Case Digest

Laurel vs. Misa

Topic:

Treason Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil. 856 FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO:

The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that thePhilippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is eithersubsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was theexercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding thechange of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still thesame. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to theRepublic of the Philippines.

DISSENT:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippineswere suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the lawsof the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that thePhilippines wasn’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the UnitedStates. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where thePhilippines is now indeed sovereign.

SANDERS VS VERIDIANO II

FACTS:Petitioner Sanders is a special services director of the US Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer are both American citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines. They were employed as gameroom attendants. Respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They protested the conversion and the hearing officer recommended the reinstatement of respondents to full-time. Sanders disagreed with the recommendation. In a letter he stated “respondents tend to alienate co-workers and they were difficult employees to supervise; and even though the grievance was confidential they placed the records in public places” Before the start of the grievance, a letter purportedly coming from Moreau (which did not carry his signature) but was signed by W.B. Moore “by direction” from Moreau, explaining the change of employment status was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel and to concur therewith. Respondents filed a case for damages against petitioners alleging that the letter contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule, mental anguish etc. Private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. Petitioner moved to dismiss stating that the acts performed by them I the discharge of their official duties and therefore court has no jurisdiction under the doctrine of state immunity. Their motion was denied. ISSUE: Whether petitioners were performing their officialduties when they did the acts for which they have been suedfor damages.

HELD: The court held in the affirmative. Mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and doctrine of state immunity. The acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The doctrine of State immunity is applicable not only to our government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. There are two exceptions in the rule: 1. He may be sued when the purpose is to compel him to do an act required by law. 2. Also when the government itself has violated its own laws, the government may be impleaded. The case does not fall within the exceptions. Mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as they were not motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 4, July 25, 1974)

Facts:FlorentinoPilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, MillianPilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

Issue:

Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased.

Ruling:

With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parenspatriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parenspatriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution."If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, MillianPilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.0

Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972) Ponente: J. Makalintal; en banc; unanimous Facts: yAppeal from CFI of Cebu, dismissing plaintiffs comp laint yVictoriaAmigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City yNo annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in theproperty appears at the back of the transfer certificate of title of said lot yWithoutprior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used ap

ortion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and GorordoA venues yAmigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requestingp ayment of thep ortion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government;A uditor General disallowed it yAmigable filed for recovery of ownership to said CFI, but denied on groundsprimarily that government is immune from suit without its consent Issue: yWhether or not the appellant mayproperly sue the government under the facts of the case

Held:It is not immune from suit yWhere the government takes awayp rop erty from ap rivate landowner forp ublic use without going through the legalprocess of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrievedp arty mayp roperly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent (Ministerio vs. CFI of Cebu) ySince no annotation in favor of the government app ears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of anyp ortion of her lot to the government, the app ellant remains the owner of the whole lot. yThe only relief available (sinceA venues have been constructed) is for the government to make due compensation.T o determine due compensation for the land, the basis should be thep rice or value thereof at the time of the taking. ythep laintiff is entitled to damages in the form of legal interest on theprice of the land from the time it was taken up to the time thatp ayment is made by the government. yGovernment shouldp ay attorneys fees

Notes: yThe doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument forp erp etrating an injustice on a citizen

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

SANTIAGO vs. REPUBLIC Petition for Certiorari from order of dismissal of CFI Zamboanga, 1978

FACTS:

• Jan. 1971 - Ildefonso Santiago & his wife donated a land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the condition that lighting & water facilities will be installed and an office building & parking lot will be built on said land which should be ready for occupancy on or before Dec. 7, 1974. • Bureau failed to meet the conditions thus, Santiago filed this case against the RP thru the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation of the deed of donation. • CFI – granted RP’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the state can’t be sued w/o its consent.

ISSUE: WON Santiago can sue the Bureau of Plant Industry.

HELD: Yes. Petition granted. CFI ordered to proceed with case.

RATIO: 1.Admittedly, state cannot be sued w/o its consent. Government departments, bureaus, agencies, offices or instrumentalities cannot be sued either if the suit would result in adverse consequences to the public treasury, whether in disbursements of funds/loss of property. (Del Mar vs. Philippine Veterans Administration) This principle has been implicit in the 1935 Constitution (Republic vs. Purisima) thus, issue of its retroactivity as raised by the petitioner is immaterial. 2.However, it would be unfair to cloak the State with immunity when it has violated an agreement wherein it has received gratuitously a certain property w/o fulfilling the terms of the agreement. This is offensive to one’s sense of justice. The government should set the example. Since the State can waive its immunity from suit impliedly, the case at bar should prosper. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Ministerio vs. CFI Cebu). Thus when the State commits an injustice against a citizen, it implies waiver of its immunity. Bureau of Plant Industry’s failure to abide by the conditions under w/c the donation was given presumes that it gave its consent to be sued. There being no money claim, it will not affect the State’s treasury. A donor, w/ RP as donee, is entitled to go to court when there is a breach of the conditions of such donation. The State benefited from the contract and when it ignores its obligations, the people might lose its confidence on the State. *additional notes: 1.The doctrine of the non-suability of the State is a corollary of the positivist concept of law w/c according to Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on w/c such a right may be predicated. It is in consideration of the vastly expanded role of the government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote general welfare. (Mobile Phil. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service). 2.A government-owned & controlled corporation has a personality of its own distinct & separate from that of the government. It may sue & be sued & may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation. (National Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs. CIR). 3.An action against the government officials is essentially one against the government. (Araneta vs. Gatmaitan) 4.Basic & fundamental principle of the law that the gov’t can’t be sued before courts of justice w/o its consent covers with the mantle of its protection an entity such as the Angat River Irrigation System. (Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers Union) 5.Bureau of Cusotms acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service is immune from suit under the doctrine of non-suability of the State. The claimant’s remedy to recover the loss or damage to the goods under the custody of such service is to file a claim w/ the Commission on Audit as contemplated in Act No. 3803 & Commonwealth Act No. 327

Fontanilla v. Maliaman [February 27, 1991]

Facts: Motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Second Division decision in GR no. 61045. The Solicitor General maintains that NIA on the strength of PD no. 552 and the case of Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers’ Union that NIA does not perform solely and primarily propriety functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions and is therefore not liable for tortuous act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent. Son of the petitioners were killed by the driver of NIA.They filed a case for damages against NIA

Issue: WON the NIA is a corporate body performing proprietary function

Held: Yes NIA is a government agency with juridical personality separate and distinct from the government.It can be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

Ratio: The irrigation districts in the US are identical with the irrigation system in the Philippines.As such, it is appropriate to consider certain doctrines from the American jurisprudence. o Irrigation district is a public quasi corporation organized however to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits.They are members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are benefited by its operations.It is, in the administration of its business, the owner of its system in aproprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership. o Quasi-public corporation possessed some governmental powers and exercised some governmental functions, but held that the construction and operation of its irrigation canals and ditches was a proprietary rather than a governmental function, and hence the district was responsible in damages for negligent construction or operation of its canal system. Constituent – exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory.Ministrant – merely the exercise of propriety function and compulsory Other corporations that brings public benefit and public welfare are basically proprietary in nature (telecommunications, electricity) NAWASA vs. NWSA Consolidated unions – it was held that NAWASA is not an agency performing governmental functions rather it performs proprietary functions.The function of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of the government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society. NIA was not created for the purpose of local government.It is essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest andpublic welfare, such fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a “government-function” corporation.NIA was created for the purpose of“constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation project. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government.Also in PD 552 it was provided that NIA can sue and be sues in court.NIA has its own assets and liabilities and it also has corporate powers to be exercised by the BOD. Separate Opinion: Padilla NIA is an agency of the government with an original charter.RA 3061 created NIA. The charter of NIA confers upon it a separate juridical personality to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law.NIA’s primary purpose is to undertake integrated irrigation projects, by the construction ofmultiple-purpose water resource projects to increase agricultural production for the financial uplifting of the people. NIA is maintained and operated by the government in the performance of its governmental function of providing the Filipino people, particularly, the farmers nationwide, improved irrigation systems to increase the country’s agricultural production.Only the government has the capacity and facilities to successfully undertake a project or venture of such magnitude.Fees collected are for cost of operation, maintenance, insurance and rehabilitation of the irrigation systems. The fact that the charter treats NIA as incorporated under the Corporation law and confers upon it a separate judicial personality is not the test in determining whether it is performing a governmental or proprietary function.It was held that were the nature of the duties imposed on an agency and performed by it does not reveal that it was intended to bring any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit to the government, said agency is deemed to be exercising a governmental function. The charter of NIA provides that it may sue and be sue, thus, the consent of NIA to be sued has been given.The rule of immunity no longer applies.Is the State liable for damages?No.The State would be liable for damages when it acts through a special agent.The Hugo Garcia was not a special agent rather he was NIA”s regular driver.For the State to be liable Congress should enact an appropriate legislation to compensate the petitioners and to appropriate the necessary fund for it.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993

FACTS: • Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. • Petitioner Maxine Bradford is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. • Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was

allowed to leave afterwards. • Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. • Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. • Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k. • May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. • July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. • July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly- discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. • RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. • Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.

ISSUES/RATIO:

1.WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have

allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 3.WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 4.WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted

G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS FACTS:Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. However, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of

these fees and ordered that it shall be reimbursed for the reason that NACOCO, being a public corporation, is exempted from the fees. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON NACOCO is exempt from legal fees being an alleged government corporation.

HELD:

NO.There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty (constitute), and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people (ministrant). To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporations under the Corporation Law. They do not acquire the status of a government entity for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. NACOCO is a GOCC. Thus, not part of the government.

NATIVIDAD ANDAMO & EMMANUEL ANDAMO,vs. IAC, & MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LASALETTEG.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990 CJ Fernancertiorari , prohibition andmandamus

ISSUE:W/N a CORP., which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors & contrivancesw/in its land, thereby causing inundation & damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Art. 2176 & 2177 on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceedindependently of the criminal case.

FACTS:Sps. Andamo, owners of a parcel of land situated in Cavite which is adjacent to that of Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.W/in the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,

caused a young man todrown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

Andamo instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin,officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Art. 324, RPCSubsequently, petitioners filed another action (civil case) against respondent corporation, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

TC dismissed Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of thecivil case was still unresolved. It was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rulesof Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may beinstituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot beinstituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." IAC ± affirming the decisionof TC.

RULING:Decision of IAC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TC is ordered to reinstate Civil Case and toproceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.the civil action is one under Arts 2176 & 2177, onquasi-delicts. All the elements are present:(a)damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by theplaintiff.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirelyindependent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177, CC. There can be no logicalconclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution ² whether it be conviction or acquittal ² would render meaningless theindependent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Art. 31, that his action mayproceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

QUIRICO DEL MAR vs. THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

Facts Del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command; he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; in March 1950, the said Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through the United States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during World War II, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government. PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United States

Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension and PVA also asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. The action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention, and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims.

This appeal raises several questions which will be discussed in seriatim.

1.The PVA argues that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try civil case because it involves a money claim against the said PVA — a mere agency of the Government performing governmental functions with no juridical personality of its own — and, in reality, partakes of an action against the Philippine Government which is immune from suit without its consent.Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an appeal bond? To resolve this issue, we must initially determine whether the PVA is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, and, in the affirmative, whether it exercises governmental functions. a.this Court referred to the claim of the private respondent therein as "a claim for a sum of money against the Government, which claim, if adjudged finally to be meritorious, would render the Republic of the Philippines liable therefor," since the funds from which the claim was to be satisfied were funds appropriated by Congress for the PVA; As a general proposition, the rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property."

2.del Mar alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to court action. a.in the present controversy — involves a question solely of a legal nature, there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief.

3.The validity of section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the "Rules and Regulations on Veterans' Benefits" adopted by the PVA constitutes the core of the present controversy. a.Pursuant to the foregoing, the PVA cancelled and discontinued the monthly life pension of del Mar reasoning that the latter's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit from the Philippine Government. The principle recognizing the necessity of vesting administrative authorities with the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectual its policies, constitutes well established doctrine in this jurisdiction. The PVA's pretense that del Mar case falls under the clause of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, which excepts those who "are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds" from the coverage of said section 9 — predicated upon its interpretation that the phrase other Government funds" includes funds of the United States Government — fails to persuade this Court as a valid argument to justify its cancellation of del Mar monthly life pens.

4.The rest of the assigned errors relate to the allege undue interference by the court a quo with the purely discretionary functions of the PVA in the matter of granting discontinuing the pension benefits.

a. The law concedes to administrative bodies the authority to act on and decide claims and applications in accordance with their judgment, in the exercise of their adjudicatory capacity.

This Court directs the appellant Philippine Veterans Administration to compute and then to pay to the appellee del Mar his past and accumulated monthly life pension at the aforementioned statutory rates.

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.

Held:

It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

REPUBLIC vs PALACIO

FACTS:

Ortiz instituted action against Handong Irrigation Association to recover possession of land whichHIA allegedly entered and occupied at the inducement of Irrigation Service Unit, an agency under theDept. of Public Works and Communications.A writ of execution and order of garnishment was served against the deposits and trust funds of ISU to pay for the damages to Ortiz .CA upheld on the basis that ISU is engaged in the private business of purchase and sale of irrigation pumps.

ISSUE:

WON State or its fund can be made liable for damages

HELD : NO

RATIO:

The ISU liability in inducing HIA to invade and occupy land of Ortiz arose from torts and not fromcontract.It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that embodied in Art 2180 of CC that the State is only liable for torts caused by its special agents especially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent’s regular duties. There being no proof that the making of the tortuous inducement was authorized, neither the state nor its funds can be made liable. Other issues:Even if the liability of the state had been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itselfwhether to pay the judgment or not. Thus execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

Facts:On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfactionof a judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs of RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of military and civilian personneland for maintenance and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of Execution against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment arenull and void.

Issue:Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held:What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of theConstitution.It isa fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of sovereignty that the stateas well as its government is immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from suit,not because of any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that therecan beno legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand soundsense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent to be sued had been previously granted andthe state liability adjudged.The universal rule that wherethe State gives its consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limitclaimant’s actiononly up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government fundsand properties maynot be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy suchjudgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the correspondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,asappropriated by law.

G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978PHIL. NATIONAL BANK vs. JAVIER PABALAN

Issue;

The petitioner is requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.

Facts;

Philippine National Bank invoked the doctrine of non-suability in behalf of PVTA. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its consent." In addition, the amount held by said bank is subject to garnishment.

Held;

The certiorari was dismissed without cost by the Supreme Court saying that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment, thus, the writ of execution be imposed immediately. The non-suability clause raised by PVTA being a government owned corporation was also denied citing previous decisions held by the Supreme Court specifically citing that of Manila Hotel Employees Association vs Manila Hotel Company and to quote 'it is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.

Case Digest - Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971

FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and

just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation.

In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use."

The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that they are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government immunity from suit correct?

HELD:

NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court decided that the lower court’s decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO,LA UNION vs.HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, ET.AL.

FACTS:

At about 7am of December 16, 1965, acollision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot (owned bythe Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel andsand truck driven by Jose Manandeg (ownedby Tanquilino Velasquez), and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union anddriven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact,several passengers of the jeepney includingLaureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of theinjuries they sustained and four others sufferedvarying degrees of physical injuries.The private respondents instituted acomplaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, ownerand driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendantsfiled a Third Party Complaint against thepetitioner and the driver of a dump truck of

petitioner.Petitioner raised as one of its defensesthe non-suability of the State.

ISSUE:

WON the Municipality of San Fernandois immune from suit.

HELD:

YES.Anent the issue of whether or not themunicipality is liable for the torts committed byits employee, the test of liability of themunicipality depends on whether or not thedriver, acting in behalf of the municipality, isperforming governmental or proprietaryfunctions.In the case at bar, the driver of thedump truck of the municipality insists that "hewas on his way to the Naguilian river to get aload of sand and gravel for the repair of SanFernando's municipal streets." We alreadystressed in the case of Palafox,et .al vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102Phil 1186) that "the construction ormaintenance of roads in which the truck andthe driver worked at the time of the accidentare admittedly governmental activities."We arrive at the conclusionthat themunicipality cannot be held liable for the tortscommitted by its regular employee, who wasthen engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable thoughit may be –– imposed on the municipality noduty to pay monetary compensation

US VS GUINTO February 26, 1990

FACTS:

These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.

1) US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607) The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon.The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.

2} US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470) Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed

after it had been ascertained in an investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock.Genove filed a complaint for damages against the club manager who was also an officer of USAF.

2) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp ODonnel, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. A trial ensued where petitioners testified against respondent Bautista.As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that because of the latters acts, he was removed from his job.

3) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258) Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by handcuffing and unleashing dogs on them by the latter.The individual petitioners, US military officers, deny this stressing that the private respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries. In all these cases, the individual petitioners claimed they were just exercising their official functions.The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

ISSUE:

Is the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at bar?

HELD:

A state may not be sued without its consent.This doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance.The rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.Consent is implied when the sate enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.

1) US VS GUINTO (GR No 76607) The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons.The petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint, the contract in question being decidedly commercial.Thus, the petition is DISMISSED and the lower court directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of the case.

2) US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470) The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a commercial and not a government activity.The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove.Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Geneove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court be dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted quite properly in terminating the private respondents employment for his unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the soup stock with urine.

3) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) It was clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the

complainant.For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, thay cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.The conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of Clark Air Base was a submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is rejected.Express waiver cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.Neither does it come under the implied form of consent.Thus, the petition is granted and the civil case filed in the lower court dismissed.

4) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258) The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record were too meager to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred.Only after the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.

Republic vs Purisima

Facts:A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit inthe sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiffbeing private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, theleading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to passon the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unlessconsent beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of FirstInstance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:

WON the respondent’s decision is valid.

Rat io na le:

The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the presentConstitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent.

Ruling:

The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]Constitution is alogical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of anylegal right asagainst the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all,even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it toengage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone thatcalls for itscontinued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject toappeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited ProvidenceWashington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it hasoperated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vastand ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimantsmay still exist,is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in thedetermination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has beenthese so manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointedout byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed tohad no bindingforce on the government.

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch 9, Caylao et.al G. R. No. 84607, March 19, 2003

FACTS:

The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the Constitution under Article XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued without its consent. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is, on its face, against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liablity will belong not to the officer but to the government. With respect to the incident that happened in Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell twelve rallyists, the the case filed against the military officers was dismissed by the lower court. The defendants were held liable but it would not result in financial responsibility to the government. The

petitioner (Caylao Group) fileda suit against the State that for them the State has waived its immunity when the Mendiola Commission recommended the government to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts and utterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's waiver of immunity and therefore, the government should also be liable andshould be compensated by the government . The case has been dismissed that State has not waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer filed a petition for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should the State be liable for the incident?

HELD:

No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability authomatically attaches to the State. The purpose of which is to investigate of the disorders that took place and the recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State. The acts and utterances of President Aquino does not mean admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case does not qualify as suit against the State. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. The military officials are held liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they have exceeded to their authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly and should guarantee the safety of the people. The court has made it quite clear that even a “high position in the government does not confera license to persecute or recklessly injure another.” The court rules that there is no reversible error and no grave abuse of dicretion commited by the respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders.