Case Characteristics and Defendant Tenant Default in a Housing Court

Case Characteristics and DefendantTenant Default in a Housing CourtErik Larson*

Although frequently cited as an important influence on case outcomes,defendant default in lower courts is not sufficiently studied as an outcomein its own right. In this article, I develop theoretical propositions andhypotheses concerning the impact of case characteristics on tenant defen-dant default and examine these hypotheses in light of data on 677 cases ina housing court. I find that allegations that are easier to dispute (thoseconcerning a breach of lease, rather than nonpayment of rent) and highermonthly rent levels are associated with lower levels of default. Additionally,tenant default rates are highest in areas with the highest concentration ofpoverty. These findings reveal the importance of considering case charac-teristics in studies of legal participation and as a basis for organizationalreform.

Studies of civil courts draw attention to the large percentage of defendantswho fail to appear at hearings in conciliation courts, with default judgmentsentered for plaintiffs in a range of 25–75 percent of cases (Yngvesson &Hennessey 1975; Vidmar 1984; Hildebrandt et al. 1982; Seron et al. 2001).Despite the frequency of defendant default, few studies do more than notethe association of such default and judgments favoring plaintiffs. Reasonsoffered by researchers to explain rates of default tend to be suggestive, ratherthan systematic. In large part, this result stems from the focus of the research,which is on activities taking place inside the courts (such as understandingwhat types of parties use the courts, which types of litigants tend to securefavorable outcomes, and the role of legal representation in court operation).

*Sociology Department, Macalester College, 1600 Grand Ave., Saint Paul, MN 55105; email:[email protected].

I thank Ron Aminzade, David Knoke, Elizabeth Boyle, and the JELS editors and referees fortheir helpful comments on this work. Support for this research came from a National ScienceFoundation Graduate Research Fellowship.

Journal of Empirical Legal StudiesVolume 3, Issue 1, 121–144, March 2006

©2006, Copyright the AuthorJournal compilation ©2006, Cornell Law School and Blackwell Publishing, Inc.

121

mailto:[email protected]

The phenomenon of default becomes part of the explanation of these otherfeatures of the court, rather than something to be explained.

The empirical problem—high rates of defendant default—remainsunderstudied as a result. Certainly, part of the reason for this empiricalvacuum is practical: one has difficulty measuring attributes of parties notpresent, let alone asking these parties questions. Attention in sociolegalstudies to structural influences on case outcomes, however, suggests a pos-sible starting point for examination: case characteristics. Research on mon-etary outcomes has found variation associated with case characteristics, suchas the degree of admitted liability (Vidmar 1984; LaFree & Rack 1996).Further, research on responses to discrimination suggests that differences inthe structures of sites of discrimination (e.g., workplace vs. housing) influ-ence the likelihood of the filing of a grievance (Kritzer et al. 1991). Suchcase-contextual elements may help explain patterns in defendant default.Theoretically, such a contextual focus is also warranted by research concern-ing the influence of political-institutional contexts on levels of politicalparticipation (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001).

Using theories of political activity as a guide to contextual factors thatmay influence participation, I develop a number of hypotheses to examinethe impact of case characteristics on defendant defaults and test thesehypotheses using data about residential tenant defendant defaults in unlaw-ful detainer (eviction) cases in a housing court. The analysis demonstratesthat there is a structure to efficacy in cases that influences defaulting: claimsthat are easier to dispute are associated with a greater likelihood of tenantparticipation. Additionally, situational resources, particularly communitystatus and monthly rent, are associated with participation. At the level of theindividual housing unit, tenants in higher-rent units are less likely to default.Net of this individual unit variation, high concentrations of poverty increasethe risk of default for cases from the area.

The research analysis is focused on the case characteristics associatedwith defendant tenant default. It certainly may be that individual character-istics and wider systemic variation also exert influence on the likelihood ofdefault in particular cases, or in one social setting in comparison to another.Notwithstanding the potential impact of individual and systemic factors,examination of case-contextual factors’ influence on default within a par-ticular institutional setting makes both theoretical and practical contribu-tions. Establishing explanations involving case-contextual influences allowsfor the progressive development of theory. Within a particular institutionalsetting, certain types of claims may be easier to support, or particular seg-

122 Larson

ments of the community may have easier access. Such initial findings canspur further investigation into the associations and interactions between theindividual and system levels and the case characteristics. Furthermore, thecase-contextual findings identify mechanisms through which systemic andindividual variation result in differences in outcomes. Practically, the focuson structural-level characteristics can help encourage organizational or legalreform. Legislation or administrative decisions potentially could addressorganizational practices related to a court that lead to variation in defaulting.In contrast, changes to the characteristics of individuals in the jurisdiction orthe wider social system are by nature less amenable to reform.

I. Theory

Little formal theory about default in courts exists; however, there are anumber of theories of political participation that offer conceptual guidance.As with other forms of political participation, individuals who arrive in courtas defendants in civil cases must commit time and interact with a govern-mental body. As such, propositions about political participation may offerguidance to understanding participation in civil court cases. Although thereare differences between political participation and judicial participation,careful consideration of theories of political participation can highlightaspects of theory that are useful to understanding participation in court.Perhaps the most fundamental difference between participation in judicialproceedings and political participation is the individualized nature of courtprocesses, as compared to the collective nature of much political activity(Abel 1982). Although the collective nature of political participation posesthe potential problem of individuals free-riding on the work of others in theabsence of a system of selective incentives (Olson 1965; but see Ferree 1992for a critique of this perspective), the free-rider problem is a nonissue forjudicial participation, as the individualized nature of court proceedingsinherently provides a selective incentive to participate. Similarly, courts issuesummons for individuals to appear, although these summons frequentlycarry no threat of criminal sanction for civil defendants.1 The individualizednature of court cases and the ability of courts to summon individuals point tofactors that suggest courts should have a lower threshold to mobilize indi-

1In the court studied in this article, there is no threat of criminal sanction for failure to appear(summons on file with author).

Case Characteristics and Defendant Tenant Default in a Housing Court 123

vidual appearance and participation. Yet, substantial variation exists in thefrequency of court appearance for those who are summoned to defendthemselves.

Beyond theories of individual mobilization for collective action, anumber of theories of political participation identify organizational contextsassociated with larger-scale variation in participation that may offer guidancefor understanding this variation in court participation. Some of these theo-ries account for variation in participation by highlighting differencesbetween individuals (Verba & Nie 1972; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993), whileothers emphasize variation due to social structural factors (Hirschman 1970,1987; Skocpol & Fiorina 1999; Tarrow 1998; Fung & Wright 2001). At boththese levels of explanation, theories use a variety of mechanisms to accountfor variation in participation. Theories premised on the logic of rationalchoice hold that participation is more likely if individuals will maximize theirrealization of their preferred ends or the social structure facilitates suchrealization (Olson 1965; Hechter et al. 1990). Alternately, theories premisedon social relations highlight the importance of individual networks(McAdam 1988) or societal developments (Tarrow 1998) on shaping levelsof participation. Together, these theories suggest a number of generalpropositions about participation. These general propositions, when com-bined with findings from previous research in courts, form the basis of anumber of specific research hypotheses about defendant default.

A. Proposition 1: Participation is More Likely if Contextual Factors Favor Efficacy

A number of theories of participation highlight structural factors that influ-ence the likelihood of potential participants being successful in realizingpreferred ends. Such theories rely on an implicit underlying logic of arational-choice mechanism (Olson 1965; Teixeira 1992). That is, as theprobability that participation might help to achieve a desired outcomeincreases, a greater proportion of potential participants engage in theaction. These theories do not explicitly propose that particular individualsweigh decisions within a rational-choice framework, but that the overallcost-benefit structure influences rates of participation (Hirschman 1970,1987). As such, there are structures of efficacy, or factors, that impact theability of an individual to make a difference in a particular setting. Althoughmany theories starting from this premise focus on the individual level ofanalysis and the free-rider problem, other theories highlight social relationaland macro-structural factors that influence the potential for participation tomake a difference. One aspect of a structure of efficacy is the strength of

124 Larson

opposition, as suggested by theories of political opportunity that highlighthow aggregate levels of participation increase when a regime is vulnerable tochallenge (Tarrow 1998; Joppke 1993). A second aspect of a structure ofefficacy is based on issue characteristics, with research finding that partici-pation increases as the ease of disputing an issue increases (Haines 2000).

Opposition strength and issue characteristics can be applied to courtcases in a straightforward manner. In the context of a defendant in acivil court case, a stronger opposing party may increase the likelihood ofdefault. The strength of an opponent can be understood as a feature of theresources it is able to use in the setting, particularly in relation to legalrepresentation. Such representation can serve to capture the benefits ofrepeat players (Galanter 1974). Additionally, research suggests that gaps inrepresentation—in which a plaintiff is represented by an attorney and adefendant is not—may impact case outcomes in favor of the representedparty (Seron et al. 2001; but see Vidmar 1984 for contrary findings). Thus:

Hypothesis 1: Defendants are more likely to default if the plaintiff has legalrepresentation.

Issue disputability, the other aspect of the structure of efficacy, alsotranslates into the court context easily. Within courts, the clarity of liability isassociated with how controvertible a claim is (Vidmar 1984). As such, cases inwhich liability claims are cut-and-dried decrease the ability of a defendantto dispute the claim. Research concerning a public housing eviction boardfound that case characteristics are associated with the likelihood that legalaid attorneys accept a case for defense (Monsma & Lempert 1992). Theattorneys were more likely to take on cases when the eviction complaintsraised issues of behavioral problems rather than those that simply allegednonpayment of rent. This pattern reflects the more disputable nature of thebehavioral complaints (Monsma & Lempert 1992).

Hypothesis 2: Defendants are less likely to default if the complaint is based on issues ofbehavior as opposed to monetary issues only.

B. Proposition 2: Participation is Less Likely if a Successful Presentation ofSelf is Difficult

Differences in psychological involvement may alter the costs and benefits ofpolitical participation (Teixeira 1992). Individuals who have stigmatizingcharacteristics attempt to manage stigma by avoiding social contact thatbrings the stigma to light (Goffman 1963). Consequently, potential


participation that risks highlighting perceived negative qualities may depressparticipation levels by imposing social-psychological costs. Early studies ofsmall claims courts (reviewed in Yngvesson & Hennessey 1975) suggestedthat such psychological costs discouraged some individuals from appearingat court proceedings. Such potential damage to the successful presentationof self could arise from the types of allegations raised in a complaint. Inhousing cases, such allegations are often related to the nature of how indi-viduals maintain or use a household.

Hypothesis 3: Defendants are more likely to default if the complaint is based on issues ofbehavior as opposed to monetary issues only.

Note that this hypothesis predicts the opposite relationship between theissues alleged and the likelihood of default from the hypothesized relation-ship based on the structure of efficacy in a case. It is possible that bothhypotheses could be partially accurate, as the structure of efficacy encour-ages participation, while the risks to presentation of self depress participa-tion. If there are social-psychological costs based on a risk to a successfulpresentation of self, it is likely that multiple allegations (concerning bothbehavior and monetary issues) would have an additive effect, as multipleallegations concerning the defendant’s reputation would exist.

Hypothesis 4: Defendants are more likely to default if the complaint is based on both issuesof behavior and monetary issues.

C. Proposition 3: Participation is More Likely if the Forum of Participation isConveniently Located

Inclusion of the convenience of participation highlights the temporality andspatiality of social action (Giddens 1984; Sheppard 1996). Economic geog-raphers have highlighted the importance of the “friction of distance”(Haggett 1966) to explain the location of services and industries in centralareas. Overcoming this friction imposes costs on participation, such thatsocial participation has decreased with suburban development (Putnam2000) and conventional forms of political participation decrease with dis-tance (Davis 1999).

Hypothesis 5: Defendants are more likely to default as distance from the court increases.

Space may represent friction, but conceptual work in geography has high-lighted that not all distance is the same, as the meaning of space and distance

126 Larson

are socially constructed (Giddens 1985; Gregory 1994). The situation ofsocial processes within a spatial system and site characteristics are importantconsiderations when accounting for the impact of distance (Sheppard1996). Smaller-scale venues covering a more limited geographic area areperceived differently than those on a larger scale (Smith 1994). As nation-wide civic organizations have grown in prominence over more localizedorganizations, participation in this realm of civic life has decreased (Skocpol1999).

Hypothesis 6: Defendants are less likely to default in cases scheduled in smaller-scalevenues (courts covering a more limited geographic area).

D. Proposition 4: Participation is More Likely if There are Social SituationalResources that Support Participation

Resources may be important determinants of participation (Brady et al.1995); however, beyond individual possessions or characteristics, resourcesare also a component of social relations (Giddens 1984). At an extra-individual level, in addition to formal organizations,2 there may be emergentproperties of social networks and neighborhoods that encourage participa-tory social action (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Klinenberg 2002). Researchfindings support the importance of community-level resources, noting thathigh poverty and unemployment rates are associated with lower levels ofparticipation, as community members have lower perceived self-efficacy(Cohen & Dawson 1993; Boardman & Robert 2000).

Hypothesis 7: Defendants are more likely to default if they live in areas with higherconcentrations of poverty and disadvantaged populations.

In addition to the influence of community-level factors, the situation ofa social setting highlights the relative status of a particular location in rela-tion to other locations (Sheppard 1996). One aspect of situation is theperceived desirability of a particular location, which may increase participa-tion by offering individuals both incentives and the ability to participate. Tothe extent that a situation is desirable, individuals would prefer to preserve

2Formal organizations such as tenants’ unions or legal aid offices may be an important situ-ational resource. For the analysis in this article, however, these organizations are not consid-ered, as both a tenants’ union and legal aid office are organized to have the same geographicscope as the court.


access to this position, which would motivate participation. A desirable situ-ation may also be associated with direct and indirect resources. Directresources are those that derive from the situation itself—for example, expo-sure and access to other individuals with relevant information—whereasindirect resources are those associated with the individuals who are able toaccess the situation—such as ability to access on the basis of socioeconomicfactors (Brady et al. 1995).

Hypothesis 8: Defendants are less likely to default if the case involves access to a sociallydesirable situation.

Finally, the desirability of a situation may decrease based on the overallcost of maintaining access in relation to alternatives to the situation. To theextent that costs of maintaining access are high, exit may become a preferredresponse (Hirschman 1970). Tenants facing eviction for nonpayment of rentmay be able to maintain their current households by making good on therent unpaid. As the relative amount of this unpaid rent increases, tenantsmay simply decide that moving is a better option—defaulting and not payingrent. The relative amount of unpaid rent may interact with the desirability ofa situation, such that larger relative monetary claims exert greater influencein undesirable situations than highly desirable situations.

Hypothesis 9: Defendants are more likely to default as the size of a monetary claim againstthem increases, particularly if they are in a socially less desirable situation.

II. Data and Methods

To test the research hypotheses, I use data from a housing court inHennepin County, Minnesota. Hennepin County, which includesMinneapolis, a number of suburbs, and some semi-rural areas, is the 15thmost populous county in the United States, containing over one-fifth of thepopulation of Minnesota. It is one of two counties in the state to have aseparate housing court. Hennepin County Unlawful Detainer (UD) Courthas jurisdiction over cases regarding the right to possession of property andcases raising issues of property owners’ compliance with standards of habit-ability of rental property. The court, therefore, hears cases filed by propertyowners and mortgagees to retake possession due to the failure of tenants,mortgagors, and buyers on contracts-for-deed to pay owed money or other-wise uphold a rental or purchase agreement. Tenants may also bring suit if

128 Larson

a rental property owner has not complied with the standards of habitabilityor otherwise not complied with a rental contract.

For this analysis, I examine only cases involving owner-initiated actionsto evict residential tenants. Instead of examining the rental housing rela-tionship or the eviction proceedings, the analysis, therefore, provides insightinto the case characteristics associated with variation in tenant default ineviction proceedings. This focus differs from Black’s (1989) social structureof the case, in that Black calls for examination of the social relationshipbetween disputing parties (e.g., class, socioeconomic differences) to deter-mine outcomes, rather than looking at the internal qualities of the case ordispute processing itself. Given the nature of residential tenancy, much ofBlack’s social structure of the case, therefore, is constant in this analysis. Asall the cases are of the same genus, there are similar benefit structures orself-interests to participate for all defendants. Despite this general similarity,there are enough general variations in case characteristics to allow for analy-sis of the impact of case characteristics and situational features of cases onthe likelihood of default.

The data for this study are derived from case records in HennepinCounty UD Court for a two-year period. Each case record consists minimallyof a copy of the complaint, summons, record of service, and decision andorder of the court and is kept in a separate file folder. To initiate a case inUD Court, the complaining party completes a verified and notarized com-plaint, filing it with the court. For parties to initiate a case, the court offers astandardized form, which includes a set of boxes to check for reasons to seekan eviction. When the complaint is filed, the court schedules a date and timefor an initial hearing within 7 to 14 days. The defendant in the case must beserved with a summons and copy of the complaint no later than seven daysbefore the scheduled hearing. The court schedules hearings in four loca-tions: the county government center in downtown Minneapolis (where amajority of cases are heard) and three suburban locations, which may hearcases only in their respective parts of the county (one northern, one western,and one southern). A systematic sample of 5 percent of the cases was selectedwith a random start for each year. After selecting only cases that were evictionactions against residential tenants and excluding cases with missing values onone or more of the variables used in the analysis, there are 677 cases for thisanalysis.

The dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous dummy vari-able: whether the tenant defaulted (or failed to make an appearance) at theUD Court hearing, with default coded as 1 and appearance (participation) as


0.3 In the sample used for this analysis, 40.4 percent of the tenant defendantsdid not appear for their court hearings. The covariates in this analysis consistof the variables that represent the information that appears on an unlawfuldetainer complaint and summons (copies on file with the author). Thesevariables comprise the set of relevant information fixed before any hearingby the court and represent the case characteristics that could be associatedwith defendant appearance or default.

The first group of variables is a series of dummy variables representingthe location of the property. During data collection, the county was dividedinto six regions, with three corresponding to parts of Minneapolis and threecorresponding to suburban and outlying locations.4 The locations in Minne-apolis were divided into north, south, and northeast-southeast correspond-ing to street addresses. These divisions also correspond fairly well withgeographical divisions in the city, with northeast and southeast Minneapolisseparated from the rest of the city by the Mississippi River and north andsouth Minneapolis separated by train tracks, an industrial area, and thedowntown region. The suburban locations were classified as northern,western, or southern, depending primarily on the major arterial routes fromthe central business district to these areas, which also correspond with thesettlement patterns in these suburbs (Martin & Lanegran 1983). In relationto Hypotheses 5 and 7, the property location variables measure proximityand community-level effects. (The relationships predicted by the hypothesesare summarized in Table 1.) The three Minneapolis locations are closer tothe downtown court than the suburban locations and also had higher con-centrations of poverty and lower median income than the surroundingsuburban areas. In comparing the three parts of the city, north Minneapolishad the highest concentration of poverty and lowest median income,followed by south Minneapolis and northeast and southeast Minneapolis(Planning Department 1999).5 Northeast/southeast Minneapolis is used as

3Tenants who defaulted at the scheduled initial hearing but later moved to reopen the case werecoded as making an appearance.

4No separate category was designated for the more rural locations in the county, since only oneof the original 1,052 cases was in such a location. This case is not included in this analysis sinceit did not involve the eviction of a residential tenant.

5There are some reasons to prefer examination of finer-grained differences between geographicregions on a smaller scale; however, data were collected on an aggregated level for reasons ofpracticality. The large population of the county and large number of geographic subdivisions

130 Larson

(e.g., Minneapolis with just about one-third of the county’s population has over 70 separateadministratively defined neighborhoods) would require a highly complex coding scheme thatwould combine geographic subdivisions from the 45 cities in the county. Analytically, collectingthe community-level data on a smaller scale would have required using some continuousvariable (whether a simple measure such as poverty rate or a composite measure based on anumber of community factors). The use of a measure on this smaller scale would have causedproblems in analyzing the impact of distance, unless this, too, were to have been measured ona similarly smaller scale, raising additional practical problems of precisely mapping each prop-erty location.

Table 1: Predicted Relationships of Case Effects on Tenant Default atUnlawful Detainer Hearings by Research Hypothesis

Independent Variable

Hypothesis

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

North Minneapolis +Northern suburbs + -South Minneapolis +Southern suburbs + -Western suburbs + -Suburban court venue - -Breach only - +Breach and nonpayment + +Owner has agent +Owner has attorney +Monthly rent, natural log -Months of rent alleged

unpaid+

+: Hypothesis predicts an increased likelihood of default.-: Hypothesis predicts a decreased likelihood of default.Hypothesis 1: Defendants are more likely to default if the plaintiff has legal representation.Hypothesis 2: Defendants are less likely to default if the complaint is based on issues of behavioras opposed to monetary issues only.Hypothesis 3: Defendants are more likely to default if the complaint is based on issues ofbehavior as opposed to monetary issues only.Hypothesis 4: Defendants are more likely to default if the complaint is based on both issues ofbehavior and monetary issues.Hypothesis 5: Defendants are more likely to default as distance from the court increases.Hypothesis 6: Defendants are less likely to default in cases in smaller-scale venues (courtscovering a more limited geographic area).Hypothesis 7: Defendants are more likely to default if they live in areas with higher concentra-tions of poverty and disadvantaged populations.Hypothesis 8: Defendants are less likely to default if the case involves access to a sociallydesirable situation.Hypothesis 9: Defendants are more likely to default as the size of a monetary claim against themincreases, particularly if they are in a socially less desirable situation.


the reference (omitted) category because it allows comparison to the subur-ban locations for proximity and comparison to the other two Minneapolislocations for concentration of poverty.

Three additional sets of dummy variables are included as covariates.First, a variable indicates if the case was scheduled at one of the suburbancourts, testing the effects of proximity and scale (Hypotheses 5 and 6).Second, a series of variables representing the types of allegations in theunlawful detainer complaint tests Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Cases could allege:nonpayment of rent only; a breach of lease other than nonpayment of rent;or both nonpayment and a breach of lease other than nonpayment. Third,a set of dummy variables accounts for the representation of the propertyowner to test Hypothesis 1. Owners may be represented by themselves,agents, or attorneys in UD Court, with the representative typically complet-ing and signing the complaint form.6

Two continuous variables are the remaining covariates. The natural logof monthly rent for the unit is used to test Hypothesis 8, regarding thedesirability of the situation. Although an imperfect measure of desirability ofhousing, rent levels display a fair degree of correspondence to demandfactors, particularly when examining rent within one urban area and con-trolling for some degree of the intra-urban location (Gilderbloom &Appelbaum 1988).7 Finally, a variable measuring the months of rent allegedunpaid serves as the basis for testing Hypothesis 9 by measuring the potentialcost to tenants of remaining in their unit. Given the potential for the effectof claims against defendants to vary based on social desirability in Hypothesis9, I also test for interaction between monthly rent and months of unpaidrent.

Logistic regression is used for this analysis, since the dependent vari-able is dichotomous (Menard 2002; Pampel 2000). The analysis uses a logit

6Under an exemption to unlicensed practice of law regulations, individuals who are not licensedto practice law may represent parties in UD Court if they have a properly notarized power ofauthority agreement. There are a number of agents who are fairly active in Hennepin CountyUD Court, often representing owners in multiple cases per day.

7The cases selected are from 1993 and 1994, years in which there was not substantial pricechange for rental housing in the Minneapolis area. A test for difference between mean monthlyrent between years shows a nonstatistically significant difference of less than $10 per month.Additionally, separate analysis not reproduced here used a dummy variable for the year in whichthe case was filed to control for possible effects of more general changes in the rental housingmarket, with no significant effects found.

132 Larson

model, based on maximum likelihood estimation. The resulting logit equa-tion predicts a log of the odds ratio for the dependent variable. A coefficientfor a continuous variable x(bx) in the equation represents the expectedchange in the log of the odds ratio of the tenant default for each unit changein x. Similarly, a coefficient for a dummy variable d(bd) represents the pre-dicted change in the log of the odds ratio of the dependent variable when dis present, as compared to the omitted category in a series of dummy vari-ables. Although the logit equation coefficients do not lend themselves toimmediate, intuitive interpretation beyond the direction and statistical sig-nificance of a relationship, the equation may be used to calculate predictedprobabilities for the dependent variable. Such results show the influence ofparticular values of independent variables on the predicted probability ofthe dependent outcome—in this case, tenant defendant default in housingcourt. The statistical significance of each covariate’s coefficient is tested byusing the Wald statistic (the square of the ratio of the coefficient to thecoefficient’s standard error), which is distributed as a chi-square variablewith one degree of freedom and tests whether the sample b value is signifi-cantly different from zero.

Overall equation fit is tested by comparing nested equations. Theproduct of the log likelihood (the function maximized by maximum likeli-hood estimation procedures) multiplied by -2 of the nested equation issubtracted from the product of the log likelihood of the original equationmultiplied by -2. The difference is the test statistic, distributed as a chi-square variable with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in thenumber of covariates in the two logit equations and that tests whether theadditional parameters in the nested equation improve the overall fit com-pared to the original equation. In the case of an initial logit equation, theoriginal logit equation is one in which only the intercept (constant) appears,comparing the equation to the distribution of values on the dependentvariable.

III. Findings

Table 2 presents the coefficients and standard errors for the variables in fournested logit models containing location, court venue, type of allegation inthe unlawful detainer complaint, the type of representation of the propertyowner, the natural log of monthly rent, and months of rent alleged unpaid.Model 1, which includes the property location, court venue, owner’s


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representation, and the type of allegation variables, offers a significantimprovement over the intercept-only model (p � 0.01). Model 2 adds thevariable measuring monthly rent, significantly improving equation fit(p � 0.01) and primarily altering the coefficients for the suburban locations.Model 3 adds the months of rent alleged unpaid, while Model 4 includes aninteraction between the monthly rent and the months alleged unpaid. Theimprovement in equation fit in Model 3 is nonsignificant, while the improve-ment in Model 4 is statistically significant. (Additionally, when comparedwith Model 2, Model 4 offers a statistically significant improvement in overallfit at p � 0.05 with two degrees of freedom.) Tolerance statistics8 for Model4 suggest no serious problems of collinearity, with the lowest tolerance valuesamong the series of the five property location dummy variables, but all withinacceptable levels (above 0.2) for model estimation (Menard 2002:75–78).Analysis of studentized residuals in Model 4 shows all cases with residuals lessthan an absolute value of 2.25, suggesting good fit for all cases (Menard2002:80–84). Additionally, no cases have standardized Cook’s distance values(dbeta) greater than 1, suggesting no significant changes to the estimatedcoefficients would occur with deletion of the most influential cases (Menard2002:84–91).9

The coefficients in the logistic regression models show a lack of supportfor some of the hypotheses. In contrast to Hypothesis 1, the representationof the property owner does not have a meaningful association with thelikelihood of default. Similarly, the coefficient for cases scheduled in thesuburban courts is nonsignificant and in the opposite direction predicted byHypotheses 5 and 6.

The variables for types of allegations in the complaint test Hypotheses2, 3, and 4. In all models, the coefficient for allegations of breach of leaseother than nonpayment of rent is negative and statistically significant, in linewith Hypothesis 2, but the coefficient for breach of lease and nonpaymentallegations is not statistically significant. Although the reported coefficients

8Tolerance is a measure of the amount of variance in each independent variable that is notexplained by the other independent variables and is equal to 1 - R2

x, where R2x is the amount

of variance in each variable x associated with the other independent variables in the regressionequation (Menard 2002:75).

9In fact, separate analyses deleting the most influential cases increased the model chi-squareimprovement in Model 4 over the baseline model and increased the absolute values of allsignificant coefficients while also decreasing their p values. These patterns suggest that the mostinfluential cases have modest suppression effects.


compare these two variables to cases raising only issues of nonpayment ofrent, the difference between the coefficients for breach of lease only andbreach of lease plus nonpayment of rent suggests that there is a significantdifference between these types of cases. That is, cases that do not include anallegation of nonpayment of rent are associated with decreased propensityfor tenant default. Table 3 illustrates the substantive impact of the differencein default rates based on the nature of the complaint by comparing thepredicted probability of default for a nonpayment-only case and breach-of-lease-only case, with all other variables set to the modal (for dummyvariables) and median (for continuous variables) values. Such a nonpaymentcase has a predicted probability of tenant default (0.403) over three timeslarger than an identical breach of lease case (0.126).

The series of dummy variables for property location test Hypotheses 5and 7. A UD complaint concerning a property in north Minneapolis (thearea with the greatest concentration of poverty and disadvantaged popula-tions) is associated with a greater likelihood of tenant default, as predicted byHypothesis 7. Comparison of cases at the modal and median values on allvariables except for property location show a predicted probability of defaultabout 70 percent higher for a case from north Minneapolis (0.502) than inthe reference category (0.296). There is, however, no significant differencebetween the area with the next largest concentration of poverty (southMinneapolis) and the reference category. These patterns suggest that theimpact of situational resources is highest in areas with the most severeconcentrations of poverty. Although not statistically significant at p � 0.05,the coefficients for southern and western suburban locations are similar inmagnitude to the coefficient for north Minneapolis in models that includemonthly rent. Given the lack of significance of the court venue variable, it

Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of TenantDefault by Type of Allegation in UnlawfulDetainer Court Complaint

Complaint Alleges Predicted Probability of Default

Nonpayment of rent only 0.403Breach of lease only 0.126

Note: The above probabilities are calculated using Model 4coefficients with all sets of dummy variables (other than type ofallegation) computed at modal values and all continuous vari-ables computed at median values.

136 Larson

seems unlikely that distance in itself can account for variation in rates ofdefault.

The variables for monthly rent and months of rent alleged unpaid testHypotheses 8 and 9. The addition of the natural log of monthly rent inModel 2 shows both a statistically significant improvement in model fit andan association between higher levels of rent and decreased likelihood ofdefault, as predicted by Hypothesis 8. The addition of months of rent unpaidin Model 3 appears to have no effect; however, Model 4, which includesmonths unpaid and its interaction with monthly rent, shows both a signifi-cant improvement in overall model fit and that months unpaid has a signifi-cant association with the likelihood of default, conditional on monthly rent.These impacts, however, are in the opposite direction predicted by Hypoth-esis 9. To illustrate the substantive impact of these variables, Table 4 showsthe predicted probabilities of default at the quartile cutpoint intersectionsfor monthly rent and months of rent alleged unpaid. Comparison down thecolumns shows a clear pattern at every level of months of rent allegedunpaid: higher monthly rent is associated with decreased probability ofdefault. At the 25th percentile for months of rent unpaid, the predictedprobability of default is 20 percent greater for a case involving a property atthe 25th percentile of monthly rent (0.436) compared with a property at the75th percentile of monthly rent (0.361). Comparison of the patterns acrossrows, however, reveals a somewhat surprising finding: at the 25th percentileof monthly rent, the predicted probability of default is about 4 percent higherfor a case concerning the 25th percentile of months of rent unpaid than it isfor case concerning the 75th percentile of months of rent unpaid. That is,among the lowest-rent units, tenants who are alleged to have more months of

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Tenant Default by Quartile Cutpoints ofMonthly Rent and Months of Rent Alleged Unpaid

Monthly Rent, Natural Log

Months of Rent Alleged Unpaid

75th Percentile Median 25th Percentile

75th percentile 0.373 0.365 0.361Median 0.400 0.403 0.40425th percentile 0.420 0.431 0.436

Note: The above probabilities are calculated using Model 4 coefficients with all sets of dummyvariables computed at modal values. Quartile cutpoints for the natural log of monthly rent are6.263, 6.028, and 5.858. Quartile cutpoints for months of rent alleged unpaid are 2.324, 1.569,and 1.283.


rent outstanding were less likely to default than those who were alleged tohave fewer months of rent outstanding. At the 75th percentile, this patternis reversed, with the probability of default greater for those who are allegedto owe more months of rent than those who are alleged to owe fewer monthsof rent. Potential explanations for the pattern at the lower end of themonthly rent distribution include the possibilities that some of these casesconcern subsidized housing10 and that some of these cases involve tenantswho have withheld rent (but not initiated a rent escrow action with thecourt) to attempt to get repairs made to property.11 Unfortunately, neitherpotential explanation can be tested systematically with these data. UD Courtcase files contain no systematic indication of whether a tenant is in subsi-dized housing, meaning that these data are simply unavailable.12 Rent with-holding cannot be used as a covariate in the regression analysis, since onemust appear in court to raise the defense (and, consequently, its value doesnot preexist the UD summons). Exploratory analysis, however, suggests thatthere may be an impact due to the cases of rent withholding: comparison ofthe months of rent alleged unpaid in those cases in which monthly rent wasbelow the median shows a marginally significant difference between cases inwhich tenants asserted an affirmative defense (mean of 2.4 months unpaid)to those cases in which tenants did not assert an affirmative defense (meanof 1.9 months).13

10Subsidized housing may present unique incentives for both property owners and tenants. Incases in which subsidized rent is vended to property owners through the county, nonreceipt ofrent may involve county case workers, lengthening the time before which a property owner filesa case. Tenants who receive subsidized housing may have a greater incentive to avoid eviction,as replacing such housing may be more difficult.

11Under Minnesota case law, tenants who face a UD complaint can raise an affirmative defensethat they did not pay rent due to a lack of repairs made to the premises (Fritz v. Warthen, 298Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973)).

12Attempts to estimate potential cases of subsidized housing found no difference between casesconcerning the lowest-rent properties and other below-median-rent properties. Althoughcasting some doubt on this explanation, the test is insufficient, since some efficiency apartmentsmay rent for similar amounts as partially subsidized large (e.g., three or more bedroom)apartments or entire houses. Further computation is not possible, since UD Court complaintsdo not specify rental unit size.

13Similarly, in cases in which tenants asserted an affirmative defense, the mean months of rentalleged unpaid was lower for properties with rent above the median (1.7) than for thoseproperties with rent below the median (2.4).

138 Larson

IV. Discussion and Conclusions

By deriving research hypotheses from theoretical propositions about politi-cal participation, I set out to analyze defendant default, a phenomenonunderstudied as an outcome in its own right. Although limited in general-izability to the particular court and sample period, my findings offer a basisfor preliminary assessment of the research hypotheses about the impact ofcase characteristics on defendant tenant default. The empirical analysisshows some support for hypotheses derived from propositions about contex-tual impacts on efficacy and social situational access to resources, whileoffering no support for hypotheses derived from propositions about theconvenience of location and the social-psychological risks to the presenta-tion of self, in contrast to suggestions from earlier research (Yngvesson &Hennessey 1975). The lack of significant findings about the social-psychological risk to the presentation of self may be due to such risks beinginherent for lay participants in courts and constant across cases, as interviewevidence has suggested that witnesses suffer a great deal of apprehensionover testifying in court (O’Barr & Conley 1985; Ewick & Silbey 1998).

The findings about the influences of case-level effects offer guidancefor organizational policy and planning. In the present study, while thecounty has made courts available in suburban locations, the greatest level ofdefault comes from the area in which there is the highest concentration ofpoverty, net of the effects of complaint characteristics and monthly rent. Tothe extent that the court would want to decrease these sociogeographicdisparities, these findings suggest a possible redirection of resources. Simi-larly, while tenant advocacy and legal aid organizations may prioritize casesin which their assistance can make a difference in an adjudicated outcome(Monsma & Lempert 1992), these organizations might consider how toensure that these rational organizational practices do not have the spill-overeffect of encouraging tenant default in less disputable nonpayment of rentcases.

In addition to the practical implications of the findings of case-contextual impacts on defaulting, these findings offer a foundation forfurther research about court participation. Such research could examine theways case-contextual factors intersect with individual characteristics andlarger-scale systemic variation. For instance, the impact of contextual factorsmay be mediated by the distribution of knowledge among a population (e.g.,some groups of tenants may have greater awareness of their rights) or theinfluence of particular case characteristics may wax or wane based on


macrosocial developments (e.g., as vacancy rates increase, the cost of exitmay decrease).

Considering the theoretical proposition about how efficacy is shapedby contextual factors, the evidence in this context points to a clear associa-tion between issue characteristics and likelihood of default, with more con-testable issues being associated with a substantially lower likelihood ofdefault.14 There is no evidence, however, supporting the hypothesis concern-ing opposition characteristics, based on the level of representation of theproperty owner. It appears that the contextual ability to make a difference isless a function of the characteristics of the opposing party’s representationand more about the issue characteristics. Given this finding, future researchmight examine how these issue characteristics are understood. Understand-ings of efficacy could form part of a broader set of cultural orientationstoward law, reflecting shared beliefs common in a society (Ewick & Silbey1998). Although orientations toward law may be distributed on the basis ofsocially ascribed characteristics (Nielsen 2000; Hobson 1990; Smith et al.1991), these orientations may also reflect the location of social situations inrelation to law. Future research could examine the ways these contextualfactors are mediated by individual characteristics and larger-scale systemicvariations.

The analysis also highlighted that situational resources exert someinfluence on the likelihood of default. Cases concerning properties in thearea with the highest concentration of poverty and disadvantaged popula-tions were associated with an increased likelihood of default, even aftercontrolling for differences in monthly rent. Further research could examinethe mechanisms through which these community-level characteristics shapeparticipation, such as examining whether lower levels of perceived self-efficacy (Cohen & Dawson 1993; Boardman & Robert 2000) extend toparticipation in the justice system. The finding that monthly rent influenceslikelihood of default suggests two aspects of access to desirable resources that

14Although one may be tempted to view this as purely a rational decision (tenants likely to losedo not show up to the eviction hearing), such an interpretation does not examine the eventualdisposition of the cases, nor does it account for the broader set of interests that an appearancecould serve. The particular housing court encourages negotiation in all cases. It is quitecommon for the parties to agree that tenants who are unable to pay the money that they owe tomove out in a short period of time (5 to 10 days). While this is a limited period in which to move,it is quite a bit longer than that given to those who default (one day). Additionally, tenants whomove under such agreements are likely to avoid having decisions recorded against them by thecourt and do not pay additional money to the property owner.

140 Larson

could influence participation. First, the lower levels of default associatedwith the higher-rent units may reflect the attempt to maintain access to moredesirable locations. At the same time, the relationship may reflect the greateraccess to the direct resources associated with being able to rent a moreexpensive unit along with the indirect resources accessed through socialrelations (perhaps through participation in work or civic participation). Ineither case, there is influence of social situational resources on defaulting.Further research can illuminate the ways situational resources are accessedand used by individuals. Such access and use of resources may be stratified bycontextual factors, as highlighted in this case by the possible impacts ofsubsidized housing and rent withholding on the lower-rent units.

Beyond defendant default, the findings about the research hypotheseshold suggestions for further research about the process of disputing(Felstiner et al. 1981). The structure of institutions for grievances and theirrelations to other social arrangements may influence the likelihood thatindividuals pursue grievances in different contexts. Given that the hypoth-eses concerning social situational resources and contextual impacts on effi-cacy were derived from more general propositions about participation,researchers concerned with variation in disputing may find the theoreticalperspective advanced here useful in developing explanations. Indeed,research that applies these theoretical insights to a variety of types of par-ticipation within the formal legal system provides a manner with which toexamine the connections between individual, contextual, and systemic influ-ences on legal participation.

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Documents

Case Characteristics and Defendant Tenant Default in a Housing Court