CASE STUDY: The Cadbury Schweppes salmonella outbreak and ... · providing a summary of the case; and then by selecting and organizing the pertinent facts of the case into a timeline

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CASESTUDY:TheCadburySchweppessalmonellaoutbreakandchocolaterecallof2006ByRustyCawley,APR

Executivesummary

uringthesummerof2006,Britain’stopchocolate-makerCadburySchweppesannouncedthatitwouldrecallmorethanonemillioncandybarsdistributedintheUnitedKingdom.Atfirst,otherthanthescaleoftherecall,the

announcementappearedroutine.Butoverthenextfewdays,therecall—orrather,Cadbury’sactionsbeforeandduringtherecallprocessaswellasthesubsequentgovernmentinvestigationandprosecution—sparkedsignificantlevelsofstakeholderoutrageamongBritain’sregulators,customers,investors,politicians,andthenewsmedia.TwogovernmenthealthagenciessoonrevealedtotheBritishnewsmediahowCadburyhaddetectedararestrainofsalmonellainthecandybarsduringitsproductionprocess,hadmadeadeliberatedecisiontoputthebarsonstoreshelvesacrossEnglandduringtherun-uptotheimportantEasterseason,andyethadfailedtoinformthegovernmentofitsactions.OnlywhenUKhealthprofessionalsdetectedanoutbreakofsalmonella,andapproachedCadburywithevidencethatitsproductshadtriggeredthatoutbreak,didthecompanyissuearecall.Cadburypubliclydeclinedtoacceptresponsibilityfortheoutbreakformorethanayear,thusgeneratingangstandangerinBritainthatlastedlongpasttheactualrecall.

ThiscasestudyexaminesthestoryoftheCadburychocolatescarebyconductingaclosereadingofmorethan300contemporarynewsarticlesconcerningtheUKsalmonellaoutbreakof2006,whichwereidentifiedviaaLexisNexissearch;byprovidingasummaryofthecase;andthenbyselectingandorganizingthepertinentfactsofthecaseintoatimelinenarrative.ItthendemonstratestheprocessofproducingasetofmessagemapscombinedwithapublicstatementthatmayhaveimprovedCadbury’spositionduringitsdisputewithBritain’sfood-safetyregulators.

Section1:Background

1-A.Thecompany:CadburySchweppesplc

Like many Quakers living in Englandduring the early 19th century, JohnCadbury chose to enter the businessworld. He had little choice, as Britishuniversities and England’s militaryrejected Quakers as non-conformists(Dellheim, 1987). Business offeredone of the few available paths for

Quakerstothrive.So in1824, the22-year-oldCadburyopenedagroceryinBirmingham.Hesoldteaandcoffeeasalternativestoalcoholicbeverages.Healso sold cocoa and drinkingchocolate, which proved so popularthat nine years later he decided tofocus on manufacturing them. By1842, he was selling sixteen lines ofdrinking chocolate in powder orcakes. In 1847, John brought brotherBenjamin into his growing firm to

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create Cadbury Brothers, andconstructed a large factory in thecity’s center. In 1854, the brothersreceived a Royal Warrant as officialsuppliers of cocoa and drinkingchocolatetoQueenVictoria.

Despite this royal testimonial, thecompany fell into decline and thebrothers dissolved their partnershipin 1861, leaving control of retail andmanufacturingtoJohn’ssons,25-year-old Richard and 21-year-old George.Thismarked the turning point in thecompany’s fortunes. CharlesDellheimwrites in his 1987 analysis of theCadbury business culture, “Threemain influences formed George andRichardCadbury’sbeliefs: theQuakerethic,whichshapedtheirviewsofthenature and purpose of business; theexperienceofturningaroundafailingfirm; and an exposure to the socialproblemsofanindustrialcity.”

After five years of struggle, thissecond generation of Cadburysintroduced the breakthrough thatwould eventually establish theircompany’s dominance in the UnitedKingdom. In 1866, they adopted acocoapressdevelopedinHollandthatproducedapurerformofcocoa,whichthe Cadburys branded as Pure CocoaEssence, the United Kingdom’s firstunadulterated cocoa. This processprovided the Cadburys with the rawmaterials for manufacturing a widerange of chocolate confections. Theybegan to produce “fancy chocolates”tocompleteheadtoheadwithsweetsimported from France. By featuringpaintingscreatedbyRichardCadbury,the company made its productpackaging more attractive, thusinventing the genre of chocolate-boxart; today, collectors prize theelaborate boxes the CadburysdistributedacrossEnglandduringtheVictorian and Edwardian eras. “Theirefforts were particularly successfulbecause they anticipated and helped

create the vogue for ‘pure’ foods inEngland,” Dellheim writes (1987), “avogue given parliamentary sanctionby the passage of the Adulteration ofFoodActsin1872and1875.”

In 1875, Cadbury’s launched a newproduct – the Cadbury Easter Egg –that would make its brandsynonymous with happy childhoodsandfamilyvaluesthroughoutEngland.Madefromdarkchocolate,thesefirst-everchocolateeggsfeaturedasmoothsurface containing sugarcoatedchocolate drops. By 1878, now with200 employees, Cadbury’s becamedesperate to expand its operations.“Theneedforgreateraccommodationfor the rapidly growingbusiness, anda desire to secure improvedconditionsforthework-people, ledtothe removal of the factory to adistance of about fourmiles south ofthe city,” BrandonHeadwrites in his1903accountofthecocoaindustry.In1879, the Cadburys constructed afactory on fourteen acres, four milessouth of Birmingham, near theBirmingham Canal and a recentlycompleted railway; this combinationwouldgivethecompanybetteraccesstomilk and cocoa. They renamed theestate Bournville. “The move to thecountryside was unprecedented,”Delheim writes (1987). “Theircontemporariesgenerallysawitasanunwise, not to say daft, choice, giventhe practical difficulties of providingtransportation for workers andgoods.”

Before long, the Cadburys introduceda series of innovations and reformsthat cemented the company’sreputation as politically progressive.The new factory included heateddressing rooms for workers. TheCadburys negotiated special fares forworkerswhotraveledfromthecitytothe factory by rail. George Cadburyacquired 120 acres near the factoryandbeganthedesignandconstruction


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of a model village with 313 cottagesand houses for hisworkers, planning“almost every aspect of the village,from houses and roads to parks andtrees (Dellheim, 1987).” Concernedwiththehealthandphysicalfitnessoftheir workforce, the Cadburys builtseveral parks, pools, and otherrecreational features to encouragewalking, swimming, and outdoorsports. To discourage drunkennessamong workers, George Cadburyprohibited pubs from his village. In1907, Cadbury donated the entireestate to theBournvilleVillageTrust,having “no desire to rule Bournvillelike a latter-day feudal magnate(Dellheim,1987).”

The Cadburys also are credited withsignificant social reforms, such half-day holidays on Saturdays and fullholidays on bank holidays. Theyopened medical and dental offices,and established a pension fund, fortheir workers. In 1918, the Cadburysestablished democratically electedwork councils – one for themen andone for the women – to deal withworkingconditionsaswellasissuesofsafety,health,education,training,andsociallife.

As a growing company, Cadbury’sproved equally aggressive in themarketplace. In 1905, the companychallenged the Swiss dominance ofmilk chocolate with a bar thatincludedmoremilk thananyotheratthe time: The Cadbury Dairy Milk.“Here too, purity was the key,”Delheim writes (1987). “Cadbury’susedfreshmilkratherthanpowderedmilk. Therewas a ‘glass and a half ofmilkineveryhalf-poundbar’ofC.D.M.The name ‘Cadbury’ was written oneachsquare.”

Over the coming decades, through acombination of new products,effective advertising, and strategicacquisitions, Cadbury’s emerged as

England’sKingofChocolate. In1969,Cadbury (having dropped thepossessive from its company name)became an international behemothwhen it merged with the beveragegiant Schweppes. The mergereffectively cut off the company fromits Quaker roots. Yet the Cadburyfamily retained some power withinthe new mega-company until 1993,when Sir Dominic Cadbury resignedasthegroup’schiefexecutive.

By 2003, the company ranked firstworldwide in sweets and fourth inchocolate. Its overall brand portfolioofconfectionsandbeveragesincludedCadbury, Trident, Dr Pepper, Halls,Schweppes, Dentyne, Bassett’s,Snapple, Orangina, Bubblicious,HawaiianPunch,and7Up.

That same year, 51-year-old ToddStitzer became the first foreign-bornCEO of Cadbury Schweppes. Thoughhehadworkedhiswaysteadilyupthecorporate ladder for more than twodecades, Stitzer came under closescrutiny (and some outright distain)fromBritain’s investmentelites. “He’slike every American businessmanyou’ve ever met or seen or heardabout,” Marketing Today said in a2004 profile, with a “meticulousappearance and manner and histendency to use management speak,”but also “a relaxed charm, clarity ofvisionandsolidity.…He’snotBritish,he’snotaCadbury,he’snotaSir.”

Britain’s investment establishment,known as the City, had assumedCadbury COO John Brock wouldsucceedJohnSunderlandasCadbury’sCEO.“Stitzer,inchargeofstrategyandfrom a legal rather than a marketingbackground,wasnotat thetopof thepundit’s list,” Marketing Today said.Ontheotherhand,theprofilesaid,“Asa go-getter with a social conscience,(Stitzeris)reallyfromthesamemouldasthefirm’sQuakerfoundingfathers.”


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Born in New Jersey, raised in NewYork, Stitzer enjoyed what hedescribedas“amiddle-classAmericanchildhood.” His father directed aYMCA and encouraged his son tofollow him. “This means that at anearly age he was taught theimportance of giving and of seriousthought,” Marketing Today reported.“His family cared for others and hadstrong Christian beliefs – not unlikethe founding fathers at Cadbury’s, infact.”

He first attended Springfield College,“the training ground for futureYMCAand aid workers in Massachusetts.”However, Stitzer had also longadmired an uncle who practiced lawin upstate New York. “I thought thecombination of skills required of alawyer were right for me – writing,thinking and verbal skills – pluslawyersdida lot for the community,”he told Marketing Today. He soonswitched to Harvard University,wherehe earned a bachelor’s degree,and then attended Columbia LawSchool in New York, where hereceivedhislawdegree.

In1973, Stitzer joined theManhattanlaw firm Lord, Day & Lord as anassociate, and focusedhispracticeonmergers and acquisitions. One of hismajor projects was to advise NewYork City Mayor Ed Koch on therestructuring of the city’s $3.2 billiondebt.WhileheenjoyedtheM&Awork,the hours were brutal, and the payfailed to match his contributions tothe firm. “I billed more hours thananyoneelseatthefirmforthreeyearsin a row,” Stitzer said in a 2007interview with the Columbia LawSchool’spressoffice.Lord,Day&Lordconformed to the “Marxist theory ofsurplus value,” he told MarketingToday. “The associates worked veryhard,thepartnersmadealltheprofits.…MywifeusedtocallthemLord,Day&Night.Iwasthereallthetime.”

Lord, Day & Lord served as the leadfirm in theUnited States for CadburySchweppes, and Stitzer frequentlyadvised the company’s executives. In1983, Cadbury offered Stitzer apositionasassistantgeneralcounsel,amove thatwould allow Stitzer to livein Connecticut and spend more timewith his wife and children.Meanwhile, his law firm informedStitzer that he was only five yearsthrough an eight-to-10-year processthat might eventually allow him tobecomeapartner. HetookCadbury’soffer.

“I had a strong interest in the socialhelping professions, what with myfamily background.” Stitzer toldMarketing Today. “There’s a hugeconnection, however, with CadburySchweppes, which has a heritage ofcaringaboutpeopleandofcommunityand of the greater good. Mybackground and mindset fit witheverything Cadbury Schweppesstands for.” And yet, London’s TheGuardian would report in 2009,Stitzer’sfavoritebookwasAynRand’sAtlasShrugged,anovel“whichrejectsreligion and supports laissez-fairecapitalismandindividualrights.”

Following the advise of DevelopmentDirector Dominic Cadbury, theambitious Stitzer soon steered hiscareer away from Cadbury’s legaldepartmentandtoward itsmarketingandsalesgroup.HemovedtoLondonin 1991 as group developmentdirector and returned to the UnitedStates in 1993 as vice president formarketingandstrategicplanning. Hetold Management Today (Blackhurst,2009), “I adopted the fire-hosemethod of management. I stoodwithmymouthopenandtheypoured intoit.” The Daily Telegraph in Londondescribes Stitzer as a “furious note-taker; a former colleague refers toStitzer’smanagementstyleas‘leadingwith his head down (Sibun, 2010).’”


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Stitzer’s progress over the comingdecadewas sure and swift, but oftenhismoveswere“notformoremoney,but to add to his knowledge and tofurther his career,” according to theMarketing Today profile. He becamethechiefoperatingofficerforCadburyBeverages in North America in 1995.In 2000, he joined Cadbury’s maingroup board as chief strategy officer.In 2003, in a move that stunnedLondon’s financial establishment, hebecame CEO for Cadbury Schweppes.That same year, Stitzer managedCadbury’s $4.2 billion acquisition ofUS-based chewing gum-manufacturerAdams from Pfizer to create theworld’s largest maker of chocolateand other confectionaries. Bypurchasing Adams, Cadbury addedTrident sugar-free gum, Dentyne Icechewing gum, and Halls coughlozenges to its product portfolio, andinstantly became the world’s secondlargestmanufacturer of chewing gum(Ball, 2002; Confectionary News,2002). “Stitzer was chosen, yourealize, because he has a bit ofeverything: the American (more thantwo-thirds of [Cadbury’s] business isintheUS);thetime-servedemployee;theambitious;thehumble,”MarketingToday said in its profile. “Stitzer’sstyleistoconsult,toseekadvice,thentoact.Heisnotanautocraticleader.”

“Beingaprincipled leader isapartofmy life and it’s been that way eversinceIwasalittlekid,”StitzertoldtheDaily Telegraph (Sibun, 2010).“Cadburyisaprincipledcompany,it’sbeen that way since 1824. So therewas this wonderful accident ofCadbury and Todd Stitzer comingtogether in 1983 and that’s been agreat thing for me.” But MarketingToday (Blackhurst, 2010) was highlycriticalofStitzer’sbearing:“Itisapity,though, that he allows thisstraightforwardness to be clouded bythesortofmanagementgobbledygook

that can leave the listener cold. … InAmerica, excess verbiage may beacceptableandcommonplace.ItisnotinBritain.… Such language can leavethe speaker open to ridicule andhostility.” As a lawyer, MarketingTodaysaid,Stitzer“wastaughtthatnowordcangounchecked,nostatementcan go without being fully defined.”The Daily Telegraph (Sibun, 2010)concurred:“Stitzer’srelationshipwiththeCityhasneverbeeneasy.… (his)formal, Ivy League bearing has notalways sat well with hard-nosed,cynicalBritishinvestorsandanalysts.”Still, in January 2006, the Times ofLondon (Jameson, 2006) portrayedStitzer as “the real lifeWillieWonka”from Roald Dahl’s children’s story,Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, abook rooted in a teenaged Dahl’sdaydreams of working at a Cadburyfactory. In that article, AngelaJamesonofTheTimesfoundadualityin Stitzer that reflected both of thebook’scentralcharacters.Shewrote,“…chipawayatthegreysuitandwhiteshirtexteriorandthereismoreoftheyoung Charlie, the boy so anxious toplease his guardians, than themercurialWonka.”

1-B.Thepathogen:salmonellaMontevideo

A rare strain of non-typhoidsalmonella bacteria, salmonellaMontevideo enters the body throughthe consumption of contaminatedfood or water, or of fecal material.Though commonly considered acontaminant of food animalproducts,in recentyearssalmonellabacteria infresh produce have caused severalserious US outbreaks. Food productsknown to trigger salmonellaoutbreaksincludemeat,poultry,eggs,milkanddairyproducts, fish, shrimp,spices,yeast,cocoanut,sauces,freshlyprepared saladdressings, cakemixes,cream-filled desserts, toppings, driedgelatin, peanut butter, cocoa,


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tomatoes, peppers, cantaloupes andchocolate, according to the US FoodandDrugAdministration(2012).

The US Centers for Disease ControlandPrevention estimatemore than1million cases of non-typhoidsalmonella occur each year in theUnited States (2013). In the Englandand Wales, the government’sestimates put annual cases at around8,500(PublicHealthEngland,2016).

Clinical features: Salmonella mayinfect anyone of any age, but isespecially harsh when contracted bythosewithweakimmunesystems:thevery young, the elderly, people withHIV or a chronic illness, or who areundergoing chemo orimmunosuppressive therapy,orothermedications. Exposure may causeissues with the stomach andintestines,includingnausea,vomiting,diarrhea, cramps, and fever.Symptoms generally appear betweensix and seventy-two hours afterexposure.Theyusuallysubsideinfourto seven days, with the worstsymptoms lasting fewer than twodays. The disease leads to death inless than 1 percent of cases inotherwise healthy adults. Thepercentage may climb to 3.6 percentamongtheelderly(WHO,2015).

Treatment: There exists no standardtreatment for salmonellosis, theillness caused by an infection of thesalmonella bacteria. In severe cases,treatment is symptomatic, with anemphasis on rehydration andelectrolyte replacement.Antimicrobial therapy is notrecommended for mild or moderatecases.

Control and prevention: Preventivemeasures include cooking foodthoroughly; washing hands afterhandling raw food; separating rawfood from cooked food; and

refrigerating food at 40 degrees F orbelow.

1-C.Theoutbreak

BetweenMarch 1 and June 19, 2006,the United Kingdom’s HealthProtection Agency documented eightconfirmed cases of salmonellaMontevideo among infants youngerthan one year and twenty-two casesamong children younger than agefour,accordingtoScotlandonSunday(Gray,2006).Looking forclues to thecause,theagencyanalyzedallsamplesof the bacterium it had receivedduringthepreviousmonths.

On June 16, 2006, scientists at theUnited Kingdom’s Health ProtectionAgency identified salmonellacontaminationinsamplesofchocolatecrumb received from a private labrepresenting an unidentifiedconfectionary firm. The agencyapproached the lab for moreinformation and was told the sourceof the samples was confidential. TheHPA then alerted the Food StandardsAgency. Only when FSA officialsapproached the lab did its client,Cadbury Schweppes, admit to thecontamination.

Cadbury then actively and openlyresisted the FSA’s insistence upon asignificant recall, and rejected thegovernment’s opinion that thecompany should have alertedregulators to the contaminationimmediately. Cadbury claimed thatonly 5,000 bars were made with thecontaminatedchocolate.However,theFSA demanded a much larger recall.Cadbury’s delay in reporting thecontamination angered agencyofficials, who told the Telegraph,“Under food hygiene law, havingsalmonellainaready-to-eatfoodsuchas chocolate is unacceptable and canposeahealthrisk(Derbyshire,2006).”


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1-D.Therecalls

OnJune23,2006,CadburySchweppesrecalled seven chocolate productsfrom grocery shelves across theUnitedKingdom, in consultationwiththe Food Standards Agency: thechocolate button Easter Egg, DairyMilk Turkish, Dairy Milk Caramel,DairyMilkMint,DairyMilk8Chunk,1kg Dairy Milk, and the Freddo bar(AFXNews).Atmorethanonemillionitems,therecallrepresentedonethirdof Britain’s daily consumption ofCadburychocolate.

Cadbury swiftly positioned the recallas a “precaution,” telling the DailyMirror (2006, June 24): “The levelsare significantly below the standardthatwouldbeahealthproblem.Thereis no evidence anyone has been sickthrough eating this chocolate.” TheHPA disagreed, confirming to theSunday Times in London (2006, June25) that “molecular fingerprintingtests” showed that the bacteriacausing the outbreak were the sameas those found in the Cadburysamples. Agency statisticians hadsuspectedthatchocolatemightbethevector for the disease, since somanyof the reported cases were found inchildren. The reported fifty-threecases could have been ten timeshigher in reality, the agency told theTimes,becausemostsalmonellacasesgo unreported: “We cannot be 100percent sure that Cadbury’s productscaused the disease, but it’s a strongpossibility.”

Over time, health officials identifiedthreeways inwhichCadbury’serrorsledtotheoutbreak.

First, Cadbury apparently failed torepair a leaky pipe at its Marlbrook,Herefordshire, plant where itmanufactured the chocolate crumb, akey ingredient for creating chocolatecandy. The Hereford Magistrate’s

Court brought charges againstCadbury“relatedtothestateofrepairof a drainage pipe and roof vent, thelayout of the factory, theprovisionofdrainage facilities and the cleaningand disinfection of equipment,including conveyors and storage silos(The Guardian, 2007, July 3).” It ispossiblethatrats,mice,orwildbirds,any of which may carry salmonella,may have beenwatering at the leakypipeandcontaminatedtheplant(TheTimes,2006,June24).

Second, Cadbury changed its foodsafety standards in 2003, apparentlyunder the mistaken impression thatthere are safe levels of salmonellacontamination for chocolate crumb.Routinetestsweretakenthreetimesaday, every eight hours, to check forcontamination of ingredients, of theproduction line, and of finishedproducts. A private laboratoryhandled the analysis of the tests,detected the salmonellacontamination,andalertedCadbury.

The factory set its alert system towithdrawanyproductattenpartspermillionpertengrams(TheTimes,July24, 2006). Unfortunately for Cadburyand its consumers, chocolate is anideal vehicle for salmonella becausethe high levels of fat and sugarpreservethebacteriaandcarryitintothe intestine, according tomicrobiologists (SundayTimes, 2006,June 25). Sir Huge Pennington, abacteriologist at Aberdeen UniversityinScotland, toldtheAssociatedPress,“The fat in chocolate actuallypreserves the salmonella from thenormal intestinal defenses, so youdon’t have to eat very manysalmonellas to get infected. It’s abouta thousand times less than if you’reeating it from traditional sources likemeats(2006,June25).”

TheFoodStandardsAgencysaidinanofficial report that Cadbury’s food


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safety system was unreliable,outdated, and underestimated thelevel and likelihood of salmonellacontamination (The Guardian, 2006,July 24). The report also saidCadbury’sriskassessmenterredwhenit drew parallels between thethresholdforsalmonellainfectionandthe thresholds for infection by othermicro-organismsthatmaybefoundinchocolate.Theagencysays:“Wethink(Cadbury) made a mistake inassuming there was a safe level ofsalmonellainaproductlikechocolate.Our view is there isn’t. (AssociatedPress,July4,2006)”

Third, knowing that the crumbcontained salmonella, Cadbury choseto distribute the contaminatedproducts throughout England.Cadbury later confirmed it failed toapproach thesituationasacrisis,butinstead decided informally that thecontamination levelswere too low towarrant a crisis footing, and tomoveforward with production. (Leake &Walsh).TheDailyTelegraphreported,“The court heard that in early 2006the problem was so endemic thatCadburystaffweredealingwith‘daily’salmonella-related problems, andwere referring to instances ofcontamination by an alphabeticalseriesofcodewordsratherthanusingwhat they referred to as the ‘s-word’(Bitten,2007).”

TheBirminghamCrownCourtin2007fined Cadbury £1 million (about $2million US) for its role in thesalmonella outbreak of 2006:£500,000forputtingunsafechocolatefor sale to the public, £100,000 oneach of two other charges, and£50,000 foreachof sixoffensesat itsHerefordshire factory (AFX News,2007,July16). TheHealthProtectionAgency held Cadbury directlyresponsible for thirteenof theknownfifty-six reported cases of theMontevideo strain of salmonella in

2006 (TheMirror, 2007, July 22). Ofthe fifty-six cases, thirty-seven were“possibly” caused by Cadburyproducts,whilethirteenofthosewere“certain.,” the Mirror says (MacLean,2007). Because the illness rate fellafterCadburywithdrewsevenbrandsfrom the marketplace, the agencyfound that “consumption of CadburySchweppes’s products was the mostcredibleexplanation.”

At the urging of the Food StandardsAgency, Cadbury agreed to acomprehensive cleaning of allproduction lines at the Marlbrookplant (The Guardian, 2006, July 27).Cadbury also agreed to destroy anychocolate testing positive forsalmonella, however small (WesternDaily Press, 2006, July 27), and toreleaseproductsonlyaftertestresultsreturned negative (BirminghamDailyMail,2006,July27).

In addition, Cadbury appeared tobecomemoreaggressive in launchingrecalls. In February 2007, Cadburyvoluntarily recalled its chocolateEaster eggs after learning that theproduct might pose a danger toconsumers with nut allergies, theBirmingham Post reports (Revill,2007).

1-E. Stakeholder reaction (timelineanalysis)

Day 1: June 23, 2006—CadburySchweppes announces it has recalledseven chocolate products fromgrocery shelves across the UnitedKingdom,accordingtoAFXNews.Inadecision made in consultation withthe UK’s Food Standards Agency,Cadbury recalls the chocolate buttonEaster Egg, DairyMilk Turkish, DairyMile Caramel, Dairy Milk Mint, DairyMilk8Chunk,1kgDairyMilk,andtheFreddo bar. The company frames therecall as a precautionary measurewhile admitting some of these


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products “may contain minute tracesof salmonella,” according to AFXNews. In a prepared statement, thecompanysays,“Cadburyhasidentifiedthe source of the problem andrectified it, and is taking steps toensure these particular products arenolongeravailableforsale.”

Day 2: June 24, 2006—A disputeeruptsbetweenCadburyandtheUK’sFoodStandardsAgency,saystheDailyMirror of London (Sayid, 2006).Cadbury waited for five months toalert the agency that the companydistributedcontaminatedchocolateinmore than one million candy bars.Cadbury claims the health riskswereso “minimal” therewasno legal needtoinformtheagencyimmediately,theMirror said. Cadbury tells theMirror:“This is a precaution. The levels aresignificantly below the standard thatwould be a health problem. There isno evidence anyone has been sickthrougheatingthischocolate.”ButtheFood Standards Agency challengesCadbury’s version of events. “Theyshould have told us earlier,” theagency says. “Cadbury is duty boundbytheFoodHygieneAct to informusstraightaway of any contamination.They failed to do so for almost sixmonths. It doesn’t matter how smallthe risk. … Having salmonella inchocolate can pose a health risk. Wewouldn’trecalltheseproductsjustforfun.”

Simon Baldry, managing director atCadbury, tells the BirminghamEveningMailthattherewas“noneed”to take thechocolateproductsoff themarket when contamination wasdiscovered in January. “Our productswere perfectly safe,” Baldry says.“We’d gone through our rigoroustestingprocess…We’didentifiedthatthese were only minute traces.” Theproductsarecontaminatedwithararestrain of the bacteria salmonellaMontevideo. Reported cases of the

strain have quadrupled in recentmonths,theMailsays.TheUK’sHealthProtection Agency tells the Mail ifthere was a decline in salmonellaMontevideo following the productrecall,itwouldbe"strongevidence"ofa link. Each year, Cadbury’s plant inMarlbrook generates 97,000 metrictons of chocolate crumb, which istransported to Cadbury factories inBourneville, Birmingham, andSomerdale (near Bristol) to beblended with cocoa butter, and thusturned into milk chocolate. Cadburydeclines to discuss the cost of therecall, but sets up a helpline forconcerned customers, and provides arecallproceduretoexchangeproductsforrefundvouchers.

The Guardian in London reports thatBritain’sconsumersmayhavealreadyeaten as many as half of thecontaminated candy bars during theprevioussixmonths,whichmayhavetriggeredfoodpoisoninginmorethanforty people. The Food StandardsAgency accuses Cadbury of failing toreportthata leakingwastewaterpipeat the company’s Marlbrook plantcontaminatedthechocolatecrumb:“Itwas found in January, but they didn’ttell us until Monday. In the interim,products have gone out into themarket. There was a window whentheyknewtheyhadaproblemintheirfactory.” Cadbury corrected theproblemsometimeinMarch,meaningthe company had producedcontaminatedproductsforaboutfortydays, the Guardian says. The HealthProtection Agency discovered theproblem while investigating anoutbreak of salmonella Montevideoamong more than forty people. Theagencyfoundanexactmatchwiththestrainfoundinbacteriasamplesfoundin the Cadbury chocolate, but so farhasprovennocausal link. Salmonellabacteria affect the stomach andintestines, causing symptoms that


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includediarrhea,constipation,nausea,headache, stomach cramps and fever,whichgenerallyclearupinsevendayswithout treatment. Severe cases canlead to complications, such asarthritis.Cadburysays:“Wefoundthecause of the problem, fixed it, andsubsequent tests proved we werecompletelyclear.…Weareawaretheyhave been looking at salmonellaprevalence,andthatyoucouldsaythestrain found inourproduct is similarto the one they found. The scientificevidencewas that the level found (inthe chocolate) was way below thelevel that would cause illness(Vasagar,2006).”

The Food StandardsAgency is askingCadbury to explain why it failed toalert the agency after discoveringsalmonella at its Marlbrook plant inJanuary,theTimesofLondonreports.Meanwhile, the Health ProtectionAgency says it has foundabout forty-five cases of salmonella poisoningsince March, compared to fourteencases between March and June 2005“Thewatchdogisparticularlyirritatedthat even though Cadbury disclosedonMondaythepresenceofthebuginchocolate, it took the company untilThursdayeveningtoagreetoarecall,”according to theTimes.Cadbury sellsmore than one billion pounds ofchocolate annually in the UnitedKingdom. The recall was theequivalentofa thirdofBritain’sdailyconsumption of Cadbury’s chocolate.“While the cost to the company,” theTimes says, “which manufactures2,500products, isexpectedtobelow,thedamageto itsreputationcouldbesignificant.” It is possible that rats,mice,orwildbirds,anyofwhichmaycarry salmonella, may have beenwatering at the leaky pipe andcontaminated theplant. Routine testswere taken three times a day everyeight hours to check forcontamination of ingredients, of the

production line, and of finishedproducts. A private laboratoryhandled the analysis of the tests,detected the salmonella and alertedCadbury.The lab found0.3partsof amillioninthecontaminatedchocolate.Thefactory’salertsystemwouldhavewithdrawn any product at ten partsper million per ten grams, CadburytellstheTimes.“Wehavefollowedtheregulations,”aCadburyspokeswomansays. “The (Food Standards Agency)will have to decide ifwe need a newregulationandwearewillingtoworkwiththemonthat(V.Elliott,2006).”

The Daily Telegraph in Londonreports: “The contamination wasmade public only after the HealthProtection Agency noticed a puzzlingrise in salmonella Montevideo cases.Last year, 14 cases were confirmedbetween March 1 and June 19. Thisyear 45 were scattered across thecountry. More than half affectedchildren under four.” Looking forclues,theagencyanalyzedallsamplesof the bacterium it had receivedduringthepreviousmonths,includingthose sent by Cadbury. The agencyapproached Cadbury’s independentlab, and were told the source of thesamples was confidential. Only whenofficials from the Food StandardsAgency approached the lab didCadbury admit to the contamination.Cadburyclaimed thatonly5,000barswere made with the contaminatedchocolate. But the Food StandardsAgency demanded a much largerrecall. Cadbury’s delay in reportingthe contamination angered agencyofficials, who told the Telegraph,“Under food hygiene law, havingsalmonellainaready-to-eatfoodsuchas chocolate is unacceptable and canposeahealthrisk(Derbyshire,2006).”

Day3:June25,2006—LyndonSimkin,abrand-marketingscholaratWarwickUniversity, expresses surprise thatCadbury made a decision to ship the


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contaminated candy. “What thecompanyhaddoneisstrangegivenitsQuaker background of caring forworkers,” Simkin tells the SundayMercury. “Cadbury is much-lovedbecauseofverycleverbrand-buildingwork, like sponsoring ‘CoronationStreet’(along-runningBritishTVsoapopera). It has homely connotationsand people trust it and have greatloyalty to it.” He predicts that thesalmonella controversy “… in a fewweeks, it will be forgotten,” unlesspeople can prove they got sick fromeatingtheproducts(Allen,2006).

CadburyEuropeanPresidentMatthewShattock tells the Mercury that thetraces of salmonella detected in thechocolate crumb were “minute” andthat candy recall is purelyprecautionary. “The highest level wefoundwasone-thirtiethofthelevelatwhichwewouldraiseanalertas toafood safety issue,” Shattock says(Allen,2006).

Between March 1 and June 19, theHealthProtectionAgencydocumentedeight confirmed cases of salmonellaMontevideo among infants youngerthan one year and twenty-two casesamong children younger than agefour,accordingtoScotlandonSunday(Gray,2006).

Cadbury’s European presidentMatthew Shattock says that onlyfourteen samples of the chocolatecrumb showed minute traces ofcontamination–outof7,000samplestested – according to Wales onSunday.Since then,notracehasbeenfound in 17,000 samples tested, hesays: “Ourproductsareperfectly safeto eat and we have no evidence thatanyonehasbeen ill fromeating them(Wales,2006).”

Cadburyannouncesplanstobury250tonsofchocolatebarsandEastereggsin landfills across Britain. The candy,

which was recalled from shops andwarehouses,weighsaboutthesameasthirty-three double-decker buses,according to the Daily Mail, and isequivalent to one-third of Britain’sdaily consumption of Cadburychocolate.Allwrappersandpackaginghave been removed, and Cadbury isdiscouraging children from searchingfor the candy on a “Willie Wonkahunt”(Leake,2006).

The Daily Mail reveals that anindependent lab alerted the HealthProtection Agency to thecontaminationasearlyasJanuary,butthe informationwasnotpassedon totheFoodStandardsAgency.Membersof Parliament call for a governmentinvestigation into Cadbury’s delayedreportstothegovernment. “Weneeda proper explanation from ministersaboutwhatwentwrong,”saysLiberalDemocrat Bob Russell. “There hasbeen a communication breakdownand, clearly, the current rules arenotbeing operated properly (Leake,2006).”

The Independent (Carrell, 2006)publishes the following timeline ofevents:

• June 16: The HealthProtection Agency findscontaminated samples froman unidentifiedconfectionaryfirm.

• June 19: The HealthProtectionAgency alerts theFood Standards Agency,which approaches theprivate lab for the name ofthe client. The lab alertsCadbury, which then callsthe Food Standards Agencyand admits contaminationhadtakenplace.

• June 21: Cadbury agrees toshareadditional informationaboutaffectedproducts.


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• June 22: Cadbury denies acover-up, but agrees to aproductrecall.

CadburyEuropeanPresidentMatthewShattock tells the Independent: “Ourresponsibility is the welfare of ourconsumersandIcanreassureyouthatourproducts areperfectly safe to eat(Carrell,2006).”

In the Sunday Mirror (Hayward,2006),officials at theFoodStandardsAgencyexpresssurprisethatCadburyfailed to report the contaminationearlier:“Wewillbeintalkswithlocalenvironmental and trading standardsofficers thisweek to see if anyactionis taken.” Massive fines are apossibility.Meanwhile, officials at theHerefordshire council’s healthdepartment tell the Sunday Mirror,“Cadbury’s compliancewith the FoodSafetyActwill bepartof theongoinginvestigation.” Cadbury EuropeanPresident Matthew Shattock replies,“We are absolutely confident theseminutelevelsofsalmonellawouldnothavemadeanyoneill.”

Journalists at the Sunday Heraldreport buying Cadbury’s recalledproducts readily in England stores.Cadbury says it is “working all handson deck” to complete the recall.OfficialsattheFoodStandardsAgencysay, “The ultimate responsibility lieswith the manufacturer.” Meanwhile,SirHughPennington,presidentfortheSocietyforGeneralMicrobiology,tellsthe Herald that DNA testing couldtracethestraintoCadbury.“Theonlysafelevelofsalmonellainchocolateiszero,”hesays(J.Johnson,2006).

Britain’s Parliament is demanding a“full and public explanation” of theCadbury recall, the SundayIndependent in Ireland reports. Dr.Richard North, a food safety advisor,tells the Independent: “Cadbury isbeing disingenuous. It has only

withdrawnitsproductsbecauseithasbeen found out.” Cadbury sent ninesamples of chocolate crumb to anindependent lab, which detectedsalmonella, then passed the sampleson to the Health Protection Agencywithout identifying the source. Theagency says it received the samplesbetweenearlyFebruaryand lateMay(Harrison,2006).

The Health Protection Agencyconfirms that “molecularfingerprinting tests” show that thebacteria causing the outbreaks werethe same as those contaminatingCadbury products, according to theSunday Times in London. Agencystatisticians suspected that chocolatemight be the vector for the disease,since so many of the reported caseswere in children. The reported fifty-threecasescouldhavebeententimeshigher in reality, the agency tells theTimes,becausemostsalmonellacasesgo unreported: “We cannot be 100percent sure that Cadbury’s productscaused the disease, but it’s a strongpossibility.” Chocolate is the idealvehicle for salmonella because thehigh levels of fat and sugar preservethe bacteria and carry it into theintestine, microbiologists tell theSunday Times. “This meant thatserious illness could be caused bywhat appeared to be mere traceelements of the bacterium,” theSunday Times said. Food safetyconsultant Michael Kane says therules for food safety are establishedunder the Global Food Standard andthe British Retail Consortium: “Theysay that as soon as salmonella wasdetected the company should haveinstituted a crisis managementprocedure, including recalls of anypotentially hazardous products andwarning relevant authorities.”Cadburyconfirmsitfailedtoapproachthe situation as a crisis, but insteaddecided informally that the


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contamination levelswere too low towarrant a crisis footing, and tomoveforward with production. TheHerefordshire’s environmentalstandards department last inspectedthe factory in Fall 2005 (Leake &Walsh).

Sir Huge Pennington, a bacteriologistat Aberdeen University in Scotland,tells theAssociated Press: “The fat inchocolate actually preserves thesalmonella fromthenormal intestinaldefenses,soyoudon’thavetoeatverymany salmonellas to get infected. It’sabout a thousand times less than ifyou’re eating it from traditionalsourceslikemeats.”

Day 4: June 26, 2006—A member ofthe British Parliament, LiberalDemocrat Bob Russell, tells theBirmingham Post: “It seemsextraordinary than Cadbury, orwhoever makes these decisions,decided to withdraw these productssofardownthelinewhentherewereconcerns about this some monthsago.” Meanwhile, The Straits Timesreports that Cadbury is recalling itschocolatebarsinSingapore.

TheBirminghamEveningMail (Authi,2006) reports that “thousands” havecalledCadbury’ssalmonellahotline.

The Bulldog Reporter, a tradepublication serving the US publicrelations industry, quotes a Cadburyspokesperson: “There are minutetraces of salmonella, which aresignificantly below those (levels)whichscientificstandardssaypresentany hazard. There’s no connectionbetween our product and anybodybecoming ill from it. … We’ve takingthis precautionary step because ourconsumers are our highest priority.We apologize for any inconveniencecaused.”

Day 6: June 28, 2006—Cadburysuspends its £10 million annual

sponsorship of “Coronation Street,”one of the longest-running scriptedtelevision programs in the world,second only to “As theWorldTurns,”theBirminghamPostsays.Thismarksthe first time in ten years that theprogram will air without Cadburyadvertising, says the Western DailyPress (Morgan, 2006). Cadburyoriginally wanted to replace its ads,which promoted a wide range ofCadbury products, with a messagedesignedto“reassure”customers.Butbroadcasting rules in the UnitedKingdomprohibitedtheplan,saysthetradepublicationMarketing (Bowery,2006).

Day 8: June 30, 2006—Timescolumnist Mike Hume questions theneed for the Cadbury recall: “Anepidemic it ain’t. In any case, theCadbury’s chocolate produced inJanuary is likely to have long sincebeen scoffed. Sowhat iswithdrawinga million different bars months latersupposed to be a ‘precaution’against?” He continues: “Cadbury isbig enough to defend itself. It is therestofusIamworriedabout,livingina superstitious society where it isdeemed wise to bury tonnes ofperfectly good foodstuff, and wheregovernment agencies treat us likemilky children in need of protectionfromhypotheticalevils,andtoomuchchocolate.”

In the same issue, the Times reportsthatababy,achildandanadulthavebeen admitted to hospitals with newcases of the salmonella Monteverdistrain, also known as SmvdX07. TheHealth Protection Agency raises thecountofcasestothirty-oneinEnglandand Wales since March 1, with themost affected group being two-year-olds. The agency says it first noticedanuptickincasesonMay22.

Business columnist Sheila O’Flanaganof the Irish Times writes: “Purely


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precautionarywouldhavebeendoingsomething about it back in January.Thecurrentrecallisn’tprecautionary.It’s slamming a stable door after thehorse has not only bolted but done alapofthetrack.…Whatonearthwerethey thinking when they allowedsalmonella infected product onto theshelves? … The ‘we know best’mentality isn’t one that works whenyou have to deal with anxiousconsumers. … An arrogant company,suggesting that they considered theproblem, but didn’t think it worthdealing with, will not find the publicvery sympathetic. … Nevertheless,confidence in the brand has beenshaken. And it’s not becausesomething bad happened – problemsalways occur. It’s because thedirectors sat around and discussed itand decided that the profitabilitytrade off was probably worth a fewpeoplegettingsick–andthat’salwaysthewrongdecision.”

The Burton Mail reports, “Tests byfood safety officers have found thathalf of shopkeepers visited in Burtonhaveignoredthefoodhazardwarningfor various Cadbury’s chocolateproducts.” The East StaffordshireBoroughCouncilsentanotherwrittenwarning to all shopkeepers afterfinding the initial recall had beenignored in about half of local stores.Rob Morgan, head of environmentalhealth,tellstheMail:“Inthiscaseafterwe informed the shop owners,everybody was happy to take theproductsofftheshelves.Theyallsaidthey weren’t aware, which is quite asurprise(Powles,2006).”

Day 9: July 1, 2006—The Guardianreports:TheHealthProtectionAgencycalled the Food Standards Agency onJune16 toexpress itsconcernsaboutapotentialsalmonellaoutbreak.SinceMarch1,theHealthProtectionAgencyhas received an unusual number ofsamples with the Montevideo strain,

which is usually found in hotterregions of theworld. The caseswerescattered geographically rather thanclustered, as is the case with mostfoodpoisonings.Halfthevictimswereunder two. Officials at HealthProtection suspected a nationallydistributed product marketed tochildren. Their investigation focusedon nine samples from an anonymouscompany,allofwhicharrivedinearlyFebruary. The lab refused to identifythe source, so Health Protectionturned to Food Standards to use itspowers toget the source’sname.Theagencies learned that Cadbury’sHerefordshire factory sent thecontaminatedcrumbtoitsBournevillefactory,where itwas stored in a silo,and later mixed with other batches.About thirty brands were madeduring the period that thecontaminated crumb was in thefactory. Birmingham authorities aresifting through Cadbury warehousesin search of contaminated stock.Herefordshire authorities are alsoinvestigating whether thecontaminationmighthave come fromanearbydumpaboutahalfmilefromtheCadburyplant.Thedumpcontainsrottingchickenfeathers,animalparts,andfeces.

Concernedthecrumbmayhavefoundits way into the full line of chocolateproducts, the Food Standards Agencyordered testing for thirty more linesof Cadbury products, the Guardianreports. An agency spokesman says,“TheremaybecontaminationinotherCadbury products.” A Cadburyspokeswoman responds: “We aretestingproductlinesfourtimesaday,andenvironmentalheatharecheckingsotheycanfeelasconfidentaswedoabout our testing regime. We havetesting all products and found nosalmonella.” Kath Dalmeny, policyexpert for the independentwatchdoggroupTheFoodCommission,says:“It


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seems Cadbury has been arrogantenoughtorelyonitsreputationtogetit through a crisis rather than takingimmediateaction(Lawrence,2006).”

The Grocer, a trade publication,interviews several players within theindustry to comment on Cadbury’sposition in the wake of the recall(Carmichael,2006):

Paul Osborne, a confectionary buyerforHancocksC&C,says:“Cadburyhasbeen quite lucky in oneway.Most oftheaffectedproductsdon’thavedirectrivals, so there’s no alternative forpeopletoswitchto.”

DavidArkwright,brandingconsultantatMEAT,says:“BrandslikeCadbury’sare like human beings and areforgivable,buttheyhavetoearnthat.I’m confident that Cadbury can beforgiven,butitwouldhavetopresentitself as penitent and this must bedone purposefully. I’m not surethey’ve done that as much as theyought, should and could, but it’s abrand with huge equity and publicaffection and that can outweigh anymomentarynegative.”

Paul Cousins, director of Catalystmarketing consultants, says: “In theshort term, the effects will benoticeable: some people are nervous.There’ll be a short-term dip in sales,but in the long term I don’t think it’llmakemuchdifference.”

On the day of the recall, CadburySchweppes chairman Sir JohnSunderland – though not acting quitelikehimself–gaveanupbeatkeynoteaddresstotheannualluncheonfortheBiscuit Cake Chocolate &Confectionary Association, accordingto The Grocer. Sunderland remindedhis audience of the positive role thathis industry plays in the lives ofordinary Britons, providing safe,

affordable, quality food. He closed bytelling his audience they would hearmoreaboutfoodsafetythatafternoon.Afewhourslater,Cadburyannounceditwouldrecallonemillioncandybars(Carmichael,2006).

Day 10: July 2, 2006—Cadburypublicly rejected suggestions that itshouldrecallmoreofitsproductsdueto the salmonella scare, according toAFX News. Through a spokesman,Cadburysays,“We’renotrecallinganymore products. Environmental healthofficershavetestedanumberofotherproducts, which is perfectly normal.We’ve tested tens of thousands ofproducts and they’ve all come upnegativesowedonotbelievethereisany reason to recall any otherproducts.”

Day 11: July 3, 2006—Analystsestimate the scare will cost CadburySchweppes £25 million, according tothe Daily Mail: £5 million in recallcosts,withtherestinlostsalesduringto a loss of consumer confidence(Poulter,2006).

Day 12: July 4, 2006—The FoodStandards Agency says in an officialreport that Cadbury’s food safetysystem is unreliable, outdated, andunderestimates the level andlikelihood of salmonellacontamination. Birmingham foodsafetyteamleaderNickLowetellstheGuardian, “Whatwe andCadbury aredoing with testing is just at theneedle-in-haystack level.” Cadbury’sresponse: “Atall timeswehaveactedingoodfaithandwedonotchallengethe views of the expert committee ortheenvironmentalhealthofficers.Wewill be changing our procedures inlight of their advice (Lawrence,2006).”

The agency’s report also saysCadbury’sriskassessmenterredwhenit drew parallels between the


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thresholdforsalmonellainfectionandthe thresholds for infection by othermicro-organismsthatmaybefoundinchocolate,accordingtotheAssociatedPress. The agency says: “We think(Cadbury) made a mistake inassuming there was a safe level ofsalmonellainaproductlikechocolate.Ourviewisthereisn’t.”

Day 13: July 5, 2006—TheDailyMailreports that Cadbury informed theFood Standards Agency of a similarcontamination incident in 2002, buthad yet to submit paperwork withdetails, such as the affected productsor factories. “I don’t know if itwas acynicalmove by Cadbury,” an agencyspokesman tells the Mail, “but wewould have expected to be informedabout it as soon as it happened.” Theagency also criticized the company’sapproach to detecting contamination,telling the Mail (Levy, 2006):“Cadbury’s risk assessment does notaddress the risk of salmonella inchocolate in a way that the (FSA’sindependent Advisory Committee onthe Microbiological Safety of Food)would regard as a modern approachto risk assessment.We can’t rule outthepossibilitythatotherproductsareaffected.”

The 2002 incident at the Marlbrookplantinvolvedthesamerarestrainofsalmonella,thefoodStandardsAgencytells the Independent (Hickman,2006). The Herefordshire CountyCouncil says it was not informed oftheincident.

Cadbury detected the strain in twoproducts – Cadbury’s Dairy Milk andBrazilCaramel–as longagoas2002,but failed to notify governmentauthorities, the Guardian reports(Lawrence, 2006). Cadbury told theFood Standards Agency it destroyedtheproductsatthetime.Cadburytellsreportersitwasunabletoidentifythesourceofthatcontamination.

Several tankers of chocolate crumbfrom the Marlbrook plant testedpositive for the rare strain during athree-week period in 2006, theGuardianreports.However,Cadbury’sjust-in-time production systemallowed the tankers to leave and thecontentstobemixedatotherfactoriesbefore the test results werecompleted. A tanker left the plantevery hour, but results were notavailable for twenty-seven to twenty-nine hours, rendering “the testmeaningless,” said Andrew Tector,head of environmental health inHerefordshire. A Cadburyspokeswoman tells the Guardian:“Under the legislation, it is left to themanufacturer to determine theirtesting protocols. We did this basedon sound independent science. At alltimes we acted in good faith(Lawrence,2006).”

In a statement published in theBirmingham Evening Mail, Cadburytells the news media that it willcontinue to seek guidance from theFood Standards Agency andenvironmental health officers:“However, we welcome theconfirmation by the FSA that theybelieve‘proportionalactionwastakenbyrecallingsevenproducts.’”

“ThePRplanwastoolittle,toolateforCadbury. The day it discoveredsalmonella in its chocolate, it shouldhave set the PR wheels in motion,”Ruth Shearn, managing director ofRMS PR, tells the trade magazineMarketing.

Day 14: July 6, 2006—The outbreakcouldbe the first inaseriesofhealthscaresinthefoodindustry,MarketingWeek speculates. An anonymousindustry insidersays, “I can’t imaginethatCadburyistheonlycompanythattests for salmonella in this way.”Cadbury responds that its detectiontestsarebasedon“hardscience.”


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Investment bankers JP Morganspeculates ina researchnote that theoutbreak will cost Cadbury in excessof £30 million (about $55.4 millionUS), according to AFX News: “Therecall has received a growing andincreasingly negative amount ofmedia coverage damaging the brandimage and the corporate reputation,”the note says. Morgan recommendsinvestors avoid Cadbury until the“situation is clarified.” Cadburyresponds that it is “far too early totell”whattheeventualcostswouldbe,and adds “… you can’t estimatewhatthe sales impact might or might notbe.” The company says it plans toaddress the issue when it publishesinterimresultsforthesecondhalf.

Day15:July7,2006—Attheurgingofthe Food Standards Agency, Cadburyagreestoacomprehensivecleaningofall production lines at theMarlbrookplant, according to the Guardian.Third-partycompaniesusedchocolatecrumb from the Marlbrook plant tomanufacture chocolate products, theGuardian says (Lawrence & Meikie,2006),buttheFoodStandardsAgencyis unable to provide a list of thosecompanies.

Cadbury agrees to destroy anychocolate testing positive forsalmonella, however small, accordingto the Western Daily Press. Aspokesman for the Food StandardsAgency says, “We are not saying thewhole plant is contaminated butsalmonella is a very difficult thing togetridofandthedrypowdercangetinallthecrackssothebestthingtodois have a complete overhaul, startfrom scratch and clean the wholeplaceup(Hughes,2006).”

Cadbury also agrees to releaseproductsonlyaftertestresultsreturn

negative, says the Birmingham DailyMail.

Day 16: July 8, 2006—The Times ofLondon explains to its readers thesciencebehind salmonella as a threatto food safety and human health:Large numbers of salmonella willinterfere with the function of thedigestive tract. The bacteria preventthe body from absorbing waternormally,andthe liquid ispassedoutasdiarrhea. It takesroughlyamillionsalmonella cells to make a personnoticeably ill.Butas fewas2,000cancauseillnessiftakeninchocolate.Thefat in the chocolate protects thebacteria from digestive acids.Chocolate isaperfectvehicle tocarrythe cells into the small intestine.Chocolate is not submitted to hightemperatures during themanufacturing process that wouldnormally kill salmonella. Exceptionalcaremustbe taken tomakesure thatthe raw ingredients are free of thebacteria before the process begins.“Salmonella infection is so commonthat wemight have been unaware ofCadbury’s problems,” the Times says,“hadthevarietyofbacteriuminvolved– Montevideo – not been so rare(Parry,2006).”

Cadbury dismisses speculation thatmore companies couldbedrawn intothe scare, according to a story in theBirmingham Post, which identifiesseveral third-party companies whobuy chocolate crumb from Cadbury,including Premier Chocolate, PremierBeverages, and British Sugar. Nonereceived the contaminated crumb,Cadbury says. The Food StandardsAgencyconfirmsCadbury’sstory:“Wehavenoreasontobelieve(thecrumb)wouldhavebeencontaminated.”

Day 17: July 9, 2006—The SundayExpress inLondon(L. Johnson,2006)reports that Chris Huhne, anenvironmental spokesman for the


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LiberalDemocrats,isdemandinglegalaction against Cadbury: ”This lookslikeacaseofcorporatecover-upwhenwhat was needed was an honestowning-up. Cadbury’s should beprosecuted to ensure all foodmanufacturers know safety mustcomefirst.ItsfailuretonotifytheFSAisaclearbreakofitslegalduty.”JerryMorris,afoodexpertattheCharteredInstitute of Environmental Health,agreesthatCadburyshouldanswertothe public: “Wewould want to knowthe reasons why Cadbury’s riskassessment differs from that of thegovernmentexperts.”

Catherine Henderson, 62, of CountyAntrim in Northern Ireland, tells theSunday Express (L. Johnson, 2006)that she was in a hospital isolationward for five days after eating aCadbury Caramel. “I never thoughtyou could get ill like that fromchocolate,” she says. “I didn’t think Iwould come out alive. … I am notlooking for money. I just feel thecompany should have been moreresponsible in informing people.”SolicitorsatIrwinMitchellhavetakenher case. A Cadbury spokeswomandenies the company withheldinformation about the contaminationand says Cadbury’s had scientificevidence to show “levels of the bugfoundweretoolowtoposearisk.”

Day 19: July 11, 2006—Sallie Booth,anattorneywiththeIrwinMitchelllawfirm representing salmonella victimCatherineHenderson, tells theBelfastNewsLetter:“Aschocolateistargetedmainly at children, the measurestakenbyCadbury’s shouldhavebeenultra-rigorous.”

Day 24: July 16, 2006—The pollsterBrandIndexsaysCadburyhaslosttheconfidenceofconsumers,accordingtothe Sunday Telegraph in London(Murray-Watson, 2006). Just beforethe scare began, Cadbury posted a

brandscoreof44;after theoutbreak,the score fell to 22. Brand Indexmonitors thereputationsofhundredsof organizations. The brand score isbased upon responses toquestionnaires. Chief executiveStephan Shakespeare tells theTelegraph: “The loss of confidence inCadbury is thegreatestwehave seensince we started Brand Index ninemonths ago. The issuehas gone rightinto the core of the publicconsciousness.”

Day 25: July 17, 2006—Cookingcolumnist Julia Watson says in adispatch from United PressInternational: “How appropriate that(Cadbury)arenowpayingafarhigherprice than theywouldhavedonehadthey behaved as though theircustomers were indeed their highestpriorityassoonastheydiscoveredtheleakingwaterpipe.”

Day 29: July 21, 2006—The HealthProtection Agency reports thatCadbury products were the probablecause of a national outbreak ofsalmonella Montevideo, the GuardianUnlimited says, with fifty-six casesdocumented since March. Theagency’soutbreakcontrolteam(OCT)obtained detailed food histories offifteen victims; of them, thirteen (or85 percent) had consumed Cadburyproducts. The agency says, “Aftercarefully considering all the availableevidence the OCT concluded thatconsumption of products made byCadbury Schweppes was the mostcredible explanation for the outbreakof salmonella Montevideo.” Cadburyresponds: “We are sorry to hear thatpeople have been unwell. We’vealready announced that we havechanged our protocols because weunderstandthattheconsumers’desirefor no risk at all is paramount. Anyproduct showing any traces ofsalmonellawillbedestroyed.”


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UK government investigatorscomment on the Cadbury recall in areportpublishedintheCommunicableDisease Report Weekly: “No othercommon brands, retail outlets,catering chains or single food typeswere identified as common factors(AssociatedPress,2006,July21).”

Day 30: July 22, 2006—TheIndependent in London reports thatCadbury says it will considercompensation for outbreak victims.The Health Protection Agency says ithas identified forty-nine primarycases of salmonellaMontevideo sinceMarch1.Of those, thirty-sevenareofthesamestrain–SmvdX07–foundinthe Cadbury products. The agencyestimates the reported casesrepresent between111 and185 totalcases linked to Cadbury products.Cadbury declines to say whether itagrees with the HPA’s conclusions. ACadbury spokeswoman tells theIndependent: “If any people comeforward, we will take their situationseriously and consider their case(Hickman, 2006).” David Standard ofthe law firm Irwin Mitchell tells theScotsman in Glasgow: “Confirmationof the causal link between Cadbury’sproducts and this rare and seriousform of salmonella means the casestrengthens for those willing to takelegalaction(Jamieson,2006).”

Day 37: July 29, 2006—TheBirminghamEveningMailreportsthatCadburywill tell investors in its half-year report that the salmonella scarewill cost the company at least £30million.Ofthat,£5millionistheresultof the recall of one million chocolatebars.Cadburyhasyettoindicatehowmuch the scare has affected sales inthe seven weeks since thecontaminationbecamepublic.Thereisalso no assessment of howmuch thecompany may pay in related legalcosts(Morley,2006).

Day38:July30,2006—AndrewWood,an analyst at New York brokerageSanford C. Bernstein, tells theIndependent: “Public recalls are notunusual in the food industry. Sowhyhas this one garnered so muchattention? For a start, salmonella inchocolate doesn’t seem to jive, andthey have known about it sinceJanuary. Its reputation has suffered.”Thayne Forbes, joint managingdirector of the brand expertsIntangible Business, agrees: “ForCadbury, this is a really serious PRproblem because it affects childrenandit’sahealthissue.Theyshouldbetaking a proactive approach, be seento be giving advice and putting inplacequalitycontrol,andIreallydon’tseethemdoingthat.…Theyaretryingtodownplaytheeffects,whileIwouldsay theyshouldbe trying toestablisha quick, concerted and extensiveprogrammetosortitout.Otherwise,itlooks like they don’t really care(Townsend,2006).”

Day 39: July 31, 2006—Stockbrokerage ABN Amro estimatesa£25milliondropinsales, leadingtoa £15 million drop in profits,according to theWestern Daily PressinBristol(Buckland,2006).

Day 41: Aug. 2, 2006—Five of theseven brands that Cadbury recalledare scheduled to return to storeshelves,coincidingwiththereleaseofCadbury’s 2006 interim results,according to a report from AgenceFrancePresse.

AccordingtotheBirminghamEveningMail, Cadbury Schweppes CEO ToddStitzer is telling investors thatchocolate sales have plunged 14percent since the scare began. Heexpects a total bill of at least £26million. Half is due to the recall, therest to manufacturing improvementsand dealing with news media.Insurance will cut the total bill by


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about £6million. Despite these costs,thewell-diversifiedcompanyposteda24 percent boost in pre-tax profits(£402 million) for the six monthsleading to July 30, 2006 (Morley,2006).

Cadbury CEO Stitzer defendsCadbury’s decision not to inform theFood Standards Agency when thecompany discovered thecontaminated crumb, according to anAFX News report. “We felt that wewere acting in accordance with whatthelawspecifiessowedidn’tfeelthatwe were doing anything wrong,”Stitzersays.“Clearly, inconversationswiththeFSAtheyhadadifferentviewand we’ve changed our processesbecausewe don’t want consumers tohave any possible concern about ourprocesses and our products (AFXInternationalFocus,2006).”

“We clearly caused concern to ourconsumersandweare trulysorry forthat,” Stitzer tells the EveningStandard (Miller, 2006) in London.The company plans to spend £5million in advertising and marketingtoreassurecustomers.

The overall market for candy in theUnited Kingdom fell by 7 percentduring July because of a major heatwave, according to Market Watch.Cadbury’s market share fell by 1.1percentduringthefirst fourweeksofthe second half, thanks to the heatcombined with the recall. Shares forCadburySchweppesrose3percent inmorning trading after the first-halfresultswerereleased(Lagorce,2006).

The company’s first-half profits beatthe consensus among analysts, whoexpected profits to come in atbetween £376 million and £398million. Cadbury said the sevenproduct lines that were recalledrepresent less than 3 percent ofBritishsalesandabout0.5percentof

group sales, Agence France Pressereports.

Claire Collingwood, a trader at CMCMarkets in London, tells theAssociated Press, “The main reasonbehind the share price jumpwas thereliefthatthecostofitsrecallwasnotas much as the market has feared.”David Lang at Investec says, “TheburningquestionishowtheconsumertreatsCadburyatChristmas(Stringer,2006).”

Brandsurveysindicatethatconsumerconfidence inCadbury is returning tonormal, says Simon Nixon atbreakingviews.com: “The companystillshowsaworryingrefusaltoadmitit has done anything much wrong.”Cadbury stands by its originalprotocols,hasapologizedonly for the“concern”theoutbreakhasgenerated,and continues to cast doubt on theideathatCadbury is thesourceof theoutbreak: “Cadbury’s stance suggestseither complacency or confirms thethreat of legal action – fromconsumers and regulators – remainsreal,”Nixonwrites.

Day 42: Aug. 3, 2006—CEO ToddStitzer continues to defendCadbury’spre-outbreak protocols, the Times ofLondon reports, but he admitsCadbury has upgraded to a “zeropresence testing” system since thescarebegan. Inaddition,Cadburyhasmodified some of its operations(includingtransportationofchocolatecrumb) to improve hygiene, Stitzersays. He also says that local plantmanagers followed companyprocedures, and that he made nochanges to management at theMarlbrook facility. Stitzer playeddown the effect of the outbreak on aslump in sales since June 23, puttingthe blame instead on Britain’s recentheat wave. He says the companyexpectsminimaldamagetoCadbury’sreputationorsales(Klinger,2006).


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Cadbury says it will resumesponsorship of “Coronation Street” inthe fall with a £5 million deal,according to the Birmingham Mail(Morley,2006).

Cadbury Schweppes Chair JohnSunderland says he and the boardlearned about the salmonella issuejust two days before the recall, theMail reports (Morley, 2006). TheTimes says thatCEOToddStitzerdidnot know about the salmonellaproblem until “some time after itsdiscovery(Klinger,2006).”

CEO Todd Stitzer tells the Mail(Morley, 2006): “Although we havealwaysactedingoodfaiththroughout,wehavecausedconcernsandforthatIamextremelysorry.”

In an opinion piece for the Guardian,journalist Nils Pratley writes, “ItwouldbedifferentifCadburyscrewedup again, but British consumers, byandlarge,areforgiving.”

Day 44: Aug. 5, 2006—Cadbury hassent letters of apology to 28,000convenience stores in its distributionchannel, the Grocer reports. Theletters thank the stores for theirsupportandforhelpingtoexecutetherecall “as quickly and efficiently aspossible.” The letter adds: “…we aretaking all the necessary steps to putthis right at both our manufacturingsitesandintheeyesofthepublic.”

Day 66: Aug. 27, 2006—The FoodStandards Agency will bankroll aninvestigationoftheCadburychocolatefactory by the Herefordshire council,the Sunday Telegraph reports. Themoney will come from a £200,000fightingfundand“willhelpexpediteaprosecutionofCadbury,”accordingtotheTelegraph.“Prosecutionwillmeanthat the company receives furthernegative publicity, possible just as itenters thekeyChristmassalesperiod(Northedge,2006).”

Day 96: Sept. 26, 2006—Staffmembers at the Food StandardsAgency are annoyed by the lack ofcooperation from Cadbury, accordingtodocumentsacquiredundertheUK’sFreedom of Information law, theBelfast Telegraph reports (Hickman,2006). The agency staff privatelyconsideredthatCadburyhasposedanunacceptable risk to the public.Meeting minutes show that staffmemberswereunhappywithalackofresponse forrequests for informationthat would have helped thegovernment better deal with theoutbreak. Also, a request forCadbury’s risk assessment wentunfulfilled. “All requests forinformation have to be reinforced,”thedocumentsaid.

Day 99: Sept. 29, 2006—The FoodStandards Agency’s AdvisoryCommittee on Microbiological Safetyof Food (ACMSF) is calling forCadbury to implement a “robust”HazardAnalysisCriticalControlPointsystem at its manufacturing plants,according to the trade publicationProcess Engineering. But Cadburyclaimsitalreadyhassuchasystematall factories. The article says thatCadburyreliedonend-producttestingthat ACMSF found unsuitable fortestingforfoodsafety.“Thecompanywrongly drew parallels between thethresholdforsalmonellainfectionandthe threshold for infection by othermicro-organisms found in chocolate,”the article says. ”(but) there is nominimum infection dose forsalmonella.”

Day116:Oct.16,2006—Stockbrokersin England are turning negative onCadburyasthesharepriceslipsby6pto 551.5p, the Guardian Unlimitedreports. MerrillLynchgoes frombuytoneutral; JPMorgandrops its ratingaswell, and tells its clients: “Cadburyhasbeenstruggling toregainpositivesales momentum in UK chocolate


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sincetheannouncementofitsproductrecall(oversalmonella)on23June.…If the authorities were to take legalaction,CadburycouldfaceanotherPRnightmareandwebelieveseriousbadpresscould result in furtherpressureon sales – with serious financialconsequences if that were to happenduringtheChristmasseason.”

Day 126: Oct. 26, 2006—Cadbury’schocolate sales have dropped by 5percent since the beginning of July2006, as compared to sameperiod in2005,theEveningStandardinLondonreports.Cadburyhasblamedarecentheat wave for slow sales, but bothsummers were unusually hot forBritain. Meanwhile, consumerconfidence in thebrandhasreturned,Cadbury claims, citing rising sales foranewproduct calledFlakes.CadburyCEO Todd Stitzer “stressed theimportance of the returningconfidence in the Cadbury nameamong British consumers in the runup to the crucial Christmas season,”theEveningStandard says (Armitage,2006).

AnewACNielsenresearchreportsaysMars – themanufacturer of Snickers,Twix,andMilkyWay–hasovertakenCadbury as the market leader inBritish chocolate,with a33.7percentshare vs. Cadbury’s 31.3 percentshare, according to the EveningStandard. Cadbury CEO Todd Stitzerdisputesthereport,claimingCadburyowns a 3 percentage-point lead overMars in 2006 year-to-date sales ofchocolate. He accused the FinancialTimes, which broke the story, of a“totallyoverzealous interpretation”ofa single month’s figures, and sayspublicconfidenceinCadburyproductshas returned to pre-contaminationlevels. The coming Christmas seasonaccounts for 35 percent of Cadbury’s

annual sales in the United Kingdom(Armitage,2006).

Day 127: Oct. 27, 2006—“Cadbury isnot the only one suffering; thewholeUK confectionery market has beendown5 (percent) since thebeginningofJuly,”theDailyMailreports(Brown,2006). The Birmingham Post quotesCadburyCEOToddStitzer:“Haditnotbeen for the continued long, warmspell, the group would have met itstargetsforrevenueandmargingrown.… The UK confectionary market,which accounts for 15 percent of ourgroup sales, has been weak, but wethinktheweatherhadagreatereffectthantherecalldifficulties.”Around70percentofCadbury’ssalescome fromthe Americas and the Asian Pacific.ChrisHuhne,aLiberalDemocratwhoserved as the Department forEnvironment, Food and Rural Affair’s“shadow secretary,” tells the Post:“Cadbury has paid the price for itsfailuretoquicklytacklecontaminationin its plants, and then for failing toownupquicklyandputthingsright.…Itisanotherobjectlessonthatinareasconcerning public health, companiescannot be too careful with theirreputation, and also that regulatorsneed to be tough and vigilant (Pain,2006).”

Day130:Oct.30,2006—Cadburytellsanalysts that the company will nolonger forecast profitability growth,saying it will increase operatingmargins “over time” while avoidingspecifics,theAssociatedPressreports.

Day 135: Nov. 4, 2006—ACNielsennow says that Mars usurpingCadburysfordominanceoftheBritishchocolate market “was a blip,”accordingtoTheGrocer.ThevalueofCadbury’stop-sevenchocolatelinesissignificantlyhigherthanthetop-sevenlinesofMasterfoods(ownerofMars):£670 million to £560 million. Inrelatednews,asurveybyYouGovsays


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consumer confidence in Cadbury isalso recovering. “Trust in the(Cadbury) brand plummeted directlyafter the salmonella scare but hassteadilyrisensince,althoughit isstillnot up to pre-salmonella levels,” TheGrocersays.

Day 136: Nov. 5, 2006—CEO ToddStitzer spent the previous weekmakingpresentationstoinvestorsandanalystsinLondonandNewYork,theSundayTimesreports.Theresult?Theshare price fell 3.7 percent. Stitzersaystheresponsewaspredictable,theresultofalotofinformationinashorttime. “Stitzer is confident that inBritain, Cadbury’s chocolate canrecover from the trauma of thesalmonella episode,” the SundayTimessays.“Araftofnewproductsisto be launched between now andChristmas. … Stitzer predicts that inBritain there will be big increases insales of dark and premium chocolate(Laurence,2006).”

Day173:Dec.12,2006—Cadburyhasraised its estimate of the costs itincurred during the salmonellaoutbreak to £30 million ($59 millionUS),accordingtoAgenceFrancePress.The change reflects “highermanufacturing and facilityrectification and remediation costs,”thecompanysaidinastatement.

Day 177: Dec. 16, 2006—“The awardfor cock-up of the year,” The Grocersays, “could go to no one else butCadbury for its management of thesalmonellascare.”

Day 235: Feb. 12, 2007—Cadbury isrecalling its chocolate Easter eggsafter learning that the productmightpost a danger to consumerswith nutallergies,theBirminghamPostreports(Revill, 2006). Liquid chocolate usedin the eggs were mistakenly“manufacturedona line thathasalsobeen producing chocolate which

contains nuts,” a Cadbury spokesmantellstheInternationalHeraldTribune.The products are “perfectly safe” forconsumers without nut allergies,Cadbury says (Nayeri, 2006). Dr. PhilStern,aconsumerbehaviorscholaratWarwick Business School, tells thePost: “As an alternative towithdrawing theproducts, they couldhave asked the retailers to putstickers on the eggs, saying theymaycontainnuts.Buttheychosenottodothat.Theydidnotconsider that tobereliableenough,anddecided to recallthe products. That is the mostresponsible decision they could havetaken.” The Post says, “Cadbury’spromptlyactionwasatextbookactionin dealing with the crisis, added Dr.Stern. The key, apparently, is toacknowledgetheissues,andpointoutif possible that it is not the result ofsome systematic failure, but rather aone-off(Revill,2006).”

Day 243: Feb. 20, 2007—Cadburyannounces a major investmentprogram in the United Kingdomfollowing “2006 results which werebelow market expectations,” AFXNews reports, by launching TridentguminBritain.Cadbury’sshareoftheUK market has recovered to 34percent by the end of 2006, aboutwhere it stood before the salmonellascare. “Our market share hasrecoveredinthefourthquarterand,inparticular,overtheChristmasseason,”CEO Todd Stitzer says. “(Thesalmonellaoutbreak)isnotsomethingyou’llhearustalkingaboutagain.”Headded that February’s nut-allergyrecall had been “immaterial” to salesand profits, but declined to discusspending legal actions under the UK’senvironmental health laws. Cadburyhaslearnedimportantlessonsfromitsproblemsin2006,Stitzersays.“We’reprofiting from those learnings, takingthem and applying them to ourbusinessgoingforwardsothatwecan


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be a bigger, stronger business,” hesays.“Ourrecordstandsforitself.”

Credit Suisse reiterates its“underweight” rating on Cadbury,with a target of 520 pence, citingfuturepressureonearningsbasedonthe company’s investment plans, AFXNewsreports.CitigroupratesCadburyabuyat620pence,andconsidersthesalmonella scare to be a short-termproblem.

Day 265: March 14, 2007—UScorporate raider Nelson Peltz revealsheownsa3percentstakeinCadbury,making him the company’s fourth-largestinvestor,theGuardianreports.On that news, market value forCadbury climbs by more than £1billion. Rumors say Peltz plans tobreak up Cadbury. England’s unionsexpress outrage; about 2,000 ofCadbury’s UK workforce (3,500)belong to the Transport and GeneralWorkersUnion(Finch,2006).

Day 267:March 16, 2007—Followingpressure from shareholders, the NewYorkTimes says, Cadbury announcedplans to separate its beverage unitfromitscandyunit.ThebeverageunitincludesDrPepper,7Up,CanadaDry,allSchweppesbrands,allMott’sjuices,and Hawaiian Punch (Werdigier,2006). “Once separated, bothbusinessescouldfallpreytobidsfromrivals or private equity companies,”says the Times. The Daily Telegraphsays, “It’s the biggest strategic movesince its merger with Schweppes in1969.”CEOToddStitzerinsiststhede-merger is the “culmination of a two-orthree-yearprocess(Wallop,2006).”ThiscontrastswithStitzer’sstatementless than a year before, just afterCadbury purchased the DrPepper/Seven Up Bottling Co. for£198 million, as the investmentcommunity anticipated a potentialdemergerofCadburyandSchweppes:“There is nothing to read into our

future strategy from today’s deal.Wehave done this because it is the rightthing for our beverage business andwillhelpitcontinuetogrow.(English,2006).”

Day 269: March 18, 2007—Critics ofthe decision to split CadburySchweppes into two companies saythe move could make Cadburyvulnerable to a hostile takeover. CEOTodd Stitzer disagrees, telling theSunday Times: “We would expect tobe the transformer rather than thetransformed (Laurence & Rushe,2007).”

Day 306: April 24, 2007—TheBirmingham City Council levies threecharges against Cadbury, eachpunishablebyunlimitedfines,oruptotwoyearsinprison,orboth,accordingto the Western Main: putting unsafecontaminatedchocolateonthemarketbetween Jan.19andMarch10,2006;failing to inform relevant authoritiesabout the dangers; and, failing toidentify the hazards posed by thecontamination.Cadbury issummonedto appear before the BirminghamMagistrates’ Court on June 15, 2007.Cadbury responds with a writtenstatement:“Wehavefullyco-operatedwith the authorities throughout theirinquiries and we will examine thecharges that have been brought. Asthere is now legal action pending, itwould be inappropriate for us tocommentfurther(Barnett,2007).”

Day 358: June 15, 2007—In a ten-minute hearing, Cadbury’s attorneyentered guilty pleas to the threecharges brought before theBirmingham Magistrates’ Court, theAssociated Press reports. In astatement of the hearing, Cadburysaid: “Mistakenly, we did not believethat therewas a threat to health andthus any requirement to report theincidenttoauthorities.Weacceptthatthisapproachwasincorrect.”


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Day 376: July 3, 2007—Cadburyattorneys appear in HerefordMagistrates’ Court to face chargesunder UK food and hygieneregulations, according to theAssociated Press. “The company didnot enter a formal plea,” theAssociatedPresssays,“butitslawyerssaid that the chocolate-makerintended toplead guilty to six countsof contravening food hygieneregulations.” The charges “related tothe state of repair of a drainage pipeand roof vent, the layout of thefactory, the provision of drainagefacilities and the cleaning anddisinfection of equipment, includingconveyors and storage silos,” theGuardian reports. The hearing wasadjourneduntil July13andmoved totheBirminghamCrownCourt.

Day386:July13,2007—Aprosecutorfor the Birmingham City Council toldthe Birmingham Crown Court that achange in Cadbury’s testing systemsled to the outbreak of salmonellapoisoning, the Guardian says(Smithers, 2007). Cadbury enteredguildpleastoallsixcharges.

ProsecutorBarryBerlintoldthecourtthat Cadbury altered its system in2003 to allow “safe levels” ofsalmonella to enter their chocolate-making processes, according to theBirmingham Evening Mail. Cadburyallowed the changes to its system tosave money and cut back on waste,theprosecutorsaid.Cadburydetectedthe presence of salmonella in itsproductsinJanuary2006,butfailedtoreport it until June despite regularlyscheduledvisitsfromlocalauthoritiesto the chocolate plant inHerefordshire every two months, hesaid. Berlin “insisted thereshouldbeno salmonella in ready-to-eatproductsatall,”theMailreported.“Hesaid the problem with chocolate andsalmonella was that the fat inchocolate preserved the organism.”

Cadbury “sought to savemoney fromwastage by allowing a tolerance forsalmonella in their food,” Berlin toldthe court, according to the PressAssociation. Berlin presented thecourt with research literature aboutsalmonella. “Cadbury knew perfectlywell, we submit, that outbreaks ofsalmonella had been associated withvery low levels in chocolate,” theprosecutor said. The LocalGovernment Chronicle quotes Berlinas telling the court: “There is nodispute that there is a linkagebetween the chocolate that wasdistributed by Cadbury and thepoisoningthattookplacelateron.”

Anthony Scrivener, QC, defenseattorney for Cadbury, describesCadburyasa reputable company thatmadeanerror,accordingtotheDerbyEveningTelegraph. “At no timedid itclose eyes to the risks or choose toaccept any risk,” he tells the court.“Nothing was destroyed or hidden –Cadbury believed it had nothing tohide.” He points out that Cadbury’stests for salmonella detected (at itshighest point) a level that is still 100timeslessthanthelevelthatCadburybelieved to be dangerous to humanhealth. “Negligence we admit,”Scrivener says, “but we certainly donot admit that this was donedeliberatelytosavemoneyandnoristhere any evidence to support thatconclusion.”

The Daily Telegraph (Bitten, 2007)reports,“Thecourtheardthatinearly2006 the problem was so endemicthat Cadbury staff were dealing with‘daily’ salmonella-related problems,and were referring to instances ofcontamination by an alphabeticalseriesofcodewordsratherthanusingwhattheyreferredtoasthe‘s-word.’”

TheWesternDailyPresssays,“Italsoemerged in court that some of thosewho were taken ill after eating the


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chocolate needed hospital treatment.One person began to vomit blood, a61-year-old woman lost 10lb inweightandanotherwomanwasso illshe could not attend her sister-in-law’sfuneral.”

After the hearing, Cadbury issues astatement:“Qualityhasalwaysbeenatthe heart of our business, but theprocesswe followed in theUK in thisinstance has been shown to beunacceptable.Wehaveapologized forthis and do so again today. Inparticular, we offer our sincereregrets and apologies to anyonewhowasmadeillasaresultofthis failure(WesternDailyPress,2007).”

Day 387: July 14, 2007—The DerbyEvening Telegraph reports, “ADerbyshire child will be awarded apayoutaftereatingCadburychocolateand falling ill with salmonella.”Cadbury agreed to the compensation,but did not admit responsibility. Ajudge will decide on the exact sumafterconsultingamedicalexpert.

Day 389: July 16, 2007—AFX Newsreports that the Birmingham CrownCourt has fined Cadbury £1 million(about$2millionUS)foritsroleinthesalmonella outbreak of 2006:£500,000forputtingunsafechocolatefor sale to the public, £100,000 oneach of two other charges, and£50,000 foreachof sixoffensesat itsMarlbrook factory. Recorder JamesGuthrie says in his ruling, “I regardthisasaseriouscaseofnegligence. Itthereforeneedstobemarkedassuchto emphasize the responsibility andcare which the law requires of acompanyinCadbury’sposition.”SallieBooth, a lawyer who is representingtwelve persons affected by thecontamination, says: “The 1 millionpoundfinesendsaclearmessagethatcompanies who have a great deal ofresponsibility for protecting publichealth cannot afford to ignore a

potentially dangerous situation andcannot take a risk with the public’shealth.” In the day’s trading, Cadburyshares fall0.2percenton theLondonStockExchange.

The Western Daily Press quotesRecorder Guthrie as saying to thecourtroom: “The victims varied fromtheelderlytotheveryyoungandtheirsymptoms varied in severity. Threepeople needed treatment in hospitaland all of them suffered extremelydistressing symptoms.” Andy Tector,head of environmental health andtrading standards service for theHerfordshire Council, says, “We arenow confident the factory atMarlbrook is operating within foodand hygiene regulations and willcontinue to work with Cadbury toensure this remains the case andconsumerscanbeconfidentthefirm’sproducts are safe to eat (Denby,2007).”

Law firm Irwin Mitchell confirms toThe Grocer that it is pursuing civilcases against Cadbury on behalf oftwelve individuals who claim to beaffected by the contaminatedchocolate(C.Williams,2007).

Cadbury’s chocolate tests positive forsalmonella thirty-six times betweenJanuary andFebruary2006, saysTheGuardian: “… it was not until thesuffering of several victims severalmonths later was linked to Cadburythat the products were pulled fromtheshelves(R.Williams,2007).”

Day 395: July 22, 2007—The Mirrorreports that a Health ProtectionAgency investigation holds Cadburydirectlyresponsibleforthirteenoftheknown fifty-six reported cases of theMontevideo strain of salmonella in2006. Of the fifty-six cases, thirty-seven were “possibly” caused byCadbury products, while thirteen ofthosewere “certain.,” theMirror says


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(MacLean,2007). Because the illnessratefellafterCadburywithdrewsevenbrands from the marketplace, theagency found that “consumption ofCadbury Schweppes’s products wasthe most credible explanation.”Cadbury issues a statement: “We aresorryforallthosewhosuffered.”

1-F.Theaftermath

March 26, 2009—Marketing Weekreports that the Cadbury’s brand is“themosttrustedchocolateproducer”intheUK,accordingtoapublicoptionsurvey published by Reader’s Digest:“…no other chocolate comes close totheparentCadburybrand in termsoftrust.” Cadbury chocolate enjoys awinningmarginof53percentoverthenearest brand. “Even a widelypublicized salmonella scare in 2006appearstohavehadnoimpactontheleveloftrustpeoplehaveinCadbury,”themagazinesays.

Cadbury’sUKmarketingdirectorPhilRumbol tells Marketing Week, “As acompany, Cadbury has really clearvalues that drive how it behaves. Inmany respects, you cannot separatethe company from the brand. Thosevalues of integrity, honesty andstriving to do the right thing governthe way Cadbury does business.” Hesays that Cadbury was involved incorporate responsibility “decadesbefore the phrase was coined.” Howdid Cadbury’s reputation survive thesalmonella scare? Rumbol creditshaveplenty in“thebankofgoodwill.”Rumbol says he signed on asCadbury’s marketing director just sixweeks before news broke of thesalmonella outbreak. “He described aconsumer focus group held at thetime,” Marketing Week reports,“whereonememberofthegroupcastaspersions on Cadbury’s handling ofthe issue, prompting the rest of the

group to vigorously defend thebrand.”Rumbolsays. “I’veneverseenthat before. … I would hypothesizethat level of trust comes from lots ofsmall things that Cadbury has donethat we have all experienced; maybenothing in particular sticks in yourmindbutyouhavetheoverallsenseoffairnessanddecency.”Ittakes“along,longtimeforthatkindofreputationtobuildup,”Rumbolsays(Jack,2009).

November 30, 2009—The UK trademagazine Management Today ranksCadbury as Britain’s fourth most-admiredcompany.

January 18, 2010—When asked todescribe his legacy as Cadbury’s firstforeign-born CEO, Todd Stitzer tellsthe Daily Telegraph, “I would like tothinkthatwhenmytimeisdonehere,peoplewillsaytherewasasea-changeincommercialandfinancialcapability.And that we did it in line with ourvalues.IfIgetsomemodicumofcreditfor delivering on both sides of thatequation,thatwouldbeagreatlegacy(Sibun,2010).”

January 19, 2010—After a hostilenegotiation that consumed fivemonths, US food conglomerate KraftFoods agrees to buyCadbury for £11billion UK (840p per share), about$19.5 billion US, according to theEvening Standard. The combinedcompanies create theworld leader inchocolate and sweets, and thenumber-two company in the chewinggummarket. “The agreed price is 13times Cadbury’s earnings. Cadburyhad argued that similar recenttakeovers in the sector had been for14 times earnings or more,” theStandard says. CEO Todd Stitzerwalks away with a payout worth £7million (which comes to a littlemorethan two years of compensation): £4million in cash; £3 million in stock.The Standard says, “He has beenhighlycriticalofKraft throughout the


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course of the bid, dismissing theAmerican company as an unsuitablepartner with low growth prospects.”Stitzer and Chairman Roger Carr arelikely to be pushed out of thecompany, the Standard says. JeremyBatstone-Carr at stockbrokerageCharles Stanley says, “We have toadmit surprise at how meeklyCadbury has acquiesced.” AndrewWood at stockbrokerage SanfordBernstein in New York says, “A yearfrom now, Kraft will be singing thepraises of what a great deal they got(English,2010).”

February 2, 2010—Seventy-twopercentofCadburyshareholdersvoteto approve the takeover bid. USbillionaire investor Warren Buffettcriticizes the deal, saying Kraft was“overpaying by using undervaluedshares to complete the deal. Buffett’scompany Berkshire Hathaway isKraft’s largest shareholder.“ Kraftsidestepped a vote among its ownstockholdersby reducing thenumberofsharestobeissuedforthedeal,”theNewZealandHeraldreports.

February 3, 2010—The EveningStandard in London reports thatStitzer will leave Cadbury aftertwenty-sevenyearswiththecompany.The newspaper estimates that Stitzerwill exit with about £20 million incompensation that includes sharesand long-term bonuses. Stitzer tellsthemediathathewilltake“sometimeout” to spend with his family, but:“YoucanbesuremyheartwillalwaysbeadeepCadburypurple.”

March 12, 2010—FT Magazine (apublication of Financial Times)reports in an extensive, behind-the-scenes story on theKraft acquisition:“WhenCadburyemployeeswoke thatmorning (January 19) to newspaperheadlines announcing the impendingsale of their employer, many weresurprised and angry. Some

descendants of Cadbury’s founderswere, too. They claimed that hedgefunds and other short-term investors– which owned close to one-third ofthe company’s stock as the bid battledrew to a close, up from just 5 percentbeforeKraftwentpublicwith itsoffer in September 2009 – had soldCadburyout.…Institutionalinvestors,meanwhile, were concerned thatCadbury had given in too easily.Cadbury’ssecond-largestshareholder,Legal & General, issued a statementsaying the final price did not ‘fullyreflect the long-term value of thecompany’ and that it was‘disappointed’ management hadrecommended the offer for an ‘iconicanduniqueBritishcompany’.”

May 18, 2011—Springfield Collegeannounces it will dedicate the newStitzer YMCA Center on May 19.Established through lead gifts fromthe Stitzer family, the Stitzer YMCACenter“isadestinationsite forYMCAprofessionalsandgroupsfromaroundthe world. It includes the nationalYMCA Hall of Fame, offices of theAssociation of YMCA Professionals(AYP),theSpringfieldCollegeOfficeofYMCA Relations and facilities forYMCAmeetingsandotherprograms,”thecollegesaysinanewsrelease.Thecollege quotes family spokesmanTodd Stitzer: “The defining values ofthe YMCA, and of Springfield Collegeas a premier educator of YMCAleaders, have profoundly influencedourfamily.Itisourhopethatthisnewcenterwillhelpempowerpresentandfuture YMCA professionals tomaximize theirpotential in service toall members of our society. And, inhonoring the visionaries who shapedthe YMCA movement, it willperpetuatetheirprinciples.”

Section2:Mappingthemessages


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2-A.Assessingtheoutrage

Of the twelve primary factorsidentified by risk communicationconsultant Peter Sandman (1993),Cadbury managed to violate at leasteleven during the chocolate scare,virtually guaranteeing the companywould provoke outrage among itscustomers, its regulators, London’sinvestment community, the Britishgovernment, and the news media.Let’s now examine these factors onebyone:

Voluntary or coerced?—We tend tothinkofcoercionastheresultofforce,and might at first glance dismisscoercion as a factor in the Cadburycase. After all, no one forcescustomers to purchase Cadburychocolate or to consume it. Butcoercionmayalsoresultfromfraud.IfI tell you that something is “perfectlysafe,”whilemyin-housedataistellingmethattheriskinvolvesatleastsomehazard, and you find out that Ideceived you, then you are likely tofeel you have been coerced throughfraud, and thus are likely to becomeoutraged.

One could make the case thatCadbury’s first mistake – beforechoosing to distribute contaminatedchocolate or resisting thegovernment’s attempts to recall itsproduct – was the much earlierdecision to alter its detectionprotocols (based on a shockinglyflimsy understanding of salmonellacontamination)so thecompanycouldcut costs on wasted product(BirminghamEveningMail,2007,July13).However,thisdecisionisnotatallsurprising.

Corporations are designed to pursueoneend,andthatisshareholdervalue.CEOs like Todd Stitzer (for all hisexpressed admiration of publicservice) are trained and indeed

required to relentlessly pursueshareholder value. “Today, mostcorporatelawscholarsembracesomevariantofshareholderprimacy,” legalscholarStephenM.Bainbridge(2002)says. A leadingcriticofcorporations,former Harvard professor DavidKorten (2010), agrees. “Any chiefexecutive officer of a Wall Street-tradedcorporationthatputssocialorenvironmental considerations aheadof financial return will soon findhimselfcastout indisgracethrougharevoltof institutional shareholdersorhostiletakeover.”

In2006,CadburywasaBritish-ownedcompany,butitsstocktradedonWallStreetanditsmanagementwasclearlyconcerned with impressing investorsintheUnitedStates.Moreover,StitzerisanAmericanlawyertrainedinNewYork City and acclimated to workingwith(andthinkinglike)thecorporatebehemoths of the New York StockExchange. Also, following its mergerwithSchweppes,Cadbury (whichhadlong behaved aggressively in themarketplace, often growing morefrom acquisition than frommarketing) stopped being the quaint,family-operated, Quaker-influencedcompany of British lore, and becameinstead an international corporateplayer. Such companies do not thriveon the world markets withoutadapting the American notion ofshareholderprimacy.

This doesn’t make Stitzer or mostotherCEOs“evil,”butitdoespointtoareality of modern business: Everycorporationisdesignedtobehaveasasociopath,topursueitsadvantages,to“externalize” any cost it can, and toresist attempts by anyone – evengovernmentregulators–toreininthecorporation’s desire to expand itspower,growitsmarket,pockethigherprofits, and increase shareholdervalue (Bakan, 2012). This is not apoliticalopinion.Itisalegalfact.


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To recognize this reality is not tobrand the corporation as “evil,” butrather to fathom that Big Businessconsiders the marketplace to be abattlefield, corporations tobe armies,andgovernmenttobeanuisancethatmust be usurped or circumventedwhenever possible. This is just howthegameisplayed,notjustbycustom,but also by law. The shareholder isfirst in all things. If there is a legalcornertobecut,thenitshouldbecut.Theonus isalwaysongovernment towritetherulesthatprotectthepublic,enforce them, and punish offenders.This is how a large organization ofintelligent,decent,law-abidingpeoplemakes the decision to distributechocolate that it knows iscontaminated, and why those samepeople will later defend theirorganization’sdecisionwithrighteousindignation and more than a littlehubris.

Natural or industrial?—Salmonellaare bacteria and thus are found innature. Natural things rarely triggeroutrage. While people will tend totolerate cruelty from Mother Nature,theyaregenerallyunwillingtoacceptthe same trait in their fellowhumansor their organizations. The presenceofsalmonellaoranycontaminantinamanufactured food like chocolate ispurely industrial, and thus tends totriggeroutrage.

This is especially true when anorganization chooses to cut costs byignoring the science behind foodsafety, which explicitly says that nolevelofsalmonellaissafeinchocolate,andthenattemptstofostertheblameon government regulations. “Wefollowed the rules” will not fly as anexcuse for skirting the hard sciencethat is supposed to guide yourmanufacturingprocess.

Familiar or exotic?—Both the WorldHealth Organization (2014) and the

US Centers for Disease Control andPrevention(2015)ranksalmonellaasa frequent contributor to foodborneillness in humans worldwide. In theUnited Kingdom, “salmonella is thepathogen that causes the mosthospital admissions – about 2,500each year” says the UK’s FoodStandardsAgency(2014).

However, in the Cadbury case, theculprit turnedout tobe anextremelyrare(at least, in theUnitedKingdom)strain,salmonellaMontevideo.Indeed,itwas the rareness of this strain thatpointed the finger at Cadbury as thesource of the contamination(BirminghamEveningMail,2006,June24)

Did the exoticness of this specificstrain actually trigger outrage amongthenon-experts?Thatseemsunlikely.While the strain is unusual, thesymptoms and the prognosis are thesame for more common strains:diarrhea,fever,andabdominalcrampsfor twelve to seventy-twohours afterinfection, lasting from four to sevendays, with more severe issues forinfants, the elderly, and those withweakened immune systems (Centersfor Disease Control and Prevention,2013).

WhatisexoticabouttheCadburycaseis the transmission of salmonellapoisoning through chocolate. Thepublic is at least somewhat familiarwith the presence of salmonellabacteria in meat, poultry, eggs, andrawmilk.FoodsafetyadvocatesintheUnited States and Western Europehave enjoyed significant success incommunicating a simple technique toprevent the bacteria from making usill: cooking food thoroughly beforeservingit.Thissolutiondoesnotworkfor chocolate. Chocolate becomesinedible when raised to thetemperatures required to killsalmonella bacteria. Worse yet,


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salmonella actually thrives inchocolate.

Not memorable or memorable?—Sandman (1993) refers to thememorable as the flipside of thefamiliar; that is, themorememorablearisk,themoreeasilyonecanimaginewhat can go wrong. Whether aparticular risk ismemorabledependsless on events, and more on thesymbols that act upon the public’smind, both consciously andunconsciously. The best source ispersonal experience, Sandman says;the second best is what we learnthroughnewsmedia.

For example, the headlines in theBritish press during 2006-07 servedto frame the situation for England’sreadingpublic:

• The Guardian (London) –Salmonella scare: Chocolatemay have poisoned morethan40

• The Times (London) – Amillion ‘food bug’ chocolatebarstakenoffshelves

• The Daily Telegraph(London) – Cadbury’sdeliberately let salmonellaintobars

• The Sunday Independent(Dublin) – Cadbury hidsalmonellasformonths

• Sunday Express (London) –I’m lucky to be alive, saysvictimofthechocolatebug

• The Guardian (London) –Poisoned patients andmysterysamples–howfooddetectives traced Cadbury’sbug

The stories tend to characterize(mostlythroughimplication)Cadburyand its executive team as greedy atbest and evil at worst. Upon this areheapeddescriptionsof empty shelvesingrocerystores(V.Elliott,2006),and

of truck after truck dumpingmillionsofCadburybars–weighingabout thesame as thirty-three double-deckerbuses–intolandfills,followedbydirewarnings to the nation’s children notto explore the landfills on WillieWonka-style treasure hunts (Leake,2006). Such should be expected.“Reporters deal in extremes instories,” crisis consultant James E.Lukaszewski says (2013), “tellingstories that have bright, attractivebeginnings, very little in the middle,anddevastatingorclimaticendings.”

All of this negative imagery directlyconflicts with England’s long-heldimageofCadbury (thecompany)asabeacon of social justice and Cadbury(thechocolate)asabelovedchildhoodmemory that connects deeply withEngland’s observances of Christmasand Easter. This incongruity revealsitself in the scene described byCadbury’s UK marketing director, inwhichaconsumerfocusgroupshoutsdown a member who dares toquestion Cadbury’s integrity, even asthe salmonella scaremakesheadlinesacrossBritain(Jack,2007).

Not dreaded or dreaded?—When wetalk about dread, we generally meanapprehension. We dread the thingsthatmakeusilloruncomfortable.Wedread cancer. We dread hazardouswasteandcontaminatedwater.Whenwe perceive that a company is doingsomething that may cause us to getcancer, or may contaminate ourdrinking water, we tend to becomeoutraged.

A very close cousin of dread,according to Sandman (1993), is“disgust.” Consider the following:Cattle and chickens are commonreservoirs of salmonella Montevideo,according to Cornell University(2013), and outbreaks are generallyassociated with imported spices andlive poultry. “Salmonella live in the


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intestinal tracts of humans and otheranimals, including birds,” the USCenters for Disease Control says(2013). “Salmonella are usuallytransmitted to humans by eatingfoodscontaminatedwithanimalfeces.Contaminated foods usually look andsmellnormal.Contaminatedfoodsareoften of animal origin, such as beef,poultry, milk, or eggs, but any food,including vegetables, may becomecontaminated.”

Now consider this quote from aCadbury executive: “Thehighest levelwe found was one-thirtieth of thelevelatwhichwewouldraiseanalertastoafoodsafetyissue(Allen,2006).”Cadbury hoped this and similartechnical information woulddemonstrateitsmasteryofthesubjectmatter and thus would calm thesituation. But when faced with thissort of information, non-experts arefarmore likely torespond: “What thehell? Cadbury thinks it’s OK to putanimal crap inmy chocolate?!!!” Thisresults from what Sandman (2012)calls the Yuck Factor; our instinctiveaversion to consuming animal fecescompletely overrides any explanationof just how little feces is in thechocolate. This aversion tends todriveoutrageupward.

Chronic or catastrophic?—Non-experts tend to become moreconcerned about risks that are (orhave the potential to become)catastrophic than those that arechronic (Sandman, 1993). In otherwords,communitiesaremorelikelytobecome upset about things that killpeopleinlargeclumpsinashorttime(like jumbo jets) than about thingsthatkillmorepeople inmuchsmallerclumps over a longer period of time(likefamilyautomobiles).Withthisinmind,wheredoweplaceafoodbornepathogen like salmonella on thechronic/catastrophicscale?

“Salmonellosis is one of the mostcommon and widely distributedfoodborne diseases, with tens ofmillions of human cases occurringworldwide every year,” according tothe World Health Organization(2013). In the United States andWestern Europe, salmonella is lesscommon but still chronic; we areunlikelytoeliminateabacteriumsuchassalmonellaaswehaveavirussuchassmallpox.

Americansdo a good job generally ofkeepingsalmonellacontaminationoutof pre-packaged foods. In 2014, theCenters for Disease Control recordedten outbreaks involving products asdiverse as poultry, cucumbers, nutbutter, spices, cheese, and frozenfeeder rodents. However, much riskremains in restaurants andhouseholds that fail to adhere to thecommonstandardsoffoodsafety.

All that aside, should we considersalmonella particularly catastrophic?Even in an epidemic, the symptomsfor salmonella remain typically mildand, while decidedly uncomfortable,usually last for only two to ten dayswithout treatment. Strictly speaking,salmonellawouldseemanimprobablecandidate to punch the catastrophicbuttonofcommunityoutrage.

However, one may argue that theCadburycasesimulatedacatastrophe,ascouldany food-poisoningcase thatinvolves pre-packaged food.Remember, the case came to theattentionofUKhealthauthoritiesonlybecausetheHealthProtectionAgencydetected a significant uptick – aboutforty cases of salmonella Montevideo– across Britain, and asked the FoodStandards Agency to investigate. Wecould reasonably consider this clumpof morbidity as a contributing factorin the community outrage thatfollowedCadburyduringandaftertherecall.Thismaystretchthelogictothe


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point of breaking, but is worthconsideringnonetheless.

Knowable or unknowable?—Theunknowable factor covers at leastthreecomponents:uncertainty,expertdisagreement, and detectability(Sandman,1993):

Uncertainty refers to the margin oferror:Howmuchdoweactuallyknowabout the risk, and howmuch doweknow about the worst-case scenario?In general, the non-experts are farmore comfortable with a dangerousbutfairlycertainriskthanwithasaferbutlesscertainrisk.

Expert disagreement refers to acommon situation in public disputeswhere each side trots out its subject-matter experts. These experts, ofcourse,disagreeonwhetheraspecifichazardisdangerousorsafe.Thenon-experts are generally morecomfortable with expert consensusthanwithexpertdisparity.

Detectability refers to whether aspecific risk may be perceived withoneormoreofthefivehumansenses.Ifwecanseeit,hearit,smellit,touchit, or taste it, we are less likely tobecome outraged by a potentialhazard. This is one reason why aradiation leak is far more likely tooutrageusthanagasleak.

All three components came into playduringtheCadburycontroversy.First,therewas theuncertainty ofwhetherthe Cadbury recall had successfullyremoved all or even most of thecontaminated candy from storeshelves,especiallygivennewsreportsthat many shopkeepers wereoblivious to the recall notice (J.Johnson,2006;Powles,2006),aswellas Cadbury’s steadfast refusal toacknowledge any uncertainty aboutits testing procedures or its decision-

making, such as Cadbury EuropeanPresident Matthew Shattock’s earlystatement that, “We are absolutelyconfident these minute levels ofsalmonella would not have madeanyoneill(Hayward,2006).”

Second, there was the expertdisagreement between Cadbury(whom one would expect to be anauthorityonfoodsafetyforchocolate)and its government regulators. Fromthebeginning,theseexpertsdisagreedonthebasic factsof thesituation, thepropersizeoftherecall,thedegreeofCadbury’s culpability, and even thefundamental science behindsalmonella poisoning in chocolate.Cadbury’s experts insisted that therisktothehealthofitsconsumerswas“minimal,” that the recallwas only “aprecaution” (Sayid, 2006), that therewas “noevidenceanyonehasbeen illfrom eating this chocolate,” and thatthe contaminated chocolate was“perfectly safe to eat” (Wales, 2006).Meanwhile,expertsatthegovernmentagencies condemned Cadbury’stesting protocols as outdated andunreliable (Lawrence, 2006 July 4),declaredthatnolevelofsalmonellaissafe when found in chocolate (J.Johnson, 2006), and said Cadburyshouldhaveapproached thesituationas a crisis bywarning the authoritiesand issuing an immediate recall ofsuspectedproducts(Leake,2006).

Third, there was the lack ofdetectability, as foods that arecontaminated with salmonella“usually lookandsmellnormal. (CDC,2013).” It was impossible for anyonetoexamineanyCadburyproductwithonly the five human senses and tellwhether it contained any trace ofsalmonellacontamination.

Controlled by me or controlled byothers?—Control is all about whoimplements any given action(Sandman, 1993). Most people feel


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much safer if they are driving a carratherthansimplyridinginacar.Oneof the reasons many people fear airtravel is that they must relinquishcontroltothepilot.Inasituationthatinvolvesrisk,organizationsarerarelywilling to cede control to acommunity, preferring that theorganizations’ experts exert theircontrol. For the experts, this makessense; for the non-experts, it’s oftenanoutrage.

Duringthefirstyearofthesalmonellacontroversy, Cadbury did its best tomaintain control of the situation. Itcontrolled the original distribution ofthecontaminatedproduct,andlargelycontrolled its recall. Itkeptcontroloftheincriminatingtestresultsuntilthegovernment all but demanded thatCadbury’s private lab identify thesourceofthecontaminatedsample.Ittried to control the decision on howmuchchocolatetorecallandhowwellto clean its contaminated factory inMarlbrook. It sought control over thedirection of the government’sinvestigation. It even attempted tomaintain control of the publicdiscoursethroughitsrhetoric,suchasthe company’s early assertion that,“We found the cause of the problem,fixed it, and subsequent tests provedwe were completely clear (Vasagar,2006).” At every turn, Cadbury’sattempts to control the situationserved only to increase the outragethatfueledthecontroversy.

Fair or unfair?—Fairness addressesthe balance between the distributionof risk and thedistributionof benefit(Sandman1993).IntheCadburycase,themostglaringlackoffairnessisthewayCadburyattemptedtoexternalizeits costs to its customers by alteringitsprotocols formanagingsalmonellacontamination in its chocolatecrumb.First,Cadburychosetosavemoneybylowering its testing standards forsalmonella contamination, thus

cutting back on wasted crumb(BirminghamEveningMail, 2007 July31). Second, Cadbury allowed itstankers to leave theMarlbrook plant,andallowed itsother factories tomixthe crumb into Cadbury products,before the company’s lab haddelivered results from the diagnostictests, which required up to 29 hoursfor completion (Lawrence, 2006 July5). Third, Cadbury had allowed itsfood safety system to becomeoutdated, and thus unreliable,according to the Food StandardsAgency (Lawrence, 2006 July 4). Bydefault,thesepracticesshiftedtheriskforsalmonellacontaminationontotheunsuspectingconsumerwhileofferingclear benefits to Cadbury’s bottomline. Such practices, once revealed tothenon-expertpublic,tendtoincreasecommunityoutrage.

Morally irrelevant or morallyrelevant?—Ifanyonepushedmoralityto center stage during the salmonellascare, itwasCadbury,whichhadlongwrapped itself in its Quaker heritage,even well after the Quaker influencehad ebbed from its leadership.Moreover,CEOToddStitzerhadcitiedCadbury’sQuakercultureasoneofthereasonshehad left theNewYork lawfirmLord,Day&LordtoworkfortheBritish chocolate-maker (MarketingToday,2006).

Yet,whenitcametimeforthatcultureto step forward and take moralresponsibility for a situation itsprocesses had created, Cadburyshirked. At first, Cadbury executivessimply denied the possibility thattheir candy had anything to do withtheoutbreak,while knowing fullwellthat Cadbury’s own diagnostics haddetected the contamination (Sayid,2006). Next, they publicly parriedwith regulators over the size of therecall as well as the details ofEngland’s food standards laws(Vasagar,2006;V.Elliot,2006). Long


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after the Health Protection Agencyfound a “molecular fingerprint” thatdirectly linked Cadbury to theoutbreak(Leake&Walsh,2006),CEOStitzer dodged responsibility,apologized only for causing concern,and insisted that the company hadfollowed UK’s food standards laws ingood faith when Cadbury decided toaccept a level of salmonellacontamination that exceeded zero(Daily Mail, 2006 August 3). AsSandman (1993) says, “What makespeople angry is not the failure toachievezero:It isthecasualnesswithwhich some companies accept thatfailure.” Worse yet, Cadbury didn’tsimply fail to achieve zero; it verydeliberatelychose toaccepta levelofrisk higher than zero to save moneyonwastedproduct.

Trustworthy or untrustworthy?—From the first day of the crisis,Cadbury attempted to manage thesituation by reassuring the Britishpublic through the nation’s massmedia. The company repeatedly citedits “rigorous testing process”(BirminghamEveningMail,2006June24) based on “sound independentscience” (Lawrence, 2006 July 26). ACadbury spokespersonwent as far asto deny any possible connectionbetween the outbreak and thechocolate (Bulldog Reporter’s DailyDog, 2006). Moreover, Cadburysuspended its long-standingsponsorship of a popular televisionprogram because the networkdeclined to allow the company toreplace its standard productadvertisements with reassuringmessages about theoutbreakand therecall(Bowery,2006).

Unfortunately for Cadbury, thegovernment agencies that police foodsafetyandpublichealth in theUnitedKingdom refused to co-operate withthe company’s reassurances. Instead,

the government issued publicmessagesalongtheselines:

• “Cadbury’s risk assessmentdoes not address the risk ofsalmonella in chocolate in away that the committeewould regard as a modernapproachtoriskassessment.We can’t rule out thepossibility that otherproducts are affected (Levy,2006).”

• “There may becontamination in otherCadbury products(Lawrence,2006July1).”

• “Wethink(Cadbury)madeamistake in assuming therewasasafelevelofsalmonellain a product like chocolate.Our view is there isn’t(Associated Press, 2006 July4).”

• “Wewouldwanttoknowthereasons why Cadbury’s riskassessmentdiffers from thatofthegovernmentexperts(J.Johnson,2006July9).”

• “No other common brands,retailoutlets,cateringchainsor single food types wereidentifiedascommonfactors(Associated Press, 2006 July21).”

• This dynamic points to arecurring theme inSandman’sresearch:Whenitcomes to managing outrage,not all sources ofinformation are treated asequal. The playing field inany crisis is asymmetrical,Sandman says, and tiltstowardthosewhoclaimthatthe hazard in question isreal, imminent, anddangerous.

• “People know the activists’warnings are probablyexaggerated; they generally


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approve of theexaggeration,”Sandmansays“People also know thecompany’s reassurances areprobably exaggerated, andconsider that a much moreserious problem. Theasymmetry is built in:Exaggerated warnings are apublic service, whileexaggerated reassurancesare a public disservice(2010).”

InCadbury’scase,thecompanywasn’tcompeting for the public’s trust withhyperbolic activists, but rather withgenerally methodical, understatedgovernment regulators. In anysituationwherethesourceofariskisahuge corporation that is attemptingto defend its brand and itsshareholder value, and its opponentsare underpaid government officialswhoare chargedwith lookingout forthe public’s welfare, the non-expertcommunity is far more likely tobelievethegovernment’sexpertsthanthe corporation’s spokespeople. Theresult? Every time that Cadbury said“minute traces” and the governmentsaid,“noamountissafe,”Cadburylosta littlemoreofthepublic’strust(TheGrocer, 2006 November 4), thusinflaming the community outrage itwasattemptingtocalm.

“Even lay persons recognize thatoverly-certainprojectionsofrisksthatfail to acknowledge the inherentuncertainty are simply unrealistic,”according to risk communicationresearchers Timothy L. Sellnow,RobertR.Ullmer,MatthewW.Seeger,andRobertS.Littlefield(2009).“Theybeg the question, how can anyoneknow for complete certainty how arisk might develop in the future?These overly certain and reassuringmessages also imply that thecommunicator is not being entirely

openandhonestregardingthenatureoftherisk.”

Responsive or unresponsive?—Cadbury CEO Todd Stitzer isconspicuously absent from the publicdiscourse until August 2, forty daysafter the controversybegan, andonlythen to explain to Cadbury investorswhateffectsthechocolatescaremighthave on company earnings (Morley,2006). Instead of assumingleadership for the crisis, he sends asuccession of relatively minorfunctionaries to deal with thecontroversy. This is odd behavior forsomeone who claims to put publicserviceattheforefrontofhisthinking,andwhoclaimstovaluetheconcernsofhiscustomersaboveall.

When he finally does take centerstage, Stitzer often resorts to a seriesofnon-denialdenials:

• “… we’ve changed ourprocesses because we don’twantconsumerstohaveanypossible concern about ourprocesses and our products(AFX International Focus,2006).” Translation: Theprocesses have changed toalleviate concern, but not toaddress any particularhazard caused by thoseprocesses.

• “We clearly caused concerntoourconsumersandwearetruly sorry for that (Miller,2006).”Translation:Cadburytakes responsibility forcausing concern, but not forcausing illness among itscustomers.

• “Although we have alwaysacted in good faiththroughout, we have causedconcerns and for that I amextremely sorry (Morley,


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2006).” Translation:Whatever Cadbury did, thecompanydidwiththebestofintentions, but it will admittonothing.(This“goodfaith”defense graduallysupplanted the “hardscience” defense as itbecame more and moreevident to all that Cadburyhad embraced defectivepracticesforfoodsafety.)

• “We’re profiting from thoselearnings, taking them andapplying them to ourbusiness going forward sothat we can be a bigger,stronger business. Ourrecord stands for itself.”(AFX News, 2007)Translation: The lessons ofthe salmonella scare addnothing to Cadbury’s abilitytoprotect its customers, butrather contribute to futureearnings and shareholdervalue.

Again and again, Stitzer turns downobvious opportunities to provideleadership, choosing instead torespond to questions and challengesin an unresponsive fashion,sidesteppingmeaningful apology, andinadvertently driving up the outrageateverystage. Indeed,theonedirectapologythecompanymadewasto itsdistributors, not its customers (TheGrocer,2006August5).

Stitzer’smeasuredcommentsreflectapreoccupation with the investmentcommunity, such as his Oct. 26statement that “stressed theimportant of returning confidence inthe Cadbury name among BritishconsumersintherunuptothecrucialChristmas season (Armitage, 2006).”The company’s overall reticencebecame so evident that one punditreferredtoitas“aworryingrefusalto

admit (Cadbury) has done anythingmuch wrong (Nixon, 2006).” Indeed,Stitzer’s emotions seem to engagewith thecrisisonlywhen it threatensCadbury’sstandingwithinthemarket,such as his response to a FinancialTimes article about an A.C. Nielsenresearch report that indicatedarchrivalMarshadsurpassedCadburyas Britain’s market leader, whichStitzer characterizes as a “totallyoverzealous interpretation (Armitage,2006).”

In addition, there is Cadbury’s oft-repeatedinsistencethatthecrisiswasoverbeforeitbegan,suchastheearlystatement by Cadbury’s EuropeanpresidentMatthewShattock–“Weareabsolutely confident these minutelevels of salmonella would not havemade anyone ill (Hayward, 2006)” –oritsattemptstoevadeculpabilitybyblaming regulators for its dilemma,such Cadbury’s June 24 statement,“We have followed the regulations.TheFSAwillhavetodecideifweneedanewregulationandwearewillingtowork with them on that (V. Elliott,2006).” In early 2007, CEO Stitzerconcurred by telling journalists, “Ourmarket share has recovered in thefourthquarterand, inparticular,overtheChristmasseason.(Thesalmonellaoutbreak)isnotsomethingyou’llhearus talking about again (AFX News,2007).” About two months afterStitzer’s statement, the BirminghamCity Council levied three criminalchargesagainstCadburyforitsroleinthe salmonella outbreak, thus forcingCadbury to continue a conversationthat Stitzer had unilaterally declaredtobeclosed.

Finally, there is Cadbury’s reluctancetotakeeventhemostsensibleactionstoprotectthepublicitclaimedtocaresomuchabout:

Cadbury received a lab reportindicating that it had distributed


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chocolate contaminated withsalmonella,yetwaitedforfivemonthsbefore sharing this information withthe Food Standards Agency (Sayid,2006), and did so only because theagency had tracked the source of theoutbreak to Cadbury’s doorstep(Derbyshire,2006).

When the agency insisted thatCadbury recall the products, thecompanyresisted,declaringthecandybars to be “perfectly safe”(BirminghamEveningMail,2006June24).

When health authorities warned thepublic about the seriousness of thecontamination, and alertedBritons tothegrowingnumberofreportedcasesof salmonella poisoning, Cadburycountered by telling the newsmedia:“Ourproductsareperfectlysafetoeatandwehavenoevidencethatanyonehasbeen ill fromeating them(Wales,2006).”

By any standard, Cadbury wasunresponsive to the demands of itspublic. Thus, Cadbury so angered itsregulators that the Foods StandardsAgencydipped into its “fighting fund”to pay for Herefordshire’s localinvestigation of Cadbury’s criminalculpability (Northedge, 2006). Thisextendedthecontroversywellintothenextyear,producedapublictrialthatexcoriatedCadburyanditsfoodsafetypractices, played havoc with investorconfidence (Guardian Unlimited,2006), and generated a court fine of£1 million pounds (AFX News, 2007July16).

Cadburycouldhaveavoidedallofthisby simply cooperating with itsregulatorsfromthestart.Asevidence,consider how Cadbury responded inearly2007,whenthecompanyquicklyand voluntarily removed from storeshelvesalargeshipmentofcandybarsthat may have come in contact with

nuts (Revill, 2007). The 2007 recallquicklydroppedoutofthenewscycleand registered little effect on thecompany’s share price (AFX News,2007February20).

Secondary factors—Inaddition to thetwelve primary factors, Sandman(1993) identifies eight secondaryfactors. These are factors that maycontribute tocommunityoutrage,butnotasoftenastheprimaryfactors.Ofthese eight secondary factors, fiveappeartoapplytotheCadburycase:

Vulnerable populations: The public ismore likely to become outraged if ariskaffectstheelderly,theveryyoung,the sick, the poor, and the otherwisehelpless. During the height of theoutbreak, the Health ProtectionAgency documented twenty-twoconfirmed cases of salmonellaMontevideo among children youngerthan age four, including eight amonginfants (Gray, 2006). Indeed, theagency’s statisticians suspectedchocolate as the vector because somany of the fifty-three documentedcases involved children (Leake andWalsh,2006).Moreover,salmonellaisknown to present a higher threat tothe elderly and to those whoseimmune systems are damaged orsuppressed(WHO,2013).

Delayed vs. immediate effects: A riskthatliesinwaittostrikeismorelikelyto trigger outrage than will animmediate threat. By allowing anylevelofsalmonellacontaminationintoits chocolate crumb, Cadbury createda perverse version of the GoldenTickethuntmadefamousbythe1971motionpicture“WillieWonkaandtheChocolate Factory,” with thisunderlying-if-unintended message:“Hereareamillionchocolatebars,butonly a select few are contaminatedwith a bacteria that will ruin yourfortnight andperhaps sendyou to anemergencyroom.Havefun,kids!”Isit


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any wonder that outrage soaredamong consumers, regulators,politicians,andjournalists?

Identifiabilityof thevictim:Statisticalvictims will trigger less outrage thanwill a single, easily recognizablevictim. On Day 16 of the Cadburycrisis, a 62-year-old woman fromNorthern Ireland named CatherineHenderson put a human face on thesalmonella outbreak when she begantalking to the London newsmedia. “Inever thought you could get ill likethatfromchocolate,”shesaid.“Ididn’tthink I would come out alive(Johnston,2006).”

Reductionofrisk:Thepublicwantstoeliminate the risk, notmerely reduceit,wheneverpossible.Throughouttheearly stages of the controversy,Cadbury put much effort intoattemptingtoreassurethepublicthatits chocolate could not have causedthe outbreak because the amount ofdetected contaminationwas “minute”(Allen, 2006) The company sent itsEuropean vice president to deliver“reassuring”soundbites,suchas:“Weareabsolutelyconfident theseminutelevels of salmonella would not havemade anyone ill (Hayward, 2006).”EvenifCadburyhadbeencorrectwithits interpretation of food safetyscience(whichiswasn’t),thiswasthewrong strategy. Non-experts arehappiest when the experts set theirgoal for acceptable risk at zero;anything that registers greater thanzero then tends to trigger outrage.“Reductionmight be wiser andmorecost-effective,” Sandman says (1994),“but elimination speaks to theoutrage.”

Media attention: The media cannotcause community outrage, but it canamplifyexistingoutrage.TheCadburycase generated 265 non-duplicativenewspaper articles, primarily in theUnited Kingdom, between June 23,

2006andJuly24,2007,accordingtoaLexis-Nexis search conducted onMarch6,2015,usingthesearchterms“Cadburyandsalmonella.”

2-B.Identifyingthestakeholders

Clearly, from the beginning of the2006 chocolate scare, CadburySchweppes took a hardline, winner-take-all approach to managing itsmessages to the government, theinvestment community, themarketplace, the news media,company critics, consumers, and thegeneral British public. In this section,wewillconsideroptionsthatCadburySchweppes could have explored tobetter manage the British public’soutrage and avert damage to itsreputation.

For example, before the chocolatescare began, the company could haveavoided the crisis almost entirelysimplyby:

• Maintainingazero-toleranceprotocol for salmonellacontamination in itschocolatecrumb.

• Reporting contamination ofthe chocolate crumb atMarlbrook immediately toregulators and seekingguidance from agencymicrobiologists.

• Responding promptly andopenly to the government’srequests for information oraction.

• Recalling any questionableproducts from store shelvesrapidly, efficiently andvoluntarily.

However, for the purposes of thissection, let’s begin our analysis onJune 19, 2006, the day on which theFood Standards Agency firstapproached Cadbury’s private lab forinformation about a rare strain ofsalmonella the agencyhad found in a


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samplethatcamefromthecompany’sMarlbrook plant. At this point in thecontroversy we can make thefollowingassumptions:

• Cadbury has altered itsprotocols to tolerate whatthe company’s expertsconsidertobe“safelevels”ofsalmonella contamination inits chocolate crumb (ThePressAssociation,2007).

• Cadbury’s Marlbrookemployees are generallyaware that salmonellacontamination has becomeendemic at the plant(Britten,2007).

• At some level withinCadbury, administratorsknow that the company hasshippedchocolatecandythatis contaminated withsalmonella(V.Elliott,2006).

• These administrators havedecided that the levels ofcontamination are in linewith food safety regulationsand thus pose no threat tohuman health (Lawrence,2006July5).

• Theseadministratorsbelievethere is no reason to alertpublic health authorities(Sayid,2006).

• Neither Cadbury CEO ToddSwitzer (Klinger, 2006) norChairman Sir JohnSunderland (Moreley, 2006)appears at this point to beaware of these specificadministrativedecisions.

• Authorities at the HealthProtection Agency (Leakeand Walsh, 2006) and theFood Standards Agency(Derbyshire, 2006) suspectthat a chocolate product isthe source of the outbreak,but have not completely

narrowed the field to aspecificmanufacturer.

• The Food Standards Agencyis aware of a similarcontamination at Marlbrookin 2002, but has yet toreceive formal paperworkabout the incident fromCadbury(Levy,2006).

• The agencies are apparentlyunaware of Cadbury’scurrent protocols forsalmonella contamination(Associated Press, 2006 July4; Levy, 2006) or of thedecision-making processthatledtothedistributionofcontaminated products(Lawrence,2006July5).

Allconsidered,thesepointsareclearlypushingCadburytowardtheprecipiceofasignificantpubliccontroversy.Itisalmost inevitable that the news willcreateheadlinesacrossEngland.

OK, so it’s June 19, 2006.We are thetopexecutivesatCadburySchweppesand we’ve just learned from ourprivate lab that the Food StandardsAgencyisaskingaboutasamplefromourMarlbrook plant. The sample hastested positive for a rare strain,salmonellaMontevideo.Wealsoknowthat the government is investigatingan outbreak of the illness caused bythis pathogen. Obviously, Cadbury isgoing to get pulled into a nationaldebateonfoodsafety,whetherweareguilty or innocent. It’s time to getmoving.Withanyluck,wehaveadayorsobeforethestorybecomespublic.Our first step is to identify ourstakeholders for this dispute. Morespecifically, in Peter Sandman’sterminology (2003), who are theattentivesandwhoarethefanatics?

Clearly, the immediate need is toaddress the stakeholders who aremost likely to be affected by theoutbreak: consumers who may have


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purchased and eaten thecontaminated chocolate, includingthose who have become ill (thoughnot necessarily from having eatenCadburyproducts). Theywill becomethe primary audiences for ourmessages in the days to come, and –because our customers are spreadacross the width and breadth ofUnitedKingdom–ourbestchoiceistoreachthemthroughmassmedia,withan emphasis on the nation’snewspapers, television and radio.Ideally, we would addressstakeholdersdirectlyandletthenewsmediareportonwhatwesayanddo.However, in the case of a foodborneoutbreak,wemust hope to enlist thenewsmediaasalliesingettingcrucialinformation to our customers. Forimmediacy and outreach, there’s noothergoodchoice.

Thus, our initial set ofmessagemapswill target customers as our primarystakeholders and journalists as ourprimary medium. Customers whofrequently or occasionally purchaseCadburyproductsarelikelytobecomeattentive to these messages.Customers who have consumedCadburychocolatewithinthelastfewweeks, or who have also become illwithsymptomssuchas fever,nausea,anddiarrhea–thoughnotnecessarilybecause of the chocolate – are alsolikely to become attentive, andperhaps fanatical (especially when

they learn that Cadbury made adeliberate decision to sell thecontaminatedchocolatetothepublic).

For the purpose of this exercise, wewill focus on messages aimedprimarily at Cadbury customers,withthe assumption that many of thesemessages will also inform othersignificant groups of stakeholders.These include internal stakeholders,such as employees and managers, aswell as stakeholderswho are vital tothe health of our company, such asdistributors and investors. This alsoincludes external stakeholders, suchastheregulatorswithwhomwemustcollaborate over the coming weeksand months, as well as food-safetyexpertswhonotdirectlyconnectedtothesituation,andpolicymakersinthegovernment, especially members ofParliamentandtheiradvisors.

We know from experience thatCadbury is held in high regardthroughout England. Our goal is toleverage that goodwill withoutabusing it. To accomplish this, weshould follow the example of ourcompany’s founders, and workdiligently through this process in thebest interests of our customers.Clearly, the best way to protectCadbury’s shareholders in thissituation is to protect our customers.This is a rare instance when ourcorporate responsibility aligns withoursocialduty.


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2-C.Buildingthemessagemaps

Next,wewillworkthroughthemessage-mapprocessusingCadbury’ssalmonellaoutbreakforoursourcematerial.Onceagain,wewillassumethattodayisJune19,2006,thedaywhentheFoodStandardsAgencyfirstcontactedCadbury’sprivatelabforinformationaboutthesalmonellaMontevideocontaminationfoundinasamplefromCadbury’sMarlbrookplant.Timeisshort.ItisclearthatthisnewswillbreaksoonacrossthenationandwillaffectCadbury’sreputation,salesrevenues,andshareprices.However,thecompany’sfirstpriorityshouldbetoassistregulatorsincontainingtheoutbreakandtohelpconsumersavoidthepathogenormanagetheillness,evenifthecompanyiscertaintheirproductsareinnocent.Inthelongrun,thisisthecommunicationsstrategythatwillbestservethecompany,itsshareprice,itsreputation,andthusitsstakeholders.

Map1.Theoverarchingmap:Whatdoesthepublicneedtoknowmostaboutthisoutbreakandrecall?

Thefirstmapputsthefocusontheinformationthatstakeholders—specificallyBritishconsumersandthepublicat-large—mostneedtoknowaboutthesituation.Thisisouropportunitytoframethestoryforthenewsmedia.However,weshouldframethestoryfromariskcommunicationperspective(howtohelpthemostpeopleavoidthehazardandtomanagetheiroutrage)ratherthanfromatraditionalpublicrelationsperspective(howtominimizethedamagetothecompany).Thegoodnewsisthatasolidriskcommunicationsstrategyisalmostalwaysourbestpublicrelationsstrategybecauseitwillminimizeourunforcederrorswhilemitigatingstakeholderoutragetowardourcompanyandourbrand.

Thefirstkeymessageanditssupportingmessagesalertthepublictotherecall.Thesecondsetexplainswhat’swrongwiththecandy.Thethirdsetgivesstakeholdersagroupofactionstotake.Theabilitytotakeeffectiveactiontendstoloweroutrageamongstakeholders.

Map1.OverarchingmapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandtheBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Whatdoesthepublicneedtoknowmost?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3Cadburyisrecallingsevenchocolateproducts.

Thecandymaybecontaminatedwithsalmonellabacteria.

Pleaseavoideatinganyoftheseproducts.

Supportinginformation1-1 Supportinginformation2-1 Supportinginformation3-1TheyarethechocolatebuttonEasterEggandtheFreddoBar;

It’sararestrainknownassalmonellaMontevideo.

Returnthemtoyourstoreforafullrefund.

Supportinginformation1-2 Supportinginformation2-2 Supportinginformation3-2DairyMilkbarsincaramel,mint,andTurkishdelightflavor;

Itcancausenausea,diarrhea,andotherdigestiveproblems.

Fordetails,pleasevisitourwebsite:Cadbury.co.uk.

Supportinginformation1-3 Supportinginformation2-3 Supportinginformation3-3DairyMilk8Chunkandthe1kilogramDairyMilk.

Healthofficialsbelieveourcandyhascausedanoutbreak.

Orcallustoll-freeat0-800-818181anytime.


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Map2.TheRecallMap:Whyareyourecallingtheproduct?

ThismapprovidesanefficientexplanationofthecircumstancesthatledtoCadbury’srecall.Thefirstkeymessageanditssupportingmessagesfocusonthepathogen.Thesecondsetconnectsthepathogentotheoutbreak.Thethirdsetisdesignedtocalmstakeholderoutragebydetailinghowwearecooperatingwithauthoritiestoendtheoutbreak.Overall,thismapaddressesCadbury’suncertaintyatthispointoveritsculpabilitywhilemakingitclearthecompanyintendstoactresponsiblybyputtingpublichealthfirst.

Map2:TheRecallMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Whyareyourecallingtheproduct?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

Testsfoundsalmonellainourchocolatesamples.

OurchocolatemayhavecausedanoutbreakinEngland.

Wearecooperatingfullywithgovernmenthealthofficials.

Supportinginformation1-1 Supportinginformation2-1 Supportinginformation3-1

Thisstrainofsalmonellabacteriaisveryrare.

Therearefifty-threeconfirmedcasesacrossBritain.

WearerecallingsevenCadburychocolateproducts.


Weareunsurehowitcontaminatedourchocolate.

Therearenoreporteddeaths.

Wearesearchingforthesourceofthecontamination.


Salmonellaendangerschildren,seniors,andpeoplewithlowimmunity.

Twenty-twocasesarewithchildrenyoungerthanfour.

Wehavesuspendedchocolateproduction.


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Map3.TheSituationMap:Howdidthishappen?

Inaddressingthisquestion,Cadburyshouldhavepleadedstupidity(Sandman,2001,January29).Howelsetoexplainhowoneoftheworld’sleadingchocolate-makersfailedtounderstandbasicfoodsafety?Thereisnolevelofsalmonellabacteriathatissafeinchocolate.ExpertsinBritainweredumfoundedtolearnthatCadburybelievedotherwise.SonowCadburyhasonlytwooptions:Itcanletthepublicbelievethecompanyisevilanddeliberatelyputthebacteriainitschocolate,oritcanadmitthatitmadeaseriouserrorinjudgment.Thefirstkeymessageanditssupportingmessagesgiveabriefexplanationofevents.ThesecondsetexplainsCadbury’serror.ThethirdsetmakesitclearthatCadburyunderstandstheerrorandisworkingtocorrectit.

Map3:TheSituationMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Howdidthishappen?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

Healthofficialsbelieveourchocolatecrumbstartedtheoutbreak.

Weknewsomeofourcrumbcontainedsalmonella.

Wethoughtthecrumbwassafetoconsume.


OurMarlbrookplantmadethecrumbinJanuary.

Wechangedourfoodsafetyprotocolsin2003.

Expertstelluswewerewrongtothinkthis.


Wearesearchingforthecauseofthecontamination.

Thesechangesallowedforminimalcontamination.

Zeroistheonlysafelevelforsalmonellainchocolate.


WearealsodisinfectingtheMarlbrookplant.

Wethoughtthesechangesfollowedcurrentfoodscience.

Expertsarehelpingusupdateourprotocols.


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Map4.TheContaminationMap:Howdidyoudiscoverthecontamination?

Thissetofmessagesisdesignedtounravelacomplexsituation.ThetruthisthatCadburyknewthecrumbwascontaminatedwhenitshippedoutthecandy.Thecompanyhadrecentlyreviseditsfood-safetyprotocolstoacceptlowlevelsofsalmonellacontaminationontheassumptionthatthecookingprocesswoulddeactivatethebacteria.WhatthecompanylearnedfromHPAandFSA—andsummarilydismissed—wasthatthebacteriahadindeedtriggeredanoutbreak.Ratherthanfighttheobvious,Cadburywouldhaveserveditselfbetterbyadmittingitserrorandexpressingitsdismayatlearningithadshippedahazardousproduct.

Map4:TheContaminationMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Howdidyoudiscoverthecontamination?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

Weknewsomeofourchocolatecontainedsalmonellabacteria.

Wethoughtthelevelsweresafeforconsumption.

Wearehorrifiedtolearnthatwewerewrong.


HPAfoundbacteriainsamplesfromourMarlbrookplant.

Ourprivatelabtoldusaboutthegovernment’sconcern.

Wearerecallingsevenchocolateproducts.


Theywereseekingthesourceoftheoutbreak.

WehavesuspendedproductionatourMarlbookplant.

Wearereviewingourprotocolswithgovernmentexperts.


HPAaskedFSAtocontactCadbury’sprivatelab.

WewillreopenitwhenFSAissatisfied.

WearethoroughlydisinfectingourMarlbrookplant.


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Map5.ThePathogenMap:Whataretheeffectsofthepathogenanditsdisease?

Thismapisdesignedtobepurelyinformational.Therearenoattemptsatself-efficacyorapology.Thefirstsetdescribesthepathogen,thesecondoutlinesitseffectsonpeople,andthethirdprovidessomecontextonwhichpopulationsaremostatrisk.

Map5:ThePathogenMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Whataretheeffectsofthepathogenanditsdisease?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

ThepathogeniscalledsalmonellaMontevideo.

Itinfectspeoplewhoconsumecontaminatedfoodproducts.

EnglandandWalesreportabout12,000casesofsalmonellosisannually.


HSAsaysitisararestrainofbacteria.

Symptomsappearwithinsixto72hours.

Lessthan1%leadtodeathinhealthyadults.


Thebacteriacontaminatefoodanimalproducts.

Symptomsgenerallysubsideinfewerthansevendays.

However,childrenandtheelderlyareathighrisk.


Theseincludedairy-basedproducts,likechocolate.

Symptomsincludefever,nausea,diarrhea,cramps,andvomiting.

Soarepeoplewithweakenedimmunesystems.


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Map6.TheAvoidanceMap:Whatcanpeopledotoavoidthepathogen?

Thismapisfocusedonself-efficacy.Thatis,givingstakeholderstheirbestavailableoptionsforavoidingthepathogenandthustheinfection.Inthecaseoffoodborneillness,theprimaryoptionisalmostalwaystoavoidconsumingthecontaminatedproducts.Thisishandledinthefirstsetofmessages.Thesecondsetanswersthequestion,“WhatdoIdowiththeproductsI’vepurchased?”Ifwewanttomanageoutrage,weneedtoprovideasimplemethodforreturningpurchasesandreceivingrefunds.Acontaminatedproductisadefectiveproduct.Consumersdeservetogettheirmoneybackwithminimalhassles.Thethirdsetanswersthequestion,“WhatifI’vealreadyconsumedtheproduct?”Thesemessagesprovideusefulinformationforthosewhomaybeill.Theyalsohelptomanageoutrageamongwhathospitalscall“theworriedwell,”thosefolkswhomaynothavetheinfectionbutarehighlyconcernedabouttheoutbreak.

Map6:TheAvoidanceMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Whatcanpeopledotoavoidthepathogen?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

Fornow,avoideatinganyCadburychocolate.

ReturnpurchasedproductstoyourstoreorcontactCadbury.

Ifyouhaveeatenthecandy,watchforsymptoms.


Wehaverecalledsevenchocolateproducts.

Dothisevenifyouhaveeatenpartoftheproduct.

Theseincludefever,nausea,cramps,vomiting,anddiarrhea.


YoucanfindacompletelistonlineatCadbury.co.uk

Lookforanyproductsstoredathomeoryouroffice.

Symptomsusuallyappearin12to72hours.


Orcallusanytimeat0-800-818181.

Pleasealertyourfamily,friends,co-workers,orneighbors.

Ifyouhavesymptoms,pleaseseeyourdoctor.


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Map7.TheDiseaseManagementMap:Whatcanpeopledotomanagethediseaseanditssymptoms?

AcompanionmaptoMap6,thisonealsofocusedongivingstakeholderssomepoweroverthesituation.It’simportanttobehonest.Ifthediseaseisdeadly,sayso.Ifit’snot,avoidbeingoverlyreassuring.It’susuallywisetoattributethisinformationtofoodsafetyexpertsorpublichealthofficials,basedonreadilyavailableliterature.Thefirstsetisfocusedontherelativehazardofthedisease.Thesecondsetoutlinessomepotentialtreatmentsformildcases.Thethirdsetprovidesdetailsonwhichpopulationsaremostatriskandhowtheyshouldrespond.

Map7:TheDiseaseManagementMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Whatcanpeopledotomanagethediseaseanditssymptoms?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

Salmonellosisrarelyleadstohospitalizationordeath.

Mosthealthypeoplerecoverwithouttreatment,expertstellus.

Children,seniors,andpeoplewithlowimmunityareathighrisk.


Symptomsofsalmonellosisincludefever,cramps,andnausea.

Antibioticsareineffectivefortypicalcases.

High-riskindividualsshouldseeadoctoriftheysuspecttheyareill.


Theseusuallystartwithin12to72hoursafterexposure.

Drinkfluidsandelectrolytestoavoiddehydration.

Hospitalizationislikelyinhigh-riskcases.


Theyusuallyendwithinfourtosevendays.

Anti-diarrhealsmayeasecramping,butmayprolongthediarrhea.

Deathoccursinabout3%ofhigh-riskcases.


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Map8.TheFutureMap:Whatareyoudoingtoavoidfuturecontaminationinyourproducts?

Thismapsetsthestageforournextactionsasweattempttoremedytheproblemandtocompensateforourmistake.Thisisalsothemapthatthelawyerswilltrymosttosuppress.Attorneysfrequentlyunderestimatetheneedtowininthecourtofpublicopinion,andthustheneedtomitigatestakeholderoutrage.Cadburyattemptedtoignorehealthofficialsatthenationalandlocallevels.Itdismissedmediacoverage.ThecompanydisregardedtheconcernsofParliament.Intheend,Cadburywasforcedtoacknowledgeitsmistakesandtoseekforgiveness.ThebrandwouldhavebeenbetterservedifCadburyexecutiveshadactedwithfarlesshubrisandfarmoreremorse.Thefirstsetdealswithwhatwearedoingnow.Thesecondsetisfocusedonwhatwearedoinginthenearterm.Thethirdsetisalistofspecificactionsweplantotake.Intheend,thereisnosubstituteforeffectiveactionifwewanttoreduceoutrageandendthecontroversy.

Map8:TheFutureMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Whatareyoudoingtoavoidfuturecontaminationinyourproducts?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

Weareworkingwithexpertstofindthecause.

Wearereviewingourfood-safetyprotocols.

Wewillimprovetomeetorexceedgovernmentstandards.


ThesuspectedsourcecamefromourMarlbrookplant.

Webelievedthebacterialevelinthesampleswassafe.

Wewillfindandfixtheproblem.


Healthofficialsarecombingtheplanttofindtheproblem.

Expertsaretellingusweweremistaken.

Wewillthoroughlycleanourplantunderofficialsupervision.


WeareshuttingdownproductionattheMarlbrookplant.

Wepledgetofollowallgovernmentprotocolsfromtodayonward.

Wewillresumeproductionwhenhealthofficialsapproveit.


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Map9.TheMakeItRightMap:Whatareyoudoingtomakethingsright?

Thisfinalmapletsstakeholdersknowourplanforassistinghealthofficialsintheireffortstoendtheoutbreakandforfairlycompensatinginjuredstakeholdersforanyharmwehavecaused.That’stheeasypart.Formanyexecutives,thehardpartispubliclyadmittingfault,acceptingblame,andapologizingforourroleintheoutbreak.Yettheprocessofmitigatingoutrageamongstakeholdersisnevercompletewithoutpenance(Sandman,2001,May4).Makingthingsrightrequiresthatwedomorethanjustsignchecks.Thefirstsetofmessagesexplainsourrefundprocess.Thesecondmakesitclearthatweareworkingwithhealthofficialstoendtheoutbreak.Thethirdsetletsthepublicknowwetakeresponsibility,wearesorry,andweareactivelyseekingtoidentifyanyconsumerswhowereharmedsoweworkoutfairsettlements.Theemphasishereistoacknowledgeourmistakesandtotakeactionsthatsignificantlyimprovethesituationforourstakeholders.

Map9:TheMakeItRightMapCategoryofstakeholder:CadburycustomersandBritishpublicQuestionorconcern:Whatareyoudoingtomakethingright?Keymessage1 Keymessage2 Keymessage3

We’reofferingarefundforallreturnedchocolateproducts.

Weareworkingwithhealthofficialstoendthisoutbreak.

Weareseekingconsumerswhowereharmed.


Thisincludespartiallyconsumedproducts.

Wearerecallingsevenchocolateproducts.

Weapologizetoanyonewhowasmadeill.


Returntheproducttothestorewhereyouboughtit.

Wewillsafelydestroyallreturnedproducts.

Wewillofferfairandquickcompensation.


Orcallusat0-800-818181forhelp.

Weareworkingwithretailerstoremoveproductsfromshelves.

Ifyouweremadeill,pleasecontactusat0-800-818181.


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Section3:Craftingthepreamble

Our choice ofmessenger is crucial tosuccessfullydeliveringourmessagetoour stakeholders. Cadbury chose touse lower-level executives to bringtheirmessagestothenewsmediaandto the British public. This was amassive error in judgment. Itsuggested that the company’s topexecutives were too busy or tooinsensible to discuss the situationwithCadbury’scustomers.

Selecting the actual spokespersonshoulddependuponhisorherabilityto convey caring and empathy, andnot necessarily on expertise andstatus. We should keep Covello’sresearch inmindduring theselectionprocess: Stakeholders under stressarefarmoreconcernedwithissuesoflistening, caring, empathy, honestyand openness than they are incompetence and expertise (Covello,2003).

For the sake of credibility, the bestchoicewould have been a joint newsconference featuring top leadershipfrom Cadbury Schweppes, the HealthProtection Agency, and the FoodStandards Agency. This would haveallowed the three organizations tospeakfromacommonsetofmessages,and would have led to far lessconfusion and consternation in thenews media. It would also havesignaled to Parliament and to food-safety experts that Cadbury wasworking with, and not against, itsregulators.

We want to deliver the initialinformation in three stages (Covello,Minamyer & Clayton, 2007): astatement of concern, followed by astatement of intent, followed by astatementofpurposefortheeventormeeting at which we have chosen todeliverourmessages.

Thepreamblehelpsustosetthestagefor our message maps. We use thepreamble to open either a newsconference or a town meeting inwhich we will discuss the outbreakand the recall. Suchpublic events arecrucial to managing stakeholderoutrage.Wemusthavethecouragetoanswer questions directly fromjournalistsorstakeholders.

In addition, a well-crafted preambleprovides our communications teamswithpre-vettedlanguagethatthatcanuse inother communications, suchasnews releases, backgrounders, openletters,advertisements,websitesandvideos.

As an illustration, let’s compose apreamble for Cadbury on the day thecompany announced its productrecall. We will assume this is for anewsconference.

To start, let’s consider who shoulddeliver this preamble and the keymessages, and then field questionsfrom stakeholders and journalists? Ina perfectworld, itwould be the CEO,Todd Stitzer. However, for the manyreasonscitedearlier,Stitzerclearly isneitheremotionallynorprofessionallypreparedtohandlethisdutywell.Thebest available choice is likely theboardchair,SirJohnSunderland,whois more experienced in publicspeaking,andhastheaddedqualityofactuallybeingBritish.

So here’s the preamble that Sir Johnmightdeliverafterheisintroduced.

Part1:Thestatementofconcern

Goodmorning.AschairmanofCadburySchweppes, I want to apologize onbehalfoftheentireCadburySchweppesfamily, and express our deep concernfor the situation we are about todescribe and any harm it may havecaused.


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Our company has a long tradition ofchampioning food quality in Britain.We take that tradition seriously.Unfortunately, if the government’sexperts are right, we have failedCadbury’stradition,ourcustomers,ouremployees,andournation.

You will have every right to be angrywithus.Weshouldhaveknownbetter.Weshouldhaveservedyoubetter.

Wearedeeplysorry foranyangeryoumayfeeltowardtheCadburyname.Wehaveadutytoliveuptothatname,anditappearswehavefailedthatduty.

Weare saddenedandwearehumbledby the situation that warrants it. Theveryideathatwemayhaveallowedthesale of contaminated chocolate to anycustomersickensustothecore.

Part2:Thestatementofintent

Youhaveourpledgetodaythatwewillmake this right. We will act honestlyandtransparentlyasweworkwiththegovernmenttoresolvethissituation.

Ifweareindeedproventobetheactualsource of this outbreak, we willestablish a fair and just process tocompensatethoseharmedbyit.Evenifwearenotproventobethesource,wepledge to work with governmentexperts to upgrade our food-safetystandardstomeettheirexpectations.

Wewillalsoworkcloselywithnationaland local authorities to follow aprocess that allows them toindependently measure and monitorthe safety of Cadbury products onbehalfofyou,theBritishpublic.

Itiswhatyoudeserve.

Part3:Thestatementofpurpose

I am here today to announce that weare recalling seven of our chocolateproducts from across Britain. We dothis at the request of governmentexperts in food safety, who have

detected an outbreak of salmonella inBritain.

Theexpertstellusthatourchocolateisthesource.Asaresult,wefeel it isourmoral duty to follow their advice andrecall our chocolate products fromBritishstoresshelves.

Over the next few minutes, I willprovide you with the details, as weunderstand them. I will then answeryour questions. To assist me, we havewithustodayrepresentatives fromtheHealthProtectionAgencyandtheFoodStandardsAgency.

Here is what we know right now:Cadbury is recalling seven chocolateproducts. The candy may becontaminated with salmonellabacteria. Please avoid eating any oftheseproducts.Thesevenproductsarethe chocolate button Easter Egg andthe Freddo Bar; Dairy Milk bars incaramel, mint, and Turkish delightflavor; Dairy Milk 8 Chunk and the 1kilogramDairyMilk.ThecandymaybecontaminatedwithararestrainknownassalmonellaMontevideo.Itcancausenausea, diarrhea, and other digestiveproblems. Health officials believe ourcandy has caused an outbreak. Pleaseavoid eating any of these products.Return them to your store for a fullrefund. For details, please visit ourwebsite: Cadbury.co.uk. Or call us toll-free at 0-800-818181 any time. Torepeat our key messages for today:Cadbury is recalling seven chocolateproducts. The candy may becontaminated with salmonellabacteria. Please avoid eating any oftheseproducts.We are now ready to answer yourquestions.Notehowthepreambleflowsfromthestatementofconcern,tothestatementofintent,tothestatementofpurpose.Alsonotehowthelanguageallowsthe


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speaker toexpresscontritionwithoutlegally binding Cadbury this early inthe investigation. Given that Cadburyalreadyknewthatitssafetystandardswould allow some contaminatedchocolate to enter the British foodsystem,thesmartplayistoannounceits failure at the same time as itsrecall, insteadof letting thebadnewsdribble out over the coming days,weeks,andmonths.

Section4:Conclusion—Ananalysisbasedonbestpractices

In this final section, we will analyzeCadbury’s messages and actionsduring the outbreak and recall byusing nine best practices for riskcommunication, asoutlinedinthe2009 book EffectiveRisk Communication: A Message-Centered Approach, writtenbyfourcommunicationscholars:TimothySellnowof the University ofKentucky, Robert Ulmerof theUniversity of Arkansas,MatthewSeegerofWayneStateUniversity,andRichard Littlefieldof North DakotaState University.These best practicesare based on extensive research andare designed to lead a riskcontroversy toward mitigation andeventualresolution.For Cadbury, the goal should havebeen to use a combination ofmessages and actions to cause theirharshest critics to say, “Cadbury hasfinally accepted our position and isnow on the right path.” Since thislargelyinvolvedraisingthecompany’sfood-safety standards for salmonellawhile compensating those who wereinjured by the outbreak, while alsoexpressing the company’s contritionfor having caused the problem, thiswould have been a relatively smallprice for Cadbury to pay.Unfortunately, the company’sleadershipalloweditsegotoavoidthe

actions that would have cut thedispute short and spared thecompany’sreputation.

DidCadburyinfuseriskcommunicationintopolicydecisions?

No. The company made a significantchange to its food safety protocolswhen it decided to accept "minimumlevels" of salmonella bacteria in itschocolate. There is no evidence thatCadbury considered how this changemight affect its reputation amongBritish consumers or its relationshipwithgovernmentregulators.

DidCadburytreatriskcommunicationasaprocess?

No. From the moment the companylearnedthathealthofficialssuspectedits chocolate as the source,Cadbury'sapproachwas to reassure the Britishpublicthatitsproductshadplayednorole in the outbreak. Oddly, thecompany did thiswhile knowing thatit had distributed candy productsmade from chocolate contaminatedwith the same rare strain ofsalmonellaasdetectedingovernmenttests. Again and again, Cadburyattempted to end its conversationwith stakeholders by declaring itsproducts to be "perfectly safe." Againand again, this tactic not only failedbutalsomadethesituationworse forCadbury.

DidCadburyaccountfortheuncertaintyinherentinrisk?

No. Indeed, Cadbury acted as if itsproducts posed zero risk toconsumers. The company treated itsrecall as merely precautionary anddismissed the concerns of healthofficials and safety experts. From thebeginning, Cadbury acted as if knewall the answers as well as all thequestions.


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DidCadburydesignmessagestobeculturallysensitive?

No.Foralmostayear,Cadburyissuedmessagesthatservedonlytoinfuriatehealth officials at the national andlocal levels and to angermembers ofthe British Parliament. It was as ifCadbury were a stranger in its ownland.

DidCadburyacknowledgediverselevelsofrisktolerance?

No. Many times over, the companyinsisted that its interpretation ofevents was the correct one, and thatanyone who disagreed was eithermisinformed ormalicious. It failed todemonstrate any understanding ofhownon-expertsviewrisk.

DidCadburyinvolvethepublicindialoguesaboutrisk?

No. Cadbury made no effort toestablish an ongoing dialogue withconcerned stakeholders, other thaninvestorsandretailers.

DidCadburypresentriskmessageswithhonesty?

No. Cadbury concealed the fact thatthe company knew it had distributedproductsmade fromchocolate crumbcontaminated with the same rarestrain of salmonella found bygovernmenttesting.

DidCadburymeetriskperceptionneedsbyremainingopenandaccessibletothepublic?

No.Cadburymadenoattempttomakeitself accessible to anyone other thanthe investment community. It all butignored health officials, governmentrepresentatives, the news media,injured consumers, outragedcustomers,ortortattorneys.

DidCadburycollaborateandcoordinateaboutriskwithcredibleinformationsources?

No. Cadbury resisted investigation,ignored advice, and fought bitterlywith the food-safety officialsrepresenting the British public. Iftherewas awrongmove tobemade,Cadburymadeit.

Section5:Sources

$2millionfineforCadbury.(2007,July16,2007).AFXNews.

21.7millionpoundsofbeefrecalled.(2007,September30).CNN.comRetrieved24April2015fromhttp://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/29/meat.recall/

Allen,P.(2006,June25).BossesknewEastereggscouldbecontaminated;expertattacksCadbury’ssalmonellaalertdelay.SundayMercury(Birmingham).

Armitage,J.(2006,Oct.26).CadburyhitsbackatMarstopchocclaim.EveningStandard(London),p.41.

Armitage,J.(2006,Oct.26).UKchocolateloversregaintheirtasteforCadbury.EveningStandard(London),p.31.

Authi,J.(2005,June25).Callersfloodchochelpline;Cadbury:Concerngrowsasagencyorderssalmonellaprobe.BirminghamEveningMail,p.2.

Bainbridge,S.M.(2002).Directorprimacy:Themeansandendsofcorporategovernance.Nw.ULRev.,97,547.


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Bakan,J.(2012).Thecorporation:Thepathologicalpursuitofprofitandpower.HachetteUK.

Ball,D.(2002,December18).CadburyDealtoAcquireAdamsBolstersRevenue;PactforPfizerCandyUnitLeavesConfectionerWithHeavyDebtLoad.TheWallStreetJournal.

Barnett,L.(2007,April24)Cadburyfacessalmonellacontaminationcharges.WesternMail,firstedition,p.8.

Belson,K.(2007)AfterExtensiveBeefRecall,ToppsGoesOutofBusiness.TheNewYorkTimes.

BirminghamtoprosecuteCadburyoversalmonellaoutbreak.(2007,July13).LocalGovernmentChronicle.

Bossesdefendreportingdelay.(2005,June26).BirminghamPost,p.3.

Bowery,Joanna.(2006,June28).Cadburyfreezesalladsamidsalmonellascare.Marketing,p.1.

Blackhurst,C.(2004).THEMTINTERVIEW:TODDSTITZER-TheCEOofCadburySchweppesmaybeanAmericaninchargeofaBritishcorporation,buthe'sfromaNewYorkfamilywithasocialconsciencequiteinlinewiththefirm'sfoundingQuakers.Andheknowshowtomarket,astheauthordiscoversinconversationwithhim.ManagementToday,42.

Britain’sMostAdmiredNo.4:Cadbury,ToddStitzer.(2009,November30)ManagementToday.

BritishFoodSafetyAgencycriticizesCadburyforsalmonellacontamination.(2006,July4),AssociatedPress

Britten,N.(2007,July14).Cadbury’sdeliberatelyletsalmonellaintobars.DailyTelegraph(London),p.9.

Brown,T.(2006,Oct.27).Cadburyseessalesofchocolatemeltaway.DailyMail(London),p.90.

Buckland,R.(2006,July31).Cadburyfaces20millionpoundclean-up.WesternDailyPress(Bristol),p.33.

Cadburyallowedsalmonellainitschocolatebars.(2007,July14)WesternDailyPress(Bristol),p.4.

CadburybecomesworldleaderwithAdamsacquisition.(2002,December17).ConfectionaryNews.com.RetrievedApril9,2015,fromhttp://www.confectionerynews.com/Manufacturers/Cadbury-becomes-world-leader-with-Adams-acquisition.

CadburybossesToddStitzerandRogerCarrleaveafterKrafttakeover.(2010,February3).EveningStandard(London).

CadburyCEOadmitsunableyettoassessfullimpactofsalmonellascare.(2006,Aug.2),AFXInternationalFocus.

Cadburychocolate’sPRmeltdown.(2006,Dec.16).TheGrocer,p.34.


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Cadburydismissestalkthatmoreproductswillneedtoberecalled.(2006,July2).AFXNews.

Cadbury‘failedtoassess’risk.(2006,July5).BirminghamEveningMail,p.3.

Cadburyhikescostofsalmonellafoodscareto30millionpounds.(2006,Dec.12)AgenceFrancePress.

Cadburyincourtonhygienecharges.(2007,July3).TheGuardian(London).

Cadburynamedoversalmonellaoutbreak.(2006,July21).GuardianUnlimited

Cadburypleadsguiltyto3offensesinsalmonellacontamination.(2007,June15)AssociatedPress.

CadburySchweppesappearsincourtonfoodhygienecharges(2007,July3).AssociatedPress.

CadburySchweppesscrapsitsforecastforprofitability.(2006,October30).TheAssociatedPress.

CadburySchweppesslipsasFTSEhitsanotherhigh.(2006,Oct.16).GuardianUnlimited.

CadburySchweppeswithdrawssevenchocolateproductsinsalmonellascare.(2006,June23).AFXNews.

CadburyshareholdersapproveKraftdeal.(2010,February2)NewZealandHerald.

Cadburytalkdownsalmonellawhispers(2006,July8).BirminghamPost,p.5

Cadburytopayoutonkid’ssalmonellacase.(2007,July14).DerbyEveningTelegraph,p.3.

Cadburywarnsoversalmonellascareasfirst-halfprofitsjump.(2006,Aug.2).AgenceFrancePresse.

Cadburywritessweetlettersincharmoffenseonc-stores.(2006,Aug.5).TheGrocer,p.6.

Cadbury’spullsCoronationStads.(2006,June28).BirminghamPost,p.1.

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END

Documents

CASE STUDY: The Cadbury Schweppes salmonella outbreak and ... · providing a summary of the case; and then by selecting and organizing the pertinent facts of the case into a timeline