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ForewordThe campaign described in the present volume wasimportant to the

Army as an experience in amphibious warfare and combined operationsagainst a formidable and still resourceful enemy. It was also of criticalimportancein theevolutionofAmerican strategyin the Pacific. CARTWHEELbegan as an uphill fight with means that seemed inadequate to the endsproposed, even though these were limited. But it swiftly brought our forcesto a crest from which we were able to launch the two powerful drives,through the Southwest and Central Pacific, that crushed Japan before weredeployed the forces directed against Germany.The campaign put to thetest the principle of unityof command, and also the capacityfor co-opera-tion between two theaters, one under Army, the other under Navy com-mand, and both under forceful and dominant commanders. By ingeniousand aggressive use of the ground, sea, and air forces at their disposal theymade thesesuffice toachieve more than had been foreseenaspossible, andopened up a newvistaof strategy.They took a heavy toll of the enemy'sresources, established the technique of bypassing his strongholds, includ-ing finally Rabaul itself, and threw him on the defensive.This book willbe of interest not onlytoprofessional officers, but also to awide varietyofother readers and students.Washington, D. C.30 May 1958 R. W. STEPHENSMaj. Gen., U. S. A.

Chief of Military History

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The AuthorBorn in Scotland and a U.S. citizen since 1928, John Miller, jr., was

awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History by the State Uni-versity of Iowa in 1942. In World War II he sawservice overseas with theU.S. Marine Corps in NewZealand and in the Solomon Islands, where heparticipated in the Bougainville operations described in this volume. Amember of the historical staff of the Department of the Army since 1945,Dr. Milleris the authorof Guadalcanal: The First Offensive in the presentseries, coauthor of Korea: 1951-1953, and contributor of several chaptersto the 1956 edition ofROTC Manual 145-20,AmericanMilitary History,1607-1953. He haswritten articles and reviews forhistorical and militaryjournals, and has taught history at the University of Omaha, the StateUniversity of Iowa, the Graduate School of the U.S. Department of Agri-culture, and The American University in Washington, D.C.

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PrefaceThe reduction of Rabaul was accomplished by a gigantic double en-

velopment which required closely co-ordinated land, sea, and air opera-tions by the armed forces of the United States and her Pacific allies.Thisvolume, like theothers in theseries, attempts to explain in detail the partplayed by the U.S. Army ground forces and to make clear, by summary,the contributions of all forces and nations.

The CARTWHEEL battles differed from those of the two earlier cam-paigns, Guadalcanal and Papua, that were directed toward the reductionof Rabaul.In Guadalcanaland Papua the antagonists,more evenlymatchedthan in later campaigns, strained themselves to bring relatively smallground forces to bear on narrow fronts, so that great issues hinged on theoutcome of regimental and battalion actions. A study of those campaigns,therefore, quite properly focuses on tactics. During the period covered bythis book the Allied commanders could employ superior forces over a vastarea while the Japanese had no recourse but to entrench themselves in aneffort to hold out and inflict as many casualties as possible. This volumeattempts to analyze the techniques by which the Allies employed theirstrength to bypass fortified positions and seize weakly defended but stra-tegically important areas, or, in the apt baseball parlance used by GeneralMacArthur,to"hit 'emwheretheyain't."It is,therefore, astudyinstrategyand high command as well as in tactics.

The will ing, able counsel and assistance I have received in preparingthisbookhavegreatlyeased my task. Dr. LouisMorton,Chief of the PacificSection of the Office of Military Historyduring the period of research andwriting, and my other friends and colleagues in this Office have aidedunstintingly. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Army,has been a constant source of wise and kindly help. The successive Chiefsof Military HistoryMaj. Gens. OrlandoWard, Albert C. Smith, John H.Stokes, and Richard W. Stephensand Cols. Thomas J. Sands, George G.O'Connor, Ridgway P. Smith, Jr., and Seneca W. Foote have appreciatedthenatureand worthofhistoryand provided encouragementand powerfulsupport.For locating and furnishing to me, without restriction, all the neces-sary records I wish to make public my gratitude to the efficient records

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staff of this Office and of the Military Records Branch, Federal RecordsCenter,of the U.S.General ServicesAdministration; the HistoricalBranch,G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Naval History Divisionof the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I also owe thanks to Messrs.Stanley L. Falk and Thomas G. Wilds for performing research and trans-lation in Japaneserecords, to Mrs. Marguerite Bartz for typing the manu-script, and to theparticipantsnamed on pp. 386-87whogenerouslyread allor parts of the manuscript and sent in helpful comments and additionalinformation.

Final editingwas theresponsibilityofMrs.GayMorenus Hammerman,whoalsoprepared theindex.Mrs.NancyEasterlingPayne wascopyeditor.Maps were prepared under the supervision of Maj. James F. Holly andMr. Elliot Dunay. Miss Margaret E.Tackley selected the photographs andwrote the captions. To these capable and friendly colleagues who con-tributed so muchmany thanks.

Responsibility for any deficiencies in thisbook isminealone.Washington, D. C.30 May 1958 JOHN MILLER, JR.

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ContentsChapter Page

I THE STRATEGIC B CKGROUND 1Early Pacific Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1The Casablanca Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

I I . SELECTING OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Preliminary Theater Planning . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Pacific Military Conference . . . . . . . . . . . 11Preparation of the Directive of 28 March 1943 . . . . . . 15

III. ELKTON III: THE PLAN FORCARTWHEEL . . . . . 20The Southwest Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20The Plan of Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

IV . T H E JAPANESE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Japanese Command and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 32Japanese Offensives, January-June 1943 . . . . . . . . 36Japanese StrengthandDispositions,30June 1943 . . . . . 45

V. CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THESOUTHWEST PACIFIC . . 49CHRONICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9Nassau B a y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9

VI. TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEWGEORGIA ... 67South Pacific Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Preparations and Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70Secondary Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8Rendova. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5The Move toZanana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Rice Anchorage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4

VII. THE OFFENSIVE STALLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Japanese Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7Operations o f theNorthern Landing Group . . . . . . . 99Operations of theSouthernLanding Group . . . . . . . 106Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 0Command and Reinforcements . . . . . . . . . . . 122

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Chapter PageVIII. GRISWOLDTAKESOVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 27

The Attack on Bairoko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Pressureon theJapanese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132Preparations for the Corps Offensive . . . . . . . . . 137

IX. XIVCORPSOFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 3Ilangana andShimizu Hill: The 43d Division . . . . . . 146The Attack Against theRidges: The 37th Division . . . . 149Capture of the Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

X . AFTERMUNDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 65T h e Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 65Reinforcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7T h e Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 69Vella Lavella: The Bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Final Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 4

XI. THE MARKHAM VALLEYAND THE HUON PENINSULA 189Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9Allied Air and Naval Preparations . . . . . . . . . . 195Lae: T he Seaborne Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 02Nadzab: The Airborne Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . 2 07Strategic Reconsiderations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2Advance Through theRamu Valley . . . . . . . . . . 216T h e Coastal Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 17

XII. T HE INVASION O F BOUGAINVILLE . . . . . . . . 222The Decision To Bypass Rabaul . . . . . . . . . . . 222T h e General Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 25Air Operations in October . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229Forces and Tactical Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Preliminary Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 9Seizure of Empress Augusta Bay . . . . . . . . . . . 241

XIII. EXPLOITINGT H EBEACHHEAD . . . . . . . . . . 2 51Air and Surface Action, 1-11 November . . . . . . . . 251Operations Ashore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 5December Attacks Against Rabaul . . . . . . . . . . 26 9

XIV. CROSSINGT H ESTRAITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 72Plans a n d Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 72Arawe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 2Cape Gloucester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 89Saidor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 5

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Chapter PageXV. E X P A N D I N G INTOTHE BISMARCKARCHIPELAGO . . 306General Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 6Reducing Rabaul an d Kavieng . . . . . . . . . . . 309Seizure of the GreenIslands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

XVI. ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES . . . . . . . . . 316T h e Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 16The Reconnaissance in Force . . . . . . . . . . . . 321To the Shores of Seeadler Harbour . . . . . . . . . . 332Lorengau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 9

XVII. BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK . . . . . . . . 3 5 1Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 1Hill 7 0 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58Hill 2 6 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64Action by the Creeks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

XVIII. FINALE: EMIRAU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 9BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 3GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 0BASIC MILITARY MAPSYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 9

TablesNo. Page1. Comparison of Allied Intelligence Estimates With Japanese Strength

and Dispositions, Southeast Area, 30June 1943 . . . . . . . 472 . American Casualties on New Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Charts1 . Organization of Forces fo r CARTWHEEL . . . . . . . . . . . 212. EstimatedTimingand Sequenceof CARTWHEEL Operations . . . . 283. Organization of Japanese Forces, Southeast Area, June 1943 ... 334. Southwest Pacific Organization for Woodlark-Kiriwina . . . . . 525. Organization of Principal South Pacific Forces, June 1943 . . . . 68

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No. Page6 . Organization of South Pacific Forces for TOENAILS . . . . . . . 747. Organization of Attack Force, D Day . . . . . . . . . . . 778. Western Force on D Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799. Eastern Force on D Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 0 . South Pacific Organization forVella Lavella Invasion . . . . . . 176

11. Organization of Northern Force [TF 31], Vella Lavella . . . . . 177

Maps1. Pacific Ocean (National Geographic Society Map) . . Inside Back Cover2. The Pacific Areas, as of 1 August 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . 33 . The CARTWHEEL Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 . T h e Wau Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375. Operation CHRONICLE Area, 30June 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 506. Southern Approaches toSalamaua . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627. Landings in NewGeorgia, 21June-5July 1943 . . . . . . . . 698. Approach toBairoko,5-20July 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 . DriveTowards Munda Point, 2-14July 1943 . . . . . . . . . 107

10. Capture of MundaPoint, 22July-4August 1943 . . . . . . . . 14511 . The Cleanup, 5-27 August 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16612. The Huon Peninsula and theStraits . . . . . . . . . . . . 18913. Opening the Markham Valley, 4-16 September 1943 . . . . . . 20414. Capture ofFinschhafen, 22September-20October 1943 . . . . . 21715 . Bougainville Landings, 27October-1November 1943 . . . . . . 22516. Situation on Bougainville, 15 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . 25817 . Arawe Landings, 15December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . 28318 . Cape Gloucester Landings, 26-29 December 1943 . . . . . . . 2921 9 . Seeadler Harbour Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31820 . Los Negros Assault, 29February-9 March 1944 . . . . . . . . 32421. Lugos Mission to Lorengau, 15-18 March 1944 . . . . . . . . 34122. Japanese Counterattack on Bougainville,9-17 March 1944 . . . . 353

IllustrationsGeneral Douglas MacArthur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Some Pacific Planners in Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Vice Adm. Jinichi Kusaka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5General Hitoshi Imamura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5L t . Gen. Hatazo Adachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6

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PageLt . Gen.Haruyoshi Hyakutake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38JapaneseTroopTransportUnder Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Brig. Gen.Nathan F. Twining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Troops Disembarking From L C I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7Natives Carrying Luggage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8Jeep and Trailer Leaving an LST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Clearing Airfield Site With Hand Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Airfield a t Segi Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2Men of152dField Arti l lery Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Ships Moving Toward Rendova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86Aboard theTransportMcCawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7Men of 43d Signal Company Wading Ashore . . . . . . . . . . 89Truck Towinga 155-mm. HowitzerOver MuddyTrail . . . . . . . 93Maj. Gen.Noboru Sasaki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8Troopsof the 172d Infant ry WadingAcross aCreek . . . . . . . . 111Evacuating Casualties, 12 July 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113JeepTrail From Zanana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 5Infant ry Loading on LCP(R)'s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116LCM's Approaching Laiana, NewGeorgia . . . . . . . . . . . 117Rear Adm. Theodore S.Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125Japanese Prisoners Captured Near Laiana Beach . . . . . . . . . 128Pillbox Made ofCoconut Logs and Coral . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Soldiers of the161stInfantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138Bombing of Munda Airfield, Early Morning . . . . . . . . . . 141Munda Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 0Reducingan Enemy PillboxWith aFlameThrower . . . . . . . . 162Light Tanks M3 of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion . . . . . . . 164Munda Airfield in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1684-Ton Truck Stuck in the Mud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17037th Division Troops Carrying Weapons andAmmunition . . . . . 171Warship Firing a t Japanese Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . 18214thNewZealand Brigade Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185Maj. Gen.J . Lawton Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188B-24Over Salamaua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 7Enemy Aircraft Destroyed on the Ground . . . . . . . . . . . 198B-25Medium Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 9Salamaua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 2CrossingRain-Swollen Francisco River . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 3Australian Troops Debarking From LST's . . . . . . . . . . . 206C-47 Transport Planes Loaded With Parachute Troops . . . . . . 208Airdrop at Nadzab, Morning of 5 September 1943. . . . . . . . 209Bombing Rabaul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 1B-25's Leaving Bougainville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 3Lt . Gen.Alexander A . Vandegr i f t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 7

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PageMaj. Gen. Allen H . Turnage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243Mount Bagana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 53d Marines Landing on Cape Torokina . . . . . . . . . . . . 247LCVP's on the Beach at Empress Augusta Bay . . . . . . . . . . 249Aircrewman Wounded in Strike on Rabaul . . . . . . . . . . . 254Amphibian Tractors LVT (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256Tractor and Trailer in Mud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257Soldiers of the 148th Regimental Combat Team . . . . . . . . . 259Admiral William F . Halsey, J r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 237th Division Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 3Results of Japanese Bombing of Puruata Island . . . . . . . . . 264105-mm. Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 64.2-Inch Chemical Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 7Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268C-47 Air-Dropping Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 0B-25's Over Wewak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 1Alligator Returning to Beach on Arawe . . . . . . . . . . . . 289Early Morning Bombardment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 17th Marines Landing on Narrow Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . 293Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297M10Motor Carriage Mounting 3-Inch Gun . . . . . . . . . . . 301Japanese Ships Burning a t Rabaul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310Aboard the Cruiser Phoenix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325First Wave of Landing Craft Unloading . . . . . . . . . . . . 3272 d L t . Marvin J . Henshaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328Digging aFoxhole Through Coral Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . 329Lt . Gen. Walter Krueger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337LST's Loaded With Troops and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . 339Men of the 8th Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346Crossing the Lorengau River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Troop G, 8th Cavalry, Near Number 1 Road . . . . . . . . . . 34960-mm. Mortar Emplacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 4155-mm. Guns of the 3d Marine Defense Battalion . . . . . . . . 35737thDivision MenCarrying 5-GallonCansofWater . . . . . . . . 360Two Light TanksM3 of the754th Tank Battalion . . . . . . . . 363"OP Tree" on Hill 260. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365South Knob, Hill 260. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370North Knob, Hill 260. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371Maj . Gen.Robert S. Beightler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376Tank-Infantry Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 7Japanese PillboxonFire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files.xvi


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CHAPTER I

The Strategic BackgroundThe great Japanese bastionat Rabaul

on New Britain in the Bismarck Archi-pelagoposedadouble threatto theAlliesfrom 1942through the early months of1944. Bristling with warships and air-planes, it menaced the line of commu-nications from the United StatestoAus-tralia, and itblockedanyAllied advancealong thenorth coastof NewGuinea tothe Philippines. Reduction of Rabaulwas therefore the primary mission, dur-ing this period, of the Allied forces ofthe South and Southwest Pacific Areas.In executing this mission these forcesfought a longseriesof ground, air,andnavalbattles spaced acrossa vast region.

Early Pacific StrategyBefore th e Allies could move effec-

tively against Rabaul itself, they had toclear the way by seizing Guadalcanaland drivingthe Japanese out of the Pa-puan Peninsula.With thesuccessful con-clusion of these two campaigns in early1943, the South and Southwest Pacificforcescompleted th e first phaseof aseriesof offensive operations against Rabaulthat had beenorderedby the U.S.JointChiefsof Staff inJuly 1942.The strategicpurpose of this serieswas defensive, thescale limited.The immediateaim of theJoint Chiefs was, not to defeat theJapa-

nesenation,but toprotect AustraliaandNew Zealand by halting the Japanesesouthward advance from Rabaul towardthe air and sea linesof communicationthat joined the United States andHawaii to Australia and NewZealand.

These orders stemmed from earlier,more fundamental decisions by Presi-dent FranklinD.Roosevelt, PrimeMin-isterWinstonS.Churchill,and the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff, whofrom the very outset had agreed to de-feat Germany first and then to concen-trate against Japan. Pending Germany'sdefeat, theAllies decidedon a defensiveattitude in the Pacific. But within thisf ramework they firmlyresolved that Aus-tralia, New Zealand, the Hawaiian Is-lands, and Midway were not to be al-lowed to fall into Japanese hands.1

Throughout the earlymonths of 1942the Japanese threat to the Allied lineof communications had mounted stead-1For complete discussions on the developmentof this strategy see Maurice Matloff and Edwin

M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition War-fare: 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953), Chs. I-VIII;Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Wash-ington, 1953), Chs. II-IV, IX; and Mark SkinnerWatson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Prepara-tions (Washington, 1950), pp. 367-521. All are inthe series, UNITED STATES A R M Y IN WORLDWAR II. See also Louis Morton's volumes onstrategy, command, and logistics in the Pacific, nowin preparation for the same series.


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2 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAULily. The enemy's capture of Rabaul inJanuary placed him in an excellent posi-tion to move south. Well situated inrelation to Truk and the Palau Islands,Rabaul possessed a magnificent harboras well assites fo r several airfields. Only440 nautical miles southwest of Rabaulliesthe NewGuineacoast,whileGuadal-canal is but 565 nautical miles to thesoutheast. Thus the Japanese could ad-vance southward covered all the way byland-based bombers. And since none oftheislandsin theBismarckArchipelago-NewGuinea-Solomons area lay beyondfighter-plane range of its neighbors, theJapanese could also cover their advancewith fighters bybuildingairstripsastheymoved along. By May 1942they hadcompleted th e occupation of the Bis-marck Archipelago. They pushed southto establish bases at Lae and Salamauaon the northeast coast of New Guinea,and built airfields in the northern Solo-mons.

With the Japanese seemingly able toadvance at will, the Joint Chiefs hadbeen making all possible efforts to pro-tect Hawaii, Midway,NewZealand,andAustralia by holding the lines of com-munication.Troopstoreinforce existingAllied bases and to establish new baseswere rushed overseas in early 1942.The32dand41stDivisions wenttoAustralia.The 37th Divisionwas dispatched to theFijis, the Americal Division to NewCaledonia, and the 147th Infantry toTongatabu.Troops of theAmerical Di-vision, plusNavy and Marineunits,oc-cupiedposts in the NewHebridesbegin-ninginMarch.ANavyand MarineforceheldSamoa.At this time the Japanese planned tocut the line ofcommunications arid iso-

late Australiabyseizingthe Fijis, Samoa,New Caledonia, and Port Moresby inNewGuinea.But even before they wereturned back from Port Moresby by theAlliesduring May,in thenaval battleofthe Coral Sea, the Japanese had post-poned the attacks against the Fijis, NewCaledonia, and Samoa and had plannedinstead the June attempt against Mid-way. Although they managed to seize afoothold in the Aleutians, they faileddisastrously at Midway. With four air-craft carriers sunk and hundreds ofplanesandpilots lost,theJapanesecouldno longer continue their offensives. TheAllies were thus able to take the initia-tivein thePacific.

To conduct operations, the JointChiefsorganizedthePacifictheater alonglines which prevailed for the rest of theperiodofactive hostilities.Byagreementin March 1942amongtheAlliednationsconcerned, they set up two huge com-mands, the Southwest Pacific Area andthe Pacific Ocean Area.2 (Map 2) TheSouthwest Pacific includedAustraliaandadjacent waters, all the NetherlandsIndies except Sumatra, and the Philip-pineIslands.

The vast Pacific Ocean Areas em-braced nearly all the remainder of thePacific Ocean. Unlike the SouthwestPacific, which was one unit, the PacificOcean Areas were divided into threepartstheSouth,Central,and NorthPa-cific Areas. The North Pacific includedthe ocean reaches north of latitude 42

2The plural is customarily employed for thePacific Ocean Areas, although the JCS directiveestablishing the command used "Area." See CCS57/1, Memo, JCS for President, 30 Mar 42, title:Dirs to CINCPOA and to the Supreme ComdrSWPA,with Incls.


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THE STRATEGIC B A C K G R O U N D

MAP 2

north; the Central Pacific lay between42northand theEquator.The South Pacific Area, which lay

south of the Equator, east of longitude159 east, and west of longitude 110west, was an enormous stretch of waterand islands that included but one mod-ern sovereign nation, the Dominion ofNewZealand. Among the islands, manyof them well known to readers of ro-mantic fiction, were the French colonyof New Caledonia, the British-French

Condominium of the New Hebrides,and the Santa Cruz,Fiji, Samoa,Tonga,Cook, Society, and Marquesas Islands.The boundary separating theSouth andSouthwest Pacific Areas (longitude 159east) split the Solomon Islands.

GeneralDouglasMacArthur,SupremeCommander or, as hecame to becalled,Commander in Chief of the SouthwestPacific Area, with headquarters at Bris-bane, Australia, in early 1943,com-manded all land, air, and sea forces


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CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

GENERAL DOUGLAS M A C A R T H U R , Commander in Chief of the Southwest PacificArea, with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the PacificOcean Areas. Photograph taken in Brisbane, Australia, March 1944.assigned by the several Allied govern-ments.3 This famous and controversialgeneral wasenjoined from directlycom-manding any national force. In contrastAdmiral Chester W. Nimitz , who wasconcurrently Commander in Chief ofthe Pacific Ocean Areas, with authorityover all Allied forces assigned, wasalsoCommanderin Chiefof thePacificFleet.He exercised direct control over theNorth and Central Pacific Areas but inaccordance with the Joint Chiefs' in-

structions appointed a subordinate ascommander of the South Pacific Areawith headquarters first at Auckland,NewZealand,and lateratNoumea,NewCaledonia. Like MacArthur, this officerwas ineligible tocommand anynationalforce directly. Admiral William F. Hal-sey, Jr.,the incumbent at the close oftheGuadalcanal Campaign,replaced theoriginal commander,ViceAdm.RobertL. Ghormley, on 18October while thecampaignwasreachingitsclimax.

At the time of the Coral Sea engage-mentin May,asmallJapaneseforcehadgarrisonedTulagi in theSolomons,andshortly afterward the Japanese began

3"Supreme Commander" was the title used byCC S 57/1,30 Mar 42. MacArthur seems to havepreferred "Commander in Chief" and "SupremeCommander" fell into disuse.


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THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 5building an airfield at nearby LungaPoint on Guadalcanal. Just before theylearned of the Japanese airfield underconstruction on Guadalcanal, the JointChiefs capitalized on the Midway vic-tory by ordering the South and South-west Pacific Areas to begin the advanceagainst Rabaul. The operations, as setforth in the Joint Chiefs' orders of 2July 1942,were divided into threephases. The first, or "Task One," wasthe seizure of Tulagi and Guadalcanalin the Solomons, and of the Santa CruzIslands. Since possession of the SantaCruz Islands did not prove necessary,they were never taken. Task Two in-cluded the capture of the remainder ofthe Japanese-held Solomons and of Lae,Salamaua,and other points on the north-east coast of New Guinea in the South-west Pacific Area. Task Three was theseizure and occupation of Rabaul itself,and ofadjacentpositions.4

Command during Task One, whichwould be executed in the South PacificArea, wasentrusted to the South Pacificcommander. Tasks Two and Three, tobe carried out by South and SouthwestPacific Area forces entirely within theSouthwest Pacific Area, were to be con-ducted under MacArthur's command.When they received the Joint Chiefs'directive, the commanders of the Southand Southwest Pacific Areasmet in Mel-bourne, Australia, to discuss the threetasks. They agreed that the advanceshould be governed by two basic con-cepts:theprogressiveforward movement

of air forces and the isolationofRabaulbefore the final assault.After the initiallungeintoGuadalcanal,therewouldfol-low aseriesof advances to seize air andnavalbasesin New Guinea, NewBritain,and the northern Solomons. With thesebases Allied fighter planes and bomberswould be in position to cover the en-tire Bismarck Archipelago-eastern NewGuinea-Solomons area and isolate Ra-baulfrom theeast,west,north,andsouthbefore troopswereput ashoreto capturethegreatbase.5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned thereinforced 1st Marine Division as thelanding force forTask One.That unit,landing on Guadalcanal and Tulagi on7 August 1942,quickly captured itsmajor objectives. The Japanese reactionto the invasionwas soviolent and reso-lute,andAllied control overthe air andsea routessotenuous, that thecampaigndid not end then but dragged on for sixmonths. It was not until February 1943after two Army divisions and onemoreMarine division had been committed tothe battle and six major naval engage-ments foughtthat Guadalcanal wascompletely wrested from the enemy.6

4Jt Dir for Offen Opns in SWPA Agreed on byU.S. CsofS, 2 Jul 42, OPD 381, Sec 2, Case 83.Unlike other JCS directives, this paper bore noJCS number. It is also reproduced in JCS 112,21 Sep 42, title: Mil Sit in the Pac.

5 Dispatch, CINCSWPA and COMSOPAC to CofSUSA, COMINCH, and CINCPAC, 8 Jul 42, CCR82s, ABC 370.26 (7-8-42), Sec 1.

6For the history of the Guadalcanal Campaignsee John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offen-sive,UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WARII (Washington, 1949); Samuel Eliot Morison, His-tory of United States Naval Operations in WorldWar II, Vol.IV,Coral Sea,Midway, and SubmarineActions (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,1949), and Vol. V, The Struggle for Guadalcanal(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949); Maj.

John L. Z immerman , USMCR, The GuadalcanalCampaign (Washington, 1949); and Wesley FrankCraven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army AirForces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:Guadalcanal to SaipanAugust 1942to July 1944(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950).


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CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF R A B A U LWith the Guadalcanalvictory, theAlliesseized the initiative from the Japaneseandhalted their southwardadvance.TheJapanese never attempted the assaultsagainst the Fijis, Samoa, and New Cale-donia.Justas the GuadalcanalCampaignwasopening, a Japanese force landed atBuna, on the northeast coast of NewGuinea's Papuan peninsula, and at-tempted to capture the vital Allied baseat Port Moresby by crossing the tower-ing Owen Stanley Range. But the offen-sive stalled, and MacArthur wasable tomove the 32d U.S.Division, the 7thAustralian Division, and several addi-tional American regimental combatteams and Australian infantry brigadesagainst theJapanesebeachheads atBuna,Gona, and Sanananda on the Papuanpeninsula,as well as to establish bases atMilneBay at Papua's tip and on Good-enough Island in the D'Entrecasteauxgroup.7

At the beginning of 1943, with boththe Guadalcanal and Papuan campaignsdrawing to a successful close, the Alliescouldlookforwardto using Guadalcanaland Papua as bases for continuing theadvance against Rabaul. In the CentralPacific,AdmiralNimitzcouldnotunder-take any offensive westward from PearlHarbor and Midway until the line ofcommunications to Australia was abso-lutely secure. At this time both HalseyandMacArthurwerepreparingplans fortheircampaigns againstRabaul,but hadnot yet submitted them to the JointChiefsof Staff.

The Casablanca ConferenceAlthough the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

not yet received detailed plans for Ra-baul, theywerewellawareof the impor-tance of the operations in the Southand Southwest Pacific Areas. These op-erations naturally had to be consideredin the light of global strategy and re-viewed by the U.S.-British CombinedChiefsof Staff.8

By the end of 1942, the Joint Chiefswere concluding their study of Alliedobjectives for the year 1943.PresidentRoosevelt and the service chiefs werethen preparing to meet at Casablancain French Moroccowith Prime MinisterChurchill and the British Chiefsinorderto explore the problem ful ly and deter-mine Allied objectives for the year. Nofinal plan for the defeat of Japan hadbeen prepared but the subjectwas beingstudied in Washington.9Alsounderdis-cussion were the question of advancingagainst Japan through the North Pacific

7For a detailed discussion of the war in theSouthwest Pacific, 1942-43, see Samuel Milner, Vic-tory in Papua, UNITED STATES ARMY INWORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957).

8See Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive,pp. 172-73; Min,JC S mtg,22 D ec 42; Min,JP Smtg, 16 Sep 42; JCS 112/1 , 14 Oct 42; title: Mil Sitin the Pac.For a more detailed discussion see RayS. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Opera-tions Division, UNITED STATES A R M Y INWORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 215-19,and Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins:An IntimateHistory (New York:Harper&Brothers,1948), Ch. XXVII. See also John Miller, jr., "TheCasablanca Conference and Pacific strategy," Mili-tary Affairs, XIII (Winter 1949), 4.

Unless otherwise indicated, this section is basedon the proceedings and papers of the CasablancaConference which are filed in regular sequencewith the CCS and JCS minutes and papers. Theywere also printed and bound, along with the pro-ceedings of the meetings attended by the Presidentand Prime Minister, in a useful separate volumeCasablanca Conference: Papers and Minutes ofMeetings.

9JPS 67/2,4 Jan 43, title: Proposed Dir for aCampaign Plan for the Defeat of Japan.


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THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 7and the possibility ofconducting opera-tions in Burma to reopen the road toChina.10Pacific operations, and the emphasisand support that theadvanceon Rabaulwould receive, weresignificantly affectedbydecisionsmade at Casablanca.Duringthe ten-day conference that began on 14January the President, the Prime Min-ister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staffcarefully weighed their strategic ends,apportioned the limited meansavailableto accomplish them, and so determinedAllied courses of action for 1943.

The Americans and British who metat Casablanca agreed on general objec-tives, but their plans differed in severalimportant respects. The Americanswished the Allies to conduct a strategicoffensive directly against Germany andto aid the Soviet Union, but they alsofavored strong action in the Pacific andFar East. It wasimperative,in theirview,to guarantee the security of Allied linesofcommunicationthereand to break theenemyholdonpositions that threatenedthem. Convinced that China had to bekept in the war, they recommended thatthe British, with the aid of Americanships and landingcraft, recaptureBurmaso that the Burma Road could be re-opened and the Allies could send moresupplies tobolsterGeneralissimoChiangKai-shek's armies. They wished to keepthe initiative in theSouthwestand SouthPacific, to inflictheavylosseson theJapa-nese, and eventually to use Rabaul andnearby positions as bases for furtheradvances.Admiral ErnestJ. King, Chiefof NavalOperations,expressed the hope

that 30percent ofAllied military powercould be deployed against the Japaneseinstead of the 15percent which he esti-matedwas thenbeing used.

The British understandably shiedaway from enlarging the scope of Alliedaction in the Pacific. With theGermansright across the Channel from England,the British stressed the importance ofconcentrating against Germany first.While admitting the necessity for retak-ing Burma, theystronglyem phasized theimportance of aiding the Soviet Union.They promised to deploy their entirestrength against Japan after the defeatof Germany, and suggested that the Jap-aneseshould meanwhile becontainedbylimited offensives. At the same time theBritish desired to extend the scope ofAllied operations in the Mediterranean.

General George C. Marshall, Chief ofStaff, and Admiral King opposed whatMarshall called "interminable opera-tions in the Mediterranean." They ad-vocated maintaining constant, unremit-ting pressureagainsttheJapaneseto pre-vent them from digging in and consoli-dating their gains. Warning that theAmerican peoplewouldnotstandfor an-other Bataan, Marshall argued that suf-ficient resources must be kept in thePacific; otherwise "a situation mightarisein thePacificat anytimethatwouldnecessitate the United States regretfullywithdrawing from the commitments intheEuropeanTheatre."11AdmiralKing,pointing out thestrategic importanceofan advance across the Central Pacific tothe Philippines, raised the question ofwhere to go after Rabaul wascaptured.The British did not wish to make spe-10 Min, JPS mtgs, 2 and 9 Dec 42; Min, JCS

mtgs, 25Aug, 15Sep, and 15 Dec 42, and 5 Jan 43;Min, CCS mtg, 6 Nov 42. 11Min, CC S mtg, 17 Jan 43.


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CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAULcificcommitmentsforoperationsbeyondRabaulbut suggesteda meeting after itscapture todecide the question.By 23January Americans and Britishhadreconciledtheirdifferencesover stra-tegic objectives for 1943. Theyagreed tosecure the sea communications in theAtlantic, to move supplies to the SovietUnion, to take Sicily, to continue theirbuild-upof forces in Britain for the in-vasion of northern France, anda de-cision that was to have a marked effecton Pacific operationstobomb Germanyheavily in the CombinedBomber Offen-sive that was to be launched by mid-summer 1943.To make sure that noneof these undertakings would be jeop-ardized by theneedfordivertingstrengthto prevent disaster in the Pacific, ade-

quate forceswould be maintained in thePacific and Far East. What was consid-ered "adequate"was not defined.

The Combined Chiefs agreed in prin-ciple that Burma was to be recapturedby the British and that theywouldmeetlater in the year to make final decisions.In the Pacific the Allies were to main-tain constant pressure onJapanwiththepurpose of retaining the initiative andgetting into position for a full-scale of-fensive once Germany had surrendered.Specifically, the Allies intended to cap-tureRabaul,makesecure the Aleutians,and advance west through the Gilbertsand Marshalls in the Central Pacifictoward Truk and the Marianas. TheCentral Pacific advances were supposedto follow thecaptureofRabaul.


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CHAPTER II

Selecting ObjectivesWith Allied strategic objectives for

1943determinedat Casablanca, thenexttask facing the Army and Navy com-manders in Washington and in the Pa-cific was the selection of exact tacticalobjectives.Two considerationswould beparamount in makinga choice: themili-tary value of the objectives, and the re-sources that would be available. Theprocess of selection was not completeduntil a full-dress conference involvingthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint StaffPlanners, and representatives of all thePacific commands had met in Washing-ton.1 Such aconference wasmade neces-sary by the large disparity between thesize of the forces General MacArthurasked for to take his objectives and thesizeof the forces thatwereactuallyavail-able.

Preliminary Theater PlanningGeneralMacArthur'sPlans

In the SouthwestPacific, GeneralMac-Arthur had begun planning for the of-fensive against Rabaul at an early date.His plans for Tasks Two and Threemutually supportingadvancesalong twoaxes,culminating in a convergingattackagainst Rabaulwere the same in earlyJanuary 1943 as those outlined in July

of theprevious year.But his forcescouldnot start Task Two until theAllies hadsuccessfully completed the Guadalcanaland Papuan campaigns in the first twomonths of 1943.Therewere not enoughgroundtroopstoundertakeanyoffensivemoves immediately, MacArthur re-ported,and therewere far from enoughair forces to conduct the campaigns.2

In order toadvance againstRabaul inone continuous movement, MacArthurwished to assemble all the necessaryforces before starting the offensive, andsubstantial reinforcements would be re-quired. In both South and SouthwestPacific Areas there were troops equiva-lent to fifteen and two-thirds American,New Zealand, and Australian divisions,but not all were trained and equippedfo r offensive action. Of the six trainedSouthwestPacificdivisions,fivewouldberesting and reorganizing for some timeto come, after fighting in Guadalcanal,Papua, and theMiddleEast.Therewereseven trained divisionssix Americanand one New Zealandas well as someseparate infantry and cavalry regimentsin the South Pacific. Three of the di-visions and one regiment had seen serv-ice on Guadalcanal and were enjoying

1See below, pp. 11-15.2Rad to MacArthur , 7 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2273;

Rad to M a c A r t h u r , 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2833; Radfrom MacArthur, 10 Jan 43, CM-IN 4574.


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10 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAULa well-deserved rest. The equivalenttherefore of only five divisions plus sev-eralseparateregimentscould be countedasreadyforimmediate use.

In navalstrength, MacArthurwaslim-ited to cruisers, destroyers, and subma-rines.He had no carriers, no battleships,and few cargo ships, transports, andlanding craft. The greater part of thePacific Fleet, including aircraft carriers,battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, wasoperating in the South Pacific Area.Bothareasboasted a total air strengthof about 1,850 land-based planes of alltypesbombers, fighters, and cargoplanes.Theseplanescame from the U.S.Army Air Forces, the U.S. Navy, theU.S. Marine Corps, the Royal New Zea-land Air Force, and the Royal Aus-tralian AirForce.3

At this time General MacArthur waslooking forward to targets well beyondRabaul; he had set his sights on thePhilippine Islands. In February 1943he and his staff concluded that the com-pletion of the campaign against Rabaulcould secure for the Allies "important,but not decisive advantages." These ad-vantageswould certainlyaid fu tureoper-ations but,except for the destruction ofprecious shipping, would do little dam-age to Japan's main economic structure.Since the Netherlands Indies containedthegreateconomic wealth,especiallyoil,taken by Japan in 1941 and 1942, a

decisive blow could be struck, Mac-Arthur reasoned, bycutting the lines ofcommunication between Japan and theIndies. As the Philippine Islands laysquarely athwart all sea and air routesbetweenJapanand the Indies, theAlliescould cut them by establishing air andnaval bases in the Philippines. GeneralMacArthur concluded that he shouldmove to the Philippines by advancingwestward along New Guinea's northcoast, then swinging northwest throughthe intermediate islands into the Philip-pines. The advance along the NewGuinea coastmight be started about thetime that the siege ofRabaulbegan,butcould not safely start until Rabaul wasneutralized lest ships and planes basedthere harry or obstruct the advance.4

Thisplanfor advancing to the Philip-pines, called RENO, had not yet beentransmitted to Washington. It looked farinto the fu ture . There werenot enoughforces to inaugurate the Rabaul plan,ELKTON. Certainly not enough wereavailabletobegin RENO.AdmiralHalsey's Plan

In the South Pacific, Admiral Halseylooked on MundaPointin NewGeorgiaas the most likely first objective for hisforces under Task Two.5 The Japanesehad started an airfield at the AustralianMethodistMissiononMundainNovem-ber 1942 when their attempts to recap-ture Henderson Field on Guadalcanalhadfaltered. The new fieldwasintendedto serve as an advanced air base in an-

3Information on strength and plans at this timeis drawn from GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan for theSeizure and Occupation of the New BritainNewGuinea-New Ireland Area, 12 and 28 Feb 43, andfrom U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Th e Employ-ment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Com-mand (Washington, 1947), p. 18. The latter is analmost verbatim copyof aseriesofmonographspre-pared duringand immediately after the war by theHistorical Section, G-3, GHQ, SWPA.

4GHQ SWPA, Estimate of the Situation andRough Draft, RENO Plan, 25 Feb 43, OCMH.5The name "Munda" is apparently a phoneticrendition of a native term rather than a reflectionof Caesar's glory.


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SELECTING OBJECTIVES 11otherattempt toretakeHendersonFieldin 1943.The Japaneseexhibitedskillandcun-ning in concealing their activities atMunda.Eventhough theAllieshadlongknownthatMunda Pointwasbeingusedasastagingarea, theywerenot sure thatan airfield wasunder construction until3 December. The Japanese had riggedcables to the tops of thepalmtrees,thencut the trunks away and left the cablesholding up the treetops. Thus hiddenfrom aerial observation, they built theirrunway and then cut down the camou-flage. The day they completed the run-way, 15 December 1942,the Japanesedecided tobuilda secondairfield atVilaon nearbyKolombangara.6 The airfieldsat Munda and Vila, only 180 nauticalmiles from Henderson Field, presentedaseriousthreat to theAlliedpositionsinthe Solomons and New Hebrides.

In Allied hands, Munda would beinvaluable for continuing the advanceagainst Rabaul, and Admiral Halsey'sforces pressed on. They capped theirsuccess on Guadalcanal with the blood-less seizure of the Russell Islands on 21February 1943.This shortened the air-line distance to Munda by sixty-fivemiles and provided torpedo boat andlandingcraftbasestoassistin thecaptureof all New Georgia, an operation thenbeing planned by Halsey and his sub-ordinates.

Munda Point was, physically, one ofthe best sites for an air base in the Solo-mon Islands. Strategically, it was well

situated to support an advance to Bou-gainville, which would be necessary ifSouth Pacific aircraft were to strikeRabaul effectively.7 South Pacific forceswould have to use aircraft carriers toadvance directly from Henderson FieldtoBougainville,but possession ofMundaPoint would enable them to advanceprogressively under cover of land-basedfighter planes and bombers and obviatethe need to use precious carriers closeto islandsthatwerestuddedwith enemyairfields.8

The Pacific Military ConferenceNeither MacArthur nor Halsey could

start his offensive yet.They had not yetagreed on a co-ordinated plan, and theylacked enough forces to begin. Allot-ment of forces would depend on deci-sionsby the Joint and Combined Chiefsof Staff, who at Casablanca had decidedon the program for 1943without know-ing howmany troops, planes, and shipswouldbeneededforRabaul.

Shortlybefore leavingWashington forCasablanca, the Joint Chiefs had in-structed MacArthur to submit detailedplans for carryingout their directive of2 July 1942and authorized him to ex-change views with Nimi tz and Halsey.Theysuggestedpersonal meetings by the

6Southeast Area Naval Operations, I, JapaneseMonogr No. 48 (OCMH) in the series JapaneseStudies in WorldWar II, 47, 52; ONI USN,CombatNarratives: Solomon Islands Campaign, X, Opera-tions in the New Georgia Area, 21June-5 August1943 [Washington, 1944], 1-2.

7From Henderson Field to the Shortland Islandsis 285 nautical miles, to Kahili, 300 miles, to BukaPassage, 363 miles. From Munda, which is withinfighter range of Henderson and the Russells, to theShortlands is 100 nautical miles, to Kahili, 125miles, to Buka Passage, 234miles, and to Rabaul,394 miles.

8AdmWilliam F. Halsey,Jr., Narrative Accountof the South Pacific Campaign, 3 Sep 44, OCMH;Lt Gen Millard F. Harmon, The Army in the SouthPacific, 6 Jun 44, p. 7,OCMH; Fleet Admiral Wil-liam F. Halsey and Lt Comdr J. Bryan, III,Ad-miral Halsey's Story (NewYork: Whittlesey House,1947), p. 154.


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12 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF R A B A U Lcommandersor bytheir staffs topreparea broad plan thatwouldenabletheJointChiefs to give careful consideration tosuch matters as timing, reinforcement,supply, and the transfer of commandover Tasks Two and Three to Mac-Arthur.9 Maintaining that it wasincon-venient for high commanders to under-takelongjourneysaway from theirhead-quarters, MacArthur radioed his ideasforTasksTwo andThreeto Nimi tzandHalsey. On 11February Halsey sent hisdeputy commander, Rear Adm. Theo-dore S.Wilkinson, to Brisbane to beginaco-ordinatedplan.10

Shortly thereafter MacArthur askedthe Joint Chiefs for permission to sendhischief of staff and severalother officerstoWashington toexplainhisplans.TheJoint Chiefs approved, but stipulatedthat representatives from Halsey's andNimitz 'areasshouldalsocomefor agen-eraldiscussion ofPacific problems.11The

delegates reached Washington on 10March and two days later met with Ad-miral Kingand various officers from theArmy and Navy planning and logisticalstaffs.12

Thus began the series of meetings,generally known as the Pacific MilitaryConference, which were to produce anew directive for operations. This con-ferenceconstitutedan excellent exampleof the detailed and undramatic, but ab-solutely essential, spadework that hadto precede major decisions affecting thecourseof the war in the Pacific.TheELKTON Plan

After Admiral King opened the firstsession on 12 March with a strategicreview of theworldsituation, Maj. Gen.Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur'schief of staff, presented the ELKTON plan

9Rad to MacArthur, 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2833;Rad to Maj Gen Rush B. Lincoln, New Caledonia(to be passed to Halsey), 8 Jan 43,CM-OUT 2834;Rad to Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, Hawaii (to bepassed to Nimi tz) , 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2835; Radto MacArthur, 11 Jan 43, CM-OUT 3664.

10Rad from MacArthur, 27 Jan 43,CM-IN 12553;Rad from MacArthur, 11 Feb 43, CM-IN 5610;Commander, South Pacific Area and South PacificForce, War Diary: 1 January 1943-30 June 1944(hereafter cited as COMSOPAC War Diary), 11-12, 14-15 Feb 43entries.

11Rad from MacArthur, 15 Feb 43, CM-IN 7418;Rads to MacArthur, 16 Feb 43,CM-OUT 5656 andCM-OUT 5660; Rads to Harmon (for Halsey), 16Feb 43,CM-OUT 5658 and CM-OUT 5661; Radsto Emmons (for Nimitz) , 16 Feb 43,CM-OUT 5657and CM-OUT 5659. The Pacific representativestimed their trip toaccompany Brig. Gen.Albert C.Wedemeyer to Washington. Wedemeyer, a memberof the Operations Division of the War DepartmentGeneral Staff and of the Joint an d Combined StaffPlanners, visited the Southwest Pacific to explainthe Casablanca decisions to MacArthur and to be-come better acquainted with the area.

12To represent him, Halsey had selected GeneralHarmon, Commanding General, U.S. A r m y Forcesin the South Pacific Area; M aj. Gen.Nathan F.Twining, commanding the Thirteenth Air Force;and two staff officers, Brig. Gen. Dewitt Peck,USMC, his war plans officer, and Capt. Miles R.Browning, USN, hi s chief of staff. MacArthur sentMaj. Gen. Richard K.Sutherland,his chief of staff;Brig. Gen.Stephen J. Chamberlin, his operationsofficer; and Lt. Gen.George C. Kenney, Com-mander, Allied Air Forces, SWPA. RepresentingNimitzwerehis deputy and chief of staff, ViceAdm.RaymondA. Spruance,General Emmons,and Capt.Forrest P. Sherman. Present at the first meeting,besides King and the Pacific delegates, were Lt.Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staffof the Army; Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, of theJoint StrategicSurveyCommittee; Maj.Gen. GeorgeE. Stratemeyer, Chief of the Air Staff; Maj. Gen.Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Opera-tionsDivision, War DepartmentGeneral Staff; Maj.Gens. LeRoy Lutes and Lucius D. Clay, of Head-quarters, Army Service Forces; Vice Adm. RussellWillson, of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee;Rear Adm.Charles M.Cooke,Jr.;and Wedemeyer.


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SELECTING OBJECTIVES 13to the conference.13 This plan, bearingthe date 28 February 1943,was a re-vision of the first ELKTON plan, whichwas dated 12 February, and prescribedthe same general scheme of maneuveras MacArthur's earlier plans for the re-duction of Rabaul. MacArthur had pre-paredit on theassumptionthat hewouldcontrol both the Southwest and SouthPacific forces forTasks Two and Three,fo r the Joint Chiefs' directivehad statedexplicitlythat thesewouldbeconductedunder his command. Halsey, accordingto MacArthur, had already assented toELKTON.

ELKTON'Sintelligenceestimatepointedout that the Japanese generally con-trolled the north coast of New Guineanorthwest of Buna, aswell as New Brit-ain, New Ireland, and the Solomonsnorthwest of Guadalcanal. Japanese de-fenses were concentrated, aswere Alliedholdings in the region, in thevicinityofairfields. Except for the perimetersaround the airfields and naval bases, theland areas were pretty well unoccupied.

Between 79,000 and 94,000 Japanesetroops were thought to be stationed inthe New Guinea-Bismarck Archipel-ago-Solomons area. Enemy air strengthwas estimated at 383 land-based planes,while 4 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers,14 cruisers, 11 seaplane tenders, about40 destroyers, numerous auxiliaries, andabout 50merchantshipsof3,000 tonsorover were on hand for operations. Itwas expected that the Japanese, if at-tacked,could be immediately reinforced

by 10,000to 12,000troopsand about250planes as well as major portions of theCombined Fleet from the NetherlandsIndies, Japanese home waters, and thePhilippines Islands. In six months, 615more aircraft could be committed, and10or 15divisions mightbe dispatched ifshippingwasavailable.

Having described the forbidding na-ture of the enemy stronghold, GeneralSutherland proceeded, in his presenta-tion of the ELKTON plan, to outline thecontemplated Allied moves. The execu-tion ofTasks Two and Threewould re-quiremutuallysupporting, co-ordinatedadvancesalongtwolines:one,by South-westPacific forces in thewest, from NewGuinea to New Britain; the other, bySouth Pacific forces in the east, throughthe Solomons. ELKTONbrokeTasksTwoandThreeinto fiveoperations:1. Seizure of airdromes on the HuonPeninsula of NewGuinea toprovideairsupport for operations against NewBritain;

2. Seizure of Munda Point as well asother airdromes on New Georgia tocover operations against New Irelandin the Bismarck Archipelago and theremainderof theSolomons;

3. Seizure of airdromes on New Brit-ain and Bougainville to support opera-tions against Rabaul and Kavieng inNewIreland;

4. Capture of Kavieng and the isola-tion of Rabaul, although it was consid-ered possible that Kavieng might betakenafterRabaul;

5. CaptureofRabaul.The timing of these missions was notrigidly fixed, nor was there an estimateof the time required to carry them out.

13Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar 43, 1st mtg,12Mar 43. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Re-ports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (NewYork: Duell , Sloan and Pearce, 1949), devotes onechapter (VIII) to this conference.


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14 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF R A B A U LLarge forces, assembled in advance,

were required to execute the five opera-tions of ELKTONand there was the rubfrom the point of view of the Washing-ton planners faced with global responsi-bilities.TheylistenedasSutherlandreada detailed accounting of forces on handand forcesrequested. The plan, in brief,called for five additionaldivisions, forty-fiveadditionalair groups,or about twicethe 1,850 land-based planes then onhand,and an unspecified numberofwar-ships, transports, cargo ships, and land-ing craft sufficient tomount and supportall the operations.14

The official records do not disclosewith whatemotions the officers from thevarious Washington agencies receivedthe information about the necessary re-inforcements, but it is not difficult toimagine that some were surprised. AtCasablanca the Americans had assumedthe captureof Rabaul in 1943 as amat-ter of course, and had confidently dis-cussed the possibility of advancing be-yondRabaul.

The Pacific delegates learned imme-diatelythattherewasvirtuallyno chancefo r them to get all the reinforcementsthat they wanted.15 It was possible toeffect some increases in the number ofaircraft, but to give General MacArthureverything he asked would have cut toodeeply intothebomber offensive againstGermany. There were several traineddivisions available in the United States,but there were not enough transportstoshipthem overseas in time, or tosup-plythem after their arrival.Everyone at

the conference was convinced of thenecessity for offensive operations, but itwasrecognizedthattheoperationswouldbe limited by the available means. Ad-miral Halsey's representatives, Lt. Gen.Millard F. Harmon of the Army, Brig.Gen. Dewit t Peck of the Marine Corps,and Capt. Miles R. Browning of theNavy, endorsed th e ELKTON plan, butsome of the Navy planners in Washing-ton were dubious of its value. Theybelieved it would tie up too many shipsand toomany troopsfor too longa time,and would not achieve decisive results.The Washington planners informed thePacific representatives that only two orthree more divisions and a few moreplanescouldbe sentoverseas.16

The solution thereforewas to replacethe ambitious directive of 2 July 1942with something more realistic. Beforedeciding on a new directive, the JointChiefs instructed the Pacific delegates todecide what offensive operations theythought could be undertaken in 1943with the allotted forces. It was under-stoodthat the Pacificcommanders wouldnot becommitted by their subordinates'recommendations.17

The Pacific delegates answeredpromptly. They stated that the Southand Southwest Pacific forces would beable to advance as far as the southeastpart of Bougainville, seize eastern NewGuineaup toMadang,extend toWood-lark and Kiriwina in the TrobriandIslands,and advance to Cape Gloucester

14GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan. . . . 28 Feb 43.15Rad, Sutherland to MacArthur, 12 Mar 43,CM-OUT 1930.

16For the detailed record of debate and discus-sion at the various meetings of the Pacific MilitaryConference, see Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar43, with Inclosures and Annexes. See below, Biblio-graphical Note.

17Min, JCSmtg,19 Mar 43.


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SELECTING OBJECTIVES 15in western New Britain. These opera-tions were essentially the second task ofthe directive of 2July 1942.18 With thisstatement, the Pacific Military Confer-ence as such came to a close, althoughthe Pacific representatives remained inWashington a few days longer at therequest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Preparation of the Directive of28 March 1943The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having ap-

proved the additional Pacific reinforce-ments and heard the opinions of thePacific delegates, immediately acceptedthe proposal that South and SouthwestPacific operations in 1943 be limitedto Task Two,and turned to considera-tion of new orders for Halsey and Mac-Arthur.19

Neither the limitation of operationstoTask Two nor the inclusionof Wood-lark and Kiriwina was an entirely newidea. The Joint U.S. Strategic Commit-tee, commissioned by the Joint StaffPlanners toprepareaplanfor the defeatof Japan, in February had consideredthe means for,and limiting factors af-fecting, the operations planned at Casa-blanca, and recommended that onlyTask Two be carried out in 1943.Thecommittee felt that the capture of Ra-baul, which could not be undertakenuntil fairly late in 1943,might interferewith the recapture of Burma, an opera-tion which was considered to be on apriority with the advance through theCentral Pacific and the support ofChina. The Strategic Committee had

also recommended capture ofWoodlarkand Kiriwina.20Seizure of these islands would bringRabaul and the northern Solomonswithin range of fighters and mediumbombers, and would thus compensatefor the absence of enough heavybombers. The islands,which lie outsidethe bad weather belt that frequentlyblankets the southeast tip of NewGuinea,wouldalsoserveasstagingbasesfo r the rapid switching of air unitsbetween the South and Southwest Pa-cific. In December of the previous year,Admiral Halsey had suggested to Mac-Arthur the establishment of an air baseat Woodlark or Kiriwina, and offeredto furnish some of the necessary troops.This project had the approval of Mar-shall and King.21 The seizure of Wood-lark and Kiriwina was included as partof Plan ELKTON of 12February, but had

18Memo by Reps of the Pac Areas, in JCS 238/2,2 1 Mar 43.

19Min,JCSmtg, 21 Mar 43.

20Memo, Secretariat JUSSC for Secretariat JPS,13 Feb 43,sub:Opns in S and SW PacAreasDuring1943 and Their Relation to the Concept of MilStrategy fo r 1943 as Set Forth in the Anfa Papers,with Incls A and B,attached to JPS67/2, 4 Jan 43,title: Proposed Dir for a Campaign Plan for theDefeat of Japan, ABC 381Japan (8-27-42), Sec 1.This paper is also filed as JPS 67/3,15 Feb 43,title: Opns in S and SW Pac in 1943.The Casa-blanca Conference was held at Anfa and is oftenreferred to as the Anfa Conference, although itscode name was S Y M B O L . The Joint U.S.StrategicCommitteewas renamed the Joint War Plans Com-mittee in March 1943, and should not be confusedwi th the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, whichwas composed of senior officers who advised onbroad strategic matters.

2 1See C O M S O P A C to C O M S O W E S P A C[ C I N C S W P A ] , 17 Dec 42; C O M I N C H toCOMSOPAC, 18 Dec 42; Memo, King for Marshall,20 Feb 43, sub:Instal of Airstrips on Kir iwinaIsland or Woodlark Island; Memo, Marshall forKing,22 Feb 43,samesub. All in CNO File A 16-3(4) No. 1, Warfare Opns, SWPA, 1943,and madeavailable by Lt. Grace P. Hays, USN,of the HistSec, JCS.See also Halsey and Bryan, AdmiralHalsey's Story, p. 154.


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16 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAULbeen omitted from the version of ELK-TONwhich Sutherland brought toWash-ington.Timing

Although the Joint Chiefs had ac-cepted the delegates' proposals in prin-ciple, they were concerned about thetiming of operations. They brought thePacific representatives and some of theJoint Planners into their meeting onSunday morning, 21March, to helpset-tle matters.

The Southwest Pacific delegates ar-gued that lackof adequate forces wouldkeep the South Pacific from beginningoperations against New Georgia andsouthern Bougainville until after theSouthwest Pacific had seized the HuonPeninsula in NewGuinea, an operationthat would take place about August.This sequence was approximately thatset for th in the ELKTONplan.The SouthPacificdelegates, especially Harmon, feltthat it would be better to move againstNew Georgia before the capture of theHuon Peninsula. A reasonable marginof safety would require that enoughstrength be mustered for a drive rightthrough to Bougainville after Munda'scapture.The views of the Southwest Pacificdelegates on New Georgia are somewhatcurious.At anearly meetingof the con-ference, Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke,Jr., of Admiral King's staff, had askedSutherland for MacArthur's opinion onthe operation against Munda for whichthe South Pacific was then preparing.Sutherland replied that his chief wouldbe unable to make recommendationsuntil he had been "apprised" of theoperations, the forces involved, and the

amount of assistance he would be ex-pected to contribute.

22

Admiral King was disturbed by theidea of postponing action in the Solo-mons, for the Japanese fleet was nolonger pinned down by the Guadal-canal Campaign. If the Solomon opera-tions wereto bepostponed, hesuggested,the American fleet units assigned to theSouth Pacific might be more profitablyemployed elsewhere, perhaps in the Cen-tral Pacific. The Joint Chiefs directedthe Joint Planners to draf t a plan, butdid not immediately attempt to decideon the timing of operations.23 In themessage the Joint Chiefs sent to Mac-Arthur, Nimitz, and Halsey about theadditional reinforcements, they statedthat "prevailing opinion" in Washing-ton favored launching the invasion ofMunda after the establishmentof an airbase at Woodlark and possiblyafter theconclusion of the planned advance inNew Guinea.

MacArthur replied at once to expresshis vigorous opposition to what he, Suth-erland, and Kenney called "divergentaction," that is, concurrent operations

22Noteson Pac Conf Held in Mar 43, 3d mtg, 13Mar 43. It is difficult to comprehend Sutherland'sstatement as reported in the official record.MacArthur's message regarding Wilkinson'svisit toBrisbane indicated that an exchangeof views hadtaken place. According to the COMSOPAC WarDiary, 4 March 1943 entry, MacArthur was in-formed on 4March that South Pacific headquartershoped to seize New Georgia about 10 April. Halseydiscussed the action with Sutherland and Kenneyat his headquarters in Noumea, New Caledonia,and made it clear that MacArthur would not beasked for any assistance except for limited air ac-tion against the Shortland Islands. Finally, the 28February ELKTON, which Sutherland read to theconference, specifically called for an invasion ofNew Georgia and made an estimate of the forcesthat would be needed.23 Min, JC S mtg,21 Mar 43.


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SELECTING OBJECTIVES 17

SOME PACIFIC P L A N N E R S IN C O N F E R E N C E . From left, Capt. Cato D. Glover, Jr.,Maj. Gen. Richard J.Marshall,Lt. Gen. GeorgeC. Kenney, Lt. Gen. Richard K.Sutherland, Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, and Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Cham-berlin. Photograph taken in Brisbane, Australia,March 1944.

against New Georgia and New Guineaby the South and Southwest PacificAreas. Neither area, he asserted, wouldbe strong enough for independent ac-tion. The South Pacific would needstrong air support from its neighborin the New Georgia action, and theresimply were not enough planes. Hetherefore recommended that the NewGeorgia invasion be postponed at leastuntil the seizure of the Lae-Madangarea guaranteed control of the VitiazStrait between the Huon Peninsula andwestern New Britain, prevented theJapanese from moving reinforcementsto Rabaul from the west, and enabledthe Southwest Pacific to support andprotect itsneighborbybombingRabaul

heavily. Then New Georgia could betaken, and the South and SouthwestPacific Areas, nowmutually supporting,could begin the reduction of Rabaul.24

The question of timing was neverfinally determined by the Joint Chiefs.Speaking at their meeting on 28Marchwhen theJoint Planners' draf t of a newdirectivefor Halseyand MacArthurwasconsidered, King again emphasized thedangers of allowing the South Pacific tostand idly by while waiting for thenortheast New Guinea coast to be

24Rad from M a c A r t h u r , 25 Mar 43, CM-IN13461; Comments by Gen Kenney on d ra f t MS ofthis vo lume, attached to Ltr, Gen Kenney to MajGen Albert C. Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 11 Nov53, no sub, OCMH.


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18 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAULcleared. Marshall, whose talents includedgreat skill at reconciling divergentpoints ofview, offered the opinion thatboth MacArthur and Halsey would takeevery advantage to press forward when-ever Japanese resistance was weak. TheJapanese would find themselves in adif-ficult position. If they strengthened theSolomonsat theexpenseof NewGuineaMacArthur could move forward, andHalsey could take advantageof anyshiftsof troops to New Guinea. Halsey him-self, although willing to postpone theadvance against NewGeorgia until afterWoodlark and Kiriwina were taken, hadstated that he would not remain idle.He intended to hit the Japanese withland-based aircraft and to be preparedto move into New Georgia and southernBougainville if the Japanese weakenedtheir defenses to such an extent that hecould advance without precipitating amajor engagement. King withdrew hisobjections, subject to the proviso thatMacArthur submit detailed plans show-ing timing and sequence of operationsand the composition of task forces.25Command

One final question, command, re-mained to be decided before the JointChiefs could issuea newdirective. Thisquestion wassettled fairly quickly.26 Thedirective of 2 July 1942 had providedthat Tasks Two and Three would beunder MacArthur's direction. Thisprin-ciple continued to be accepted by theJoint Chiefs without serious challenge.Both the Army and the Navy had been

arguing somewhat heatedly over thequestion of a unified command for theentire Pacific, but the warmth of theirdebate did not seriously interfere withthe preparation of the new directive.The possibility of mutual co-operationby Halsey and MacArthur was rejected.Somenavalofficers, including King, sug-gested that since Halsey would be oper-ating west of the line of demarcation(longitude 159 east),itshould bemovedwestward again, but did not press thepoint.27 It was agreed that MacArthurwould command the operations by theSouthwest Pacific forces, and that Hal-sey'soperations with South Pacific forcesin the Solomons would be under Mac-Arthur's "general directives."

One particularly important aspect ofthe command question related to thePacific Fleet units that would take partin the operations.Admiral King alwaysopposed any tendency to break up thePacific Fleet by permanently assigningits units to any particular area, for thenthe fleet would lose part of its strikingpower as well as strategic and tacticalmobility. For these reasons King hadpreviously proposed that Nimitz' au-thoritybeextendedtoincludethewatersof the Southwest Pacific Area, but hadapparently never insisted on this as asolution. The Joint Chiefs settled thematter on 28 March by agreeing that allunits of the Pacific Ocean Areas otherthan those assigned by the Joint Chiefsto task forces engaged in the operationswould remain under Nimitz' generalcontrol. This meant that MacArthur

25Min, JCS mtg, 28 Mar 43; COMSOPACWarDiary, 28 Mar 43 entry.26But see Rad, Sutherland to MacArthur,25 Mar43, CM-OUT 9499.

27Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 213, indi-cates that discussions of this point in and out ofthe conference room were heated. The minutes donot yield much information about the emotions ofthe protagonists.


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SELECTING OBJECTIVES 19would exercise strategic direction onlyover Halsey's forces that were engagedin the Solomons west of longitude 159east, and that Halsey's other forces, aswell as Pacific Fleet units not assignedby theJoint Chiefs,wouldremainunderNimitz.28Withthequestionofcommandsettled and the problem of timing leftlargely to the commanders' discretion,the Joint Chiefs on 28 March approveda directive providing for offensive oper-ations by MacArthur and Halsey in1943.29The 28March Directive

Brief crisp orders were dispatched toHalsey, Nimitz, and MacArthur on 28March.The Joint Chiefs canceled theirdirective of 2 July 1942. They ordered

MacArthur and Halsey to establish air-fields on Woodlark and Kiriwina, toseize the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madangareaof NewGuineaand occupywestern New Britain, and to seize andoccupy the Solomon Islands as far assouthern Bougainville. The operationswere intended to inflict losses on theJapanese, to deny the target areas tothe enemy, to contain Japanese forcesin the Pacific byretainingthe initiative,and to prepare for the ultimate seizureof the Bismarck Archipelago. As previ-ously indicated, operations would beconducted under MacArthur's com-mand. The advances in the Solomonswere to be under the direct commandof Halsey, who would operate underMacArthur's strategic direction. Exceptfo r those units assigned by the JointChiefs of Staff to task forces engaged inthese campaigns, all elements of the Pa-cific Ocean Areas would remain underNimitz.MacArthurwasdirected to sub-mit detailed plans including the com-positionof task forces and sequenceandtimingof operations.30

With this directive, the Joint Chiefsset the program for 1943 in the Southand Southwest Pacific. There can be nodoubt that they were disappointed bytheir inability to approach the goals setso freely atCasablanca,but the 28Marchdirective possessed the virtue of beingbased onassumptions thatwererealistic,even pessimistic.The defined objectiveswere believed to be surely attainable.

28The command question is treated in the fol-lowing documents: Ltr, COMINCH-CNO [King]to CofS USA [Marshall], 6 Jan 43, no sub, in-cluded in JCS 112/1, 14 Oct 42, title: Mil Sit inthe Pac, ABC 370.26 (7-8-42), Sec 1; Memo, GenHandy for Capt Connolly, Naval War Plans Div,29 Dec 42, no sub, OPD 384 PTO (12-29-42), Sec2, Case 43; Memo, Marshall for COMINCH, 8 Jan43, sub: Strategic Dir of Opns in the SW Pac, samefile; Memo, COMINCH for CofS USA, 18 Feb 43,sub: Opns in SOPAC-SWPA, OPD Exec Off FileNo. 10, Item 67c; Memo, CofS USA for CNO, 19Feb 43, same sub, same file; JCS 238/3, 21 Mar 43,title: Plan of Opns for Seizure of Solomon Islands-New Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area; JCS238/4, 27 Mar 43, title: Plan of Opns for Seizureof Solomon Islands-New Guinea-New Britain-NewIreland Area-Offen Opns in the S and SW PacDuring 1943; JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar 43, title: DirPlan of Opns for Seizure of Solomon Islands-NewGuinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area; and MinJCS mtg, 28 Mar 43.

29 Min, JCS mtg, 28 Mar 43. 30JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar 43.


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CHAPTER III

E L K T O N III: The Plan for C A R T W H E E LThe Southwest Pacific Area

Command StructureMost of the commands of the South-

west and South Pacific Areas whichwould execute the Joint Chiefs ' orderswerealreadyinexistence.1General Mac-Arthur, as Allied Commander in Chief,had organized his General Headquar-ters (GHQ), Southwest Pacific Area, onU.S. Army lines. Directly under Suther-land, the Chief of Staff,2 were the fourstandard general staff and three specialstaff sections. Each section was headedby an American Army officer. Officersfrom the American Navy and from theAustralian, Netherlands, and Nether-lands Indies armed forces served in themost important staff sections, but incomparatively junior positions.3 On the

surface GHQ was a U.S. Army head-quarters, but its responsibilities and au-thority were joint and Allied in nature.It was an operational headquarters.

Under GHQ in Australia were threeother tacticalheadquartersAlliedLandForces, Allied Naval Forces, and AlliedAir Forces, whose names indicate theirfunctions. (Chart 1) Allied Land Forceswascommanded by an Australian, Gen-eral Sir Thomas Blarney, and wastheo-retically responsible for the tactical di-rection of all Allied ground troops, lesscertain antiaircraft units which werecontrolled by Allied Air Forces. UnderAllied Land Forces was the U.S. SixthArmy, established in the area in Febru-ary 1943 under command of Lt. Gen.Walter Krueger. Included in SixthArmy were Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichel-berger's I Corps, the 2d Engineer Spe-cial Brigade, and the 503d ParachuteInfantry Regiment. The 1st Marine Di-vision wasunder Krueger's operationalcontrol.4 The First and Second Aus-tralian Armies, many of whose unitswerestillintraining,werepartofAlliedLand Forces. The main tactical head-quarters which operated under Blarney

1For details see Louis Morton's forthcomingvolumes on strategy, command, and logistics in thePacific, and Milner, Victory in Papua. For SouthPacific organization, see below, pp. 67-70.2Sutherland, a lean, spare, dedicated man, andan exacting taskmaster, was somewhat less thanpopular with some of the officers who commanded

forcesdirectly under GHQ, apparently because theyfelt that he, personally, tried to take over part oftheir authority. But his worst enemies have neverquestioned his professional competence.3 G-3, forexample, contained asubstantial num-ber of U.S. Navy and Allied officers, and such sub-

ordinate sections of G-2 as the Allied IntelligenceBureau, the AlliedTranslator and Interpreter Serv-ice, and the Allied Geographical Section had largenumbers of Allied officers.

4GHQ SWPA GO 17, 16 Feb 43, in GHQ SWPAG-3 Jnl, 16 Feb 43. The antiaircraft units, twoantiaircraft coast artillery brigades that were con-trolled by Allied Air Forces,were assigned to SixthArmy.


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CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAULduring early 1943 was New GuineaForce, a largely Australianheadquartersresponsible for the conduct of opera-tions in New Guinea. GHQ usuallyestablished a temporary advanced eche-lon at Port Moresby, New Guinea,shortly before the beginning of eachoperation.

Allied Naval Forces was commandedby Vice Adm. Arthur S.Carpender (in-evitably called "Chips") of the U.S.Navy, and included the U.S. SeventhFleet (concurrently commanded byCar-pender)andlargepartsof the Australianand Netherlands Navies. The most im-portant component of Carpender's com-mand was the VII Amphibious Force,organized under Rear Adm. Daniel E.Barbey in early 1943.

Lt. Gen.GeorgeC.Kenney,anAmer-ican airman, led the Allied Air Forceswhich consisted of the U.S. Fifth AirForce and the Royal Australian AirForce Command, Allied Air Forces,under Air Vice Marshal William D.Bostock. Kenney also commanded theFif th AirForcebut for tacticalpurposesit was run by the Deputy Commander,Brig.Gen.Ennis C. Whitehead who ledthe Advanced Echelon at Port Moresby,N ew Guinea.5

Allnational forcesservingunderthesetactical headquarters were administeredand usually supplied by their own serv-ice elements. U.S. Army Forces, FarEast, commanded by MacArthur, wasresponsible for administration of theSixth Army, the Fif th Air Force, andU.S. Army Services of Supply, South-west Pacific Area.This last,under Maj.Gen. Richard J. Marshall, had the re-

sponsibility for logistical support ofAmerican ground forces.6 AustralianLineofCommunications units in AlliedLand Forces supplied the Australiantroops.Soldiers fighting in NewGuineaunder NewGuinea Forceweresuppliedbya U.S.-Australian organizationknownas the Combined Operational ServiceCommand which had been created dur-ing the Papuan campaign.

Most echelons subordinate to GHQhad functioned during thePapuan cam-paign and by mid-1943 were operatingwith an efficiency born of this experi-ence.Geography

The forthcomingcampaignswouldbefought in New Guinea, the SolomonIslands, and the Bismarck Archipelago.Many places in these islands bear thenames of outstanding figures in the his-tory ofexploration:Torres Strait,Dam-pier Strait, Bougainville, and D'Entre-casteaux Islands.Other names like NewBritain and New Ireland are of morepedestrianorigin, and theBismarck andSolomon SeaswerenamedduringWorldWar II.7Despite thefamiliarityof manyplace names, the area was one of theleast known and least developed in allthe world. Further, although there isperhaps no ideal place to fight a war,the New Guinea-Bismarcks-Solomons

5Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal toSaipan, p. 99.

6GHQ SWPA Stf Memo 3, 19 Feb 43; USAFFEGO 1, 26 Feb 43, adv copy. Both in GHQ SWPAG-3 Jnl, 19 Feb 43.

7Nothing is named for Meneses, who first visitedNew Guinea in 1526, nor for Mendaa who dis-covered the Solomons in 1568. But the wholegroup,the islands of Guadalcanal, San Cristobal, SantaIsabel, andFlorida,and Point Cruz on Guadalcanaland Estrella Bay at Santa Isabel retain the namesgiven by Mendaa.


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ELKTON III: THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL 23areawas one of theworst possibleplaces.(Map 3)All theislandshavemuch in common,and much that is common is unpleas-ant.All have hot, wet,tropicalclimates.Ali are mountainous. All are heavilyjungled. All are pest-ridden and full oftropical diseases, especially malaria.Nonehasmotorroadslonger thana fewmiles. There are almost no ports withpiers and quays to accommodate largeships.

The nat ive inhabitants are Melane-sians, most of them barely beyond theStone Age. Cannibalism and headhunt-ing were suppressed only recently inareas where British, German, Dutch,and Australian governments exertedtheir authority. During World War IItherewere rumors that some of the NewGuinea natives, freed by the Japaneseconquests from the white man's restrain-ing influence, had reverted to their an-cient practices.New Guinea, th e largest island in thearea and after Greenland th e largestisland in the world, is about 1,600 stat-ute miles long, 500 miles from northto south at its widest point, and hasan area estimated at about 312,000square miles. Its most distinctive geo-graphic feature, aside from the jungle,is the great cordillera that runs thelength of the island. This cordilleraconsists of a number of parallel east-westmountainrangeswhichnarrowintothe Owen Stanley Range in thePapuanpeninsula.The highest peaksreachoversixteen thousand feet into the sky. Themountain valleys that are cut by suchrivers as the Sepik, Ramu, Markham,and Bulolo are several thousand feetabove sea level, and the climate ispleas-

ant and relatively healthful. There areno really large rivers in New Guinea,but the Markham, which flows intoHuon Gulf , and the Sepik and Ramuare severalhundredmileslong.T he 600-mile Sepik, flowing between the VictorEmmanuel Range and the TorricelliMountains, isnavigablebysteam launchfor 300miles above itsmouth. Betweenthe mountains and the sea are swampylowlands and vast stretches of tropicalrain forest so thick that the sun neverpenetratesthe treetops to dry thegroundand no underbrush ever grows.At the outset of the war there werenomotor roadsof anysignificant length.There were short roads in and aroundthe main ports and gold fields and in-nume rable nat ive footpaths, or "tracks."As both Allied and Japanese forces haddemonstrated during the Papuan cam-paign, overland travel was fantasticallydifficult. The best ways to travel wereby water and byair. However, both theAustralians and Japanese were, in thefirst part of 1943, engaged in ambitioustransmontane road-building projects.Before the war the Australians hadexploited air travel to the utmost indeveloping the gold fields of the BuloloValley in the mountains southwest ofSalamaua. They had avoided the diffi-culties of overland travel by cutting air-strips in the f lat lands of the valley, thenflying in gold-mining machinery, build-ing materials, and, to add to the ameni-ties of life in the attractive uplands,even race horses.

Across Vitiaz and Dampier Straitsfrom New Guinea's Huon Peninsulalies Cape Gloucester, the western tipof New Britain, which curves northeast-erly to culminate in Gazelle Peninsula
http://map3.pdf/http://map3.pdf/http://map3.pdf/


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24 CARTWHEEL: THE R EDUC TION OF RABAULand Rabaul.New Ireland, long andnar-row, parallels the long axis of the Pa-puan peninsulaso that it, theAdm ira ltyIslands, part of New Guinea, and NewBritain enclose the Bismarck Sea. NewBritain, New Ireland, the Admiralties,and other islands form the BismarckArchipelago.Southeast of Rabaul , and northeastof the Papuan peninsula and the Lou-isiade Archipelago, lie the SolomonIslands. This 600-mile-long double-chained archipelagowas found by Men-daa in 1568, but his calculations oflongitude were so far wrong that twohundredyearswentbybefore whitemenfound it again. Carteret, Bougainville,Surville, Shortland, and D'Entrecast-eaux sighted or visited the archipelagobetween 1767 and 1793, and Frenchgeographers eventually concluded thatthese were the islands Mendaa hadfound.

The area wasdivided politically.Thatpart of New Guinea west of longitude141 east belonged to the Netherlands.Papuaw as anAustralian possessionwiththe status of Territory. Northeast NewGuinea, the Admiralties, New Britain,New Ireland, Bougainville, and Bukamade up the Australian Mandated Ter-ritory of New Guinea; Australia tookthem from Germany in World War Iand was awarded a League of Nationsmandate over them.8 The Solomonssoutheast ofBougainvilleare,politically,the British Solomon Islands Protector-ate, established byGreatBritain in 1893to suppress blackbirding.

A crude comparison may give a gen-eral idea of the size of the area. If amap of the New Guinea-BismarckArchipelago-Solomon Islands area issuperimposed on a map of the UnitedStates, with the western tip of NewGuinea'sVogelkop Peninsula at Seattle,Washington, Milne Bay at southeasternNew Guinea lies in Colorado, and theSolomon Islands lie in the Missouri andMississippi Valleys.Coastwatching

In early 1943 the key points of thishuge area, except for Port Moresby,Milne Bay, Goodenough Island in theD'Entrecasteaux;group,and the Guadal-canal-Russells-Florida area of the Solo-mons were in Japanese hands, but Al-lied intelligence agencies were able tokeepafairlyclose check on enemytroop,ship, and plane movements bymeansofradioed reports from observers operat-ing behind the enemy lines. These ob-servers were the coastwatchers,mem bersof an organization, the CoastwatchingService, established before the war aspart of the Directorate of Intelligence,Royal Australian Navy. Their territoryoriginally embraced New Guinea, theBismarck Archipelago, and the Solo-mons, but later islands of the Nether-lands Indieswereadded to thenetwork.Initially thecoastwatchers wereall Brit-ish, Australian, or New Zealand civilservants or planters, commissioned inthe Australian armed forces, but as thewar progressed qualified men from theAmerican forceswere alsoassigned.Thecoastwatchers were part of the AlliedIntelligence Bureau of the G-2 Sectionof GHQ. Those in the Solomons re-

8In 1947 the Mandated Territory and Papuawere consolidated as a United Nations trusteeship.


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ELKTON III : THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL 25ported their observations directly toSouth Pacific agencies.9These intrepid men were greatlyaided in their work by the devotionand help of the natives. The Melane-sians in general remained loyal to theAllied cause, and throughout the warrescued shot-down airmen and strandedsailors, worked as guides, bearers, andlaborers, and aselect fewstayedwith thevarious coastwatchers.

As the interior of the New Guinea-Bismarcks-Solomons area was littleknown and practically unmapped, th ecoastwatchers proved an invaluablesource of information on terrain. Inaddition, their hideouts served as basesfo r th e patrols that thrust behind th eJapanese lines in advanceofnearlyeveryAllied operation.The Plan of Maneuver

On receiving the instructions fromthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mac-Arthur and his subordinates turned tothe job of preparing plans and issuingorders to carry out the directive of 28March. The task was not difficult. All

Documents

Cartwheel the Reduction of Rabaul