Case 2 the Roman Catholic Apostolic (Davao) vs. LRC

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    CASE No. 2

    THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC., petitioner,vs.

    THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAOCITY, respondents.

    G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957

    PONENTE: FELIX, J .:

    FACTS:

    Mateo Rodis sold his parcel of land located in Davao City to the herein petitioner, theRoman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. on Oct. 4, 1954. Herein petitioner is acorporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. ClovisThibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.

    Upon presentation of the deed of sale to the Register of Deeds of Davao for registration,the latter required herein petitioner to submit an affidavit declaring that 60 percent of themembers thereof were Filipino citizens pursuant to similar case where the Carmelite Nuns of Davao registered a deed of donation of a parcel of land in favour of their congregation.

    Although willing to submit such affidavit, herein petitioner claimed that the case of thecorporation sole is not similar to that of the Carmelite Nuns because a corporation sole has onlyone incorporator as compared to five for the Nuns and the owner of the land would be theCatholic population of Davao and not the corporation sole or the congregation.

    The Register of Deeds referred the matter to The Land Registration Commissioner for resolution. The Commissioner resolved, after proper hearing, that the herein petitioner corporation was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of that atleast 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic

    Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being noquestion that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen. This ispursuant to the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution.

    After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus wasinstituted with the Supreme Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under the CorporationLaw the deed of sale is actually in favor of the Catholic Church which is qualified to acquireprivate agricultural lands for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship, andprayed that judgment be rendered reversing and setting aside the resolution of the LandRegistration Commissioner in question.

    ISSUE:

    Whether or not corporations sole is qualified to acquire lands in the Philippines inview of the provisions of section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution.

    RULING:

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    The framers of the Constitution had not in mind the corporations sole nor intended toapply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of said Article XIII when they passed and approvedthe same.

    The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom theconstitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The words employed are to betaken in their natural sense, except that legal or technical terms are to be given their technicalmeaning.

    The Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a corporationsole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but merely theadministrator thereof. The Canon Law also specified that church temporalities are owned by theCatholic Church as a "moral person" or by the dioceses as minor "moral persons" with theordinary or bishop as administrator.

    It has been shown that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations whichare formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one person, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining anypercentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole; (3) suchtemporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territoryof the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and the citizenship of theincumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of thecorporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respectivedioceses or corporation sole.

    The framers of the Constitution intended said provisions (Sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII)as barrier for foreigners or corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire, exploit anddevelop our natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for our people to clear andenrich when they are already prepared and capable of doing so. But that is not the case of corporations sole in the Philippines, for, We repeat, they are mere administrators of the"temporalities" or properties titled in their name and for the benefit of the members of their respective religion composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos.

    Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized the corporations soleeven to receive bequests or gifts of real estates and this Court could not, without any clear andspecific provision of the Constitution, declare that any real property donated, let as say this year,could no longer be registered in the name of the corporation sole to which it was conveyed. Thatwould be an absurdity that should not receive our sanction on the pretext that corporations solewhich have no nationality and are non-stock corporations composed of only one person in thecapacity of administrator, have to establish first that at least sixty per centum of their capitalbelong to Filipino citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:

    ART. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws , it is presumedthat the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

    The imperfections of language as a vehicle for conveying meanings result in ambiguitiesthat must be resolved by result to extraneous aids for discovering the intent of the framers.

    Among the more important of these are a consideration of the history of the times when theprovision was adopted and of the purposes aimed at in its adoption. The debates of constitutional convention, contemporaneous construction, and practical construction by thelegislative and executive departments, especially if long continued, may be resorted to resolve,but not to create, ambiguities. . . . Consideration of the consequences flowing from alternativeconstructions of doubtful provisions constitutes an important interpretative device . . . . The

    purposes of many of the broadly phrased constitutional limitations were the promotion of policiesthat do not lend themselves to definite and specific formulation . The courts have had to define

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    those policies and have often drawn on natural law and natural rights theories in doing so. Theinterpretation of constitutions tends to respond to changing conceptions of political and socialvalues. The extent to which these extraneous aids affect the judicial construction of constitutionscannot be formulated in precise rules, but their influence cannot be ignored in describing theessentials of the process (Rottschaeffer on Constitutional Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19).

    There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation may be inconsistentwith the general objectives of policy behind it, and on the basis of equity or spirit of the statutethe courts rationalize a restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted interpretation is usuallyapplied where the effect of literal interpretation will make for injustice and absurdity or, in thewords of one court, the language must be so unreasonable 'as to shock general common sense'.(Vol. 3, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 150.).

    A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development of a country nor anobstruction to its progress and foreign relations (Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs.Bank of New York and Trust Co., 294 N. Y. S.648; 56 N.E. 2d. 745, 293 N.Y. 749).

    Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from thetime of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for a great length of time, and it is progressive and not static. Accordingly, it should not receive too narrow or literal aninterpretation but rather the meaning given it should be applied in such manner as to meet newor changed conditions as they arise (U.S. vs. Lassic, 313 U.S. 299, 85 L. Ed., 1368).

    Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the languageused and that construction which effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or purpose of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be adopted (State ex rel.Randolph Country vs. Walden, 206 S.W. 2d 979).

    It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction shouldbe broad or liberal or equitable, as the better method of ascertaining that intent, rather thantechnical (Great Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).

    All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the Constitution had not inmind the corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of said

    Article XIII when they passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it is, hereinpetitioner, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., could not be deprived of the right to acquire by purchase or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent andeducational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in its name with the Register of Deedsof Davao, an indispensable requisite prescribed by the Land Registration Act for lands coveredby the Torrens system.

    Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration Commission of September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the PhilippineConstitution the vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands in the Philippines in theabsence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, properties or assets of the RomanCatholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. is actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens,and denying the registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with suchrequisite, is hereby reversed . Consequently, the respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of the RomanCatholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present litigation