10 Human Ecology Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003© Society for Human Ecology

Abstract

Over the past decade, a number of factors have nega-tively impacted the Michigan carrot industry and carrotgrowers have responded to the problems in various ways. Weexamine growers’ use of various rationalities in making deci-sions about adaptive strategies. We investigate the extent towhich ecological rationality exists among Michigan carrotgrowers and influences their strategic decision making. Wefirst elucidate the most relevant analytical lenses of rational-ity presented in the literature, and focus finally on severaltypes of ecological rationality. Using material from inter-views, we demonstrate that Michigan carrot growers’reliance on a practical ecological rationality provides aground for their farming practices as well as for their over-all attitudes about the farming life.

Keywords: rationality, ecological rationality, pest man-agement, integrated pest management, farming decisions

Introduction

Over the past decade, a number of factors have negative-ly impacted the Michigan carrot industry: (1) a decline in thedemand for carrots for the feeding and baiting of wild deer dueto changes in policies to reduce the prevalence of bovinetuberculosis among wildlife in Michigan’s northern LowerPeninsula, (2) new restrictions on chemical pesticides per-ceived by growers to be essential to profitable production, and(3) powerful marketing strategies of the Canadian andCalifornia carrot industries. The Michigan carrot industry hasnot been passive in the face of these adversities; carrot grow-ers have attempted to react to the problems in various ways.This situation allows one to ask what decision-making strate-gies growers use in deciding how to adapt and respond to thesechanging circumstances. In exploring this question we willexamine growers’ use of various rationalities in making deci-sions about adaptive strategies. We will particularly explorethe extent to which, among the several rationalities, a specifi-cally ecological rationality can be identified and delineated.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to whichecological rationality exists among Michigan carrot growersand influences their strategic decision making. In the face offormidable hardship, growers persevere with a sense of stew-ardship for the sustained health of their farm as well as a mat-ter of family and local history. While certain chemical pesti-cides are considered to be necessary within Michigan’s “pest-friendly” climate, growers would universally opt for econom-ically feasible reduced-risk alternatives (Worosz et al. 2001).Growers routinely seek information about, and adopt, prac-tices whose environmental benefits and efficacy have beendemonstrated by University agriculture research specialists.Growers sustain the health of their soils by careful nutrientanalyses, in cooperation with the MSU Extension Service andMichigan Agriculture Experiment Station researchers.

Most notably, many growers voiced strong sensitivityregarding public perceptions of chemical fertilizer and pesti-cide use by farmers. Often, these growers articulated resent-ment regarding the “environmentalist” portrayal of farm life,suggesting instead that the farmer has a strong desire to main-tain ecological, as well as economic, sustainability since thefarm is often expected to be passed on to the family’s suc-ceeding generations.

We first elucidate the several analytical lenses of ratio-nality presented in the literature, and focus finally on severalversions of ecological rationality that have been discussed.Using material from interviews, we demonstrate thatMichigan carrot growers’ reliance on a practical ecologicalrationality provides a ground for their farming practices aswell as for their overall attitudes about the farming life. Datawas collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews ofMichigan carrot growers, and ethnographic content analysiswas conducted.

Sociological Theories of Rationality

As social actors operate from culturally informed views(structural conditions) about what the world is and how theworld should be, and at the same time assert their individualpositions (agency) about what the world is and how the world

Carrot Soup for the Mind: Carrot Growers and Ecological Rationality

Win Kurlfink and Craig K. HarrisDepartment of SociologyMichigan State University429 Berkey HallEast Lansing, MI 48824-1111USA1

Research in Human Ecology

Human Ecology Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003 11

should be, the concepts of reason, ideology, and rationalityare bound up within their actions. Reason is a fallaciousescape from ideology because it is ideologically defined.Reason has been the ethos of western secularism since theEnlightenment and it arguably reaches back before Aristotle.Ideology is commonly used as a rhetorical negative. As socialbeings we are absolutely ideologically biased, for example,by virtue of the language(s) we are born into and adopt, or byvirtue of our biophysical environment and the ways that wevalue particular material items. The quality of our capacityfor reason reveals itself in our rationality, our style of ratio-nal expression.

The criteria for rational action are determined by ideo-logical biases for rational/reasonable constructs. For exam-ple, ecologically rational action should have ecologicallybeneficial outcomes; but what is perceived as ecologicallybeneficial by one social actor may be perceived as ecologi-cally detrimental by another social actor (Geason and Harrisforthcoming). Finally, it is critical that we recognize how andwhen a rationality, as a style of rational expression, producesirrational outcomes. As we seek the expression of ecologicalrationality within the Michigan carrot industry, and specifi-cally among the carrot growers, we begin by looking to thesociological theories of rationality to discuss where specificrationalities are useful (produce intended consequences) andwhere they fail us (produce unintended consequences).

Weber’s Rationality TypesWeber was one of the first sociologists to address ratio-

nality thematically throughout his work. For Weber, ratio-nality can be conceptualized in several ways. In the generaloverarching concept, rationality is instrumental and“anchored in means-end rational and value-rational action”(Kahlberg 1980, 1149). Weber delineated within this instru-mentalism four rationality types, each with its own character.Practical rationality characterizes the mode of action in ordi-nary life wherein action is informed primarily by experientialpractice. We do it this way because it’s always been done thisway and because it has worked. The accepted practice offersthe most efficient means to the intended end and the practicerefers back to self-interest. I do it this way because I havefound it to work best. I have something to gain or lose. I trustmy own judgement. This is differentiated from formal ratio-nality, which is sometimes referred to as bureaucratic ratio-nality. Essentially, the same calculative means-end practicerefers instead to the given rules, standards, or regulationswith the ideal of strict objectivity and universality. Theprocesses of industrialization in the eighteenth and nine-teenth centuries provided Weber with paradigmatic examplesof formal rationality.

In contrast to the groundedness of practical rationality

and the rigidness of formal rationality, substantive rationali-ty considers the ultimate aims of actions:

The concept of ‘substantive rationality’ ...is full ofambiguities, it conveys only one element common toall ‘substantive’ analyses; namely, that they do notrestrict themselves to note the purely formal and(relatively) unambiguous fact that action is basedon ‘goal-oriented’ rational calculation with thetechnically most adequate available methods, butapply certain criteria of ultimate ends, whether theybe ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal,egalitarian, or whatever, and measure the results ofthe economic action, however formally ‘rational’ inthe sense of correct calculation they may be, againstthese scales of ‘value rationality’ and ‘substantivegoal rationality.’

(Weber 1999, 214)

Substantive rationality, then, refers to the value stancesof the actor. It will usually be the case that these value stancesare structurally conditioned, and that something which is sub-stantively rational can only be so in the appropriate culturalcontext. While shamanistic medicine, for example, wouldappear irrational at the scale of a western hospital as a whole,within the room of a particular patient, the practice ofshamanism might be fully rational. Action and decision arerationally informed by one’s relevant “value postulate ...(which) implies entire clusters of values that vary in compre-hensiveness, internal consistency, and content” (Kahlberg1980, 1155). Since the range of possible value postulates isinfinite, “radical perspectivism” (cultural relativism) is a keycomponent of substantive rationality (Kahlberg 1980, 1155).For Weber, then, rationality is both an endowment of socialorganization (a function of structural conditions), and a phe-nomenon driven by individual action (a function of humanagency). The degree to which the individual act is rationalcan only be determined in relation to its social context.Finally, given the complexity of substantive rationality in par-ticular, we can illustrate these rationalities as distinct fromeach other, but we must also consider the overlapping char-acter of these rationalities, as Figure 1 suggests.

Figure 1. Weber’s rationality types as directly related to action

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Theoretical rationality, or intellectual rationality, relatesto abstract thought and therefore only indirectly relates toaction. This type emphasizes the cognitive processesinvolved wherein patterns of meaning are interpreted fromthe world. The sociological nature of this type of rationalitymay seem to be obscured. Again Kahlberg (1980, 1160):

Mental processes are of interest to Weber primarilyin regard to the extent to which they can be trans-lated into patterns of social action. In some cases,such as practical rationality, regularities of actionfollow so closely on the calculation in relation toself-interests that the mental process itself is scarce-ly visible, Theoretical rationality, on the other hand,illustrates the opposite extreme: here cognitiveprocesses often do not introduce patterns of action.

Further, for Weber, the rationality type may itself varydepending upon the cultural context:

Constellations of historical and sociological factorsdetermine, for Weber, whether a particular type ofrationality in fact found clear expression as mentalprocess alone or as regularities of action thatbecame established as sociocultural processes,whether at the level of groups, organizations, soci-eties, or civilizations as a whole.

(Kahlberg 1980, 1160)

For example, it may be that for a group of academics, the ac-tivity of discussing theories is in fact a very practical activity.

Finally, a key component to rationality in general, asstated, regards the efficiency of means-end action. Whilerationality remains an abstract concept, efficiency is, to somedegree, measurable. One may be unable to evaluate action asrational but instead one may assess efficiency of action.Weber clearly resists this reductive and narrow definition ofrationality, so we turn to examine how Weber’s rationalitieshave been further developed. This may lead one into the eco-nomic arena of the rational actor paradigm, which holds thathumans are “rational beings motivated by self-interest andconsciously evaluating alternative courses of action... (atonce) conceptualiz(ing) the social universe as an aggregate ofatomistic actors (and serving) as the basis of a social orderthat is appropriate and good” (Jaeger et al. 2000).Alternatively it may lead one into the social arena, which isanalyzed by Diesing. It is to that approach that we now turn.

Diesing’s Decision RationalitiesPaul Diesing elaborated the discussion arguing that a

narrow, economistic rationality was being understood asrationality as a whole. To the contrary, he asserted that socialbehavior could not be characterized as rational with a narrow

economistic view of rationality, suggesting instead that manyactivities are not reducible to technical efficiency. In sodoing, Diesing elaborates the ways in which several commonsubstantive orientations interrelate with instrumental ratio-nalities.

A decision or action is ... rational when it takesaccount of the possibilities and limitations of agiven situation and reorganizes it so as to produce,or increase, or preserve, some good. This definitionincludes two points: the decision must be an effec-tive response to the situation in that it producessome possible good, and the effectiveness must bebased on intelligent insight rather than luck.

(Diesing 1962, 3)

Diesing borrows from Mannheim (1940) to distinguishbetween different types of individual and organizationalrationalities. “Mannheim distinguishes between substantialand functional rationality, the former applying to individualdecisions and the latter to organizations” (Diesing 1962, 3,emphasis added). Social actors must often navigate decisionprocesses alone (substantial) but functionally rational deci-sions take place communicatively as groups face collectivedecision processes.

Diesing initially criticized economism as an inappropri-ate frame for the rationality of social behavior. In so doing,he further extended Weber’s work on rationality by outliningfive distinct rationalities. Each of these distinct modes ofrationality ground the decision processes in the five respec-tive realms: technical, economic, integrative (social), judi-cial, and political.

Each rationality has its order. This order results from theongoing interrelationship between materiality and ideation -between ideas and the patterned behaviors which implementthose ideas:

(1) Out of necessity and survival, one, one’s community,and/or one’s society engages in production. Efficiency is theorder of production, i.e., technical rationality.

(2) Out of necessity, these human systems, to a degree ofeffectiveness, engage in value measurement. Economic orderis that of measurement and comparison of values, i.e., eco-nomic rationality. As Busch (2000) argues, valuation andstandards are what make exchange and/or markets possible.

(3) Social order (integrative rationality) is an order ofinterdependence or solidarity, but also control.

(4) Judicial order (legal rationality) is that of a fairly dis-tributed availability of resources — a concept usually associ-ated with politics (e.g., Lasswell 1936). To some degree,individuals and groups coexist (perhaps with degrees of con-flict) and develop the judicial sense toward fairness. As oneamong others in a community, one relies on others for sur-

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vival and a social order develops. The complexity of thatorder necessitates a judicial order, i.e., legal rationality.

(5) Out of necessity, these human systems creativelyevaluate alternative ways to approach decisions. Necessitybegets the development of a rational order of decision struc-ture. Political order (political rationality) is the order of dis-cussion and decision.

We should note that the language offered here, despiteits deterministic flavor, intends to emphasize the interplaybetween action (agency) and necessity (structural processes).Specific strategies for decision and action can be grounded inappropriate rationalities depending on the immediate as wellas structural circumstances.

The question left open, then, regards environmentalprocesses. We suggest that Diesing’s model neglects the bio-physical environment within which humans are immersed, asmany environmental sociologists have accused sociology ingeneral (Catton and Dunlap 1978; Dunlap and Martin 1983).Diesing’s argument specifically attempted to lend credibilityto decisions based on human relationships at a time when theenvironmental movement was a glimmer on the horizon. So,as he pointed to a social rationality in 1962 (the same yearthat Silent Spring was published), others have argued for therationality of environmental sensitivity. Bartlett was one ofthe first to do so.

Ecological RationalityBartlett added to Diesing’s framework the concept of

ecological rationality: “Ecological rationality may be thoughtof as a rationality of living systems, an order of relationshipsamong living systems and their environments... [ecologicalrationality] draws extensively from the science of ecology”(Bartlett 1986, 229). It draws on principles of holism andenvironmental dynamism. Time horizons tend to extend farbeyond those afforded economic rationality.

Bartlett, following Simon (1976), differentiates betweenprocedural ecological rationality and substantive ecologicalrationality. Substantive ecological rationality is grounded inthe Weberian concept (substantive rationality) but it refersmore simply and specifically to the capability to analyze sit-uations in the interest of the ecosystem. “Ecological rational-ity may be an attribute of behavior or actions, denoting theextent to which such actions are ecologically appropriatewithin the limits imposed by given conditions and con-straints” (substantive rationality) (Bartlett 1986, 239).Procedural ecological rationality refers to rational strategyfor action and decision; this can refer either to individuals aswith Diesing’s substantive rationality or to organizations, aswith Diesing’s functional rationality and ultimately Weber’sformal rationality. It refers to “the effectiveness, in light ofhuman cognitive powers and limitations, of the processes and

procedures used to make ecologically important choices”(procedural rationality) (Bartlett 1986, 239).

Building nicely on Diesing, then, Bartlett also hints atthe prescriptive; Bartlett suggests that in certain situationsecological rationality will provide the most appropriate guideto conduct. In addition, he acknowledges human cognitivelimitations in dealing with the complexity of the ecologicalphenomena to be brought into the equations for rational dis-course. This problem may be effectively approached from theperspective of bounded rationality — born of the rationalactor paradigm — as a psychological approach to examiningadaptive thinking to complex situations with limited informa-tion (Gigerenzer 2002; Todd 2000). In fact the idea of bound-ed rationality and the resources available within one’s “adap-tive toolkit” serve to remind us of our reliance on historicalexperience — on ideological penchants. Nevertheless,Bartlett offers a useful conceptual analysis. He helps to openup a rational environmental discourse of Weberian lineage.Habermas, however, requires us to investigate the characterof those ideological penchants as well as the character ofenvironmental discourse in order to recognize the degree ofits rationality.

Communicative RationalityIn contrast to Bartlett and predecessors who saw the

problem as cognitive limitation, Habermas views human andsocial actors as ideologically limited. In Habermas’ view theobstacles to rational action are not cognitive incapacity;rather, we are challenged to resolve, or at least recognize, ide-ological differences. In the first instance (Bartlett’s view),social actors are limited by the quantity and complexity ofmanageable information regarding decisions in the interest ofan ecosystem. In Habermas’ view, social actors are limited intheir ability to reconcile ideological (structural) conditionswith the interest of an ecosystem. Those ideological chal-lenges are equally present at the broadest level of advancedcapitalism, as well as the micro level of rural communities:friends, loved-ones, competing growers, input salespersons,buyers, etc. In short, ideology interpenetrates all relationallevels (scale) in the life-world of the grower. Each of thesegroups of actors brings different understandings about whatworks or does not work, what is right or wrong, what isimportant and reasonable, and each is set against the back-ground of a society, which, as Habermas describes, placesscience and technological growth in the driver’s seat. “Theprogressive ‘rationalization’ of society is linked to the insti-tutionalization of scientific and technical development”(Habermas 1970, 81).

Habermas speaks, then, of a kind of perilous rationaliza-tion, which encourages ecologically irrational outcomes.Industrialization, for example, may continue to appear eco-

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nomically rational, particularly given an ideological faith inthe seemingly dependable development of scientific and tech-nological solutions for ecologically harmful consequences,but is it rational to assume that such solutions will always bepossible?

Looking back to Weber’s substantive rationality, weoblige the local culture, as one location of the value com-plexes of the actor, to provide the yardstick by which to mea-sure the rationality of the action. This measurement maycoincide or conflict with the macro-cultural context (e.g.,shamanism in the western hospital).

Habermas, then, emphasizes the irrationality of the sci-entistic and technocratic character of advanced capitalism. Inso doing, he manages to tease out the rational possibilitiesexisting where actual people communicate and act togetheras members of groups within or against the larger culturalsetting. As he notes:

(A)n evolutionary trend...is taking shape under theslick domination [by] technology and science asideology. Above all, it becomes clear against thisbackground that two concepts of rationalizationmust be distinguished. At the level of subsystems ofpurposive-rational action, scientific-technicalprogress has already compelled the reorganizationof social institutions and sectors, and necessitates iton an even larger scale than heretofore. But thisprocess of the development of the productive forcescan be potential for liberation if and only if it doesnot replace rationalization on another level.Rationalization at the level of the institutionalframework can occur only in the medium of sym-bolic interaction itself, that is, through removingrestrictions on communication.

(1970, 118, emphasis in original)

Within the context of advanced capitalism wherein sci-ence and technology characterize societal ideology, ecologi-cal rationality, indicative of Weber’s substantive rationality,would be irrational — actions motivated by ecological sensi-tivities are incommensurate with those motivated by potentialeconomic benefits. However, broad cultural norms do reflectthe decisions and actions of actual individuals, typically pol-icy makers and power elites, but also (sometimes) the voicesof active dissenters. The institutional framework requiresintelligible discourse among participating players. While pessimism may rule the day for environmentalism, it can bepossible, for Habermas, to shift the macro-cultural conditionsof technocratic advanced capitalism into conditions whereinenvironmentally sensitive value complexes can hold sway.

Practical Ecological RationalityAs Bartlett builds on Diesing, Dryzek too calls for eco-

logical rationality to be given primacy among Diesing’s ratio-nality types. In contrast to the abstract and value laden notionof substantive rationality in Weber, ecological rationality forDryzek is very programmatic and procedural. Ecologicalrationality is implemented through lexical (hierarchicallyordered) procedures. Institutional decisions regarding envi-ronmental matters require the strategy of ecological rational-ity in order to prevent “the tragedy of the commons” (forexample), and lexical priority lends tangibility to such a strat-egy. “Lexical priority means that lower values come into playonly when designs in pursuit of higher value are totally com-plete” (Dryzek, 1987, 59). Lexicality provides participantswith a common vocabulary which becomes important whenconsidered relative to communicative action — a key compo-nent in Dryzek’s well-developed tactics for collective envi-ronmental problem solving. However, in focusing the devel-opment of ecological rationality on strategic collective deci-sion-making, Dryzek moved it out of the realm of practicalindividual decision-making and into the realm of practicalsocietal decision making.

Perhaps the most relevant (and most satisfying) discus-sion regarding ecological rationality is offered by Murphy(1994, 2002). Rather than appealing to Diesing, Murphy’secological rationality draws directly from Weber. As many(e.g., Merchant 1980) have suggested, a primary consequenceof the Enlightenment has been a scientistic objectification of,and alienation from, the natural world. Murphy’s argument(2002, 83) outlines the consequential direct correlationbetween the increased technological manipulation of natureand global environmental hazards. Similarly, Beck (1994,176) refers to “unintentional self-endangerment” of modernsociety — a condition which fosters anomie. For Murphy, asfor Beck, this anomic response is a form of ecological irra-tionality.

Ecological rationality, for Murphy, consists of the re-unification of the social and the material. Whereas theEnlightenment separated society from the biophysical envi-ronment, the project of ecological rationality is to providetools for decision-making, which simultaneously accomplishboth social and ecological ends. Not only do we have toaccomplish both social and ecological ends but we have torecognize that they are one and the same. Ecological ratio-nality may simply be a substantive rationality wherein valuecomplexes regarding the social and the material are integrat-ed. Further, ecological rationality, in keeping with Bartlett’ssuggestion, accomplishes this integration by expanding ourtemporal scale far into the future.

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In a sense, the extended range of ecological rationality isa perceptual shift. What have been otherwise lofty idealiza-tions — the benefit of future generations, the well being ofthe natural environment and wildlife, etc. — become verytangible concerns as the risks become tangible. Ecologicalrationality becomes a matter of practice, of practical action.Here, we reintroduce the term practical only partly in refer-ence to Weberian rationality. If Weberian practical rationalityrefers (for the actor) back to personal interest, experience,and benefit, and substantive rationality refers to the valuecomplexes so culturally embedded in the actor’s world, thenpractical ecological rationality binds together both the tangi-ble consequences the actor anticipates for her/himself and theimpacts s/he anticipates for the biophysical environment.

Ecological Rationality — A New SynthesisIn light of the theoretical outline of types of rationalities,

we offer several conceptual issues which ecological rational-ity can address for us. The term substantive entered our dis-cussion in two specific ways. For Weber, substantive referredto the value postulates of a given cultural setting. The ratio-nality of actions must be evaluated in terms of its consisten-cy with the value complexes of the setting. For Bartlett, sub-stantive indicates, in a sense, the motivational component ofrational action as he differentiated substantive from proce-dural, the rational strategy to be implemented. Certainly,Bartlett’s conception is consonant with that of Weber. We willstay with a conceptual understanding of substantive rational-ity, but to emphasize the motivational aspect we will use theterm generative. A generative rationality can motivate action;actions can be evaluated to identify the generative rationalityof that cultural context. While this concept leans toward thestructural, and seems to suggest that actions are motivatedmerely by cultural conditions, we do not intend to suggestthat actions are strictly the consequence of structural condi-tions. In fact, such a suggestion would entirely negate thenotion of rationality, which implies the degree of alignmentbetween one’s actions and one’s societal value complexes.Social actors, with some degree of rationality, affect out-comes through action.

The second component of ecological rationality that wewish to emphasize we will label procedural. Bartlett, as stat-ed, specifically differentiated the procedural from the sub-stantive (generative). Generatively, one is ecologically ratio-nal in terms of one’s motivations, and procedurally, one isecologically rational in terms of one’s actions. While Bartlettoffers little in the way of specific strategies, Habermas andDryzek, on the other hand, offer more specific approaches.

While Habermas calls for careful attention to the mode ofcommunication in order to create intelligible discourse with-out the trappings of actors’ ideological biases, and thereforeenable collective rational action, Dryzek offers lexicality as ameans of prioritizing issues — a checklist of communicativeaction.

Outcome, in the most common sense usage, suggests theconsequence of action. Whether intended or unintended, con-sequences result from the act (procedure), which may or maynot be generatively intended. We must emphasize cautionregarding our usage of outcome. With Murphy squarely inmind we maintain that material (bio-ecological) outcomes areinextricable from the outcome as social experience. If oneunderstands outcome merely as produced material things —an automobile as an outcome of economic rationality — itwould follow that we absurdly suggest such things to be, tosome degree, endowed with rationality. Rather, the carrotfield (for example), as a functioning ecosystem, is a tangiblecharacteristic of rational expression. Therefore, outcome eco-logical rationality is a manifestation of socio-bio-physicalconsequence.

Thematic throughout this paper, though often onlythrough implication, we have touched on the issue of scale.Rationality as a concept is equally relevant as a macro-sys-temic phenomenon as it is relevant at the micro level. Weberemphasizes both the value complexes inherent in particularcultural settings and the individual’s choice to act in accor-dance with or against such conditions

Habermas, as well, articulated rationality as the functionof society — as he spoke of advanced capitalism — yet ratio-nality is equally a function of personal interaction. For both,the degree to which actions are rational (or irrational) can beassessed only by examining the action within or against itscultural conditions. Murphy, then, adds materiality. We actwith some degree of consistency to our cultural conditions,and our various cultural settings inform and motivate ouractions, all the while our actions are fundamentally contin-gent upon the biophysical environment.

Our actions take place in biophysical space, shaping,transforming, preserving, or in other ways affecting materialstuff. That stuff, therefore, is central to our cultural valuecomplexes, to our motivations for action, hence to actionsthemselves, and the outcomes of those actions. Figure 2 illustrates the paths from these theorists to the conceptsoffered here. We turn then to the question of the ways inwhich Michigan carrot farmers use practical ecological ratio-nality in deciding on adaptive strategies for their farmingoperations.

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Figure 2. Sociological Theories of Rationality

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Methods

In order to better understand the ways that Michigan car-rot farmers make decisions regarding the specific problemsthey, and the industry, face, we undertook a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews. The interviews lasted betweenone and one-half to two and one-half hours and revolvedaround issues such as the changing challenges within theindustry, general farm management practices, and decision-making. More specific topics were covered such as thereduced deer-feed market, changes in pesticide availabilityand pest management practice, overall changes in the market,satisfaction with current pest management techniques, andideal future pest-management strategies. We also discussedgeneral carrot industry questions regarding, for example,market conditions, consumer demand regarding carrot quali-ty and appearance. We inquired about family and farm histo-ry. Overall, the range of questions was intended to create anoverview of how growers viewed themselves within theMichigan carrot industry during a time in which market con-ditions and environmental regulations were in flux.

We conducted individual interviews with sixteen grow-ers and processors. Interview transcriptions were analyzedusing the Nudist Vivo qualitative analysis package to identifymajor themes concerning adaptation to adversity and deci-sion-making in the face of political, economic, and biologicalpressures.

Results and Findings

Types of Practical Ecological RationalityIn light of the literature on ecological rationality outlined

above, and through ethnographic content analysis of ourongoing conversations with the Michigan carrot growers, weidentified three types of practical ecological rationality with-in several topic areas: pest management practices, organicproduction, interest in information regarding current agricul-tural research, land stewardship, and the tensions betweenproductivist agriculture and environmentalism. It is throughthese specific topic areas where the three rubrics, or types, ofecological rationality were articulated by the Michigan carrotfarmers. First, we identify what we call the generative ormotivating function. This is the causal character of ecologicalrationality, leading one toward what one intends to be ecolog-ically beneficial actions/decisions. This is the explicit, delib-erate intention to accomplish ecologically sensitive action.

Secondly, we identify the procedural component. Whenfaced with a decision, some growers will follow a standardoperating procedure. Procedures may be developed on thebasis of long-term, perhaps even multi-generational, experi-ence, or procedures may be based on various sources of

external advice (e.g., chemical company representative,extension agent).

Regarding the third component, outcome, we reiteratethe caution stated above. While our conceptualization doesnot resolve the problem of equating rational processes ofmind with external events and things, we nevertheless viewoutcome as a practical expression of socio-bio-physical con-sequence. Outcome is the realization of the ecologicallyrational act. The ecologically beneficial outcome may notnecessarily have resulted from deliberately ecologicallyrational motivations or explicit strategies but it representsecological rationality if, in fact, it is ecologically beneficial.The actor may perceive ecologically beneficial outcomes, orthe outcomes may go totally unrecognized. If the outcome isnot seen as a consequence of one’s action, one has the situa-tion described by cognitive anthropologists as emic models(Rappaport 1984; Dryzek 1987).

These three components of ecological rationality areonly partially integrated as the Figure 3 illustrates. It is pos-sible for a grower’s behavior to be purely generative, purelyprocedural or purely outcome oriented. But perhaps moreinteresting sociologically are the questions of the extent towhich and the ways in which the three components are inte-grated. How does the generative component influence farmoperation procedures? What monitoring is done of the out-comes of carrot raising procedures? How do perceived out-comes feed back into the generative function — can out-comes drive future ecologically rational action? If so, an out-come may be understood as a consequence of the grower’sactions and valued as ecologically important, and may cometo drive future ecologically rational action. Finally, we notethe strong resonance between the ecological rationality typesand those rationality types Weber described as directly relat-ed to action as illustrated below. Generative ecological ratio-nality is strongly rooted in Weberian substantive rationalityas they share the contextual component. Weberian formalrationality provides the rules and standards by which proce-dures are followed and Weberian practical rationality showsus what works to our own ends. Outcomes, in a practicalsense, speak for themselves.

Figure 3. Types of ecological rationality

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Each of the three forms of rationality was expressed inseveral contexts. Since the interviews were loosely structuredaround a number of discussion topics, each of the followingexamples emerged relative to those topic areas. Examples ofeach type of ecological rationality, therefore, are describedwith respect to the topic areas. Topic areas include (1) stew-ardship, (2) micro/macro level rationality, (3) recognition ofenvironmental harms, (4) organic production, (5) pest man-agement practices, (6) land-grant agricultural research, and(7) tensions between productivist agriculture and environ-mentalism.

At this point, then, we offer discussion and examples ofthe three types of ecological rationality.

Generative Ecological RationalityThere were many instances in which growers articulated

forms of generative ecological rationality, illustrating theirmotivations and intentions for environmentally sensitiveaction. With regard to stewardship, one grower discussed hisown visceral discomfort when he sees evidence of poor soilmanagement:

You get a windstorm around here in the spring, thesands blowing, (and) I’d like to go bury myself inthe basement... ‘cause I don’t want to watch it. It’ssickening...I mean, you can see plumes going up inthe air.

Certainly, this grower offers an ideological expression of anenvironmentally sensitive behavior, both as he carries it, andas he experiences it among the growers in his region.

Another grower expressed his sensitivity differently, andwhile this example is relevant to stewardship it also growsout of the theme regarding micro/macro level rationality. Hisis a pragmatic interest in stewardship, both in terms of theproduction of food and the stability of American agriculture(macro level), and as steward for the wildlife with whom he,in a personal sense (micro-level), cohabits:

If we can go to the moon and build a space lab, Iguess it’s time to work on our food program, andwork on taking care of our wildlife. We’re not hereto turn our back on them. They’re here for us to takecare of.

This grower, within a single sentence, juxtaposes twopositions that he feels may be irreconcilable. He offers amoral position about how growers should behave. Yet he saysas much about good grower behavior as he says about anagro-industrial production system that constrains such behav-ior. He places responsibility on consumers to care about howand where carrots (and all American food items) are pro-duced suggesting that consumerism jeopardizes the rural

landscape and lifestyle. This grower suggests that to assumeresponsibility as steward of land and wildlife (micro-levelrationality) is irrational in the context of macro-cultural con-ditions (macro-level rationality) whose obstacles to ecologi-cal rationality are agro-industrial production and con-sumerism.

Also relevant to micro/macro level rationality, anothergrower suggested that ecological rationality (not his choice ofwords) is shared by some groups of carrot growers as a cul-tural collectivity. His perception of the ecological sensitivi-ties of the growers in his county, one of the major carrot pro-ducing counties in the state, was that he and many of theother county carrot producers are more concerned with theecological well being of the region than are growers in otherregions:

We’re more concerned; this area is very concernedabout it. I don’t know why that is. It’s just the wayagriculture happened in this area and it’s part ofthe crops we grow, too. When you go outside of thisarea... we’re...more concerned about it than othergrowers... I think we are more concerned about itthan others, outside the area.

This example also illustrates the ways in which somegrowers manifest a generative ecological rationality throughthe recognition of environmental harms that are caused bysome carrot production practices. Many members of this par-ticular group of growers communicate and encourage ecolog-ical sensitivities.

Concerning, then, the recognition of environmentalharms, one grower discusses the Michigan agricultural tech-nique of decades past in which wetlands were drained andconverted into very fertile muck fields. He expresses concernfor the negative environmental consequences resulting fromthe disappearance of wetlands:

It’s a filter. Muck that has not been (drained), isswampland. Swampland doesn’t drain really fast.You take all this water that runs off this open farmground and runs into this muck area, it really getsfiltered before it gets into the streams. I think itmakes a big difference.

We can debate the accuracy of his statement, a debatethat becomes relevant to the ecological rationality of thestrategies he employs, and the ecological rationality of theoutcomes of that procedural rationality. At this point, howev-er, it serves as a sound example of generative ecologicalrationality by illustrating genuine concern for environmentalmatters.

Another important topic area regards grower perceptionsabout organic production in the Michigan carrot industry. We

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were interested in how they characterize organic productionand what the barriers might be for their own transition toorganic production if they were interested in making such atransition. Ecological rationality emerged in interesting waysthrough this topic.

The issue of organics is perceived to be unrealizable as asustainable practice with current techniques. This grower isopen to organic production but feels that current techniqueswould be harmful. Generative ecological rationality regard-ing organic carrot production in Michigan, for this grower,rejects chemical free practices for IPM (Integrated PestManagement) — a presumably sustainable alternative:

I was on an organic farm in Colorado two years agoand they grew at that time, I think it was around 300acres, maybe more, 500 acres of organic carrots.You know, there’s a lot of talk out there aboutorganic but what I seen in Colorado, they wereorganic but they’re weren’t sustainable. I mean, thatsoil, what I seen there and it was windy but theysaid it was windy there all the time, I seen plumes inthe air that were 300 feet tall from dust blowing anddirt blowing away in these fields when I was there.

This example illustrates how the grower thinks about organicproduction relative to his own practices and therefore illus-trates generative ecological rationality. He reflects on hisfeelings evoked by evidence of poor (ecologically detrimen-tal) farm management practices.

Procedural Ecological RationalityOne of the primary foci of the research has been to bet-

ter understand the ways that growers make pest managementdecisions and how they think about available alternatives.Ecological rationality, then, becomes evident in growerdesires to limit chemical inputs to the minimum effectiveapplication. Certainly, they quickly offer the obvious benefit.Less input saves money as the products become increasinglyexpensive. Nevertheless, the growers often move right intothe “more important” benefits of chemical input reduction.

Regarding pest management practices, the followingexamples reflect the ecologically rational strategies regardingspecific pest management procedures. In particular, there is agreat deal of concern for effective soil management and theminimization of chemical inputs into the soil. While dis-cussing these issues, several growers offered their strategiesfor reducing inputs into the soil for the sake of soil health. Asone grower stated:

I haul water to wherever I’m spraying and I fill upin several spots... If it’s really concentrated in onespot, that spot will never be alive again, just never.

Another grower spoke of his method of “banding” rather than“broadcast” spraying as a means to limit the chemical inputsinto the soil between the rows of carrots:

We got sprayers, banders we rigged up to go behindyou. We’ve got a five foot wide row, you’re sprayinga 12 inch wide strip, your concentration is the sameon that 12 inch wide but guess what, on a broadcastspray, it’s 150 product per acre. Instead of putting a1/4 [ratio] on ‘em, we’ll put 1/5 [ratio] on ‘em on abroadcast basis and we’re getting the job done... atthat much of a reduced rate.

Certainly, there are economic incentives for these practices. Itwould be foolish to suggest the absence of economic ratio-nality within these examples. However, they serve as usefulexamples of the procedural component of ecological ratio-nality as they were described primarily as methods for man-aging soil health. Economic rationality would apply whengood soil health were merely a means to the economic gainsof maximizing yield. Certainly, this is not overlooked as adesired outcome, but here the grower is concerned withhealthy soil as the primary desired end.

One area of discussion regarded the degree to which thegrowers read and follow the suggestions of land-grant agri-cultural research offered through extension services fromMichigan State University. Certainly, their willingness to par-ticipate in these interviews suggests a more general opennessto university research. It seems that such an interest may bemotivated in a variety of ways. While there may be econom-ic benefits which result from the ongoing research, there maybe perceived environmental benefits as well. In our discus-sions regarding these kinds of benefits, the following exam-ples surfaced.

The “Tom-cast” crop disease-forecasting device is aproduct currently being tested in cooperative research with a number of growers and Michigan State University re-searchers. The following example illustrates the proceduralcomponent of ecological rationality relative to the implemen-tation of Tom-cast as a method for reducing pesticide appli-cations:

Our program with the Michigan State consultants,they monitor the sensors once a week and they comeand give us a printout of the leaf wetness numbersand then we base our sprays off that, they do it on aTuesday and then kind of project when to spray.With asparagus we’ve used 15 for a trigger pointbut I guess in all reality it’s new enough in the car-rots we don’t know what that trigger point is gonnabe, if it’s gonna be 15 or 20. You know, if you breakit in the center and do 17 or something, you know,we need a couple of years to fine-tune it.

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This example, then, illustrates strategy. This is something thegrower is currently trying and therefore procedural ecologicalrationality is exemplified.

Indicative of procedural ecological rationality through asense of environmental responsibility and land stewardship,one grower spoke of his plans to remove an undergroundgasoline tank despite the considerable cost of removal:

I’m probably gonna pull a gas tank out of theground this year just because I’m afraid of, well, Iwatched it put in and it was covered with tar. It wasa certified tank. If it had any scratches they sent youanother thing of tar to cover the scratches beforeyou covered it up... I doubt that it’s leaking. It’sbeen there for probably 15 years.

This grower reveals his environmental sensitivity and senseof responsibility in a very direct way through this descriptionof his intended procedure.

Many of the growers spoke candidly about their discom-fort regarding their perception of an adversarial relationshipwith “environmentalism.” Environmental groups are per-ceived to be targeting agriculture as the cause of environ-mental degradation. Specifically, growers perceive a “publicperception of growers” to be one of careless abusers of chem-ical pesticides. In fact, most voiced the suggestion that grow-ers have more interest in careful pest management and thesustainability of their land than does anyone else. For thisreason there is considerable resentment toward environmen-tal groups in general. Through discussion of the topic of tensions between agriculture and environmentalism, ecologi-cal rationality revealed itself and we offer the followingexamples.

This grower discusses the quantity of chemical inputs heperceives the EPA to expect him to apply versus the quantityof pesticides he actually does apply:

Well, go to the EPA, they go to the, they go to aspray book, you know, and somethin’ like this, lookthrough it. Oh, Bravo, okay. Every 5 days or every7 days or every 10 days, these guys are puttin’ onthe equivalent of a pound and a half of Bravo foreight weeks, 10 weeks. Holy cow. That’s 15, 20pounds of Bravo. That’s not what we do. I’ve gotone, two, three, three Bravo sprays on there all sum-mer long on carrots.

The procedural component of ecological rationality isexpressed through his actual strategy of chemical applicationrelative to those he perceives to be EPA expectations.

Recalling the example regarding organic productionunder the generative category, we illustrate the connectionbetween types of ecological rationality. The grower moves

from feelings evoked by perceived detrimental practices(generative ecological rationality) to the relationship betweenthose feelings and his own resulting practices. Here, thegrower refers back to an experience on a Colorado organiccarrot farm:

I seen plumes in the air that were 300 feet tall fromdust blowing and dirt blowing away in these fieldswhen I was there. They have no cover crop ‘causethey don’t know how to control ‘em. They don’t, youknow, how do we control a cover crop in the spring?You know, you either do it with chemicals or you doit with tillage. Their comment to us when we asked‘em about it, they said we have no good way to con-trol our cover crop so we don’t plant cover crop.

Cover crops are perceived to be a very important componentin maintaining topsoil and managing soil erosion. This grow-er plants a winter wheat cover on his fields after harvest tomanage soil erosion. This is tilled under prior to planting. Ofgreater interest here is the practice of planting rye betweenrows of carrots to protect seedlings from soil and wind dam-age. When the carrot leaves grow to approximately nine inch-es the rye must be removed for the carrot to thrive. Tillage isnot an option for this cover crop, as it would damage the car-rots, so an herbicide is used to remove the rye. Organic pro-duction, would be ecologically less rational than chemicalapplication because the cover crop with chemical inputs isperceived to be more sustainable than no cover crop, nochemical inputs, and increased soil erosion. Further on, wewill again return to this example as we illustrate outcomeecological rationality, and as one example where each of thethree types of ecological rationality occasion the others.

Outcome Ecological RationalityThe outcome component is exemplified by the processes

which have proved themselves. In the following examplewhich concerns pest management practices, the grower notesthe effectiveness of scouting, the practice of walking throughthe field and visually scanning for insect, disease, and weedpests, and Tom-cast. These practices help growers spraychemical pesticides only “as needed” rather than the custom-ary timed sprays:

Well, scouting is working very well. I mean, thescouting tied in with the Tom-cast. You know, you tiethat all together... I talk to other growers in the statethat don’t use any of this and...they’re goin’ wayoverboard of what they need to do.

This example serves to illustrate how the outcomeinforms the generative. The process proves effective throughoutcome and motivates continued practice.

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Regarding the use of “Tom-cast”, relative to land-grantagricultural research, one grower has settled on a higher thanrecommended humidity reading which enables him to waitslightly longer than recommended between applications:

Well, I don’t have it (Tom-cast) on this farm butthere’s several within a quarter mile, really impor-tant I think, but I also have my own theory. They sayspray at, say they say spray at 15 points. I’m gonnago to 18 and I don’t see worse results.

The process has proven itself for him and offers an illustra-tion of the outcome component of ecological rationality.

Regarding both land stewardship and organic produc-tion, we return to the grower whose soil management prac-tices via cover crops create a practice perceived to be moresustainable than organic practice. Further into the discussionregarding cover crops and the perceived negatives associatedwith organic practices, he pointed to the field across the roadfrom his shop. It was early spring and the field was greenwith winter wheat. Cast against organic production, his prac-tices result in what he perceives to be truly ecological out-comes as a matter of his responsibility to the sustainability ofhis land. The use of cover crops throughout the year help toreduce soil erosion. As earlier mentioned, cover crops alsoprotect newly emerging carrot leaves from wind damage:

In this area, cover crops, like right across the road,that field is green now. Most areas, agricultureareas you go into do not do that. They can’t dealwith it. We can deal with it here so it’s acceptedhere. We don’t go through one year, I mean, whenour crop comes off it gets a cover crop put in andit’s growing through the winter. It’s green. It will beplowed down in the spring. But it protects that soilout there, you know, over the winter, over the snow-belt, over the wind erosion that can take place. I gotmore ...wind erosion from this ditch I got dug outfrom my house than I got in 40 acres out here.

Out of a deliberate sense of stewardship, this grower illus-trates the outcome component of ecological rationality as soiland wind erosion is, and has been, managed via the use ofcover crops.

Further, regarding organic production, the followinggrower, like the previously cited grower, has not adoptedfully organic production practices. He has, however, adoptedsome of the practices, has found them to work, and they havebecome part of the overall practice. Therefore, they representthe outcome component of ecological rationality:

We’re starting to deal more with organic fertilizersnow instead of a straight fertilizer. You know, we’re

using compost and both my brother and I thinkwe’re seeing a result from it but we don’t know thatfor a fact but we, I just, I got to believe it’s better forthe soil. So we’re gonna continue playing with it.

This quote serves as another example of the outcome feedingback into generative and procedural functions of ecologicalrationality. “We’re seeing a result” implies outcome. “I’vejust got to believe it’s better for the soil,” suggests generativerationality. “We’re gonna continue playing with it” points tothe strategy.

Conclusion

A central theme in environmental sociology is the rela-tionship between human and social dimensions, on one hand,and environmental and ecosystemic dimensions, on the other(Goldman and Schurman 2000). A central theme in agricul-tural sociology is change and stasis in farm managementpractices (Buttel et al. 1990; Fleigel and Zuiches 1993).Ecological rationality is broadly relevant to both of theseconcerns.

Also of particular relevance to sociological inquiry is the indivisibility of structure and agency. This indivisibilitymanifests itself both in the ideological realm and in thesphere of action. Thus, what strikes us when we look overthe types of ecological rationality is the ways in which theagency/structure dynamism emerges out of our conversationswith the growers.

So as we begin to understand the ecological rationalityof Michigan carrot growers, we must ask about the practicalrelevance to the Michigan carrot industry — a central pointwhich has yet to be fleshed out. We must now look to thecharacter of rationality at the structural level — carrot grow-ing and the carrot commodity system — so that we betterunderstand ecological rationality across scale dimensions.

Further, what we have yet to do effectively is clarify eco-logical rationality across the time dimension, and chart itmore explicitly through from the generative, the procedural,as outcome - as a dynamic interaction among the three types.The examples regarding organic practice serve only to beginthis discussion. In Michigan, there are no growers “within theindustry” growing organically. As we identify growers “in thefringes” we can understand both dimensions more compre-hensively. We then ask if “organic” practice is ecologicallyrational in the Michigan carrot industry. And if not now, canit become rational? Ultimately, is the trajectory (across time)of carrot production in Michigan (across scale) an ecologi-cally rational process? The theories outlined may allow us toconjecture about the scientistic and technological leanings ofagro-industry in general. Yet the absence of clear empirical

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description of ecological rationality as the societal and his-torical contexts against which to evaluate the ecologicalrationality of the growers provides us with exciting possibil-ities for future investigation.

Endnote

1. Email: kurlfink@msu.edu

Acknowledgments

The work on which this paper is based was undertaken with supportfrom the Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station, and from the USDACSREES through a RAMP grant entitled “Partnership Among Eastern U.S.Carrot Stakeholders to Develop and Implement IPM.” This article is arevised version of the presentation with a similar title at the joint annualmeetings of the Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society and theAssociation for the Study of Food and Society at Chicago in 2002. Wewould like to thank M. Suzanne Sontag for encouragement in the investi-gation of this topic, as well as Toby Ten Eyck, Lawrence Busch, andMichelle Worosz for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of thispaper. We would also like to thank Mary Hausbeck, Bernard Zandstra,George Bird, Norm Myers, Jim Breinling, and John Bakker for advice andinsight into Michigan carrot production. We alone, however, are responsi-ble for this paper’s content.

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