USON v. DEL ROSARIO GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953 92 PHIL 530 FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.

The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.Borja v. Borja 46 SCRA 577 FACTS:

Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:

W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated.

HELD:

YES, the compromise agreement is valid.

The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.

There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.

And as a hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.

HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.

The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person.

Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court whenever a party to a pending case dies it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives. This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case.

The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue.

This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.

When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death.

It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint.

This should not have been done for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased.

Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.Jimenez v. FernandezParas, J. (1990)PET: Sulpicia Jimenez et al.RESPs: Vicente Fernandez, Teodora GradoFacts: Land in question (2, 932 sqm) formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez.Fermin Jimenez had 2 sons: Carlos and Fortunato. Fortunato predeceased Fermin leaving behind a daughter, Sulpicia.After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso.Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to EdilbertoCagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion tothe latter, who has been in occupation since.August 1969 -- PET executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she isthe only heir of her deceased uncle. A TCT was then issued in petitioner's namealone over the entire 2,932 square meter property.PET, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.Lower court: Dismissed the complaint.CA: Affirmed lower court.Issue:1.WON Melecia Cayabyab had any right over the eastern part of the propertyshe took possession of and later sold? No. (See Ratio 1 & 2)2.WON Melecia Cayabyab had acquired any right over the said part of the property through prescription? No. (Ratio 3)3.WON PET is barred from recovering the parcel of land through laches? No.(Ratio 4)Ratio:1.From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that MeleciaJimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez.2.(RELEVANT) Assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughterof Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right tosucceed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subjectof this petition.oArt. 777 of the CC: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedentoArt. 2263 of the CC: Rights to the inheritance of a person who died withor without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of CourtoSince Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of died on July 9, 1936 way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determinedin accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.oTo be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so faras the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be eithera child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural chi

ld for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit.oMelecia Cayabcab could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in sofar as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.3.No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner ofthe land covered by the certificate of title. Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be good when she segregatedit into a new titlein 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat herproprietary rights thereon.4.It is apparent, that the right of PET to institute this action to recover possession of the portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 and the Court has invariably in past casesupheld that "the right of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.Dispositive: Petition GrantedQuison Vs. Salud

De vera vs. Galauran Arsenio de Vera, as surviving spouse of the deceased Isabel Domingo, acting for himself and as guardian ad litem of six minors heirs, instituted an action against Cleotilde Galauran in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of a deed of sale of a registered parcel of land. It is alleged in the complaint that Arsenio de Vera and his wife Isabel Domingo, now deceased, have mortgaged their property to the defendant to secure a loan received from him, but said defendant illegally made them sign a deed which they then believed to be of mortgage and which turned out later to be of pacto de retro sale; and that the six minor children named in the complaint are the legitimate children and legitimate heirs of the deceased Isabel Domingo. A demurrer was interposed by the defendant alleging that the plaintiffs have no cause of action, for they have not been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. The demurrer was sustained, and, on failure of plaintiffs to amend, the action was dismissed. Wherefore, this appeal.

Unless there is pending a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, the legal heirs may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor, without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. (Rosa Hernandez vs. Padua, 14 Phil., 194; Mendoza Vda. de Bonnevie vs. Cecilio Vda. de Pardo, 59 Phil., 486; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Serafica, 33 Off. Gaz., 334; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 45 Phil., 430.) If the deceased turns out to have debts, the creditors or the heirs themselves may initiate a special proceeding. If the heirs are minors, a guardian ad litem may be appointed for them. (Secs. 116 and 117, Act No. 190.)

In the complaint it is asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the minor plaintiffs. The lower court should have granted this petition instead of sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action.

The order of dismissal is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee.