Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

Facts:

The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue:

Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Held:

Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

Toyota Workers Association vs Toyota Motor Phils.

Facts:

In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the DOLE Secretary.

Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a preventive mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyota’s appeal.

In relation to Toyota’s appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union.  But despite this, many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day

which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly abandoned their work.

This resulted to another rally within Toyota’s premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work.

In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and June 2001, union members still conducted rallies and pickets.

Issue: 

Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are illegal.

Held: 

Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when the 227 employees were terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper procedure required by the Labor Code. It cannot be said that the strike conducted before the BLR is beyond the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor Code. The Union argues that the “strike” is actually a protest directed against the government and is covered by their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The SC disagreed with this argument because the Union failed to provide evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was biased against them. Further, if this were the kind of protest they were claiming, they should have secured a rally permit. Further still, this case involves a labor dispute. The employees may shroud their “strike” as mere demonstrations covered by the constitution but in reality these are temporary work stoppages.

The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute are illegal for they violated the return-to-work order.

The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:

1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or

2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or

3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or

4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or

5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or

6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.

Primicias v. Fugoso

The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for purposes of petitioning the government for redress to grievances. However, the City Mayor, founding his actions on Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, did not issue the permit.

Facts:

The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on a Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances.

However, the Mayor of the City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not issue the permit. For this purpose, the campaign manager of the party (Cipriano Primicias) instituted this action for mandamus.

Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the power of the City Mayor of Manila to grant or issue permits for the holding of assembly or meeting, parade or procession. Moreover, he would be able to determine where to hold such activities.

Ruling:

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But, it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

Under Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of the City of Manila, that the holding of athletic games, sports or exercises during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district may be permitted provided that a permit be issued by the Mayor who shall determine the streets, or public places or portions thereof where said activities may be held. From the Revised Ordinance of the City, there is no express and separate provision regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places.

As Section 1119 is susceptible to two constructions: one, that the Mayor of the City is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting in the streets and other public places of the City, and second, that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the

latter’s reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, the Court believed that it must adopt the second construction. It means that the ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting be held.

The other alternative when adopted because it would mean that the Mayor has the power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions. Moreover, said construction would render the ordinance invalid and void as it contravenes constitutional limitations.

The Mayor reasoned that, in granting the permit, the speeches delivered in the meeting would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. In reiterating the pronouncements of the US Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, “[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.”

Navarro v. Villegas

The City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for an assembly.

Facts:The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.

Ruling:Every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public.Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant petitioners’ application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court denied the writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their petition.

Reyes v. Bagatsing

The Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It would start in Luneta Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After the march, a program would follow whereby two brief speeches were to be delivered. However, the City Mayor did not act on the request of organization for permit.

Facts:Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the US Embassy which is two blocks away. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference.

A short program would be held after the march. During the program, there would be a delivery of two brief speeches. After which, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the US Ambassador.

The Mayor of the City of Manila however intruded by not acting on the request of the organization for permit. Rather, he suggested with the recommendation of the police authorities that a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be held at the Rizal Coliseum. As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization, filed a suit for mandamus.

Ruling:Reyes’ petition was granted.

The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.” Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”

Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.

Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech.Reiterating the ruling in Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held that it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, of other legitimate public interest.

What is guaranteed by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in US v. Apurado, “[i]t is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievances and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.” It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty is our scheme of values.

It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: “The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.”

There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must he for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberta, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”

The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger tests be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favourable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary – even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been felicitously termed by Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.” Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

PBM Employment Association v. PBM

In airing their concerns regarding the excesses of the Pasig police, employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacañang. The Company feared of losses to be incurred from 6 am to 2 pm.

Facts:Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacañang in protest of the alleged abuses of the Pasig police.

Said demonstration would be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 am to 2 pm) as well as those in the regular second and third shift (from 7 am to 4 pm and from 8 am to 5 pm, respectively), and that they informed the respondent company, Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. of their proposed demonstration.

Ruling:The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security “against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles.” In the pithy language of Justice Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw “certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s rights to life, liberty and property to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Laski proclaimed that “the happiness of

the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. Is interest, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise.”

The freedoms of expressions and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms, the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs – political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.” The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose – that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive – would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

The freedoms of speech and of the press, as declared in New York Times v. Sullivan, as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or “when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”

The demonstration held by petitioners before the Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer; said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of PBM Co. to protect

petitioners from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of PBM to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks, enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein the employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of PBM were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution – the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of the employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 am to 2 pm, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.

To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is a “potent means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence, its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after the accused has already served sentence for 22 years.

Malabanan vs Ramento

Facts:

Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees within hearing distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were asked to explain why they should not be held liable for holding an assembly.

Issue:

Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?

Decision:

Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

IBP vs Atienza

Facts:

In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in the rally permit.The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).

2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without consulting with the IBP.

Held:

1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to

suspend the criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action.

2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of expression.

F. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - public meeting at Plaza Miranda - (1) A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in them issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. (2) In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant.

NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda - The Mayor cannot be compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no change was made.

JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - a peaceful march and rally from Luneta park to the gates of the US Embassy. - (1) The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. (2) If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. (3) Application for permit should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant but at another place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants

must be heard on the matter. (4) Decision of the licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity.

MIRIAM COLLEGE V. COURT OF APPEALS –Article - (1) The right of the students to free speech in school premises is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the court upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases, disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others were not ruled out. (2) The school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS – teachers and mass actions - mass actions then staged. That given the return-to-work orders issued by the then DECS Secretary, they still refused to return to work, they were then suspended and later on dismissed from service. - Where public school teachers absent themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in mass protest, their absence ineluctably results in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they are responsible, and they may be penalized not for their exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances but for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

NAACP vs Alabama, 357 US 449

Background

In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama brought a suit to the State Circuit Court of Montgomery, Alabama, challenging the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for violation of a state statute requiring foreign corporations to qualify before doing business in the state. The NAACP, a nonprofit membership corporation based in New York, had not complied with the statute, as it believed it was exempt. The state suit sought both to prevent the Association from conducting further business within the state and, indeed, to remove it from the state.

Referring to the Association's involvement with the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 and its role in funding and providing legal assistance to black students' seeking admission to the state university, the suit charged that the Association was ". . . causing irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afford no adequate relief . . . ." On the day this suit was filed, the circuit court agreed to issue an ex parte order restraining the Association from conducting business in the state or taking steps to qualify it to do so.

The Association, represented throughout by Robert L. Carter of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, responded by moving to dissolve the order on the grounds that its activities within the state did not require its qualification under the statute and that the state's suit was intended to violate its rights to freedom of speech and of assembly as guaranteed by the Constitution

of the United States. Before a hearing date was set, the state issued a subpoena for much of the Association's records, including bank statements and leases, but most notably the names and addresses of the "agents" or "members" of the Association in Alabama.

In its response to the lawsuit, the Association admitted that it was in breach of the statute and offered to obtain qualification to continue business if that part of the ex parte order was lifted. Because the Association did not comply with the order to produce its records, that motion was denied and the Association was held in contempt and fined $10,000. The contempt order allowed for the reduction or remission of the fine if the production order was complied with within five days, after which the fine would be raised to $100,000.

Contending that the State could not constitutionally force disclosure of the records, the Association moved to dismiss the contempt judgment once more. According to Alabama case law, however, a petitioner could not seek a hearing or to dissolve an order until it purged itself of contempt.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the first contempt judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court then claimed the U.S. Supreme Court had relied on a "mistaken premise" and reinstated the contempt judgment, which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed again. The NAACP moved to try the case on the merits; this motion was denied and again appealed up to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case to Alabama, and ordered the Federal district court to try the case on the merits if the Alabama court system continued to refuse to do so.The Alabama state circuit court finally heard the case on the merits, and decided the NAACP had violated Alabama law and ordered it to stop doing business in the state; the Alabama appeals courts upheld this judgment, refusing to hear the NAACP's appeals on Constitutional grounds. Finally, the fourth time the case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, it granted certiorari and decided the case, itself, on the merits rather than remand the case to the balking Alabama court system, which had taken five years to get this far.

Decision

In an opinion delivered by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment" and, further, that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The action of the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

Yates vs US, 354 US 298

Background

Fourteen lower echelon officials of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) were charged with violating the Smith Act by being members of the CPUSA in California. The Smith Act made it unlawful to advocate or organize the destruction or overthrow of any government in the United States by force. The appellants claimed that the Communist Party was engaged in passive political activities and that any violation of the Smith Act must involve active attempts to overthrow the government.

Opinion

The Supreme Court of the United States ruled 6–1 to overturn the convictions. It construed the Smith Act narrowly, stating that the term "organize" meant to form an organization, not to take action on behalf of an organization. The Court drew a distinction between actual advocacy to action and mere belief. The Court ruled that the Smith Act did not prohibit "advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract doctrine." The Court recognized that "advocacy to action" circumstances would be "few and far between."Writing for the majority, Justice John Marshall Harlan introduced the notion of balancing society's right of self-preservation against the right to free speech.[1] He wrote:[2]We are thus faced with the question whether the Smith Act prohibits advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end, so long as such advocacy or teaching is engaged in with evil intent. We hold that it does not.... In failing to distinguish between advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine and advocacy of action to that end, the District Court appears to have been led astray by the holding in Dennis that advocacy of violent action to be taken at some future time was enough.

In a concurring opinion Justice Hugo Black wrote:

Doubtlessly, dictators have to stamp out causes and beliefs which they deem subversive to their evil regimes. But governmental suppression of causes and beliefs seems to me to be the very antithesis of what our Constitution stands for. The choice expressed in the First Amendment in favor of free expression was made against a turbulent background by men such as Jefferson, Madison, and Mason – men who believed that loyalty to the provisions of this Amendment was the best way to assure a long life for this new nation and its Government.... The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve a free government – one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.

With respect to evidence required to convict in the absence of an appropriate standard, Black wrote:

The testimony of witnesses is comparatively insignificant. Guilt or innocence may turn on what Marx or Engels or someone else wrote or advocated as much as a hundred years or more ago.... When the propriety of obnoxious or unfamiliar views about government is in reality made the crucial issue, prejudice makes conviction inevitable except in the rarest circumstances.Yates did not rule the Smith Act unconstitutional, but limited its application to such a degree that it became nearly unenforceable. The Yates decision outraged some conservative

members of Congress, who introduced legislation to limit judicial review of certain sentences related to sedition and treason, which did not pass. The appellants' convictions were reversed and the case was remanded to District Court for a retrial.

Reaction

The decision was announced on the same day as several other decisions in which communists were on the winning side, including Watkins v. United States and Sweezy v. New Hampshire (with the same majority and dissent). The day was called "Red Monday" by some anti-communists who disagreed with the decision. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoovercalled the decisions "the greatest victory the Communist Party in America ever received." President Eisenhower evaded questions about the decisions at a press conference, but wrote a letter to the Chief Justice after reports that he was "mad as hell" about them. The day was viewed as an indication of the Court's assertiveness under its new Chief Justice, with Time magazine headlining its coverage "U.S. Supreme Court: New Direction". Journalist I.F. Stone said the day "will go down in the history books as the day on which the Supreme Court irreparably crippled the witch hunt."

People vs Ferrer

Facts: 

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of thePhilippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult topublic officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. 

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. 

Issues: 

1. Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.2. Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: 

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of theorganization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act are given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. 

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. 

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that theorganization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of

thePhilippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.