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18-0396-cv _________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
_________________________________________________________________
MATTHEW HERRICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GRINDER, LLC, KL GRINDR HOLDINGS, INC., and GRINDR HOLDING COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________________________________________
BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE GRINDR HOLDING COMPANY _________________________________________________________________
Moez M. Kaba Allison Libeu Jonathan D. Guynn Hueston Hennigan LLP 523 West 6th Street, Suite 400 Los Angeles, CA 90014 T: (213) 788-4340 F: (888) 775-0898 [email protected] [email protected]
Attorneys for Appellee Grindr Holding Company
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page1 of 28
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
- i -
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ...................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .................................. 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................... 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 3 I. The Grindr App ............................................................................................. 3
II. Grindr Holding Company ............................................................................. 4
III. Third Party Harassment of Appellant ........................................................... 4
IV. Appellant’s Jurisdictional Allegations ......................................................... 5
V. Procedural History ........................................................................................ 5
I. GRINDR HOLDING COMPANY IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE DISTRICT COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION .............................. 10
A. The Court Should Affirm Dismissal Because the District Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Under New York Law ............... 10
B. The Court Should Affirm Dismissal Because the District Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Under the Due Process Clause ............................................................................................... 13
II. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED .......................... 15
A. Grindr Holding Company Cannot Be Held Liable for Grindr’s Actions as a Matter of Law ................................................ 15
B. The First Amended Complaint Lacks the Basic Level of Specificity Mandated by Rule 8(a) .................................................. 16
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page2 of 28
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)
Page
- ii -
C. The First Amended Complaint Lacks the Heightened Specificity Required by Rule 9(b) .................................................... 17
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 20
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page3 of 28
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
- iii -
Cases
Angermeir v. Cohen, 14 F.Supp.3d 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ............................................................. 18
Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed. Appx. 33 (2d Cir. 2001)............................................................ 16, 17
Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 1999) ........................................................................ 10
Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007) ........................................................................ 13
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) ................................................................................. 11
CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. Terra Nostra Consultants, 230 Cal. App. 4th 405 (2014) ...................................................................... 16
Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010) ........................................................................ 13
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014)..................................................................................... 11
DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1987) ...................................................................... 18
Ellison v. Clos-ette Too, LLC, 2014 WL 5002099 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014) ................................................ 15
Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Blanford, 794 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) ........................................................................ 18
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page4 of 28
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
Page(s)
- iv -
Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d. Cir. 1961) ....................................................................... 16
Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (1995) .................................................................................... 15
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) ............................................................................ 11
Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 1998) ........................................................................ 10
Latner v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 7
Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 5 (2d Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 10
Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986) .......................................................................... 19
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996) .......................................................................... 13
NovelAire Techs., L.L.C. v. Munters AB, 2013 WL 6182938 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) ............................................ 14
Penguin Grp. (USA), Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 14
Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 17
Sandoval v. Ali, 34 F.Supp.3d 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ........................................................... 16
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page5 of 28
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
Page(s)
- v -
Schwartzco Enters. LLC v. TMH Mgmt., LLC, 60 F.Supp.3d 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ............................................................. 18
Statutes
Cal. Corp. Code § 17703.04 ................................................................................... 15
Rules
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 ............................................................................................... 11
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 ............................................................................................... 11
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page6 of 28
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 28(a)(1), Appellee
Grindr Holding Company (“GHC”) states that it is a private, non-governmental
entity, that it has no parent company, and that no publicly-held corporation owns
10% or more of GHC’s stock.
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page7 of 28
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1) Whether the District Court properly found that Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), barred
Plaintiff-Appellant Matthew Herrick’s (“Appellant”) claims for defect in design,
defect in manufacture, defect in warning, negligent design, failure to warn or to
provide adequate instruction, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress?
(2) Whether the District Court properly found that Appellant failed to plead
plausible claims for fraud, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and
deceptive practices and false advertising under New York General Business Law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews de novo the District Court’s decision to grant motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) or 12(b)(6). Charles
Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2018). The Court may
affirm the District Court’s decision for any reason supported by the record. Latner
v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2018).
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page8 of 28
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks to hold Grindr LLC (“Grindr”), a California Limited Liability
Company, and its then members, Grindr Holding Company (“GHC”) and KL Grindr
Holdings, Inc. (“KL Grindr”), liable for speech and other content that a third party
promulgated on Grindr’s interactive computer service. GHC joins Grindr’s
Opposition Brief and files this separate brief to make additional arguments relevant
to it.
I. The Grindr App
Grindr owns, operates, and maintains a geosocial-networking application
(“Grindr App.”) for smartphones geared towards gay and bisexual men. (A-57, ¶ 21.)
Since its launch in early 2009, the Grindr App. has become the largest and most
popular gay social networking app in the world, connecting nearly 10 million users
in almost 200 countries. (A-57, ¶ 29.) The Grindr App. utilizes location-based
technology, which enables users who are near each other to interact and connect.
(A- 57, ¶¶ 22-23.) Through the Grindr App, a user can filter other users by various
attributes, determine how close another user is, see that user’s photographs, read that
user’s biography, and chat with that user. (A-59, ¶ 31.) The Grindr App. is available
on multiple smartphone platforms. (A-58, ¶ 28.)
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page9 of 28
4
II. Grindr Holding Company
At the time the suit was filed, GHC held a minority ownership interest in
Grindr. (A-188, ¶ 3.)1 GHC is a Delaware corporation that had its principal place of
business in the County of Los Angeles, California. (A-188, ¶ 2; see also A-56, ¶ 18.)
GHC neither owns nor leases any property in the state of New York. (A-188,
¶ 2.) It has no physical presence in New York. (Id.) GHC has no offices in New York
and does not employ anyone who works or resides in New York. (Id.) In fact, GHC
has no employees at all. (Id.) GHC does not have any bank accounts or telephone
numbers in New York state. (Id.) GHC is not a registered New York entity of any
type, and it has never sought to become registered in New York. (Id.) GHC has not
advertised, solicited, or engaged in any form of business in New York. (Id.) Put
simply, GHC has no presence of any kind in New York. (Id.)
III. Third Party Harassment of Appellant
In this action, Appellant alleges that his ex-boyfriend harassed him by
impersonating him through phony accounts the ex-boyfriend created on the Grindr
App. (A-54, ¶ 5; A-65, ¶ 49.) Appellant further alleges that unwanted visitors came
to his home and work in response to invitations that his ex-boyfriend extended using
the phony accounts. (A-65–69, ¶¶ 49–50, 54, 63.)
1 GHC has since sold its interests in Grindr and is no longer a member of Grindr.
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page10 of 28
5
Appellant blames Grindr, GHC, and KL Grindr (collectively, “Appellees”)
for his ex-boyfriend’s alleged acts. (A-69, ¶ 66.) He alleges that Grindr was not
sufficiently responsive to his complaints and that the Grindr App. does not employ
sufficient technology to prevent misuse. (A-54, ¶ 7; A-61, ¶ 38; A-64, ¶ 44; A-70–
74, ¶¶ 67, 79, 83–86.) Appellant, however, does not make any specific allegations
of misconduct as to GHC. Indeed, the only allegations that Appellant specifically
makes as to GHC is that GHC (i) is a member of Grindr; and (ii) is “incorporated
under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in California.” (A-
56, ¶¶ 16, 18.)
IV. Appellant’s Jurisdictional Allegations
Appellant alleges in conclusory fashion that Appellees, collectively, are
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York. (A-56,
¶ 19.) He fails to plead any facts supporting personal jurisdiction over GHC and
alleges no facts that GHC has contacts of any kind with New York.
V. Procedural History
On January 27, 2017, Appellant commenced this action against Grindr in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County. (A-9–40.) Upon
Appellant’s application, Justice Kathryn Freed entered an Ex Parte Order to Show
Cause and temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (A-41–42.)
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page11 of 28
6
On February 8, 2017, Grindr timely removed the action to the District Court,
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.)
On February 22, 2017, the District Court held a hearing on Appellant’s
application to extend the TRO. (A-43.) At that hearing, Grindr’s counsel informed
the District Court that Grindr rigorously worked to try to stop the alleged
impersonation by conducting daily searches for accounts that might have been
created by Appellant’s ex-boyfriend. (A-149–53.) By conducting searches based on
email addresses, phone numbers, and street addresses, Grindr was able to identify
and delete numerous accounts. (Id.) By order dated and filed February 24, 2017, the
District Court denied extension of the TRO. (A-43–52.)
On March 31, 2017, Appellant filed his Amended Complaint (the “FAC”),
adding GHC and KL Grindr as defendants.2 (A-53–95.)
On April 21, 2017, Grindr moved to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that all of the claims were barred by
Section 230 and that they were improperly pleaded. (A-96–97.) GHC joined
Grindr’s motion and additionally sought dismissal on the grounds that: (i) the
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it; (ii) it could not be liable based
2 KL Grindr and Grindr Holding Co. were, at the time of the Complaint, Grindr’s two corporate members. For no articulated reason, the FAC attempts to extend Appellant’s claims against Grindr to these members. Appellant simply groups the three separate entities—along with the Grindr App.—into a single defined term. (See A-53.)
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page12 of 28
7
solely on its status as a member of Grindr; and (iii) Appellant impermissibly engaged
in group pleading. (A-186; ECF No. 60.)
By Decision and Order dated and filed January 25, 2018, the District Court
properly dismissed Appellant’s FAC with prejudice.3 (A-190-218.)
3 The District Court’s finding that each of Appellant’s claims was subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) did not address GHC’s other bases for dismissal of the FAC. Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the District Court’s decision for any reason supported by the record. Latner, 879 F.3d at 54.
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page13 of 28
8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant seeks to hold Appellees responsible for the acts of his estranged ex-
boyfriend. To that end, Appellant asserts fourteen claims against Appellees,
including claims for products liability, negligent design, negligence, copyright
infringement, promissory estoppel, fraud, deceptive business practices, false
advertising, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent misrepresentation.
The District Court found that Section 230 barred Appellant’s claims for defect
in design, defect in manufacture, defect in warning, negligent design, failure to warn
or to provide adequate instruction, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. It further found that Appellant
failed to plead plausible claims for fraud, promissory estoppel, negligent
misrepresentation, and deceptive practices and false advertising under New York
General Business Law. For the reasons identified in Grindr’s and KL Grindr’s joint
Opposition Brief, which GHC hereby joins, the Court should affirm the District
Court’s order dismissing all of Appellant’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Court may affirm dismissal of Appellant’s claims as to GHC for the
additional reasons that (1) the District Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GHC;
(2) GHC cannot be held liable for Grindr’s alleged actions as a matter of law; (3) the
FAC lacks the basic level of specificity mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page14 of 28
9
8(a); and (4) the FAC falls short of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s
heightened pleading standard.
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10
ARGUMENT
I. GRINDR HOLDING COMPANY IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE DISTRICT COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION
For a court to lawfully exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, three
primary requirements must be satisfied. First, “service of process upon the defendant
must have been procedurally proper.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank,
SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012). Second, “there must be a statutory basis for
personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective.” Id. Third, “the
exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process
principles.” Id. at 60. The allegations in the FAC do not establish the second or third
requirements for the District Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over GHC.4
A. The Court Should Affirm Dismissal Because the District Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Under New York Law
A district court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant that would be
subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the
district court is located. Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir.
1998). In a diversity case such as this, district courts look to the law of the state in
which it sits to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction. Bank Brussels
Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999).
4 Although the District Court did not address the issue of personal jurisdiction, it noted the FAC contained no factual allegations against KL Grindr or GHC, and that Appellant appeared to acknowledge he engaged in group pleading. (A-196 n.5.)
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page16 of 28
11
A defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in New York if it is domiciled
in New York, served with process in New York, or continuously and systematically
does business in New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301. As clarified by the Supreme
Court, an entity is subject to general jurisdiction only in those places where it is “at
home,” which is generally limited to the entity’s state of incorporation or principal
place of business. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–39 & n.19 (2014).
Alternatively, a defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction under New
York’s long-arm statute if it engages in the following acts and such acts relate to an
asserted claim: (1) transacts business within the state or contracts to supply goods or
services in the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state; (3) commits a tortious
act outside the state but injures a person or property in the state; or (4) owns, uses,
or possesses any real property in the state. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). As recently
underscored by the Supreme Court, in order for a state to exercise specific
jurisdiction, the suit must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco
Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). When there is no such connection, “specific
jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities
in the state.” Id.; see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (holding that, for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over
a claim, there must be an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page17 of 28
12
controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum);
id. at 931 n.6 (“[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify
the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.”).
The FAC lacks factual allegations sufficient to give rise to personal
jurisdiction over GHC under New York law. As a preliminary matter, Appellant does
not even allege that jurisdiction is proper under any New York statute. But even if
Appellant had identified a theory of personal jurisdiction under New York law, the
FAC’s allegations are still inadequate because the FAC simply declares that
“Defendants are subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Southern District of New
York,” (A-56, ¶ 19), but Appellant pleads no facts to support this bald conclusion.
First, there is no general jurisdiction over GHC under New York C.P.L.R.
§ 301 because Appellant does not allege, as he must, that GHC is domiciled in New
York, was served with process in New York, or does business in New York. To the
contrary, the FAC admits that GHC “is . . . incorporated under the laws of Delaware
and has its principal place of business in California.” (A-56, ¶ 18.) Further,
Appellant served GHC with process in Delaware, not New York. (ECF No. 39.)
Finally, GHC does not do business in New York nor does it have a physical or
business presence in New York of any kind. (A-188, ¶ 2.)
Second, Appellant does not allege facts sufficient for the District Court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over GHC under New York’s long-arm statute. The
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page18 of 28
13
FAC does not allege that GHC or one of its agents conducted any business in New
York. It also fails to allege that GHC or one of its agents committed any tortious
conduct in New York or giving rise to injury in New York. Most importantly, it does
not allege any relation between GHC’s ostensible New York contacts and the claims
at issue here. As set forth above, Appellant cannot do so because GHC has no
presence of any kind in New York. (See A-188, ¶ 2.)
B. The Court Should Affirm Dismissal Because the District Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Under the Due Process Clause
The due process requirement for personal jurisdiction protects an entity
without meaningful ties to the forum state from being subjected to binding
judgments within its jurisdiction. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84
F.3d 560, 567–68 (2d Cir. 1996). There are two aspects of the due process analysis:
(1) the minimum contacts inquiry, and (2) the reasonableness inquiry. Chloe v.
Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2010).
In determining whether minimum contacts exist, courts must examine the
“quality and nature” of the contacts under a totality of circumstances test, to
determine whether the defendant has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws . . . such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d
Cir. 2007). At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff needs to make a prima facie
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page19 of 28
14
showing of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Penguin Grp. (USA), Inc. v.
Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2010). “Such a showing entails making
legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction, including an averment of facts that, if
credited, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Penguin, 609
F.3d at 35 (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted).
The District Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over GHC consistent
with GHC’s due process rights because Appellant has not alleged that GHC has
contacts of any kind with the state of New York. Appellant alleges only that “Grindr
Holding Company is . . . incorporated under the law of Delaware and has its
principal place of business in California.” (A-56, ¶ 18.) Such non-specific
jurisdictional allegations are fatal to Appellant’s FAC.
Moreover, GHC’s ownership interest in Grindr is insufficient as a matter of
law to give rise to personal jurisdiction consistent with principles of due process. See
NovelAire Techs., L.L.C. v. Munters AB, No. 13 Civ. 472 (CM), 2013 WL 6182938,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) (holding that an ownership interest in a corporation
is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional standards of minimal contacts).
Because Appellant has not alleged that GHC has any contacts with New York,
the District Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GHC and the Court should affirm
the dismissal of Appellant’s claims as to GHC.
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page20 of 28
15
II. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
A. Grindr Holding Company Cannot Be Held Liable for Grindr’s Actions as a Matter of Law
The Court should affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the FAC as to GHC
because Appellant seeks to hold GHC liable for the alleged acts and omissions of
Grindr based solely on GHC’s status as an LLC member. But GHC’s status as a
member of Grindr is insufficient to plead claims against GHC as a matter of law.
Because Grindr is a California limited liability company, (A-56, ¶ 15),
California law governs whether GHC may be held liable for Grindr’s acts. See, e.g.,
Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (1995) (“[U]nder New York choice of law
principles, ‘[t]he law of the state of incorporation determines when the corporate
form will be disregarded[.]’”); Ellison v. Clos-ette Too, LLC, 2014 WL 5002099
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014) (holding that “[t]his [choice of law] principle applies to
LLCs as well as corporations.”). California follows the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, which precludes a member of an LLC from being held liable
for the acts of the LLC: “[T]he “debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a limited
liability company . . . do not become the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a
member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or manager
acting as a manager for the limited liability company.” Cal. Corp. Code § 17703.04;
see also see also CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. Terra Nostra Consultants, 230 Cal. App.
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page21 of 28
16
4th 405, 411 (2014) (“[M]embers of a limited liability company are not liable for the
‘debts, obligations, or other liabilities’ of the limited liability company.”).
There is a limited exception where the member is the alter ego of the LLC.
Here, however, Appellant does not allege alter ego in the FAC, much less plead facts
sufficient to state such a theory as to GHC. Accordingly, the FAC should be
dismissed as to GHC. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Ali, 34 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1040 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (granting motion to dismiss because “[c]onclusory allegations of ‘alter ego’
status are insufficient to state a claim”).
B. The First Amended Complaint Lacks the Basic Level of Specificity Mandated by Rule 8(a)
Because he cannot allege any wrongdoing by GHC, Appellant attempts to
plead his claims by lumping the Appellees together and seeing what sticks. As this
Court has held, however, this type of group pleading is improper. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 8(a) requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each
defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it
rests.” Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d. Cir. 1961). It does
not permit a plaintiff to merely “lump [ ] all the defendants together in each claim
and provid[e] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.” Atuahene v. City of
Hartford, 10 Fed. Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001). Where a plaintiff names multiple
defendants, it must provide a plausible factual basis to distinguish between the
conduct of each of the defendants.
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page22 of 28
17
The FAC does not contain a single allegation of misconduct or wrongdoing
that is specific to GHC. Appellant relies instead on vague allegations about the
supposed acts of “Grindr,” which the FAC defines to include all of the Appellees as
a group. (A-53, ¶ 1 (defining term “Grindr” to include Grindr LLC, KL Grindr
Holdings, Inc., and GHC).) This Court has rejected the practice of pleading claims
by lumping defendants together. See, e.g., Atuahene, 10 Fed. Appx. at 34 (affirming
district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss where the complaint “failed to
differentiate among the defendants, alleging instead violations by ‘the defendants’”).
Because Appellant only provides blanket allegations of the Appellees’ misconduct,
GHC is left guessing as to which allegations apply to it, or to one of the other
Appellees. The Court should therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of
Appellant’s claims as to GHC
C. The First Amended Complaint Lacks the Heightened Specificity Required by Rule 9(b)
Under Rule 9(b), complaints alleging fraud must satisfy heightened pleading
requirements. The complaint must “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff
contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the
statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent,” to
survive a motion to dismiss. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2004).5
5 Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement applies to Appellant’s claims for
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page23 of 28
18
In a complaint against multiple defendants, such specificity is even more important.
DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987)
(“Where multiple defendants are asked to respond to allegations of fraud, the
complaint should inform each defendant of the nature of his alleged participation in
the fraud.”). Thus, just like Rule 8(a), Rule 9(b) prohibits plaintiffs from pleading
fraud claims that impute “guilt by association” by lumping together the acts of
multiple defendants. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Blanford,
794 F.3d 297, 304 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Bare allegations that an
individual or entity is somehow affiliated with fraudulent acts of a collective is not
enough to satisfy Rule 9(b). Angermeir v. Cohen, 14 F.Supp.3d 134, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
The FAC does not contain any allegations of GHC’s specific role in any
alleged deception or fraud. Appellant again relies on blanket allegations about the
acts of “Defendants” and “Grindr,” both of which are defined to include all
defendants as a group. Because Appellant provides only allegations as to what
“Grindr” and “Defendants” allegedly did, GHC is left guessing which of Appellant’s
allegations – if any – apply to GHC. Such group pleading is improper. See, e.g.,
fraud (Ninth Cause of Action) and negligent misrepresentation (Fourteenth Cause of Action), which sounds in fraud. Schwartzco Enters. LLC v. TMH Mgmt., LLC, 60 F.Supp.3d 331, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page24 of 28
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Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that allegations that
referred to misrepresentations by “Defendants” were deficient under Rule 9(b)).
The Court should affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation as to GHC because Appellant has not
pleaded with specificity that GHC played any role in the alleged actions underlying
his fraud claims.
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CONCLUSION
Appellee GHC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court’s
Order dismissing Appellant’s FAC in full.
Dated: August 23, 2018 Respectfully submitted, HUESTON HENNIGAN LLP
By: /s/ Moez Kaba Moez M. Kaba Allison Libeu Jonathan D. Guynn 523 West 6th Street, Suite 400 Los Angeles, CA 90014 T: (213) 788-4340 F: (818) 775-0898 Attorneys for Appellee Grindr Holding Company [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This document complies with the type-volume limit of 14,000 words of Local
Rule 32.1(a)(4) of the Local Rules and Internal Operating Procedures of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit because, excluding the parts of the document
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f), this document contains 4,646 words. This
document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and
the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this document has
been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14
point Times New Roman.
DATED: August 23, 2018 By: /s/ Moez M. Kaba
Moez M. Kaba
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Counsel for Appellee Grindr Holding Company certifies that on August 23,
2018, a copy of the attached Brief was filed with the Clerk through the Court’s
electronic filing system. In addition, I certify that copies of the above Brief is
being sent, via third-party commercial carrier for delivery overnight, to the Clerk.
I certify that all parties required to be served have been served.
DATED: August 23, 2018 HUESTON HENNIGAN LLP
By: /s/ Moez M. Kaba Attorneys for Appellee Grindr Holding Company
Case 18-396, Document 110, 08/23/2018, 2374850, Page28 of 28