Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 1 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Joseph Darrell Palmer (State Bar No. 125147)
LAW OFFICES OF DARRELL PALMER, PC
603 North Highway 101, Suite A
Solana Beach, CA 92075
Telephone: (858) 792-5600
Facsimile: (866) 583-8115
John W. Davis (State Bar No. 200113)
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN W. DAVIS 501 W. Broadway, Suite 800 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 400-4870 Facsimile: (619) 342-7170 [email protected] Steven F. Helfand (State Bar No. 206667)
HELFAND LAW OFFICES
582 Market Street, Suite 1400
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 397-0007
Facsimile: (415) 397-0009
Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for Objectors Marlene A. Selvaggio, John Metzger and Tony Buhowski
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
RICHARD JOHNS, et al. Plaintiffs, v. VISA U.S.A, et al., Defendants.
Case No. CGC-03-004335
JCCP: 4335
CLASS ACTION
AMENDED OBJECTION TO PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND NOTICE TO APPEAR AT FAIRNESS HEARING
Date: April 2, 2013 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept.: 305 Judge: Hon. John Munter
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 2 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Class members Marlene A. Selvaggio, John Metzger and Tony Buhowski object to the
proposed settlement as follows:
Selvaggio and Metzger hereby incorporate their prior filings made on May 20, 2010 in
opposition to the former settlement considered by The Honorable Richard A. Kramer. Objectors
intend to appear through counsel at the April 2, 2013 hearing.
A. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE RELEASE
In analyzing the fairness of class settlements, courts have long been directed to consider a
variety of factors, “which is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case,” and includes, “the
strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation,
the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the
extent of discovery completed and the stage of proceedings, the experience and views of counsel,
the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement [citation omitted]. The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each
case.” Clark v. American Residential Serv., LLC, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 799 (2009).
Yet California courts have also made it absolutely clear that, of these factors, the most
important “is the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount
offered in settlement.” Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 130 (2008), quoting
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 455. Moreover, the settling parties
must provide the trial court with sufficient evidence and legal analysis to permit an independent
analysis of the relevant factors. Pursuant to both Kullar and Clark, evidence and cogent legal
analysis are the key components to settlement approval. Indeed, the Kullar case refers to a
substantial evidence standard in the review of settlement approvals. See Kullar, 168 Cal. App. 4th
at 133 [referencing settlement evaluations under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 877.6, regarding
good faith settlement among joint tortfeasors].) Here the parties have failed to support the
settlement with sufficient evidence.
Without sufficient and substantial evidence to support a trial court’s assumptions and
factual findings, an approval is an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.
v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 864, 870-71 [discussing abuse of discretion and
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 3 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
substantial evidence in the context of courts’ evaluation of settling defendants’ potential liability
under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 877.6, concluding that “if…there is not substantial evidence to
support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant’s liability, then a
determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.”]; Tire
Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 538, 544 [“We defer to the trial court’s
factual finding so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, and determine whether,
under those facts, the court abused its discretion. If there is no evidence to support the court’s
findings, then an abuse of discretion has occurred.”]; Stack v. Stack (1961) 189 Cal. App. 2d 357,
368 [“[w]e find no authority distinguishing between insufficient evidence and abuse of discretion.
It would seem obvious that, if there were no evidence to support the decision, there would be an
abuse of discretion.”].) Here, the settling parties have failed to submit requisite evidence and
analysis, and instead rely on rote incantations about the desirability of settlement and the risks of
further litigation all the while failing to monetize the scope of the release.
B. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OR ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION
REVEALED IN PLAINTIFFS’ INVESTIGATION TO SUPPORT AN INITIAL
PRESUMPTION OF FAIRNESS IN LIGHT OF THE SCOPE OF THE RELEASE
Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801-1802, opines there is an
initial presumption of fairness when: “(1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length
bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is
small.” Id.
However, the Kullar court expressed considerable doubt about the continued viability of
the Dunk presumption, noting that the Dunk court relied on “an earlier version of Newberg on
Class Actions” when it articulated it. Kullar, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 128. Indeed, the presumption
articulated in Dunk seems to be based upon the Dunk court’s doubt that the burden of proving the
fairness of the settlement should be upon the settling parties in the first place. Dunk, 48 Cal. App.
4th at 1801-1802. Regardless, the Kullar court explained that any such presumption did not
withstand the need for the court to require evidence and analysis of the value of the settlement
versus the strength of plaintiffs’ claims and, lacking that, there was no presumption. Kullar, 168
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 4 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Cal. App. 4th at 129 [“Assuming that there is a ‘presumption’ such as Dunk asserts, its invocation
is not justified by the present record.”].) The Clark court, too, made it clear that the Dunk
presumption did not affect the ultimate burden of proof or the evidence required to support it,
because the trial court has a duty to conduct an independent evaluation of the settlement even in
the absence of objection. Clark, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 801.
As in Kullar and Clark, the invocation of the initial presumption of fairness in this case is
unwarranted, there is insufficient evidence supporting this settlement; the investigation and
discovery were insufficient to enable the court to act intelligently especially when measured
against the scope of the release. As Kullar and Clark make clear, it is not enough that class
counsel have taken discovery and satisfied themselves that the settlement is fair: the parties must
provide evidence and argument directed at supplying the trial court with the information necessary
to compare the value of the settlement against the strength of plaintiffs’ case. “A class action
settlement, where a class representative purports to settle third party claims, is subject to particular
scrutiny, because the trial court, as guardian of the class, must independently satisfy itself that the
consideration received for a release of class claims is reasonable in light of the magnitude of the
release.” Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. et al. (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 562, 597 (dissent by
Chaney)(citing Clark, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 799-800; Kullar, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 129).
Here, as in Kullar, “There was nothing before the court to establish the sufficiency of class
counsel’s investigation other than their assurance that they had seen what they needed to see.”
Kullar, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 129. As discussed supra and infra, the settling parties’ failure to
provide adequate evidence and analysis precludes the trial court from weighing the benefits
offered in the settlement especially when squared against the broadness of the release. Indeed,
after assessing the value of the settlement relief offered to the class, the next step is to analyze it in
light of the strength of plaintiffs’ claims, i.e., the possibility of a greater recovery after further
litigation. Although the trial court is not required to decide the ultimate merits of the class
members’ claims before approving the settlement, “an informed evaluation cannot be made
without an understanding of the amount in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the
litigation.” Kullar, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 120.
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 5 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
In Kullar, the panel faulted the settling parties because they failed to provide any
declarations detailing their investigation of the claims and the factual circumstances surrounding
the claims, failed to provide any “analysis of the factual and legal issues that required resolution”
to determine damages, failed to provide any “estimated quantification” of the potential recovery,
nor any explanation of the factors “considered in discounting the potential recovery for the
purposes of settlement.” Kullar, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 128-29.
The panel in Clark, too, faulted the trial court for failing to provide sufficient legal analysis
of the strength of the plaintiff’s case in approving the settlement, reiterating that “[I]t is not
possible for a court to evaluate the ‘strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits’” as required by
Kullar, “with no regard at all for whether or not a legal issue exists that may have a significant
impact on the value of the claim.” Clark, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 803.
Here, the problem is similar. Though Class counsel claims to have taken significant fact
discovery, none of the relevant discovery is now before the trial court, either to estimate the
amount of restitution or damages (to the extent this was obtainable) at stake or to clarify the issue
of Defendants’ potential liability especially when balanced against the magnitude of the release.
C. THE SHORT AND INCOMPLETE VALUATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
Put simply, evidence in support of the proposed settlement seems to focus exclusively on
Defendants’ interchange and discount fees and does not take into account, for example, “finance
charges” let alone the myriad undefined and all encompassing “charges of any kind” Defendants
are notorious for foisting upon class members. There is also no apparent effort to meaningfully
deal with Plaintiffs’ alleged unfair practices or antitrust violations tethered to similar interest rates
and fees charged by the Visa and MasterCard associations’ members to bankcard holders or set by
individual member financial institutions through duality. Plaintiffs alleged that “duality has led to
similar interest rates and fees charged by the Visa and MasterCard associations’ members to
bankcard holders, and similar discount rates charged to merchants accepting Visa and
MasterCard. (Consolidated Amended Complaint p. 11, ¶ 40) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not
appear to have monetized the release of “finance charges” that would inure to, for example,
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 6 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“member financial institutions” either.
Even if member financial institutions did not engage in a conspiracy (contrary to Plaintiffs’
claims) in setting finance charges and/or interest rates or the host of other applicable charges, the
settling parties make no effort to square the value of the release that shall inure to individual
membership banks. Put simply, no monetization was offered with respect to finance charges or
the myriad other valuable charge claims which encompass such things as annual fees, balance
transfer fees, finance charges, membership fees, reward fees, reward redemption fees, cash
advance fees, late fees, pay by phone fees, duplicate statement copy fees, paper transaction fees,
replacement card fees, reward recovery fees, activity fees, non-activity fees, payment protection
fees, and over-the-limit fees all of which are impacted per Plaintiffs by anticompetitive practices
based on “duality.” If there could be a basis for imposition of a fee or charge, Defendants surely
would have found a way to craft one. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs release these claims altogether for
inconsequential indirect relief meant to only address two limited network specific charges.
D. PRESERVATION OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS IS AN ILLUSORY BENEFIT
It is likewise no answer to say that class members who do not like the settlement can
simply opt-out or that individualized claims are preserved: a possibly unfair settlement is not
rendered fair merely because a class member can opt-out of it, and individuals who opt-out, even
if their claims are large enough to warrant individual pursuit, lose the economies of scale and
bargaining power attending a class action. Trotsky v. Los Angeles Federal Savings and Loan
Association (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 134, 139-140 quoting Ace Heating & Plumbing Company v.
Crane Company (3d Cir. 1971) 453 F.2d 30,33, [“[Fed.] Rule [Civ. Proc.] 23 recognizes the fact
that many small claimants frequently have no litigable claims unless aggregated. So, without court
approval and a subsequent right to ask for review, such claimants would be faced with equally
unpalatable alternatives -accept either nothing at all or a possibly unfair settlement.”].)
E. THE PROPOSED CY PRES DISTRIBUTION DOES NOT BENEFIT CLASS MEMBERS
The Proposed Settlement is not fair and does not benefit class members because: (i) more
than 99.5% of the entire settlement funds are being distributed to charitable and other
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 7 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
organizations, without any direct distribution to class members; and (ii) even if one were to
assume that a cy pres distribution is the only possible alternative here, (it is not clear that this is
the only available method of distribution) the proposed distributions do not directly or indirectly
benefit the class.
Primarily, the court is entrusted with determining whether a proposed settlement is fair to
the class members. Here, the proposed settlement does not provide for any distribution to class
members. Instead 99.5% of the over $21 million settlement is to be distributed to among more
than 150 national and California charitable organizations. The remaining .5% of the settlement
funds is intended to cover administrative expenses associated with making these distributions.
Evidently, the proposed settlement is not even attempting to locate class members and make
appropriate distributions to them. Instead, almost all of the funds are being diverted without
providing any benefit to class members. Unfortunately, the only real beneficiaries of this
settlement are plaintiff’s attorneys. Where the proposed settlement does not make any distribution
to class members, it is not fair and reasonable. Under the circumstances, the proposed settlement
must not be approved.
Additionally, even the proposed distributions to charitable organizations do not benefit
class members or “fulfill the purpose of the underlying cause of action.” Here, almost the entire
settlement funds of over $21 million are being treated as unpaid residuals because these funds are
being distributed to national and California charitable organizations. The distribution of the
settlement funds to these charitable organizations does not promote the interest of the class
members, or promote the purpose of the class action and is not in keeping with accepted legal
standards for cy pres distributions. California Code of Civil Procedure section 384 provides a
framework for the distribution of unpaid residuals in class actions. Code of Civil Procedure
section 384(a) provides that “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to ensure
that the unpaid residuals in class action litigation are distributed, to the extent possible, in a
manner designed either to further the purposes of the underlying causes of action, or to promote
justice for all Californians.” (emphasis added). In State of California v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 460, the Supreme Court considered the problems presented where the “proof of
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 8 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
individual damages by competent evidence is not feasible. Each individual's recovery may be too
small to make traditional methods of proof worthwhile. In addition, consumers are not likely to
retain records of small purchases for long periods of time.” Id. 472 The court considered the cy
pres doctrine, which it denominated “fluid recovery.” Id. 472 The court held that “The propriety of
fluid recovery in a particular case depends upon its usefulness in fulfilling the purposes of the
underlying cause of action.” (emphasis added) Id. 472 Later California class action cases have
also held that, “when it is not possible or practicable in a class action judgment to compensate
class members according to their respective damages, the best alternative for the court is to award
damages in a way that benefits as many of the class members as possible….” (In re Vitamin
Cases, (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 820,826) Where, the settlement proposes a cy pres distribution,
must “the trial court must scrutinize the agreement and approve it only after determining that it is
fair, adequate, and reasonable. In making this determination it must further consider whether the
proposed cy pres distribution is useful in fulfilling the purposes of the underlying cause of action.”
In In re Microsoft I-V Cases (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 724. A similar standard of determining
the fairness of cy pres distributions have been adopted by Federal courts. In Dennis v. Kellogg
Co. 697 F.3d 858 (9th
Cir., 2012), the 9th
Circuit court held that, “[t]o avoid the ‘many nascent
dangers to the fairness of the distribution process,’ we require that there be ‘a driving nexus
between the plaintiff class and the cy pres beneficiaries.’” Id at 5 (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC,
663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th
Cir. 2011)). In the third circuit, generally, “the court should consider (1)
the objectives of the underlying statute(s), (2) the nature of the underlying suit, (3) the interests of
the class members, and (4) the geographic scope of the case.” Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys
Football Club, Ltd., 362 F. Supp 2d 574, 576 (2005, E.D Pennsylvania) citing to In re Airline
Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir.2002). Therefore, the court must
carefully scrutinize the cy pres distribution to ascertain whether the intended distributions provide
any benefit to class members. Here, the cy pres distributions fail under such a scrutiny. For
instance, distributions to Boys and Girls clubs of various different cities are intended cy pres
recipients and Guide dogs of America (No. 132 of list, page 4 of 6 of cy pres distributions). These
organizations are worthy charitable causes. However, distributions to these organizations do not
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 10 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Maria V. Carapia, declare under penalty of perjury that I: am a citizen of the United
States; am over the age of 18 years; am employed by Law Offices of Darrell Palmer PC, 603 N.
Highway 101, Suite A, Solana Beach CA 92075; am not a party to or interested in the cause
entitled upon the document to which this Proof of service is affixed; and that I served a true and
correct copy of the following document(s) in the manner indicated below:
AMENDED OBJECTION TO PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND
NOTICE TO APPEAR AT FAIRNESS HEARING
(x) By today depositing, at Solana Beach, California, the said
document(s) in the United States mail in a sealed envelope, with a
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid; (and/or)
( ) By facsimile transmission to the parties listed below;
(x) By electronic mail to the parties listed below;
( ) By overnight mail to the parties listed below;
( ) By today personally delivering the said document(s) to the person(s)
indicated below in a manner provided by law, by handing them the
documents or by leaving the said document(s) at the office(s) or usual
place(s) of business, during usual business hours, of the said person(s)
with a clerk or other person who was apparently in charge thereof and
at least 18 years of age, whom I informed of the contents.
See Attached Service List.
Dated: February 19, 2013 __________________________
Maria V. Carapia
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 11 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL: BY ELECTRONIC MAIL
Robert Schubert
Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP
Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 1650
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 788-4220
Facsimile: (415) 788-0161
Attorneys for Richard S.E. Johns
Guido Saveri / R. Alexander Saveri
Geoffrey C. Rushing / Cadio Zirpoli
Saveri & Saveri, Inc.
706 Sansome Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 217-6810
Facsimile: (415) 217-6813
Attorneys for Richard S. E. Johns
Maxwell M. Blecher
Donald R. Pepperman
Blecher & Collins, P.C.
515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1750
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 622-4222
Facsimile: (213) 622-1656
Attorneys for Mark Wallgren, Sury
Romero, and Robert Carlos Martinez
Jonathan W. Cuneo / Daniel M. Cohen
Jon A. Tostrud
Cuneo Waldman & Gilbert, LLP
317 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20002
Telephone: (202) 789-3960
Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
Attorneys for Mark Wallgren, Sury
Romero, and Robert Carlos Martinez
Gordon Ball
Ball & Scott
550 Main Ave., Suite 750
Knoxville, TN 37902
Telephone: (865) 525-7028
Facsimile: (865) 525-4679
Attorneys for Mark Wallgren,Sury
Romero, and Robert Carlos Martinez
Steve W. Berman / George W. Sampson
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP
1301 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 623-7292
Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
Attorneys for Ana C. Lossada
Reginald Terrell
The Terrell Law Group
P.O. Box 13315
Oakland, CA 94661
Telephone: (510) 237-9700
Facsimile: (510) 237-4616
Attorneys for Crystal DeFrantz and
Marion Anderson
C. Donald Amamgbo
Amamgbo & Associates
7901 Oakport Street, #4900
Oakland, CA 94621
Telephone: (510) 434-7800
Facsimile: (510) 434-7804
Attorneys for Crystal DeFrantz and
Marion Anderson
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 12 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Kimberly A. Kralowec
The Kralowec Law Group
188 The Embarcadero, Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 546-6800
Facsimile: (415) 546-6801
Attorney for Richard S.E. Johns
Josef Cooper / Tracy R. Kirkham
Cooper & Kirkham, P.C.
357 Tehama Street, 2nd Flr.
San Francisco, CA 94103
Telephone: (415) 788-3030
Facsimile: (415) 882-7040
Attorneys for Amy Miller
Emelike I. Kalu
Law Offices Of Emelike I. Kalu, APC
315 W 9th Street, Suite 603
Los Angeles, CA 90015
Telephone: (213) 624-1500
Facsimile: (213) 624-9476
Attorneys for Michael I. Kalu
Chief Mnamdi A. Ekenna
The Ekenna Law Firm, APC
4311 Wilshire Bouelvard, Suite 612-B
Los Angeles, CA 90010-3717
Telephone: (323) 954-1000
Facsimile: (323) 954-1001
Attorneys for Wambura N. Mkono, Sebron
Johnson, and the Class
Joseph M. Patane
Law Offices Of Joseph M. Patane
2280 Union Street
San Francisco, CA 94123
Telephone: (415) 563-7200
Facsimile: (415) 346-0679
Attorneys for Karen Brock
Mario N. Alioto / Lauren Russell
Trump, Alioto, Trump & Prescott, LLP
2280 Union Street
San Francisco, CA 94123
Telephone: (415) 563-7200
Facsimile: (415) 346-0679
Attorneys for Karen Brock
Rosemary Rivas
Finkelstein Thompson & Loughran
100 Bush Street, Suite #1450
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 398-8700
Facsimile: (415) 398-8104
Attorneys for Foad Ahmadi and Iman Sadri
Lionel Z. Glancy / Avi N. Wanger
Glancy Binkow & Goldberg LLP
1801 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 311
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 201-9150
Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
Attorneys for Lindsey Rosenthal
Susan G. Kupfer
Glancy Binkow & Goldberg, LLP
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 760
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 972-8160
Facsimile: (415) 972-8166
Attorneys for Lindsey Rosenthal
Marc M. Seltzer / Amy T. Brantly
Susman Godfrey L.L.P.
1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 950
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 789-3100
Facsimile: (310) 789-3150
Attorneys for Carmela Chiurazzi
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 13 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Neal S. Manne / Mark Evetts
Susman Godfrey L.L.P.
1000 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone: (713) 651-9366
Facsimile: (713) 654-6666
Attorneys for Carmela Chiurazzi
Ali Oromchian
Dental Counsel, P.C.
2603 Carmino Ramon, Suite 200
San Ramon, CA 94583
Telephone: (925) 242-2511
Facsimile: (925) 884-1725
Attorneys for Foad Ahmadi
DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL: BY ELECTRONIC MAIL AND U.S. MAIL
Robert J. Vizas / Sharon D. Mayo
Arnold & Porter LLP
One Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-3711
Telephone: (415) 356-3000
Facsimile: (415) 356-3099
Attorneys for Visa U.S.A. Inc. and
Visa International Service
Association
Robert C. Mason
Arnold & Porter LLP
399 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022-4690
Telephone: (212) 715-1000
Attorneys for Visa U.S.A. and Visa
International Service Association
Kenneth A. Gallo / Patricia C. Crowley
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-5694
Telephone: (202) 223-7300
Facsimile: (202) 223-7420
Attorneys for MasterCard
International Inc.
Gary R. Carney
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,Wharton & Garrison LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone: (212) 373-3000
Facsimile: (212) 757-3990
Attorneys for MasterCard International Inc.
Gary L. Halling / Thomas D. Nevins
Michael W. Scarborough
Shepard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
LLP
Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 434-9100
Facsimile: (415) 434-3947
Attorneys for MasterCard
International Inc.
Amended Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement - Page 14 Case No. CGC-03-004335
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
OBJECTORS COUNSEL: BY ELECTRONIC MAIL
Thomas V. Girardi / Graham B. LippSmith
Girardi Keese
1126 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90017-1904
Attorneys for Objector and Plaintiff
in James Attridge v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.
et al., Case No. CGC-04-436920
Lingel H. Winters
Law Offices Of Lingel H. Winters, P.C.
275 Battery Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111
Attorneys for Objector and Plaintiff
In James Attridge v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., et al. Case No. CGC-04-436920
Joseph M. Alioto / Theresa D. Moore
Alioto Law Firm
225 Bush Street, Suite 1615
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: 415-434-8900
Facsimile: 415-434-9200
Attorneys for Appellant Objector Salveson
Martin N. Buchanan
Law Offices Of Marin N. Buchanan
600 B Street, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101
Attorneys for Objector and Plaintiff
in James Attridge v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
et al. Case No. CGC-04-436920
CLASS COUNSEL SERVED BY U.S. MAIL
Craig Corbitt / Judith A. Zahid
Jose M. Umbert / Heather T. Rankie
Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 3400
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 693-0700
Facsimile: (415) 693-0700
