EN BANCG.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila onMarch 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following

completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly

conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.

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Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

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Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As

a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualificationsWhether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issuea) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the ElectionsWhether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

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Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TOBE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites

certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the

Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and3. Acts which correspond with the purpose

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal

residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some otherplace. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable

by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting

the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court inMarcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870Petitioner,- versus -DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD andPHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENTAGENCY (PDEA),Respondents.x-----------------------------------------------xATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633Petitioner,- versus -DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD andPHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENTAGENCY,Respondents.x-----------------------------------------------xAQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658Petitioner, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:Respondent.November 3, 2008x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NVELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

x x x x

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

x x x x

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x

x x x x

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari

and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of

the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition

(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]

Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each

department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition

(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs.HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.

Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.

On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:

The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be consideredipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto'is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.

In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.

Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did

not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;

b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,

d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called "administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:

A.IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

B.COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said

Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.

Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:

Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:

Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:

Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.

The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:

Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. — Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.

It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:

MR. PALMARES: In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to be different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.

Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?

MR. PEREZ (L.): I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...

Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:

MR. GARCIA (M.M.): Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on constitutional grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resignednot because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1— Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.

Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.

Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.

As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers not only to the community which voted him to office, but primarily because under this commentary on

accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be considered ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy."

It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.

The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.

Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:

MR. MAAMBONG: Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.

MR. DAVIDE: Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG: It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE: Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG: Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE: It is more general, more embracing.

That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:

MR. RONO: My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is that in one case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an intention to relinquish his office.

MR. TOLENTINO: Yes ...

MR. RONO: And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.

MR. TOLENTINO: Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.

MR. RONO: Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention; it's already there.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:

... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.

The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition

where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.

It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.

The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:

A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)

The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)

I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.

The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code — does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.

It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.

It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for

another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the constitution.

Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the Constitution?

From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that heintended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.

In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act' of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.

And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)

The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

# Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.

The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.

It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.

The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:

A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)

The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)

I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.

The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the

1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code — does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.

It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.

It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the constitution.

Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the Constitution?

From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that heintended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.

In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act' of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.

And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)

The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner.

He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes1 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.2 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 24.3 Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 30.4 Rollo, 8 and 14.5 June 1941.6 Emphasis supplied.7 Emphasis supplied.8 No. 1296.9 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 8 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.10 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.11 Compared to the provision in the 1973 Constitution which reads:"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."12 Memorandum for Respondents, 9.13 Underscoring supplied.14 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104.15 McKittrick vs. Wilson, 350 M 486, 166 SW2d 499, 143 ALR 465.16 People ex rel. Fleming vs. Shorb, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.17 Am Jur. 2d, p. 63.18 People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90; Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30; Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6.19 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 SW 421.20 State vs. Driscoll, 54 P. 2d 571, 576, 101 Mont. 348.21 Garrison vs. City of Shreveport, 154 So. 622, 624, 179 La. 605.22 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 591, 19 July to 6 August 1986.23 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985, Underscoring supplied.24 1 July 1967, 20 SCRA 620, 625.25 Phil. 94, 196.26 Section 8, Rule III, Rules of the House of Representatives.27 Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil 818.28 Burton vs. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.29 Am Jur 926.

EN BANC

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

The Facts

Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.

Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election.[1] Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.[2]

On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13 th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President.[3] Respondents Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.

On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.

Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A. No. 6645); [4] (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; [5] and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet thecandidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646).[6] Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.[7]

Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results.To support their claim, petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the Senate.[8] Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections.[9]

Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.

Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.

On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.

In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.

In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.

The Issues

The following are the issues presented for resolution:

(1) Procedurally

(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;(b) whether the petition is moot; and(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.

(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction

A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded.[10] Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.

A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namely: (1) a declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these Resolutions

proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.

On the Mootness of the Petition

COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.

Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[11] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[13] Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date of the election.

On Petitioners Standing

Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.

Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act.[15] The requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues,[16] relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18]

Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.[19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose.[20]

On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage.[21] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an interest. We held:

[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.

Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied)

We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.

Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law, thus:

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)

To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:

Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call

and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.

Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?

A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions [24] or even in its press releases[25] did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.

The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasans proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a call for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the negative.

COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election Did Not Negate the Calling of such Election

The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the elections validity.[26] In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election.[27]

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.[28] This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority[29] and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.[30]

Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.[31]

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.

Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the special election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.

No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void.[32]

The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13 th highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELECs failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special election.

Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual notice could come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign.[33]

More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELECs omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise.[34]

Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorates will and let the results of the election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections.[35] This is but to acknowledge the purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:

to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself.[36] (Emphasis in the original)

Separate Documentation and Canvassing not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,

Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC fix the date of the election, if necessary, and state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for. Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.

Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84.Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad) made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience, thus:

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 [later converted to Resolution No. 84].

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.

T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled

RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM

WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;

WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority vote of all the members of both House of Congress, voting separately;

WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday and every three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.

Adopted,(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD

SenatorS[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special election was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there were only eight to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24 candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a three-year term.My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate with the 13th largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there going to be an election for a position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13thlargest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do not know if we can No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a manner.

x x x x

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13 th placer be therefore deemed to be the special election for this purpose.So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less disfranchisement.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming elections that will be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we understand it.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr. President.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that there will be anyone running specificallyT[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will be running with specific groups.S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.

x x x x

ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934

If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.[37]

Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.[38] COMELECs decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.[39]

A Word to COMELEC

The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the

circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELECs failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular elections in general and special elections in particular.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.Vitug, J., joins the dissent.Ynares-Santiago, J., joins J. Punos dissent.Tinga, J., joins Justice Punos dissent.

[1] As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 7166, as amended.[2] Resolution No. 84 reads:WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of

the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;

WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been conferred by a majority vote of all the members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately;

WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial, city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday of May and every three years thereafter. Now, therefore be it Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved to certify as it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up said vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 th ) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Emphasis supplied)

[3] Resolution No. 01-005 reads:WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting [E]n [B]anc as the National

Board of Canvassers for the election of Senators of the Philippines, officially canvassed in open and public proceedings the certificates of canvass of votes cast nationwide for senators in the national and local elections conducted on May 14, 2001.

Based on the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass submitted by seventy-eight (78) out of seventy-nine (79) Provincial Boards of Canvassers, twenty (20) City Boards of Canvassers of cities comprising one (1) or more legislative districts, two (2) District Boards of Canvassers of Metro Manila, and one (1) Absentee Voting, and the remaining uncanvassed certificate of canvass which will not anymore affect the results, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers finds that the following candidates for senators in said elections obtained as of June 04, 2001 the following number of votes as indicated opposite their names:

Name Votes Garnered(as of 4 June 2001)

NOLI DE CASTRO 16,157,811JUAN M. FLAVIER 11,676,129SERGIO R. OSMEA, III 11,531,427FRANKLIN M. DRILON 11,223,020RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR. 11,187,447JOKER P. ARROYO 11,163,801MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. 11,084,884

FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 10,877,989EDGARDO J. ANGARA 10,746,843PANFILO M. LACSON 10,481,755LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA 10,456,674RALPH G. RECTO 10,387,108GREGORIO G. HONASAN 10,364,272

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers hereby PROCLAIMS the above-named thirteen (13) candidates as the duly elected Senators of the Philippines in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based on the certificates of canvass finally tabulated, the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13 th ) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof, as implemented under Republic Act No. 6645. (Emphasis supplied)

[4] This provision states: The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.

[5] This provision reads: Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.

The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.

[6] This provision reads: Certificates of Candidacy; Certified List of Candidates. x x x The names of all registered candidates immediately followed by the nickname or stage name shall also be printed in the election returns and tally sheets.

[7] Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.[8] Senator Roseller T. Lim was elected in the special election of 13 November

1951 while Senator Felisberto Verano was elected in the special election of 8 November 1955.

[9] Rollo, pp. 8-12.[10] Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule 66, THE 1997

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[11] Sections 1-2, Rule 65, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[12] Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute resolution).[13] Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134856, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA 577;

Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184 (1997); Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).

[14] 342 Phil. 467 (1997).[15] Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, 24

August 1993, 225 SCRA 568.[16] Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).[17] CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).[18] Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,

Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).[19] See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).[20] Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392

(internal citations omitted).[21] De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208 SCRA 420;

Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967). See also Telecom & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).

[22] G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.[23] Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284 , 15 August

2000, 338 SCRA 81.[24] E.g. Resolution No. 3258, dated 28 September 2000 (providing for the

calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the 14 May 2001 elections as amended by Resolution Nos. 3322, dated 5 October 2000; 3284, dated 20 October 2000; 3306, dated 7 November 2000; 3426, dated 22 December 2000; and 3359, dated 6 February 2001); Resolution No. 3632, dated 1 March 2001 (canceling the certificates of candidacy of nuisance senatorial candidates); and Resolution No. 3743, dated 12 March 2001 (providing for the general instructions to the Boards of Election Inspectors on the casting and counting of votes).

[25] E.g. undated COMELEC pamphlet entitled Frequently Asked Questions on the May 14, 2001 Elections.

[26] 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).[27] Ibid; ibid.[28] 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 282 (1996).[29] Ibid.[30] McCoy v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951).[31] 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).[32] See 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 292 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 72 (1965).[33] Indeed, the fact that 13 senators were due to be elected in the 14

May 2001 elections and that the senator elected to the 13th place will serve the remaining term of Senator Guingona was published in news reports (see Philippine Star, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 6 and Daily Tribune, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 8; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Today, 8 February 2001, p. 10; Manila Bulletin, 9 February 2001, pp. 3, 8). Furthermore, the fact that the administration and opposition coalitions each fielded 13 senatorial candidates (and not only 12) was similarly given extensive coverage by news publications (see Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, A14; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Philippine Star, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Today, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; Manila Standard, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 2; Malaya, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; Daily Tribune 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Manila Times, 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 2A; Philippine Star Ngayon, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4).

[34] Florendo, Sr. vs. Buyser, 129 Phil. 353 (1967); Capalla v. Tabiana, 63 Phil. 95 (1936); Kiamzon v. Pugeda, 54 Phil. 755 (1930); Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 852 (1924). Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, (Omnibus Election Code), on failure of elections (resulting to the annulment of elections), provides: SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place had not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by an interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

[35] Alcala v. Commission on Elections, 218 Phil. 322 (1984); Villareal v. Fornier, 84 Phil. 756 (1949); Lucero v. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852 (1924).

[36] Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).[37] Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8 February

2001, pp. 49-54. (Emphasis supplied)[38] E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).[39] Pugutan v. Abubakar, 150 Phil. 1 (1972) citing Sumulong v. Commission on

Elections, 73 Phil. 237 (1941).

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.

Roman Ozaeta and Felixberto Serrano for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and organized under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General, was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.

Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of the House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the Presiding officers and members, respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly provided that "the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act provides "that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.

The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) contained the following items for the House of Representatives:

SPEAKER

1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to December 29, 1965and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 . . . P29,129.00

MEMBERS

2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives at P7,200 from July 1 to December 29, 1965and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00

while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:

1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . . P 16,000.00

2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . . 165,600.00.

Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.

The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, that provides as follows:

SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of

Representatives, and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)

The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought from the Secretary of Justice (Annex "C", Petition). Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or before January, 1966, and before the Justice Secretary could act, respondent Aguiluz, as former Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing of the present action.

The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to institute the action, for lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with the Constitutional provisions, insofar as present members of the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand, in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices to make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.

The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give pause. As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405, December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December 24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L-24022, March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:

The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an unlawful expenditure or waste of state funds is the minority doctrine.

On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that since the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the Representatives' increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were indispensable or proper parties defendant to this action.

These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the increased compensation to the members of the House of Representatives who were elected after the expiration of the term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of the increase?

It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there

is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).

Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable between the two chambers.

It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that the Legislature should be bicameral in form, initially recommended that the increase in the compensation of legislators should not take effect until the expiration of the term of office of all members of the Legislature that approved the increase. The report of the committee read as follows:

The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their services an annual compensation of four thousand pesos including per diems and other emoluments or allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective residences when attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise fixed by law: Provided, That no increase in this yearly compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature that approved such increase. (Emphasis supplied) .

The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral legislature, was carried over and made more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision, which read:

Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect until after the expiration of the term of office of the Members of the National Assembly who may be elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (Aruego, 1, p. 297)

As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our fundamental law, the limitation assumed its present form:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.

It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered. From the first proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause has been to require expiration of the full term of all members of the Legislature that approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its adoption.

The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution had intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all the members of the Congress" instead of specifying "all the members of the Senate and of the House". This is a distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for specifying the component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize the transition from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution.

It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words "of the" before "House" in the provision being considered, and in the use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter expression "of the Senate and the House". It was grammatically correct to refer to "the members of the Senate and (the members) of the House", because the members of the Senate are not members of the House. To speak of "members of the Senate and the House" would imply that the members of the Senate also held membership in the House.

The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of the Senators, as well as that of the Representatives, must all expire the Constitution would have spoken of the "terms" (in the plural) "of the members of the Senate and of the House", instead of using "term" in the singular (as the Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI), has been already considered. As previously observed, the use of the singular form "term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in question the Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single unit, and this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, "until the expiration of the full term of ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase".

It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the Senators before the effectivity of the increased compensation would subject the present members of the House of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the 1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original limitation or the present one, as amended, as maximum delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before an increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.

If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an election, two assemblymen's terms, of 3 years each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that the increase could become operative, because the original Constitution required that the new emolument should operate only after expiration of the term of assemblymen elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since Senators hold office for six (6) years.

On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the legislature on its last session just prior to an election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the approving assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be added. Once again an identical period must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a given election four of the approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to run.

To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until after the expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen elected in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the present Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be collectible until December 30, 1969, since the said Senators' term would expire on the latter date.

But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution) were to approve the increase in compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new compensation would still operate on December

30, 1941, four years later, since the term of assemblymen elected in November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the increase) would end in December 30,1941.

Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding the elections in November of that year, the higher compensation would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years later, because the most recently elected members of the Senate would then be Senators chosen by the electors in November of 1963, and their term would not expire until December 30, 1969.

This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and the amended constitution can not be just due to accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of the present House to await the expiration of the term of the Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under the Constitution as originally written.

The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage the approval of increases of compensation just before an election by legislators who can anticipate their reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be nullified by resorting to technical and involved interpretation of the constitutional mandate.

In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.

We concur in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring opinions of Justices Bengzon, Zaldivar and Castro.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:

Fully concurring with the ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, I should like only to mention a few thoughts related to some points contained therein.

As stated in the majority opinion, it is argued by respondents that if it was intended that the increase should take effect at the same time, the provision of the Constitution could have been phrased as follows:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Congress approving such increase.

They maintain that in specifying "the Senate" and "the House" instead of just using the words "the Congress" the body obviously considered that inasmuch as the terms of the Representatives and Senators under the legislature provided for, would not necessarily coincide, the effective date of the increased salary of the Representatives could also be different from that of the Senators.

The fact that "Congress" is not used in the provision in question, in my opinion, is rather an argument for the petitioner herein. "Congress" is not used, obviously because after every four years the Congress is dissolved. On the other hand, the term of a member of the Senate, being six years, goes beyond the duration of one Congress and extends to that of the next Congress. In other words, while the term of the members of the House of Representatives coincides with the lifetime of the Congress, the term of a member of the Senate goes beyond the existence of one Congress.

The Constitution, instead, uses (1) "Senate" and "House of Representatives" and (2) adds "all" before "the Members", clearly intending that no increase in the compensation therein provided for shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the most junior among the members of the Senate at the time the increase was approved. Precisely, therefore, because the Constitution speaks of "Senate" and "House of Representatives" instead of "Congress", the prohibition against effectivity continues even after the end of the Congress which approved the measure and, which amounts to the same thing, even after the end of the term of the members of the House of Representatives approving the increase. In specifying "the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase", the Constitution leaves no doubt that until after the condition is met as to the Senate, no increase in the compensation laid down for Senators and Representatives shall take effect.

It is also contended by respondents that the Constitution in using "term" instead of "terms" shows the clear intention to consider the "term" of the Senators independently from that of the Representatives. The contention is untenable. The provision clearly uses "term" in the general sense. For, otherwise, even in referring to members of the Senate alone, it should have used "terms" since the Senators had originally different terms of office (two, four and six years), as provided for in Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution, a provision contemporaneous with the one involved herein. Yet just the same, the Constitution uses the would "term" (singular) to cover all these different terms of office.

I am of the opinion therefore that no other course is open to the Supreme Court in this case but to apply the provision of the Constitution restricting the increase of salaries of Senators and Representatives by subjecting it to a period of waiting. To forestall the view that the Supreme Court thereby offends equity, because the other Constitutional officers — including the members of said Court — are already receiving their increased salaries under Republic Act No. 4134, suffice it to bear in mind that it was within the hands of the legislators themselves if they had so desired, to have provided that the salary increases of the aforesaid other Constitution officers take effect at the same time as their own. In other words, if they had thought it would be inequitable to grant salary increases to others before they could receive their own salary increase — an argument which, I am glad to note, has not been advanced — they could have easily provided that the salary increases therein given be effective December 30, 1969, as in their case.

I consequently reiterate my concurrence.

ZALDIVAR, J., concurring:

During the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines House Bill No. 6190 was approved, and this bill was signed into law on June 20, 1964 by the President of the Philippines and became Republic Act No. 4134.

Section 1, paragraph A of Republic Act 4134 provides, among others, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be forty thousand pesos, and that of the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be thirty-two thousand pesos each. The paragraph ends with this sentence: "The salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."

The pertinent provision of the Constitution as far as the effectivity of any law increasing the compensation of the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives is concerned reads as follows:

. . . No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of

Representatives approving such increase. . . . (Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution)

Inasmuch as House Bill No. 6190 was passed during the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, in 1964, said bill was approved by the House of Representatives whose members were elected in the elections of November, 1961 and whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1965; and by the Senate whose membership was composed of: eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1965; eight Senators who were elected in November, 1961 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1967; and eight Senators who were elected in November, 1963 whose term would expire on December 29, 1969.

Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing the opinion of the Court in the case now before Us, interpreting the effectivity clause in paragraph A, Section 1 of Republic Act 4134 in relation to the pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, herein-above quoted, says that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act 4134 for the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives will not take effect until December 30, 1969. I concur with this opinion because it will not be until December 29, 1969 when the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives that approved the increase in 1964 would expire. And I also agree with the opinion that in so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (Appropriation Law for the fiscal year 1965-1966) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation for the Members of the House of Representatives prior to December 30, 1960 violates the Constitution and must be held null and void..

My opinion in this regard is based upon a personal knowledge of how the constitutional proviso, Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution, which is now in question, became a part of our present Constitution. It was the Second National Assembly which amended our original Constitution. I was a humble Member of the Second National Assembly, representing the province of Antique.

The three important amendments that were incorporated in our Constitution by the Second National Assembly in 1940 were the provisions regarding (1) the establishment of a bicameral legislature composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate, to take the place of the then existing unicameral legislature known as the National Assembly; (2) the change in the term of the office of the President of the Philippines, and the Vice-President, which formerly was for a period of six years, to that of four years, with the proviso that no person shall serve as President for more than eight consecutive years; and (3) the creation of the Commission on Elections.

It is regrettable that the deliberations of the Second National Assembly on the 1940 amendments to the Constitution were mostly done in caucuses behind closed doors, and the discussions were not recorded. It was during the first special sessions of the Second National Assembly in September, 1939 when discussions on proposed amendments to the Constitution were held. It was only after the propose amendments had been approved in caucuses when the amendments were embodied in a resolution and submitted to the National Assembly in open session. The amendments as approved in caucuses were embodied in Resolution No. 38 and adopted on September 15, 1939. However, during the second regular sessions in 1940 Resolution No. 38 was amended by Resolution No. 73 which was adopted on April 11, 1940. That is how the amendments came to be known as the 1940 Amendments. Those amendments were approved in a plebiscite that was held on June 18, 1940.

I still have vivid recollections of the important points brought up during the deliberations in caucus over proposed amendments and of the agreements arrived at. I remember too the influences that worked, and the pressures that were brought to bear upon the Assemblymen, in the efforts to bring about agreements on very controversial matters and thus secure the insertion of the desired amendments to the Constitution. The discussions on the proposed amendments affecting the legislative branch of the government were specially of interest to us then because we were in some way personally affected, as most of us were interested in running for reelection.

It is not my purpose here to impose on anyone my recollections of matters that were brought up during our caucuses then, but I only wish to emphasize the fact that my concurring opinion in the decision of the case now before Us

has for its basis my honest and best recollections of what had transpired, or what had been expressed, during the caucuses held by the Members of the Second National Assembly in the deliberations which later brought about the 1940 amendments.

I distinctly remember that the proposed amendment to change the legislature from unicameral to that of bicameral, just as the proposal to change the term of office of the President from six years without reelection to that of four years with one reelection, at first met very strong oppositon by a considerable group of Assemblymen. But somehow the opposition was finally subdued, so to say. In the case of the legislature, the basic idea of having two chambers of the legislature — one chamber serving as a check to the other — was accepted. It was then considered as a wise idea to have the Senate as the upper chamber, to be composed of members who would be elected at large, and it was expected that those who would be elected to the Senate would be men of national prestige; prestigious because of their known integrity, in their record and experience as a public servant, or in their prominence as a successful member of his profession. It was even said, then, that the Senate would be a training ground for future Presidents of the nation. And so, when it was agreed that a bicameral legislature would be provided in the Constitution, the next matter that had to be considered was the tenure of office of the members of each of the two chambers of the legislature. As far as the terms of the members of the lower chamber, to be known as the House of Representatives, there was no disagreement over the idea that their term be for a period of four years, to coincide with the term of the President. But as far as the term of office of the members of the upper chamber, to be known as the Senate, there was at first a divergence of opinion. There was a group that supported the idea that the term of the members of the upper chamber be four years, similar to that of the House of Representatives, so that in the national elections that would take place every four years there would be elections for President, Vice-President, and all the members of the Congress of the Philippines. However, there was a very strong advocacy on the part of top political leaders at that time that the Senate should be made a continuing body, such that the complete membership of that chamber should not be elected during the national elections that would take place every four years.

Finally, it was agreed that the members of the Senate, which was decided to be composed of twenty-four, would have a term of six years, one-third of which number would be elected every two years. The idea of having elections of one-third of the membership of the Senate was adjusted to the situation that in between two national elections there were the elections for local officials. The question regarding the term of office of the Members of the first Senate to be elected under the Constitution as amended was settled by inserting a proviso that the first senators elected should, in the manner provided by law, be divided equally into three groups: the senators of the first group to serve for a term of six years, those of the second group to serve for a term of four years, and those of the third group for a term of two years (Article VI, Section 3). And for the purposes of the first elections under the amended Constitution Commonwealth Act No. 666 was enacted by the National Assembly providing, as far as the first Senate was concerned, that "The Senate shall, within ten days after it shall have been organized with the election of its President, determine by lot which of the elected Senators shall belong to the group who shall serve six years, which to the group who shall serve for four years, and which to the group which shall serve for two years." (Section 9, Com. Act No. 666)

When the matter regarding the compensation of the members of both chambers came up for the deliberation, there were proposals that the Senators be given more compensation than the Members of the House of Representatives, and a number of proposals were presented regarding the amount of compensation that would be paid to the Senators or to the Representatives, as the case may be. This matter was the subject of long discussions. It was finally agreed that the amount of compensation for the Senators and for the Members of the House of Representatives be the same, and it was fixed at P7,200.00 per annum each, including per diems and other emoluments, exclusive only of travelling expenses in going to and returning from the sessions. There was an increase of P2,200.00 over the P5,000.00 per annum that the Members of the National Assembly were receiving at the time. It is thus seen that in the matter of compensation the sense of the Members of the Second National Assembly who amended the Constitution in 1940 was to provide for an equal compensation for the Members of the Senate and to the Members of the House of Representatives.

When the matter regarding the increase in the compensation of the Senators and of the Representatives came up for consideration, there was unanimity among the Assemblymen in support of the idea that members of the Congress of the Philippines may approve a law increasing their compensation, but that no Member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate that approved the law increasing the compensation should receive the increased compensation during their term of office when the increase was approved. I remember that the question as to when the increase of compensation as approved by the Members of the Congress of the Philippines should take effect was the subject of a prolonged and heated discussion. Many Members of the National Assembly wanted to continue with the provision of Article VI, Section 5 of the original Constitution that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase." I have taken note that no less than eighteen members of the Second National Assembly in 1940 were members of the 1934 constitutional convention that drafted the original Constitution, and it was this group of Assemblymen that were zealous in maintaining the idea that one full term of a member of the legislature subsequent to the approval of the increase in compensation should be made to lapse before the increase shall take effect. But this idea could not be insisted upon because while that was feasible in the case of Members of the National Assembly which was a unicameral body, that idea could not be adopted in a bicameral body where the term of office of the members of one chamber was not the same as that of the members of the other chamber. I recall that it was finally agreed to simply adopt the constitutional precept that no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may receive any increase in compensation, as approved by the House and the Senate of a particular Congress, before the expiration of the term of all the members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate that approved the increase. Inasmuch as the term of the Members of the House of Representatives is shorter than that of the Senators, it was understood that the expiration of the term of the Members of the Senate that approved the increase should be awaited before the increase in compensation would take effect. As finally worded by the Committee on Style of the Assembly, and that Committee on Style was headed by the illustrious and indefatigable Assemblyman Gregorio Perfecto, who later became a worthy member of this Court, that constitutional precept which became part of Section 14, Article VI of the amended Constitution was worded as follows:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.

It should be noted that the above-quoted portion of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution talks of the "expiration of the full term of all the Members" then followed by the words "of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." This proviso contemplates not the Representatives or the Senators who voted in favor of the increase, but the Senate and the House of Representatives as a body that approved the increase. And so, because the understanding of the amending Assemblymen was that the effectiveness of the increase should take place after the expiration of the term of the Senators with the longest term among the Members of the Senate that approved the increase the constitutional proviso was so worded "shall take effect until after the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." It will be noted that this Section 14 starts with using the words "Senators and Members of the House of Representatives" in referring to the compensation to be received by each. They are considered individually. But in the matter of determining the time when the increase is to take effect they are considered as collective by the use of the phrase "all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." The use of the word all includes every Member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, regardless of whether or not he or she voted affirmatively for the increase. It is the House and the Senate that approved the increase. And so because the effectiveness of the increase depends on the expiration of the term of all the members of both chambers it stands to reason that all the members of the two chambers were taken into consideration, and because when the increase was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives there were members of the Senate whose term of office was longer than that of some other Members of the Senate and of the Members of the House of Representatives it is the term of the Senators which was the longest that should first expire before the increase should take effect. That is how I understood then that portion of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, and

I sincerely believe that that was also how most if not all of my colleagues understood it.

The question precisely was raised whether under that constitutional proviso, as above-quoted, the Members of the House of Representatives who are elected during the elections subsequent to the approval of the increase by the Congress of the Philippines could receive the increased compensation inasmuch as the term of those Members of the House that had approved the increase had already expired. I remember that it was the understanding of the Members of the National Assembly that those members of the House of Representatives who would be elected subsequent to the approval of such increase could not immediately receive the increased compensation as approved during the preceding Congress; and neither could the eight Senators who would be elected along with those Representatives in the same elections. To allow those newly elected Representatives and Senators to receive the increased compensation would give rise to a situation whereby the Members of the House of Representatives and eight Senators would be receiving a compensation higher than that received by at least sixteen Members of the Senate, including the President of the Senate, as the case might happen. That would be inconsistent with the basic idea adopted by the Members of the National Assembly that the compensation of the Members of the House of Representatives and those of the Senate should be the same; and it is only logical that when we say that the compensation of the Members of the House and of the Members of the Senate is the same, that compensation should be the same not only in amount but also at the same time within their respective terms of office.

It was envisaged by the Members of the National Assembly that the salary increase, under the constitutional proviso now in question, would become effective after the lapse of two years, or four years, as the case may be, after the commencement of the term of office of those Members of the House of Representatives that are elected in the elections subsequent to the approval of the increase. In the case of the lapse of four years, which we have just stated, it would mean that it would be the Members of the House of Representatives who would be elected in the second elections subsequent to the approval of the increase who would receive the increased compensation.

As I have stated, it was the sense of the Members of the Second National Assembly that approved the constitutional amendment in 1940 that the increase in the compensation for Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate would take effect only until after the expiration of the full term of the senators who were Members of the Senate that approved the increase. It is my recollection that the main idea of the Members of the National Assembly in adopting the proviso in question was to maintain the equality of the compensation of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate at all times.

Three situations were anticipated to happen by the amending Assemblymen under the constitutional proviso in question:

1. This is the first situation. Let us take the case of the First Congress of the Philippines which was elected in November, 1941 already under the Constitution as amended in 1940. This Congress was composed of a House of Representatives whose members were elected for a term of 4 years, to expire on December 29, 1945; and of a Senate composed of eight Senators with a term of 6 years to expire on December 29, 1947; eight senators with a term of 4 years to expire on December 29, 1945, and eight senators with a term of 2 years to expire on December 29, 1943.

If a law increasing the compensation of Members of Congress was passed during the sessions of 1942, supposing that there was no war, the increase would take effect on December 30, 1947, after the expiration of the term of the eight senators who were elected in the elections in November, 1941 who served for a term of six years. The term of the eight senators who were elected in 1941 and who would have served for only two years would have expired on December 29, 1943; and the term of the eight senators who would have served for four years would have expired on December 29, 1945. The term (4 years) of the Representatives who were elected in November, 1941 would also have expired on December 29, 1945. But in November, 1943 elections for eight senators who would serve for a regular term of 6 years would have taken place; and likewise elections for a full House of Representatives and for another set of senators to serve for a full term of six years would have taken place in November, 1945. If the war did not upset the

national affairs a new Congress would have convened in January, 1946, already composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate whose members would all have been elected for a term of six years each.

So, on December 30, 1947 when the increase in the compensation would take effect, the increased compensation would be uniformly enjoyed by all members of Congress (Senators and Representatives alike) — those Senators who were elected in the 1943, 1945 and 1947 elections, and by the Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in the 1945 elections. Under that situation, the Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in 1945 would have waited for two years before they could receive the increased compensation that was approved in the 1942 sessions of Congress. And this is so, because it is on December 29, 1947, when the six-year term of the eight Senators who were Members of the Senate that approved the increased compensation in 1942 (along with the then existing House of Representatives) had expired.

2. Now let us take the second situation. Let us take the case of a Congress that is normally constituted. When I say "normally constituted" I mean a Congress composed of a House of Representatives whose members had been elected for a term of four years, and a Senate that is composed of Members who had each been elected for a term of six years, although at different elections, as provided in the Constitution.

We make the Third Congress of the Republic of the Philippines as an example. This Congress covered the period of four years from January, 1954 to December, 1957, inclusive. During the first two years (or two regular sessions) this Congress was composed of the House of Representatives whose members were elected in the elections of November, 1953 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1957; and twenty-four senators: eight who were elected in November, 1953 whose term would expire on December 29, 1959; eight who were elected in November, 1951 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1957; and eight who were elected in November, 1949 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1955.

If a law increasing the salary is passed, say in the first regular session of the Third Congress in May, 1954, then the increase provided for in this law would take effect on December 30, 1959. Why? Because that law was approved by the House of Representatives (the term of whose members ended on December 29, 1957) and by a Senate at least eight of whose members were elected in November, 1953 and whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1959. That means that the members of the House of Representatives who were elected in the elections of November, 1957 (many of whom may be members of the Third Congress who voted for the law in May, 1954) would have to wait for two years before they could receive the increased compensation. In other words, beginning December 30, 1959, the Members of the House of Representatives and all the Members of the Senate (those elected in the 1955, 1957 and 1959 elections) would all be uniformly getting the increased salary.

3. Let us take the third situation. We still use the Third Congress of the Republic of the Philippines as an example. Let us suppose that the law increasing the compensation was passed in the third regular session of the Third Congress in May, 1956. This time the Third Congress is composed of the same members of the House of Representatives who were elected in November, 1953, but the Senate has a different composition. The Senate would already be composed of eight new Senators who were elected during the elections of November, 1955 and whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1961, the remaining eight Senators elected in 1953 and eight Senators who were elected in 1951. If the law increasing the compensation is passed during the regular session of 1956 this law would be approved by the House of Representatives and by the Senate that had eight new members whose term would expire on December 29, 1961. Since the term of these new eight Senators would expire on December 29, 1961, then the increased compensation would take effect on December 30, 1961.

In November, 1957 there were elections and a new House of Representatives was then elected, and the term of office of the members of the new House would expire on December 29, 1961. Likewise, a new set of eight Senators were elected whose term would expire on December 29, 1963. Those Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in November, 1957, among whom perhaps were Representatives who voted for the increase during the 1956 sessions, would not enjoy the increased compensation

because their term would expire on December 29, 1961 — the very same date of the termination of the term of the eight Senators who were elected in 1955 and who were Members of the Senate that approved the increase during the session of 1956. In this case the increased compensation would be received by the Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in the elections of November, 1961, along with the Senators who were elected in November, 1961 and the remaining Senators who were elected in 1959 and 1957. They would all be receiving the same compensation and at the same time while they are in office during the term for which they were elected.

As far as the House of Representatives is concerned, the situation as portrayed in this third case is the same situation as that which was contemplated by the framers of the original Constitution of 1935 when it was provided in the Constitution as adopted that the increase in salary should not take effect "until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase." In the example we have given, the increase in salaries of the Members of the House of Representatives which was approved by the Members of the House in the third regular session of the Third Congress did not take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the House who were elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The case now before Us is similar to Case No. 3 that we have portrayed above. Republic Act 4134 was approved during the regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines in May, 1964 and signed into law by the President on June 20, 1964. As I have stated earlier, the increase provided in this law was approved by the House of Representatives whose members were elected in November, 1961, and whose term of office expired on December 29, 1965; and by the Senate composed of eight Senators who were elected in November, 1963 whose term would expire on December 29, 1969, eight Senators who were elected in November, 1961 whose term would expire on December 29, 1967, and eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959 whose term had expired on December 29, 1965. Inasmuch as the increase would take effect at the expiration of the term of the Senators who were elected in November, 1963 — which is on December 29, 1969 — the Members of the present House of Representatives cannot receive this increased compensation during their present term of office. It will be the Members of the House of Representatives who will be elected in November, 1969, along with the Senators elected in 1965, 1967 and 1969, who will receive this increased compensation. They will then all be receiving the same compensation during the time that they are in office.

I have endeavored to make a discourse of facts as I know them, because I sincerely believe that the interpretation embodied in the opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, of the pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14 of our Constitution is in consonance with the facts and circumstances as I remember them, and as I know them. As I have stated at the early part of this concurring opinion, it is not my purpose to impose on anyone my recollection of what transpired, or of what had been discussed about, or of what had been agreed upon, by the Members of the Second National Assembly during the deliberations which brought about the 1940 amendments to our Constitution. My perception and my memory are as frail as those of any other human being, and I may have incurred myself in error. It just happened that the facts and the circumstances that I have herein narrated, as I remember them, have engendered in my mind an opinion, nay a conviction, which dovetails with the opinion of my illustrious colleague that has penned the opinion for the majority of the Court in this case.

CASTRO J., concurring:

Republic Act 4134, increasing the salary of all the members of Congress, was approved on June 20, 1964. In the light of the constitutional prohibition or station embodied in section 14 of article VI of the Constitution, when does such increase in salary take effect? Shall effectivity be this year 1966 for the members of the House of Representatives, considering that the full term of the members thereof who participated in the approval of the salary increase has expired? Even if the full terms of all the members of the Senate, as composed in 1964, have not expired? Or shall effectivity be only on December 30, 1969, after the expiration of the full term of the senators elected in 1963? .

I fully adhere to and support the position taken by my esteemed brethren, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Jose P. Bengzon and Calixto Zaldivar. Their thorough

going treatment of the issue effectively exploits logical, historical and empirical considerations leading quite inevitably to the firm conclusion that the salary increase provided for by Congress in 1964 can take effect, for any and all members of Congress, only after the expiration of the full term of the senators elected in 1963, that is to say, only after December 29, 1969.

There is, however, a vital aspect of the problem that, in my view, requires not only projection but emphasis as well. This is the language of the pertinent constitutional prohibition or limitation which by itself forcefully compels the very conclusion arrived at by the majority of the Court.

We cannot overemphasize the essential role of language. It is one of the distinctive qualities of man, especially of modern thinking man. Man does feel and analyze his intellectual and material experiences; but more than this he has the ability to articulate, and through articulation he manages synthesis and brings forth the creation and evolution of culture, literature, science and law. In the process, the unceasing effort is to say what is meant and to mean what is said.

How, then, is the constitutional prohibition or limitation on congressional salary increases stated? "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." This statement has a literal message of striking clarity. The phrase "No increase in said compensation shall take effect" establishes the character of the provision as a prohibition or limitation, as can be seen from the unqualified words "no increase". The words "until after the expiration of the full term" impart the period of time during which the prohibition or limitation operates, after which period the increase in compensation can take effect. Whose full term must first expire before the increase can take effect? It is the full term "of the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." The immediate as well as lasting impact of these words is that what must first expire is the full term of the members of both houses of Congress approving the increase. It cannot be the full term of the members of either house, nor yet the full term of the members of the Senate or that of the members of the House of Representatives.

The key word is the particle "and". "And" is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning "together with," "joined with" (Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 105); "along or together with," "added to or linked to," used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause with clause (Webster's New International Dictionary, p. 98). The word "and" does not mean "or"; it is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union, "binding together relating the one to the other" (See 3 Words and Phrases, 569-571.).

As understood from the common and usual meaning of the conjunction "and," the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of the full term of all the members of the House of Representatives. From the perspective of semantics, it is undeniably perceived that those who framed the constitutional provision, when they utilized the word "and," stated what they meant and meant what they stated.

There is, to be sure, a specific rule of interpretation that would allow "or" to be interchanged with "and," in which event a negation of the concept of joinder would ensue. But this is the exception rather than the general rule. The exception is resorted to only when a literal interpretation would pervert the plain intention of the writer or draftsman as gleaned from the overall context of the writing and/or from external factors. This does not obtain in the provision under discussion. Indeed, a departure from the general rule and a resort to the exception would pervert section 14 of article VI. Note the parity of compensation of the senators and the members of the House of Representatives. If the expiration of the full term of the members of the Senate would be considered as separable from the expiration of the full term of the members of the House of Representatives, despite the conjunction "and," then the result would be to allow members of the House of Representatives to enjoy the increase in compensation ahead of the senators, thereby producing a disparity of compensation. Furthermore, if the framers of the provision were concerned with the realities of the term of office of the senators and that of the representatives, more than with the reality of the parity of compensation, then they should have staggered the effectivity of entitlement to the increased salary and allowed the first group of senators elected after the approval of the increase to enjoy such increase.

The prohibition or limitation may be stated elsewise: "The full terms of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase must first expire before an increase in compensation can take effect." Would the literal meaning of the provision still be in doubt?

The framers of the constitutional provision under discussion certainly were not wanting of competent legal stylists. With such more reason, then, must they be regarded as having achieved a unity of intention, statement and meaning. These experienced stylists could have so easily phrased the provision differently to conform to a different intention. For example, it could have been: ". . . until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives approving such increase, as the case may be." But this was not done, and we cannot deviate from what able stylists have plainly stated in plain language.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ., concur.EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs.BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñëtIt has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National

Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged

operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.

THIRD DIVISION ANTERO J. POBRE,Complainant,

- versus -

Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,Respondent.

A.C. No. 7399

Present:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.,Acting Chairperson,CARPIO MORALES,*

VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:August 25, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by

idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.[1]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.[2]

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5]

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the

dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once

apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her

attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in

the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result. No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to

the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his

professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and

maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her

achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a

prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming

in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.) A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her

statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the

JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officiochairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.) The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules

concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally

cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

x x x x (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda ,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of thePhilippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal

ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts. Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral

Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.[13]

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.[16]

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

* Additional member as per August 3, 2009 raffle.[1] 109 Phil. 863 (1960); cited in Bernas, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 643 (1996).

[2] Tenney v. Brandhove, 34 US 367, 71 S. Ct. 783786.[3] Id.[4] Osmena, Jr., supra.[5] Tenney, supra note 2.[6] 82 Phil. 595, 602 (1949).[7] Ali v. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 1, 13.[8] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 8.[9] In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49

SCRA 22, 26-27.[10] A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 43.[11] No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441, 444.[12] No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1, 16-17.[13] Id.; citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851,855; Sotto,

supra note 6; Malcolm, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 160 (1949); and People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).

[14] Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 172, 178.