Case Study Annex FINAL - European Commission · 2016-09-13 · Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment | Case Study Annex This report does not necessarily reflect the view of the

Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment | Case Study Annex

European Commission

Studies in the Field of the Common Fisheries Policy and Maritime Affairs

Lot 4: Impact Assessment Studies related to the CFP

March 2011

Impact Assessment of Discard Reducing Policies

Case Study Annex


This report does not necessarily reflect the view of the European Commission and in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area.


Project no: ZF0926_S10 Issue ref:

Date of issue: March 2011 Prepared by: CH, DA, SM, RC, TP Checked/Approved by:

DA

Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment | Case Study Annex i

Contents 1 Iceland’s Discard Ban ...................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background to the Fishery........................................................................................ 1 1.2 The Discard Ban Policy ............................................................................................ 2

1.2.1 Technical aspects.............................................................................................. 2 1.2.2 Reducing undersize catch ................................................................................. 4 1.2.3 Management measures of deterrence .............................................................. 5 1.2.4 Industry measures of voluntary compliance ...................................................... 6

1.3 Discard Rates ........................................................................................................... 6 1.4 Affects of the Discard Ban ........................................................................................ 7

1.4.1 Environmental Indicators................................................................................... 8 1.4.2 Economic Indicators .......................................................................................... 8 1.4.3 Social Indicators .............................................................................................. 10

1.5 Social and public perception................................................................................... 11 1.6 Wider Uptake.......................................................................................................... 11

2 Norway’s Discard Ban ................................................................................................... 12 2.1 Background to the Fishery...................................................................................... 12 2.2 The Discard Ban Policy .......................................................................................... 14

2.2.1 Technical Aspects ........................................................................................... 14 2.2.2 Reducing Undersize Catch.............................................................................. 16

2.3 Discard Rates ......................................................................................................... 17 2.4 Affects of the Discard Ban ...................................................................................... 18

2.4.1 Environmental impacts .................................................................................... 18 2.4.2 Economic Impacts ........................................................................................... 19 2.4.3 Social Indicators .............................................................................................. 21

2.5 Wider Uptake.......................................................................................................... 22 3 Scotland’s Catch Quota Management and Remote Electronic Monitoring Scheme...... 24

3.1 Background to the fishery....................................................................................... 24 3.2 Background to the scheme..................................................................................... 25 3.3 Discard rates .......................................................................................................... 26 3.4 Scheme Results ..................................................................................................... 26 3.5 Behavioural impacts ............................................................................................... 26 3.6 Economic impacts .................................................................................................. 27 3.7 Management costs ................................................................................................. 28 3.8 Development and wider application........................................................................ 28

4 The Danish Catch Quota Management Project 2010 .................................................... 30 4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 30 4.2 The scientific project 2008 – 2009.......................................................................... 30 4.3 The Catch Quota Management project 2010 ......................................................... 31

4.3.1 Implementation................................................................................................ 31 4.3.2 Licenses and rules of engagement ................................................................. 32 4.3.3 Reporting, monitoring, and validation.............................................................. 33 4.3.4 Preliminary experiences gained ...................................................................... 33

4.4 Preliminary results .................................................................................................. 34 4.4.1 Size grade distribution and discards ............................................................... 34 4.4.2 Fisher behaviour and change of fishing pattern ........................................ 36

Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment | Case Study Annex ii

4.4.3 The use of REM from a control and enforcement perspective ................. 36 4.4.4 Impacts on resources ................................................................................... 37 4.4.5 Economic and social impacts ...................................................................... 37 4.4.6 Administrative cost-effectiveness ............................................................... 37

4.5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 38 4.6 References ............................................................................................................. 39 4.7 ANNEX 1 ................................................................................................................ 40

4.7.1 Electronic monitoring system ...................................................................... 40

Tables

Table 1 Cod equivalent of all species as published by Ministry of Fisheries – 2005-2011 (Source: Ministry of Fisheries, Iceland)................................................................................... 3 Table 2 Undersize discard estimates of haddock in Icelandic fisheries – 1988-2000 (Source: Palsson, 2003). ....................................................................................................................... 6 Table 3: World’s top 10 exporters of fish products 1996 & 2006 – sorted by 2006 figures (source: FAO 2008) .............................................................................................................. 12

Figures

Figure 1 Net profit margin for Iceland’s demersal fishery, 1969–1989 (Data source: Statistics Iceland 2010 and Arnasson, 1995) ......................................................................................... 1 Figure 2 Icelandic cod stock levels as assessed by NWWG (2010). ...................................... 2 Figure 3 Number of real-time closures in Icelandic fisheries (source: Ministry of Fisheries, Iceland) ................................................................................................................................... 5 Figure 4 Percentages of undersize discards as a proportion of total catch for haddock and cod (data from Palsson, 2003; Arnasson, unpublished) ......................................................... 7 Figure 5 Cod SSB and landings in thousands of tons 1980 – 2010 (NWWG, 2010). ............. 8 Figure 6 Haddock SSB and landings in thousands of tons 1980 – 2010 (NWWG, 2010). ..... 8 Figure 7 Price per kilogram (ISK/kg) for cod & haddock in real terms using prices indices for groundfish without iced fish 1990 – 2006 (STATICE, 2011) ................................................... 9 Figure 8 Icelandic investment in fishing gear for vessels >200GT nominal values 1997 – 2009 (STATICE, 2011) ........................................................................................................... 9 Figure 9 Net profit of harvesting sector 1980 – 2008 (Data source: Statistics Iceland 2010 and Arnasson, 1995)............................................................................................................. 10 Figure 10 Crew share for vessels >200GT and level of employment for demersal fishing fleet 1997 – 2009(data from STATICE, 2011). ............................................................................. 10 Figure 11: Europe's largest fishing nations in fish production (source: Statistics Norway, 2010)..................................................................................................................................... 12 Figure 12: North East Arctic Cod Stock Status 1900-2000 (source: Hylen et al., 2008)....... 13 Figure 13: Total Coastguard Expenditure including capital investment 1977-2006 (indexed 2006 = 1) (source: Statistics Norway, 2010). ........................................................................ 15 Figure 14: WWF Smart Gear Competition Runner-up 2006: Flexigrid design (source: WWF, no date)................................................................................................................................. 16 Figure 15: Cod SSB as proportion of Blim in the North East Arctic stock. The higher this percentage, the healthier the stock (source: Diamond & Beukers-Stewart, 2009). .............. 18

Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment | Case Study Annex iii

Figure 16: North East Arctic Stock Status 1946 - 2010 (source: AFWG, 2010) ................... 19 Figure 17: Entire Norwegian Fleet Profitability 1980 – 2005 (source: Statistics Norway, 2009)..................................................................................................................................... 20 Figure 18: Required catch by fishers to earn national average wage (source: S. Johansen, pers. comm., 21 May, 2010) ................................................................................................. 20 Figure 19: Fish sales value adjusted to consumer price index – 1945=4 (source: S. Johansen, pers. comm., 21 May, 2010)................................................................................ 21 Figure 20: Estimated revenue of cod fishing vessels assuming stable price scenario (2009 = 1). Orange points for 2010 and 2011 indicate speculative catches based on TAC set by ICES (source: graph created by author based on ICES 2010a & S. Johansen, pers. comm., 2010)..................................................................................................................................... 21 Figure 21 The catch quota principle...................................................................................... 24 Figure 22 Size grade of cod as percentage of landings 2010 (source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Denmark) .................................................................................... 35 Figure 23 Size grade distribution of cod in landings 2010 (source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Denmark) .................................................................................... 36 Figure 24 Schematic diagram of the electronic monitoring system, which can record ......... 40

Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment | Case Study Annex 1

1 Iceland’s Discard Ban

1.1 Background to the Fishery

Fish products have always played a large role in Icelandic domestic product and exports. They accounted for 26% of exports during the 2000s and 8% of total GDP – 35-40% of this was cod. Given the importance of cod stocks to the national economy, attempts were made in 1984 to reverse a decreasing stock and catch trend by introducing a quota system to align fishing capacity with resource opportunities. Total Allowable Catches (TACs) were set for different stocks and then split amongst vessels as Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQs). Addressing bycatch and discards was also necessary as all major fisheries in Iceland are multi-species and therefore cannot be used to target one single species. Because of this, Iceland introduced a discard ban into their fisheries in 1984 coinciding with the original IVQ system. The Icelandic fleet still experienced poor economic performances (Figure 1) and a continuing decrease in cod stock biomass (Figure 2) during this period. This led to further legislative changes in 1990 through the Fisheries Act which was passed in 1991.

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Figure 1 Net profit margin for Iceland’s demersal fishery, 1969–1989 (Data source: Statistics Iceland 2010 and Arnasson, 1995)


Figure 2 Icelandic cod stock levels as assessed by NWWG (2010).

Through the Fisheries Act, Icelandic authorities now, amongst other things, had the legislative ability to implement a full transferable quota system. However, as operators gained more rights to the resource and economic performances increased, there were calls from industry and management to solve the continuing issues of bycatch and discards given its perceived connection to failing stocks. It should be noted that while the discard ban, in some form, had been implemented since 1984, it has been through the development of further policy, and in particular the current regulation no. 57/1996, which has brought about the highest levels of compliance and overall benefits (see Figure 4).

1.2 The Discard Ban Policy

The discard ban initially started as a catch quota scheme for cod and haddock. That is, it was legal to continue discarding of all other species. Over time, the list of species to which the discard ban was applicable grew. The policy has now evolved into one where the list now only contains species of which discarding is allowed. These species which can be discarded are considered to not hold any commercial value and are unmarketable. There are, however, some allowances for discarding commercially-listed species if they are damaged. The discard ban policy has been established through parliamentary process and is legally enforceable.

1.2.1 Technical aspects

The initial method of reducing discards is the concept that prior to each fishing trip, the operator’s portfolio must hold enough quota to fish all the species which the trip is expected to encounter in that fishery. That is, if the fishery has cod and haddock and the vessel only currently holds quota for cod, then the trip should not proceed. The Directorate of Fisheries is in corresponds periodically with the vessels’ operators to inform them of up-to-date figures on quota utilisation. In instances where operators have exhausted some quota or do not hold quota for a certain species, this can be leased (short-term) or traded (long-term) with another operators. This is also a 5% over-quota buffer allowed per species for all operators. Monitoring and enforcing the concept of holding adequate quota to fish is difficult. This is why there are various other measures in place which align with this concept and can be more easily monitored; this includes a mix of incentive-based and regulatory measures.


When vessels catch species which are outside their portfolio of quota, quota is automatically added to the portfolio for that species at the cost of cod quota. This cost is established through the cod-equivalent index. Each year, the Ministry of Fisheries publishes the cod equivalent in weight for all species. For example, in 2010/11 1kg of cod was the equivalent to 1.05kg of haddock (Table 1). This can occur for up to 2% of the total cod quota in the individual operators’ portfolios. Cod is used to create other species quota, but other quota cannot be used to bolster cod quota.

Table 1 Cod equivalent of all species as published by Ministry of Fisheries – 2005-2011 (Source: Ministry of Fisheries, Iceland)

Year Species

05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/010 10/11

Cod 1 1 1 1 1 1

Haddock 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.69 0.76 0.95

Saithe 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.38 0.49 0.64

Demersal redfish 0.54 0.69 0.6 0.42 0.61 0.74

Ling 0.55 0.6 0.64 0.49 0.48 0.51

Tusk 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.37 0.34

Greenland halibut 2.04 1.98 1.67 1.23 1.94 2.21

Plaice 1.29 1.18 1.02 0.81 0.77 0.8

Atlantic catfish 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.6 0.71 0.87

Monk fish 1.6 1.8 1.76 1.34 1.65 1.92

Witch flounder 0.63 0.59 0.52 0.5 0.61 0.6

Dab 0.52 0.48 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.24

Long rough dab 0.45 0.46 0.29 0.26 0.34 0.34

Lemon sole 1.55 1.43 1.46 1.21 1.14 1.07

Herring 0.14 0.13 0.1 0.07 0.12 0.11

Capelin 0.06 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.17

Blue whiting 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.13

Silver smelt 0.4 0.44 0.36 0.32

Offshore shrimp 0.68 0.67 0.57 0.49 0.6 0.63

Inshore shrimp 0.36 0.36 0.52 0.52 0.61 0.58

Iceland scallop


Year Species

05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/010 10/11

Nephrops tails 6.45 6.42 5.05 4.68 4.71 4.51

Pelagic redfish 0.51 0.73 0.69 0.41 0.56 0.86

Atlanto Scandian herring 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.16 0.16

Flemish Cap shrimp 0.84 0.75 0.44 0.44 0.75 0.44

All catch below minimum size must be retained for all species. However, this catch is not to exceed 10% of total trip-catch. The undersize catch must also be stored separately from the regular catch in case the vessel is boarded for inspection at-sea or in port. All undersize fish can be sold once landed, and it only 50% of its weight is counted against operators’ quotas. The disincentive to catch undersize fish is the consequences of having a catch composition of undersize fish being greater than 10% of the trip-catch. Some of these consequences will be discussed in further detail in section 1.2.2.1.

Towards the end of the season, many operators are naturally beginning to exhaust all quota in their portfolios. As an incentive to continue landing all catches, operators are able to sum the weight of all landings (all species) and land an additional percentage of their catch. Vessels targeting demersal species can land an additional 5%; vessels targeting pelagic species an additional 2%. This additional catch can also be for species which are outside those for which the operator holds any quota. As with the undersize catch, this catch must also be stored separately from the main catch so as to be clearly identifiable. This additional catch is then auctioned off and 80% of the sale value is confiscated by the Ministry of Fisheries to contribute to a fisheries development fund.

Any catch sold beyond this 5% is recorded by the Directorate of Fisheries. By the end of the season, letters are sent to operators with this higher level of catch requiring a payment for this catch. The payment is set at an auctioned value and the 100% of this value is required as payment.

1.2.2 Reducing undersize catch

As discussed through section 1.2.1 operators are required to land all undersize catch, but also ensure that it does not exceed 10% of the total trip-catch. This requires initiatives to reduce the level of undersize (juvenile) catch that was occurring prior to the discard ban.

Using more selective gear is one approach used by Icelandic fishing operators. Unlike the scheme under EU’s EFF, government subsidies are not provided to invest in more selective fishing gear – this investment is industry-driven. The incentive for industry to invest in this gear is purely to avoid the consequences of not catching a greater than 10% portion of juvenile fish. In addition to the use of more selective gear, Icelandic authorities also implement real-time closures.


1.2.2.1 Real-time closures

Real-time closures have played an important role in reducing the interaction between fishing and juvenile fish. The decision rule to implement a closure is based on many factors including information from the Marine Research Institute on large abundance of juvenile fish in the area, or from composition of catch by fishing operators. If juvenile catch levels are recorded to be greater than 10% of the total catch, the area in which these catches were made is examined. If it is noted that this area requires a temporary closure, this can be enacted and enforced within 12 hours.

Real-time closures automatically last two weeks and are closely monitored as the area is reopened. If an area is closed more than twice, it is considered that perhaps this area is highly likely to harbour juvenile fish. The temporary status of the closure is then reconsidered and sometimes this closure becomes more permanent. The more unselective the gear used, the more area closed; this then has clear economic impacts. In 2010 there were 120 closures. Of the closures which were for cod, up to 70% were due to the poor selectivity of longlines (K Helgasson, pers. com., 2011). Figure 3 indicates that there is a decreasing trend in these closures due to cod trawls but an increasing trend in longline cod fishing.

Figure 3 Number of real-time closures in Icelandic fisheries (source: Ministry of Fisheries, Iceland)

1.2.3 Management measures of deterrence

As a deterrent to discarding, the Icelandic coastguard plays an important enforcement role. The coastguard conducts at-sea inspections of vessels and carries out surveillance for vessels discarding at-sea.

The Ministry and Directorate of Fisheries consider logbooks and catch composition comparisons to be one of the most valuable methods of detecting non-compliance with the discard ban (K Helgasson, pers. comm., 2011). The Directorate of Fisheries regularly has observers onboard vessels and inspectors portside to analyse catch composition and catch-length frequencies. If it is noted that catches from two different operators are from the same area, but have very different length frequencies, it can be reasonably assumed that discarding has occurred.


1.2.4 Industry measures of voluntary compliance

As part of the discard ban policy, there are a range of measures industry have control over. Vessel operators are able to transfer up to 15% of the year’s unfished quota to the following year’s portfolio.

Operators are also able to keep track of all recorded landings via the directorate of fisheries website. A benefit to this is when operators wish to monitor catches to determine how much cod quota has been removed for other species via the cod equivalent method. If it is found that an economically unfavourable outcome has occurred in the species transfer, the operators can lease quota of the relevant species to reverse the transfer.

1.3 Discard Rates

Palsson (2003) and Arnasson (unpub) have estimated the levels of undersize discards in the haddock and cod fishery using a length-based analysis method (Table 2 and Figure 4). It should be noted that in Figure 4, data collection sufficient for cod analysis only began in 2001. There have been several development stages with Iceland’s discard ban. By 1986, all species under individual quota management had prohibitions on discarding. Despite this, there was a decrease in mesh size 1991 which may provide an explanation for the increase in discard levels after 1991 in Figure 4. A fully transferable ITQ system was also introduced in 1991 (Arnasson, 1995) which may have also contributed to an increasing trend in discarding. Operators may have been more interested to reduce the level of low-value landings through this period.

Greater public awareness of discarding and well publicised punishments are cited as contributors to an increase in compliance (Arnasson, unpub). Compliance may have also increased (Figure 4, after 1996) due to the introduction in 1996 of The Act concerning the Treatment of Commercial Marine Stocks as subsequently amended No 57/1996 which provides greater legislative power to authorities.

Any discarding which occurs in Icelandic fisheries is said to be mainly undersize (Palsson, 2003; Arnasson, unpub). The bulk of haddock discards in Iceland (67% of weight) have been from the demersal trawl sector (Palsson, 2003).

Table 2 Undersize discard estimates of haddock in Icelandic fisheries – 1988-2000 (Source: Palsson, 2003).

Discards numbers Discards weights DL50 (cm) Stock Size Landings Year

Millions % tons % '000 tons Millions Tons

1988 2.9 11.69 1,481 3.79 40.1 151 24.8 39,088

1989 2.6 9.89 1,499 3.39 41 168 26.3 44,215

1990 1.1 3.55 634 1.34 37.1 145 31 47,158

1991 6.9 37.70 3,349 9.66 43.8 120 18.3 34,661

1992 8.4 47.46 3,858 13.26 39.3 106 17.7 29,093


Discards numbers Discards weights DL50 (cm) Stock Size Landings Year

Millions % tons % '000 tons Millions Tons

1993 5.7 25.11 2,414 8.01 38.5 129 22.7 30,132

1994 8.9 29.57 4,236 10.73 40.4 127 30.1 39,474

1995 12.8 44.14 8,397 19.61 42.2 119 29 42,829

1996 10.2 39.38 4,577 11.60 41.1 108 25.9 39,466

1997 8.3 50.61 6,160 22.28 44.4 89 16.4 27,643

1998 5.4 34.62 2,501 10.34 40.3 96 15.6 24,191

1999 2.6 14.13 1,349 5.20 38.8 91 18.4 25,960

2000 3.4 21.79 1,930 8.39 40.5 86 15.6 22,990

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Figure 4 Percentages of undersize discards as a proportion of total catch for haddock and cod (data from Palsson, 2003; Arnasson, unpublished)

1.4 Effects of the Discard Ban

The implementation of The Act concerning the Treatment of Commercial Marine Stocks as subsequently amended No 57/1996 certainly appears to have had the greatest influence on the reduction of discarding. Many developments were occurring in Iceland’s fisheries during the 1990’s (e.g., new fisheries management act, full transferable quotas, increasing legislation against discarding) so it is difficult to place total causality of any trends on the banning of discards. Regardless, many indicators seem to demonstrate an improvement in Iceland’s fisheries as a result of all initiatives.


1.4.1 Environmental Indicators

Both cod and haddock have experienced increases in SSB since 1996 – the introduction of the discard ban legislation – with 88% and 68% (Figure 5 and Figure 6) increases respectively. The beginning of the increasing trend in haddock SSB seemed to also coincide with the introduction of the legislation; cod’s increase, however, most notably began in 1993.

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Figure 5 Cod SSB and landings in thousands of tons 1980 – 2010 (NWWG, 2010).

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Figure 6 Haddock SSB and landings in thousands of tons 1980 – 2010 (NWWG, 2010).

1.4.2 Economic Indicators

The discard ban does not appear to have had a long-term negative impact on groundfish fish prices. Often a common assumption on the impact of a discard ban will be an overall reduction of fish prices due to the landing of greater proportions of smaller fish. Figure 7 indicates that prices for cod and haddock have actually increased over time. If the discard ban has had any effect on these prices, it is most likely to have been a result of an increase in selectivity. This increase in selectivity would have then resulted in a reduction in the number of small fish caught.


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Figure 7 Price per kilogram (ISK/kg) for cod & haddock in real terms using prices indices for groundfish without iced fish 1990 – 2006 (STATICE, 2011)

An increase in fishing selectivity can occur either through the avoidance of high-risk areas for juvenile fish, or through an increase gear selectivity. Increases in gear selectivity will require some form of modification or a full replacement to current fishing gear. Figure 8 indicates the level of investment in fishing gear for vessels over 200GT. Data are not available prior to the discard ban, but the figure does indicate a large increase in investment of fishing gear post 1996. Fishing gear investments peak in the last year of available data at ISK 1.35 billion (€ 8.4 million).

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Figure 8 Icelandic investment in fishing gear for vessels >200GT nominal values 1997 – 2009 (STATICE, 2011)

Overall economic performance of the Icelandic harvest sector has shown a notable increase since the late 1980s and early 90s (Figure 9). Figure 9 shows the net profit margin of Iceland’s harvest sector has being greater than zero 16 out of 20 times since 1988. This cannot reasonably be solely attributed to affects of a discard ban, though. As mentioned in section 1.1, Iceland’s fishing fleet was undergoing major developments in terms of a new fisheries management Act and move into fully transferable quotas. The increase in fishable biomass, as a likely indirect result of the discard ban, and the increase in fish prices would certainly have assisted in this increase in economic performance.


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Figure 9 Net profit of harvesting sector 1980 – 2008 (Data source: Statistics Iceland 2010 and Arnasson, 1995)

1.4.3 Social Indicators

The increase in economic performance of the Icelandic fleet has translated into an increase in crew share. Figure 10 indicates a steady increase in crew share for all Icelandic vessels greater than 200GT from ISK 771 million (€ 4.79 million) in 1997 and ISK 5.4 billion (€ 33.5 million) in 2009.

With the introduction of ITQs, there was also a consolidation of quota resulting in a decrease in vessel numbers (Arnasson, 1995). It is reasonable to assume that the decrease in vessel numbers led to the reduction in crew numbers shown in Figure 10. This decrease in crew numbers is not likely to have been caused in any way by the discard ban. It is important to highlight in this study though, as it indicates increase in attractiveness of the sector proportionate to the increase in total crew share and decrease in crew numbers.

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Figure 10 Crew share for vessels >200GT and level of employment for demersal fishing fleet 1997 – 2009(data from STATICE, 2011).


1.5 Social and public perception

There has been a marked increase in the social responsibility of fishers with regards to discards. Due to close proximity of all fishing-related issues to the general Icelandic public, generally most issues are dealt with quite swiftly (K Helgasson, pers. comm., 2011). The Icelandic government and the public in general believe and promote that discarding is immoral. In addition to the waste of consumable protein, there isn’t an economic gain from continuing the practice.

There have been other major changes to the behaviour of fishers. With the increased understanding of the benefits from a discard ban, there have been recorded cases of vessel operators reporting other operators when they have witnessed them discarding illegally. This indicates that even if the coastguard is not patrolling certain areas, the likelihood of being detected when discarding still exists. If operators are not detected when discarding, cases have also occurred where disgruntled crew have reported previous employers for discarding.

1.6 Wider Uptake

In theory, a discard ban such as this is widely applicable to fisheries with high discards or bycatch. Despite the presence of a coastguard conducting at-sea patrols, heavy emphasis has not been placed its necessity to the scheme. The regime as a whole is a good concept and has proven to be successful. The key issue has been that often it is difficult to prove deliberate discarding. It is unclear the exact developments in legislation which has led to an increased compliance after 1996.

An important factor in this scheme is the emphasis on at-sea and port observers. Even though not all trips are monitored, being able to compare catches of monitored and non-monitored trips has proven a useful tool in identifying target vessels. Using observers 100% for fisheries tasks also allows for cost-recovery schemes when the economic performance of fleets increases. When large amounts of control effort are used through the coastguard, given the multi-use nature of the organisation, it would be difficult to allocate a “fisheries proportion” of cost.

Overall the Ministry considers the flexibility of quota swapping and buffers in this scheme to be vital as a method of increasing incentives to industry. With these incentives, industry has been more willing to voluntarily reduce the level of discards.


2 Norway’s Discard Ban

2.1 Background to the Fishery

Fisheries in Norway contributed largely to the country’s economy accounting for 5.8% of the export value. Norway’s total fisheries capture in 2007 was 2.54million tonnes with a total catch value of NOK12.16billion (£1.3billion) (Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 2010). This figure makes Norway the second most important fishing nation in Europe (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: Europe's largest fishing nations in fish production (source: Statistics Norway, 2010)

According to European Commission (2009), 95% of all fish produced in Norway is then exported; a large majority of which is to other European markets. Given these large levels of export, Norway is considered the world’s second largest fish exporting nation (see Table 3).

Table 3: World’s top 10 exporters of fish products 1996 & 2006 – sorted by 2006 figures (source: FAO 2008)


It was during the 1950s that research started to clearly identify the impacts caused on the stock from retaining offshore juvenile cod from the nursery grounds (see Figure 12). This was clear as fishers were noticing declining levels of catch in the spawning stock fishery. It was assumed that this decrease in spawning stock catches, and thus decreases in income and profits, was due to overcapacity of the offshore fleet. This realisation led to a series of decommissioning rounds in an attempt to reduce overcapacity.

Figure 12: North East Arctic Cod Stock Status 1900-2000 (source: Hylen et al., 2008)

Although the fishery’s managers had implemented this decommissioning scheme, very little other management measures were being implemented prior to the mid 1970s. This was despite the constant advice from ICES on suggested quota levels or effort levels and possible area closures. It was not until around the time Norway anticipated claiming their right to the 200nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 1977 that the fisheries began to be


subject to management regulations. Initially, just prior to the claiming of the EEZ, the first total allowable catch (TAC) for Cod in the Barent Sea set by the Norwegian government was in 1975.

When the TAC was introduced in 1975, Norway experienced issues which were not unlike those experienced by many other countries with similar management regimes. Because vessels were now limited in the amount of catch which could be landed, industry was now beginning to prioritise holding capacity for higher valued fish through a method known as highgrading (P. Gullestad, pers. comm., 2010). Despite the extreme negative view of this practice by management authorities, the legislation which established the TACs did not imply that highgrading was illegal.

In addition to highgrading, where mature sized but low valued target species were being thrown back to sea, there was also another common practice occurring which was required by legislation. Fishers were required to throw back undersized fish which did not meet the size regulations set by the Directorate of Fisheries.

Evidence from IMR suggested that the combination of these factors led to a decrease in stock size (Hylen et al., 2008 – see Figure 12), yet it was difficult to demonstrate this as catch levels continued to increase until 1979. However, after 1979, catch levels began to decrease and as catch per unit effort (CPUE) also began to decrease (A. Fjeldskår, pers. comm., 2010 & Diamond & Beukers-Stewart, 2009), it was clear to industry that the harvest behaviour was not sustainable. It was also during this period that subsidies were reaching their peak which further suggested that catches were not at a level which provided economic stability given that level of capacity (Hanneson, 2009).

2.2 The Discard Ban Policy

In 1987, Norway first introduced a discard ban on cod and haddock. This ban meant that vessels from any country were no longer able to discard dead or dying fish whilst in Norwegian waters.

The management measure is known as the discard ban. However, in order for the ban to have successfully achieved the goal of sustaining fish stocks, management authorities needed to simultaneously implement a number of measures. This regime of measures under the auspice of the discard ban includes the following measures:

• Selective gear measures

• RTCs and,

• Banning of discards.

2.2.1 Technical Aspects

As a measure to maximise compliance, ample incentives needed to be provided for vessels to not discard the fish. When the ban was first introduced, fishers were required to land and report all catches even if the catch was illegal of which the catch was the confiscated by the sales associations (Gezelius, 2006). This led to a system of reimbursing a percentage of confiscated catch – fishers could apply to the sales associations for 20% of the sale value of


the confiscated catch (Gezelius, 2008 & Diamond & Beukers-Stewart 2009). It should be noted though, that this system only occurs in the whitefish sectors and was removed from the pelagic sales as it was considered to be too lucrative (Gezelius 2006 & Gezelius, 2008).

Given this reimbursement may not cover 100% of total fishing costs, there is still some economic justification and incentive to discard. Due this fact, there is still a level of enforcement required by the coastguard. The coastguard is mandated to patrol waters to monitor and control discarding activities, monitor closed areas and conduct at-sea inspections of vessels in Norwegian waters (Honneland, 2009 & Lockwood et al., 2010). The coastguard is very experienced and knowledgeable of both high-risk areas and vessels to which it can concentrate effort. However, assistance is also provided by IMR to inform the coastguard on regular basis of shifts in water conditions and juvenile migratory patterns (P. Gullestad & O. Misund, pers. comm., 2010).

The total cost of the coastguard is estimated at NOK 800 million (£ 86 Million). Figure 13 presents the total expenditure, adjusted for inflation, for the Norwegian coastguard from 1977 to 2006. This total includes capital expenditure which accounts for the large peak in cost during the late 1970s as this marked the initial years of the coastguard. The source of funds for the coastguard is 100% government funded. Attempts have been made to estimate the percentage of the coastguard’s effort required for fisheries surveillance (~70%), as a means to recover this cost from industry, however agreements have not been reached (P. Gullestad, pers. comm., 2010).

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Figure 13: Total Coastguard Expenditure including capital investment 1977-2006 (indexed 2006 = 1) (source: Statistics Norway, 2010).

The effectiveness of the coastguard’s presence is clear. Interview responses in Honneland (2000) and anecdotal evidence from A. Fjeldskår suggest that while some small levels of discarding does still occur, most fishers appreciate that discarding can only be done in small amounts and not often without the likelihood of being caught.


Norwegian vessels are subject to a 15% maximum bycatch limit for cod (Lockwood, et al., 2010). The importance of this bycatch limit is also relevant as it is the trigger for another aspect of the discard ban regime – real time closures (RTCs).

2.2.2 Reducing Undersize Catch

While the banning of discards is a key component to the regime, the overarching purpose is to guide the fishery into a condition to when banning of discards is not required and undersize catch is limited (B. Schultz, pers. comm., 2010).

2.2.2.1 Gear Restrictions

While implementing BRDs is an important step to reducing bycatch, the ability of the device to enhance survival rates of escaped species is paramount. A literature review conducted by Suuronen (2005) found that small pelagic species have extremely high rates of mortality (77-100%) once escaped from nets, yet flatfishes such as flounder and plaice have mortality rates as little as less than 10%.

The key to success of BRDs in the north east arctic cod fishery is due to the extremely high survival rate of cod escaping from nets. Suuronen (2005) states that studies have found cod mortality rates to be less than 3%. Studies conducted by IMR have also shown that cod passing through multiple BRDs, due to being swept up by multiple trawls, still have a high survival rate (O. Misund, pers. comm., 2010). Much of this high survival rate is due to biological traits, however developments in BRDs technology by IMR’s Responsible Fish Capture Research Group (RFCRG) and private designers have also contributed to increasing survival rates. Design and testing of the Norwegian gear is conducted by RFCRG, which is funded through the government budget and in 2009, the group’s budget equalled NOK 26.5 million (£ 2.8 million). However, all purchasing of this gear to be implemented in the fishery is done at industry’s expense and is not subsidised (O. Misund, pers. comm., 2010).

Traditionally, sorting grid systems are steel bars rendering them quite heavy, rigid and dangerous to operate at sea. A new flexigrid system has been implemented which is similar to the one of the award-winning designs from the WWF Smart Gear competition (Figure 14). Anecdotal evidence suggests that this development of the traditional sorting grid has addressed some of the safety concerns (A. Fjeldskår, pers. comm., 2010) and also reduces cod bycatch substantially (O. Misund, pers. comm., 2010; WWF, no date)).

Figure 14: WWF Smart Gear Competition Runner-up 2006: Flexigrid design (source: WWF, no date).


Regulating mesh sizes are also used to reduce undersized catch which comes in to contact with the net, whether in trawling, seining or with gill nets. If mesh sizes are set the appropriate size, target species under the minimum catch size can pass through the net. In the Barent Sea fishery, the minimum catch size is 47cm which requires a 135mm minimum mesh size in the Norwegian sector for trawls and Danish seines and 180mm minimum mesh size for gill nets (Lockwood et al., 2010).

2.2.2.2 Real Time Closures

RTCs are used as a dynamic method of addressing large congregations of juvenile cod. Coastguard inspectors perform regular inspections on vessels operating in the Barent Sea to determine if juvenile catches in the holds are too high and if so, the area of catch is recorded and a five mile radius is closed to fishing (Lockwood et al., 2010; Diamond & Beukers-Stewart, 2009). Assessment fishing is then conducted by management authorities to determine when the areas are suitable to re-opened. Quota is set aside at the start of the year to include catch taken by these assessments (S. Johanssen, pers. comm., 2010). The assessments are carried out by IMR researchers using actual contracted fishing vessels to ensure the scenario of fishing is accurately replicated. Unlike the North Sea RTCs implemented by Scotland, these closure times are not subject to a maximum length (ie 21 days).

Approximately 3000 inspections are made each year by the coastguard which are required to assist in determining areas for RTCs. Scientific inspection vessels employing the use of up-to-date fishing gear are also used to determine sites for RTCs. To increase the efficiency of the operations of the coastguard and the scientific inspection vessels, oceanographic analysis is conducted by IMR to determine where areas would be ideal nursery grounds for juvenile cod (O. Misund, pers. comm., 2010). Management authorities are also well experienced in the dynamic nature of the real time closures and can manage a high volume of closures; there are roughly 100 area closures per year (P. Gullestad, pers. comm., 2010).

2.3 Discard Rates

Discard data is not collected in Norway. However, multiple studies have been conducted to estimate the levels occurring despite the prohibition of discarding. The Institute of Marine Research (IMR), conducted a study in 20021 which suggests that discards account for approximately 2-8% of the total catch quantity for all Norwegian fisheries. This level varies widely from fishery to fishery. For example, industrial trawlers targeting cod in the Barent Sea have an estimated discard rate of 1-5% whilst the tusk longline fishery has an estimated discard rate of 5-15%. The overall estimate is consistent also with Valdemarsen and Nakken (2002)2 where they estimated a weighted discard rate of 3.9%, or about 100 000 tonnes of discards from landings of approximately 2.5 million tonnes.

The positive environmental impacts experienced with northeast arctic cod fishery will be indicated in section 2.4.1. These impacts will demonstrate the differential in levels of discards prior to and post the introduction of the discard ban.

1 Source: Valdemarsen and Nakken, (2002), see http://www.imr.no/__data/page/3926/Rapport_om_utkast_av_fisk_i_norske_farvann.pdf 2 Valdemarsen, J.M. & Nakken, O. 2002. Utkast I norske fiskerier. Workshop om utkast I nordiske fiskerier. Sophienberg Slot, Rungsted, Denmark.

http://www.imr.no/__data/page/3926/Rapport_om_utkast_av_fisk_i_norske_farvann.pdf


2.4 Effects of the Discard Ban

When considering the economic state of Norway’s fishing fleet and the consistent increases in suggested TAC by ICES, it is clear that the discard ban has been successful in addressing the key issues surrounding the fishery’s decreasing stock sizes. As a testament to the success of the discard ban in increasing stock levels of cod (and other earlier species), the concept has now been applied to all species with a commercial value as required by legislation in Stortinget (2008).

2.4.1 Environmental impacts

Figure 15 indicates the change in stock size after the introduction of the discard ban. The greater the proportion of SSB/Blim, the healthier the stock; proportions less than one suggest a stock which will struggle to affectively spawn. In the years preceding the discard ban, the proportion is steadily declining and approaching zero in some instances; indicating zero SSB. However, the second linear function, considered after the discard ban, shows a constantly increasing proportion.

It is possible that the implementation of the discard ban cannot be credited with all the biological benefits experienced. Poor TAC limits set between 1980-1985 reduced the SSB to such low limits that harvest levels needed to be reduced to less than 200,000 tonnes. This was also the result of TACs which were agreed between Norway and Russia only considered catch taken by trawling vessels; other gears were not restricted by TACs (Hylen et al., 2008). This, in addition to the need to reduce capacity cost-effectively, led to introduction of the IVQ system to regulate catch levels across the entire fleet. Regardless of this, the discard ban has resulted in much more accurate stock assessments which allow more suitable TACs to be set.

Figure 15: Cod SSB as proportion of Blim in the North East Arctic stock. The higher this percentage, the healthier the stock (source: Diamond & Beukers-Stewart, 2009).

The current status of the North East Arctic Stock is extremely positive considering the declining levels of catch and spawning stock biomass (SSB) which the fishery had been subject to in the past (see Figure 16). Naturally, the stock fluctuates according to environmental conditions but generally the stock has shown positive growth since the


implementation of the discard ban in 1987. The International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES) have also assessed the fishery’s harvest control rules (HCR) and stated that the regulations satisfactorily meet precautionary principles (ICES, 2010). ICES (2010) also states that the stocks SSB is approaching record levels.

The latest advice from ICES has suggested that in 2011 the cod TAC should be 703,000t which is an increase of 22% on the previous year’s suggested TAC and an approximate 134% increase on the catches made leading up to the innovation. The dilemma that the joint-commission must now face though is that the agreed HCR state that to ensure stock stability and to acknowledge the natural variability in stock size, TACs will not be adjusted by more than ±10%. However, some members of management believe that in this circumstance, the raising of the TAC beyond the 10% limit would still be considered a precautionary action (pers. comm., P. Gullestad, 2010).

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Figure 16: North East Arctic Stock Status 1946 - 2010 (source: AFWG, 2010)

2.4.2 Economic Impacts

Shortly after the implementation of the discard ban, the IVQ system was introduced as a method to increase fleet profitability. Therefore, the profit margin increases indicated in Figure 17 cannot be attributed entirely to the discard ban given that profitability is a function of fishing income and cost. However, if it were to be considered that the increase in stock size is a function of the discard ban, and that fish prices are to remain stable (as demonstrated below), then it can be stated that the rise in fishing revenue is a direct result of the discard ban.


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Figure 17: Entire Norwegian Fleet Profitability 1980 – 2005 (source: Statistics Norway, 2009).

The increase in fleet profitability has also meant fishers are now earning above the national average wage. Figure 18 illustrates that after the introduction of the quota system in 1989, the catch per fisher increased and started becoming more align to and also greater than the catch required to earn the national average wage. Additionally, as shown by the relatively stable fish price index (Figure 19), this cannot be attributed to rises in fish prices but largely due to the level of capacity reduction occurring throughout the industry (Hanneson, 2009 & MOF, 2010).

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Figure 18: Required catch by fishers to earn national average wage (source: S. Johansen, pers. comm., 21 May, 2010)

The price for fish has remained relatively stable since 1945 (see Figure 19) it can be reasonably assumed that the price per tonne fetched for cod in catches from 2007 onwards will be similar to those in 2007. Therefore considering inflation and a total Norwegian catch share of 261,500t, it can be estimated that the value of the fishery for Norway in 2009 was NOK3.29billion (£354million).


Figure 19: Fish sales value adjusted to consumer price index – 1945=4 (source: S. Johansen, pers. comm., 21 May, 2010).

By assuming the stable price scenario, revenue from the cod stock has increased from NOK 2.09 billion (£ 224 million) in 1989 to NOK 3.29 billion (£ 352 million) in 2009. If Norway were to implement the suggested TAC by ICES of 351,500 tonnes (which would be against the 10% year on year increase policy) the revenue could be valued at NOK 4.42 billion (£ 473 million) in 2011 (see Figure 20).

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Figure 20: Estimated revenue of cod fishing vessels assuming stable price scenario (2009 = 1). Orange points for 2010 and 2011 indicate speculative catches based on TAC set by ICES (source: graph created by author based on ICES 2010a & S. Johansen, pers. comm., 2010).

2.4.3 Social Indicators

When considering the discard ban alone, there have been a number of positive social outcomes and very few negative. Aside from poor management decisions between 1985-1989, resulting in record low stocks, cod stock levels and fishing income have shown substantial increases (see Figure 16 and Figure 20). This has increased the sustainability and viability of the fishery, thus sustaining a traditional livelihood. Fishers still involved in the fishery view the new management measures as a positive step which has boosted their


profitability and crew share (Figure 18). Therefore, while fishers appreciate that compliance is not 100%, seeing the long-term value of such regimes has encouraged a high compliance rate; this high level of compliance is also validated in reports such as Honneland (2000) and Diamond & Beukers-Stewart (2009).

Negative social outcomes which have occurred since the introduction of the discard ban are mainly attributable to reduction in employment through fisheries as a result of the IVQ system. However, the sales associations have expressed concern over the new list of species included in the discard ban as a result of The Ocean Resources Act (Stortinget, 2008). Without successful marketing schemes, it is unlikely that demand will suddenly increase as more of the traditionally discarded species are supplied to the market. Despite this, sales associations are obliged to compensate vessel owners for landing this catch (J. Straume, pers. comm., 2010).

2.5 Wider Uptake

Due to high government revenue, management authorities have the ability to meet the required cost of the coastguard in this fishery. Furthermore, institutional capacity is relatively high which allows active and effective research groups such as RFCRG to develop fishing gears which reduce the level of bycatch within the fishery and IMR which provide information on when closed areas are suitable for reopening.

Given that the transboundary cod stock is also shared with Russia, the bilateral agreement (NRJFC) was a vital barrier to overcome. This appears to have been successfully achieved as ICES (2010) has suggested that IUU fishing by both Norway and Russia has been essentially eradicated from fishery.

New marketing schemes are also required when providing further supply of traditionally low-demand species to the market. Without the successful sale of this new supply, the discard ban which limits discarding of all commercially valued species will not have achieved its objective of not wasting sources of protein.

Given the high cost of the coastguard as a result of this regime, this financial aspect may prove a barrier to wider implementation. However, wide coverage of at-sea observers could provide a cost-effective alternative to the intense inspection regime currently employed. Figures provided in MRAG (2006) suggest that for the cost of 70% of the coastguard budget (the proportion estimated to be used for fisheries surveillance), all large scale vessels could employ an observer for 684 days per year; a figure clearly greater than the number of days per year. This is based on a rather simplistic calculation and of course, there are more fleets fishing in Norwegian waters than just those for Barent Sea cod. However, it does indicate that even if each vessel did fish 365 days of the year, there is a substantial margin in which wide observer coverage could be achieved. The calculation is based on the following assumptions:

• Number of large scale vessels are 400 and;

• Cost of programme is £220 per observer day, a figure which can be drawn from conservative estimates of costs of current European observer programs presented in MRAG (2006).


Wide coverage of the fishery from observers can achieve much of the task required of the coastguard, provided no direct at-sea enforcement is required. Observers can provide up to date information on bycatch levels which can be used to determine areas for closure and they can report instances of discarding which can be acted upon at a later date by the relevant authorities. Observer coverage can then also provide the levels of data required for accurate stock assessment and levels of bycatch which is not landed due to being outside the discard ban regulation. Data at this level of detail would not be available through regular catch and landings records and will also assist in management decisions if new objectives were to require a shift towards greater ecosystem management based approaches. From a financial perspective, costs of observer programmes are usually 100% recovered through industry payments.

In the current coastguard system, difficulty has arisen in trying to attribute accurate proportions of cost to fisheries and therefore cost-recovery does not occur. Unlike that system, costs of observer programmes can be easily attributed to industry and allow to effective cost-recovery.

An Icelandic case study has also proven the effectiveness of employing at-sea observers. The coverage rate does not need to be substantially high in this case given their role. As opposed to providing more of a comprehensive data collection and monitoring role, sample analysis of catch will be taken to compare against other vessels’ catch compositions when landing at port. If the catch compositions do not match the expected levels, then it is likely that discarding has occurred.


3 Scotland’s Catch Quota Management and Remote Electronic Monitoring Scheme

3.1 Background to the fishery

Since 2004, vessels fishing in the North Sea cod fishery have faced significantly reduced quota and effort allowances in an attempt to rebuild North Sea cod stocks under the Cod Recovery Plan. Despite indications of recovery leading to a long term management plan replacing the recovery plan in 2008, the most recent ICES advise was for a 20% reduction in the TAC for North Sea cod in 2011, which would be accompanied by reduced effort allowances (days at sea) under the plan.

To manage these ongoing reduced fishing opportunities Scotland’s whitefish fleet has significantly reduced its capacity through decommissioning (most recently in 2007), diversification into other fisheries such as Nephrops, increased gear selectivity and other cod avoidance measures such as real time closures to enable vessels to continue to fish. Scotland developed the Conservation Credits Scheme to incentivise the whitefish fleet in adopting all practicable cod avoidance measures.

However, cod still represents around 5% of Scottish landings by value and can still be legitimately caught within the limited quota available (the UK holds around 48% of the EU TAC for North Sea cod amounting to 13,000t in 2010) and while operating in a mixed demersal fishery such as the North Sea, whitefish vessels cannot entirely avoid cod. Vessels targeting other whitefish such as haddock and whiting have found that occasional catches of cod (a comparatively larger gadoid species) has been inevitable. Prawn trawlers targeting Nephrops will also experience occasional cod by-catch. The limited amount of cod quota available makes purchasing or leasing additional quota to cover these accidental catches very difficult and costly. As a result, fishermen without the quota to cover these cod catches have been forced to discard.

Overall ICES estimates that 35% of the total fishing mortality on North Sea cod in 2011 will be in the form of discards. As a result the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), or more accurately, Total Allowable Landings, is only 65% of total fishing mortality (Figure

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Figure 21 The catch quota principle

All involved with fishing recognise that discarding is a wasteful practice; throwing good quality, valuable fish back into the sea dead creates no benefit to cod stocks, the wider ecosystem or society. The discards issue has increased in prominence as fishermen feel that scientific advice, particularly in relation to cod, is lagging behind and they are experiencing far more cod on the ground in the last couple of years. Recent UK media interest has added to a renewed focus on discarding and efforts by the UK fishing industry to reduce discard levels.

3.2 Background to the scheme

Marine Scotland, the government department responsible for sea fisheries management, science and enforcement in Scottish waters out to British fishery limits, sought to develop a system that would reduce discards of cod and importantly would provide proof that this was the case. The development of a system to create a fully documented fishery that would prove discarding levels was critical to the acceptance of such a scheme.

The Catch Quota Management System brings the current ‘discard mortality’ portion of the

fishing mortality (Figure 21 ) into the catch allocation. This is used as an additional catch allowance (along with proportional increases in effort allowances) to provide an incentive for fishers to join the scheme.

The Scottish Government sought to include up to 30% of the discard mortality (i.e. 85% of the 35% estimated discard mortality), but the EC & Norway agreed to allow an additional 12% allocation on the UK TAC . To maintain a strong incentive, vessels were invited to join


the scheme with an offer of an additional 30% cod quota and effort, but the number of vessels that could then join the scheme was more limited.

The REM system uses a set of 4 or 5 cameras located on deck and in the fish room and are continually recording while at sea to show the quantity and composition of catches and discards. The system includes winch sensors that links footage to hauling activity. This enables land-based observers reviewing the footage to jump directly to relevant footage.

The vessels joining the scheme must commit to:

1. No discarding of cod and instead land all cod caught by the vessel (irrespective of size). 2. Once the cod quota or any other quota for a species where catching cod is possible, the

vessel must cease fishing. 3. The installation of Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) equipment including cameras,

sensors and recording apparatus. 4. A duty of care for maintaining the REM equipment in good working order.

Seventeen vessels were part of the scheme in 2010 and this has risen to 26 vessels for the 2011 scheme from 58 applications, which is close to half the remaining dedicated Scottish whitefish fleet. The initial findings from the 2010 scheme are to be presented in a joint UK report including the Defra discard reduction trial due to be finalised in March 2011. Below some initial reported findings and comments from managers of the scheme are provided, along with some economic analysis undertaken by Marine Scotland.

3.3 Discard rates

The level of discarding differs between fisheries and individual vessels as it is dependant on a number of variables including gear selectivity, fishing patterns and quota holdings. The average discard rate for North Sea cod in UK fisheries between 2007 and 2009 was 51%. Based on UK quota this represents over 6,000t of cod.

The average discard levels of those applying for the scheme (58 vessels) were between 30% and 37%.

The proportion of undersized fish reported in the catches is 5%, illustrating that North Sea cod discarding is predominantly due to a lack of quota.

3.4 Scheme Results

Vessels within the scheme are not allowed to discard cod, therefore the reduction in cod discards is to 0%. This year at least 1,000t of cod that would have been discarding will now be landed under the catch quota management scheme.

As soon as a vessel reaches 100% uptake of cod quota they must stop fishing in any fishery where cod could be caught. In the mixed North Sea fishery this is effectively all trawl fisheries and therefore the vessel is restricted by whatever quota limit is reached first.

The average price per tonne achieved by vessels within the scheme was 0.6% less per tonnes than those outside the scheme. This is due to the size profile of the cod landed leaning more towards smaller fish, which suggests that unless non-scheme vessels have


more selective gear or are fishing in markedly different areas, some high-grading may still be occurring outside the scheme.

3.5 Behavioural impacts

Vessels within the scheme fished throughout the year; they did not have to tie up early when cod quota was exhausted. Very close to 100% of cod quota was fished and most fished up to 100% on whiting, but there was a more limited take-up of haddock (around 50%) The opportunity to purchase or lease additional quota remains open to these vessels and this flexibility is encouraged. So too is the opportunity to sell or lease unused quota.

It was found that vessels within the scheme steamed further to avoid areas of high cod by-catch compared with those outside of the scheme and the length of trip was slightly longer. This is due to the scheme vessels having an additional effort allocation. Vessels not in the scheme are more confined by days at sea allocations and therefore catch what they can is as short a time (distance from port) as possible. Those within the scheme were better able to manage how to maximise returns on quota allocations.

Undersized cod that is caught (and therefore landed) cannot enter a human consumption market – it goes to either fishmeal or for bait. This achieves a small fraction of the price of marketable cod, but still goes against the vessel’s quota; this creates another strong incentive to avoid small cod via gear selectivity and avoiding areas known for juvenile cod.

Another interesting impact of the scheme is that vessels within the scheme are distinguishing themselves in the market as ‘discard-free’ vessels. The scheme is being used as a positive selling point to customers.

3.6 Economic impacts

The 26 vessels within the scheme this year represent around 20% of the Scottish whitefish fleet. Therefore the impact of the scheme is unlikely to be felt across the fleet as a whole and may have limited market impacts. Instead consideration is given to the impact on vessels within the scheme compared to those outside of it.

Marine Scotland has undertaken some economic analysis of the Scottish scheme and the English scheme3. Economists modelled a number of scenarios relating to the uptake of North Sea cod, haddock, whiting and plaice quota by various gear segments to show impact of the scheme one year ahead. The following summary findings are reported:

In general, the scheme appears to lead to positive net revenues for most participating vessels (excluding Nephrops) and, in some instances, the level of this net revenue may be very significant in comparison to average net profit. Nonetheless, the following points are worth highlighting:

• Demersal vessels are estimated to derive an average net benefit of between 8-11% as long as we assume 100% quota uptake of the four stocks. However, we also see that losses are possible if vessels fail to achieve 100% quota uptake in all stocks.

• The benefit to Beam vessels is almost entirely dependent upon plaice being part of the scheme. Where plaice is included, Beam vessels are estimated to derive a substantial average net benefit of between £340-347k (a 30% improvement).

3 Catch Quota Scheme Scenario Analysis, Marine Scotland/Defra, 2011.


• Nephrops vessels are not estimated to benefit from participation in the scheme due to early cessation of fishing leading to a reduction in volume of catch of other NS stocks.

• Additional quota allocation could fall to as low as 47-49% of the [current ICES estimated] discard rate before the scheme ceases to deliver additional net benefit to vessels.

• Landings of other NS stocks could fall by 18-19% against our central estimate before the average vessel ceases to derive additional net benefit from the scheme.

• Average prices as a result of participation leading to landing a greater proportion of smaller fish could fall by 15-18% before the average vessel ceases to derive additional net benefit from the scheme.

In addition to this modelling exercise, other suggestions for likely economic impacts include:

• Leasing prices are expected to increase if the scheme were more widely adopted, but these are difficult to differentiate from the impact of changes in TAC, e.g. this years 20% reduction would be a more significant impact than the catch quota scheme.

• Vessels are seeking to differentiate their product in the market as ‘discard-free’, which could result in some form of price premium and more than compensate for the 0.6% decrease in average price seen in 2010 from landing comparatively smaller fish.

3.7 Management costs

The REM system has a capital cost of approx. £10,000, which to date has been purchased with grant aid.

Comparing results with observer coverage shows that the system provides a high degree of confidence that all of the catch is being adequately observed.

Scheme managers have estimated that to extend the scheme to the majority of the Scottish whitefish vessels would require a team of around 8 operators reviewing footage. This is far less than the ‘call centre’ estimates made by some. As with other enforcement systems , a risk-based approach would require reviewing footage from a small sample of vessels based unusual landings/fishing patterns and some random sampling.

The system enables very good targeting of footage and over 80% of recorded footage can be ignored as vessels are not hauling or sorting catch. With suitable training, comparatively low grade administrators can review the footage and only involve enforcement officers if anomalies are identified.

A fully documented fishery (FDF) creates the potential for substantial savings in at sea and aerial surveillance, which are some of the most costly aspects of fisheries enforcement. Linking the REM system with port controls recording all fish being landed enables enforcement authorities to significantly reduce other inspections such as of gear as there is a clear incentive to be as selective as possible, removing the temptation for using smaller mesh or blinders.

In addition to MCS benefits, the potential benefits for fisheries science are also noteworthy. Scottish scientists estimate that it would take 3-4 years for catch quota footage to be appropriately integrated into fisheries assessment as they would have to test comparability with existing assessment methods. A camera kit has been installed on the research vessel,


Scotia, to trial the system with scientific surveys. In the long term, there are clear benefits in having a high degree of confidence that landings were equal to catches. The technology also provides the opportunity for more automated and remote size profiling, which would be cheaper than market sampling methods.

3.8 Development and wider application

2011 has seen the expansion of the scheme to 26 vessels. Marine Scotland is looking to trial haddock and whiting this year.

A number of Nephrops trawlers are part of the scheme and these showed a more mixed result with some involved being at a disadvantage as full uptake of Nephrops quota was not possible. For these species where cod is more of a by-catch, the incentives of additional quota and effort do not outweigh the loss of other fishing opportunities when the first quota limit (which is likely to be cod) is reached.

At present the specifics of the catch quota management scheme limit expansion to those species where discard estimates are used in scientific assessment, namely cod, haddock, whiting and plaice. Should scientific information improve on other species, the developers of the scheme can see its application to other quota species.

Theoretically there is nothing to prevent an extension of the discard ban to non-quota species. Discarding of non-quota species is currently due to a lack of a market or due to fish being below a minimum landing size. However, the lack of quota to incentivise behavioural change and the restriction of stopping fishing leads operators of the scheme to suggest the scheme would not work for vessels targeting non-quota species. The cod scheme would not be so effective without the numerous other efforts to avoid undersized cod. As gear selectivity has not been so fully explored for non-quota species, extending the ban on discards to these species in the same way (i.e. permitting undersized landings) could increase overall catch levels.

In terms of the REM system, operators suggest this could be more widely applied to enable fully documented fisheries and the estimated reductions in enforcement costs. It would work well with long line and gill net fisheries as the quantity of fish coming aboard is less, allowing a more accurate estimate of total catch. For pelagic fisheries it would also work well as quantity and sizes can be estimated with a high degree of confidence, enabling a catch profile to be estimated and incidents of slippage to be more readily detected.

For small scale vessels the measures appear excessive and UK authorities are looking at alternative management strategies such as effort-based systems to improve management and reduce discarding.


4 The Danish Catch Quota Management Project 20104

4.1 Introduction

With total fish landings (2010) of 821.000 tonnes Denmark is the 5th biggest fishing nation in Europe . With a total fish export (2009) of €2.271 million, Denmark is the 5th biggest fish exporter in the World. The Danish commercial fishing fleet has a total capacity of 68.2 thousand tonnes (2009) and comprises 4 purse seiners, 695 trawlers and 2.135 gill netters. Since 2007 the national TACs have been managed under an ITQ scheme.

In 2008 the Danish Government suggested that the utilization of the marine resources in the EU should be based on the simple and fair requirement that the fisher accounts for his total removal of fish from the resource. By giving the fisher catch-quotas instead of landing quotas his incentive to optimize his value by discarding less valuable fish would be exchanged by his incentive to use selective fishing methods to optimize the value of his total removals from the stock.

To achieve this objective the fisher should receive increased catch-quotas to reflect that all was accounted for and he should be given the freedom of choice of method in conducting his fishery in order for him to make his own methods work for the result.

Denmark suggested that the transfer of responsibility should be established gradually as an offer for voluntary participation in a “second management track”, where fishermen who chose the catch-quota option would have to document their fishing activities by “full documentation” consisting of video and sensor monitoring on the vessel.

A scientific trial was carried through in 2008 and 2009. In 2010 the trial continued in a concrete management perspective. The trial includes catch-quotas and full documentation. The fisherman’s choice of method has been restricted however as the technical conservation rules still apply.

4.2 The scientific project 2008 – 2009

From September 2008 to September 2009 DTU Aqua conducted a trial with fully documented fishery. The objective was to evaluate the reliability and functionality of Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) as a tool to monitor fishing in a catch-quota management. 16,955 hours of days at sea, at 561 fishing trips and 1,558 fishing operations was carried out by 6 vessels during the project period. The experiences obtained during the trial showed that the electronic monitoring system used during the scientific trial could be operated on most types of vessels and give close to 100% documentation of the fishing activities. The full trial report5 can be found at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish.

4 This report is based on the report ”Interim Report. Status on the Danish Catch Quota Management Project 2010”, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Danish Directorate of Fisheries, and National Institute for Aquatic Resources (DTU Aqua), October 2010 and interviews undertaken in February 2011 with representatives of the said organisations. 5 Final Report of Fully Documented Fishery, DTU Aqua Report no. 204-2009 by Joergen Dalskov and Lotte Kindt- Larsen.

http://www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish


The very promising results of the trial contributed to the decision in EU that a catch quota management could be tried on an explicit legal basis, namely in the form of the introduction of a limited catch-quota option in the TAC/Quota regulation for 2010.

4.3 The Catch Quota Management project 2010

At the council meeting 19th October 2009 The Council and the Commission in a Joint Statement recommended experiments and development on Catch Quota Management (CQM) based on fully documented fishery as it might offer a real alternative to the present CFP. COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 219/2010 of 15th March 2010 made provisions for a CQM in EU Member States. The regulation i.a. states, that: “Member States may allow vessels participating in initiatives regarding fully documented fisheries to make additional catches within an overall limit of an additional 5 % of the quota allocated to that Member State, provided that:

• the vessel makes use of closed circuit television cameras (CCTV), associated to a system of sensors, that record all fishing and processing activities on board the vessel,

• all catches of cod with that vessel are counted against the quota, including those fish below the minimum landing size,

• the additional catches are limited to 30 % of the normal catch limit applicable to such a vessel"

The catch quota management project was an extension of the above mentioned scientific trial carried out in 2008-2009. 7 fishing vessels between 17 and 40 meters participated in the project.

4.3.1 Implementation

National rules for a Danish CQM trial were established in December 2009 and further elaborated in February 2010 with a description of the more specific requirements that a vessel would have to meet to participate in the trials. The Danish Fishermen’s Associations were consulted prior to the issuing of the regulations, and changes were made according to their proposals.

In the selection process it was attempted to recruit vessels in the Western and Eastern Baltic, Kattegat, Skagerrak and the North Sea. However, 6 of the vessels have their main fishery in the North Sea and Skagerrak, and only 1 vessel has its main fishery in the Baltic Sea. It was also the aim to recruit vessels both smaller and larger than 18 meters, and vessels using different kind of gears such as trawl and gillnets. However, 6 of the vessels were >18m and all 7 vessels selected were trawlers. The catch quota bonus (max 30%) obtained by the vessels ranged from 23 to 57 tons of cod.

The Archipelago EM sensor systems applied comprised a GPS, a hydraulic pressure transducer, and a photoelectric drum rotation (winch) sensor. Each vessel was also equipped with up to four waterproof armoured dome closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras providing an overhead view of the aft deck and closer views of the fish handling areas and discard chute areas for catch identification. Sensors and cameras were connected to a control box located in the wheelhouse. The control box consisted of a computer that


monitored sensor status and activated image recording. The details of the sensor system is described in Annex 1.

4.3.2 Licenses and rules of engagement

The requirements to be met regarded equipment to be installed on the vessels, the vessels deck-arrangement, the processing of catches of cod, and reporting of catches. A vessel participating in the trials must cease fishing with a gear for which cod is recognized as a target species when its quota for cod has been exhausted.

4.3.2.1 Equipment requirements 1. The vessel must be equipped with a Remote Electronic Monitoring system (REM) which

consists of a control box, hydraulic pressure sensor, rotation sensor, GPS and an adequate number of cameras.

2. The REM must be turned on before the vessel leaves port and must not be turned off before the vessel is moored at port.

3. The vessel master must use the REM according to the guidelines for the system. 4. The vessel must be equipped with a functioning VMS system. 5. The vessel must be equipped with a functioning electronic logbook. 6. The vessel must fill out the electronic logbook haul by haul, and information must be sent to

the Directorate of Fisheries as soon as the processing of the catch is finished.

4.3.2.2 Requirements for vessel design 1. The vessel must be arranged in such a way that it is possible to place a camera that is able to

film the area where the vessel is shooting and retrieving the gear. 2. The vessels working deck must be arranged in such a way that it is possible by using an

adequate number of cameras to overview the whole working deck and the cargo hatches. 3. Fish which are discarded must only be discarded through a specially designed skids/conveyor

belt, which can be monitored by a camera.

4.3.2.3 Requirements for catch processing 1. All cod – above or below the minimum size – must be sorted out from the rest of the catch. 2. Cod over the minimum size must not be discarded. 3. Both the weight of cod above and below the minimum size must be registered haul by haul. 4. Catches of fish restricted by a quota must not be discarded, if they are above the minimum

size. If the vessel does not have a vessel quota of that particular species, it must lease it or obtain it from other vessels participating in a quota pool.

5. The weight of the total discard must be recorded.

4.3.2.4 Reporting requirements 1. In the electronic logbook the position where the vessel is shooting the gear and the position

for where the vessel is retrieving the gear must be recorded haul by haul . 2. The amount of cod that is kept onboard and the amount of cod that is discarded must be

recorded in the electronic logbook. 3. The recording of other species must be done according to normal procedure, however it

must be performed haul by haul, and also the weight of the total discard must be recorded.


4. Any problem with or breakdown of the VMS, REM or electronic logbook must immediately be reported to the Danish Directorate of Fisheries.

4.3.3 Reporting, monitoring, and validation

The skippers on the participating vessels have to report additional information in addition to the official logbook requirements. For each individual fishing operation the following information is recorded: Date, time and position of shooting the gear, time and position of hauling the gear, total catch in weight, weight of retained part of the catch by species, total weight of discarded cod, length measurement of discarded cod, weight of discard of other species.

4.3.3.1 Monitoring

The REM hard disc drives from the vessels are collected by staff from the Directorate of Fisheries for data storage and interpretation. Both sensor and image data are interpreted. All of the sensor data is interpreted by staff at the Directorate of Fisheries using computer software developed by Archipelago Marine Research. Sensor data is used to validate fishing time and position and imagery to validate the fishers recording of catches and especially recording of the amount of discards of cod.

4.3.3.2 Sensor Data Analysis

The purpose of sensor data (GPS, hydraulic and winch rotation) interpretation was to determine the spatial and temporal parameters for start and end of each fishing trip and each fishing event. The key vessel activities including transit, gear setting, and gear retrieval were identified and compared with the logbook recordings.

4.3.3.3 Image Data Interpretation

The objectives of image interpretation are to examine and assess the amount of fish caught for comparison with the catch amount recorded by the crew. The secondary objective is to document catch handling and observe the discard pattern to verify whether discards of cod are correctly monitored and recorded by the crew.

In addition to use REM data to verify the fishers recording of catches and discard the REM sensor data and imagery is used to test whether and how this type of information can be used as a control and enforcement tool. Therefore, various possible non compliance scenarios are tested in order to examine whether REM data can be used as a documentation tool.

4.3.4 Preliminary experiences gained

Since the beginning of the trials in early April 2010 fishery control personnel and students have been employed in the Directorate of Fisheries to review the video material from the vessels. In this trial each controller has the responsibility to monitor the same vessels in order to grow familiar with the routine patterns on the particular vessel. Irregularities in the handling of fish and reporting are easier to discover if you are familiar with the vessels routines.


The Directorate of Fisheries has revied 10 % of the monitored hauls. This has been done simply by reviewing every tenth haul made by the vessels. This is done by analyzing all the sensor data stored on the REM system data hard drive that are collected from vessels and then selecting every tenth haul.

When reviewing the selected hauls the Directorate of Fisheries has examined the time of departure and the time of arrival to port, and compared that information with the information provided by the vessel master in the logbook. The information from the REM system on the first and final hauls has also been compared with the information provided in the logbook. It is also been checked if there is a discrepancy between the catch area recorded in the logbook, and the catch area that is observed from the data collected be the REM systems. These comparisons between the sensor data from the REM system and the VMS system and the data from the vessels logbook have been made for all 7 participating vessels.

When monitoring the selected hauls the amount of cod discarded is estimated and recorded. The amount of discard of other species is also estimated and recorded. These amounts are compared with the amounts of discard registered in the logbook. The Directorate of Fisheries has not yet analyzed differences between the amount of discards registered in the logbook, and the amount of discards estimated by monitoring the vessels through the REM system.

The experiences gained when analyzing the data collected have shown that close contact with the participating vessels master and crew is of importance in the initial phases of an implementation of full documentation. Both the staff of the Directorate of Fisheries and the participating vessel master and crew have had to get familiar with the routines and how to solve irregularities that arose. To achieve a mutual understanding of which information and routines that are essential in making the trials as useful as possible, the Directorate of Fisheries visited all vessels after the REM system had been functioning for a couple of months. When discussing any irregularities of the recordings in the logbook that may have occurred the vessel owners and masters have subsequently followed the instructions of the Directorate. This has implied that the standard of the incoming information has improved. Information regarding the recording of vessel activities such as the time of deployment and retrieval of gears has especially been improved.

The assessment of the software to analyze sensor data and images is that it is very user friendly. It is easy to navigate and it is quite simple to determine the vessels activities from the collected data. Whether the vessel is steaming, fishing, hauling or deploying the fishing gear can easily been determined. The data that can be extracted from the system is very precise, which facilitates accurate comparisons with the data in the logbook.

Even though the REM system works well The Directorate believes that there is still a potential for improvement of the technology.

4.4 Preliminary results

4.4.1 Size grade distribution and discards

The vessels participating in the CQM project have to retain all fish above the minimum landing size. For most species the price per kg increases with fish size and it is possible for a vessel to optimize the value of a quota by only retaining large fish and discarding small


ones. This type of illegal discard known as “high grading” often occurs for species and areas where catch opportunities and quotas do not match.

Six of the trial vessels have been fishing in the North Sea and the Skagerrak and a comparison between these vessels and the rest of the fleet fishing in the same areas can be made. Figure 22 shows the proportion of landings of cod in 2010 per size grade (size grade 1 are the large fish and 5 are small) for the period before the trial start (Jan-Apr) and after the trial start (May-Sep) 2010 for the trial vessels (REM vessels), comparable vessels (using the same gear type and mesh size and same fishing grounds) and for all other vessels that have landed cod caught in the North Sea and the Skagerrak. A difference of the proportion of size grade 4 and 5 can be seen. A similar comparison has not been made in the Baltic as only one trial vessel is operating in the here. All data collected by this Baltic Sea vessel is of course monitored and reviewed.

The percentage of cod discarded by the vessels participating in the CQM trial has been below 3% of the cod caught. The ICES estimate is app. 36 %.

Figure 22 Size grade of cod as percentage of landings 2010 (source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Denmark)

Figure 23 show the size grade of the landed fish for the 3 vessel categories and two seasons (before and after full documentation. In group 1 consisting of the CQM vessels it is seen, that the share of the smallest and least valuable grade doubled after the installation of full documentation. Compared to other vessels (group 3) it is seen that the share of small fish is 3 to 4 times higher. This indicates the level of high grading among vessels without full documentation.

Change in size grade distribution may be caused by several factors such as the species viability in relation to the set quota, change in prices per kg. per size grade (less differences between size grade 3 - 4 and especially between size grade 4 and 5) and change in


selected fishing ground as most demersal fisheries are mixed fisheries and therefore catch opportunities of other species have to be taken into account.

Figure 23 Size grade distribution of cod in landings 2010 (source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Denmark)

4.4.2 Fisher behaviour and change of fishing pattern

The Danish Directorate of Fisheries has been in continuous contact with the vessel owners participating in the trials. The participants have stated that they have changed behaviour including careful selection of fishing grounds, move to other grounds when discard is to high, and use of larger mesh sizes (140 mm) to avoid small fish. When doing the catch handling the crew measures the smallest cod in order to determine whether the cod is below or above the minimum landing size. Before entering the trials the size determination of the cod was just done by eye, which meant that fish just above the minimum size most often were discarded.

Those vessel owners who chose to participate in the trials have a positive opinion towards the project and the CQM approach. The incentives to participate in the trial have been partly the opportunity to gain a premium of cod, but also a desire to document their fishery and to provide reliable data. There are also some fishers that believe that their participation will be an advantage in relation to MSC certification. All vessels participating in the 2010 trial have opted for participation in the 2011 trial which is expected to include some 25-30 trawlers6.

4.4.3 The use of REM from a control and enforcement perspective

The preliminary assessment of the use of REM to verify the recording of discards in the logbook looks very promising. Given the incentive and a conscious adherence to the requirements for verification of the discard, it can be made with high accuracy. Also it is the 6 The 2011 trials will not include gill net fishing vessels as the owners have found the 6% quota bonus offered for this segment to low.


opinion of the Directorate of Fisheries that the use of the REM system is a very efficient control instrument towards eliminating misreporting of areas in which the fishery is taking place.

The experiences gained so far show that REM cannot at this stage replace all control mechanisms. The main objective of full documentation is to ensure that discards are recorded with a reliable weight, and that no other discards takes place. The exact weight of the contained catch must be weighted by landing.

4.4.4 Impacts on resources

At this stage there is no information on the impact of the trial on the cod resources. However, the trial gives reason to believe that CQM will provide better catch statistics as catches and discards are fully documented. The better the statistics, the better and more precise the stock assessments. The catch quota setting will probably be more in line with the stock size and the unallocated mortality may therefore be reduced.

It is anticipated that the industry will use a mesh size that will minimise discarding as in a CQM regime discarding will mean “throwing money back in to the sea”. The fishery will probably be more selective and thereby by-catches may also be reduced.

4.4.5 Economic and social impacts

There has been no attempt to assess the economic impacts of the CQM system. However, the bonus involved has made participation in the trial lucrative for vessels as well as for crew members. All trawlers involved in 2010 pilot programme have applied for continued involvement in the 2011 where as set netters have backed out because of the low (6%) bonus offered.

The fishers involved in the trial have changed behaviour which implies (i) careful selection of fishing grounds and move to other grounds when the discard is to high, and (II) the use of larger mesh sizes (140 mm) to avoid small fish.

There is a lot of political goodwill associated with the CQM system. CQM with CCTV full documentation is now official Danish CFP reform policy.

4.4.6 Administrative cost-effectiveness

The Danish Directorate of Fisheries has not at this stage made a cost efficiency comparison between full documentation and other means of control such as landing control, VMS, control at sea or control by observers. Such a comparison would take account of the nature of full documentation as a continuous surveillance as opposed to other controls that rely on observations at the given time of control.

The directorate’s experiences as regards the administrative time consumed in 2010 on monitoring of fishing operations (10% of all operations) shows that in average 1 hour is needed per fishing operation (appr. 45 min if clean fishery/90 min if mixed fishery).

The directorate has given priority to obtain comparable monitoring and control results, and advantages of a risk based approach have not yet been tested. Initial analyzing of logbooks and sensor data can give relevant information in relation to need of further scrutinize – e.g. if


a given vessel has only registered large size grades. Similarly results from vessels with full documentation can serve as a reference to comparable vessels.

The additional work load for the directorate staff includes (i) at headquarters: permissions to participate, bonus allocations, implementation of monitoring and system/procedures and (ii) at fishing ports: monitoring of CCTV installation on fishing vessels, replacement of harddisks, instruction/training of fishers. There has been no reduction in the directorate workloads associated with the trials.

4.5 Conclusions

The preliminary conclusion of the trials is that the REM system is working well. It is possible through the REM system to estimate the amount of discard of cod and other species. The system also has the potential to improve the existing control mechanisms, especially regarding cases of area misreporting.

The trials have also shown a change of behaviour for the vessels involved. The participants have stated that they pay more attention to where they are fishing in order to avoid areas with small cod. When doing the catch handling the crew now measures the smallest cod in order to determine whether the cod are below or above the minimum landing size. The vessel owners in the trials have a positive opinion towards the project and CQM.

By viewing images from the catch handling onboard, an estimate of the total catch amount and the species distribution can be made. The focal point for this project has been discards of cod. Experience gained in the trial has shown that the estimate of discards of cod by viewing the images can be made with significant accuracy, especially if the vessel has a sorting conveyor belt where the discarded fish pass the discard chute individually. If large amounts of discards occur the accuracy of the estimate of the discard amounts decreases unless specific catch handling protocols are followed by fishers.

It is considered that the voluntary participation ensure acceptance of legitimacy of the documentation thus ensuring a smooth operation where the fishermen work “with the system” .The incentive effect and possible relevance market requirements affects the operational integrity of REM as a reliable tool for documenting catches. The initial implementation and running of the system needs close co-operation between the industry and the authorities to ensure maximum data security.

The results are very much in line with those from the scientific trial in 2008/2009. There is political goodwill associated with the system. CQM with CCTV full documentation is now official Danish CFP reform policy.


4.6 References

Dalskov, J. & Kindt-Larsen, L., 2009. Fully documented fishery. DTU Aqua report. Available at: http://www.aqua.dtu.dk/upload/dfu/kameraforsoeg/final%20rapport%20300809%20v3.pdf

McElderry, H. 2008. At-Sea Observing Using Video-Based Electronic Monitoring. Report prepared for the Electronic Monitoring Workshop held by The North Pacific Fishery Management Council, The National Marine Fisheries Service and The North Pacific Research Board, July 2008.

McElderry, H, R. Reidy, D. Pahti, 2006. A Pilot Study to Evaluate the Use of Electronic Monitoring on a Bering Sea Groundfish Factory Trawler. Unpublished report prepared for the International Pacific Halibut Commission by Archipelago Marine Research Ltd., Victoria BC, Canada.

McElderry, H., A. Crumpacker, R. Wright and D. McCullough. 2005. ElectronicMonitoring for the 2005 U. S. Shore-based Pacific Hake Fishery--A Pilot Study. Unpublished report prepared for the National Marine Fisheries Service, Northwest Fisheries Science Center, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce by Archipelago Marine Research Ltd., Victoria BC, Canada.


4.7 ANNEX 1

4.7.1 Electronic monitoring system

Archipelago Marine Research Ltd. (Archipelago), Victoria, BC, Canada has successfully developed and deployed video based remote electronic monitoring (REM) on a variety of gear and vessel types (McElderry et al., 2005; 2006; 2008) and DTU Aqua decided to use this REM system for the scientific pilot project carried out in 2008-2009 (Dalskov et al. 2009). The same system is used during the 2010 CQM trial.

The system comprises of a GPS, hydraulic pressure transducer, a photoelectric drum rotation (winch) sensor (Figure 24) and four television (CCTV) cameras providing an overhead view of the aft deck and closer views of the fish handling areas and discard chute areas for catch identification. Sensors and cameras are connected to a control box located in the wheelhouse. The control box consists of a computer that monitors sensor status and activates image recording.

Figure 24 Schematic diagram of the electronic monitoring system, which can record

The control box contains data storage capability for about 30 days of vessel fishing activity, and the computer is set to collect and store sensor data (GPS, hydraulic pressure and drum rotation). REM sensor data and image recording are recorded continuously when the REM system is powered which, in principle, is constantly during the entire fishing trip (port to port). No image recording takes place in port.

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Case Study Annex FINAL - European Commission · 2016-09-13 · Common Fisheries Policy Impact Assessment | Case Study Annex This report does not necessarily reflect the view of the