G.R. No. L-53597 February 28, 1989

D.C. CRYSTAL, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. ALFREDO C. LAYA Judge, CFI, Cebu, Br. IX and CORAZON Y. LUA, respondents.

FACTS:

A restraining order was issued  in Civil Case No. AV-433, commenced  by complaint of the Corazon Y. Lua against Desamparado C. Crystal and D.C. Crystal, Inc.

Lua's verified complaint  averred that she is lawfully engaged in the business of supplying crushed aggregates and mixed sand and gravel within public land in relation to which she had obtained corresponding permits from the Bureau of Mines; that the business requires the use of a rock crusher machine, and to have a right-of-way from the national highway to the site where her machine was installed, she had leased the property of Paulino Abatayo and constructed a road along said right-of-way; that on February 25, 1980, while her trucks were engaged in loading and hauling crushed aggregates at the quarry, the defendants, claiming that her (Lua's) area of operations was within their own concession area, caused a bulldozer to dig up and destroy the road built by Lua on her right-of-way. As a result of defendants' bulldozing, Lua's employees were denied access to her operations area, and her machines 3 payloaders, 8 dump trucks, her crusher machine and trucks were isolated and rendered immobile; that with the assistance of PC soldiers, the defendants had since effectively prevented Lua from retrieving her trucks and from conducting normal business operations in the area.

Respondent Judge issue the temporary restraining order. The defendants promptly filed two (2) motions. One sought dismissal of the action on the ground that venue had been improperly laid and Lua had no cause of action. The other prayed for dissolution of the restraining order on the asserted theory that Lua had not shown a right to the relief demanded and that in truth it was she who had invaded defendants' rights.  Lua submitted a formal opposition to the motions.

The Respondent Judge denied both motions. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to annul and perpetually inhibit enforcement of the restraining order. It further alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue restraining order or preliminary injunction against its mining and related activities under PD 605.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

HELD: YES, As regards the preliminary injunction, it is germane to stress that what is restrained by the injunction issued by the Trial Court are not defendants' mining activities but their invasion of plaintiffs' operations area and their infringement of her rights in respect thereof. The Court a quo cannot thus be regarded as having acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in rendering the Orders now impugned before this Court.

The action in the Court below is a personal, not a real one.  It seeks recovery of damages caused to the plaintiff by the defendants' use of intimidation and other illegal means to prevent the former from conducting licit business activities and operations, to destroy her property and deprive her of use and enjoyment of machinery. 

G.R. No. 87678 June 16, 1992

DEL BROS HOTEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and LEON M. TIAMSAY, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent Leon M. Tiamsay entered a consultancy agreement to negotiate the sale of DBC Hotel and the sale of the DHC shares.

On July 27, 1987, Tiamsay filed a complaint against DHC seeking the recovery from the defendant of the sum of P1,549,118.65 as his commission for the sale of the DBC hotel building, in accordance with their Agreement. It was alleged that DHC had continuously refused to pay him the said amount despite demands and hereby incurred liability not only for the said amount but also for moral and exemplary damages, attorney s fees and costs.

DHC moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The motion averred that there was no allegation in the said complaint that the sale of the DHC hotel building, which was the condition sine qua non set forth in the Agreement for its obligation to pay the commission, had been consummated. 

RTC Makati denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint has cause of action.

HELD: YES. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered. The court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the merits of case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said motion.

In the view of this Court, these allegations sufficiently state a cause of action. The complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on this merits of the case. In fact, the complaint is not supposed to contain evidentiary matters.  7 Rule 6, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that this petition must be limited to "a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." We find that the amended complaint complies with this requirement.