MMDA VS. Viron Transpo

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.

Pedrosa vs. Hill

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.. Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. Non-compliance therewith may cause the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.. While the strict application of the rule on the payment of docket fees has been relaxed in some cases the Court took cognizance of the peculiar circumstances attendant to said cases. The case before us is no exception

Dela Cruz vs. CA

The Compromise Agreement between the parties is valid and binding. The Decision dated July 12, 1999 and Order dated June 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, are hereby REINSTATED.

A compromise is an agreement between two or more persons who, aiming to prevent or put an end to a lawsuit, adjust their respective positions by mutual consent. Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every compromise agreement. Each party approximates and concedes a point in the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing, its own advantage. It is, in essence, a contract. It is binding and has the force of law between the parties unless it is a void contract under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, or unless the consent of a party is vitiated (such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence) or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. It has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata, and when the court renders a judgment based on the compromise agreement, the judgment becomes immediately executory, there being an implied waiver of the parties' right to appeal from the decision.

Pentagon vs Jimenez

"Sec. 12. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

'(b) Tools and implements necessarily used by him in his trade or employment;'"

Respondents contend that from the above provision, three (3) things can be deduced, viz:

"(a) Except in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court, the exemptions are accorded to individual debtors.

(b) The exempt properties are used personally by the debtor or his family, or as tools or implements of the debtor in his trade or employment.

(c) The properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor and his family." (Rollo, p. 58)

The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or manual labor needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his living. Here petitioner is a business enterprise. It does not use the firearms personally, but they are used by its employees. Not being a natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are necessary for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there are security guards rendering service without firearms.

There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without firearms to equip its guards is useless.

However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity.

Abiera vs CA

that "no court has power to interfere by injunction, with the judgments or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction ..."

The doctrine as thus formulated is well settled, and has been adhered to consistently whenever justified by the facts in order to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings. For the doctrine to apply, however, the injunction issued by one court must interfere with the judgment or decree issued by another court of equal or coordinate jurisdiction, and the relief sought by such injunction must be one which could be granted by the court which rendered the judgment or issued the decree.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the action filed by the De la Cruz spouses wherein they claim ownership of the properties levied upon by the provincial sheriff is sanctioned by Section 17 of Rule 39, which provides:

If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution.

The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.

Ong vs Tating

Ong is correct in arguing that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals available to the Tatings from the adverse judgment of the CFI in the action of certiorari and prohibition instituted by him, was not by "petition for review" under Section 22 of B.P. Blg., 129 24 but an ordinary appeal (by writ of error) under Rule 41, Rules of Court and Section 39, of B.P. Blg. 129 (also, Section 20 of the Interim Rules) A "petition for review" is the correct mode of appeal from a judgment rendered by a CFI (RTC) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction i.e., when it decides a case appealed to it from the inferior court. In such a case, the appeal is not a matter of right, its acceptance being discretionary on the Court of Appeals, which "may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed." On the other hand, when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error, involving merely the filing of a notice of appeal except only if the appeal is taken in special proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in which event the filing of a record on appeal is additionally required. 25 Of course, when the appeal would involve purely questions of law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder) specified in Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, 26 it should be taken to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.

The remedies just mentioned are without prejudice to "any proper action" that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate "his claim to the property." Such a "proper action," in the context of Section 17 of Rule 39, has been held to refer to an action distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced.

Such a "proper action" is, quite obviously, entirely distinct from the explicitly described in Section 17 of Rule 39, i.e., "an action for damages ** brought (by a third-party claimant) against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond ** for the taking or keeping of the property" subject of the terceria. Quite obviously, too, this "proper action" would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, of course, and such other parties as may be alleged to have wrongful with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. And such a "proper action," as above pointed out, is and should be an entirety separate and distinct action from that in which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit

Imani vs Metrobank

Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only be applied with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit.27

The filing of the motion by petitioner to annul the execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale was, therefore, a proper remedy. As further held by this Court:

Certain it is that the Trial Court has plenary jurisdiction over the proceedings for the enforcement of its judgments. It has undeniable competence to act on motions for execution (whether execution be a matter of right or discretionary upon the Court), issue and quash writs, determine if property is exempt from execution, or fix the value of property claimed by third persons so that a bond equal to such value may be posted by a judgment creditor to indemnify the sheriff against liability for damages, resolve questions involving redemption, examine the judgment debtor and his debtors, and otherwise perform such other acts as may be necessary or incidental to the carrying out of its decisions. It may and should exercise control and supervision over the sheriff and other court officers and employees taking part in the execution proceedings, and correct them in the event that they should err in the discharge of their functions.28