAs) already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, since the DAR must
be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings.
Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify
illegally issued CLOAs and should first ask the DAR to reverse and
correct itself, Justice Ynares-Santiago, in her Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, stated that [i]f the acts of DAR are patently illegal and the
rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be
reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in
this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and void. She
also noted that [i]f CLOAs can under the DARs own order be cancelled
administratively, with more reason can the courts, especially the
Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue.
In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is
patent, the Court must immediately take action and declare the issuance
as null and void. There being no question that the CLTs in the instant
case were improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is
warranted. The same holds true with respect to the EPs and certificates
of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid
transfer of title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are
void. Cancellation of the EPs and OCTs are clearly warranted in the
instant case since, aside from the violation of petitioners right to due
process of law, the subject property is outside the coverage of the
agrarian reform program.
Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata
The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs validity has already
been settled by this Court in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, where We held that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001
had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time the
petitioners therein instituted the case in 2005; hence, their issuance
may no longer be reviewed.
In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to
preclude a relitigation of the issue concerning the validity of the EPs
issued to private respondents.
Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely:
(1) bar by prior judgment, wherein the judgment in a prior case bars the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause
of action; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment, which precludes
relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos, this Court, in Spouses Antonio v.
Sayman, expounded on the difference between the two aspects of res
judicata: The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1)
bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these two aspects of res judicata as follows:
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between
the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application when a
fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon,
and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Elucidating further on this second aspect of res judicata, the
Court, in Spouses Antonio, stated: x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or
order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We
find that LBPs contention that this Courts ruling inHeirs of Sofia
Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already
become indefeasible and incontrovertible precludes a relitigation of the
issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents
does not hold water.
In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia
Nanaman Lonoy and the instant case. Arguably, the respondents in
these two cases are similar. However, the petitioners are totally
different. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petitioners are the more
than 120 individuals who claim to be descendants of Fulgencio
Nanaman, Gregorios brother, and who collectively assert their right to a
share in Gregorios estate, arguing that they were deprived of their
inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to private
respondents without notice to them. On the other hand, in the instant
case, petitioners are the heirs of Deleste who seek nullification of the
EPs issued to private respondents on grounds of violation of due process
of law, disregard of landowners right of retention, improvident issuance
of EPs and OCTs, and non-coverage of the agrarian reform program,
among others. Evidently, there is even no privity among the petitioners
in these two cases.
And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of
Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the issue was whether the filing of a petition for
prohibition was the proper remedy for the petitioners therein,
considering that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001, four
(4) years prior to the filing of said petition in 2005. In the instant case,
however, the issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued in favor of
private respondents are void, thus warranting their cancellation.
In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are
different such that the necessity of applying the rule on indefeasibility of
title in one is wanting in the other. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the
petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners therein in 2005,
notwithstanding the fact that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued
in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling that [p]rohibition, as
a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli, it
becomes incumbent upon this Court to hold that: x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued
in 2001, they had become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in 2005, and may no longer be judicially reviewed. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of
private respondents EPs and OCTs was filed on February 28, 2002.
Taking into account that the EPs and OCTs were issued on August 1,
2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, the filing of the petition was
well within the prescribed one year period, thus, barring the defense of
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if the petition was filed
before the DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as mandated by Sec.
32 of the Property Registration Decree, this should necessarily have the
same effect, considering that DARABs jurisdiction extends to cases
involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and even of certificates of title
issued by virtue of a void EP. As this Court held in Gabriel v. Jamias: It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication
arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere
issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases
was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot
be deemed to disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA, on which it was grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of title issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.
From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is
the DARAB and not the regular courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in the names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation patents previously issued to them by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that the said emancipation patents were erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid retention rights of respondents had already attained finality. Considering that the action filed by respondents with the DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents issued to the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling
in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 does not bar Us
from making a finding in the instant case that the EPs and OCTs issued
to private respondents are, indeed, void.
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell
on the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition
and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs October 28, 2004 and
September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The
Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the
subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private
respondents are hereby declared NULLand VOID.
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation
Patents and Original Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of
private respondents.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100091. October 22, 1992.]
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.
Abundio L. Okit for petitioner.Cabanlas, Resma & Cabanlas Law Office for respondent Obrique, et al.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; TENANCY; TENANTS' CLAIM OF BEING LANDLESS REQUIRES PROOFS. — Complainants claim that they are landless peasants. This allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was a Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position and was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
2. ID.; ID.; SQUATTERS CANNOT CLAIM RIGHT UNDER CARP. — After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court.
3. ID.; ID.; NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL. — As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its
avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land.
4. ID.; ID.; DARAB; JURISDICTION; LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP. — Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc. Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AGRARIAN DISPUTE, DEFINED. — There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE TENANTS, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
7. ID.; ID.; NEITHER EDUCATION OF THE YOUTH OR AGRARIAN REFORM NEED GIVE WAY TO THE OTHER. — The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
D E C I S I O N
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.
From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a
farm school at Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of Bukidnon.
In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No. 467, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT Nos. 160, 161 and 162. 1
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than 3,000. By 1988, the student population had expanded to some 13,000 students, so that the school community has an academic population (student, faculty and non-academic staff) of almost 15,000. To cope with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its education facilities partly from government appropriation and partly by self-help measures.
True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on self-help measures to carry out its educational objectives, train its students, and maintain various activities which he government appropriation could not adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program, the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice projects. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries. The location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is quite a distance from the nearest town, was the proper setting for the adoption of such a program. Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants who were not members of the faculty or non-academic staff of the CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU.
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups of "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or members of their family to establish any house or live within the vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impart of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.
Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To The CMU-Income Enhancement Program, 3 a former employee would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the respondents DARAB and the Court of Appeals, raised the following issues:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.
In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the DARAB, complainants Obrique, et. al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part of portion of the CMU situated at Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon, consisting of about 1,200 hectares. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.
In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants. This allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was a Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very
responsible position and was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally authorized or given permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose — to carry out certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and other related technologies, using the land and other resources of the institution as laboratory for these projects. Their entry into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a specified purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. 4Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, segregating 400 hectares from the CMU land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land subject hereof is "not directly, actually and exclusively used for school sites, because the same was leased to Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines)".
In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent University failed to show that it is using actually, really, truly and in fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it show that the same is directly used without any intervening agency or person", 5 and "there is no definite and concrete showing that the use of said lands are essentially indispensable for educational purposes". 6 The reliance by the respondents Board and Appellate Tribunal on the technical or literal definition from Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, may give the ordinary reader a classroom meaning of the phrase "is actually directly and exclusively", but in so doing they missed the true meaning of Section 10, R.A. 6657, as to what lands are exempted or excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, are as follows:.
SECTION 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public an private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229 including other lands
of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to
or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest for mineral lands
to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act
until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as
determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable
for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of
the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
SECTION 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. — Lands actually, directly
and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research
and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant
thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal
farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research
and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope
and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied). The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present education program with its present student population and academic facility — overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West. What we now know as Michigan State University, Penn State University and Illinois State University, started as small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing educational programs. They were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology and scientific research. Funds for the support of the educational programs of land grant colleges came from government appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources.7 It was in this same spirit that President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its
future campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational institution, to develop and train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the country. LLjur
In line with its avowed purpose as an agricultural and technical school, the University adopted a land utilization program to develop and exploit its 3,080-hectares land reservation as follows: [ix]8
No. of Hectares Percentage
a. Livestock and Pasture 1,016.40 33b. Upland Crops 616 20c. Campus and Residential sites 462 15d. Irrigated rice 400.40 13e. Watershed and forest reservation 308 10f. Fruit and Tree Crops 154 5g. Agricultural Experimental stations 123.20 4
——— ———
3,080.00 100%
The first land use plan of the CMU was prepared in 1975 and since then it has undergone several revisions in line with changing economic conditions, national economic policies and financial limitations and availability of resources. The CMU, through Resolution No. 160 S. 1984, pursuant to its development plan, adopted a multidisciplinary applied research extension and productivity program called the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP). The objectives 9 of this program were:
1. Provided researchers who shall assist in (a) preparation of proposal; (b) monitor project implementation; and (c) collect and analyze all data and information relevant to the processes and results of project implementation;
2. Provide the use of land within the University reservation for the purpose of establishing a lowland rice project for the party of
the Second Part for a period of one calendar year subject to discretionary renewal by the Party of the First Part;
3. Provide practical training to the Party of the Second Part on the management and operation of their lowland project upon request of Party of the Second Part; and
4. Provide technical assistance in the form of relevant livelihood project specialists who shall extend expertise on scientific methods of crop production upon request by Party of the Second Part.
In return for the technical assistance extended by the CMU, the participants in a project pay a nominal amount as service fee. The self-reliance program was an adjunct to the CMU's lowland rice project. .
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program, with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said contracts with the Philippine Packing Corporation and others of a similar nature (like MM-Agraplex) were made prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 and were directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational institution. As soon as the objectives of the agreement for the joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of June 1988, the CMU adopted a blue print for the exclusive use and utilization of said areas to carry out its own research and agricultural experiments.
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;
(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers. (Emphasis).
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to establish that the fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now subject of review.
Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation of a portion of a private property titled in the name of its lawful owner, even if the claimant is not entitled as a beneficiary, is an issue we feel we must resolve. The quasi-judicial powers of the DARAB are provided in Executive Order No. 129-A, quoted hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:
SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. — There is
hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office
of the Secretary . . . The Board shall assume the powers and functions
with respect to adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive
Order 229 and this Executive Order . . .
SECTION 17. Quasi Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is
hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters including implementation of Agrarian Reform.
Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform . . .
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture. 10
In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred Hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority. We do not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as
beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and development of this country.
It is the opinion of this Court, in the light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons indicated, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. We hereby declare the decision of the DARAB dated September 4, 1989 and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the quasi-judicial body, as null and void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Melo, JJ ., concur.
Narvasa, C .J ., is on official leave.
Bellosillo, J ., took no part.
Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
MILESTONE FARMS, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
G.R. No. 182332 Present: CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andVILLARAMA, JR.,* JJ.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,Respondent.
Promulgated: February 23, 2011
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Amended Decision dated October 4, 2006 and its
Resolution dated March 27, 2008.
The Facts
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960. Among its
pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle,
pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which
may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of
said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable
and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to
purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies,
stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-
products of said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other
livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs,
and other livestock as may be authorized by law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and
swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court,
sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry,
and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its
316.0422-hectare property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
(T-410434) M-15750, (T-486101) M-7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T-
274129) M-15751, (T-486103) M-7309, (T-486104) M-7310, (T-332694)
M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311, (T-486106) M-7312, M-8791, (T-486107)
M-7313, (T-486108) M-7314, M-8796, (T-486109) M-7315, (T-486110) M-
9508, and M-6013, and located in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, from the
coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this
Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR
A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of
agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from
CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its
application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.
Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and
Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular
inspection on petitioners property and arrived at the following findings: [T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is 258.8422 hectares; the area which served as
infrastructure is 42.0000 hectares; ten (10) hectares are planted to corn and the remaining five (5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that the livestock population are 371 heads of cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of swine and 788 heads of cocks; that the area being applied for exclusion is far below the required or ideal area which is 563 hectares for the total livestock population; that the approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes with an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below the allowable 10% variance; and, though not directly used for livestock purposes, the ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and the five (5) hectares devoted to fishpond could be considered supportive to livestock production.
The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the
LUCECs findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director Percival
Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27, 1994,
exempting petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from CARP.
The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
(Pinugay Farmers), represented by Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia),
moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was
denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24,
1994. Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed a letter-appeal with the
DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case
No. 781-T. The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was
later reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal.
Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its Decision dated October
8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all
defendants therein to vacate portions of the property covered by TCT
Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000,
the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file a motion for
reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record received its
October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and executory.
In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No.
7881, which was approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural
lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded
from the coverage of the CARL. On October 22, 1996, the fact-finding
team formed by the DAR Undersecretary for Field Operations and
Support Services conducted an actual headcount of the livestock
population on the property. The headcount showed that there were 448
heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine.
The DAR Secretarys Ruling
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
(Secretary Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776
hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director
Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered
by CARP.
Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be
excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry,
and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He
found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by
petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the
name of petitioners president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to June 15, 1988;
133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered from
1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates
rather than to the headcount because the same explicitly provide for the
number of cattle owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988.
Applying the animal-land ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every
head of cattle/carabao/horse) and the infrastructure-animal ratio (1.7815
hectares for 21 heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare for 21
heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao exempted
240.9776 hectares of the property, as follows:
1. 86 hectares for the 86 heads of cattle existing as of 15 June 1988;
2. 8 hectares for infrastructure following the ratio of
1.7815 hectares for every 21 heads of cattle; 3. 8 hectares for the 8 horses; 4. 0.3809 square meters of infrastructure for the 8
horses; [and]
5. 138.5967 hectares for the 5,678 heads of swine.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, submitting therewith
copies of Certificates of Transfer of Large Cattle and additional
Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle issued to petitioner prior to
June 15, 1988, as additional proof that it had met the required animal-
land ratio. Petitioner also submitted a copy of a Disbursement Voucher
dated December 17, 1986, showing the purchase of 100 heads of cattle
by the Bureau of Animal Industry from petitioner, as further proof that it
had been actively operating a livestock farm even before June 15,
1988. However, in his Order dated April 15, 1997, Secretary Garilao
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal before the
Office of the President (OP).
The OPs Ruling
On February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision reinstating
Director Dalugdugs Order dated June 27, 1994 and declared the entire
316.0422-hectare property exempt from the coverage of CARP.
However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision filed by farmer-groups Samahang Anak-Pawis ng Lagundi
(SAPLAG) and Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution dated September 16,
2002, setting aside its previous decision. The dispositive portion of the
OP resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision subject of the instant separate motions for reconsideration is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, as reiterated in another Order of 15 April 1997, without prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and verification proceedings that DAR, thru the appropriate
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake pursuant to Rule III (D) of DAR Administrative Order No. 09, series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.
The OP held that, when it comes to proof of ownership, the
reference is the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. Certificates of
cattle ownership, which are readily available being issued by the
appropriate government office ought to match the number of heads of
cattle counted as existing during the actual headcount. The presence of
large cattle on the land, without sufficient proof of ownership thereof,
only proves such presence.
Taking note of Secretary Garilaos observations, the OP also held
that, before an ocular investigation is conducted on the property, the
landowners are notified in advance; hence, mere reliance on the
physical headcount is dangerous because there is a possibility that the
landowners would increase the number of their cattle for headcount
purposes only. The OP observed that there was a big variance between
the actual headcount of 448 heads of cattle and only 86 certificates of
ownership of large cattle.
Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA. The Proceedings Before the CA and Its Rulings
On April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary
evidence presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion
had more than satisfied the animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios
under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner applied for
exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating
the claim that petitioner merely converted the property for livestock,
poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP coverage.
Petitioner was held to have actually engaged in the said business on the
property even before June 15, 1988. The CA disposed of the case in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Office of the President dated September 16, 2002 is hereby SET ASIDE, and its Decision dated February 4, 2000 declaring the entire 316.0422 hectares exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby REINSTATED without prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and verification proceedings which the Department of Agrarian Reform, through the proper Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake pursuant to Policy Statement (D) of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.
Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without
the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court
then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR
Conversion Order No. CON-0410-0016 (Conversion Order), granting
petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare
property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The
portions converted with a total area of 153.3049 hectares were covered
by TCT Nos. M-15755 (T-332694), M-15751 (T-274129), and M-15750 (T-
410434). With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of
the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
On the CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for Reconsideration
were filed by farmer-groups, namely: the farmers represented by Miguel
Espinas (Espinas group), the Pinugay Farmers, and the SAPLAG. The
farmer-groups all claimed that the CA should have accorded respect to
the factual findings of the OP. Moreover, the farmer-groups unanimously
intimated that petitioner already converted and developed a portion of
the property into a leisure-residential-commercial estate known as the
Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex (Palo Alto).
Subsequently, in a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration
on Newly Secured Evidence pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1993 (Supplement) dated June 15, 2005, the Espinas group
submitted the following as evidence:
1) Conversion Order dated November 4, 2004, issued by Secretary
Villa, converting portions of the property from agricultural to residential
and golf courses use, with a total area of 153.3049 hectares; thus, the
Espinas group prayed that the remaining 162.7373 hectares (subject
property) be covered by the CARP;
2) Letter dated June 7, 2005 of both incoming Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) Bismark M. Elma (MARO Elma) and outgoing
MARO Cesar C. Celi (MARO Celi) of Baras, Rizal, addressed to Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II of Rizal, Felixberto Q. Kagahastian,
(MARO Report), informing the latter, among others, that Palo Alto was
already under development and the lots therein were being offered for
sale; that there were actual tillers on the subject property; that there
were agricultural improvements thereon, including an irrigation system
and road projects funded by the Government; that there was no existing
livestock farm on the subject property; and that the same was not in the
possession and/or control of petitioner; and
3) Certification dated June 8, 2005, issued by both MARO Elma and
MARO Celi, manifesting that the subject property was in the possession
and cultivation of actual occupants and tillers, and that, upon inspection,
petitioner maintained no livestock farm thereon.
Four months later, the Espinas group and the DAR filed their
respective Manifestations. In its Manifestation dated November 29,
2005, the DAR confirmed that the subject property was no longer
devoted to cattle raising. Hence, in its Resolution dated December 21,
2005, the CA directed petitioner to file its comment on the Supplement
and the aforementioned Manifestations. Employing the services of a new
counsel, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Rejoinder,and prayed that the
MARO Report be disregarded and expunged from the records for lack of
factual and legal basis.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly
Secretary Villas Conversion Order of November 4, 2004, the appellate
court had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy
would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. In the same
token, the Espinas group prayed that this remaining area be covered by
the CARP.
On October 4, 2006, the CA amended its earlier Decision. It held
that its April 29, 2005 Decision was theoretically not final because DAR
A.O. No. 9 required the MARO to make a continuing review and
verification of the subject property. While the CA was cognizant of our
ruling in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, wherein we declared
DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional, it still resolved to lift the exemption
of the subject property from the CARP, not on the basis of DAR A.O. No.
9, but on the strength of evidence such as the MARO Report and
Certification, and the Katunayan issued by the Punong Barangay, Alfredo
Ruba (Chairman Ruba), of Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, showing that the
subject property was no longer operated as a livestock farm. Moreover,
the CA held that the lease agreements, which petitioner submitted to
prove that it was compelled to lease a ranch as temporary shelter for its
cattle, only reinforced the DARs finding that there was indeed no
existing livestock farm on the subject property. While petitioner claimed
that it was merely forced to do so to prevent further slaughtering of its
cattle allegedly committed by the occupants, the CA found the claim
unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the CA opined that petitioner should have
asserted its rights when the irrigation and road projects were introduced
by the Government within its property. Finally, the CA accorded the
findings of MARO Elma and MARO Celi the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions in the absence of evidence proving
misconduct and/or dishonesty when they inspected the subject property
and rendered their report. Thus, the CA disposed:WHEREFORE, this Courts Decision dated April 29,
2005 is hereby amended in that the exemption of the subject landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
SO ORDERED.
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On
January 8, 2007, MARO Elma, in compliance with the Memorandum of
DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres, tendered another
Report reiterating that, upon inspection of the subject property, together
with petitioners counsel-turned witness, Atty. Grace Eloisa J. Que (Atty.
Que), PARO Danilo M. Obarse, Chairman Ruba, and several occupants
thereof, he, among others, found no livestock farm within the subject
property. About 43 heads of cattle were shown, but MARO Elma
observed that the same were inside an area adjacent to Palo Alto.
Subsequently, upon Atty. Ques request for reinvestigation, designated
personnel of the DAR Provincial and Regional Offices (Investigating
Team) conducted another ocular inspection on the subject property on
February 20, 2007. The Investigating Team, in its Report dated February
21, 2007, found that, per testimony of petitioners caretaker, Rogelio
Ludivices (Roger), petitioner has 43 heads of cattle taken care of by the
following individuals: i) Josefino Custodio (Josefino) 18 heads; ii) Andy
Amahit 15 heads; and iii) Bert Pangan 2 heads; that these individuals
pastured the herd of cattle outside the subject property, while Roger
took care of 8 heads of cattle inside the Palo Alto area; that 21 heads of
cattle owned by petitioner were seen in the area adjacent to Palo Alto;
that Josefino confirmed to the Investigating Team that he takes care of
18 heads of cattle owned by petitioner; that the said Investigating Team
saw 9 heads of cattle in the Palo Alto area, 2 of which bore MFI marks;
and that the 9 heads of cattle appear to have matched the Certificates
of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner.
Because of the contentious factual issues and the conflicting
averments of the parties, the CA set the case for hearing and reception
of evidence on April 24, 2007. Thereafter, as narrated by the CA, the
following events transpired:
On May 17, 2007, [petitioner] presented the Judicial Affidavits of its witnesses, namely, [petitioners] counsel, [Atty. Que], and the alleged caretaker of [petitioners] farm, [Roger], who were both cross-examined by counsel for farmers-movants and SAPLAG. [Petitioner] and SAPLAG then marked their documentary exhibits. On May 24, 2007, [petitioners] security guard and third witness, Rodolfo G. Febrada, submitted his Judicial Affidavit and was cross-examined by counsel for fa[r]mers-movants and SAPLAG. Farmers-movants also marked their documentary exhibits. Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Formal Offers of Evidence. Farmers-movants and SAPLAG filed their objectionsto [petitioners] Formal Offer of Evidence. Later, [petitioner] and farmers-movants filed their respective Memoranda. In December 2007, this Court issued a Resolution on the parties offer of evidence and considered [petitioners] Motion for Reconsideration submitted for resolution.
Finally, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the
CA in its Resolution dated March 27, 2008. The CA discarded petitioners
reliance on Sutton. It ratiocinated that the MARO Reports and the DARs
Manifestation could not be disregarded simply because DAR A.O. No. 9
was declared unconstitutional. The Sutton ruling was premised on the
fact that the Sutton property continued to operate as a livestock farm.
The CA also reasoned that, in Sutton, this Court did not remove from the
DAR the power to implement the CARP, pursuant to the latters authority
to oversee the implementation of agrarian reform laws under Section
50 of the CARL. Moreover, the CA found:
Petitioner-appellant claimed that they had 43 heads of cattle which are being cared for and pastured by 4 individuals. To prove its ownership of the said cattle, petitioner-appellant offered in evidence 43 Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle.Significantly, however, the said Certificates were all dated and issued on November 24, 2006, nearly 2 months after this Court rendered its Amended Decision lifting the exemption of the 162-hectare portion of the subject landholding. The acquisition of such cattle after the lifting of the exemption clearly reveals that petitioner-appellant was no longer operating a livestock farm, and suggests an effort to create a semblance of livestock-raising for the purpose of its Motion for Reconsideration.
On petitioners assertion that between MARO Elmas Report dated
January 8, 2007 and the Investigating Teams Report, the latter should be
given credence, the CA held that there were no material inconsistencies
between the two reports because both showed that the 43 heads of
cattle were found outside the subject property.
Hence, this Petition assigning the following errors: I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT LANDS DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK FARMING WITHIN THE MEANING OF LUZ FARMS AND SUTTON, AND WHICH ARE THEREBY EXEMPT FROM CARL COVERAGE, ARE NEVERTHELESS SUBJECT TO
DARS CONTINUING VERIFICATION AS TO USE, AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH VERIFICATION, MAY BE ORDERED REVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION AND COMPULSORY ACQUISITION[;]
II.
GRANTING THAT THE EXEMPT LANDS AFORESAID MAY BE SO REVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION, STILL THE PROCEEDINGS FOR SUCH PURPOSE BELONGS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE DAR, BEFORE WHICH THE CONTENDING PARTIES MAY VENTILATE FACTUAL ISSUES, AND AVAIL THEMSELVES OF USUAL REVIEW PROCESSES, AND NOT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES COMPLETELY UNRELATED TO REVERSION [; AND]
III.
IN ANY CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE IS NO LONGER BEING USED FOR LIVESTOCK FARMING.
Petitioner asseverates that lands devoted to livestock farming as
of June 15, 1988 are classified as industrial lands, hence, outside the
ambit of the CARP; that Luz Farms, Sutton, and R.A. No. 7881 clearly
excluded such lands on constitutional grounds; that petitioners lands
were actually devoted to livestock even before the enactment of the
CARL; that livestock farms are exempt from the CARL, not by reason of
any act of the DAR, but because of their nature as industrial lands; that
petitioners property was admittedly devoted to livestock farming as of
June 1988 and the only issue before was whether or not petitioners
pieces of evidence comply with the ratios provided under DAR A.O. No.
9; and that DAR A.O. No. 9 having been declared as unconstitutional,
DAR had no more legal basis to conduct a continuing review and
verification proceedings over livestock farms. Petitioner argues that, in
cases where reversion of properties to agricultural use is proper, only
the DAR has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
same; hence, the CA, in this case, committed serious errors when it
ordered the reversion of the property and when it considered pieces of
evidence not existing as of June 15, 1988, despite its lack of jurisdiction;
that the CA should have remanded the case to the DAR due to
conflicting factual claims; that the CA cannot ventilate allegations of fact
that were introduced for the first time on appeal as a supplement to a
motion for reconsideration of its first decision, use the same to deviate
from the issues pending review, and, on the basis thereof, declare
exempt lands reverted to agricultural use and compulsorily covered by
the CARP; that the newly discovered [pieces of] evidence were not
introduced in the proceedings before the DAR, hence, it was erroneous
for the CA to consider them; and that piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice. Finally, petitioner submits
that, in any case, the CA gravely erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion when it held that the subject property was no longer used for
livestock farming as shown by the Report of the Investigating Team.
Petitioner relies on the 1997 LUCEC and DAR findings that the subject
property was devoted to livestock farming, and on the 1999 CA Decision
which held that the occupants of the property were squatters, bereft of
any authority to stay and possess the property.
On one hand, the farmer-groups, represented by the Espinas
group, contend that they have been planting rice and fruit-bearing trees
on the subject property, and helped the National Irrigation
Administration in setting up an irrigation system therein in 1997, with a
produce of 1,500 to 1,600 sacks of palay each year; that petitioner came
to court with unclean hands because, while it sought the exemption and
exclusion of the entire property, unknown to the CA, petitioner
surreptitiously filed for conversion of the property now known as Palo
Alto, which was actually granted by the DAR Secretary; that petitioners
bad faith is more apparent since, despite the conversion of the
153.3049-hectare portion of the property, it still seeks to exempt the
entire property in this case; and that the fact that petitioner applied for
conversion is an admission that indeed the property is agricultural. The
farmer-groups also contend that petitioners reliance on Luz
Farmsand Sutton is unavailing because in these cases there was actually
no cessation of the business of raising cattle; that what is being
exempted is the activity of raising cattle and not the property itself; that
exemptions due to cattle raising are not permanent; that the declaration
of DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional does not at all diminish the
mandated duty of the DAR, as the lead agency of the Government, to
implement the CARL; that the DAR, vested with the power to identify
lands subject to CARP, logically also has the power to identify lands
which are excluded and/or exempted therefrom; that to disregard DARs
authority on the matter would open the floodgates to abuse and fraud by
unscrupulous landowners; that the factual finding of the CA that the
subject property is no longer a livestock farm may not be disturbed on
appeal, as enunciated by this Court; that DAR conducted a review and
monitoring of the subject property by virtue of its powers under the
CARL; and that the CA has sufficient discretion to admit evidence in
order that it could arrive at a fair, just, and equitable ruling in this case.
On the other hand, respondent OP, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), claims that the CA correctly held that the
subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as
substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising; that the
issues presented by petitioner are factual in nature and not proper in
this case; that under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questions of fact may be raised by the parties and resolved by the CA;
that due to the divergence in the factual findings of the DAR and the OP,
the CA was duty bound to review and ascertain which of the said
findings are duly supported by substantial evidence; that the subject
property was subject to continuing review and verification proceedings
due to the then prevailing DAR A.O. No. 9; that there is no question that
the power to determine if a property is subject to CARP coverage lies
with the DAR Secretary; that pursuant to such power, the MARO
rendered the assailed reports and certification, and the DAR itself
manifested before the CA that the subject property is no longer devoted
to livestock farming; and that, while it is true that this Courts ruling
in Luz Farms declared that agricultural lands devoted to livestock,
poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the CARP, the said ruling
is not without any qualification.
In its Reply to the farmer-groups and to the OSGs comment,
petitioner counters that the farmer-groups have no legal basis to their
claims as they admitted that they entered the subject property without
the consent of petitioner; that the rice plots actually found in the subject
property, which were subsequently taken over by squatters, were, in
fact, planted by petitioner in compliance with the directive of then
President Ferdinand Marcos for the employer to provide rice to its
employees; that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the
ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the
use and disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs
jurisdiction; and that, inasmuch as the subject property was not
agricultural from the very beginning, DAR has no power to regulate the
same. Petitioner also asserts that the CA cannot uncharacteristically
assume the role of trier of facts and resolve factual questions not
previously adjudicated by the lower tribunals; that MARO Elma rendered
the assailed MARO reports with bias against petitioner, and the same
were contradicted by the Investigating Teams Report, which confirmed
that the subject property is still devoted to livestock farming; and that
there has been no change in petitioners business interest as an entity
engaged in livestock farming since its inception in 1960, though there
was admittedly a decline in the scale of its operations due to the illegal
acts of the squatter-occupants.
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Let it be stressed that when the CA provided in its first Decision
that continuing review and verification may be conducted by the DAR
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, the latter was not yet declared
unconstitutional by this Court. The first CA Decision was promulgated on
April 29, 2005, while this Court struck down as unconstitutional DAR A.O.
No. 9, by way of Sutton, on October 19, 2005. Likewise, let it be
emphasized that the Espinas group filed the Supplement and submitted
the assailed MARO reports and certification on June 15, 2005, which
proved to be adverse to petitioners case. Thus, it could not be said that
the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate
of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.
While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the
complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice,
and due process, the same is not without exception, such as this case.
The CA, under Section 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in
the interest of justice, entertain and resolve factual issues. After all,
technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the
rules may thus be allowed to attain the prime objective of dispensing
justice, for dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts. Moreover, petitioner cannot validly claim that it was deprived of
due process because the CA afforded it all the opportunity to be
heard. The CA even directed petitioner to file its comment on the
Supplement, and to prove and establish its claim that the subject
property was excluded from the coverage of the CARP. Petitioner
actively participated in the proceedings before the CA by submitting
pleadings and pieces of documentary evidence, such as the
Investigating Teams Report and judicial affidavits. The CA also went
further by setting the case for hearing. In all these proceedings, all the
parties rights to due process were amply protected and recognized.
With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioners
arguments fail to persuade. Its invocation of Sutton is unavailing.
In Sutton, we held:
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
Indeed, as pointed out by the CA, the instant case does not rest on facts
parallel to those of Sutton because, in Sutton, the subject property
remained a livestock farm. We even highlighted therein the fact
that there has been no change of business interest in the case of
respondents. Similarly, in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Uy, we
excluded a parcel of land from CARP coverage due to the factual findings
of the MARO, which were confirmed by the DAR, that the property was
entirely devoted to livestock farming. However, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty,
Inc., represented by Carmen Z. Arnaiz v. Office of the President;
Department of Agrarian Reform; Regional Director, DAR Region V,
Legaspi City; Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR Provincial Office,
Masbate, Masbate; and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR
Municipal Office, Masbate, Masbate, we denied a similar petition for
exemption and/or exclusion, by according respect to the CAs factual
findings and its reliance on the findings of the DAR and the OP that
the subject parcels of land were not directly, actually, and exclusively
used for pasture.
Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for
its own livestock is fatal to its cause. While petitioner advances a
defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants of the subject
property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we find it surprising that not
even a single police and/or barangay report was filed by petitioner to
amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover, we
accord respect to the CAs keen observation that the assailed MARO
reports and the Investigating Teams Report do not actually contradict
one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were
actually pastured outside the subject property.`
Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption
are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are
well within the DAR Secretarys competence and jurisdiction. Section 3,
Rule II of the 2003 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
Rules of Procedure provides:
Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
x x x x
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine, and poultry raising.
Thus, we cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR
Secretary of his legal mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over
all ALI cases. To succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is
declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural
as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land
is entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive
of self-regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with
such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from
CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in
accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit
parenthetically, Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into
residential and golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area
originally claimed as exempt from CARP coverage because it was
allegedly devoted to livestock production.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the assailed Amended Decision and
Resolution of the CA which would warrant the modification, much less
the reversal, thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals
Amended Decision dated October 4, 2006 and Resolution dated March
27, 2008 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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