Case Digest in Credit Transactions

8/13/2019 Case Digest in Credit Transactions

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CASE DIGESTS

COMMODATUM

CASE NO. 7

TITLE: PAJUYO vs. CA AND GUEVARRA

G.R. No. 146364, Jun 3, !""4

#ACTS:

Pajuyo and Guevarra executed a Kasunduan or agreementwhereby Pajuyo, as the owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to

live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the

cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised to

vacate the premise on Pajuyos demand but Guevarra broke his

promise and refused to heed Pajuyos demand to vacate. hus,

Pajuyo filed an ejectment case before the !". #n his $nswer,

Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of

possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is


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within the %&' hectares set aside by Proclamation (o. %)* for

sociali+ed housing. !" ruled in favour of Pajuyo whereby it held

that the subject of the agreement between Pajuyo and Guevarra

is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the owner of the house, and

he allowed Guevarra to use the house only by tolerance. hus,

Guevarras refusal to vacate the house on Pajuyos demand made

Guevarras continued possession of the house illegal. $ggrieved,

Guevarra appealed to the ".

he " upheld the Kasunduan, which established thelandlord and tenant relationship between Pajuyo andGuevarra.he terms of the Kasunduanbound Guevarra to returnpossession of the house on demand. #t likewise declared that inan ejectment case, the only issue for resolution is material orphysical possession, not ownership. -hen the case reached the"$, it reversed the !" and " rulings, which held that theKasunduanbetween Pajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie akinto that of a landlord and tenant relationship. The Court oAppeals ruled that the !asunduan is not a lease contractbut a co""odatu" because the a#ree"ent is not or aprice certain. #t declared that Pajuyo and Guevarra are suattersand the Kasunduanbetween Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not haveany legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or ineual fault. he court will leave them where they are. Pajuyoappealed to the /".


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#//012 -3( the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra is that

of a "3!!34$0!.

05#(G2

(3, in a contract of commodatum, one of the partiesdelivers to another something not consumable so that the latter

may use the same for a certain time and return it. $n essential

feature of commodatumis that it is gratuitous. $nother feature of

commodatumis that the use of the thing belonging to another is

for a certain period. hus, the bailor cannot demand the return of

the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or

after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is

constituted. #f the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he

may demand its return for temporary use. #f the use of the thing

is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the

thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a

precarium. 0nder the "ivil "ode, precarium is a kind of


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commodatum.

he Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded byPajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. -hile theKasunduandid not reuire Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated himto maintain the property in good condition. he imposition of thisobligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from acommodatum. he effects of the Kasunduan are also differentfrom that of a commodatum. "ase law on ejectment has treatedrelationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord6tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission wouldresult in the termination of the lease.he tenants withholding ofthe property would then be unlawful. his is settled jurisprudence.-herefore, Pajuyos petition is granted, the "$s decision was setaside and the "s decision affirming the decision of !" isreinstated.

* Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if theparties to the ejectment suit are squatters. The determination of

priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent

matter that cannot be left to the squatters to decide. To do so

would make squatters receive better treatment under the law.

The law restrains property owners from taking the law into their

own hands. However the principle of pari delicto as applied by

the Court of !ppeals would give squatters free rein to dispossess


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fellow squatters or violently retake possession of properties

usurped from them. Courts should not leave squatters to their

own devices in cases involving recovery of possession.

SIMPLE LOAN

CASE NO. $

TITLE: SAURA IMPORT $ E%PORT vs. D&P

G.R. No. L'!4(6), A*+- !, 1(!#ACTS:

#n 7uly %8&) /$0$ #(". applied to the ehabilitation9inance "orporation :9";, before its conversion into 4 and P8,%''.'' as


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additional working capital. 3n 7anuary *, %8&? 9" passed

esolution (o. %?& approving the loan application for

P&'','''.'', to be secured by a first mortgage on the factory

building to be constructed, the land site thereof, and the

machinery and euipment to be installed. On A*+- 13, 1(/4 0

-o2n ou5n0s + 7u0: 0 *+o5sso+8 no0, 0

#.R. 92--n, +*+sn0n Cn2 Enn+s, L0., 2s on o;

0 o'sn+s< 2n 0 o++s*onn o; 5o+02,

2s u-8 +s0+ on 0 ;o--on A*+- 1.

#n lieu of the letter of /aura to 9" reuesting modifications ofthe terms it laid down, 9" passed esolution no. *)@. #t likewisepassed other resolutions namely esolution (o. )8A8 whichreduced the loan from P&'','''.'' to P)'','''.'', and lastly isesolution (o. 8'A) restoring the loan to the original amount ofP&'','''.'', provided that there be a certification that the4epartment of $griculture and (atural esources that the rawmaterials needed are available in the immediate vicinity and thatthere is prospect of increased production thereof to provideadeuately the reuirements of the factory. /auna not being inthe position to comply with the said reuirement insteadreuested that the mortgaged be cancelled. 8 years after /auracommenced a suit for damages against 9" for its failure tocomply with its obligation to release the proceeds of the loan


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applied for and approved, thereby preventing the plaintiff from

completing or paying contractual commitments it had enteredinto, in connection with its jute mill project. he trial courtrendered judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that there was aperfected contract between the parties and that the defendantwas guilty of breach thereof. 3n appeal the defendant reiteratedthat there was no perfection of contract :simple loan; betweenthem.

ISSUE: -3( there is perfected consensual contract.

RULING:

B1/, there was indeed a perfected consensual contract, asrecogni+ed in $rticle %8)? of the "ivil "ode, which provides2

ART. 1(/4. An 2*0 *+o5s 0o -v+

so50n, =8 28 o; o55o20u5 o+ s5*-

-o2n s =nn u*on 0 *2+0s, =u0 0

o55o20u5 o+ s5*- -o2n 0s-; s2-- no0 =

*+;+0 un0- 0 -v+8 o; 0 o=>0 o; 0

on0+20.

here was undoubtedly offer and acceptance in this case2 theapplication of /aura, #nc. for a loan of P&'','''.'' was approved


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by resolution of the defendant, and the corresponding mortgage

was executed and registered.


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corresponding mortgage was e"ecuted and registered there

arises a perfected consensual contract of loan. 3n $pril %), %8&?the loan documents were executed2 the promissory note, with 9..Falling, representing "hina 1ngineers, 5td., as one of the co6signers> and the corresponding deed of mortgage, which was dulyregistered on the following $pril %*.H

#ULL TE%T O# CASES

G.R. No. 146364 Jun 3, !""4

COLITO T. PAJUYO,petitioner,vs.


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COURT O# APPEALS 2n EDDIE GUEVARRA,respondents.

4 1 " # / # 3 (

CARPIO,%.:

T C2s


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the house from %8*8 to * 4ecember %8A&.

3n A 4ecember %8A&, Pajuyo and private respondent 1ddie

Guevarra :DGuevarraD; executed a Kasunduan or agreement.

Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the

house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness

and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would

voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand.

#n /eptember %88?, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the

house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra

refused.

Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the

!etropolitan rial "ourt of Iue+on "ity,


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%)* for sociali+ed housing. Guevarra pointed out that from

4ecember %8A& to /eptember %88?, Pajuyo did not show up or

communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor

Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.

3n %& 4ecember %88&, the !" rendered its decision in favor of

Pajuyo. he dispositive portion of the !" decision reads2

-F11931, premises considered, judgment is hereby renderedfor the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to2

$; vacate the house and lot occupied by the

defendant or any other person or persons claiming

any right under him>

"; pay plaintiff the sum of P),'''.'' as and by way of


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attorneys fees> and

4; pay the cost of suit.

/3 34114.*

$ggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the egional rial "ourt of

Iue+on "ity,


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raised pure uestions of law. he eceiving "lerk of the /upreme

"ourt received the motion for extension on %) 4ecember %88@ or

one day before the right to appeal expired.

3n ) 7anuary %88*, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the

/upreme "ourt.

3n A 7anuary %88*, the 9irst 4ivision of the /upreme "ourt issued

a esolution8referring the motion for extension to the "ourt of

$ppeals which has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. he case

presented no special and important matter for the /upreme "ourt

to take cogni+ance of at the first instance.

3n =A 7anuary %88*, the hirteenth 4ivision of the "ourt of

$ppeals issued a esolution%'granting the motion for extension

conditioned on the timeliness of the filing of the motion.

3n =* 9ebruary %88*, the "ourt of $ppeals ordered Pajuyo to

comment on Guevaras petition for review. 3n %% $pril %88*,


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Pajuyo filed his "omment.

3n =% 7une =''', the "ourt of $ppeals issued its decision

reversing the " decision. he dispositive portion of the decision

reads2

-F11931, premises considered, the assailed 4ecision of thecourt a uo in "ivil "ase (o. I68@6=@8?) is REVERSEDand SETASIDE> and it is hereby declared that the ejectment case filed

against defendant6appellant is without factual and legal basis./3 34114.%%

Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo

pointed out that the "ourt of $ppeals should have dismissed

outright Guevarras petition for review because it was filed out of

time. !oreover, it was Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who

signed the certification against forum6shopping.

3n %? 4ecember =''', the "ourt of $ppeals issued a resolution

denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration. he dispositive

portion of the resolution reads2


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-F11931, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is

hereby DENIED. (o costs./3 34114.%=

T Ru-n o; 0 MTC

he !" ruled that the subject of the agreement between Pajuyo

and Guevarra is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the owner of

the house, and he allowed Guevarra to use the house only by

tolerance. hus, Guevarras refusal to vacate the house on

Pajuyos demand made Guevarras continued possession of the

house illegal.

T Ru-n o; 0 RTC

he " upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord

and tenant relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra. he terms

of the Kasunduan bound Guevarra to return possession of the

house on demand.

he " rejected Guevarras claim of a better right under


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Proclamation (o. %)*, the evised (ational Government "enter

Fousing Project "ode of Policies and other pertinent laws. #n an

ejectment suit, the " has no power to decide Guevarras rights

under these laws. he " declared that in an ejectment case, the

only issue for resolution is material or physical possession, not

ownership.

T Ru-n o; 0 Cou+0 o; A**2-s

he "ourt of $ppeals declared that Pajuyo and Guevarra are

suatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested

lot which the government owned.

Pere+, the person from whom Pajuyo acuired his rights, was also

a suatter. Pere+ had no right or title over the lot because it is

public land. he assignment of rights between Pere+ and Pajuyo,

and the Kasunduanbetween Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have

any legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or in

eual fault. he court will leave them where they are.


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he "ourt of $ppeals reversed the !" and " rulings, which

held that the Kasunduanbetween Pajuyo and Guevarra created a

legal tie akin to that of a landlord and tenant relationship. he

"ourt of $ppeals ruled that the Kasunduanis not a lease contract

but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price

certain.

/ince Pajuyo admitted that he resurfaced only in %88? to claim

the property, the appellate court held that Guevarra has a better

right over the property under Proclamation (o. %)*. President

"ora+on ". $uino :DPresident $uinoD; issued Proclamation (o.

%)* on * /eptember %8A*. $t that time, Guevarra was in physical

possession of the property. 0nder $rticle J# of the "ode of Policies


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the hierarchy of priority.

#n denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration, the appellate

court debunked Pajuyos claim that Guevarra filed his motion for

extension beyond the period to appeal.

he "ourt of $ppeals pointed out that Guevarras motion for

extension filed before the /upreme "ourt was stamped D%)

4ecember %88@ at ?2'8 P!D by the /upreme "ourts eceiving

"lerk. he "ourt of $ppeals concluded that the motion for

extension bore a date, contrary to Pajuyos claim that the motion

for extension was undated. Guevarra filed the motion for

extension on time on %) 4ecember %88@ since he filed the motion

one day before the expiration of the reglementary period on %?

4ecember %88@. hus, the motion for extension properly

complied with the condition imposed by the "ourt of $ppeals in

its =A 7anuary %88* esolution. he "ourt of $ppeals explained

that the thirty6day extension to file the petition for review was


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deemed granted because of such compliance.

he "ourt of $ppeals rejected Pajuyos argument that the

appellate court should have dismissed the petition for review

because it was Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who signed

the certification against forum6shopping. he "ourt of $ppeals

pointed out that Pajuyo did not raise this issue in his "omment.

he "ourt of $ppeals held that Pajuyo could not now seek the

dismissal of the case after he had extensively argued on the

merits of the case. his technicality, the appellate court opined,

was clearly an afterthought.

he #ssues

Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution2

-F1F1 F1 "30 39 $PP1$5/ 114 3 $


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file petition for review at the time when there was no

more period to extend as the decision of the egional

rial "ourt had already become final and executory.

=; in giving due course, instead of dismissing, private

respondents Petition for eview even though the

certification against forum6shopping was signed only

by counsel instead of by petitioner himself.

); in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered

into by the parties was in fact a commodatum,

instead of a "ontract of 5ease as found by the

!etropolitan rial "ourt and in holding that Dthe

ejectment case filed against defendant6appellant is

without legal and factual basisD.

?; in reversing and setting aside the 4ecision of the

egional rial "ourt in "ivil "ase (o. I68@6=@8?) and

in holding that the parties are in pari delicto being


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both suatters, therefore, illegal occupants of the

contested parcel of land.

&; in deciding the unlawful detainer case based on the

so6called "ode of Policies of the (ational Government

"enter Fousing Project instead of deciding the same

under the Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the

parties, the terms and conditions of which are the

laws between themselves.%)

T Ru-n o; 0 Cou+0

he procedural issues Pajuyo is raising are baseless. Fowever, we

find merit in the substantive issues Pajuyo is submitting for

resolution.

Procedural &ssues

Pajuyo insists that the "ourt of $ppeals should have dismissed

outright Guevarras petition for review because the " decision


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had already become final and executory when the appellate court

acted on Guevarras motion for extension to file the petition.

Pajuyo points out that Guevarra had only one day before the

expiry of his period to appeal the " decision. #nstead of filing

the petition for review with the "ourt of $ppeals, Guevarra filed

with this "ourt an undated motion for extension of )' days to file

a petition for review. his "ourt merely referred the motion to the

"ourt of $ppeals. Pajuyo believes that the filing of the motion for

extension with this "ourt did not toll the running of the period to

perfect the appeal. Fence, when the "ourt of $ppeals received

the motion, the period to appeal had already expired.

-e are not persuaded.

4ecisions of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their

appellate jurisdiction are appealable to the "ourt of $ppeals by

petition for review in cases involving uestions of fact or mixed

uestions of fact and law.%?4ecisions of the regional trial courts


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involving pure uestions of law are appealable directly to this

"ourt by petition for review.%&hese modes of appeal are now

embodied in /ection =, ule ?% of the %88* ules of "ivil

Procedure.

Guevarra believed that his appeal of the " decision involved

only uestions of law. Guevarra thus filed his motion for extension

to file petition for review before this "ourt on %? 4ecember %88@.

3n ) 7anuary %88*, Guevarra then filed his petition for review with

this "ourt. $ perusal of Guevarras petition for review gives the

impression that the issues he raised were pure uestions of law.

here is a uestion of law when the doubt or difference is on what

the law is on a certain state of facts.%@

here is a uestion of fact

when the doubt or difference is on the truth or falsity of the facts

alleged.%*

#n his petition for review before this "ourt, Guevarra no longer

disputed the facts. Guevarras petition for review raised these


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uestions2 :%; 4o ejectment cases pertain only to possession of a

structure, and not the lot on which the structure stands :=; 4oes

a suit by a suatter against a fellow suatter constitute a valid

case for ejectment :); /hould a Presidential Proclamation

governing the lot on which a suatters structure stands be

considered in an ejectment suit filed by the owner of the

structure

hese uestions call for the evaluation of the rights of the parties

under the law on ejectment and the Presidential Proclamation. $t

first glance, the uestions Guevarra raised appeared purely legal.

Fowever, some factual uestions still have to be resolved

because they have a bearing on the legal uestions raised in the

petition for review. hese factual matters refer to the metes and

bounds of the disputed property and the application of Guevarra

as beneficiary of Proclamation (o. %)*.

he "ourt of $ppeals has the power to grant an extension of time


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to file a petition for review. #n 'acsa"ana v. Second Special

Cases (ivision o the &nter"ediate Appellate Court,%A we

declared that the "ourt of $ppeals could grant extension of time

in appeals by petition for review. #n 'iboro v. Court o

Appeals,%8we clarified that the prohibition against granting an

extension of time applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is

perfected by a mere notice of appeal. he prohibition does not

apply in a petition for review where the pleading needs

verification. $ petition for review, unlike an ordinary appeal,

reuires preparation and research to present a persuasive

position.='he drafting of the petition for review entails more

time and effort than filing a notice of appeal.=%

Fence, the "ourt

of $ppeals may allow an extension of time to file a petition for

review.

#n the more recent case of Co""issioner o &nternal )evenue

v. Court o Appeals,== we held that 'iboro*s clarification of


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"ourt of $ppeals would only give due course to the motion for

extension if filed on time. he motion for extension met this

condition.

he material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of

the filing of the motion for extension are :%; the date of receipt of

the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition,

and :=; the date of filing of the motion for extension.=?#t is the

date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of

execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that

motion or pleading. hus, even if the motion for extension bears

no date, the date of filing stamped on it is the reckoning point for

determining the timeliness of its filing.

Guevarra had until %? 4ecember %88@ to file an appeal from the

" decision. Guevarra filed his motion for extension before this

"ourt on %) 4ecember %88@, the date stamped by this "ourts

eceiving "lerk on the motion for extension. "learly, Guevarra


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filed the motion for extension exactly one day before the lapse of

the reglementary period to appeal.

$ssuming that the "ourt of $ppeals should have dismissed

Guevarras appeal on technical grounds, Pajuyo did not ask the

appellate court to deny the motion for extension and dismiss the

petition for review at the earliest opportunity. #nstead, Pajuyo

vigorously discussed the merits of the case. #t was only when the

"ourt of $ppeals ruled in Guevarras favor that Pajuyo raised the

procedural issues against Guevarras petition for review.

$ party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution,

receives an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from

attacking the jurisdiction of the court.=& 1stoppel sets in not

because the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive

adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the courts

jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public

policy.=@


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#n his "omment before the "ourt of $ppeals, Pajuyo also failed to

discuss Guevarras failure to sign the certification against forum

shopping. #nstead, Pajuyo harped on Guevarras counsel signing

the verification, claiming that the counsels verification is

insufficient since it is based only on Dmere information.D

$ partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is

different from the partys failure to sign personally the

verification. he certificate of non6forum shopping must be signed

by the party, and not by counsel.=*he certification of counsel

renders the petition defective.=A

3n the other hand, the reuirement on verification of a pleading

is a formal and not a jurisdictional reuisite.=8 #t is intended

simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the

pleading are true and correct and not the product of the

imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is


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filed in good faith.)'he party need not sign the verification. $

partys representative, lawyer or any person who personally

knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the

verification.)%

-e agree with the "ourt of $ppeals that the issue on the

certificate against forum shopping was merely an afterthought.

Pajuyo did not call the "ourt of $ppeals attention to this defect at

the early stage of the proceedings. Pajuyo raised this procedural

issue too late in the proceedings.

Absence o Title over the (isputed Property will not (ivest

the Courts o %urisdiction to )esolve the &ssue o

Possession

/ettled is the rule that the defendants claim of ownership of the

disputed property will not divest the inferior court of its

jurisdiction over the ejectment case.)=1ven if the pleadings raise


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the issue of ownership, the court may pass on such issue to

determine only the uestion of possession, especially if the

ownership is inseparably linked with the possession.)) he

adjudication on the issue of ownership is only provisional and will

not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the

land.)?his doctrine is a necessary conseuence of the nature of

the two summary actions of ejectment, forcible entry and

unlawful detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the

physical or material possession over the real property.)&

#n this case, what Guevarra raised before the courts was that he

and Pajuyo are not the owners of the contested property and that

they are mere suatters. -ill the defense that the parties to the

ejectment case are not the owners of the disputed lot allow the

courts to renounce their jurisdiction over the case he "ourt of

$ppeals believed so and held that it would just leave the parties

where they are since they are inpari delicto.


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-e do not agree with the "ourt of $ppeals.

3wnership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at

issue in an action for recovery of possession. he parties cannot

present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession

except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to

resolve the issue of physical possession.)@he same is true when

the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. he

absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the

courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.

he only uestion that the courts must resolve in ejectment

proceedings is 6 who is entitled to the physical possession of the

premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the

possession de jure.)*#t does not even matter if a partys title to

the property is uestionable,)Aor when both parties intruded into

public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be

approved by the proper government agency.)8egardless of the


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actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable

uiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,

violence or terror.?' (either is the unlawful withholding of

property allowed. "ourts will always uphold respect for prior

possession.

hus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such

possession even against the owner himself.?%-hatever may be

the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior

possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain

on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects

him.?=o repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an

ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.

#n Pitar#ue v. Sorilla+?) the government owned the land in

dispute. he government did not authori+e either the plaintiff or

the defendant in the case of forcible entry case to occupy the

land. he plaintiff had prior possession and had already


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introduced improvements on the public land. he plaintiff had a

pending application for the land with the


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possession in an ejectment case.

-hile the "ourt did not brand the plaintiff and the defendant in

Pitar#ue?? as suatters, strictly speaking, their entry into the

disputed land was illegal.


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to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the

law alone to obtain what he claims is his.?&he party deprived of

possession must not take the law into his own hands.?@1jectment

proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle

speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding

need to uell social disturbances.?*

-e further explained in Pitar#uethe greater interest that is at

stake in actions for recovery of possession. -e made the

following pronouncements in Pitar#ue2

he uestion that is before this "ourt is2 $re courts withoutjurisdiction to take cogni+ance of possessory actions involvingthese public lands before final award is made by the 5ands4epartment, and before title is given any of the conflictingclaimants #t is one of utmost importance, as there are publiclands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especiallyin newly opened regions. #t also involves a matter of policy, as itreuires the determination of the respective authorities andfunctions of two coordinate branches of the Government inconnection with public land conflicts.

3ur problem is made simple by the fact that under the "ivil "ode,either in the old, which was in force in this country before the


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$merican occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action,

the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physicalpossession of real property, irrespective of the uestion as to whohas the title thereto. 0nder the /panish "ivil "ode we had theaccion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be broughtwithin one year from dispossession :oman "atholic


39/81

this uestion seems to us evident. he 5ands 4epartment does

not have the means to police public lands> neither does it havethe means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or containbreaches of the peace among settlers> or to pass promptly uponconflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly li"ited todisposition and alienation+ and while it "ay decideconlicts o possession in order to "a-e proper award+ thesettle"ent o conlicts o possession which is reco#niedin the court herein has another ulti"ate purpose+ i.e.+ theprotection o actual possessors and occupants with a viewto the prevention o breaches o the peace. The power todispose and alienate could not have been intended to

include the power to prevent or settle disorders orbreaches o the peace a"on# rival settlers or clai"antsprior to the inal award.$s to this, therefore, thecorresponding branches of the Government must continue toexercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respectivefunctions. The vestin# o the 'ands (epart"ent withauthority to ad"inister+ dispose+ and alienate publiclands+ thereore+ "ust not be understood as deprivin# theother branches o the Govern"ent o the e/ercise o therespective unctions or powers thereon+ such as theauthority to stop disorders and 0uell breaches o the

peace by the police+ the authority on the part o thecourts to ta-e jurisdiction over possessory actions arisin#therero" not involvin#+ directly or indirectly+ alienationand disposition.

3ur attention has been called to a principle enunciated in$merican courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction todetermine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that untilthe disposition of the land has passed from the control of the9ederal Government, the courts will not interfere with the


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administration of matters concerning the same. :&' ". 7. %'8)6

%'8?.; -e have no uarrel with this principle. he determinationof the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands isdifferent from the determination of who has the actual physicalpossession or occupation with a view to protecting the same andpreventing disorder and breaches of the peace. $ judgment of thecourt ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land tothe actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by anotherthrough the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can neverbe Dprejudicial interferenceD with the disposition or alienation ofpublic lands. On the other hand+ i courts were deprived ojurisdiction o cases involvin# conlicts o possession+ that

threat o judicial action a#ainst breaches o the peaceco""itted on public lands would be eli"inated+ and astate o lawlessness would probably be produced betweenapplicants+ occupants or s0uatters+ where orce or "i#ht+not ri#ht or justice+ would rule.

#t must be borne in mind that the action that would be used tosolve conflicts of possession between rivals or conflictingapplicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcibleentry. his action, both in 1ngland and the 0nited /tates and inour jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy wherebyone in peaceful and uiet possession may recover the possessionof which he has been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence orterror> its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peaceand criminal disorder. :/upia and as a matter of fact, evidencethereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of thepossession. :/econd ?, ule *=, ules of "ourt.; -ith this nature


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of the action in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can

conclusion be arrived at that the use of the remedy in the courtsof justice would constitute an interference with the alienation,disposition, and control of public lands. o limit ourselves to thecase at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in anyway interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition ofthe land contested 3n the contrary, it would facilitateadjudication, for the uestion of priority of possession havingbeen decided in a final manner by the courts, said uestion needno longer waste the time of the land officers making theadjudication or award. :1mphasis ours;

The 'rinciple of 'ari (elicto is not !pplicable to )jectment Cases

he "ourt of $ppeals erroneously applied the principle of pari

delictoto this case.

$rticles %?%% and %?%= of the "ivil "ode?Aembody the principle

ofpari delicto. -e explained the principle of pari delicto in these

words2

he rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims Le" dolo malonon eritur actio and Lin pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.he law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. #t leaves

the parties where it finds them.?8

he application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as

there are exceptions to its application. 3ne of these exceptions is


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where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well6

established public policy.&'

#n (rilon v. Gaurana+&%we reiterated the basic policy behind the

summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. -e held

that2

#t must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry

and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the titleto the property, the party in peaceable uiet possession shall notbe turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. #n affording thisremedy of restitution the object of the statute is to preventbreaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensuefrom the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope suchwithdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue tothose persons who, believing themselves entitled to thepossession of property, resort to force to gain possession ratherthan to some appropriate action in the courts to assert theirclaims. his is the philosophy at the foundation of all these

actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed tocompel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the

law alone to obtain what he claims is his.&=

"learly, the application of the principle of pari delictoto a case of

ejectment between suatters is fraught with danger. o shut out

relief to suatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly


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invite mayhem and lawlessness. $ suatter would oust another

suatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally

occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would

leave them where they are. (othing would then stand in the way

of the ousted suatter from re6claiming his prior possession at all

cost.

Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what

ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to

prevent.&) 1ven the owner who has title over the disputed

property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain

possession of his property. he owner must go to court.

"ourts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to

the ejectment suit are suatters. he determination of priority

and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter that

cannot be left to the suatters to decide. o do so would make

suatters receive better treatment under the law. he law


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restrains property owners from taking the law into their own

hands. Fowever, the principle of pari delictoas applied by the

"ourt of $ppeals would give suatters free rein to dispossess

fellow suatters or violently retake possession of properties

usurped from them. "ourts should not leave suatters to their

own devices in cases involving recovery of possession.

Possession is the only &ssue or )esolution in an Eject"ent

Case

he case for review before the "ourt of $ppeals was a simple case

of ejectment. he "ourt of $ppeals refused to rule on the issue of

physical possession. (evertheless, the appellate court held that

the pivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra

has the Dpriority right as beneficiary of the contested land under

Proclamation (o. %)*.D&? $ccording to the "ourt of $ppeals,

Guevarra enjoys preferential right under Proclamation (o. %)*

because $rticle J# of the "ode declares that the actual occupant


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here is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits of

Proclamation (o. %)*. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy the

disputed property in %8A&. President $uino signed Proclamation

(o. %)* into law on %% !arch %8A@. Pajuyo made his earliest

demand for Guevarra to vacate the property in /eptember %88?.

4uring the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to

the time that Proclamation (o. %)* allegedly segregated the

disputed lot, Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of

Proclamation (o. %)*. 1ven when Guevarra already knew that

Pajuyo was reclaiming possession of the property, Guevarra did

not take any step to comply with the reuirements of

Proclamation (o. %)*.

Third.1ven assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverageof Proclamation (o. %)* and Guevarra has a pending application

over the lot, courts should still assume jurisdiction and resolve the

issue of possession. Fowever, the jurisdiction of the courts would


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be limited to the issue of physical possession only.

#n Pitar#ue+&& we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over

possessory actions involving public land to determine the issue of

physical possession. he determination of the respective rights of

rival claimants to public land is, however, distinct from the

determination of who has the actual physical possession or who

has a better right of physical possession.&@ he administrative

disposition and alienation of public lands should be threshed out

in the proper government agency.&*

he "ourt of $ppeals determination of Pajuyo and Guevarras

rights under Proclamation (o. %)* was premature. Pajuyo and

Guevarra were at most merely potential beneficiaries of the law.

"ourts should not preempt the decision of the administrative

agency mandated by law to determine the ualifications of

applicants for the acuisition of public lands. #nstead, courts

should expeditiously resolve the issue of physical possession in


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ejectment cases to prevent disorder and breaches of peace.&A

Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession o the (isputed

Property

Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyos prior possession of the lot and

ownership of the house built on it. Guevarra expressly admitted

the existence and due execution of the Kasunduan. he

Kasunduan reads2

$ko, si "35#H3 P$70B3, may6ari ng bahay at lote sa


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the house and lot free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation

to maintain the premises in good condition. Guevarra promised to

vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand but Guevarra broke his

promise and refused to heed Pajuyos demand to vacate.

hese facts make out a case for unlawful detainer. 0nlawful

detainer involves the withholding by a person from another of the

possession of real property to which the latter is entitled after the

expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession

under a contract+ e/press or i"plied.&8

-here the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by

tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily

bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand,

failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.@' he

defendants refusal to comply with the demand makes his

continued possession of the property unlawful.@%he status of the

defendant in such a case is similar to that of a lessee or tenant


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whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues

by tolerance of the owner.@=

his principle should apply with greater force in cases where a

contract embodies the permission or tolerance to use the

property. he Kasunduan expressly articulated Pajuyos

forbearance. Pajuyo did not reuire Guevarra to pay any rent but

only to maintain the house and lot in good condition. Guevarra

expressly vowed in the Kasunduan that he would vacate the

property on demand. Guevarras refusal to comply with Pajuyos

demand to vacate made Guevarras continued possession of the

property unlawful.

-e do not subscribe to the "ourt of $ppeals theory that the

Kasunduanis one of commodatum.

#n a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to

another something not consumable so that the latter may use the


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that like him, Pajuyo is also a suatter. /uatters, Guevarra

pointed out, cannot enter into a contract involving the land they

illegally occupy. Guevarra insists that the contract is void.

Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between

suatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra

cannot now impugn the Kasunduanafter he had benefited from it.

he Kasunduanbinds Guevarra.

he Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who

between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right to physical possession

of the contested property. he Kasunduan is the undeniable

evidence of Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos better right of

physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith.

he absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as

there would still be an implied promise to vacate.

Guevarra contends that there is Da pernicious evil that is sought

to be avoided, and that is allowing an absentee suatter who :sic;


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makes :sic; a profit out of his illegal act.D*=Guevarra bases his

argument on the preferential right given to the actual occupant or

caretaker under Proclamation (o. %)* on sociali+ed housing.

-e are not convinced.

Pajuyo did not profit from his arrangement with Guevarra because

Guevarra stayed in the property without paying any rent. here is

also no proof that Pajuyo is a professional suatter who rents out

usurped properties to other suatters. !oreover, it is for the

proper government agency to decide who between Pajuyo and

Guevarra ualifies for sociali+ed housing. he only issue that we

are addressing is physical possession.

Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in

ejectment.*)his is one of the distinctions between forcible entry

and unlawful detainer.*?#n forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived

of physical possession of his land or building by means of force,


55/81

intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. hus, he must allege and

prove prior possession.*&


56/81

mean that a man has to have his feet on every suare meter of

the ground before he is deemed in possession.**3ne may acuire

possession not only by physical occupation, but also by the fact

that a thing is subject to the action of ones will.*A $ctual or

physical occupation is not always necessary.*8

uling on 'ossession (oes not +ind Title to the ,and in (ispute

-e are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared

that Dsuatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into titled

government property cannot, by such act, acuire any legal right

to said property.DA'-e made this declaration because the person

who had title or who had the right to legal possession over the

disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that party

instituted the case against suatters or usurpers.

#n this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is

not a party to the ejectment case. his case is between suatters.


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who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is

certainly not that person. he ruling in this case, however, does

not preclude Pajuyo and Guevarra from introducing evidence and

presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to

establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law.A%

#n no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone

suatting. he ruling on the issue of physical possession does not

affect title to the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive

adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership.A=he owner

can still go to court to recover lawfully the property from the

person who holds the property without legal title. 3ur ruling here

does not diminish the power of government agencies, including

local governments, to condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal

or unauthori+ed structures in accordance with existing laws.

Attorney*s 1ees and )entals


59/81

he !" and " failed to justify the award of P),''' attorneys

fees to Pajuyo. $ttorneys fees as part of damages are awarded

only in the instances enumerated in $rticle =='A of the "ivil

"ode.A)hus, the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather

than the rule.A?$ttorneys fees are not awarded every time a

party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium

should be placed on the right to litigate.A&-e therefore delete

the attorneys fees awarded to Pajuyo.

-e sustain the P)'' monthly rentals the !" and " assessed

against Guevarra. Guevarra did not dispute this factual finding of

the two courts. -e find the amount reasonable compensation to

Pajuyo. he P)'' monthly rental is counted from the last demand

to vacate, which was on %@ 9ebruary %88&.

B9ERE#ORE, we GRANT the petition. he 4ecision dated =%

7une =''' and esolution dated %? 4ecember =''' of the "ourt

of $ppeals in "$6G.. /P (o. ?)%=8 are SET ASIDE. he 4ecision


60/81

dated %% (ovember %88@ of the egional rial "ourt of Iue+on

"ity,


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appellant.

MAALINTAL,%.2p

#n "ivil "ase (o. &&8'A of the "ourt of 9irst #nstance of !anila,

judgment was rendered on 7une =A, %8@& sentencing defendant

4evelopment


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the balance of the purchase price of the jute mill machinery and

euipment> and P8,%''.'' as additional working capital.

Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that the jute mill machinery

had already been purchased by /aura on the strength of a letter

of credit extended by the Prudential and that to secure its release

without first paying the draft, /aura, #nc. executed a trust receipt

in favor of the said bank.

3n 7anuary *, %8&? 9" passed esolution (o. %?& approving the

loan application for P&'','''.'', to be secured by a first

mortgage on the factory building to be constructed, the land site

thereof, and the machinery and euipment to be installed. $mong

the other terms spelled out in the resolution were the following2

%. hat the proceeds of the loan shall be utili+ed

exclusively for the following purposes2


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9or construction of factory building P=&','''.''

9or payment of the balance of purchase

price of machinery and euipment =?',8''.''

9or working capital 8,%''.''

3 $ 5 P&'','''.''

?. hat !r. M !rs. amon 1. /aura, #nocencia $rellano, $niceto

"aolboy and Gregoria 1stabillo and "hina 1ngineers, 5td. shall

sign the promissory notes jointly with the borrower6corporation>

&. hat release shall be made at the discretion of the

ehabilitation 9inance "orporation, subject to availability of funds,

and as the construction of the factory buildings progresses, to be

certified to by an appraiser of this "orporation>D

/aura, #nc. was officially notified of the resolution on 7anuary 8,

%8&?. he day before, however, evidently having otherwise been

informed of its approval, /aura, #nc. wrote a letter to 9",


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reuesting a modification of the terms laid down by it, namely2

that in lieu of having "hina 1ngineers, 5td. :which was willing to

assume liability only to the extent of its stock subscription with

/aura, #nc.; sign as co6maker on the corresponding promissory

notes, /aura, #nc. would put up a bond for P%=),&''.'', an

amount euivalent to such subscription> and that !aria /. oca

would be substituted for #nocencia $rellano as one of the other

co6makers, having acuired the latterEs shares in /aura, #nc.

#n view of such reuest 9" approved esolution (o. *)@ on

9ebruary ?, %8&?, designating of the members of its


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66/81

5td., as one of the co6signers> and the corresponding deed of

mortgage, which was duly registered on the following $pril %*.

#t appears, however, that despite the formal execution of the loan

agreement the reexamination contemplated in esolution (o. *)@

proceeded. #n a meeting of the 9"


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obtaining in the operation of jute mills, and after having heard

amon 1. /aura and after extensive discussion on the subject the


68/81

loan of P&'','''.'' be granted. he reuest was denied by 9",

which added in its letter6reply that it was Dconstrained to consider

as cancelled the loan of P)'','''.'' ... in view of a notification ...

from the "hina 1ngineers 5td., expressing their desire to consider

the loan insofar as they are concerned.D

3n 7uly =?, %8&? /aura, #nc. took exception to the cancellation of

the loan and informed 9" that "hina 1ngineers, 5td. Dwill at any

time reinstate their signature as co6signer of the note if 9"

releases to us the P&'','''.'' originally approved by you.D.

3n 4ecember %*, %8&? 9" passed esolution (o. 8'A), restoring

the loan to the original amount of P&'','''.'', Dit appearing that

"hina 1ngineers, 5td. is now willing to sign the promissory notes

jointly with the borrower6corporation,D but with the following

proviso2

hat in view of observations made of the shortage

and high cost of imported raw materials, the


69/81

4epartment of $griculture and (atural esources

shall certify to the following2

%. hat the raw materials needed by the borrower6

corporation to carry out its operation are available in

the immediate vicinity> and

=. hat there is prospect of increased production

thereof to provide adeuately for the reuirements of

the factory.D

he action thus taken was communicated to /aura, #nc. in a letter

of 9" dated 4ecember ==, %8&?, wherein it was explained that

the certification by the 4epartment of $griculture and (atural

esources was reuired Das the intention of the original approval

:of the loan; is to develop the manufacture of sacks on the basis

of locally available raw materials.D his point is important, and

sheds light on the subseuent actuations of the parties. /aura,

#nc. does not deny that the factory he was building in 4avao was


70/81

for the manufacture of bags from local raw materials. he cover

page of its brochure :1xh. !; describes the project as a D7oint

venture by and between the !indanao #ndustry "orporation and

the /aura #mport and 1xport "o., #nc. to finance, manage and

operate a Kenafmill plant, to manufacture copra and corn bags,

runners, floor mattings, carpets, draperies> out of %''N local raw

materials, principal kenaf.D he explanatory note on page % of the

same brochure states that, the venture Dis the first serious

attempt in this country to use %''N locally grown raw materials

notably kenafwhich is presently grown commercially in the#sland

of !indanao where the proposed jutemill is located ...D

his fact, according to defendant 4


71/81

factory. /aura, #nc. itself confirmed the defendantEs stand

impliedly in its letter of 7anuary =%, %8&&2 :%; stating that

according to a special study made by the D :=; reuesting Dassurances :from 9";

that my company and associates will be able to bring in sufficient

jute materials as may be necessary for the full operation of the

jute mill>D and :); asking that releases of the loan be made as

follows2

a; 9or the payment of the receipt for jute mill

machineries with the Prudential


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mill to operate %A=,?%).8%

c; 9or raw materials and labor @*,&A@.'8

%; P=&,'''.'' to be released on the open6

ing of the letter of credit for raw jute

for O=&,'''.''.

=; P=&,'''.'' to be released upon arrival

of raw jute.

); P%*,&A@.'8 to be released as soon as

the

mill is ready to operate.

3n 7anuary =&, %8&& 9" sent to /aura, #nc. the following reply2

4ear /irs2

his is with reference to your letter of

7anuary =%, %8&&, regarding the release of

your loan under consideration of


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P&'','''. $s stated in our letter of

4ecember ==, %8&?, the releases of the

loan, if revived, are proposed to be made

from time to time, subject to availability

of funds towards the end that the sack

factory shall be placed in actual operating

status. -e shall be able to act on your

reuest for revised purpose and manner

of releases upon re6appraisal of the

securities offered for the loan.

-ith respect to our reuirement that the

4epartment of $griculture and (atural

esources certify that the raw materials

needed are available in the immediate

vicinity and that there is prospect of

increased production thereof to provide


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adeuately the reuirements of the

factory, we wish to reiterate that the basis

of the original approval is to develop the

manufacture of sacks on the basis of the

locally available raw materials. Bour

statement that you will have to rely on

the importation of jute and your reuest

that we give you assurance that your

company will be able to bring in sufficient

jute materials as may be necessary for

the operation of your factory, would not

be in line with our principle in approving

the loan.

-ith the foregoing letter the negotiations came to a standstill.

/aura, #nc. did not pursue the matter further. #nstead, it reuested

9" to cancel the mortgage, and so, on 7une %*, %8&& 9"


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executed the corresponding deed of cancellation and delivered it

to amon 9. /aura himself as president of /aura, #nc.

#t appears that the cancellation was reuested to make way for

the registration of a mortgage contract, executed on $ugust @,

%8&?, over the same property in favor of the Prudential


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paying contractual commitments it had entered into, in

connection with its jute mill project.

he trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that

there was a perfected contract between the parties and that the

defendant was guilty of breach thereof. he defendant pleaded

below, and reiterates in this appeal2 :%; that the plaintiffEs cause

of action had prescribed, or that its claim had been waived or

abandoned> :=; that there was no perfected contract> and :); that

assuming there was, the plaintiff itself did not comply with the

terms thereof.

-e hold that there was indeed a perfected consensual contract,

as recogni+ed in $rticle %8)? of the "ivil "ode, which provides2

$. %8&?. $n accepted promise to deliver something,

by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding

upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan

itself shall not be perferted until the delivery of the


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object of the contract.

here was undoubtedly offer and acceptance in this case2 the

application of /aura, #nc. for a loan of P&'','''.'' was approved

by resolution of the defendant, and the corresponding mortgage

was executed and registered.


78/81

operation are available in the immediate vicinity> and :=; that

there is prospect of increased production thereof to provide

adeuately for the reuirements of the factory.D he imposition of

those conditions was by no means a deviation from the terms of

the agreement, but rather a step in its implementation. here was

nothing in said conditions that contradicted the terms laid down

in 9" esolution (o. %?&, passed on 7anuary *, %8&?, namely C

Dthat the proceeds of the loan shall be utili+ed e"clusivelyfor the

following purposes2 for construction of factory building C

P=&','''.''> for payment of the balance of purchase price of

machinery and euipment C P=?',8''.''> for working capital C

P8,%''.''.D 1vidently /aura, #nc. reali+ed that it could not meet

the conditions reuired by 9", and so wrote its letter of 7anuary

=%, %8&&, stating that local jute Dwill not be able in sufficient

uantity this year or probably next year,D and asking that out of

the loan agreed upon the sum of P@*,&A@.'8 be released Dfor raw


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materials and labor.D his was a deviation from the terms laid

down in esolution (o. %?& and embodied in the mortgage

contract, implying as it did a diversion of part of the proceeds of

the loan to purposes other than those agreed upon.

-hen 9" turned down the reuest in its letter of 7anuary =&,

%8&& the negotiations which had been going on for the

implementation of the agreement reached an impasse. /aura, #nc.

obviously was in no position to comply with 9"Es conditions. /o

instead of doing so and insisting that the loan be released as

agreed upon, /aura, #nc. asked that the mortgage be cancelled,

which was done on 7une %&, %8&&. he action thus taken by both

parties was in the nature cf mutual desistance C what !anresa

terms Dmutuo disensoD 1 C which is a mode of extinguishing

obligations. #t is a concept that derives from the principle that

since mutual agreement can create a contract, mutual

disagreement by the parties can cause its extinguishment.!


80/81

he subseuent conduct of /aura, #nc. confirms this desistance. #t

did not protest against any alleged breach of contract by 9", or

even point out that the latterEs stand was legally unjustified. #ts

reuest for cancellation of the mortgage carried no reservation of

whatever rights it believed it might have against 9" for the

latterEs non6compliance. #n %8@= it even applied with 4


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-F11931, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the

complaint dismissed, with costs against the plaintiff6appellee.

Documents

Case Digest in Credit Transactions