Egypt - U.S. Relations in a New Era

Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for American Studies and Research (CASAR) of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo, in cooperation with the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University, and The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution held a two-day workshop on May 7 and 8, 2014 on the Egypt-US bilateral relationships in the political, military, and economic spheres. A group of diplomats and researchers from universities and research centers, in addition to private sector representatives participated in this symposium. The symposium consisted of seven sessions and each session addressed a main topic and was followed by a discussion.

Introduction

The workshop comes as the second phase after the previous one that was held in 2013 on the challenges, future prospects, and foundations for Egyptian-American relations after the January 25, 2011 revolution.

First Session: RESPONDING TO NEW DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES

This session contextualized relations between the two countries within a changing political and economic world order. Three papers were presented in this session. The papers addressed the domestic and global challenges that face the Egyptian-American relationship especially after June 30, 2014 and also the stress in the relationship that is due to the changes in global politics and US foreign policy. The first paper represented the US point of view while the two other papers represented the Egyptian’s perspective.

The first paper tackled the significant transitional moment for the US in the Middle East in many dimensions which were demonstrated into four aspects:

*First in the military dimension where the US after a long period of historically very intensive military presence in the Middle East, starting with the First Gulf war and involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US now is winding down those military engagements in the region and shifting the nature of its efforts to combat terrorism.

*Second the change in global energy from both the production and consumption sides. Many people in the US are talking about energy independence. It is true that the revolution in shale gas has changed the nature of the US’ energy landscape. But also have new discoveries in Eastern Med and new production in Africa and changes in demands from this region. The economy of the US is tightly connected to that of Europe and East Asia so, the US still has and will continue to have a keen interest in the free flow of energy from this region to the global market. And yet American talk about energy independence is having an effect on domestic debates on the US about its foreign policy and its role in the region.

*Third dimension is the domestic US politics. The American publics are very reluctant in that particular time to engage in foreign affairs. There is a general reluctance to see the US invest in other parts of the world whether it is economically, diplomatically, or militarily. This attitude was

clear in the abbreviated debate over the potential for a military strike in Syria last year besides other issues. This affects American foreign policy and it also affects America’s ability to provide foreign assistance to cooperate with other countries in joint initiatives. This combined with the economic challenges that the US is facing since 2008, which also affected the global economy, all put constraints on the US foreign policy.

*The fourth dimension is the political earthquake in the Middle East. The changes that are taking place are the results of long building societal, economic, demographic trends. Such changes are very deep and their results are not determined yet. In the face of major political re-alignment underway in the Middle East and the loss of long time partners in addition to the emergence of a strong sectarian narrative in the region’s politics, with also divergences amongst US allies in the region. All these uncertainties put the US in a very difficult position as it seeks to determine its own strategic posture in this region. The tensions today in the American relations in the Middle East are not just related to differences in approach on a specific issue, but they are broader and they are the results of deeper changes in global and regional politics and also politics in the US. The regional governments are seeking greater American engagement, but the different governments in the region do not agree amongst themselves what they want from the US. There is no consensus in the Middle East or the US, on the question of how to acquire a kind of stability back into the region. In 2011 President Obama said that the stability will not return to the region until the governments start real reform. If we look at President’s Obama’s approach to this region, we can see some define priorities that can be described as very narrow security-driven priorities which represent a core commitment to remain engaged in the Middle East such as fighting terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protecting the free flow of energy to the global market and protecting the security balance. Also it seems that the American administration is committed to a focus on the diplomatic tool as a means to advance these interests as well as using multilateral diplomatic efforts in a number of cases. If these diplomatic efforts failed in cases such as the peace process, Syria, or Iran, the question will be where the US policy will go from this point forward.

The second paper tackled the deep changes in the global order and the decline of the US power. The US-Egyptian relationship is conditioned by the nature of the international system under which such policies are conducted. During the 1950s till late 1980s, the two countries dealt with each other within a bipolar system where the international system was dominated by two powers: the US and the Soviet Union. Third parties would get what they needed from one power or the other, case in point is the building of the High Dam in Egypt. This bipolar system was replaced by a uni-polar system or the period of American hegemony which started with the campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Countries like Egypt could not find an alternative to the US. This continued also under President George W. Bush, who sent troops also to Iraq and Afghanistan. This period of American hegemony has ended. What we witness now is the beginning of a new global order; a multi-polar system. The important features of this new order are the rise of new powers in Asia and Latin America accompanied by a decline in US power. The US remains the dominant power in some areas but the US dominance of the world economy has ended. In a few years time, China will be the largest economy in the world. The US administration itself recognized these changes in international economy, so when the international financial crisis erupted President Bush

invited these new powers in the G. 20 in order to find a way out of this crisis. In fact this crisis would have disastrous effects but for the existence of such economies in Asia and Latin America. US leaders have recognized the emergence of new global order and reacted to it. There is a limit to the power the US used to exercise before not only in the economic field, but also in politics. President Obama, unlike President Bush, is reluctant to use military force in dealing with any outside challenges. In Syria, for example, when President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons in the fight against armed troops, President Obama considered this act a “red line” that should not be crossed. However, Obama was happy by the Russian proposal which allows the Syrian government to get rid of its stock of chemical weapons and he welcomed that act as an excuse not to send American troops to Syria. Also in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program, although Israel, in addition to neo conservative groups in the US, are for using military force in order to put an end to the Iranian nuclear program. President Obama prefers a diplomatic solution so he is working with permanent members of the Security Council in addition to Germany to finish a deal that would enable Iran to maintain a certain capacity to enrich uranium.

The US recognizes the change in global order and it tries to slow down the emergence of this new order. For example although the US declared its support in principle for the reform of the Security Council, it avoided any commitment to support the demands of both Japan and Germany to become permanent members of the council. Simultaneously it supported India hoping that India would balance a growing Chinese influence in the Asian continent.

The US now does not abide by the international norms followed by all countries; it claims both exceptionalism and exemptionalism. The US claims that it should be exempted from adherence to such norms such as the International Criminal Court, or the Kyoto Protocol on limiting carbon oxide emission. Such measures are also taken to slow down the emergence of a new global order. The question now is how middle powers could react to this system. The middle powers have a bigger degree of freedom to conduct their own interests. They find it better for them to change their alliances from time to time.

Economically speaking, these countries find now that the US is not able to be the main source of economic assistance they can find alternatives in other powers and they can even find models to be emulated. With all these changes in the international system and the rise of new global order a country like Egypt found it easy to dispense with the US economic assistant by getting financial support from Gulf countries and China. Also in the military field Egypt could get its needs from Russia.

The rise of this new global order gives more freedom to the middle powers to seek the kind of relations that would benefit their national interests.

The third paper looked at the future of the US-Egypt relationship and the way Egypt sees the future of the relationship. In the last 40 years both sides derived very concrete and substantial degree in most aspects of their relationship. Equally the success of the relationship depended on understanding that broader more ambitious objectives and demands from the other side were difficult to meet. For example, Egypt would like to see the US play a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the US, in its turn, would like to have more access to military facilities in Egypt. It

is also true that we are coming into a time where the 40 year bracket in the relationship is coming to a close and the future relationship will be different in many ways from the past. The paper also argued that this is an opportunity to reset the relationship within the global and regional environment and also bring new consensus and recognition of some new drivers in the relationship. One of those new drivers in Egypt is the media and the important part it plays in the political debate. Also the triangulation in the various relationships is also different; for example Saudi Arabia is discussing with the US the US-Egyptian relationship.

The paper also approached the current debate in the region about global changes. For some time now there has been that apprehension in the region that the US and Russia try to move towards a co-management of the region; the competitive element of the US and Russia is coming back especially after the situation in Ukraine. Occurrences such as Geneva 2, chemical weapons in Syria, Iran agreement to nuclear talks all indicate a movement towards an attempt to co-manage the region. Perhaps with the coming back of this competition, this will give space for the middle powers to, not necessarily replay the old cold war game and reposition themselves and derive things from both sides, but some of that is in the air.

The paper showed some trends that are taking place in the present: Recently the US role in the Middle East is retreating because of a development of a certain image and attitude in Washington may be the Middle East and Egypt are not as important as they used to be to the US. The US is seen now as a power that is abandoning the region. We are also moving towards a different modality as far as the western aggressive and upfront interventions in the region are concerned.

There is a debate inside the region about the different regional events. The Arab Spring wave has run its course in both its horizontal expansion and in terms of its impact on the shift, the reform process, the movement towards democratization even that have been arrested and in some cases reversed. Also the wave of political Islam is deeply influenced by the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and that will also have a regional impact. That narrative belongs to the past. If political Islam is going to have any role in the future; it will be a very different one from what we saw.

There is also the relationship between the Middle East system and the Arab system. The Middle East system is the non-Arab states (Iran, Turkey, and Israel). At some point there was a feeling that these particular countries are going to play a more important role in the region, now the impression is that these countries are actually searching for a role.

The scenario of Syria has been changing from the early expectations towards a more protracted conflict that is expected to continue for another five or ten years. This change is in terms of the alliance of powers in the region, the relationships with the outside world, the relationship with Turkey. The moment has come when this situation has to be handled differently possibly with a need to deal with the Syrian regime.

Another change is the coming of the Gulf countries to center stage as movers and shapers in the region. However, they are unable to claim a full leadership role in the sense of directing and shaping future roles. They are able to shore up the royal regimes in Morocco and Jordan, and protecting

them from the wave of the Arab Spring. They are able to support a country like Egypt in the short term. But in the course of defining the strategic course and of leading the region they are still challenged to do that.

Another trend is the sense of frustration, which is perhaps related to the unfulfilled role of the Gulf countries, it is a frustration with the way the global system is dealing with the region.

Also there is the Egyptian-Russian arms agreement.

For the future US-Egypt relationships, there are 3-4 models or what is called the Pakistani model in which the relationship continues in a high state of ambiguity. It becomes more about managing differences rather than working on finding common ground. To some extent this is where we stand now.

The second possibility is that the US cuts its losses, wise down the military aid, and Egypt expands the diversification in the militarily sources and in other strategic venues. There would be a continuation of cooperation and some of that is taking place as well.

The third scenario is for Egypt to clarify its strategic objectives.

The discussion that followed presented different points of views on how Egypt and the US perceive their regional role in the coming period. The following are the opinions expressed in the discussions that took place among the participants.

– It is understandable that in the last 3 years Egypt and the Egyptian people have been internally focused, but a large part of the value the US-Egyptian partnership has been about are regional and international issues. Egypt as a partner with the US in managing regional order not just regional security. In terms of the Asian pivot, we have to reassess talking about trade offices among the region when we talk about a US role in global affair. From the logic of the Obama administration, they see not only that economic opportunities in Asia are greater than other regions in the world, but also they see that East Asia is the place in the world where the global norms and frameworks that the US helps to create and that have sustained the US hegemony for such a long period, East Asia is where those norms and frameworks face the greatest challenge and so they would stand their fall on how China’s rise is managed and what is the future of trading regimes are in East Asia and so on. Those norms and frameworks are challenged not only in East Asia, but also in the heart of Iraq. What happened in Ukraine is what some describe as the end of the post Cold war era because this is a moment when Russia decided to revise international boundaries that were a matter of consensus among the post Soviet states. The transgression of that norm is a fundamental challenge to international order and to the system that the US sees itself at and benefiting from. It is not useful any longer to talk about Asia versus Europe or Middle East but to talk about the American strategy and how to sustain those international norms related to sovereignty and state order but also related to the core of America’s predominance in global affairs which are open society and open market. The question will be how to preserve it not in East Asia but everywhere.

– Ex Field Marshal al-Sisi in his debate talked about Egypt defending Arab national security not just its own security. Also in the case of Hamden Sabahi, the other candidate of the presidential elections, in case he becomes president he would like to pursue something that comes close to Nasser’s policy in the region. I believe he will respect the international agreements signed by Egypt, but he may also start relations with Hezb Allah and Iran and there also may be a sort of reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Sisi may pursue a course similar to that of Mubarak’s; also the issue of fighting terrorism will be a priority in his agenda. The international norms that the US helped to establish for example the non-proliferation of nuclear weapon treaty actually became possible because of the role of the US. But when the US signed with India an agreement to enable India to further develop its nuclear capacity that was considered a violation of this treaty in the sense that India did not sign this treaty, yet the US is helping it to develop its nuclear capacity. Also, the US is silent about Israel’s nuclear weapons in the region so, the US is abandoning its role in the international system now.

– The American domination has to do with the question of a new US in the global order. Somehow, there is an in-textual ability that American policy and presence in this region will continue to decline for years to come. I wonder if this is the consensus opinion of the present administration, which could be reversed in a moment, with policy decisions of a future administration.

– I think the reluctance of president Obama to send American troops abroad is not a personal preference, but there are problems with the American economy, and also there are economic difficulties associated with the presence of American troops abroad. Also the American public opinion is opposed to sending American troops abroad. The use of military power is not always the best way for the US to promote its national interests. There is a shift in the American public opinion as far as military intervention abroad is concerned. When President Bush wanted to persuade the public opinion of invading Iraq, he used lies about Iraq’s military strength. I think that the American public has become more aware of this sort of manipulation. So, I doubt very much that the American public would support any sort of adventurous foreign policy. In spite of the economic rise of other countries like China, India, Brazil, and Mexico, US still maintains its soft power; i.e. its diplomatic missions, its cultural influence, and strategic achievements through which the US can achieve hegemony.

– After spending so much time and money not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but for over the last 60 or 70 years to protect America, we are finally feeling it is time to pay attention to problems at home: health care, social security, and infra structure. In hearing al-Sisi recent interview, I got the sense that he believes that the course for Egypt is to focus domestically. For the Gulf countries that offer a lot of assistance to Egypt this is the course to go; and to be tough with The Muslim Brotherhood,

– Egypt will continue for a while to be domestic in focus especially after 2011 and a very involved public opinion. The challenge here that this public opinion right now is not very supportive of a US-Egypt healthy relationship. We need to raise awareness of the public where national interest lies. Egypt will have to deal with the internal economic situation but the Egyptian regional role will continue to be pivotal. The gulf aid that poured into Egypt after 2013 is a testimonial to the expectations of the Arab countries of a very strong Egyptian leadership. The

perception of Egypt of its regional role is a leadership role. Egypt will need the support of both the Arab countries and the US to get out of the current bumpy transition. This will also provide an opportunity to correct the basis of the relationship between the two countries that has been on going for the last 30 years.

– I strongly believe that the American declining role in the region should be reversed. When we compare between how president Obama was received after his speech in Cairo University and how he is now. The situation now is not only possible to reverse, in fact it should be reversed. Now is the opportunity to rebuild the US-Egypt relationship, we have to reshape, reframe, and reform the relationship because we cannot go on with the past’s standards. In order to rebuild new relationships, we have to take into consideration what is happening in the region and the world including the US.Among those points we should be considering in our rebuilding of the relationship that in the Middle East we are approaching a new era where the people have become an important factor in deciding the political situation and this is what we mean by democracy. This is an era of the people and this has to be taken into consideration by both countries.Also we have to clean the house. There is a huge misunderstanding between Egypt and the US regarding how the relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood will continue. The Egyptian people, not the government, cannot yet understand the nature of the relation between the US administration and the Muslim Brotherhood and also the US administration cannot appreciate how the Egyptian people are now suffering from terrorism. Although we find now that the US administration’s situation is evolving in a way that reflects that there is a revision of accounts, nevertheless this misunderstanding has to be cleared.Another point is that the region is approaching now a new era with new rules. I don’t believe much that the US role is declining. We are also approaching a new era of civil society but the relationship between civil society and the government in Egypt is unhealthy. But civil society has huge power with almost 35,000 organizations that have impact regionally as well. Non-state actors and terrorism are also among the new factors that affect the two countries relationship. So we should come to a gathered parameter of how we can start building a relationship.

– I will go back to the slogan of the revolution “bread, freedom, social justice, and the human dignity.” Human dignity is somehow omitted from the slogan, but to the Egyptians it is extremely important. There are two facts related to this; the first fact is that the US and the West could not predict what was going to happen in January 2011 and even in June 2013 and this is a sort of a message: if you cannot predict what was going to happen, then obviously you do not have a plan. Same in Libya and Syria. As far as Egypt-US relation is concerned: during the past 40 years since Sadat and then Mubarak changed their strategy and policy towards the US the Egyptians became just followers of these policies without any rights to object, now this has changed and we are in a different situation. I do not believe that the people will accept any decisions from the decision makers that will contradict with the human dignity. If we are talking about rebuilding or reforming the Egypt-US relation, we need to be very careful about this element.

The second fact, is that for the last 40 years the Muslim Brotherhood were colliding with the government, now they are colliding with the public so we have to perceive them in a different way because we are in a different situation now.Policy makers are facing a very tough and complex situation whether in Egypt or the US we need to be aware of the demands of the public and also the question of the human dignity. Egyptian people are not rich but the only things that keep us going are our dignity and pride.

– In the field of international relations there is no permanent friendship and there is no permanent enmity but there are always permanent interests. Although Egypt is considered one of the US strongest allies in the region, yet this was not always the case. The relation has been always shaped by the global and regional conflicts and calculations and this makes the relationship fluctuates; during Nasser’s era there was tension and then friendship during Sadat’s and Mubarak’s. The US will continue to be engaged with its role in the Middle East because it simply cannot neglect its great interests in the area and in Egypt in particular. Despite the mutual interest in the future I believe that whichever direction Egypt will take the US will not have much leverage on any Egyptian ruler. Any new government will also be sensitive to any kind of outside meddling.

– There are global determinants of the policies of the US and also of Egypt. The relation is dialectical between regions and the global system; I cannot see how the major power can focus on East Asia and ignore Eastern Europe or other parts of the world in fact it has to act everywhere so you have Russia increasing its standing in the global system by taking a position on the Ukraine issue, it is important to see why there is a post cold war regime, who is responsible for that? Is it only Russia, the US, or the EU by forcing Russia taking this position? But Russia would cash in the Middle East the power it constructed in Central Eastern Europe. There is also a decline in the relative power of the US because in fact we are not in a bipolar world any longer it is rather a flat pyramid with the US on top, but with middle powers have more freedom. Egypt is not a middle power yet, but it could be in the future as it has a potential. The domestic situation in Egypt is in fact preventing it from playing this role. The regional role that Egypt played under Mubarak is not possible any longer because the region has changed. We agree about the domestic constraints on foreign relations, but those constraints can also be factors of safety and at the same time they would allow freedom to act with other actors. We are in a world in the process of change and this is the difficulty of formulating the foreign policy because of the very little constancy we have.

– In answering a question about the reasons the US still does not have an ambassador in Egypt, the US side answered that this is due to some bureaucratic hurtles, the Egyptians however believe that this is because of the US lack of approval of June 30.

– Egypt perception of its regional role: in 2011 there was no space in Egypt for a debate on Egypt’s foreign policy, but there has been another kind of debate that the outside world did not notice a sort of a national dialogue within a group that started a discussion about foreign policy and this debate carried on till end of 2012 on the newspapers in Egypt. This debate included this group’s views on the changes in the Middle East and the developments and changes in Egypt’s foreign policy. If you look at such debates the political parties were badly represented and had a very weak opinion to offer in the topic of foreign policy. Also, a lot of the content was a criticism of the Mubarak era that saw a regression in Egypt’s international role and

hoped towards energizing that role especially in Africa and also in the Arab world. That approach has some problems including its failure to read the new global landscape including its constraints and possibilities, in addition to holding a nostalgic view that wants to go back to Nasser’s era and the role of Egypt back then. It also does not analyze the structural changes in the region where there is a completely different set of issues on the regional agenda and also the distribution of power and that the hierarchy of states in the region has changed fundamentally so to recreate Egypt’s old role in the region would be unrealistic. There is also criticism for Egypt’s reluctance to play certain role; for example Egypt has refused to join the international force to fight the Somali pirating and this position is not understood: why Egypt with a medium size navy would not play a role in securing the entrance of the Red sea. Egypt now is challenged to come up with ideas and new readings that match this new global landscape.

– In the new global order, the medium powers will seek to have close relations with the dominant powers. However, they will not adapt to foreign policies and conform to super power. For example, in the case of Ukraine, some close countries to the US like India or Israel did not support the US position in Ukraine because of the large number of Jews from Russian origin in Israel. Israel is keen in maintaining sort of friendly relations with Russia. Egypt also under this new regional order will try to maintain close relations with the US while also acquire close relations with other powers. This new global order gives greater margin of maneuver and liberty to middle powers. Egypt will become a middle power once the stability is restored in Egypt as it has soft power, culture, and diplomatic leading role. Eventually it will restore the regional power of the Arab world, Middle East, and Africa.

– So many have pointed out the importance of Egypt’s foreign policy in the future and that it will be more influenced by the public opinion and demands of human dignity. From a US perspective if there is a desire to build a new foundation for this bilateral relationship, however, the US does not know where Egypt is going with its foreign policy or what kind of partnership is it going to be and hence some reluctance , trepidation and some questions from the US side.As for the skepticism in the public opinion about the engagement abroad, it is a reality that public opinion in the US wants the US to focus at home and leave the world on its own devices. A major determinant in that is the state of American economy; the other is this sense of threat that America proceed and whether it will lead to a kind of reversal of the American military presence in the region If we perceive new kinds of threats from this region directed towards American security.The problem that most of us see is the lack of positive and proactive agenda. We have a security driven agenda if we take the other things that we used to feel more strongly we held in common. The US positive agenda in Egypt and the Middle East will be rooted in security and fighting terrorism in the US own definition of security and terrorist threats. It will be more unilateral. If the desire in the region is to see a more American soft power it will be very helpful to see what is the vision here for positive American engagement. There is a great consensus

about continuing American cooperation in the level of security; but a lot of resentment to America’s soft power dimensions. I worry, from the American perspectives, that we don’t have a positive vision for our engagement in this region and if we do not develop that positive vision our policy in the Middle East will be driven only by security agenda. It will involve al-Qaeda; it might involve military cooperation and military engagement, or Special Forces. So, it might not be a very broad American agenda.

Second Session: MILITARY AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION

Two papers were presented in this session. The papers addressed the military and security Egyptian-American relationship especially after June 30, 2013. The first paper represented the US point of view while the other represented the Egyptian’s one. This session discussed military and security co-operation issues such as:

a. How the two countries view the future of their strategic and military relations with pragmatic frameworks for the way forward

b. Counterterrorism/Sinai

c. Intelligence cooperation

d. Arms/human trafficking across borders

For the last 40 years, the US maintained strong military relationship with Egypt for a number of reasons like preventing wars with Israel and also the importance of working with Egypt as an important military and diplomatic regional power that was clear in occasions such as the Iraqi war in the 1990s besides many other times. The training and orientation of the Egyptian army has also been important to both sides, and the mutual interest in countering terrorism. Even if Egypt is going into a transition right now, Egypt’s relative power has gone up and down over time,it is still critical for the US. Egypt’s geography and size make huge difference as well. There is a lot of confusion in Washington and in Cairo about the nature of the relationship and that has its impact in military-to-military ties. Part of this relationship is based on the Camp David formula which effectively is going stale; it has been going stale for more than a decade. Once the two sides are able to reestablish a mutual understanding as to why this relationship is important not just in the militarily side but politically as well to continue to have discussions and talks.

There are 4 options as far as military-to-military relationships are concerned:

1-A continuation of where we are today where the military-to-military relationship becomes a point of debate about internal Egyptian politics, government, and human rights. And this does not seem sustainable.

2 - A return to the past status quo. Governmental issue is one element but is not necessarily a priority instead it is about what is national security is to both nations.

3 - A new form of formulation based on discussion and constructive dialogue on how to avoid that the military-to-military relationship becomes a political football.

4 - What will happen if there is a profound change here? If for example Egypt decides to opt for a multiple sources for military hardware and training, and it decides not to grant, as preferential treatment, to US navy boats passage to Suez Canal which would cost the US a great deal of money.

To Washington now, Egypt does not have many options today so it has to continue to answer US criticism in order to get a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) it badly needs. One question here: does Egypt lack any leverage here? Or it lacks the ability to change cores.

The first paper discussed the future of the US-Egypt military-to-military relationship. The political context under which the military-to-military relationship exists is what is going through a state of flux. Right now the US feels more secure with friendly neighbors to the north and the south and it is going through a period where it is focusing internally rather than interferes with the rest of the world. This notion of America in a gated community is a dangerous thought. Because you may be inside a secured gated community, but outside that community is the city that has constant challenges. If you stayed inside that community to remain secure you are putting your head in the sand. Therefore engagement abroad, and not necessarily intervention abroad, will be in America’s own interest.

Inside Egypt the primary foundation of this engagement for many years has been the US-Egyptian military relationship. We need to maintain that relationship we had for 30 years before this region went into a significant amount of transition. Regardless of any reasons or factors, we have to get back to that status quo relationship with Egyptian military not because it gives America more influence and not because it puts Egypt under the hegemony of the US, but because it has been the best deal going on for both sides for many years. The foundation of this r0elationship is one of mutually beneficial interests for the two countries and no party in it is trying to control or dictate the other. The two countries have mutual interests. President Obama reasserted such principles at the September 2013 UN general Assembly as defending our friends, deterring our enemies, fighting terrorism, preventing the spread of mass destruction weapons, maintaining of global commons and access to strategic materials. Those are the US vital national interests extend worldwide. These are the goals of our countries vital interests. Specifically for Egypt that includes concerns about certain issues:

– A developing Iranian nuclear program.– Syria-based terrorists and extremists.– Threats along the Sinai border.– Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb.– Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, small arms and MANPADs.– Key strategic commons such as the Suez Canal.

The Camp David Accords were aimed at establishing a sense of stability between Egypt and Israel. But also the accords have been a strong basis for the US-Egyptian military relationship. It is simply in the bilateral interest of both Egypt and the US and it has proved its worth over the years. The

Camp David Accords over the years has resulted in absence of war and straighten the relationship between the two militaries of Egypt and the US. Egypt’s security matters to the US because it affects the US own security.

When having to testify every year against the senate that questions why do we have to pay to Egypt a military aid of 1.3 billion dollar a year with all such challenges and shortcomings, simply one will say that the US spent 10 billion dollar per month on the war on Iraq or Afghanistan.

At its core this relationship is beneficial for both sides. The aid is not about leverage or hegemony; it is about good pragmatic interests that benefit both countries.

The second paper started by positing that it will not focus on the negative aspects in the relationship between US and Egypt. The military relationship between the two countries was the strongest for so many years since the Camp David Accords. To understand such a relationship and to predict its future, we first have to understand Washington’s defensive strategy in the Middle East that supports Israel’s and its allies’ security, and combat terrorism. One of the basic principle in the military relationship between the US, Egypt, and Israel is that the US maintains a military qualitative supremacy of Israel and that the strong security relationships with the Arab countries, especially Egypt, are included not only in Washington’s strategic interests, but also in Israel’s security interests.

The military relationship between the US and Egypt are unique due to Egypt’s geo-strategic position, in addition to the US’ interests especially those that have to do with energy security, securing the oil sources, and maintaining Israel’s security. This explains the importance the US consecutive administrations show towards the cooperation with Egypt. It is natural that the US contrives to achieve its interests and to offer aids which began since the Camp David Accords and the peace agreement confirm that the aids are included within the frame of the accord. Therefore Washington is careful to maintain good and strong relationship with Egypt as long as Egypt does not cross any red lines. The military cooperation between the two countries is represented in many forms: purchasing weapons, the transfer of military technology, and joint military exercises. Since 1979 Egypt was the second largest recipient of aid after Israel now Egypt is ranked fifth in the US foreign aid budget after Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

The military aid is a sum of money that the US government use in making purchases on behalf of Egypt at the same standards the US applies on purchase for the US military from American suppliers. Egypt was allowed to keep parts of the aid that were not used in purchasing and depositing them in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York to use them later. The accumulation of these sums helped Egypt to negotiate the purchase of major weapons. This was allowed to both Egypt and Israel.

The military aid includes purchasing weapons, maintenance operations and supplying spare parts and there is another fund to combat terrorism. Part of the aid is for countering smuggling through tunnels in Sinai.

There is no specific number about the share of the American aid in the budget of the Egyptian army. However, some sources claim that it is about 30% from the total budget of military purchases.

Since 2008 there are pressures put on Egypt to restructure its army and to convince the Egyptian military to gradually start focusing on counter terrorism rather than traditional combat. They wanted the Egyptian army to become smaller in number and to change its ideology and pay less attention to strategic challenges and focus instead on countering terrorism and piracy.

The combat ideology defines the threats that face the country and its major enemy. The formulation of the Egyptian army was made accordingly and it still considers Israel to be the major enemy in spite of the peace agreement. There is a difference in view in this particular point; the US sees that with the peace agreement there is no need for the Egyptian army to be that big forgetting that Israel itself has reconstructed it southern front in the Israeli army that is facing Egypt. Israeli combat ideology still considers Egypt as an enemy in spite of the peace agreement. These pressures were in 2008 and 2010 but the former army chief refused and insisted that the army remains in its present status.

The US military aid could not change the Egyptian army structure. The air defense still depends on Russian weapons. Therefore, the military cooperation with Russia does not mean to replace the US but it is a necessity to maintain and upgrade the present weapons and also the manufacturing processes that started in that field.

The US is worried as a result of Egypt’s move towards Russia although Egypt started to diversify its weapon sources years ago with countries such as Germany and China. So these should not be seen as replacing the US.

The US sees us through American lens: it deals with Egypt according to American culture and customs. May be if it changed the way it looks to Egypt it will understand better. June 30 th focused on independence and refusing hegemony but at the same time the American hegemony and pressures started. The US saw what happened according to the American laws and not according to the Egyptian people’s demands.

The US uses double standards in dealing with Egypt. It opposed the oust of an elected president but when the same situation occurred in the Ukraine, the US accepted the people’s demands there and forgot about the standards it dealt with Egypt accordingly.

The pressures that the US put on Egypt are not in the best interest of the relationship between the two counties. If it is in the best interest of Egypt to restart a dialogue and resume the military relationship with the US, then Washington should realize that putting more pressure on Egypt will lead to forming a popular movement that refuses US hegemony. Such movement will urge the government to review the relationship.

There is no doubt that this military cooperation between the two countries in the past years benefited the Egyptian military, nevertheless the relationship needs to be reviewed. For example the military cooperation resulted in revealing the Egyptian military abilities to Israel. These aids still control the process of manufacturing some weapons in Egypt such as battle tanks because some of the components of the tank are manufactured in Egypt and the rest comes from the US and the US can either give or stop these components so the production would stop altogether. Also

other weapons are given to Egypt, but their maintenance and spare parts are related to the American concession.

The question is whether those years of military cooperation allowed Egypt to manufacture its own weapons. Another point is the public opinion in Egypt which after two revolutions is playing a big role in decision making; therefore the US has to realize that its pressures on Egypt will affect negatively the public’s opinion. And if such pressures continued, Egypt will find itself obliged to find other sources for weapons.

The following are the opinions expressed in the discussions that took place among the participants.

– A question about whether the US still wants the Egyptian army to focus more on its counter terrorism efforts as opposed to its classic heavy weapons tank approach.To what degree does the versification of sources of weapons (Russia, China) influence the US-Egyptian diplomatic relationship?Is the tripartite relation of supplying military supplies to Israel still an issue, can it be retrieved to create some kind of level of measurement of the flow of arms to the region? The 2-3 formula can it be superseded? Is it something that Washington cares about in the present time?Should the military relationship be developed in the future in a bilateral context or should it be looked upon in regional security arrangements? In the issue whether the strategic dialogue between Egypt and the US, there seems to be such a diversion of views on why Egypt needs military capacity, what are the potential threats, what are the theaters that these weapons are designed for?

– In answering those questions:The idea of focusing on counter terrorism remains as a policy in the military-to-military relationship. Counter terrorism cooperation is on the top of the US priorities. There is a diversion of opinions about the potential threats to Egypt. For the US the most challenges that face Egypt are terrorism and the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction than an invasion from Israel. This is why there is a mismatch in communication. We look at the challenges and the threats differently; there is no common agreement on the threats.The versification in the sources of weapons to Egypt is a big issue for the US when purchasing EF300 versus Patriot. From a regional threat stand point and as far as the Gulf security dialogue is concerned there is a regional anti missile defense system and that can be done only if there is a commonality in equipment, in intelligence sharing, and in weapon systems. It becomes more difficult when it is done with weapons being embraced by one country versus another. As for the triangulation with Israel: the military aid to Egypt is better understood within the framework of the Camp David Accords. It is better and easier to connect this military aid to Egypt by connecting it to military aid to Israel.

– If we want to establish a regional defense system in the Gulf the weapons and systems have to be from one source but this system will be against whom? The Iran-US talk now stirs worries in the Gulf and I don’t think that there will be that regional defense system in the Gulf because the potential enemy is almost a friend now. Egypt is also not included in that regional defense

system in the Gulf and therefore it is a must to look for versification for weaponry sources because we are not included in any defense system with other countries. There is no common agreement between the US and Egypt on the threats that face Egypt. There must be a return to a strategic dialogue between the two countries to approach different points of view. This strategic dialogue has stopped and this has led to a conflict. If the US sees that fighting terrorism in Sinai serves the national security of the US, Egypt and Israel, then the tripartite relationship is clear and permanent in this framework. The US should understand what the Egyptian army needs in order to become a modern army. These challenges and threats are increasing for Egypt; what is happening in Libya now is very serious and it threatens the regional security and stability. Therefore this recent US-Egyptian dialogue requires that the US reevaluates its position from the military aid and that the Egyptian army’s role does not become only to combat terrorism. The military American aid puts pressure on Egypt; as far as other sectors are concerned. Egypt and the US both profit from this aid, especially in the military maneuvers the US profits even more because it exercises war in foreign places. Egypt profits from the technology and military capacity of a superior power. These issues need an intensive strategic dialogue both political and military to get back these relationships to the correct course where both parties benefit.

– The US-Egypt relations since the 1950s have been hanging on the perception on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the Camp David Accords there was a kind of tranquilizing between Israel and Egypt. We tried to diversify our relations besides this Arab-Israeli conflict and the military-to-military relation was cooperative and functioning well. Now, however, the Americans do not understand that there are other issues that are threatening the Egyptian national security besides the Israeli conflict like for example the water issue. American strategy questions why Egypt needs a big army when the Israeli threat is diminished. The US tries to hinder cooperation with other sources like China, India, or Russia at the same time where Israel got 9 German submarines.

– This very long standing diversion of visions in terms of security challenges the Egyptian army faces and how the US military assistance and Egyptian military purchases can address those challenges, this is still a very important issue in our dialogue, but I wonder whether in the years to come will still see a diversion in security concept but on different grounds, may be less about the US pushing Sinai counter terrorism agenda while the Egyptian military focuses on the prospect of the military forces of Israel. Perhaps the diversion will be more about how to ensure a sustainable security. The American side wants a sustainable partnership with Egypt with a sustainable partner and that needs the US not only on the military dimension or the security threats that Egypt faces, but on the other dimensions of security threats as well. The US military has a hard-won experience on the last decade or so in the terms of the non-military aspects of countering terrorism and I wonder if this discussion will also include the mix of military and non-military means used to address security threats.The problem of water which is a perfect example because it is a core national interest for Egypt and in extremist perhaps Egypt might be willing to use military strength to ensure its access to fresh water. The question is not what kind of military equipments Egypt will need in case of a contingency with its southern neighbor but the question is how the US and Egypt work together to address water security. Same thing with Libya and border security. The question is

how to shift this debate beyond equipment, how we define security threats and how to meet them.

– There are a lot of conversions in use. In listening to the American side, we understand that the current relationship is the best so far and it is not about leverage and not about influence but the best interest of both countries, the Egyptian side said that leverage has a lot to do with the American attitude towards the desire of the Egyptian army to reach a certain level in equipments and training and even the ideology of the army as it used to be for many years, and now the American side wants it to be a smaller army only confined to fighting terrorism. How to make a positive agenda with the emerging of the public opinion as a very strong determinant or a challenge that faces the decision makers to take decisions that will serve the best of interest in both US and Egypt. If we want this relationship to continue, it cannot continue business as usual because Egypt has changed very much during the last 3 years.

– When the US puts pressure on Egypt through the military aid, the Egyptian public opinion will also press the government to refuse this military aid and military cooperation. If Egypt takes satisfactory steps in the Future Map and both the presidential and parliamentary elections took place a lot of obstacles in the US decision making will disappear and things will become clearer and there won’t be any needs to exercise pressure on Egypt using the military aid.

– The US-Egypt relationship needs to account for changes in the situation on the ground. I see the military aid provided to Egypt as an end in itself but primarily there is means to an end which is a foundation we can build on, we need to intensify our dialogue, which is not a strategic dialogue, but military-to-military dialogue. There are needs to widen the dialogue; taking to issues such as the water problem and other challenges in the relationship that go beyond military-to-military relationship. Without that foundational basis that the military-to-military relation has provided you with, you cannot get to the next step which is a more strategic dialogue between the two countries.

– Concerning counter terrorism, there are different concepts of the US and Egypt ; in a time when the Muslim Brotherhood escalating their terrorist attacks against police and army personnel, the US sees that terrorism is only in Sinai and not elsewhere and this is extremely disgusting to the Egyptian people especially that the US does not want to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group in addition to that the US demand of including the Muslim Brotherhood in the political scene will remain a serious irritant in the relation between the two countries.

– I often disagree with this administration in the US. My opinion in this area will come closer to yours and that’s why I am in difference with policy in the US.

– There is of course the Egyptian public opinion as a determinant for the relationship, but there is also the factor that affects military-to-military relation right now because the FMF is a targeting and a marker, also is the opinion in the US. Part of the problem is the image coming across; there are images, words and people who can very much construct a narrative that anyone can believe. The popular Egyptian narrative does not match the narrative that is coming across to Washington and this is a constraint on the relationship including the military relationship itself.

– We have people who fan the public opinion and I want to know what do you recommend so that we can make a shift in the public discourse towards a more constructive dialogue? Because there is a huge diversion between Egyptian minds and American minds; we want the US to see

the inside situation in Egypt through Egyptian lens, and also you want Egyptian people to look at American policy through American lens, so can you bridge this. This will be a challenge. Now we are going through presidential election and after that it will be the time for implementation: expectations are very high although there is an attempt from ex Field Marshall al-Sisi to bring the public opinion down to reality.

– Americans cannot change the Egyptian media or the way the different parties in the government or the different institutions try to stir up the public distrust against the US. It helps if people come from the US and held talks with Egyptian people and we also like to understand you. It will be strategically devastating if Egypt becomes at the center of a dispute between the US and Gulf States and will push it into the wrong position.

– Cyber challenges should be part of the dialogue that should occur between the two militaries because in the US, we see cyber threats as military threats not simply as commercial threats; they do not simply affect our bank accounts, but rather our battle field communications. Cyber threats needs to be defended against not react to because they could be devastating to commanding control networks or weapons systems. This part of the dialogue that should exist between the two militaries.

Session Three: DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL ISSUES

Three papers were presented in the session; the papers addressed Egyptian and American perspectives on issues of Egypt’s domestic political transition. These issues included: democratic transition, human rights (including minorities and women rights), freedom of association, and good governance.

The first paper discussed the place of human rights and democracy in the bilateral relations between the US and Egypt.

The paper mainly discussed the place of human rights and democracy in the bilateral relations between the US and Egypt. The paper posited that the US policy formulation process and substance in the region are determined through two main factors: Israel’s security and the unimpeded flow of oil. At the same time, the US foreign policy in the Middle East cannot be fully understood without resorting to the so-called secondary considerations which includes certain theoretical positions embraced by the US on democratization and human rights.

There are three main arguments:

First, promoting human rights and encouraging democratic transition are not merely instruments in US foreign policy, they are rather general drivers. In other words; this is not mere idealists or social dreams but they have general support from various circles including some realists who have respect for both democracy and human rights.

Second, although a driver of American policy, human rights and democratic values however are rather “weak” drivers and have a low priority in influencing financial investments or political investments that US administration invariably largely failed to make for various reasons. For three

years running the US administration failed to pass through congress a democracy fund of 500 million US$.

Third, this driver is directly related to strategic interests of the US in the region. For example; human rights violation in Egypt now is dramatic and unprecedented to say the least in terms of dealing with political oppositions, illegal detentions, or use of excessive force that led to the death of as many as 1000 of civilians after security forces used very disproportionate force against tens of thousands of protestors. Also some violations that the state is unwilling to check such as what happens to the Copts in Upper Egypt after the dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood sit–in in Cairo last year. All of this tends to strengthen the position of human rights in shaping the US foreign policy to Egypt, however, these violations largely by the state is counterbalanced by the significant US strategic interests and considerations that drives the US foreign policy. The terrorist threats in Sinai and pressures from some conservative governments especially Riyadh brought human rights concerns again to its lower status in comparison with the strategic considerations driving the US foreign policy.

The serious independent human rights organizations do not see these issues as exercising a strong influence by the US foreign policy. The US position from human rights and democratization is merely to serve other strategic interests in the region.

The US policy varied towards the countries of the Arab Spring; to Egypt the US reaction was diplomatic intervention and public statements, at the same time they used military intervention in Libya, and still we do not know about Syria.

When there is progress in Egypt when the goals of the revolution are fulfilled it will be because of the demands of Egyptians from inside. Democratization and human rights will take place in Egypt because of domestic pressure and needs. After all human rights in its broad view include social and economic reform and justice and this is what Egyptians have called for in January 2011: freedom, dignity, and social justice.

The second paper lay out several key dimensions of the domestic environment inside Egypt that present challenges for renewed US-Egyptian cooperation, and shed light on how those dimensions are viewed in Washington within the framework of US interests and policy goals.

The paper is based on the premise that the US has an overriding interest in Egypt’s stability. There is a wildly held view in Washington that Egypt’s current course is in fact destabilizing as opposed to one that would instill instability. In the past 3 years, almost all areas of change have been going into a negative direction whether you are looking at into institutional reform, economic prosperity, security, law, civil liberties, or civic freedom.

Some of the key points that are destabilizing are:

– Denial of basic freedoms and growing repression over the past 3 years: and this has increased sharply particularly in the last year. The repression does not only concern the Muslim Brotherhood but include any and all dissented voices in the public sphere, including Egyptian and foreign media, human rights activists, youth revolutionary groups, and leftists. The

discourse that has been promoted in the public sphere particularly by the media, both private and official media, has been especially unhelpful. This discourse equates any form of dissent with either treason or terrorism or both. All this restricts political space.

– The degraded state of government institutions: January 25 2011 showed that the Egyptian people have changed. But the governmental institutions have not kept pace with that change. This is a source of instability as well. There is now a very serious gap between the expectations of the public and the capacity of the state institutions. These institutions have not changed since 2011 they also have been under attack both literally and physically. Their capacities have degraded; this degradation has accelerated over the past 2 years. During the past 3 years we have not seen serious reform efforts neither under the SCAF nor the Mohamed Mursi’s presidency. We are even less likely to see those now with even more emphasis on issues of security, stability, and the preservation of the state.

– Political polarization and exclusion: examples of that sort of things that we are likely to see from unreformed institutions are the growing political polarization and the environment of exclusion that dominates the Egyptian politics and public discourse in general. It is rather impossible to separate this from the public repression.The original sin of this transition going back to 2011 is the inability and unwillingness of various political groups to come together and arrive to a national consensus or at least to engage in an exercise of a national consensus building that involves various constituencies not just political forces but all segments of society. We are actually exchanging one form of majority for another. Unpopular views of popular ideologies are still part of the society and excluding and even attempting to eradicate greatly help at destabilizing.

– Avoidance of tough economic decisions: The economic problems particularly the looming currency crisis, rising inflation, and ever-growing unemployment (particularly youth unemployment), threaten Egyptian stability. Under both the SCAF and the Mursi presidency there has been a reluctance to take difficult economic decisions. Such atmosphere is very discouraging to foreign and American investors. Also to hear the kind of rhetoric that is common now in the Egyptian media which is highly xenophobic and anti-American that gives a message that foreigners are not welcome which affects the potential investors.

In conclusion the general trend for so many in Washington that in Egypt we are not moving into a positive direction. The elections alone are not sufficient to bring stability. True stability also requires good governance, economic reform, and respect of basic human rights and the rule of law.

The third paper posited that every nation should draw back and reflect what kind of democracy works best for it. Why Egypt, which is going through real transition, comes in focus when issues of democracy and human rights are concerned especially in a time when Egypt went through a less violent transition than other experiences.

Criticism, however, is necessary to keep transition going but this is only applied to constructive criticism and the way forward. On a positive note, there are some bright aspects that we can capitalize on; we have the constitution and the road map and these are open for foreign observations and transparent democratic process so let us build upon rather than criticize it.

We also have what distinguishes Egypt in the region; a vital civil society, which is presently fragmented, but when that civil society came to agree on one issue it toppled two regimes. We should focus on how to harness and organize a civil society to build up a democratic process. Democracy is not a switch on / switch off process but it has to be acquired. In a country that has a poverty level of 40% and literacy also of 40%, we need to build democracy and integrate it into the culture of Egypt.

When we come to talk about human rights; talking about the abusiveness in the last 3 years within the mainstream of the population it is much less so in any other community. The constitution, which I believe, has been a landmark in spinning out human rights, equality of genders, freedom of belief. The constitution is not faultless we can criticize it, but it is a remarkable step forward yet to be completed by future generations. When we talk about human rights, we cannot separate social and economic rights as well and you cannot separate them from human rights. The perception of the layman in the street about human rights is to eat, drink, good education, and guarantee a good future, fundamental issues that are components of human rights to Egyptian laymen. As for freedom of associations; we should get associations out of the grip of the government. This is an area where we should give space for NGOs to operate and contribute to our transition. Civil institutions like federations of labor unions industry; have to get out of the grip of the government and have true representatives. All these can represent major contributes in the way of democratization.

In order to have good governance, we should have political coverage which requires a parliament with a political mandate. The present transitional government has absolutely no political cover or a political mandate to take such difficult measures. No politician will take such decisions considering what happened in the last 3 years.

Reform is not going to happen over night, however, just spelling it out and having a road map in itself will invite investors and will give comfort and ease a lot of the apprehension. We still have a volatile situation we are in a country in transition if we could understand this fact; a lot of these argumentations could be mitigated.

The following are the opinions expressed in the discussions that took place among the participants.

– Human rights have been an issue in the US-Egypt relationship. For human rights there is a globally agreed irreducible minimum that applies for every one without any discrimination. The national context then cannot be used as an excuse for any violation of human rights. If we really scrutinize and monitor what is happening, we will find selective of human rights in the part for everybody i.e. the American administration and the human rights organizations. We have a Road Map and we hope to be able to implement this Road Map and to ensure diligent compliance with human rights as stipulated by the constitution and the laws that will be promulgated to implement the constitution because the constitution is too broad.

– How can Egypt build a political mandate for institutional reform when leaders are terrified of what might happen to them looking at their predecessors? Is the approach that was taken in the constitutional process can represent an alternative; is there a mechanism foreseeable where by political forces and other social sectors can be represented to generate an agenda on

issues like reform of the police, an agenda on transitional justice, or on subsidies reform. All of these controversial issues that seem there is a consensus that they are necessary but they are both painful and politically risky. How do you create the political mandate in Egypt to do this hard work?

– The US has a keen interest in the stability of Egypt, not only the US but the whole world. No one can afford an unstable Egypt because Egypt has a popularity of 90 millions populations and no one can take instability in a country that big. That should be the frame work for the discussion and shape it. Would the reform of subsidies or reducing subsidies in fields of energy for example solve Egypt’s economic problems? The subsidies are a budget problem but we should not address subsidies as “the problem” but it is a part of the economic development problem within a plan to develop the economy and raise production value. Economy cannot produce enough to meet people’s essential needs.

– It is true that in the mean time we have media xenophobia, but at the same time, we have invitations for more tourists to come to Egypt. We need to build on whatever positive aspects we have. Xenophobia will not survive for long in Egypt.

– It is not true that investors are that negative towards Egypt, we have a number of projects under way with a number of interested investors such as General Electric, Coca Cola, besides other investors who are willing to invest in Egypt.

– The question of the human rights is something that we are not well prepared for in the time being in Egypt. Can we find a joint positive narrative about the human rights in Egypt where we can present certain positive steps in the way of reforming this area? At the same time we should stay with the monitoring and recording of the transgressions and failures, which will also continue for a while. But we have to get out of this completely negative narrative as it does not take us very far. Also when it comes to public opinion, the Egyptian people do not consider this issue of human rights right now because they are more preoccupied with issues of security. How we can bring these issues together in a holistic manner?

– We cannot say that we are not prepared for human rights because Egypt has signed all human rights conventions.

– I was speaking in general; the general economic trends are negative, even if there are specific positive ones. What we have seen from this government suggest that in the future we are likely to see more of the same. There are some very positive issues on the constitution regarding human rights as compared to the previous constitution, but it is important to not only look at the texts of the constitutions, but to how to implement this on reality. But what we see now is you have very highly questioned legal verdicts and violations of the human rights by the police forces in addition to an excessive use of violence which could be avoided.If ordinary Egyptian people do not prioritize human rights, that is not a reason for us to do the same especially if we are looking at stability. Human rights should not be a function of public opinion or majorities. These majorities should not have the right to negate minorities whether political, ethnic, or religious minorities.

– I am talking from the industry point of view: we are having difficulty in having employs to join us. The informal economy which could be 50-70% is providing a parallel venue for the youth. We cannot dismiss the fact that we have an informal economy that is distorting the data we have.

In answering a previous question about whether there is a mechanism foreseeable where by political forces and other social sectors can be represented to generate an agenda on crucial issues, the answer was: From what we have been noticing during the last 6 months, educating the public by facts. We have an article in the constitution about freedom of information and access to information. This emanating of information, which has been a difficult process during the previous regimes, to the public is an educational process. Now this is the time we think of how to. We can have centers to disseminate facts to the public on regular basis.The process of reform: there had been two fundamental laws that have been reformed in the last 6 months. First the procurement law that has to do with the land allocation policies which put some officials from Mubarak’s time in prison this has been unlocked and we yet has to come up with land allocation policy. Investment law came a week ago to organize mitigation regarding privatization and anything that has to do with the government without the violations of the original laws. The major apprehension over here is the position of the Socialists aficionados that have been suppressed during Mubarak’s time; they found it an opportunity to shine in the public scene by advocating policies that are now decadent as if time has stopped in the 1960s. They did not realize that socialism has transformed and progressed in different ways in different countries.Finally I want to point out that where this economy can flourish: we have a government that owns almost 93% of the land that still untouched. Land here means tourism, mining, energy, agriculture, retail, logistic and industry and this is the core base of any reform and hope. There have been economic reports about Egypt as a potential citing Egypt as one of the top 10 economies by 2015, and another came out 3 weeks ago citing Egypt as one of the 20 economies by 2050 another potential. We have what it takes but one thing lacks in this country is proper governance and proper administration.

– It is true that human rights are not a driven force towards shaping the policy of the US towards any country, in the case of Egypt this is also true; however such issues will continue to be one of the factors that help shaping the policy towards Egypt. As long as the US defines its core security and strategic interests in Egypt in the same way that it has for many decades, I do not think that will change and human rights will not be the deriving force of how the US looks at Egypt. It is also true that if the human rights in Egypt continue to deteriorate; this will remain an irritant in the US-Egypt relationship. Also if Egypt takes real steps towards genuine democratization process, this will provide the basis for a much closer relationship between the two countries. Because this is also a relationship between the Egyptian and American people not just the two countries. If we see progress in that area during the years to come in a way that make sense to both Egypt and the US, that would be one of the pillars to revive the relationship with closer economic and trade ties.

– The second paper presented a rapport about Egypt which does not in any sense help to build a national consensus in Egypt. For both the American and the Egyptian sides, we need to look deeper on the situation in Egypt. Human rights issue is very important and we are in the process of democratization, so do not make it difficult for us to move seriously in this direction. We might have problems, but I would like also to make you bear in mind that we are facing serious challenges in security both internally and externally.

– It is important when we are looking forward to build a kind of strategic relationship between the US and Egypt that we agree that such a relationship would be in the mutual interest of both countries and not as what been happening before. One thing we should do in the future is not limiting the relationship to government-to-government relationship and look more into inter related issues such as economy, women, and youth. We need to create different tracks in addition to government-to-government relationship such as business-to-business relationship, media-to-media, and women-to-women. This infra structure of institutional relationships between both countries will limit in the future the irrational choices of the leaders whether in Cairo or Washington. This will also allow for freedom of speech and freedom of association. In that way we can build a relationship that would benefit the people in both countries.

– Concerning human rights, the US continues to support regimes that violate human rights that lack democracy like Turkey and Israel. Concerning Egypt, the US keeps talking about the human rights of a terrorist group and forgets that there are human rights for the rest of the Egyptians that their lives have been threatened by this terrorist group. Also the US has been criticizing the verdicts of the court in Menia which sentenced a large number of the Muslim Brotherhood to death, although they know that these verdicts are not final.

– The issue about reforming the police forces in Egypt: The question of security sector reform is usually raised in the post revolutions situations. However, this kind of reform is not in the agenda of Egypt because policemen are subject to terrorist attacks and that makes people sympathetic towards them. Also in the new constitution if the parliament want to pass a law concerning the police forces, the parliament have to go to the supreme council of the police forces. As for the human rights situation in Egypt, it cannot affect the US policy towards Egypt. The US, from the point of view from the Egyptian public opinion, is not in a good position to advocate human rights because of its position in Iraq and Afghanistan. We need patience and constructive criticism. But the idea of using economic measures to pressure Egypt in the time being will produce an opposite effect and the Egyptian government will be seen as defending the national sovereignty and independence.

– These presentations about human rights that stirred a lot of tension here are actually what some people in Washington believe in and also in some human rights organizations in Egypt as well and therefore we cannot just dismiss such arguments. When it comes to investment, people particularly inside the EU, see the situation in Egypt as unstable which affects the foreign investments. Even we do not consider this as a reality; we have to take such views into consideration as it affects economy.As for the public opinion in Egypt; this is very hard to know exactly how the Egyptian public is considering certain points because in the past years we did not have any reliable polls.

– We are here and participating in such conferences because we believe that America has a stake in Egypt. The Americans believe that Egypt’s future is important to the US and understand that this is a period of turmoil, challenge and controversy and who also understands that the future of Egypt will be driven by the demands of the Egyptians. Imagine for a moment that you are an American and how helpless you might feel. People in Washington are deeply engaged and invested in Egypt and they are worried about Egypt’s future.

The combination of economic, societal and political factors in Egypt generating instability that analysis is shared by US government officials. We have to share both our fears and our hopes with you if we are going to find a way forward together. So, I will ask you as you hear us share our views, analysis, hopes and fears not to dismiss this as unfair criticism but understand that it comes from a place of concern and vulnerability because we know that what happens in Egypt affects us and it also comes from the US hard-won experience of the last 12 years. In our own society facing terrorist attacks and grave threats, the US government supported the public and made choices to act in ways that gave government institutions new authorities and that led in to a number of cases that we are still learning about, to overreach and to behavior that we now view is contradictory to our values and interests. We understand that some of those feelings exist today in Egypt in the face of the threats you see yourself facing and what we are suggesting that may be you could learn from our mistakes.

– Any public statement by the US about the human rights situation in Egypt right now will be easily manipulated by the government and will only stimulate more anti-American feelings from the Egyptians. On the other hand, we should put more investments in transnational relations and in the kind of projects that started with the Middle East initiative and also through focusing on social and economic rights because you need to diversify your involvement not only focusing on issues like torture but other issues as well.

– Most of the people are very hopeful of the effects that the media can have while media professionals are skeptical about this. Media does not send messages to people but it is a system of interdependency. It can however create a political climate or mood and it can misinform also. But at the end we should not forget that the Egyptian media does not have much credibility among Egyptian audiences. The main problem we have is a lack of deliberation in the Egyptian society and that is why we have been moving into circles in the last 200 years. Egyptians are still trying to form and forge a national identity and we have not reach a solution so far. It is also still a polarized political culture because its lack of consensus on the procedures.

– It is a good sign that in Egypt right now there are still new investors and still there are new opportunities even with safety and security still not in place. I wonder why you label the protest law as not constitutional. If you review the protest laws in Germany, France, UK, and the US it is very simple and I do not see where it differs. We need to stop these blank statements and stop dealing with them as if they were facts. If you see that the majority of people are taking a harsh position against the minority of the Muslim Brotherhood do not forget that this minority resorted to violence.

– Some of the speakers said that we need a common narrative, but if you all had agreed to a common narrative we would not have been here. It is only natural that we got several narratives in this room and we just try to bring them closer by agreeing on certain elements and leave the others.

– In an article by former US president Jimmy Carter, he emphasized the idea of patience while looking at what is taking place in the Arab Spring countries. It takes time even years or decades to complete its transition. So I am asking you to bear with us because we are rebuilding a wall brick by brick.

– Human rights is not just an issue it is the life of a human being and we should not deal with it as something that we could be patient about, postpone it, or just by signing accords we think we did what we have to. Those who were killed in Rabi’a or during the last few weeks as results of what we refer to as terrorist attacks are the same thing. We should admit that we do have a problem with the violation of human rights in Egypt instead of defending the government’s position or blaming others. We are still refusing to believe that we have a problem concerning human rights. What happened in Rabi’a was a violation of human rights and what is happening now against the military and the police are also a violation of human rights.

– We, Egyptians are very reluctant to accept any criticism about the issue of human rights. However, I share the views of my American colleagues on this issue because we seem to deny instead of discuss. We need to work on such a problem but first we need to recognize it by discussing it more closely.

– I understand that Egypt is facing main challenges in the security issue but the government’s action is going about in a very heavy handed way and in such an excessive violent manner which is destabilizing instead of stabilizing maters in Egypt.In the human rights issue, my colleagues were right; the US is not going to sever its relationship with Egypt because of the violation of human rights. Human rights issue is a relatively minor concern when it comes to the bilateral relationship. I think, from the perspective of the US, that human rights along with issues like exclusion and eroding the rule of law and other forms of repression become problematic not for altruistic reasons but for the US government issues such as exclusion creates instability and an incentive within the excluded party to create a sabotage in the place.

– Democracy and human rights means different views so for all those who are trying to speak on behalf of the Egyptians no body should or has the right to speak for the Egyptians.

– In the Mubarak era, they did a good job in trying to destroy systematically the economic and social structure in Egypt. It is behind us now to rebuild because we are in a stage of transition and the question how we can bank on to harness this transition in a positive way. We have a very highly politicized public who had a huge doze of political awareness, how can we capitalize on that? We are globally engaged from the geo-political aspect and in the global economy; we cannot disassociate ourselves from what is happening around us; and this is another era to capitalize on to stir us in the right direction. Civil society has to have a fundamental role in the coming period which is a freedom to give them space to act. One other issue, the youth, who represent 50-60% of the population and who also are the near future who will govern this country, have a different mind set, they are antagonized and this is also an area to capitalize on. Political parties they have space now and they are yet to rise and this give them space for engagement in political expression.It is time for the Muslim Brotherhood to revise their position if they ever aspire to get engaged in political process in Egypt. They have a basic role in revising their ways which did not work in the past.My final point is that Egypt is finally regaining its identity which is another positive note.

Session Four: ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION A: NEW HORIZONS ON AID, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT

This session examined the role of the two governments of Egypt and the US in enhancing economic co-operation through increasing the effectiveness of limited economic assistance, expansion of trade relations and promotion of inclusive economic development. This also includes the US engagement with other donor states and institutions, and questions of macroeconomic policy. Two papers were represented. The papers discussed economic aspects and foreign aid in the relationship between Egypt and the US. The first paper presented the Egyptian point of view on the economic aid and the second presented the US point of view.

The first paper dealt with the US economic, not military aid, assistance to Egypt in this new era. The data used in the presentation came from 3 sources: OACD Database, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and the websites of major international donors supporting Egypt in the last 3-4 decades.

The presentation has 3 components:

The first: the economic assistance to Egypt: an overall view.

The second: the US economic assistance to Egypt in a statistical analysis i.e. the distribution of the aid.

The third: beyond the figures and some remarks about the managing of the US economic assistance.

We are talking about the increase in the economic assistance to Egypt over the last 10 years. The first table shows that there is an increase, based on the official development assistance statistics, in the economic assistance either from bilateral or multilateral donors. These statistics does not take into consideration the Arab or the Gulf countries economic contributions to Egypt especially in the last 3 years.

It also traces the distribution of the economic assistance by terms of assistance. There are 3 types here: loans, grants and debt swaps.

When we are comparing the international donors in terms of economic and social development programs we can find that the USAID has a much versified portfolio: it is working on urban development, energy, environment, cultural affairs, trade, health, education, financial sector, and agriculture. The same for governance and decentralization, the USAID worked on human rights, family justice, good governance, decentralization, civil society development, and media development.

The US economic assistance: the statistic analysis based on different criteria. The importance of the US contribution compared to the other contributions. The USAID has decreased over time. In the year 2002 this percentage was around 80% in 2012 the percentage became 53% in that case, we do not take into consideration the money coming from the Gulf countries. If we consider it, the figure will drop to less than 5% to 10%. The relative importance of the USAID to Egypt decreased in terms of bilateral. In terms of total assistance, it was around 55% in 2002 currently it is 10.4%. So, the USAID has a versified portfolio, but there is a decline in the relative importance of it. This fact has its reflection on both political and economic sides.

Another issue is the money directed to the central government versus the money directed to the governorates. The USAID used to support the government in Egypt, different ministries and also the governorates through development projects. According to statistics and analysis, we can see here that most of the money are directed to the Egyptian governorates rather than going to the central government of Egypt. So between the years 2002-2012 more than 90% of the total aid went to the governorates and not the central government.

In terms of the geographical distribution (the statistics here are for the years 2002-2012) 40% of the aid went to Upper Egypt governorates, 26.3 % to Lower Egypt governorates, the urban governorates 23.2% and the frontier only 10.3%.

Regarding the distribution of the aid by sectors: most of the money went to the water and sanitation sector around 16.3%, construction 15.8%, civil society and governance 12.8%, and health also 12.8%.

In terms of millennium development, 44% of the USAID went to serve the eradication of poverty, while 21% went to environment, 11.5% went to the health sector.

What is beyond figures? The USAID is responsible for managing and financing most of the US economic assistance to Egypt. The USAID position has changed after June 30, 2013 there was a suspension of the most USAID activities in Egypt. USAID dealt with the economic assistance as a function of political development. The USAID was more aggressive in its reaction to political changes more than any of the other international donors.

The US administration tries to achieve very conflicting objectives; the US administration wants to support democracy, maintain stability, and serve the national interests of the US and Middle East including the Camp David Accords. These conflicting agenda make the relationship between the US and the Egyptian government very complicated and even difficult to reach compromises which resulted in suspending most of the USAID activities in Egypt.

The Gulf countries assistant is also a key factor after 2011. These assistants coming from the Gulf puts a lot of pressure on Egypt-US economic relationship because the USAID used to have a kind of privilege compared to the other donors regarding shaping the economic and fiscal policies of Egypt. This was because of the high percentage of the USAID contribution from the total contributions to Egypt. Also, compared to the other donors, the USAID has a long history with Egyptian bureaucracy compared to the other international donors.

The failure of Mubarak regime and the USAID: The USAID supported most of the reform projects made by the Mubarak government. This failure of the regime reflected on the USAID.

The second paper dealt with the future of the economic aid: views from Washington on economic aid to Egypt from a US perspective.

The paper talked about the present debate taking place in Washington about the USAID to Egypt and its future. The economic aid program has been one of the pillars in the US-Egypt relationship for several decades and a very important key link between the two governments and especially in

the earlier years of the program. In recent years, even before 2011, there was a decline in support not just in the amounts of money, but also in the shared visions between the two governments about what the main focus of the program should be.

There was a decrease in the economical aid while the military aid remained at the same level and there has always been a lot of tension about the aid; how it is supposed to be spent, and democracy funding, mechanics of the aid relationship.

Since 2011, there has been a state of turmoil and confusion surrounding the aid.

The backdrop in US now is the weak support for foreign assistance. To offer economic support to any country is becoming a harder case to make in front of the Congress. Americans do not approve the huge amounts the US spent on economic aids, not to mention military sides, to Iraq and Afghanistan. There is an increasing self doubt in the US whether the aid can make any kind of difference in other countries. On the other hand, some people in the US think that the economic aids should remain the same and it is a worthy effort.

Among those who are opposed to the aid are three main groups:

– The first group can be considered a minority voice, but they are not absent and they believe that instead of decreasing the economic assistance to Egypt, the US should make a significant new package of economic aid to Egypt. They are motivated by many factors: some are concerned about the economic situation in Egypt and believe that the US should be doing a lot more to help. Others want to build strong relationship with the new leadership in Egypt through the economic aid.

– The second group believes that the economic aid relationship should be waned down; that the aid should be gradually decreased and eventually it becomes very small or disappears altogether.These groups of people are motivated by different ideas: some think that the economic aid idea for Egypt is outdated and we need to make a new push to move and strengthen the investment relationship. They believe that it is not an enough large amount to make any difference in Egypt and the efforts on the trade and investments should be doubled instead. The others are motivated by a desire to distance the US from Egypt. They want to scale back the relationship and to focus primarily on a few aspects of strategic interests and they do not think that it is really worth it to provide Egypt with any economic aid at this time. They feel that the two countries do not have a shared economic agenda and what they are offering is not what Egypt actually needs at this time. There are also some voices in Washington that are convinced that Egypt does not matter any longer to the US.

– The third group wants to maintain the current level of aid, but change how the aid is provided. They want to shift the relationship away from government-to-government partnership and diversify the relationship on the Egyptian side to include more of private sector, civil society, and more non-governmental actors while continuing to work with the Egyptian government on a development agenda.

In conclusion, It is interesting that there is so much focus in Washington on economic aid it is as a symbol that the US commitment to Egypt which highlight how thin the bilateral relationship is as if there are no other channels or tools to aid Egypt which is a real shortcoming.We really need to have a dialogue in the economic aid with Egypt. The decisions about the aid should be made bilaterally instead of letting one side decide for both.

The following are the opinions expressed in the discussions that took place among the participants.

– I agree that there is a decline in the economic aid but in fact I agree with the opinion that this decline is healthier because there was too much reliance on the US for the last 40 years. In fact this did not serve the interest of the US, Egypt or the region as a whole. Too much reliance on the US deprived it from revising its policy. In spite of all these assistances for 40 years, assistances which had premiered all areas; socioeconomic, political and yet we have all this hostility towards the US. This is a problem that the US needs to consider.

– The US aid failed to guarantee the future business for the American companies in Egypt. After the US money finished there were no more money to purchase equipments from the same original supplier. Also the specifications themselves are calling for European standards. The US insisted that an American contractor and American consultant do the job, with no local involvement. So when the job is finished, equipment supplies changed to European standards led to spending less money because of working with the locals.The only program which was really successful in this respect was the CIP program because the locals used to buy American equipments and then they understand what is happening. This is a point which I hope the new approach will be that the US will work with the local people. Also they need to work in other fields such as oil and gas.

– I do not think that the size of aid we are talking about is really a source of concern. By itself, it is not really significant in the relationship I believe the relationship should include other aspects such as trade and investments in addition to economic aid. The whole aid 1.6 billion dollars is only 10% of what the Egyptians receive from the remittances from the Egyptians abroad. I believe that Egypt is a net donor to the US; over the last 3 years we have lost 250,000.00 Egyptians immigrated to the US who is well educated, professionals in their fields, and they help developing the US economy. As for the effectiveness of the aid, we must not forget that many of the proponents of the US aid were making use of the US money in a very suspicious way; many people in the past parliament became rich because of the US money. We do not want this kind of aid, we want an aid that would improve Egypt’s economy.The assistance should not be an objective in itself; we should also consider training, technology, investments, immigration policy and we should think about ways to make the relationship balanced and bilateral.

– When some people suggested the idea of trade not aid the US insisted that the aid will continue. The lesson learned is that there is no accumulated experience and the idea of the American contractor meant that 70% of the money would go back to the US. The whole process did not help building local expertise, and it did not help sustain the objective of the US. I wonder if

there are any studies in the US to explain why the aid did not resonate with the Egyptian people. Why despite of all this aids the US is not popular?

– The US-Egypt relations cannot continue based on a very loose dialogue, we need a framework. If you look at Egypt’s relations with the EU which started at the 1970s when we had cooperation agreements with non-reciprocal trade liberations, then we went in associations agreements when we started discussing political issues and having a social and political dialogue where we even included democracy and good governance beside other political issues. When we started to think of starting a dialogue or a framework with the US, it was with regard to a free trade area, it was either everything or nothing we had to negotiate on the same footing there was no sort of asymmetry between Egypt and US in discussing trade issues. I believe we have to build a way, a framework or a relationship and we need to have a comprehensive framework with an enlarge participatory approach to include representatives from private sector, civil society, and the government to have a big framework where we can discuss different issues and our mutual interests as partners.

– The best kind of aid is that which enables the recipient to dispense with aid. But this was never the case in Egypt; it was the case in South Korea. I wonder why so much aid given to Egypt did not help Egypt to do without aid. I believe that this aid was even more useful to the US than to Egypt because a large part of it used to finance importing American goods. Also the kind of projects that were established like the power stations required also importing American machinery. The aid in this sense helped to perpetuate the dependency of the Egyptian economy on the American economy. It would have been more useful to expand the capacity of Egypt like land reclamation which could not be financed, also increasing our cultivation of wheat which we still import. Is it acceptable to turn whatever remains of this aid into technical assistance so we do not import goods from the US but help instead in training Egyptians and improving human capital of Egypt through training and education or financing Egyptian students who go to study in the US? With technical assistance Egypt will become less dependable on the US. Egypt however will continue to be a good friend of the US.

– The question of how to identify the local needs: the major thing that helps to identify local needs is through looking at the national impact. International funders including the US aid usually speak about big businesses and neglect small and medium enterprises which are the real engine of the economy.

– I will start with the accomplishments of aid like in sewers system and things of that nature; intangible items where people saw a difference. Technical assistance is very hard to major how well it is done and it is not going to change the public opinion here at all. It is even hard to mention that in Washington or talk about it to a skeptical congress about any foreign aid package.Another point is what is the purpose of the aid? Is it to engender good will? Is it to stimulate economic developments, or is it to encourage reform and good governance? Free trade will be great for the US and Egypt but it will take a huge political push. The amount of money spent on aid cannot be the goal it has to be how well this money is actually moving.

– The US can improve its image greatly in Egypt if it invests in major projects that would increase the percentage of unemployment and that will boost the economy. Especially that Egypt, like

many developing countries, has been struggling to overcome high levels of corruptions in all sectors of governments which is the biggest obstacle to overcome in economic road.The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is definitely under American and Western influence, Egypt is still negotiating severe restrictions to get 5 billion dollars while in no time the IMF decided to give the Ukraine 17 billion dollars.

– We should focus more on how to direct aid to benefit people. The aid should be distributed in a less government-to-government way and more down to the local level and closer to the ground. At the end of the day, we have to acknowledge two facts; how heavily shaped the US-Egypt aid relationship. If we want to get to the kind of aid relationship that we all ascribing at, we have to look into two facts: if you look where the US gives large amounts of bilateral aid especially in this region it is largely driven by strategic considerations, it is not about needs. We have global funds on maternal and child health and fighting AIDS and so on but we do not base our bilateral aid on needs but in strategic relations that is why Jordan for example gets so much money aid compared to Egypt. So the aid will be related to the health of the bilateral relationship. The big decisions about aid are made on a government-to-government relationship level and that has proved a challenge over and over again in the last 10 years of Egypt-US aid relation as we both come with great ideas in where to spend money and ways to benefit people but at the end of the day it is US ministry sitting with Egyptian ministry; so the more transparent we can make this aid relationship clear to our publics, the more involvement they will have in the process and the closer we will get to the kind of the aid program we all hope for.

– How can we associate the US aid with the changes in Egyptian economy. Why this is not happening; there must be a problem either it was not effective or because of corruption, no monitory, or no evaluation. So, we have to figure the reasons behind that. As far as Egypt’s debt to the US it is more than $ 3.5 billion and the public debts are increasing so is it possible to use part of the aid to relieve Egypt of part of the debts.Another point about the food insecurity in Egypt which is increasing what is the role of the US regarding finding solutions to this both economical and social problem. There is also the shift from aid to trade and investments. We need to consider the frameworks that are already available; The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) which we are not benefiting from and the institutional reform. It is time to rethink about the free trade area and about the shift from aid to trade in general.

– There are two basic points when we talk about strategic issues between Egypt and the US one is to remain relevant to each other and catering to each other’s needs. It has to be understood from the Egyptian perspective what Egypt is going through and what it needs. Now is the right time to influence change before a new reality sets in so now is the best time to capitalize on very long strategic relations. Based on what is going on in Egypt today, I think the superseding issue for the average Egyptian is the economy and I think this supersedes other issues, such as reform, or human rights, not that these issues are not important but if we talk about what interest people, whether investors or laymen, all are complaining about economy. We all look at sustainable stability, and we all agree that Egypt is too big to fail because Egypt’s failure will have serious global implications.

Egypt is the gate to the Arab world and to COMESA, with other known geo-strategic elements. If we create jobs, a lot of issues will fall into orders and this has to be the primarily issue and this should be the guiding objective. The Free trade agreement (FTA) is very important today more as a political symbol of realigning of recalibration of the strategic relation more than the actual FTA itself.

– The overall aid program has helped with major infra structure projects and as for the private sector development projects and trading and capacity building. In aid program there is a requirement to have 5% American equipment which is true in all other aid programs. It is not fair to the US aid to say that it did not achieve anything. For example the power plant, where Egypt contributed to land (75%), the US consultant and equipment (25%), there is a residual of increasing the power electricity by 13% out of one project. Then we have the private sector developing program and the projects that came through the aid gave the private sector the ability to function. Most of what is left from the aid today goes to training and capacity building. You have to start with the right projects in order to get good results.

– I think the aid could be used in the near future in financing small enterprises and also the aid program should target the development of women in rural Egypt. This could be the time for the aid program to focus on the development of vulnerable sectors in Egypt such as the development of small villages in Egypt.

– We cannot only blame the US for Egypt’s partial failure using the aid. Actually a lot of responsibility falls on the government of Egypt for setting the national developments priorities and strategies. We should build a more inclusive partnership among all national partners and more importantly giving attention to monitory and reporting of developments results to ensure that these development efforts have a positive needed impact on people’s life; this is the main responsibility not of any donor but of any government of the recipient country.

– When we assess or evaluate development projects we always use the counter factor approach; in this case what would be the situation if the government of Egypt did not receive this aid. The US aid money was very successful during the 1980s and 1990s but after that the US government decided not to work heavily on the infra structure and start working in institutional reform and other software for economic reform and development. As a result the government of Egypt starts to think of not relying that much on the US money. The government of Egypt expressed over the past 6-7 years that it does not need the economic aid from the US but actually the pressure was from the US to put the economic assistance as a kind of conditionality for the military assistance. Egypt’s point of view was that we cannot stop receiving the economic assistance because the military assistance is related to it and also the government of Egypt puts into consideration the role of the US in international organizations such as the IMF and other international financial institutions. So it is very important to have this economic assistance not just because of its effect, which is deteriorating starting from the new century, but also because of the linkage between the economic assistance and the military assistance. The second issue that we have to blame ourselves. A lot of the causes of failure come from the Egyptian side especially the Ministry of International Cooperation and other sector ministries and we do not have to blame the American side considering this point.When we are talking about grants in general, we have to understand that they account for only 2% of our public revenues and all these grants account less than 1.5% of the Egyptian

expenditure so when we are talking about the effect of the US aid on the overall economy or overall performance we have to be very careful because we are talking about very minimum compared to the overall expenditure which lacks a lot of efficiency.

– A lot of the recommendations and suggestions you all made during the discussion are actually taking place right now in the US aid. So, there is quite a bit of capacity building going on in the US aid program, there is also emphasis on job creation for youth, on entrepreneurship, and on trade related issues. These issues are the focus of what the US is seeking to create in Egypt at this time. I cannot answer the question whether these things are successful or effective right now but obviously there is a disconnection between how the US sees its agenda and priorities and how that is perceived in Egypt at this time.As for the US image in Egypt and how we can improve it through its aid program and why the attitudes still are very negative in Egypt towards the US in spite of the big amount of aid received during the last 4 decades, this is a very complex issue and some believe that some well designed and well executed aid program that really combine an access between Egyptian needs and US capacity are very worthwhile. The aid program will be more successful when the overall relationship will be stronger and healthier.

Session Five: Economic Cooperation B. PRIVATE SECTOR ECONOMIC RELATIONS: DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT, AND TRADE EGYPT AS A REGIONAL HUB

In this session three papers were represented. The papers explored the private-sector economic ties between Egypt and the US including trade and investment, issues for private sector growth, and the potential of Egypt as a regional economic hub.

The first paper dealt with how Egypt has a lot of factors that could make it a regional economic hub: its geographic location reaching Africa, Europe, and Asia, in addition to oceans, seas and the Suez Canal. Egypt makes logistical sense for lots of companies in lots of places. Egypt also can create a good and healthy environment for manufacturing and import/export goods such as cotton, fruit, vegetables and so on because these companies can reach all sorts of places easily.

Countries become hubs because of the policies of their governments. Countries like Dubai, Singapore, Malaysia become hubs because of their governments not because the US wanted them to be hubs. The US relationships with them grew organically out of their global positions they created common interest in business community which ultimately evolved into diplomatic relationships.

Some investors want to work in Egypt in particular as a place for investments and new projects but cannot find any political or environmental assessment. Western investors are not sure what will happen next and when the changes in this region will be over and for Egypt in particular there are six considerations that companies and investors will look for: first, an assessment of overall stability, if this is predictable, economic environment as global framework for investment.

Second, the problem of the violence in Egypt and the fear of sustain its urgency which may lead to Algeria situation. This is partly a security problem and partly a political problem.

Third the judiciary system: from business perspective the consequences of the legal judgment in Menia, for example, not just affects diplomacy or tourism, it also affects business and investments decisions.

Fourth infra structure and power problem: If you are building a business, if you are manufacturing in Egypt you need to have access to power. This is an infrastructure problem that may be the US can help with.

Fifth government efficiency effectiveness.

The last thing is what is happening in the energy sector which is very distressing to investors. Developing energy industry is a very necessary part and keeping the oil and gas companies feeling like there are rules and we will be able to apply them.

You have to have vision of what you need to do. From a business perspective, there is a sort of openness to Egypt because a lot of people still remember the images of Egypt and its kind people. So, if Egypt is to follow certain steps it will gradually take you to the place where you want to be.

The second paper examined the future of the US trade and investment in Egypt. The paper started by showing that there are a rapid decline in a number of indicators in the Egyptian economy in the past few years such as the decline in growth rate, budget deficit, current account deficit, public debt, external debt, foreign reserve, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Such declines we have never experienced in the past 30 years. In spite of the financial injection from other countries over the last 3 years that reached around 20 billion dollars still there is a great need for Egypt to try coming to terms with the IMF and fix its economy and restore its credit worthiness. I believe that at this particular point, the US administration can be of a great help however Egypt itself has to come on the basis of the ownership principle with its own recovery program and begins its implementation and call upon the IMF and the international community to support it and also the US here can mobilize the necessarily international support.

During the last period, we have seen that the transitional government has been very hesitant in the negotiation with the IMF and even in paving the way for a new government to finish the deal with the IMF because of the precarious domestic situation. Every government was only concerned with how to address issues of social justice which are still indefinable.

What the government of Egypt needs is an economic road map similar to the political road map and not nearly ad hoc actions. This map certainly needs to include public and corporate governance then we need to mature Egypt’s private capitalism and having reliance on state connections. The road map will also need to foster a strong and educated middle class.

Also, Egypt needs to remain an attractive destination to US businesses. During the last year there has been an increase in US investments flows by over 15%, this is in contrast to the declining share of the EU investments.

Egypt’s location reaches to Africa and the Arab region and also reaching to Europe. Examples are given COMESA market where the US businesses can benefit through Egypt and open to a market of

nearly 400 million people. The example here is Heinz Ketchup that exports its products from Egypt duty free to the COMESA, from the US Heinz it could have to pay import duties on its products that could have reached up to 15% to enter the COMESA region. Heinz was able to expand its market access regionally and increasing its revenues and global market share.

Another example is of US water pumps. The water pumps are assembled and exported from Egypt throughout the region meeting the 40% requirement necessary for US manufacturers to export duty-free through COMESA and GAFTA. This value added process does not mean exporting of US jobs and the bulk of production remains in the US.

Also the paper addressed main sectors where the US already has shown interest to work in Egypt such as engineering, electronics, household appliances, and where Egypt is hosting Ideal Standard factories and exporting to the EU duty free.

Other sectors are pharmaceutical and agro-industry. American companies can be instrumental in entering into joint ventures and cooperate with Egyptian companies to increase storage and port facilities. Also the Suez Canal is a very new area with mega investments where the US companies can certainly have very profitable businesses in this area.

In order to inform the others of such opportunities in Egypt there is a need to establish a dialogue and a concrete framework which Egypt should establish with the US and to put a comprehensive framework where private sectors, NGOs, and government representatives all are included.

The third paper represented the view point of the private sector investors and also complements the perspectives provided by the two other papers. As a representative of the point of view of the private sector investors, the paper tried to answer the question of the future of this sector in Egypt.

With the coming presidential and parliamentary elections, and even with the terrorist attacks, Egypt will have a certain level of legitimacy that was absent for a while and that will allow for some economic reform to start taking place.

The energy issue is at the core of Egypt’s problems right now from fiscal, management, and practical point of views; no new factories would open up facing problems of fuel. What has changed during the last three years the facts and the realization of the problems have become more established. The realization of the problems is an important step to find solutions.

We also need to recognize that for the past 6-7 years there was not enough legitimacy and enough popularity to address such problems. Even during the last few years in the Mubarak regime, 2007 or 2008 with the succession agenda dominating the discourse then, no one wanted to touch upon these problems of private sector, unemployment, privatization, no one wanted to reform such sensitive issues. After the revolution and under SCAF things were in a state of flux and those problems also remained the same. And even with Mursi presidency nothing happened because the country then was a very highly divided country.

In the coming months there will be an elected leader with popular support behind him, also there will be government-to-government support coming from the Gulf to mitigate the social costs of the

structural adjustments that need to be made and hopefully by then we will move from crisis to economic reform also by straighten up few issues such as energy reform, changing subsidies structure from one that inefficient and corrupt to one that help subsidies and welfare to get to the larger sector of the Egyptian population who needs it. By starting addressing these problems, and even with the security problem taking more time, we will be able to watch real recovery in the economic front.

The following are the opinions expressed in the discussions that took place among the participants.

– The three papers talked about certain issues and suggested certain questions:The political will to undertake reform and the political challenges that face reform. Undertaking reform that attract investments but also undertaking reform that support business development and create good base for private sector.Once you begin to undertake the reform process and people experience the adjustment costs you often get a backlash. The question is how to sustain support for reform in the face of the adjustment costs?The importance of the energy sector and the centrality of the energy as a hard constraint on the private sector development, how to address these challenges?The US may have a role as a facilitator of the private sector activities rather than a deriver of government policy reform. So, if the typical role of the US in the past year was to encourage Egyptian government to supply reform, perhaps it is time to shift to support the demand for reform.

– If we look at the quality of the debate on economic policies it is really disappointing in terms of tackling the problems, coming with options, imposing policies. At the present there is an escape into huge projects Suez Canal Free Zone for example. I am not with this kind of silver bullet solution or even where the money for these mega projects would come from. There is also a tendency about the return of the state as a major actor, the return of the army as a major arbitrator of even the market by supplying food stuff into the market and impact on the price of food and so on. I feel that something is wrong with this kind of debate. Something that could be done in the context of US-Egypt cooperation government-to-government there is no vision in Egypt for the year 2030 or 2050. It is worthwhile to invest into this matter. But now there is a huge gap in terms of envisioning a clear future economic strategy for Egypt.

– We should decide in Egypt now what kind of private sector we should have. The private sector we had for the last 20 years has a very bad image of being crony capitalism, who does not want to pay taxes and so on. We also have a government that does not want to collect taxes from the companies. The other thing is bureaucracy as hindering the investments. So, we need to get the house in order first; energy policy has to be improved and the public sector inefficiency has to be reformed.

– This session is rather about the developing of Egypt through private initiative supported by state policy. There is this question of legitimacy; we have in Egypt an absurd situation of having started a system of subsidies and let it run away rather than addressing the sources of fire we have been for decades putting on fire. The question of legitimacy is also behind the question of negotiating with the IMF.

Getting out of the system of subsidies is extremely difficult as it will require political skill and policy skill. This should not be disregarded. The trade agreements which Egypt has with several other partners and I particularly focus on the EU where we have access to industrial and manufacture goods free of charge and without limitation of quantity. We should think of a tripartite cooperation with the US, Arab funds, and Egyptian skills. Investments are not enough. Can the US help with policy formulation and policy implementation so as to raise the standard of economy? And the private sector would be the main actor.

– I think that this kind of cooperation can come from the American private sector or the American unions as it could come from the American government.

– We need not only a road economic map, but a national consensus on it. Because the economic reform and structural adjustment is the one issue no one wants to touch. With the legitimacy of the new leader, he will be able to take difficult decisions. Ex Field Marshall al-Sisi has already eluded to that and people are sort of prepared to it. The current debate on economic problems in Egypt does not come down to the series problems that we are actually facing. I wonder if the Gulf countries will continue to pour money in Egypt to mitigate the negative impact of the structural adjustment on the vulnerable groups in Egypt.With the decision of the Egyptian government to use coal will this improve the situation in energy?

– Legitimacy and mandate for the coming president is a double edged sword. It is not quite clear how the government will implement reform. We do not have a government that will be appointed by the president from an elected parliament. The coming parliament will not be necessarily a cohesive parliament but will be fragmented there is no dominant party and the president himself will not have a party to support him it is not quite clear who is going to implement the reform and by what legitimacy. We should come up with a wide paper of economical reform that clarifies clear legislative steps that will dismantle bureaucracy for example this process that should be immediately addressed land allocation policy because we do not have such a policy now. Also licensing which takes forever and cause an underground economy to stay away from the radar of the government. Such measures will help any potential investor to see that we are serious in economic reform.

– These issues are for the Egyptians to decide but if there is a way the US can help in these issues it will help.

– I see the potential role of the US and of the international community in the coming stage as very difficult. The reform that Egypt needs to imply are going to be difficult and costly and part of the reason why we should help engaging with the UAE and Saudi government, but not so much with the IMF or the US, because if there is a program of structural adjustment then the money from the Gulf will make a difference.If we want this country to get on its feet, then in conjunction with the reform and structural adjustment we need such reforms to be accompanied with a promise of very tangible support over the next 5 years public-to-public aid, plus budget support, export credit and FDI the Gulf states are constructive in that sense. I would like to see the US and other international partners to be part of a similar dialogue and similar determination, as that shown by the Gulf States, to see Egypt succeeds.

– The US has a responsibility and has to be a module for international support. I certainly do not believe that this is only a domestic issue. The US has an instrumental role and this is where we need it with the IMF. You have given support before so why now are you trying to disengage from this kind of support.

– I do not deny that there should be an American role in encouraging and supporting but if the assumption is that the US understands that Egypt is a keystone for the region stability and security and that the US is serious about Egypt but this is not the case now partly because we have a lot going on right now. There is affection for Egypt but I think not of convection that Egypt is that important to the American national security, but that we will help Egypt to keep relationships going. The better the Egyptian understand where are the problems and obstacles the better they can see where the US can fit in.

– The US can help Egypt with gross fund. Companies Small and Medium Enterprises ( SMEs) in Egypt suffer from the banking system and access to credit.

– The access to credit for the SMEs here is also about reeducating the Egyptian banks themselves on how to evaluate risk and led to SMEs. This is not necessarily a government issue there might be a solution in the private sector.

– The energy problem and the blackouts. The question of using coal is not that difficult because it is used in other countries. The only problem with coal is Co2 emission and global warming which in Egypt is much lower than other countries. Coal will be a savior in our case.

– There are tremendous efforts that have to be made in both Egyptian and US media. We are trying to fix the relationship. Egyptian media has portrayed business people as blood suckers who do not contribute anything to the country and this image has become in a sense a business impediment. The US has access to tools concerning the public awareness programs and which can help in this respect and to improve the negative image of the US as well.

– Egypt is in a reflection point and there are window opportunities. The next coming months will tell if these opportunities are ceased or not. If the structural adjustments and reforms do not start immediately, which in my view are inevitable, because no country can sustain a 15 or 16% budget deficit for very long. If we capitalize on this moment and the next president starts now these adjustments they will be less painful and the recovery will also be less painful. We have to be realistic and not expect the US treasury to give to Egypt 20 billion dollars of aids at that particular time but what we certainly hope to see is a much more engaged role from the US administration as a cheer leader to engage supporters and rallying international support for Egypt in things like the IMF negotiations.

– I do not get the sense that Egypt is coordinating as closely with the countries in the Gulf as it should. May be because they do not bring same legitimacy or do not have the same identity.Our strategy in Egypt needs to leverage what we already have, needs to leverage the relationship and needs to leverage our close relationships with the Gulf allies. Some of the positive steps you were talking about are how to create a broader team and this is a kind of stability that the US can help with and like to see Egypt reaches.

Session Six: INTERNAL DYNAMICS: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS

Three papers were presented in this session and they discussed the internal dynamics shaping Egypt-US relationship. The papers addressed public perceptions and culture influence policy

makers in the two countries and looked for potential areas for co-operation. The first paper discussed the perception of the US in the Egyptian media; the second discussed the public opinion in the US and how they perceive the image of Egypt. The third paper discussed the position and the new role of al-Azhar as a religious institution.

The first paper represented the image of the US perception in the Egyptian media. And it presented 3 main arguments:

– The mutual, Egyptian and American, images are negative.– These images can be changed.– Not enough efforts were done in this field.

The Egyptian image in the US is a negative one, apart from the fascination with the early anecdotes of January 2011; the Egyptian image has been mainly dominated by negative issues like terrorism, poverty, corruption, and so on.The US image, on the other hand, has also been predominantly negative in the past year in Egypt. The US image is mainly political and it is shaped by the US foreign policy in the Middle East region (issues such as the double standards in applying human rights, Iraq, Guantanamo, besides other points that were raised in the last 10 years). The US position to Egypt: the US is perceived as a superior power that exerts pressure on Egypt by using the military aid.The position of the US towards the Arab Spring is also another field that shows negative perceptions: since 2011 the US image has been negative due to factors related to its reluctance and inconclusive position especially at first towards January 25, 2011, and then June 30, 2013. In the media there was a lot of talking about a conspiracy theory; nowadays the US is perceived as supporting the Muslim Brotherhood to instill unrest. Culture also plays a role in shaping the US image. There is a complex and ambivalent “love-hate relationship.” Egyptians continue to consume US culture export artifacts (Disney, Hollywood movies, American Diploma, American dream as a pursued lifestyle, etc.).The factors shaping the US image in Egypt: there is a macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level. On the macro-level, the paper argued that the negative US image is not a consequence of culture. There are attitudes towards 3 contested issues that shape the US image in the current phase. *The first set of attitudes tackles the 2 main political actors in Egypt (Military and Muslim Brotherhood) this leads to the course which the US took in 2011 in which the US based its course on the premise that the Muslim Brotherhood are a moderate group among the Islamists and using Egypt as a strategic partner in the region. When Mursi was ousted it formed a major contested issue between the two countries.On the other hand, the Egyptian perception of the military is very positive. The military is perceived as the last intact state institution and that it protects the country and serves the people.

These attitudes towards the two main actors -the Muslim Brotherhood and the military- reflects the post-Mubarak dichotomy because there was no inclusive third block that is closer to the core values of January 2011. *The second set of attitudes explains the US image connects to attitudes regarding political protest versus stability. Currently there is in Egypt a general public fatigue of continuous protests, there is also fear of disintegration of state institutions, growing skepticism towards protest movements and a wish for stability at any price which might explain the low priority given to human rights. Hence any criticism from abroad regarding this issue is automatically unwelcome by the majority. *The third set of attitudes tackle the intervention of the US and the West in general. Based on its own history, Egypt shows anti colonial elements, high sensitivity towards imperial policies, and also a collective victim narrative that focuses on the powerlessness of the nation and depicts Egyptians and Arabs as losers of the globalization. This connects also to high national pride which explains the emotional reaction when there are talks about the aids or cut of aids.

Meso Level and Micro Level of analysis: how do media dynamics shape the US image.The US image is shaped within a larger context of a discourse in foreign news and international relations and it is also dictated by news values and international news flows, the international news market that shapes national images is not as free as we think. The US enjoys a high prominence in the media even it is somehow too negative.

When it comes to professionalism, the Egyptian media is still evolving but long years of authoritarian régimes has limited the development of an autonomous and diverse journalistic professional culture

The second paper discussed the public opinion and the US-Egypt relationship.

When we look at the American public attitudes toward Egypt and about the relationship with Egypt those attitudes are less a function of assessing foreign aid broadly and more a function of an American tendency now to focus at home after decades of focusing abroad. So this situation is beyond foreign aid.

The foreign aid story is not as bad as people pretend, American people have always been reluctant in providing foreign aid. There has always been an American public perception on the aid and always for cutting it down.

American public opinion: America is a deeply divided country as far as public opinion is concerned in issues of values, domestic policies, economy, and foreign policy.

Democrats have always been more open to foreign aid. Democrats and Republicans look very differently into issues of human rights or strategic issues.

In their respective attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood: The American public attitude is discomfort towards political Islam in general but after the Arab Spring wave, there was a more openness to the idea of political Islam. After January 2011 there was a fear of the rise of political Islam. There was a difference in opinion after November 2011 whether the January uprising is for

freedom and democracy, or a movement by Islamists to take control, back then most people favored the first case. That formula changed between 2011 and 2013 and the general opinion favored the second case of Islamists try to take control. The general public in the US had then negative view towards the Muslim Brotherhood and they preferred the military to the Islamists.

The Republicans saw that the Muslim Brotherhood as anti-American with whom you cannot create a working relationship. The Democrats, on the other hand, saw it as an organization that they can cooperate with.

Part of the look of the US public opinion is a function of the US polarized politics. Now we have a democratic administration and senate and there is a focus on the issue of human rights among the elites of the democrats including members in the administration. Their attitude towards political Islam is a Democratic elite view. For America to have a procuring policy in the Arab world, it must find a way to accommodate itself to put moderate political Islam which is indispensable part of the political process. A good number of people saw that the Muslim Brotherhood fill in that space that used to be accommodated.

There is a reduction in the interest of Egypt and there is a relative decline in the number of people that think of Egypt as a strategic point. Historically Americans had positive view of Egypt which was true till one year after the outset of Mubarak. We had roughly 60% who held favorable view of Egypt, and more importantly that the Tahrir Square created something bigger than that is that the American had 70% favorable view of the Egyptian people which is roughly the same as their positive view of the Israeli people. That view has declined while Mursi was at office and also since the outset of Mursi it declined more.

Also there is a reduction and relative decline in the number that thinks of Egypt as a strategic point. However, that decline can sometimes be exaggerated. The decline is not in the number of people that think of the Egyptian relationship as important, but if you go in a scale that is: “very important, important, not important at all,” the decline will be in the people that say “very important,” or “important” but very few (around 12-14%) would say “not important at all.” So, there are still people who think that Egypt is important, but they say also that it is more important to focus at home.

When you look at why there is a sense that Egypt is less significant, at least among the elites and it is a real sense inside and outside the administration. It is formally the function of the Iraq war and the changing role of the Israel issue in American foreign policy. When the American public was so focused on the Middle East and the military aspect of the American strategy, it was then easy to see how Egypt is central, now with the Iraq war over and the limited focus on a public level, the public does not see Egypt’s significance it is not that easy to make the case, but the intelligence, military and international security can see the importance of Egypt. That debate is missed to the public though.

America now is in a post-Bush era; meaning that there is less intervention in foreign affairs, whereas 70% of the public do not want the US to take sides in foreign affairs. The US elite’s conclusion is that they do not want to go back to that era and take sides

The third paper discussed the position and the new role of al-Azhar as a religious institution. Al-Azhar now has relationships with different political and economic institutes and investment parties. Al-Azhar is an Egyptian, Arab, and Islamic institution since 1400 years. It also has changed in the past 3 years and echoed the changes that are taking place in Egypt. It has cultural and religious roles unlike other voices of political and Salafi Islam that do not have any cultural components in their beliefs so al-Azhar is not a clerical institute closed upon itself. Unlike political Islam, al-Azhar distinctly differentiates between patriotism and politics. It has a national and patriotic role rather than a political one that has become clear in different historical and transitional periods.

One of al-Azhar’s main missions is to keep the historical and national unity of the Egyptian people and resists the polarization of them that could come under any form whether political or religious.

Al-Azhar’s role and dialogue has changed since 2011. It has led a dialogue called “al-Azhar’s Documents” in which all categories of the Egyptian people took place, Moslems, Copts, women, men, youths, and elderly people as well. The most important document is one called “The future of Egypt” in which it was agreed that in Islam there is no clerical state based upon religion. What we need is a national, democratic, constitutional, and modern country. Another important document concerned the four freedoms (freedom of belief, freedom of expression, freedom of research, freedom of creativity in art and literature). There are also two other documents one for citizenship and the other concerns women. All these documents are basics for stability, economy, and investments.

Al-Azhar emphasized upon isolating religion from political life and it works closely with the ministries of Religious Endowments (Awkaf) and Verdicts (Efta’a). Also in al-Azhar we have a dialogue between different parties inside Egypt and this was realized through the Family House that included al-Azhar representatives in addition to others from different Egyptian churches. Al-Azhar also leads seminars in different Egyptian governorates to teach both Muslim and Christian men of religion tolerant religious discourse in addition to the meaning of citizenship.

As for the external dialogue, we establish dialogues with the Egyptian church, Arabic and Middle East Churches, and other churches worldwide.

Since 2011, al-Azhar has been receiving and establishing open dialogues with all important foreign representatives who visit Egypt; also it has been receiving and training young imams from Europe and the US to preach moderate and tolerant religious discourse.

The following are the opinions expressed in the discussions that took place among the participants.

– When you talked about political Islam did you mean both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi groups in their new role, and what exactly are the different forms of political Islam you are referring to?

– Political Islam means to use Islam in political battles and as a means to reach political goals. We differentiate between the religious principles and the political field, also between al-Azhar patriotic role and political role. What I mean is every party that is involved in sociopolitical

activities while rising Islamic slogans whether in theory only or practically like the jihadists who are burning the region. The US played a role in establishing al-Qaeda to achieve certain interests in the region. Al-Azhar played a major role in fighting political Islam so it may maintain Islam and Egypt at the same time.

– In the media dialogue you can always find what you are looking for. So, if you started with looking for a negative image you will find it and vice versa. This is a rather complicated issue. Let us look into the deep changes in the structure of the media scene in Egypt. There has been a big shift in the pattern of media ownership and the private sector media became much stronger than the public sector and this big shift took place over the last 15 years. The private sector is chasing advertising money and therefore is looking for more sensationalism because that what brings in more audience and in this the professional standards unfortunately have disappeared. The big stars have become the actors and not their guests and the actors have their own ways of analyzing things. Another serious departure is this shift in portraying a lot of US actions as part of a conspiracy. The media are carrying stories day after day of documents and invented events because this shifts the debate away from talking about policy changes and what you can do about it and other real important issues. So there are some structural changes that are taking place in the media scene that are affecting the image of the US.

– In the second paper it was mentioned that moderate Islam is what the Americans look to find in Egypt. I am puzzled why religion has become a factor in our relationship and what kind of definition do you have for moderate Islam?

– I find it very interesting and helpful in the second paper the breakdown of attitudes because I think we can focus a lot on the messages in mass media on the mass level of public opinion. As we look ahead in terms of how we build a relationship going forward and we look for opportunities to build on, part of the data analysis that I would find helpful as to understand within different segments of society and within different sectors; where are the trends in terms of opinions towards the US whether positive or negative and on what basis. Where are the parts of Egyptian society that are thinking more about connection with the world and with the US, and how can we reach out to those sectors?

– How much of an effort has the US or the Egyptian government spent on how these messages are going to be interpreted on the other end. You see a lot of speeches in Washington about Egypt and we can see that they were interpreted in a very negative way here.

– It is more and more difficult to make a case of committing significant resources and significant engagement for Egypt in the US right now. I regret that this is the case but we have to grapple with the fact that the US experience in Egypt for the past 3 years, due in part to mistakes the US made and also the situation in Egypt has been a discouraging one which did not motivate the US to get more involved. The types of support that Egypt wants to see are harder to make a case for. We have to accept that this is a significant factor right now in at least how important people in Washington think.

– For the last 3 years Egypt has been on a rebound. We still not there at a stabilizing point. The Egyptians are still trying to find their way. A lot of what is going is on the silver screen and the media, more than the written, because Egyptians are not fond of reading but they watch the TV and 97% of the Egyptians get their information from the TV. Most of what is happening in the

media is not done by professionals and most of those who speak, speak out of their own convictions and not putting into consideration that they are transmitting a certain message or that they are influencing so many people. When listening to some key media persons I find their talks full of hate speech and violation of human rights, this is because we are still learning. There have been many calls for a code of ethics to be put by the media professionals themselves but nothing has happened so far. We need to be patient till Egypt reaches the balancing point.

– When we talk about media, there are two factors here: first, Egypt radical chorus culture is clear and in consensus and this is reflected on external parallelism in media so the editorial policies are more of clear; they either based on proximity of power and this is largely dictated by political relations and whoever is in power, for example, if they say that the US is bad, the media does the same. The other thing is the ideology or the political line of the media. In the last 15 years and with the growing of privatization we have noticed more diversifications more than the past 30 or 40 years ago, yet the media market is not autonomous because when there is a great political pressure or economic pressure and finance resources still remain challenging in the media. From a system theory approach the differentiation will provide the autonomy to the media eventually like any society going on a transformation process. When it comes to ideology the media is currently dominated by nationalist views and Nasserite voices. The highly competitive market and the pressure of the audience expectations are also not to be neglected. When it comes to individual journalists, because it is an emerging professional and not a mature one, their coverage is usually dominated by personal views instead of professional ones. So we see often unchecked facts and sensational wording and lack of cultural sensitivity.

– I am not expressing my opinions here but I am basically reporting how these are seen in Washington especially among the democratic leads. One of the mistakes that the US has been making in the last decade has been engaging a significant segment of the publics in the Arab world including non-militant political Islam and that part of the backlash that America comes out of that that the US supported their repression.But that was not because the US loves them but it is more of a realistic recognition, whether it is accurate or not, that these groups are part of the political landscape and you have to find a way to live with them. That is an interpretation that I am conveying to you.The Egyptian public majority in some of the polls has been refusing the American aid since 2011 because they do not trust the US and they think that the US uses the aid to manipulate and interfere in Egypt’s decisions. This mistrust of the US is deep in all levels of the Egyptian society left and right, the secular and the religious, and it is not going to be changed by anything realistic, including a 20% increase of aid or something of that sort, because it is based on a behavior that has been going on for decades such as the American position from the Israel-Palestine question, the American presence in the region, and the counter terrorism policy. Therefore realistically American policy should be in the short term driven by winning the public as much as creating co-working arrangements that are mutually beneficially to both countries.

– Public opinion is flexible and not fixed. We can work together to improve the perception and public opinion in both directions. Some of the Egyptians are more careful and more appreciative of the American-Egyptian relationship.

Session Seven: REGIONAL ISSUES: THE US, EGYPT AND THE REGION

The session identified the impact of regional issues on Egypt-US relations and the role of Egypt as a regional actor. The session also addressed how American interactions with other regional actors affect US-Egyptian relations.

The first paper examined what Egypt and the US need from each other. The question we all keep asking ourselves, whether in Washington or in Cairo, is what our role is and what we want. This conference has proved that both Egypt and the US spend a great deal of time examining what they want from one another but there is no self examination here.

There is a drift on the foreign policy of both nations. The US is adjusting to the new world order, not necessarily characterized as a decline, but more of a shift of bilateralism to having emerging powers. There is a change in how business and policies are going to be conducted. The US right now is having difficulties establishing what its proper role is.

In Egypt here there is a transition going on. But even before this period of transition Egypt’s foreign policy and economic policy have been suffering for the last 2 decades there has been a lack of vision and this became less creative over time. The net result is less attention to Egypt and less respect.

The Egypt-US relationship cannot be based on aid nor cannot be based permanently on the Camp David Accords basis. We all know that the Economic Support Fund (ESF) will not solve Egypt’s economic problems. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) should not be a limit on Egypt’s foreign policy or security options. The bilateral relation should be based on US global economical power and Egypt’s unique global position and its position as regional power, even if that power is latent at the moment.

The US could play a role with Egypt for example in South Sudan or Ethiopia, also in the economic development, like in expanding trade relations as looking down or up the Nile rather than looking at the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia is not stirring Egypt in foreign policy or security dimension. Saudi Arabia has never been a country that has stir decision making in the region. It has always been an important supporting cast and will continue to be. In fact, some of their criticism to the US right now is that what they see a lack of US decision making which is forcing them to take decisions now and this is not a role that they are willing to play. Also the Kingdom does not want to play the role of Egypt in the region, that is to say, the traditional role of Egypt being the leader in the Arab world because it is strong, big, and has a cultural influence.

The lack of leadership on certain issues in the region recently: The US looked to Turkey for leadership or even the Arab League for leadership but this did not work. Egypt can be a key factor in discussing Iran’s talk including returning Iran to the regional flock and also in diminishing some

sectarian tensions that continue to spread in the region and also in Iraq, where Egypt has proved its role in the first Gulf war. Egypt’s consultative role with the US in the region is critical and has been and it has proved itself in the past. Even if Egypt’s role in foreign policy is diminished right now, it will improve over time.

Also in the matter of the peace process Egypt’s role is very special in moving the process forward. Egypt also has a role beyond Africa because of its special location.

Giving the political context and the public opinion may be the bilateral solution is not the best one right now to improve the relationship, but a multi-level solution may work better.

In the economic side, using existing economic agreements in Africa and the Middle East and in the foreign policy and security option use our natural strength.

The second paper started from the point that Egypt’s regional role is the raison d’être of the Egyptian-American partnership. This is the basic reason why the Americans have partly continued this strategic partnership. In the Egyptian side, this strategic partnership is serving double objectives: the first one is the regional balance. Also, before 2011, the Mubarak regime depended on this partnership to balance domestic opposition in the last 3 decades.

That factor has changed after 2011. The Americans are not that important any more to the survival of the regime. There is more and more awareness among the Egyptian elites and the current authorities that Egypt can actually have some leverage in its regional policy and they use this to bargain with the Americans to have the kind of the American support they need, not for the survival of the regime, but for the economic stability and international acceptance.

The first question this paper is trying to answer is what Egypt wants in its regional policies, what it means for the US, and how the Egyptian policy in the region encourages cooperation or even conflict.

There are 4 elements structuring Egypt’s regional policy today and intersecting the American’s interests:

1- How personal regional issues are to the current authority in Egypt. Today Egypt is dealing with places like Gaza, Libya, Syria, and the Gulf so it is not a question of regional policy, but rather a question of security.After July 3, 2013 part of the legitimacy and authority of the current regime has been constructed against political Islam. This has translated directly on the position of Egypt on regional issues especially Gaza with Hamas and Libya with the Islamist movement and with Syria. Political Islam has been one major element defining the position of Egypt and in the frame of its relationship with the US, Egypt is using this to present itself as the key player in anti terrorism in the Middle East particularly in these 3 files.If the US supports Egypt’s position on these issues within the framework of anti terrorism policy, Egyptian authorities and media instantly translate this into support to Egypt’s anti terrorism at large including the domestic level.

In the framework of its relationship with the US, with Hamas, Egypt is presenting itself as a major fighter against terrorism, in Libya, Egypt presenting itself and its discourse as a crucial buffer zone between the new terrorist hub in Libya and other American interests in the region and these might explain one major reason why the US might be reluctant to reconsider the military aid to Egypt. The same goes for Syria where Egypt presents itself today as having a moderate position that comes from the fact that after Assad there will be an Islamist government that will take over and that contradicts Egypt’s interests inside Egypt and in the region.2- Today Egypt’s stand is a stake in itself meaning that to regional and international players, including the US, Egypt has become one of the files they are talking about and that were not the case before 2011.The fact that Egypt itself has become a conflict zone has an impact on Egypt’s position in some files: The first concerning Egypt’s role in democracy promotion in the region as Egypt was supposed to lead this kind of trans-political transformation in the region. The second file concerning Egypt’s relations with Iran. Every government that took over since the outset of Mubarak tried to start discussion with Saudi Arabia and this has implications on Egypt’s relation with Iran there will not be any relations with Iran soon because of the Gulf’s pressure, in regional issues, Egypt’s position is very much at odds with the Iranian positions from issues like Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Left alone, Egypt would have had more flexibility with Iran but currently this has become increasingly difficult.The third file is Egypt’s relations with the Gulf countries. Since the overthrow of Mubarak, every Egyptian head of state went to Saudi Arabia. These visits are not only on financial or political levels, but rather for enhancing strategic purposes and military maneuvers. Another file is the role of Russia in the region not only as far as military is concerned, but also Russia is important because of importing wheat which is more important than arms to the Egyptian people. Russia is enhancing its strategic relations in the region and also includes cooperation in liquid gas and in the nuclear energy for producing electricity at the same time when Egypt is threatened by the issue of the Ethiopian dam. 3- The question of the Nile is a question of life and death to Egypt. This is the element structuring Egypt’s position in Africa in Egypt’s policy in Africa today especially towards Nile Basin countries. There is no known cooperation between Egypt and the US to solve this conflict of the Ethiopian dam in spite of the US very good relationships with Ethiopia. The US did not offer to middle in this issue nor did Egypt asked it to do so. 4- Who takes the decision in Egypt in foreign and domestic policies? Right now the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very important. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is placing Egypt at the heart of policy making but this is not going to continue because since 2011 the question of security has been prevailing over regional issues.

The following are the opinions expressed in the discussions that took place among the participants.

– During Nasser’s and Sadat’s eras Egypt was in states of war and peace also these eras were eras of great developments and initiatives in the region. During Mubarak’s rule and especially in the

1990s, Egypt was the leader of the whole region and it was leading the whole region towards peace. How we expect the regional role of Egypt in the present time? The first paper mentioned that the lead for democratization should have been done by Egypt in the region and this is not fair because we are still in a revolution and it has to unfold certain developments. Egypt is not looking for an alternative partner and Egypt is very concerned about its interest with the US as well as that the Russians will not accept to be an alternative partner.

– How the money that is coming from the Gulf to Egypt at the present constrains Egypt’s foreign policy?

– How important is the divergent position in Syria between Egypt and critical Gulf allies and will Egypt shift the Gulf countries’ perspective on Syria or vice versa?Predictions for what al-Sisi foreign policy would look like. Egypt’s foreign policy in the near future will be tackling regional threats but there is something beyond that that Egypt will try to achieve regionally in terms of other regional influence which goes beyond countering security threats.

– I see that there are some constraints in Egypt’s role in the region. First one in the economy. The second constraint is the model that Egypt projects. In his interview last night ex Field Marshal al-Sisi answered a question about when Egypt will achieve Western democracy by saying that it will take another 25 years for Egypt to become a real democratic country. I do not think that Egypt under al-Sisi will project a model for democracy. Also the constraints in Egypt relationship with Iran. The last constraint is that now there are other powers in Africa besides the US and Egypt might want to join some of these powers like China so this is going to affect the Egypt-US relationship.

– Egypt now is currently fragmented. We do not actually sure if al-Sisi presidency will be able to act as a normal presidency and I wonder how far this going to affect foreign policy.In the Gulf area there is no one single Gulf position beyond the Qatari exception. The Saudi position, for example, is different from the Emirati one. This is important for us to consider because it is not simply Qatar versus the rest.

– Egypt is going through a huge transformation process at the economic, political, or strategic levels all these challenges that we are facing and we will be facing further in the near future need a stronger relation with the US and a continuous strategic dialogue with the US. The Gulf states came closer to Egypt because of the common threats they have seen will be coming to them later which is different from their traditional position. What we see now is not only a transformation of Egypt but of the entire region. There is also the relationship of Egypt related to Africa and I think that the cooperation and more discussion between Egypt and US when it comes to African policy, which took place before, we do not have to fix the issue on security problems only but we need to widen the scope. That is why we have been asking for more economic cooperation and trade relations that mean stronger relationship with the US to build a strong asset in the region. Also there is the Ethiopian new idea of developing the Nile which threats the ecological balance in the region.

– My reading that decisions are now made in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We need vision and we need creativity. I have not heard anything about the impact of the domestic situation on conducting foreign policy. If you look at the time of Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, who is one of

the best Foreign Ministers Egypt has, he has all the skills, the training, and the attitude. But look at his statements; most of the time he is trying to sell certain domestic developments which is really not his mandate. But he has to give those statements about the elections, Menia court verdict, and other issues. These elements we have to bear in mind.The other point that intrigues me is what we have been hearing here yesterday and today that Egypt is not important and then right after that Egypt is pivotal. In his talk yesterday, Minister Nabil Fahmy said that during his deliberations in Washington most of the questions were, not why did you do this, but how to do this. The US is seeking guidance from Egypt on handling certain issues. And this comes to what of you have said that the partnership between Egypt and the US is vital because Egypt has accumulated wisdom. Egypt may not be important but the clout of Egypt is critical. If you look at the clout of Egypt in what is happening in the Arab world; Tunisia is very small but the impact of Tunisia is not as much as the impact of a troubled Egypt. We all agree that you cannot overlook Egypt or underestimate the clout of Egypt.

– There are some controversial points to be further discussed with some depth: The approach of regional security and military balances. The policy of neutral capacity in the region. The direction and pace for the modality for reform and democratization in the

region. The role of non-Arab countries in the region. The tendency towards the fragmentation of the region. The whole issue towards political Islam. The issue of the Middle East and Israel.

– From what we see during the period when al-Sisi was the de facto in charge in Egypt we saw a lot of populism mobilizing the masses. All the decisions and the talks of the Egyptian ambassadors during this period were not necessarily the decisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I believe that we are going to see a lot of this going under al-Sisi’s rule.Al-Sisi close relations with people like Amro Moussa and Mohamed Hassanein Heikal could be indications on how he is going to conduct foreign policy.Although al-Sisi has a large campaign he is still consulting with the military and I think we are going to continue that kind of populism for sometime but given the position of the military position in Egypt I do not know if he is going to be very daring in his policy. However, I am sure that he will not be as submissive as Mubarak concerning the US and other regional issues.As for the Gulf there is no unified position. For example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE they have their differences but they are looking for Egypt and they are supporting what is going on domestically in Egypt.There is a friendly competition between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the leading role in the region something we saw in the different between Egypt’s position and Saudi position from the US military intervention in Syria.

– There has been a leadership void in the region. And that includes America has been tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan and more in fighting terrorism. Qatar that has so much wealth has a government that wanted it to have some more primacy. When no one was there in the leadership position they stepped in even if that stepping in was inconsistent with what their objectives were. Especially with a new leadership in Qatar and will see how it goes forward.

Turkey had its chance to be a leader but that moment has passed. Turkey is not going to lead the picture but is going to remain in the picture.There are a lot of speculations on what al-Sisi actually believes but even among his colleagues, if you ask them, what is he actually going to do; they do not know. He is not going to show his cards. This gives a hint that he follows his early predecessors in terms of what can be the best move for Egypt at this time. I think that is good. I do not think he has the intention to be an independent actor right now. He is smart enough to realize that it will be dangerous for him. He will be playing defense for the time even of this is not what he prefers to do.As for Egypt getting military equipments from Russia, that was done since the US started to supply Egypt with military aid. This kind of cooperation is not new. There is an over reacting to this issue

– The US position relative to Israeli military powers remains policy to the US that Israel keeps a military edge. So the formula that was built in the peace accords that military aid would be provided to Egypt and Israel at a ratio of 2 to 3 is very unlikely that this policy is going to change in the near future nor the equation of the dollar spent.

Closing Session and Final Remarks and Future Steps

- This workshop comes as a culmination of efforts started 2 years ago. Last year the workshop was limited to Egyptian participants. During this second workshop, or second effort, the idea came that the dialogue on US-Egyptian relationship should not be limited to Egyptians but also should include US partners to discuss different aspects of the relationship. We started by setting the context of this relation within the new global order: there are new actors, rising powers, non-state actors, transnational cooperation, regional organizations, and terrorist organizations.

We moved then to examine the military and strategic aspects. Although there are some conversions of interests still there are issues that Egypt would like the US to help with such as the air defense system, in addition to providing the Egyptian armed forces with tanks and fighters. The American side believes that since the signing of the Camp David Accords there is no need for such heavy weapons and that the Egyptian army should limit its functions to fight terrorism.

As for economic relations, the Egyptian side would like a new type of economic relations with the US. Perhaps the economic assistance could play a new important role in improving human capital in Egypt. The private sector can play a role in expanding these relations and moving these relations to another level perhaps to something like the relationship of South Korea and the US.

Then we moved to examine the public perception in the two countries. Egyptians do not have a very positive image of the US and this is related to the amount of aid given to Egypt and also to the US policy in the region.

Then we examined regional issues that give rise to some sort of difference in views between the US and Egypt. The most important of these issues is the Palestinian question. In fact both Egypt and the US do not have a vision of what their role should be in the region.

- We have started this workshop at a global level and ended up at a regional level. Egypt is influenced by both the global and regional levels.

We had a very interesting first session on the global system and the global determinants that influence the position of the US towards Egypt and vice versa, and also on the developments of Egypt itself. There is a room for Egypt to be more autonomous as a result of the developments in the global system. However for Egypt to cease the opportunity, it has to develop its own power which is at the moment latent due to the economic and political situations in Egypt. Also due to the uncertainties as to whether the current political process will produce the success that Egyptians expect. One subject of importance is whether Egypt is still important to the US or not. This view exists in Washington that Egypt is not that important anymore as opposed to another view that Egypt is still important to the US. Everyone has agreed that no one can afford an unstable Egypt with extended instability because of its importance in the region. We have started this workshop at a global level and ended up at a regional level and in between we addressed politics, economy, culture and perceptions.In politics it was about characterizing what is going on in Egypt from the US and Egypt different perspectives. Like a diagnosis of what is going on in Egypt: the process Egypt is going through, the sicknesses. There is hope that Egypt can recover but there was no agreement on how a country in crisis can recover. The economy was addressed in two sessions. It is obvious that the problem in Egypt is a problem of development and under development economy. The problems of unemployment, economic reform, the conditions for economic reform and how the private sector should carry out the economic development of the country supported by the Egyptian state with its international partners like the US. There were differences on the forms of economic cooperation from the US.When it came to culture; the perceptions were negative on both sides. Perception of Egypt in the US was very good before 2011, then Egypt lost ground and its perception in the US went from 70% to 30%. This is related to the political developments and confused transitional time that Egypt is going through. The negative perception of the US in Egypt takes place in a context of a positive perception. In the past 65 years we had huge influence of US culture in the region but at the same time we had the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question. There is admiration and resentment at the same time of the US till now. What added to the resentment of the US in Egypt was the failure of the economic policies in the past 40 years which some people connected to the cooperation of Egypt with the US. With regard to regional issues: Egypt is closer to the region, it has its own objectives, its own interests in the region which may be in agreement or disagreement with the US’ own interests. We have a different region or a region which is changing. The Palestinian question is till central to the region. There is also the role of Egypt in both the Arab world and Africa. Also Syria as a case, and Iran and the question whether Egypt could play a role in reconciliation between different actors in the region and that will add a lot to Egypt.In the session on politics and how Egypt and the US could work together, there were different narratives which offer different perspectives on the Egypt-US relations. If we deconstruct the different positions, of the US and Egyptians participants, we will find elements that are common in each. Even in those outline positions, we will find elements of commonality to build upon. What we need to do is to identify those elements to nurture, to develop, and to build on them.

There is an agreement that Egypt and the US both need each other. It is not a need of weakness, hopefully, but a need like countries need each other. International cooperation is essential. Egypt cannot afford a conflict with the US and vice versa. The question is how to build this cooperation. The two parties need to build healthy relations which mean that one party cannot have much dependency on the other and at the same time such relations would help to develop Egypt. Also healthy relations mean balanced relations. Egypt then needs to reconstruct its relations with the US while working on building other relations with other countries.– During the honest discussions we had during the workshop we found moments of consensus and also moments of debate. Your willingness to engage at that level demonstrates the commitment of everybody to build stronger US-Egyptian relationships. Both the US and Egypt are each now in the process of redefining their role in this region and as both countries redefining their roles in the Middle East the relationships are necessarily in flux. It is a moment when each side is questioning whether the other side is even relevant anymore. But during the last two days I have find a clear consensus that Egypt matters to the American priorities and that the US does matter to Egypt’s priorities. It is also clear from our conversations that the global, regional, and domestic conditions in Egypt and the US mean that our relationship cannot exist in isolation. You made a point that a healthy relationship is of greater balance and greater independence. At the same time all of us exist in an interdependent world. So may be our bilateral connections will still be dependant not only on our needs from one another but the dependencies we have each of us elsewhere in the region and globally. We are going to be buffeted by these other factors like we have never been before: global factors, regional factors, and domestic politics and that will be the future of our relationship and how it will be influenced and shaped.I will put out 4 points, or 4 Ts, on how to deal with that:

1 - Transforming our dialogue. We have to incorporate other voices; we need to broaden and deepen the dialogue between the two countries and to bring in other segments of our populations such as business sector, NGOs, and those who were not part of the dialogue before.

2 - More transparency in how we engage with one another. If we want to overcome issues such as the conspiracy theory, the negative reception, and the grievances we need to be more transparent with one another and with our publics to make the case.

3 - Targeting: in our cooperation, we need to focus more on things we can identify that will make concrete impact on our peoples and on our governmental priorities, we need to target our efforts and we need to follow through.

4- Transition: Egypt has ambitious goals for itself in the coming years; political and security goals but also institutional and societal transformations. If Egypt succeeds in achieving these ambitious goals, this will create new opportunities for our relationship. A democratic Egypt will be able to forge a much deeper and richer relationship with the US.

- The workshop may have shown that the present may not be so bright and although the situation remains fluid in Egypt and in the region our hopes and expectations for the future are high based on exactly what was said that there is continued relevance of both countries to one another.Foreign policy is much shaped and influenced by domestic policies and that is why we should understand the dynamics behind foreign policies in both countries. We still have a lot to cover. I would like to propose some ideas to think them over and may be we can address them later on.

*We need to see how to capitalize on this workshop; how to develop this further. Some think that we should have a similar event in Washington and this would be a continued process. *Although we have agreed not to involve the press or government representatives and we have followed these rules However, we have to consider the option of compiling this wealth of information, these interesting papers, and these discussions we had for those two days.

– In the US-Egypt relationship we have to follow two tracks; the bilateral track and the international track. The international track will be both on the Egyptian and the American side. One of the speaker said that the US is a divided nation and also here in Egypt we are divided over many issues including how we see our relations with the US. There is a great importance to dissemination because if we are complaining of a public opinion that is not conducive to good working relationship between Egypt and the US we must work on explaining facts to the publics; how we build good harmonious relationship for the best interest of the two sides. We have to explain hard facts to the Egyptian people about why Egypt needs as much as the US needs good relations with one another.

– Some ideas for the next step: *It might be interesting to have a joint email or a closed web site to share different ideas.*We should think about the theme for our next meeting; should we have a comprehensive approach and try to go over everything, or we focus on one issue and discuss it in depth. *May be it is time to do joint papers so we do not compartmentalize ourselves and get into trenchant positions where everybody feels they have to defend their respective sides.*May be we can find new techniques and new format for our meetings.