Garcia v. Lacuesta90:489 | Castillo

FACTS: This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects was signed by the testator through a cross mark (an X). The will was signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it because its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was signed by Atty. Javier at the express direction of the testator, 2) that the testator wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that the 3 witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE: Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation clause since the testator had placed a cross mark himself as his signature.

HELD: The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado directed Javier to write the testators name under his express direction. Petitioners argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator signed the will himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark (which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a thumb mark, because the cross mark does not have the same trustworthiness of a thumb mark.

CAYETANO v LEONIDAS129 SCRA 524GUTIERREZ; May 30, 1984

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS- Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, Hermogenes and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. - As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion- Eleven months after, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. - An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him. - Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made. - Respondent judge issued an order admitting the Last Will and Testament of Adoracion and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Paguia was appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.- Hermogenes filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. He filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. - Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit.

ISSUEWON the provisions of the will are valid.

HELD- NO. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. - Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. - Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. - The settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief.

ICASIANO v ICASIANO11 SCRA 4222REYES; June 30, 1964

FACTS. This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte (testatrix), deceased.. The court set the proving of the alleged will and caused notice thereof to be published for 3 successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila Chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.A daughter and son of the testatrix opposed the probate of the alleged will.. Celso later filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the signed duplicate. This was also opposed.-Court, after hearing the parties, issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. Natividad and Enrique were unhappy so they appealed to SC directly .The evidence presented for the petitioner is summarized as follows: Testatrix executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Manila, published before and attested by 3 instrumental witnesses, namely; attorneys Torres, Jr. and Jose Natividad (Jose), and Dr. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Ong, Notary Public in and for Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano, and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament attorneys Torres and Jose were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorney Samson.. The original consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Jose, on page (3); but the duplicate copy is signed by the testatrix and her 3 attesting witnesses in each and every page..Witness Jose admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.

ISSUEWON the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is NOT per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.

HELDYES. It DOES NOT JUSTIFY DENIAL of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil vs. Murciano, "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause"..This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.. SC is satisfied that : the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the same occasion, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will, and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Samson together before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. .The opinion of expert for oppositors did not convince the SC principally because said expert failed to show convincingly that there are radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix..There is also no adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither..That the carbon duplicate was produced & admitted without a new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition for probate

Gago v. Mamuyac49:902| Saranillo

FACTS:Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed a last will and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for probate which was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et. al. Said petition for probate was denied on the ground that the deceased executed another will on April 16, 1919. Gago presented the April 16 will for probate which was again opposed by Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16 will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased; and that said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased executed another will on December 30, 1920.

ISSUE:

W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.

HELD:YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.

MICIANO v BRIMO50 Phil 867ROMUALDEZ

NATUREAppeal from various Manila CFI orders

FACTS- Joseph Brimo. a Turkish national but a long time resident of the Philippines, died and left behind a testamentary will with Andre Brimo, one the decedents brother as a legatee. - Andre Brimo opposed the will on the ground that the provisions therein are not in accord with Turkish law and thus a violation of the Philippine Civil Code, Article 10 which states:"Nevertheless, legal a testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated."- He was also excluded from the will in view of the provision therein that the testator annuls and cancels the disposition found in the will favorable to persons who do not respect the provisions of the said will. - The lower court also dismissed the opposition to the will as the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws ae on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

ISSUES1. WON the will complied with Turkish law xxx2. WON the exclusion of Andre Brimo from the will is valid

HELD1. Yes. The ratiocination of the lower court with regard the presumption that Philippine and Turkish laws are the same is valid in the absence of evidence that showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter. Hence the will must be complied with and executed as the same is not contrary to Philippine laws.2. No. The condition imposed in the will that legatees must respect the testators will to distribute his property in accordance with the laws of the Philippines is void for being contrary to law under Article 792 0f the Civil Code which provides as follows: "Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide."Said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

Marcelina EDROSO vs. Pablo and Basilio SABLANG.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913FACTS:Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable property.2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause its registration.RULING:A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded.Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it.

Case Digest - Banawa vs. Mirano, No. L-24750, 97 SCRA 517, May 16, 1980Case Digest for Statutory Construction

FACTS: Defendants-appellants spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza took care of Maria Mirano, Julianas niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they treated the co-appellant Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted child. On May 5, 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from Placido Punzalan and registered the said parcel of land in the name of Maria, because the said spouses wanted something for Maria after their death.

On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the time of her death she left only as her nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are children of the deceaseds brother.

The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession of the Iba property as legal heirs of Maria. The court ruled in favor of the Miranos. The Banawas appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:

In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.

The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals and were substituted by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica and her husband Casiano Amponin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant case because Maria Mirano was not legally adopted.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court applicable to the instant case?

HELD: NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted child and does not include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

Bicomong vs. Almanza (G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977)

FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda and they had 3 children (Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio). When Sisenanda died, Simeon remarried to Silvestra and they had 2 children (Felipa and Maura). The plaintiffs are the grandchildren of Simeon with his children in his first marriage. Respondents are the heirs of the children of Simeon in his second marriage.

The subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5 parcels of land which she inherited from Silvestra Glorioso.

There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs, the Tolentinos, and Francisca Bagsic, for their shares in the properties of Maura Bagsic. When Maura Bagsic died, the properties passed on to Cristeta Almanza, who also died without division of the properties.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Almanzas appealed to CA. It was contended that since Maura died ahead of Felipa, the latter succeeded to Mauras estate, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. They said the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. The plaintiffs claim that Felipa died ahead of Maura.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maura is succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of nephews and nieces of half blood.

RULING:No. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, collateral relatives succeed to the entire estate of deceased.

It appearing that Maura Bagsic, child of the 2nd marriage in which her share is in dispute, died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the 10 children of her brother and 2 sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.Article 975 makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and 2 sisters of half blood.

(19) In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay, et. al vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010)

PTC vs. WEBBER56 Phil 522 Facts: This appeal has been taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the item of two thousand pesos (P2,000) for attorney's fees in the final account submitted by the administrator was approved; but the scheme of partition must be amended and must be taken from the value of the estate of the husband and of the wifeHerman Frankel and Mrs. Frankel pro rata.The opposition of the appellants clara webber and others was disallowed, together with every other opposition to the final account based upon the amount of the interest due on the sum of forty thousand eight hundred three pesos and seventy-three centavos (P40,803.73). Clara Webber's opposition in the matter of the jewels is also overruled. Lastly, Frema Fischler's opposition with reference to the payment of interest upon the principal of her legacy is also overruled.

Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court is committed an error in In overruling the oppositions of the appellants to the final account and project of partition filed on May 19, 1930, and to the report filed on June 26, 1930.Held: No, With reference to the investment of the inheritance funds, the trial court rightly held such investment to be in no way exceptionable or contrary to any law. The conduct of the administrator of an inheritancewho deposits the funds entrusted to his care in a current account with a solid and responsible bank, instead of depositing them in fixed account at a higher rate of interest, with a view to having them subject to withdrawal at a moment's notice, is not unlawful or even improper, but rather worthy of approval

Dy Yieng Seangio, et. al vs. Reyes, et. al (G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006)

FACTS:On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo. Petitioners opposed assailing among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. RTC dismissed the petition for probate reasoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

RULING: Yes. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of the son (Alfredo) nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.