Case Digests of Jurado, Tolentino and Balane

SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

LIMJUCO VS.ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTEG.R. No. L-770April 27, 1948

FACTS:Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.ISSUE:Whether or not the estate of Fragante may extended an artificial judicial personality.HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission..Supreme Court if of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.LLB III-B

CENTENERA VS. SOTTOG.R. No. L-49065April 30, 1947

FACTS:On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitorena file a motion praying that subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., marked as Annex E, be approved and that it be decreed that certificates of title be issued in his name on lots 2,3, and 4 of the original plan Psu-66063 and upon lots 1,5,6,7, and 8 of the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd. The movant alleged that on May 14, 1931, a decision was rendered by the lower court granting Rita Garchitorena as heiress of her father Andres, title over four lots, the same described in her original application, subject to lien in favor of Mariano Garchitorena and other creditors, with the exclusion of about 500 hectares belonging to Ramon and Jose Alvarez, about 300 hectares of land of the public domain, a portion of 18 hectares belonging to Hermogenes P. Obias and another portion of 24 hectares of land of the public domain, with the exception of 4 hectares belonging to Januario Alvarez, all said portions being included in lot number 1. It is also alleged that after said judgment was modified by the Supreme Court and some steps have been taken as a result of said modification, lots 1,2,3 and 4 of land Psu-66063 were adjudicated to Mariano Garchitorena in consideration of the amount of P28,745.93 a deed of sale having been executed to said effect on September 8, 1935, which was approved by the lower court on April 26, 1940, and that Mariano Garchitorena bought the 500 hectares of Ramon and Jose Alvarez on April 27, 1939. Several persons appeared to oppose the motion, but only three of them came to appeal against the lower courts order dated June 28, 1941, decreeing the issuance of certificate of titles in favor of Mariano Garchitorena on lots 2,3, and 4 of the original plan Psu66063-Amd., and on lots, 1,6,and 7 of the same subdivision plan.ISSUE:Whether or not the Land Court has jurisdiction over the issuance of the certificate of title of the said lots.HELD:The jurisdiction of the Land Court extends no further than the inscription of the land described in its final decree and the enforcement of that decree, and that, even though the land described in the petition be found by the court, as between the petitioner and the oppositor, to be the property of the opponent, such land can not be inscribed in his name, the Land Court having , as we have said , no jurisdiction or power to do so. It naturally and necessarily follows that the opponent, if he desires the land of which he claims ownership to be registered in accordance with law, must begin a new proceeding in the Land Court for that purpose.


BARRIOS VS DOLORG.R. No. 559March 14, 1903

FACTS:The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the late Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon, which he claims to have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention as to the law of the case he attached to the complaint a public instrument which appears to have been executed by himself and Demonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which, according to the plaintiff, a stipulation is made for a contract of partnership for the operation of the said estate, and, furthermore, a community, of ownership is established with respect to the estate in favor of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has been recorded in the registry of property. Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Dona Maria Pascuala Dolor raised an incidental issue as previous question, praying that the instrument referred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded in the registry of property, and that it be returned to the plaintiff without leaving in the record any transcript or copy thereof of extract therefrom, resting this contention upon rticle 389 of the Mortgage Law. This motion was granted by the judge by order of the 24th of March, 1898, against which the plaintiff appeals.ISSUE:Whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and should be regarded as third persons for the purposes of the Mortgage Law.HELD:The defendants are not third persons with respect to the contract entered into by their decedent, Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the instrument of February 3, 1883, and they therefore cannot avail themselves of the prohibition contained in article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose of opposing the admission of this instrument as evidence in the case, because not recorded in the registry of property. This prohibition was established solely and exclusively in favor of those who, within the meaning of that law, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of the defendants would be superior to that of the person whom they derived their rights, because he, not being a third person, could not set up such an exception. This would certainly be most illogical from a legal point of view, in view of the fact that the heir is, above stated, a mere continuation of the civil personality of his decedent.


SUILIONG & CO. VS. CHIO-TAYSANG.R. No. L-4777November 11, 1908

FACTS:Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, which was was inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan, but no entry touching the transaction was noted in the land registry. Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysn, the defendant in this action, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known, under the system of civil procedure in existence prior to the adoption of the present code, as an action for the declaration of heirship and on the 5th day of August 1903, following order declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased.On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the city of Manila by virtue of order entered the inscriptions in the land registry whereby the said Silvina Chio-Taysan is made to appear as the owner of the land in question. On the 26th day of May 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co.,of which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security for the payment of loan. Therefter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special proceedings under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, for the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased. On the 16th day of October 1905, he was appointed administrator. On the 10th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff in this action filed its complaint against the defendant , Silvin Chio-Taysan, praying for judgment for the amount loaned her as above set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the land. The trial court enteree judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both the defendant and the intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint.ISSUE:Whether one or more heirs could be entitled to be recognized as the owner or owners of the property of the deceased in an action for declaration of heirship.HELD:A judgment in an action for the declaration of heirship in favor of one or more heirs could not entitle such persons to be recognized as the owner or owners of the property of the deceased on the same terms as such property was held by the deceased, for it passes to the heir, under the new civil code, burdened with all the debts of the deceased, his death having created a lien thereon for the benefit of the creditor; and indeed an examination of the proceedings prescribed in the new code of Civil Procedure for the administration and distribution of the estates of deceased persons leaves no room for doubt that those proceedings are exclusive of all other judicial proceedings looking to that end, and supersede the judicial proceeding for the declaration of heirship, as recognized in the old procedure, atleast so far as the proceedings served as a remedy whereby the right of specific persons to succeed to the rights and obligations of the deceased as his heirs might be judicially determined and enforced.ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.LLB III-B

Pavia vs. De la Rosa8 Phil. 70March 18, 1907

FACTS:

The plaintiffs prayed that a judgment be rendered in their favor and against the defendants for the sum of 15,000 pesos, Philippine Currency, as damages, together with costs of action, alleging in effect that by reason of the death of the testator, Pablo Linart e Iturralde, Francisco Granda e Iturralde was appointed executor under the will of the said deceased, in which will the minor Carmen Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir, and that owing to the death of the executor Francisco Granda toward the end of December, 1893, there was substituted as executor Jose de la Rosa, who took possession of the personal property of the state, amounting to 10,673 pesos, Mexican Currency, as well as the property situated at No. 27 Calle Solana, Walled City, likewise the property of the testator; that during the month of April, 1904, the plaintiff, Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf, and as guardian of Carmen Linart y Pavia, executed a power of attorney in behalf of the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa with the powers therein expressed, and the attorney having accepted such power proceeded to administer the aforesaid estate in a careless manner until the 20th of August, 1903, neglecting the interests of the plaintiffs and wasting the capital, and causing damages amounting to over 15,000 pesos, Philippine currency, owing to the fact of having retired or disposed of without any necessity the sum of 7,207 pesos Mexican currency, together with interest thereon amounting to 360.25 pesos, which amounts would have produced 12,321.90 pesos, Mexican currency, for the plaintiffs; that the executor and attorney De la Rosa neglected to appraise, count, and divide the estate of Linart, deceased, notwithstanding it was his duty to do so, and leased the aforesaid house No. 27 Calle Solana to his relatives from December, 1893, to August, 1903, at a much lower rental than could have been obtained, thereby causing the plaintiffs losses amounting to 6,570 pesos, Mexican Currency; that the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa died on the 14th of September, 1903, leaving the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa as his only heirs and representatives, Eusebio Canals being the husband of the said Bibiana.

ISSUE

WON the defendant Bibiana and Salud de laRosa are responsible for the personal acts of Josedela Rosa.

HELD:

No. It has not been shown that the estate or the intestate succession of the deceased, Jose de la Rosa, was ever opened or that an inventory has ever been presented in evidence, notwithstanding that at the time of the death of De la Rosa, the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.190) was already in force, and that in accordance with its provisions the estate of the deceased should have been administered and liquidated.- In accordance with the provisions of the Act No.190 it is understood that estate or intestate succession of a deceased person is always accepted and received with benefit of inventory, and his heirs, even after having taken possession of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of said deceased with their own property, but solely with that property coming from the estate or intestate succession of said deceased.- The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the purpose of appraising the property of the estate and deciding as to the claims against said estate

ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.LLB III-B

Montelibano vs. Cruz,35 Off. Gaz. 1083April 30, 1964

FACTS:

Spouses Alejandro Montelibano and his wife Gliceria, who died, respectively, on August 14, 1927 and September 19, 1914, were survived by the children, Jose M. Alfredo M. Concepcion and Alejandro all surnamed Montelibano. On September 6, 1927, Jose M. Montelibano applied in Civil Case No. 4281 of the aforementioned court for letters of Administration of his deceased father Alejandro Montelibano. A similar petition was filed on November 12, 1927, with the same court and docketed therein as Case No. 4428, as regards the estate of Gliceria M. Montelibano. In due course, the inventories of the properties constituting the estates of the aforementioned deceased spouses was submitted on October 2, 1930. Subsequently, or on June 11, 1931, the corresponding petition for declaration of heirs of said spouses and project of partition of their respective estates was file. Said petition and project of partition were approved the court on July 21, 1931. Nothing appears to have be done in said cases until September 11, 1940, when the attention of the court was called to the payment of the corresponding inheritance taxes, whereupon both cases we declared closed on September 14, 1940.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petition for declaration of heirs is valid.

HELD:

Petitioners assail the accuracy or validity of these grounds, but a review of the record does not show that they have succeeded in their endeavor. What is more, during the period intervening from the issuance of the order of October 22, 1958, to that of April 11, 1962, petitioners had begun to introduce their evidence. Apparently, the nature thereof was not such as to impart to respondent judge the impression that petitioners' cause of action was sufficiently, meritorious to warrant a reconsideration of the first order. At any rate, the issue hinges on whether or not the other properties of respondent herein which are subject to the notice oflis pendenssuffice to protect petitioners' alleged rights, should the same be eventually upheld judicially. Upon the records before us, we are not prepared to conclude that respondent Judge had abused his discretion, much less gravely, in resolving this question, in the affirmative.


LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN66 PHIL 547November 23, 1938

FACTS:

Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3rd person. But Lorenzo before he was able to pay the debt, he died. But when he died, he had no property. Theoretically, there should have been succession between Lorenzo and Anna. So Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But because Lorenzo had no properties, Anna did not inherit anything from Lorenzo.

ISSUE:

Can the 3rd person claim from Anna?

HELD:

No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the inheritance is only to the extent of the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had debts. The value of the inheritance should only be to the value of the debts. But there was no property left.So the value of the inheritance is zero. The debts cannot beenforced against Anna because Anna inherited nothing. ARTICLE 777. The rights to the succession aretransmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.


Uson vs. Del RosariG.R. No. L-4963January 29, 1953

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Recovery of the ownership and possession

FACTS:

Five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.

ISSUE:

WON Maria Urson has the right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.

HELD:

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustrevs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osoriovs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.

AMIILBAHAR, NURULAIN K.LLB III-B

Baun vs. Heirs of BaunG.R. No. L-30750October 24, 1929

FACTS:

On May 31, 1928, the administrator of the estate filed a motion, requesting authority to sell personal and real properties of the estate, in order to pay its debts. The motion alleged (a) that the estate was indebted to theAsociacion Cooperativa del Credito Rural de Tarlacin the sum of P1,000, with interest at 10 per cent from February 11, 1925; (b) that it was also indebted to Manuel Urquico in the sum of P7,412.22, with interest at 12 per cent from November 1, 1927; and (c) that the estate was without sufficient funds to meet said obligations.

On June 1, 1928, the heirs of the estate, with the exception of Damiana Manankil, widow of the deceased, filed their written conformity to the proposed sale of the only real property of the estate described in the inventory, consisting of a parcel of land and the machinery and building thereon. They also stated that Genara Pineda offered P20,000 of said property and that they considered said offer as most advantegeous and beneficial to their interest. Said written conformity was assign by Alejandro Calma in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, and by Celedonia Baun, with the consent of her husband Lorenzo Mallari.

On June 15, 1928, the court appointed Jose Fausto, an attorney at law, as guardian ad litem of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, heirs of Jacinto Baun, with special reference to the proposed sale of the real property of the estate.

Some time thereafter said guardianad litemfiled his report, recommending favorably the proposed sale of the land and the machinery and building thereon to Genara Pineda at the price offered by her.

On June 29, 1928, the court authorized the administrator of the estate to sell the property of the deceased in the form and manner most advantageous to the estate. The pertinent part of the order of the court said:" Por la presente queda autorizado el referido administrador para vender los vienes del aludido finado en la forma que crea procedente y ventajosa para los fines arriba indicados."

On July 6, 1928, Simplicio Baun, the administrator of the estate, filed a petition requesting approval by the court of the sale of said real property to Pedro Santos for the sum of P22,000. The administrator sold the property to said vendee, who gave a better price than that offered by Genara Pineda, which was for P20,000 only, as above stated.

On July 7, 1928, the court approved said sale, and on July 10, 1928, ordered the vendee Pedro Santos to immediately deliver to the administrator of the estate the price of the property amounting to P22,000.ISSUE:

WON That the administrator sold the real property of the estate without having first sold the personal property;

WON that Damiana Manankil, the widow of the deceased, who was also an heir of the estate, did not give her conformity or consent to said sale;

WON that no notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of the estate was served upon the heirs, either personal or by publication, as required by section 722, paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (d) that no hearing was held on said application of the administrator.

HELD:

(1) that said real property was sold because the personal property of the deceased was insufficient to meet the obligation of the estate; (2) that the real property of the estate was sold upon the initiative and with the written consent of the heirs and consequently they are now estopped from attacking the validity of said sale; (3) that notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of the estate was not necessary inasmuch as the requirements of the law had been virtually satisfied by the written consent of the heirs to the sale; and (4) that the written consent of all of the heirs was not necessary because the law does not specifically require the consent in writing all of the heirs.

That the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regulating the sale of the estate of the deceased and prescribing certain formalities, were not complied with in the sale of the real property in question, and consequently the sale is null and void.

In this jurisdiction, by virtue of the provisions of articles 657 and 661 of the Civil Code, the heirs succeeded to all the rights and obligations of the decedent "by the mere fact of his death." The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." In other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all the rights and obligations of the ancestor by the merefact of the death of the ancestor. From the death of the ancestor the heirs are the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the ancestor, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by the law.

The only law providing for the sale of the property which formerly belonged to the deceased and prescribing the formalities antecedent to said sale, is found in sections 714 and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

in view of what precedes, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, the sale is hereby declared null and void; and the record is hereby remanded to the lower court with the direction that, after the citations of all the heirs including Catalina Tejeiro and all of the other creditors and Pedro Santos, and after giving them an opportunity to be heard, it issue such orders in harmony with this decision as will, in equity and justice, protect the interest of all parties concerned, to the end that the estate of Jacinto Baun may be finally settled and terminated. The appellants are also hereby ordered to deposit with the lower court such additional amount as may be found necessary to pay in full all the indebtedness and obligations of the estate, including the interest thereof; or, otherwise, the court shall proceed to sell the property of the estate for the purpose of paying said indebtedness. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.


Cuison vs. Villanueva90 Phil. 850;

FACTS:On February 14, 1939, Manuel Cuison filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the probate of a document marked exhibit "A", said to be the last will and testament of Leodegaria Villanueva who died on December 14, 1938. The heirs instituted in said will were Reynaldo Cuison, a nephew of the testatrix and six minor children Maria Dolores, Hernando, Leonardo, Angel, Maria Jimena and Telma, all surnamed Macasa, said to be grandnephews and nieces. Petitioner Manuel Cuison was appointed administrator and he qualified as such.

On January 29, 1941, the lower court, presided over by Judge Sotero Rodas, dismissed the petition "por falta de gestion de solicitante." Upon motion of the petitioner the order of dismissal was reconsidered, the case reinstated and later, by order of November 28, 1941, the lower court denied the probate of the will and declared that the deceased Leodegaria Villanueva died intestate. Upon another motion for reconsideration filed by Manuel Cuison the order of denial of probate was reconsidered and Manuel Cuison was ordered to secure a transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the hearing of probate held on March 15, 1941. This order of reconsideration was dated December 6, 1941. One or two days later the Pacific war broke out.

On December 16, 1948, the oppositor Nicolas Villanueva, et al., move for the definite dismissal of the petition for probate. By order of January 10, 1949, Judge Jose Teodoro, then presiding over the trial court, definitely denied the petition for probate. On January 22, 1949, petitioner Manuel Cuison moved for the reconsideration of the order of denial of the petition for probate.

On August 16, 1949, Elisa, Ricardo, Josefina, Luis, Hermenigilda, all surnamed Cuison, for the first time, entered this case, claiming to be legitimate brothers and sisters of Reynaldo Cuison the nephew of the testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva instituted as one of the heirs in the will, exhibit "A". Further claiming that said Reynaldo Cuison died intestate on February 12, 1939, about two months after the death of the testatrix, they filed a petition for relief under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, from the order January 10, 1949 definitely denying probate of the will. The petitioners Elisa Cuison, et al., further claimed that Reynaldo Cuison, their brother, upon his death, left neither legitimate nor natural acknowledged children, consequently, his only heirs are the said petitioners and their brother Manuel Cuison. The petition for relief was based on the allegation that they had no actual knowledge of the order of January 10, 1949, denying the probate of the will, until the month of July, 1949; that up to the filing of the petition for relief, petitioners had never been direct or actual parties to the probate proceedings but they were constructive parties, since the proceedings werein remand the order of the denial of probate would affect them as heirs of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison; that there non-appearance or participation in the probate proceedings may be regarded as excusable negligence; and that if they were given a chance, they would prove the validity and the due execution of the will in question and would present the instrumental witnesses. The trial court presided over by Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez, acting upon the petition, denied the same by order of February 18, 1950. However, instead of considering the merits of the petition for relief, Judge Enriquez based his order of denial on the ground that, pursuant to the provisions of Article 925 of the Civil Code, present petitioner have no right to represent their deceased brother, Reynaldo Cuison, in the inheritance of the testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva, consequently they have no interest in the will or the property involved and so have no personality to intervene in these proceedings by filing the petition for relief.

ISSUE:

The petition for probate was opposed by Nicolas Villanueva and others who claim to be relatives of the testatrix.

HELD:

The proceedings for the probate of a will, he should show an interest in said will or the property affected thereby (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil, 244). The lower court was equally right in holding that under Art. 925, paragraph 2, of the old Civil Code, the right of representation shall take place only infavor of children of brothers and sisters, which petitioners Elisa Cuison et al., are not. But said trial court erred in holding and assuming that petitioners Elisa Cuison et al., were invoking the right to represent their brother Reynaldo Cuison, for they were not. They seek to inherit the legacy of their brother provided for in the will for their own right and not in representation of their deceased brother. The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein, and had acquired the right to the legacy given by her to him, upon for death, for the reason that under Arts. 657 and 65l of the Civil Code the rights to the succession of a person transmitted from the moment of his death and an heir succeeds to all rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of the latter's death. It is a fact that the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy, which he received by virtue of the will. In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property.


Enriquez vs. AbadiaG.R. No. L-7188August 9, 1954

Topic/Doctrine: Will and Testament

FACTS:

In September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed document purporting to be his Last Will andTestament. Resident of the City of Cebu, hedied onJanuary 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He leftproperties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceasedif he left no will, filedopposition.

During the hearing one ofthe attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,testified without contradiction that in his presence andin the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wroteout in longhand the will inSpanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left hand margin of thefront page of each ofthe three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, andfinally signed his name at the endof his writing at the last page, all this, inthe presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said threewitnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence. The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the hand writing of the testator and that although atthe time it was executed andat the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because atthe time of the hearing andwhen the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under aliberal view, and to carry out theintention of the testatorwhich according to the trial court is thecontrolling factor and may override any defect inform,said trial court admitted to probate the Last Will andTestament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holographic will should beallowed despite the fact that when itwas executed the civil codeproscribes the execution of such wills.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that despite theeffectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the executionof holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted toprobate. This is because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, theextrinsic validity of a will shouldbe judged not by thelaw existing at the time of the testators death nor the law at the time of itsprobate, but by the law existing atthe time of the executionof the instrument. For the verysimple reason that although the will becomes operative only after the testators death, still hiswishes are given expression at the timeof execution.


IBARLE v. POGR No.L-5064February 27, 1953

Topics/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death.

FACTS:

Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE:

Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD:

The sale to defendant is valid. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

AMING, RHASDY P. LLB-III B

JAKOSALEM VS RAFOLSG.R. No. L-48372July 24, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heir/s.

FACTS:

The land in question described in the appealed in the decision originally belonged to Juan Melgar. When he died judicial administration of his estate was commenced. During the pendency of the said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. On December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolasa Rafols, who, entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant.

HELD:

Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heir/s. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-owership.It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father Juan Melgar. And as on December 12, 1920, upon the partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.

Upon the confirmation of the sale of December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in 1921 could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double sale, where neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession namely, Pedro Cui, should be referred. When the sale made in the latter's favor was confirmed on December 12, 1920, Susana Melgar was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921 only, wherefore, it is subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.

AMING, RHASDY P. LLB-III BLORENZO VS POSADASG.R. No. L-43082June 18, 1937

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death.

FACTS:Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. The will which was duly admitted to probate, provides among other things, that all properties of the testator shall pass to his nephew, Matthew Hanley. However, it also provides that all real estate shall be placed un-der the management of the executors for a period of ten years,after the expiration of which the properties shall be given to the said Matthew Hanley. Plaintiff Lorenzo was appointed as trustee. During plaintiffs incumbency astrustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty and personalty, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax. The defendant prayed that the trustee be ordered to pay the Government the inheritance tax together with the penalties for delinquency in paying such tax. The trustee paid under protest and however, he demanded that he be refunded for the amount paid. The plaintiff contends that the inheritance tax should be based upon the value of the estate at the expiration of the period of ten years after which according to thetestators will, the property could be and was to be delivered tothe instituted heir, and not upon the value thereof at the timeof the death of the testator. The defendant overruled plaintiffs protest and refused to refund the amount.

ISSUES:1. When does the inheritance accrue?2. Should the inheritance be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of thetestators death or on its value 10 years later?

HELD:1. Invoking the provision of Art. 657 (now Art. 777) of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, held: Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedents death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of that date. The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed ,to receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.2. Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testators death - If death is the generatingsource from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if,upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of thedecedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increaseor decrease in value.A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstandingthe postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, andthe tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of itsappreciation or depreciation.

AMING, RHASDY P. LLB-III B

Osorio vs. OsorioGR No.L- 16544March 30, 1921

Topic/Doctrine: THE DONATION CANNOT INCLUDE FUTURE PROPERTY

FACTS:

The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of stock of "Ynchausti Steamship Co." and the dividends corresponding to them, which were included in the inventory of the properties of the deceased Da. Maria Petrona Reyes, whose estate is administered by the defendant. The facts was D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint account association for the exploitation of the shipping business, he being the owner of one-third of the company's capital. This capital amounted to P500,000, of which P166,666.66, that is, one-third belonged to D. Antonio Osorio. Upon his death, his heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio, then administratrix of the estate of the deceased, to present a project of partition, and said administratrix inserted in the project with the consent of all the heirs, among the properties which belonged to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes, the sum of P94,000 as her part in the "share of the estate in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.," that is, a little over P166,666.66, which was the share in said business of the deceased Osorio during his lifetime. The project of partition was approved on May 10, 1915, with the consent of the heirs, by the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which had cognizance of the testamentary and administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased Osorio.

On February 28, 1914, the widow of D. Antonio Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes, now also deceased, executed before the notary D. Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in favor of her son D. Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff, giving to him one-half of her share in the one-third part which belonged to her husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., a donation which was duly accepted by the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said document with the plaintiff. On that date, February 28, 1914, the estate of D. Antonio Osorio was not yet distributed among his heirs, and the donor Da. Petrona Reyes in order to correct the error in said document, wherein it was stated that said half was adjudicated to her as part of her conjugal property, when the partition was yet being effected, executed another document dated July 3, 1915, maintaining said donation in effect in the sense that she ceded and donated to her son D. Leonardo Osorio, for the same reasons stated in the document of February 28, 1914, all interest or participation in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., which was adjudicated to her in the division of the estate of D. Antonio Osorio, which division was approved by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on May 10, 1915.

After the death of D. Antonio Osorio and before the distribution of the estate, Ynchausti & Co. purchased the steamer Governor Forbes and recognized the heirs of D. Antonio Osorio as having an interest to the extent of one-third in the ownership and business of said steamer. It was agreed upon by all the interested parties that the share of Da. Petrona Reyes, widow of Osorio, in the vessel Governor Forbes, at the time of the incorporation of "The Ynchausti Steamship Co." was P61,000, equivalent to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. Said sum was deposited with the Steamship Co. until the final settlement of the question that had arisen between the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof for, while the plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the donation made in his favor by Da. Petrona Reyes, he is the owner of said shares and of their value which is P61,000; the defendant on the other hand contends that said shares are not included in the donation in question and belong to the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes.

ISSUE:Whether the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff was valid under the law on succession particularly the future inheritance/property.

HELD:

It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on February 28, 1914, a future property, such as the share in the business of the deceased Osorio, which was adjudicated to her on May 10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right to all or part of the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.

According to article 635 of the Civil Code, the donation cannot include future property. By future property is meant that of which the donor cannot dispose at the time of the donation. This court believe the concurring opinion of Manresa that the future properties, the donation of which is prohibited by said article, are those belonging to others, which, as such, cannot be the object of disposal by the donor; but the properties of an existing inheritance, as those of the case at bar, cannot be considered as another's property with relation to the heirs who through a fiction of law continue the personality of the owner.

AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADULLLB III-B

Tinsay vs. Yusay GR No.L- 23126March 17, 1925

Topic/Doctrine: PARTITION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE; ESTOPPEL

FACTS:

Juan Yusay died leaving a widow, Juana Servando. After his death his descendants made a partition by a private instrument of certain lands, community property of his marriage to Juana Servando. Though she took no part in the partition her interest in the land was nevertheless distributed among the descendants. On the strength of the partition the descendants, among them the appellants, went into possession of the respective portions allotted to them in said partition. Some years later the portions of the appellants were registered in their names in a cadastral proceeding. Upon the subsequent death of the widow, the appellants as heirs of the widow claimed a share of her interest in the land. Held: (a) That, B not being a party to the partition agreement, the agreement standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the partition of her interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of a future inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have accepted the benefit of the partition agreement to the prejudice of the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of the property received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are estopped from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.

HELD:

Held: (a) That, Juana Servando not being a party to the partition agreement, the agreement standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the partition of her interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of a future inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have accepted the benefit of the partition agreement to the prejudice of the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of the property received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are estopped from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.


Arroyo vs. GeronaGR No.L- 36059Date: March 31, 1933

Topic/Doctrine: EXPECTANT HEIRS AND PERSONS IN CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS; FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

FACTS:

The appellant, a paternal uncle of a demented girl, qualified as her guardian and, being at the same time executor of the will of his own deceased mother (grandmother of the demented girl), submitted an inventory in the testacy of his mother, including therein as property of the latter the real estate which his ward had inherited from her own parents. The result of this trick of passing his ward's property through the estate of her grandmother was to make it appear that the greater part of such property had passed to the 'appellant under the will of the grandmother.

HELD:

That this device, coupled with the failure of the appellant to reveal to the other heirs of his ward the true state and value of the property pertaining to the latter, was a fraudulent contrivance sufficient to relieve such heirs from an agreement made by them with the appellant, subsequent to the death of the ward, with respect to the disposition of the property pertaining to her.


Tordilla vs. TordillaG.R No. 39547May 3, 1934

Topic/Doctrine: A certain value is stated in a deed of donation, that the value is different than its actual value at the time of donation.

FACTS:

Francisco Tordilla died intestate, leaving his wife, a legitimate son and Moises Tordilla a natural child and an appellant in the case at bar. One of the contentions of the appellant that where a certain value is in a deed of donation. The value cannot be questioned when properties are brought into collation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct?

HELD:

This is incorrect, as Article 1045 of the Civil Code provides for the assessment of the property at its actual valuation at the time of donation. The recital in the deed cannot therefore be controlling.

BADEO, MICHAEL J.LLB III-B

Allison Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippines and Register of Deeds of ManilaG. R. No. L-35694December 23, 1933

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Principle of Lexreisitae

FACTS:

Allison Gibbs is a citizen of California and domiciled therein, that he and Eva Gibbs where married at Ohio, USA. She acquired 3 parcels of land in the city of Manila, she died survived by her husband Allison leaving him the properties in Manila. Allison contend that the law of California should determine then extent of the title, if any. While the oppositor and respondent relies on Article XI Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which imposes tax inheritance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of California shall apply to Allison?

HELD:

In accordance with the rule that real property is subject to Lexreisitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of ante nuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated. Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands herein questioned must be determined in accordance with Lexreisitae.


Bacayo vs. BorromeoG.R. No. L- 19382August 31, 1965

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Laws of Succession, a decedents uncle and aunts may not succeed abintastado so long as the nephews and nieces of the decedent survived, willing and qualified to succeed.

FACTS:

Melodia Ferraris died without a surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse but survived by her aunt Filomena, nephews and nieces who were children of Melodias only brother who predeceased the decedent. These two classes of heirs sought to participate in the estate of Melodia. The trial court ruled that the nephews and nieces shall succeed by right of representation and excluded Filomena.

ISSUE:

Who should inherit the estate of the decedent?

HELD:

Our laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed abintastado so long as the nephews and nieces are willing and qualified to succeed.


Michael C. Guy vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 163707September 15, 2006

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Parents or Guardian may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

FACTS:

Sima Wei died intestate and left 10 million pesos consists of real and personal properties. He was survived by his wife Shirley and five children. They prayed before the court to appoint the petitioner a special administrator of the estate. Michael contend that respondents had been paid, waived, abandoned or extinguished by reason that when Remedios, the mother of the natural child of Sima Wei, received a financial support for education as a condition the natural children shall repudiate their rights to the estate of Sima Wei. As a result, the estate of Sima Wei is free from any liabilities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parents or guardian of a minor can repudiate the inheritance of their ward?

HELD:

Under Article 1044 of the Civil Code second paragraph provides that parents or guardian s may repudiate the inheritance of their ward only by judicial authorization. In the case at bar, such requisite is absent therefore, there was no repudiation transpired and the natural children are entitled to their legitime.


Quison vs. Salud12 Phil. 109November 21, 1908

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions

FACTS:

Upon the merits of this case the only question is one of fact, namely, is the boundary line between the land formerly owned by Fidel Salud, the father of the defendant, and land owned by Claro Quison, father and uncle of the plaintiffs, the estero or River Nagsaulay, or is it, as found by the court below, a straight line of mango and bamboo trees to the south of the above-mentioned estero? The land in controversy is situated between this line of trees and the estero. That Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed, but the defendant claims that he [Quison] never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of evidence, principally parol, was introduced upon this question, and after an examination thereof, we are satisfied that it clearly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below, and that it was proven at the trial that the land in question belongs to the heirs of Quison. Claro Quison died in 1902.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights of succession were transmitted to the heirs after the decedents death, according to Article 777 of the Civil Code

HELD:

Yes. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that, without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Procedure, the title to property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of the administration and the property may be taken from the claims of the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent the immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.LLB-III B

ILUSTRE vs. FRONDOSAG.R. No. L-6077November 16, 1910


FACTS:

Francisco Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903 and appears from the record that at the time of his death he was the owner of certain property. The plaintiff alleges, and the fact is not denied, that he was appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco Calzado. The record fails to show when he was appointed.

On the 31st of July, 1909, nearly six years after the death of the said Calzado, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the present action to recover the property and alleged that: that at the time of the death of Francisco Calzado he was the owner of the property described in the complaint; that at the time of the death of Francisco Calzado he had no relatives, descendants or ascendants, but nephews, who being of lawful age divided among themselves the property in question and sold to the defendant the said property; that at the time of the division of the estate among the heirs of the deceased and at the time the lands were sold, there were no debts against the estate of the said Francisco Calzado; that the plaintiff is not a creditor of the estate of the said deceased.

During the trial of the cause the defendant showed by oral and documentary proof that he was in possession of the land in question; that he had purchased the same from some of the nephews and heirs of the deceased Francisco Calzado; that he had purchased the interest of all the heirs except perhaps three. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause to show that any of the heirs of the deceased were minors or that there were any debts existing against the said estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs succeed immediately to all the property of the deceased

HELD:

Yes. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege.

The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.


BAUTISTA vs. Justices of the Special First Division of the Court of AppealsG.R. No. 79958October 28, 1988


FACTS:

The parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated December 15, 1975: that both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista; both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed-- private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition; that the parties admit that the private respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property and upon registration, certificates were issued to his name thereof; that Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, certificates were issued to private respondents; that the parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista; that the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista; that all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista; and that the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.

The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was supposed to be a partition without court intervention of the estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista, constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears to have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property of the surviving husband can be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife; whether or not there was preterition

HELD:

Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.

As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.


MALAHACAN vs. IGNACIOG.R. No. L-6207August 4, 1911

DOCTRINE: The fact that the hereditary estate is placed under administration will not affect the application of the rule stated in Art. 777 to the effect that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.FACTS:The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the said deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before the commencement of this action. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. ISSUE:

Whether or not that the said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession thereof.

HELD:

YES. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.

DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.LLB-III B

BELTRAN vs.DORIANOG.R. No. L-9969October 26, 1915

DOCTRINE: By the mere fact of the death of the husband, his children and heirs, together with their mother, by operation, of law succeeded him in the dominion, property and possession of the land and its improvements, for, from the moment Doroteo Guintu died, though survived by his widow, the rights to the succession of their deceased father were thereby transmitted to his children, since the latter, as his forced heirs, succeeded him in all his rights and obligations.

FACTS:

Modesta Beltran filed a complaint in which they allege that they were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of mangrove swamp land; that the defendants unlawfully took possession of and continue to occupy the said land of the plaintiff. It appears Feliciana Doriano, the widow of the late Francisco de la Rosa have declared that the said deceased, Francisco de la Rosa, husband and father of the deponents, left at his death property consisting mostly of mangrove swamp land which has not yet been judicially petitioned; but in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate, there was presented a proposed partition which had not yet been approved, and which set forth that there had been awarded to Maria de la Rosa, as her share of the estate, the mangrove swamp land situated, as specifically described in the deed of sale executed by her on the same date in behalf of Modesta Beltran and ratified before the notary Esteban Victorio. In the same proposed partition there was adjudicated to Feliciano de la Rosa, likewise as a part of his share in the estate, another parcel of mangrove swamp land, the description of which is given in the deed of sale executed in turn by him in behalf of the spouses Doroteo Guintu and Modesta Beltran. The heirs of the deceased De la Rosa agreed to recognize these sales as valid and effective as though the hereditary property had been judicially partitioned and the said lands legally adjudicated to the vendors who alienated them and they furthermore waived all the rights they might have therein. By virtue of the acquisition by the spouses Guintu and Beltran of the land, they entered into the possession of the property and took steps to improve it and increase the number of plants in order to secure the greatest benefit therefrom.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a co-heir is prohibited from selling his share.

HELD:

NO. There is no provisions of law whatever which prohibits a co-heir from selling his share of the estate, or legal portion, to a stranger, before the partition of the hereditary property is approved by the court, for article 1067 of the Civil Code prescribes: "If any of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the co-heirs may subrogate themselves in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the value of the purchase, provided they do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time they were informed thereof." .Still more: section 762 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains among others the following provisions: "Such partition may be made although some of the original heirs or devisees have conveyed their shares to other persons; and such shares shall be set to the persons holding the same as they would have been to the heirs or devisees."

In law, the rule governing property held by various co-owners in common is analogous to that which obtains where the estate of a deceased person is heldpro indivisoby several co-participants, for, pursuant to article 450 of the Civil Code, "each one of the participants in a thing possessed in common is considered as having exclusively possessed the part which may be alloted to him on the distribution for the entire period during which there is no division." .

The provisions of this article appear to be confirmed by that contained in article 1068 of the Civil Code. Feliciano de la Rosa could, therefore, lawfully sell the said land in question as a part of his share of the estate, even before the approval of the proposed partition of the property, which his father, Francisco de la Rosa, left at his death and besides, apart from this, the sale made by him appears to have been expressly recognized by himself and his co-heirs as well as by his mother, Feliciana Doriano, in Exhibit B.

As the defendants legally alienated the land by absolute sale to the plaintiffs and received the price thereof, they can never justify the seizure, made with manifest bad faith, of the products of the said land which no longer belongs to them.


BONDAD vs. BONDADG.R. No. L-8092March 14, 1916

DOCTRINE: The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately.

FACTS:

Rufina Bondad had two brothers and two sisters, respectively named Venancio, Placido, Maria, and Paula. The last named died leaving four children: Eleno, Estanislao, Raymundo, and Pedro, all surnamed Emlano. Rufina Bondad brought suit against her said brothers sisters, and nephews to secure the partition of the property left to these defendants by their father or grandfather, respectively, Crisanto Bondad upon his death. She designates the lands to be divided. Documentary and parol evidence was introduced, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna decided the case by dismissing the complaint and absolving defendants therefrom, with the costs against the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a need for the intervention of an administrator in the absence of any outstanding debts.

HELD:

NO. It has been repeatedly shown in the record that there are no debts outstanding against either succession, and the complaint itself so states. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. Where there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right whatever to intervene in any way in the division of the estate among the heirs.

If, at the present time or in the future, some creditor should come forward with a claim, or if debts of either or both of the two intestate estates should appear, prescription after two years could not be set up against such creditors or against such debts, because the datefrom whichthe beginning of the two years should be counted, could not be determined. This is the risk that is incurred in a partition of these intestate estates and hence the need of making the partition in writing, that is, so that it would not prejudice any third person; but among themselves the heirs must abide by the terms upon which they have agreed.

DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.LLB-III BLEGASTO vs. VERZOSAG.R. No. L-32344March 31, 1930

DOCTRINE: No contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056.Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person may, by actsinter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein said article is found, without the authority of a testament containing an expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of their property.

FACTS:

Sabina Almadin executed a will devising certain parcels of land belonging to her, to her four nieces and daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to each.Sabina Almadin partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces, executing a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels of her land therein described. On the same day, Sabina Almadin executed a deed in favor of her niece Oliva Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument. Sabina Almadin executed a deedin favor of her niece Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the four parcels of land therein described. Again on the said day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed to her niece Ruperta Palma assigning to her three parcels of land described therein. The assignees, Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, took possession of their respective parcels thus ceded by Sabina Almadin, and have to this day been cultivating them as exclusive owners thereof. Sabina Almadin passed away and her sister, Catalina Almadin, presented by Attorney Federico Marino, propounded her will, mentioned above, for probate. The said will was not admitted to probate.1Vivencio Legasto, then, the special administrator appointed by said Court of First Instance of Laguna to take charge of Sabina Almadin's estate, filed the complaint which originated this case, claiming the delivery of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and appellants herein, was valid enforceable.

HELD:

NO. Article 1056 of the Civil Code Provides:ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a testemantary or legal succession and should be made a conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in order to carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.

It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos in not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between the one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect his death.

Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since before making the partition of her property among her nieces, the defendants herein, she executed a will giving to each of them the same parcels of land which she later transferred to them gratuitously.

And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites, consequently, the partition which she made of her estate among her nieces the defendants-appellants herein, during her lifetime is likewise null and void.


BALDEMOR vs.MALANGYAONG.R. No. L-8806March 24, 1916

Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

To the petition the defendants duly answered, denying generally and specifically the facts stated in the complaint, and alleging: That they were the legitimate descendants of the said Benedicto Bonot, that they were all of lawful age, that they had, prior to the commencement of the present action, mutually made a division among themselves of the property in question, that there are no debts existing against the estate of the said Benedicto Bonot, and that the plaintiff is without authority to maintain said action in support of the allegation that the defendants had mutually divided the estate of their parent.After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was without right to maintain the action in question and dismissed the complaint, absolving the defendants from any liability under the same, without costs, reserving to the defendant, Clara Falcon, the right to maintain an action against her co-heirs form any fraud which they may have committed against her interest. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause, the case having been submitted to the lower court upon the pleadings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the special administrator may maintain an action for the purpose of taking possession of said property, thereby depriving the heirs of possession of the same.

HELD:

Section 596 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2331 provides that: Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, be agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court. Said section clearly gives the heirs the right to mutually partition their estate.

DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.LLB III-B

VELAZCO vs.VIZMANOSG.R. No. L-21244February 7, 1924

Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Encarnacion Saenz de Vizmanos died intestate on November 16, 1921, leaving no heirs by force of law (herederos forzosos). The appellee was appointed the administrator of the estate of the deceased and, in the administration proceedings, the Court of First Instance issued an order of distribution in which certain collateral relatives of the deceased in the fourth degree were declared heirs. The appellants herein are relatives in the sixth degree and claim participation in the inheritance, but were excluded there from in the order of the distribution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants contention of claiming participation in the heritance is valid as they are in the sixth degree?

HELD:

Ther

Documents

Case Digests of Jurado, Tolentino and Balane