Uypitching, et al. v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006Facts:In, there was a sale of a motorcycle with mortgage as security for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. When the vendee failed to pay, the seller went to the buyer’s establishment with the police and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle which he even mouthed slanderous statement. Sued for damages, he contended that there is no liability for the exercise of the right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.

Issue: Whether or not the act of the seller is vaid?

Held:No. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. No doubt, the seller, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Its acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations.

HSBC vs Catalan GR 159590-91 October 2004Facts:Frederick Arthur Thomson drew 5 checks payable to Catalan in the total amount of HK$3.2 million. Catalan presented these checks to HSBC [Bank]. The checks were dishonored for having insufficient funds. Thomson demanded that the checks be made good because he, in fact, had sufficient funds. Catalan knowing that Thomson had communicated with the Bank, asked HSBCBank to clear the checks and pay her the said amount. HSBC did not heed her. Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The account was transferred to HSBC [Trustee]. Catalan then requested Trustee to pay her. They still refused and even asked her to submit back to them the original checks for verification. Catalan and her lawyer went to Hongkong on their own expense to personally submit the checks. They still were not honored, leading Catalan to file a suit against HSBC to collect her HK$3.2M. Catalan claims that although HSBC has the right to examine the checks, they did so in bad faith because they required her to submit all sorts of documents and yet even upon showing that the checks were good, the Bank still refused to release the money to her. There was abuse of right on the part of the Bank.

Issue:Whether or not HSBC Bank and Trustee are liable to pay damages to Catalan on the ground of Abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code

Held:Yes. Article 19 of the Civil Code speaks of the fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a person "must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." It sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements must concur, to wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay the checks notwithstanding the repeated assurance of the drawer Thomson as to the authenticity of the check sand frequent directives to pay the value thereof to Catalan. Her allegations in the complaint that the gross inaction of HSBANK on Thomson’s instructions, as well as its evident failure to inform Catalan of the reason for its continued inaction and non-payment of the checks, smack of insouciance on its part, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of right for which it may be held liable to Catalan for any damages she incurred resulting therefore. HSBANK’s actions or lack

thereof, prevented Catalan from seeking further redress with Thomson for the recovery of her claim while the latter was alive.

Republic vs. Lacap GR 158253 March 2007Facts:Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified. Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with. Later, the Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and found it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH. DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the COA disapproved final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having expired. Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract. DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued.

Issue:Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects

Held:Yes. The Supreme Court had the occasion to once again say that Article 22 of the New Civil Code was formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. In this case, the respondent undertook works for the government, made advances for the purchase of materials and payment for labor costs. The State however refused to pay on the ground that it had an expired license at the time of the execution of the contract. Despite the same, it is entitled to be paid for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof.

MVRS Publications vs Islamic GR 135306 January 2003Facts:Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims filed in the RTC a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications, Inc., arising from an article published in an issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid; which was for the Islamic Da’Wah: a libelous statement and was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world. MVRS argued that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage.

Issue:Whether or not Islamic Da’Wah has a cause of action for libel.Whether or not in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional tort and not libel.

Held:NO, there is no cause of action for libel. Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. This is made to an individual. there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no

application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind.

NO. "Emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Here, it is relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm — which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress.

GF Equity vs. Valenzona GR 156841 June 2005Facts:GF Equity hired Valenzona as head basketball coach of Alaska team. As head coach, Valenzona was required to comply to his duties such as coaching at all practices and games scheduled for the team. Under paragraph 3 of the same contract it was stipulated there that;“If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION may terminate this contract.” Subsequently, Valenzona was terminated. GF equity invoked paragraph 3 of the said contract. Counsel of Valenzona demands for compensation arising from arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. However, GF equity refused it.

Issue:Whether or not paragraph 3 of the contract is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts

Held:Yes. The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties. The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of mutuality of contracts. It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. Whether Valenzona indeed failed to exhibit the required skill or competitive ability depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity.