Bill of Rights Case Digests (Sections 5-9)

1. AGLIPAY Vs. RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing

ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. constitutional

HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials

concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people

2. Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION

106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS: 1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate

the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

3. Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Facts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the

‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to

participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates right receive free education.

Held:

The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.

The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.

4.

4. PAMIL VS TELSON 86 SCRA 413 – Political Law – Inviolability of the Separation of Church and State

In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:

…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.

In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to run.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?

HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” If the the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.

It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.

Dissenting Opinion

J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.”

5. Taruc vs. Bishop Dela CruzG.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005

Facts:Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary

injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

6. ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.ISSUE:Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."HELD:Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would

be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice.

7. Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case digest

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no

effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

8. YAP VS CA

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issue:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held:

1. The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should

be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)

9. VELMONTE VS BALMONTE170 SCRA 256

Facts:Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of theopposition members of (the) BatasangPambansa who were able to

secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs.Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses inconnection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager FelicianoBelmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion"that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIShas a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach thisconfidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GovernmentService and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure toreceive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desiredobjective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte,Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, LeoObligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke theirright to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the BatasangPambansa membersbelonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certifiedtrue copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for thesubject information.Issue:Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the formerFirst Lady

Imelda Marcos toBatasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban politicalparties.Held:The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programsfor the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, asamended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions,premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which theRepublic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage itsresources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasonsthat prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarialsolvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmontehimself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure thatthese funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured governmentemployees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriatedfunds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degreeof fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the publicoffice held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmontemaintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentialityrestricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.

Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilegeof confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely onconsiderations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what thelaw should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government,and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

10. Aquino Vs Morato

FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land

11. Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA.

It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitutionw/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the

ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

12. BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY.

GRN L-25246 September 12, 1974

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the “Iglesia ni Cristo”, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (Union) which had with the Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.”

Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350, the employer was not precluded “from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees.” On June 18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875, as follows: “xxx but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service because he was resigning from the Union as a member. The Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.

Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the “union security clause” of the CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and contends it discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions.

ISSUE:Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or not.

RULING:

YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the “right” to form or join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. The right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The

law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.

To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, RA No.3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to

affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.

The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.

The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The contract clause of the Constitution. must be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has special application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good.

The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions,

confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents.

The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection – the collective bargaining relationship.

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.

The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. The Constitution even mandated that “the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.”

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor

organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect.

The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code.

The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act-to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.

13. GSIS vs. Kapisanan

14. Masikip v. City of PasigG.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by statute

FACTS:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property

HELD:

Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.” It is the

power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.

Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

Provided:

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration; and(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property

There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowner’s Association, a

private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.

15. REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI,

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

16. Republic Vs Sarabia

17. EPZA vs Dulay

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever

is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

18. Sumulong vs Guerrero

Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project

to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Nat’l Bank, representing the “total market value” of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines “the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation.”

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.

Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due process.

Issues:(1) Whether “socialized housing” as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not “public use” since it will benefit only “a handful of people, bereft of public character,” hence it is not a valid exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain.

(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated.

(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors.

(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge.

Held:(1) P.D. 1224 defines “socialized housing” as, “the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities.” The “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, “socialized housing” falls within the confines of “public use.”

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA’s choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good.

(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees

No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.’s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation.

(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.

19.Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through his law-making powers exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision. HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a

hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional. Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. VV.

19. Heirs of Moreno vs. MACTANGR- 156273 October 15, 2003

FACTS:MORENO: successors of 2 parcels of landMACTAN wanted to acquire land: i. Government assured landowners that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport ii. Moreno refused offer. iii. Civil Aeronautics Administration as the successor agency of the National Airport Corporation filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for the expropriation of land. iv. Trial court promulgated public use upon payment of just compensation.

v. MORENO were paid; no appeal. vi. Certificates of title were issued.LAHUG AIRPORT CEASED OPERATIONS, lands not utilized.Moreno plead for repurchase of land. i. Filed complaint for reconveyance and damages. ii. Averred that they have been convinced not to oppose since they could repurchase. iii. MCIAA did not object.ENCHUAN FILED FOR MOTION OF TRANSFERAcquired through deeds of assignment the rights of land.DPWH claimed it leased in good faith from MCIAA to Regional Equipment Services and Region 7 Office.

TRIAL COURT GRANTED RIGHT TO REPURCHASE but subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E. Enchuan and the leasehold of DPWH.CA reversed: rights gained by MCIAA were indicative of ownership in fee simple

ISSUE:Do they have right to repurchase? Or right to reversion?

HELD:PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

1. Return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial court’s underlying presumption that “Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation” when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities.

2. ARTICLE 1454: “If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him.”

a. In the case at bar, government obliged itself to use of land for the expansion of Lahug Airport i. Failure to keep its bargain: can be compelled to reconvey, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.

3. ARTICLE 1189: “If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor.”a. CREDITOR: person who stands to receive something as a result of the process of restitution. I.Petitioners must pay MCIAA the necessary expenses in sustaining the properties and services ii. Government may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land. iii.Petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime.

21.Manosa vs CAG.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.