ROMUALDEZ vs COMELECFacts:Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling. During the trial of the case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:1. Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of

Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

2. Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?

3. Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?

Held:1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes (residence and domicile are defined the same in election laws), and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law . What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights

and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed:

1) in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 2) in her acquirement of residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.

4. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)

Dimaporo vs. Mitra (1991)

Facts: Petitioner Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. In January 1990, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM with the Comelec. Upon being informed of this development, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives (HOR) excluded petitioner’s name from the Roll of Members of the HOR pursuant to Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881 )1 enacted in 1985. He was excluded from all proceedings of the House, was not paid the emoluments due his office, and his office suites were occupied by other persons. When he lost his bid for the gubernatorial race, petitioner expressed his intention to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected

1 Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881): Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Member of Congress. He is now claiming that Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution which provides specific grounds by which the term of members of the House can be shortened2.

Issues:

1. W/N Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is operative under the 1987 Constitution

2. W/N the respondent Speaker and/or respondent Secretary by “administrative act” could exclude petitioner from the rolls of the HOR

Held/Ratio:

1.

Petitioner Respondents CourtNo. The provision cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress.

Yes. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in the said provision falls within the term “voluntary renunciation of office” in Sec. 7(2), Art. VI of the Constitution.

Yes. “Term” is different from “tenure” of office. The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature. However, the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not even exist at all. Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, NOT his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

Under the rule expression   unius   est exclusion   alterius3, the statute is repugnant to the pertinent constitutional provisions since it provides for the shortening of a congressman’s term of office on a ground not provided for in the present Constitution. If

The grounds mentioned in the Constitution cannot be exclusive since there are other modes of shortening the tenure of office of a Member of Congress such as resignation, death, and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office which are

Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution provides that all public officers to the exclusion of the President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office as provided by law. This

2

Sec. 7(2), Art. VI: Voluntary renunciation of office.Sec. 13, Art. VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries.Sec. 16(3), Art. VI: Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior.Sec. 17, Art. VI: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest.

3 The expression of one thing excludes all others.

it were the intent of the framers to include the provisions of Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, they should have incorporated it in the 1987 Constitution.

not included in the enumeration.

clearly recognizes that the 4 grounds found in Art. VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are NOT exclusive. The legal maxim should not be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute because the maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. It serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.

He cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed, pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution.

Petitioner’s filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise because he is presumed to be aware of existing laws.

Petitioner failed to discern that the purpose of the statutory provision is not to cut short the term of office of public officials but rather to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 makes it clear that should incumbent public officials fail in their candidacy for another office, they cannot go back to their former position. This is in perfect consonance with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

The ground for forfeiture in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec. 7, Art. VI of the Constitution. As discussed by Constitutional Commissioners, the filing of the certificate of candidacy is already an overt act of an intention to relinquish the office currently held. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing

save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder of such an office is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

2.

Petitioner Respondents CourtNo. Respondents’ so-called “administrative act” cannot be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office because only the courts can interpret laws.

Yes. Their questioned “administrative act” is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.

Yes. Since the legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy have already been spelled out in Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, respondents cannot be said to have indulged in any statutory interpretation. Both of them perform ministerial functions as administrative officers and it was their duty to remove petitioner’s name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881. They cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing such duty because it might hinder the transaction of public business. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

Case: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (GRs. 157870, 158633 and 161658)Facts:Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 361 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug

testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached.In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

Issue: WON Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional

Held: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not.In declaring sec. 36(g) unconstitutional, the Court said that the same “unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed senator-elect,” adding that the assailed provision of the law and the COMELEC Resolution “add another layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.”

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conducted by the COMELEC. Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th elected senator.

Issue:1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.2Whether or not the petition was moot.3Whether or not petitioners had locus standi.4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again

On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELEC’s failure to give notice of the time of the special election as required under RA 6645, as amended, did not negate the calling of such election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.   The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. It could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.

Philconsa vs Mathay

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “ all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit , without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of thefull term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature . The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

Jimenez vs Cabangbang

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”

The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged

Pobre vs Defensor-Santiago

After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the position of Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate floor and was quoted as saying:

I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. . .

In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a certain Antero J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to undertake disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.

In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the statements. However, she explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.The Supreme Court agreed with Senator Santiago. In Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, it ruled:

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”

Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected

to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

While the Supreme Court dimissed the complaint, it felt that such should not be the last word on the matter. It added:

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots”. . .

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.” But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.”