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Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit DebateAuthor(s): Carine Defoort

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 3, Eighth East-West Philosophers' Conference(Jul., 2001), pp. 393-413Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399849Accessed: 09/03/2010 02:24

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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION

Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of anImplicit DebateCarineDefoortDepartmentOosterseen SlavischeStudies,KatholiekeUniversiteitLeuven

Philosophy s the showpiece of our university: veryfreshman tudentis requiredto follow a generalcourse on philosophy. Butregardlessof the ways in which thiscoursemay be consideredgeneral,the fact is that attention o non-Western ulturesis absentthroughout.Thecourseis not titled GeneralWesternPhilosophy, ndyetphilosophyis, quitesimply,a Westernmatter.This demands no further xplanation;it is takenforgranted.Itshould come as no surprisehatChinastarts roman entirelydifferentpresupposition. everalphilosophydepartments ave a branchdealingwithChinese philosophy, analogous to those offeringWestern and often even Indianphilosophy.Butnotone ChineseuniversityeachesexclusivelyChinesephilosophy,let alone underthe title GeneralPhilosophy. 'Inthe lightof such an imposingstateof affairs,he question inevitablycomes tothe fore: is there indeedsuch a thingas Chinesephilosophy ?However,the degreeof certaintywith which the conflictingpositionsareheld is not the resultof thoroughresearch,painstakingdebate,or well-foundedreasoning.For hese have hardlyevenbegun. Inboth the West and China,the answer to this questionconsists mostlyofimplicit presuppositions. t belongs less to the domain of explicit opinion than tothe implicit ramewithin which we function: he organizationof universities,book-shops,journals,and conferencesall confirma vision that, in fact,they have seldomexplicitlydiscussed. The topic is thereforerather ensitive:any explicit rejectionofthe existence of Chinesephilosophy mpliesnotonly a painfulbreakwith the raisond'etre of more than a thousand Chinese academics but also a blow to China'snationalpride.On the otherhand,the insistence hatgeneral introductoryourses tophilosophy oughtto includephilosophical raditions aid claim to by othercultureswould certainlydisturbWesterncolleagues in the field.From this one might be inclined to conclude that such strongemotions andexaggeratedsensitivities-a Western chauvinismon the one hand and an overlysensitive Chineseself-insistenceon the other-are obstaclesto a maturediscussionof this nevertheless fundamentalquestion.The argumentspresentedhere, on thecontrary, hall endeavor to show that this conclusion is not entirelycorrect.Severalconcreteargumentshave been forwarded n thisdebate,and insofaras this conclu-sion is correct,I will arguethat this very sensitivity s an interestingphenomenon,one that is unjustlybeing neglected.The following analysisof the implicitdebate has a relevancebeyond the fieldof Chinese philosophy since a similarproblematicforwards itself not only in

Philosophy East& West Volume 51, Number 3 July 2001 393-413 393? 2001 by University of Hawai'i Press


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analogous controversiesaround entities such as Chinese science or Chinesereligion 2but also in the case of othernon-Western ulturesreinterpretingheirtra-dition in terms of modernWesternconcepts. The existence of Chinesephilosophythus acts as a case studyfor a widerproblematic.It is certainlynot my intention o solve the crucialquestionconcerningthe le-gitimacyof Chinesephilosophyonce and forall-this would be an impossible askgiven the indecisiongoverning he definitionof the concept of philosophyeven inthe West. Nordo Iwish to call intoquestionthe legitimacyorvalue of two domainsthatareclosely adjacent o the themeof thisessay, namely philosophy nChina -the philosophical activities of contemporaryChinese academics-and currentChinesephilosophy, insofar as this refersto a purely geographicalvariantofsomethinglike contemporary Continental hilosophy. 3The argumentspresentedhere concern only the traditionalChinese body of thought, which is generallylabeled as Chinesephilosophy. A clear definitionof our domain is thus our firsttask.TheExpression ChinesePhilosophyDoubt over the legitimacyof Chinese philosophy is not exclusively the resultofWesternchauvinism.Indeed,the expression Chinesephilosophy encompassesastrangeparadox,which threatens o call itsvery identity ntoquestion.Just ike otherconcepts such as science or humanrights, philosophy, by definition,makes acertainclaim to universality,withouttherebydenying its particular,Westernorigin.Spanish cience or Swiss humanrights ounds strange o our ears because theadjectivesin these expressionspose a threat o the universalpretensionsof the re-spective nouns. Whatever these expressions mightmean, we are not inclined toaccept thatthey refer o a type of science or humanrights hat is only valid in thesecountries.Philosophy s somewhat more lenientin this respect:we are accustomedto such expressionsas Continental r Anglo-Saxon philosophy,denotingdif-ferenttypes or genreswithin the philosophicaltradition.But even here we do notaccept that the adjectivestakes such a claim upon the noun that Continental hi-losophy could only be graspedbythe European ontinentalmind.Inthe expressionChinesephilosophy, however,the gripof the adjectiveuponthe nounappearssostrong hatphilosophyrisksbeing suffocated.One importantreason for this is that the term philosophy -just like manyother Western erms-has been appliedto the Chinese tradition n retrospect.Dur-ingthe nineteenthcentury,Japanopened itsdoors and turned o the West for inspi-rationand modernization.So did China with the coming of the twentiethcentury,sending students o Japan o learn of its success. A Japanesescholar,Nishi Amane(1829-1887), had studied in the Netherlandsand translatedbooks into Japanese,among which were some on philosophy (in 1873). He invented a Japanesetermon the basis of two Chinese characters:he study of wisdom ~ m-tetsugakuin Japanese, zhexue in Chinese.4 This was not particularlynew; already in theseventeenthcentury,Westernmissionarieshad labeled the greatChinese masters

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and other classics (amongthem the Yijing r Book of Changes)as philosophy,andthiswhile theirChinesecontemporariesdescribed Aristotle'swork in Chineseterms(qiongli gewu 4Wf).5 What was new at the end of the nineteenthcenturywasthe disappearanceof this culturalbalance labeling he other in one's own terms.Notonly did Westernphilosophicalterminologydominateproceedings,but it was alsoeagerly adopted by the Chinese,throughJapanese ranslation,n the descriptionoftheir own thoughttradition.Thatpartof the textual corpus that was traditionallyassignedto the masters zhuziUT) along with some booksof the ConfucianCanon(jing i_)-continuing fromthe fifthcenturyB.C. (by our count) up until the nine-teenth centuryA.D.-has been retrospectivelybranded as Chinesephilosophy(Zhongguozhexue t~ -r).6Thestrange hingis that this introduction f philosophy n Chinaaround he endof the nineteenthcentury,togetherwith otherdisciplinesand above all in the con-text of radicalinstitutionalchanges, has practicallymarked he end of this verytra-dition of the masters.Those who neverthelesscontinue to studythe old masters n aseparatebranchwithinphilosophydepartments o longercall themselves masters,but rather specialists n Chinese philosophy.7The curriculumof this separatebranch consists mainlyof traditionalChinesethoughtas it existed up until the in-troductionof Westernthinking.Historicalcompilationsof Chinesephilosophyalsooften stop at the end of the nineteenthcenturyor the beginningof the twentieth.8Thus,at the moment when Chinesephilosophywas retrospectivelyreated or rec-ognized, it also largelyceased to exist as a livingtradition. Chinesephilosophyseems to have died of its own birth: Chinesephilosophy ofthe traditionalmasters)and philosophy n China atmodernuniversities)xclude each otherin the sensethat, since the introduction f the latter, he formercould only continue to exist ina foreigninstitutionalsetting,as a separatedcorpusand object of study.The fatalallergicreaction hatthe Chinese mastershave developedtowardthisstrangedisci-pline raisesquestionsregardingheir combination: s thisactuallyChinese?And is itstillphilosophy?This shortanalysisof the expression Chinesephilosophy ends some plausi-bilityto doubtsconcerningits legitimacy.Butthe disputeis not therebysettled.Thenext two stepsof thisessay shall constructa typologyof the debate,followingaboveall the lead of contemporaryChinese scholarswho, not surprisingly, ave more atstakein thisquestionthanwe do.A Conflictover FactsAt the bottom evel of this debate one can distinguish wo opposingpositions,whichimply,althoughsometimes also explicitlystate,that Chinesephilosophyeither doesor does not exist. One could call this first evel a disagreement verfacts,a level thatisquicklyovertakenonce one is able to articulate ndground t inargument.But t isneverthelessworthwhile to explicate and reflectupon the characteristics f thesetwo opposing positions.

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FirstPosition:ChinesePhilosophyDoes Not ExistThe positionthat denies the legitimacyof Chinesephilosophy is primarily,houghnot exclusively,implicitand Western.Thestrongestarguments reof both a histori-cal and a theoreticalnature.The historicalargumentation epartsfromthe irrefut-able fact that philosophy is a well-defineddisciplinethat came into existence inGreece and has expandedthroughout he West,justas the masters zhuzi)are con-sidered a productof Chinese culture.The masters ived between the fifthand thirdcenturies before our era in a regiontoward the lower reaches of the Yellow River,duringa periodof social mobilityand relativeaffluence,and when there was a needforpoliticaladvice.Justas the West cannot layclaim to its own zhuzi, here wereno philosophers t that time in the area that we now call China. It cannot bedenied thatphilosophyhas quickly spreaditself over the whole world withinjustacentury-as have so manyother culturalproductsof the West-and that it has alsoset root in China. Butthe presentexistence of philosophy n China does not yetjustifythe retrospectiveappropriation f this term by a thoughttradition hat wasignorantof the then stillexclusivelyWesterndiscipline.But his historicalargumentdoes notstandalone. Hadthe resemblancebetweenthe Chinese mastersand the Westernphilosophersbeen convincingenough, thenthere would have been littleoppositionto theirrespectiveidentification.We speakof Chinese houses and palaces without implyingthat these constructionsexactlycoincide with Europeanarchitecture.Forthis reason, the historicalline is oftencoupled with a theoreticalargument hat states that the Chinese mastersdo not ingeneral-and certainlynot entirely-satisfy the conditions of philosophy.Westernacademics may, of course, differregarding he definition of this term,but there isneverthelessa vagueconsensus thatallowsfor a varietyof writingsunder he label ofphilosophy,but not forjustanything.Philosophymustgive the appearanceof sys-tematicity,reflection,and rationality;t must differ rom science and religion;and itmust be divisible into varioussubdisciplinessuch as metaphysics, ogic, and epis-temology.A greatdeal of the teachingsof the old Chinesemasters rom he so-calledGoldenAge of Chinesephilosophy(thefifth o thirdcenturiesB.C.) arelymeet thesedemands. Thinkers ike Laozi and Confucius,who are traditionallybrandedas thefoundersof Taoism and Confucianism,respectively,expressedthemselvesin shortproverbs,aphorisms, r conversationswithoutconcerning hemselves oo muchwithsystematicity, ogic, orany otherphilosophicalcriterion.

Finally, histheoreticalarguments lentfurther urrency romthe recent histori-cal context within which China's masterswere re-baptizedas philosophers.Thisconversion was inspirednot only by a groundedconviction in a strikingresem-blance, but ratherby the solicitudeof nationalstrengthand self-worth.China hadundergonemuchforeignhumiliation ince the OpiumWar,and its internal ituationhad been cause for concern as well. The countrywanted to rebuild itself on theJapanesemodel,for which Chinasoughtforeigninspiration. eeingthatphilosophyin the West seemed to accompany strengthand esteem, Chinese scholarsdecidednot only to trainthemselvesin Westernphilosophybut to label as such theirowninheritedthoughttradition.The success of this argument n China can of course

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be reversed with equal vigor by Westerners: the conversion of masters intoChinesephilosophy was predominantlya political issue, not the result of care-ful consideration.9Second Position:ChinesePhilosophyExistsThe second positionis best and mostexplicitly representedn contemporaryChina.But t also exists,althoughmoreimplicitly, nthe West. The fact that the firstpositionexists above all in the West does not mean that all Westernersare won over by it.Perhaps he anonymous majorityassumes that something like Chinese philosophymust exist since many bookshopshave dedicated a sectionto it, albeit between thesections on astrology nd eroticmassage, and since variousuniversitiesprovidelectureson it, albeit not at philosophy departments.10This vague consensus thatsomething ikeChinesephilosophymustexistsays nothingof people's knowledgeorappreciationof it: even Hegel spoke of Chinese philosophywithoutattachinganypositivesignificanceto it.11

In comparisonwith the implicit power of the firstposition in the West, thesecond positionleads a somewhat moreexplicitexistence in contemporaryChina.The modern Westernconcept of philosophythat reached China at the end of thenineteenthcenturydid not introduce tselfas the proudambassadorof a particularculture-such as Frenchwine or Belgianchocolate-but as something universal,a rationalpursuitthat every respectableculture must be able to discover withinitself. This discovery progressed very smoothly: as Europeanmissionariesin theseventeenthcenturyhad already remarked,China had already known twenty-fivecenturies of philosophical tradition.According to this second position, the wordphilosophy s quite simplythe Westernterm for the discussionsand speculationsof, by and large,the traditional masters, espitethe culturalvariations.12Becausethis positionis more explicit, its representatives re also more clearlyidentifiable.The most famous of them was FengYoulan ,: (1895-1990), andthe oldest was perhaps his mentor,Hu Shi iAg (1891-1962). The illustrationofthe second position is dominatedto a greatextentby theirreasoning. FengYoulanstudiedat ColumbiaUniversity,aughtat Americanand Chineseuniversities, nd inlater life was awarded with honorarydoctoratesin the United States and in India.Fengthought hatChineseandWestern hinkers xpoundedon similarconcerns andexperiencesand thus, withoutknowing it themselves,participatedn the universalhumanprojectof philosophy.The forewordto the firstvolume of his A HistoryofChinesePhilosophydoes not explicitlyarguethat Chinesephilosophy exists butreflectson itsworth,thusassuming hat it does exist.Through he questionshe posesregarding he value of Chinese philosophy, one can make out that Feng'snotionof philosophy is closely relatedto the above-mentionedvague Western consensus.His explicitlystated criteriaare:systematicity, riginality,and subdivisions.Further-more, Fengholds that the mastersdidn't score too badly on these points, given thereader'swillingnessto engage them with some effort: here is an implicit presenceof a structuredphilosophyin theirtexts,but it is up to us to make it explicit;philo-sophicalprogressand originality ie hidden in inconspicuouscommentaries,and it

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is up to us to discoverthem;weak pointsin Chinesephilosophy,in particular pis-temology, metaphysics,or logic, are often the resultof the masters' elective atten-tion and conscious decision,and it is upto us to appreciate his.13In his overview of the historyof Chinese philosophy, Feng concerns himselfprimarilywith the firstpoint, namelythe explicationof implicitlyregulated houghts.Forhim, the best way to systematizeancient Chinese thoughtis through philoso-phy. His books are thereforeteeming with all kinds of Chinese neologisms forterms uch as humanism renwenzhuyiA}i-t), realism (shizaizhuyi ~t~i),pragmatism shiyong zhuyi f1Al&5t), skepticism (huaiyi zhuyi fftSC),utilitarianism (gongli zhuyi t5ilJiZT), principles (yuanze Ji#Jj), essences(benzhi )Ri), definitions (dingyit), reason r truth daoli_M), andso on.Fengthusoffershis contemporariesnew glasseswith which to gaze upontheir owntradition,providingan enrichmentand liberation orwhich manyChinese intellec-tuals are stillgrateful.Theoldestphilosophicalpresentation f Chinesethought ntermsof philosophy,however,is to be found inthe worksof HuShi,involume 1 of hisZhongguozhexuedagangrPiiJ'ctfx (Overviewof Chinesephilosophy),which appeared n 1919. Asan enthusiasticproponentof JohnDewey, pragmatism, nd the Americanphiloso-phy of thattime, Hu Shi sought aftertraces of such pragmatic, ogical, and realistthinking n the Chinese corpus.Within this project,his most renownedbook, TheDevelopmentof the LogicalMethod in Ancient China(1922), often goes radicallybeyondthe centuries-old, raditionalnterpretationsf the classicaltexts in ordertobring o lightunnoticedpassagesand thinkers.Forexample,the practical,utilitarian,and ratherpopulistschool of Mohism, which, under the pressureof Confucianism,historicallynever enjoyed much notoriety,was thrust to the foregroundby HuShi.14A philosophical readingof ancient Chinese thought is typical of the secondpositionand can adopt different orms.An extremevarietyof this is the compul-sive use of the Marxistoppositionbetween idealism weixinzhuyi l,t,3x) andmaterialism weiwu zhuyi PtA3iX). The communistvision, which classifies andinterprets he mastersaccording to this opposition, characterizes he idealistsasaristocrats oncerned with all sorts of abstract,metaphysical ruthsand repressivemoralprinciples,while the materialistswere prizedfor their resistance o this andtheir attention to concrete, materialreality.A firsttendency within these Marxistparameters onsisted of definingall Chinesethinkers rom before the liberationasidealistic. Thereupon ollowed the tendency to interprethe whole evolutionofChinesethought ntermsof a progressivedialectic between two streamsof thought,and a gradualbut constantgrowthtowardmaterialism.15 rom he 1950s onwarduntil the early 1980s, almost all disputes concerning Chinese philosophy in thePeople's Republicwere carriedoutwithinthis framework.Questions o be discussedinquiredinto which aspect of which classical philosopherand to what extent hewas idealisticor materialistic, nd how this echoed anotheraspect of his thoughtand social background.It was most difficult to put the frame of thought itselfintoquestion, seeing thatthe governmenthad imposedit as an objective,scientific,



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proletarian,and socially responsiblemethodfor opposing the Westernbourgeoisapproachof those like Hu Shi and FengYoulan.Nowadays,this Marxist rameworks often leftin silence bythewayside,butit isseldom the targetof direct attack. Not only are scholars conscious of avoidingpoliticallysensitive issues, but the framework tself is so conceptuallyweak that itis largelyundeservingof much philosophical attention.Nevertheless,this Marxistframework ertainlyhad its value in providinga freshperspectiveaftera long historyof predominantlyConfuciandomination n China.Namely,the oppositionbetweenidealism and materialism ocuses attentionon the social backgroundof diversethinkersandthe influencethis has had on theirinsights.It is encouraging o see howthe sensitivityto political context and social background,now releasedfrom itsMarxistcategories,continues to stimulate ruitfulresearchby young scholars suchas, for instance,Wang Bo (b. 1965), lecturer n philosophyat PekingUniversity.16An Evaluation f the FirstPositionThereis much that could be said forboth positions,and a defense of one is simul-taneouslyan attackon the other.An advantageof the firstpositionis that it aims toavoid a problemof the second position,namelythe conceptualconfusion of whichthe retrospective ttribution f a philosophyto traditionalChina was a part.Butthisconfusionis like a mountainof which only the peak presentsa stumblingblock forthe firstposition.To shed light uponthis peak, we need to view the mountain n itsvariousarticulations.At its foot we locate the philosophical neologisms, which, despite their com-plexity,can be organized into threegroups.17The leastproblematicof these, fromthe standpointof the conceptualconfusion,are the transliterationsthroughwhichthe Chinese charactersoffer a primarilyphonetic representationf the English erm(e.g., luoji i4_ for logic ).Equallyunproblematics the second groupconsistingoftranslations onstructedon the basis of relativelyneutral erms(e.g., keguan 4I,literally view of the guest, and zhuguantiA, literally viewof the host, for theconcepts objective and subjective, respectively).The most problematic,how-ever, because mostconfusing,is the thirdgroupof philosophicalneologisms,whichwere formed from the translationof separateor integratedendemic terms thatappearedto overlapwith the correspondingWesternideas, but thatalso covered arich and controversialgamutof political,historical,and intellectualconnotations.Forexample, the prevailingChinese word for reason or truth, daoli, is con-structed from two terms that themselves have a historyspanning more than twomillennia: dao 'i ( way, method, doctrine ) nd ii _ ( pattern, principle )belongto the mostdifficult-to-interpretoncepts inthe studyof the masters, ven forcontemporaryChinesescholars.18These neologisms broughtabout a multiplyconfused discourse. First,Chineseintellectuals translatedand interpretedWesternphilosophy via such neologisms,which on the one hand were foreign and Western,but on the other hand alsofamiliarand ripewith traditionalmeaning.Thisshortcomingwas unavoidableand isnot partof the protestsconcerningthe firstposition.A second phase of complexity,

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also no greatobstacle forthem, came about when researchers f Chinese thoughtbegan to interpret heir own ancient texts through these neologisms instead ofthrough he familiarand trusted ndemicconcepts.The fact thatthe Chinese mastershave not always come out of this complex operationin the best lightis a pointofcriticismof the second positionthatwe shall expand upon in a moment. But whatdoes presenta problem or the firstposition-the mountainpeak-is the retrospec-tive usurpationof the title philosophy by the Chinese masters, he confrontationthatis therebymade possible,and the strangechimeras hat can and often do flowfromthis confused discourse.Inthisway, forexample, Hegel's idea of Begriffs firsttranslatedor explained by the above-mentionedChinese term ii.Thisconcept wasimportant n the Neo-Confucianismof the twelfth century, in particular or thethinkerZhu Xi (1130-1200). As a result,one comes across mind-boggling tudiessuch as the article ShortComparativeAnalysisof the Theoryof Li in Zhu Xi andHegel -as if Hegel had ever participatedn the Chinese debateconcerning i andas ifthe philosopherZhuXi hadpreemptedhisWesterncounterpart y about sevencenturies.19An analysisof this conceptualconfusionexplainsthe resentment elt by thosewithin the firstposition.Butthispositionalso impliesa significantdisadvantage:hecriticsof Chinesephilosophy betrayproblematicpresuppositions oncerningthenatureof understandingand communication.They seem to believe interculturalcommunicationor even ordinary onversation o be successfulonly in those caseswhere informationappearsto traverse he gap between the head of the transmitterand the head of the receiverwithout distortionor hindrance.This,sketchedsimply,is the prevailing dealof communication.But he morepertinentquestioniswhetherthis situation s even possible,let alone desirable.BertrandRussellonce claimed that fruitful ommunicationconsistspreciselyofthe opposite,that it results rom the discontinuitybetween the different ontextsinwhich a concept comes to be articulated nd fromthe new associations o which itmay give risethere.20 fa partnernconversationwere to repeatone's wordsentirelyunchanged, like a mere echo, then one would very stronglysuspect that neitherunderstanding or any formof communicationhad taken place. One experiencessomethingas fruitful ommunicationonly when the responseor explanationdiffers.The seeds of communication hat we spreadabout seem to take rootin a somewhatforeignsoil. Difference is a sign of understanding,but it can also be a source ofmisunderstanding.uccessfulunderstandings closely related o understanding if-ferently,and thusalso-and perhaps nevitably-to misunderstanding.hus,under-standing and misunderstandingpresent themselves not as clearly distinguishedpoles, but ratheras rivals,nevertheless ntimatelybound to each other.It is becom-ing increasinglydifficult,although no less important,o keep the two apart.Themelting pot of misunderstandings esultingfrom the fact of China's self-moldedphilosophy has parallelsin the Romanadoption of Greekconcepts, the Chinesetranslationof Buddhistnotions,and, indeed, on a smallerscale, in every form ofinterpretationr conversation.21A vision of communication hatattempts o overcomeall differencebeginswith



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an equally erroneous expectation of transparency,as if Westerners could haveperfect insight into the meaning of Westernterms, and the Chinese into theirs.The meanings that words contain are not only multipleand changeable but alsonot crystalclear. The term philosophy s, in fact, a good example of this. Intheseventeenthcentury,the missionariesdid not find it difficultto brand Confucius'Analects or the Bookof Changesas philosophy,since they maintaineda far widerconcept of philosophythan what tends to be the case today. Even the division ofscience as a separatedomainof knowledge had notyet takenplace. From his per-spective,the questionof whether ancient Chinese texts can be called philosophyis not so mucha Chineseproblembut the resultof a severecontractionof the notionphilosophy n the West. Promoters f the firstpositionshould as a consequenceremove many ancient Greekstexts, togetherwith the Chinese masters,from thegeneral Introductiono Philosophy course. Modern interpretations ften (andpartly inevitably)do with Plato'swritingswhat FengYoulan did with the masters:select, systematize,and present hem in contemporaryerms.An Evaluation f theSecond PositionWithFengYoulanwe are now inthe midstof the second position.Fengbelieves thatChinese philosophy trulydoes exist and furthermore nsistsupon interpretinghemasters with a predominantlyWesternphilosophical jargon.An initialadvantageof this approach is that a dialogue with Westerncolleagues was made possible:throughFengYoulan'sbooks presentingConfucius' humanism nd Mozi's utili-tarianism, he masterswere given a recognizableplace withina familiardiscourse.Thus, for the first time, this rich and fascinatingintellectualheritagewas madeaccessible to a wide audience in the West, thanks not only to its philological butabove all to its conceptualtranslation.A second advantageof this approachis thatthe Chinesepublicwas given a new perspectiveon theirown tradition.Eventoday,Chinese scholarsexperiencethis renewal as a releasefrom a fossilized Confuciantradition,which after more than twenty centuries had exhausted its potentialfordebateand renewaland no longerappearedappropriateor the modernchallengesconfronting he country.FengYoulan'sorientationhas allowed for communicationand a renewedreflection,withoutlosingthe focus upondifference.The disadvantages of this position have already been mentioned with theadvantagesof the first.Butwhile the emphasisthere was on the Westernrejectionofan unfair dentificationbetween the masters nd the philosophers, we can nowfocus on the disadvantages or the Chinese masters hemselves.By forcing hem intoa philosophical jargon,traditionalChinese discussions and insightsriskbeing cutinto incoherentpieces: one throwstogetherwhat does not belong together,andmisses connections that are crucial within the Chinese context. Westernerswhosearchfor maximsand universalprinciples n ancient Chinese textsare like Chinesemasterswho would siftthroughthe whole corpusof Westerntexts-from politicalmanifestos o philosophicaltreatises-in searchof prescriptionsorcoffins,withouttaking nto accountour current ntellectualcategoriesorphilosophical nterests.Dueto ritual tipulations,he thicknessof coffinswas a controversialopicfor the Chinese

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mastersbut has not been coherentlydealt with in the West, except perhapsin thetrade literature f funeraldirectors.A perniciousresultof such intellectualmutilationis that the Chinese insightsare exposed as primitiveor naive forms of familiarWesternconcepts, insights,and discussions that are themselves never called intoquestion.Inthe People's Republic,such a critiqueis almost unheardof. Despitethe fewcriticalvoices thathave come andgone, the philosophical argonhas remained o alarge degree unscathed.22The dominantstudy of the masters-after the Marxistintermezzo and since the Open Door politicsof Deng Xiaoping(1979)-is againbeginning to reveal a resemblance to Feng Youlan's approach from before the1960s. Butthrough ncreasingcontact with Westerncolleagues and no doubt as aresultof independentevolutions and growingnationalism,more and more Chinesescholarsare beginningto questionthe influence of Westernphilosophicaljargon,originallyand above all in Taiwan and Singapore,but also increasinglyin thePeople's Republic.23

A Conflictover ConceptsWith this evaluation,we have arrivedat a point where the discussion over factsleads into subtlerargumentationoncerning he conceptof philosophy tself.FengYoulan'swork and the reaction o it from both Chinascholarsand Chinese scholarsreveals how explicationand argumentation t the level of facts leads to a discussionof concepts.24Iwill appealto the distinctionmade inanalyticalphilosophybetweenthe descriptive nd emotive meaningof terms, o divide discussionsconcerningthe notion philosophy nto two major ypes:on the one hand thosethatinstigatearenewed definitionof the contentof thisnotion(itsdescriptive,conceptualmeaning)and on the otherthose thatdisputeits currentappreciation theemotive meaning).As an illustration f these differentargumentative trategies,one could considertwooppositeapproaches o the notion of etiquette as differentways to defend one'spreference o eat with bare handsat a banquet.One strategywould be to state thatthis behaviorconstitutes trueetiquette, departing rom he common content of thisnotion,butpreservingtscurrentlypositiveappreciation;he alternativewould be toattackthe prevalentvalue of etiquettein general,withoutchallengingits prevalentmeaning (eatingwith a knife and fork) n our society.25Viewed from this perspec-tive, the oppositionbetween the two initialpositions in the debate on Chinesephilosophy s based on a remarkably ommon implicitground,where neither hepositiveappreciationnor the current nterpretationf the notion philosophy arebeingquestioned.One would imagine hatthe sharpestpossiblecontrastwith this commongroundwould be a positionthat underminesboth of these presuppositionsby questioningthe prevalentunderstanding f philosophy as well as its value. Butthis position,understandably,as few supporters:ne who feels nothing orphilosophy s unlikelyto take the effort to lend it new content. Forthe two most importantalternativesto come to lightin the next steps, attention o one of the two kinds of meaning is

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generally,but not necessarily,emphasizedat the expense of the other. It is far fromsurprisinghat a positive appreciationof philosophywill demand a new and broaderinterpretationf the term,allowing the ancient Chinese masters o take partin it.Similarly,t is normal hat a breakwith the currentappreciationof philosophydoesnot invite a new content of the term.

Thus,we shall discuss as a thirdpositionthe view thatpresupposes he valueof philosophywhile explicitlyquestioningits prevalentcontent. This view is oftenrelated to the second position-the assertion that Chinese philosophy exists-providing twith a moreexplicitdefense and argumentativeorce.As a fourthposi-tion we shall discussthe view that does notquestionthe prevailing nterpretationfthe term,but rather he value of the philosophicalproject:why should Chinaevenhave had a philosophy?Thisposition accompaniesthe first,but is more elaborateand predominantlyChinese in itsrepresentationnd concern.ThirdPosition:WhatIsthe Meaningof Philosophy ?The thirdposition is held above all by sinologistswith philosophicaltrainingand,analogously,by philosopherswithsinological training.Theyclaim,on the one hand,that the traditionof the Chinese masterssufficientlyresemblesthe wider Westernphilosophicaltradition-and not simply its modern variant-to be labeled as phi-losophy.Afterall, the masterspose questionsof deep human concern while sub-stantiatingheir ideaswithexamplesandarguments.On the otherhand,their hemesand formsof reasoningare sometimes so fundamentally ifferent romthose of theirWesterncounterpartshat the Chinese mastersoffer a uniqueopportunityo ques-tion, in a philosophicalmanner, he currentnotion of philosophy tself.Indeed,this may be somethingthat Westernphilosophers irelesslycontinue todo: strive orthe ideal of objectivityoropen-mindedness.Within he humanities hisideal can best be realizedin confrontationwith what is mostdifferent; nd what ismore differentfrom our Western philosophical tradition than ancient Chinesethought?Thethirdpositionadmitsthat the adjective Chinese does have an influ-ence on the term philosophy, but a beneficial one, because it breaksthroughthe unarticulated-and thereforeeven stronger-modern limitationsof the notionphilosophy and its dominantcategories.Those who support the broadening of the prevailingterm philosophy toencompassthe Chinese mastersperceivein Chinesethoughtnotonly the advantageof an entirelynew perspective,but even a valuable alternative or what manycon-sider to be an inveteratemetaphysicaltraditionwith its sharp contrastbetweenrealityand language, prescriptionand description,saying and doing, objectiveand subjective, self and other, and so on. It is no coincidence that the pushfor this appreciationof the Chinese heritagehas arisen at the hands of criticsofthe Westerntradition.According o them,we must focus our attentionnot on thoseancient Chinese ideasthat,aftersome adaptation, an be takenupwithin the circlesof Westerndiscussion,butpreciselyon those ideas that seem stubbornly ubversivetowardconceptsand categoriesfromthe West.A good example of this position is HerbertFingarette,who, inspired by John

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Austin'svision of performative anguage use, rediscovered he value of the ritualword in the Analectsof Confucius.Inhis small but influentialbook Confucius:TheSecularas Sacred, he also reacts against the familiarsubjective,psychologizinginterpretationn terms of internal intention versus external deeds. The reversal,which Fingarette escribes in his Preface, s typicalfor this thirdgroup:When I beganto readConfucius,I foundhim to be a prosaicand parochialmoralizer;his collected sayings,the Analects,seemed to me an archaic irrelevance.Later,withincreasing orce, I found him a thinker,with profound nsightsand with an imaginativevisionof manequal in itsgrandeuro any I know.Increasingly,havebecomeconvincedthat Confuciuscan be a teacherto us today-a major eacher,not one who merelygivesus a slightlyexoticperspectiveon ideasalreadycurrent.He tells us thingsnotbeingsaidelsewhere-things needingto be said. He hasa new lesson to teach.26

ThusFingaretteeactsagainst he traditionalnterpretationf Confucius hat is char-acteristic orthe second groupand that,accordingto him, representshe masterasan uninterestingariationof dustyold Western deas.Fourth Position: What Is the Value of Philosophy ?Philosophy s not universal,nor is it a traitof rationality,but is a typicallyWesterndiscourse,with its strengths such as the ideals of neutralityand universality)aswell as its weaknesses (e.g., its limited and purely academic scope).27Just asshadowboxing (taijiquan)s having success in the West, philosophy is spreadingwith muchprolificacy hroughChina,but thistakesnothingawayfromeitherof theiroriginalculturalbounds.With this idea, a minorityof mainlyChinese intellectualsconstitutesa fourthand finalmajorposition.Philosophy is, and remains,a primarilyWesternculturalproduct,a strangeand useless conversation n which European ribes have trained hemselves,full ofearnestnessand sedulity.Itis a veryspecificdiscoursethat for some reason or otherhas maintaineda highlevel of subscriptionnthe mysteriousWest. Ihaveyet to findthispossiblevariationof the fourthpositioninChinesesources,but itchallengesin apowerfulway the implicitvaluation njoyed by philosophy nthe previouspositions.Thefourthpositionis closely connected to the first,which is proclaimedby mainlyWesternproponents,but it replacesthe implicitappreciationorphilosophyby oneor moreexplicitemotivemeanings,such as contempt, pity,indifference,wonder,oradmiration.One variantof this position explicitlyadmiresphilosophy and denounces thebankruptcy f the Chinese tradition. ntellectuals ttackChina for its lack of philos-ophy and otherWesternvalues;the MayFourthMovementof 1919 andthe culturecraze (wenhua -'fZ,) of the 1980s were momentsin which this vision was rela-tivelystrong.But not all voices in thisgroupresoundwitha sharpnessequal to thatof LiuXiaobo (b. 1955), who prefersWesternphilosophyfor its intellectualfasci-nation and because of its superiority,according to him, over traditionalChinesethought.He even goes so faras to claim thatWesternphilosophy is necessarytohaul China out of its backwardness.The only thingthat can save China,so he hassaid in a controversialnterview, isthreehundredyearsof foreigncolonization. 28



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A milder variantof the fourth position has become more current since thenationaltraditioncraze (guoxue m^,) of the 1990s. Nowadays one seldomhears it said that philosophy is Westernwithout the qualification hat the Chinesetraditioncan boast a worthyalternative n a corpusof masters.This variantcharac-terizes Westernphilosophy as closely linkedwith, althoughalso rivaling,religionand science, while the Chinese mastersare said to offer a compass for navigatingthroughone's personal, amily,social, and politicallife.A certaincongenialitywiththeirown traditionoften lies hidden beneath such comparisons.Here one shareswith the thirdgroup an interestin traditionalChinese thoughtwithout, however,redefininghe descriptivemeaningof thetermphilosophy.Here also one can see thedesire to protect he masters'corpusfromphilosophicalmutilation.29An extreme versionof this variationwould have it that Westernersand Chinesesimply cannot understandeach other's thoughtbecause they differ so fundamen-tally. LiuDong, a researcherat the Academy of Social Sciences, even claims thatnon-Chinese are entirely unable to grasp either past, present, or futureChinesethought.SinologistsorChinascholarsalso lack the right eel for the Chinesecontext.Theydo not understandhe consciousness with which China deals with its com-plex situation,andthey allow themselves to be led astrayby theirown interestsandnew trends. EvenChinese scholars workingabroad misinterpretChinese thought,according to Liu, as they view China through Western philosophically coloredglasses.30Even hougha famous Chineseproverbclaims that standing n mountLuone cannotsee the true face of the mountain, and that distance can thus be intel-lectually advantageous, Liu Dong articulatesa much-held view among Chinesescholars.31To conclude, there are two prevailingWestern varietiesof this fourthposition:one is the explicitresponseof Westernphilosophyprofessors hallengedto groundtheir implicit position. Itis then thatthey gladly accept the compromisethatgrantsChina,as a consolationprize,the patenton a sort of practicalwisdom or pragmaticsensibility.As a consequence they need not adapteitherthe content or the title oftheir Introductiono Philosophy. And finally, the sinological variant considersmany Chinesetexts philosophically nterestingbecause they questiontrustedcate-gories,but it does not thereforeconsider the teachingsof the ancient master o bephilosophy. The resemblance o the Westernphilosophical raditions, of course,quitereal-otherwise there would be no confrontation.But he identification f bothtraditionshas broughtwith it so muchconfusionthattheyfind it too problematic.Evaluation f the ConceptualDiscussionsDue to the fact thatboththese varietiesare an elaborationof the first wo positions,they aredeservingof moreor less the same evaluation.Thuswe shall limitourselveshere to the respective conceptual componentsof theirarguments.Here again theevaluationhas alreadybeen implicitlyposed by the argumentation f the opposingposition.The third position deserves appreciationfor its critical orientation towardthe currentlylimited notion of philosophy. The Chinese masters can indeed be

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philosophicallymore interestingn their resistance o prevalentphilosophicalcate-gories than in their awkwardincorporationwithin them. The absence in Confuciusof an internal ealmharboring houghtsand emotions is not necessarilya weak-ness of his thought,nor is the panoplyof contradictory tipulations n the Analectsnecessarilya failure n clearthinking.China's oremostmasterdoes notalwaysneedcorrectionat the hands of modernphilosophers,and he also challengesour domi-nant metaphors locatingemotions inside)and academic habits(demandingstrictdefinitions).Such a defenseof the Chinese mastershasa furthermplication,namelythat it also reacts againstan all-too-moderninterpretationf premodernWesternthinkers.But the argumentsof the thirdpositionhave their weaknesses: as critique, heyalert us to the influenceof subconscious presuppositions, ut theirpositivealterna-tive is less convincing.With the burstingof the bordersof the modernconcept ofphilosophy,all Chinese mastersare suddenlygrantedasylum in the field. Thus,anuncheckedconceptualexpansionallows room not only forthe aphorismsof Laoziand the sayingsof Confucius,but also, by analogy, for Biblical orationsand para-bles. Anall-too-generousxpansionof the term philosophy eadsto a conceptthatencompassesalmosteverything-and that, therefore,means almostnothing.Wherethe thirdposition mainlyconcerns itself with questioning he contentofthe term philosophy, he contribution f the fourthpositionis itsexplicitattentionto its emotive meaning. The Chinese masters need not undergo a philosophicalface-lift n order to be interesting;ndeed, they need not even be consideredinstantiations f philosophy.But hereagain lies the weakness of thisposition: n thedangerthatone assumesthe abilityto completethis criticalattitudewith a positivealternative.The more self-assured he alternative, he greaterthis danger is. Theconviction thatonly Chinahas unproblematic ccess to itsown tradition s a kindofnationalistic ounterpartf the universalism efendedbythe second position.Justasthe notion philosophy to some extent remains inaccessible for contemporaryWesterners, ncient Chinese ideas remainforeign o contemporaryChinese scholars.Not only is it impossibleto turn back the clock and to purgeChinaof all Westerninfluence (the philosophical jargon included),but the ideal of transparent om-municationand perfectself-knowledgeare also mythsthat are susceptibleto theremarksmade in the evaluation of the firstposition. It is not because we do notentirelyunderstand he Chinese-and do not understand hem in theirown terms-that we thereforedo not understand hem at all. To entirelyunderstand s theunattainable dealof a problematicvisionof understanding nd communication.A Conflictof SensitivitiesWe have now exposedthe firstbuildingblocks of a largelyunarticulated ebate. Thefourpositionspresentedare not meant as descriptionsof actualvisions,but rather stypes of argumentation nd illustrations hereof. The sketchy presentationof eachseparatepositionhas sometimes madeexplicitwhat manyhave neverstated,whileithassilencedargumentshat sometimesdo ariseinconcrete discussions.Inorder o



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representn a preciseand orderly ashion as manyactualpointsof view as possibleon the basis of these foundations,one would have to expand furtherupon a widerangeof variationsand combinations.With this abundance of variousvisions concerningthe legitimacyof Chinesephilosophy,the readerperhapswonderswhy this problematichas been brandedan

implicitdebate. The arguments hat have been presenteddo indeed belong toa minority,and the elaborationof the last two positions in particulars relativelyrecent. But he fact thatonly a minority oncern themselveswith a questiondoes notmake the debate implicit, as if one expected the whole world to be concernedwitheveryproblem.Thedebate is implicit n the sense that dominantand opposingopinions implicitlyprevailwith a certainty hat is hardlyever questionedand thatapparentlyrequiresno rational oundation.The four positionsand their variationsofferarguments hatcould support hese various certaintiesbut that have not led toconsensus, nor have they been capable of significantlychangingthe realityof thesituation.Fixationupon this argumentation nd an endless progressionof it has aperniciousconsequence, namely that attention is being diverted from somethingentirelydifferent: he sensitivity urroundinghe entireproblematicand the ineffec-tivenessof the respectivearguments o breakthrough t.Both he sensitivityand the indecision characteristicf this discussion have to dowith the fact thatthe concept philosophy s opaque forus, too. Everyphilosopherhas his or her own vision and doubts aboutphilosophy,which areusuallydiscussedortemporarily ettledduring he firsthoursof class. Theprevailingdoubt and lack ofconsensus,however,do not discourageour institutionsromcontinuing o functionwith an implicit,opaque, yet highly resistant notion of philosophy. This notiondetermines that the Bible, Proust,and Kunderagenerally do not form partof thecurriculum,nor do non-Western hinkers,particularlyf they are from the ancientpast.Butthe literary xtravagancesof Nietzscheandthe loose reflectionsof the lateWittgensteinare generallytaughtas philosophy, despitetheirstrikingresemblance,respectively, o the provocative antasiesof Zhuangziand the sporadicutterancesofConfucius.It seems that the philosophersof ourcurriculumdo not shareone, albeit for thetime being disputed,essence with one another,but rathervarious and particularcharacteristics,uch as the multiple,overlappingresemblancesof familymembers.Thusseen, philosophy appears o be a concrete,culturallybound,diverse,and dis-persedwhole of conversationsconstantlyreferringo each other. Founded n Greeksoil, it has now grownovertwenty-fivecenturieswithina specificculture,languagegroup,and ethos. Eventhough ever-largerpartsof the worldare now takingpartinthis conversation, it remainsa Western culturalproductthat influences its newinterlocutorswhile being influencedby them.Theappeal to Wittgenstein'sdea of familyresemblances32s not intendedonlyto follow his lead in deserting he search fora common essence dwellingbehind itsmanifestations r to minimizethe relevanceof the discussions sketched out aboveand thus settle the dispute in favor of the firstposition.The analogy with familyresemblancescan be furtherdeveloped in a positiveway, settingthe debate on a

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new track.Themembersof a family maynotall sharea commonessence, but thereis somethingelse thatbinds them: a familyname. Incontrast o a concept, whosemeaning (be it either emotive or descriptive)may formthe object of debate, thefamilyname is something arbitrary nd empty of meaning (except perhapsfor theconcretereference o otherfamilymembersor bearersof the same name).A familyname has no abstractessence and cannot be defined. Thesensitivityof discussionsconcerning philosophylies also, as I will argue, in the fact that this term to someextent functions ikea familyname.The historyof philosophy in the West can then be read as the chronicle of alargefamily.Descendantsof the clan are usuallybornthroughstudying,lecturing,and publishing n philosophy.Now and then a bastard s spawned-from literature,linguistics,history,or anthropology-whose right o the familyname is unclearordisputed. Adoptioncan incite protest, particularlywhen a whole groupof foreignmasterscome knockingat the door-a reaction hat characterizeshe firstposition.An outsidercannotjustadoptour name withoutjustification, ven thoughwe don'tquite know why we ourselves are deservingof that name. The protestcannot beadequatelyfounded because there are no intrinsicreasonsto let anyone in or keepthemout. Butthe absence of a clearcriterionof what philosophyis only makes thequestionthat much more sensitive.The emptinessof the family name maintainsthe insecurityconcerningthe questionof not only who has rights o it but also theresponsibilitiest imposes.One musthold the name high,butwhatare its demands?Confirmationomes from he onlookers(whoknew our forefathers nd the idealsforwhich they stood),whose scrutinizing aze accompaniesus.Our Chinesecolleaguesfind themselvesin a similarthougheven more sensitivepredicament: heir academic activity also derives meaning from the frameworkwithinwhich they operate(the philosophydepartment),while they are aware thatone of theirforefatherswas an adoptedchild. They knowthat even aftera century,Westernphilosophersoftendo notconsiderthemfamilymembersof equal standing.For his reason,some of them rejectthe adoptionand wish to continuewithoutthename and demandsof philosophy, n optiontakenon boardby the fourthgroup.The majorityof Chinese, however-constituting the second and thirdpositions-proposethatthe mastersdo belong to the greatphilosophicalfamily.Butonly thesupportersof the third position feel themselves called upon and empowered tocompel the familyto adaptitselfto itsadoptedchildren.

Thisanalogyis farfromperfectsince the term philosophy s not as emptyandsensitiveas a familyname is: one can choose forphilosophy,one can be good at it,and there are, afterall, criteriacirculating or inclusionand exclusion, as the sup-portersof the differentpositionshave demonstrated.But that does not detract romthe fact that the Western relation o philosophyalso bearssomethingof the duplic-itouspositionwithinwhichthe familynameplacesus: we are attached o somethingthat remains naccessible to us;we are rootedin ourown uprootedness. 33nsofaras the disagreementover the existence of Chinese philosophy displays analogieswith such a family dispute, reflectionover name giving and adoption ought to bepartof our reflection.Of course,the further xpandable argumentsaimed at giving



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Philosophy), ol. 7 (Taibei:Landeng,1991), pp. 162-163; Fengmakes an ex-plicit distinctionbetween philosophy n China and Chinesephilosophy,but not between its traditional nd present-day arieties.4 - See Zhong ShaohuaA'~ Qingmo Zhongguorenduiyu 'zhexue' de zhui-qiu ,qA*PRiAI T 0M (LateQing Chinese pursuitof philosophy ),in Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun qrACt:9 JFA (Taibei:AcademiaSinica)2 (2) (1992): 159-189. For a briefreconstruction,ee Joel Thoroval,De la philosophieen Chine a la 'Chine'dans la philosophie:Existe-t-ilunephilosophie chinoise? Esprit,no. 201 (May 1994): 9. This articlewas mymajorsource of inspirationor the four positionsof the typology explainedbelow.5 - See Nicolas Standaert, TheClassification f Sciencesand theJesuitMission nLateMingChina, nJande Meyerand PeterEngelfriet,ds., TheJesuits:Cul-tures,Sciences,and theArts,1540-1773 (Leiden:Brill,2000), pp. 287-317.6 - The oldest Western title referring o a Chinese master as philosopher isCouplet's Confucius Sinarum Philosophus of 1687. Earlier itles refer toSapientiaSinica and Sinarumcientiapolitico-moralis. oran overview ofearlyWesternsources on Chinesephilosophy,see Iso Kern, Die VermittlungchinesischerPhilosophie n Europa, n FriedrichUeberweg,ed., Grundriss erGeschichteder Philosophie:Die philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts,Band 1,

AlgemeineThemen IberischeHalbinsel Italien, ed. Jean-Pierre chobinger(Basel:Schwabe& Co Ag. Verlag,1998), pp. 225-295.7 - Or Zhongguo zhexuejia rlqiV, which is as ambiguous as the above-

mentionedexpressionZhongguozhexue.8 - The only Dutch overview of Chinese philosophy, by Karelvan der Leeuw,voices the consensus when the authorclaims that Inthe early partof thiscentury, [China's]autonomous philosophical traditionabruptlyceased toexist. Becausethis is not a historyof philosophyin China,but of Chinesephi-losophy,my storyends here. See his Het Chinesedenken:Geschiedenisvan deChinese filosofie in hoofdlijnen (Amsterdam:Boom, 1994), p. 338.

9 - Concerningthis transitionperiod in Chinesethought,see also Anne Cheng,Epilogue, Histoirede la pensee chinoise (Paris:Seuil, 1997), pp. 605-610.Forher conscious choice of penseechinoise and not philosophie hinoise,see 29-31.

10 - ChinesePhilosophy r ChineseThought s generally aughtatdepartmentsof sinology, Asian languagesand culture,or religion,and very exceptionallyin philosophy departmentsor in interdisciplinaryourses. The UniversityofHawai'i s an exception,withcompulsorygraduate ourseson Chinese,Indian,and comparativephilosophy.11 - Hegel (1770-1813) found Chinese philosophy to be naive, primitive,andphilosophicallyuninterestingmanifestations f an early stage in the evolution



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of Geist. See Hegel's Lectures on The History of Philosophy,trans. E. S.Haldane and F. Simson,3 vols. (London:Routledgeand KeganPaul, 1968),vol. 1, pp. 119-125.12 - It is inevitable hat the wordswith which we describe ancient China cover dif-ferent entities. This is in factwhat nouns do even within a singleculture: hey

standfor a plurality f differentthings.13 - See FungYu-lan,A Historyof ChinesePhilosophy, rans. DerkBodde,2 vols.(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1937, 1973), pp. 1-6. This introductionis a reworkedand condensed translation f FengYoulan,Zhongguozhexue shi(Shanghai:ShenzhouPress,1931), pp. 1-27.14 - For an overview and short discussion of the first Chinese works on Chinese

philosophy see Ge Zhaoguang ~l:tE,Qi shiji qian Zhongguo de zhishi,sixiang, yu xinyang shijie -Lft:' fillM0 i, ' )Sifl-1?t (Theworld ofknowledge,thought,and belief in China beforethe seventh century),Zhong-guo sixiangshi, diyijuanqS ,*,S1 , --4 (History f Chinesethought,pt. 1)(Shanghai:FudanUniversity,1998), pp. 4-5.

15 - Pleas for a more subtle use of materialism ersus idealism were voiced attwo majorconferences on Chinesephilosophyheld in 1957. See ChinaNewsAnalysis,no. 219 (March1958).16 - See, for example, his Laozi 'ziran' guannian de chubu yanjiu I-T AX,It tW)t (Afirst nvestigationnto Laozi'sconcept of evidentlyso ), inZhongguozhexue shi rPBAf t 3 (4) (1995):51-55.17 - For the complexity and variety of the borrowedwords, see Lydia H. Liu,Translingual ractice:Literature,NationalCulture,and TranslatedModernity:China 1900-1937 (Stanford:tanfordUniversityPress,1995), and ChenLiwei,

Zaoqide YingHua zidian yu Riben de yangxue (EarlyChinese-English ic-tionariesand the Japanesestudyof the West), Yuanxue (1994):277-294.18 - See Chen Lai, The Conceptsof Dao and Li in Song-MingNew-ConfucianPhilosophy, n ContemporaryChinese Philosopherson Chinese Philosophy,special issue of ContemporaryChinese Thought30 (4) (Summer1999): 9-24.19 - See Michael Lackner, Les avatarsde quelques termesphilosophiquesocci-dentauxdans la languechinoise, Etudeschinoises12 (2) (1993):145-146.20 - See BertrandRussell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, in Logic andKnowledge, ed. Robert Monsh (London:Allen and Unwin, 1956, 1984),pp.195-196.21 - MartinHeideggerperceivesthe transitionof Greekconcepts into the Romanworld in highly negative terms. See his Parmenides,G. A. 54 (FrankfurtmMain: Klostermann,1982), p. xv. Kenneth Chen's account of the Chineseadoptionof Buddhist ermsis of a more historicalcharacter.See his Buddhism

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in China:A HistoricalSurvey(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1964,1973), pp. 68-69.22 - Examplesof this are innumerable.See, forexample,Chen Guying's orewordto the first volume of Daojia wenhua yanjiu _iAtIZLIJ (Investigation fthe Taoistculture) 1992), pp. 2-3. Criticism f thispositionis expressed n thefourthposition.23 - See, for example, Wang Bo, What Did the Ancient Chinese PhilosophersDiscuss? in ContemporaryChinese Philosopherson Chinese Philosophy,special issue of ContemporaryChinese Thought30 (4) (Summer1999): 28-40.24 - Inthisarticle,Iuse sinologist and China cholar interchangeably nd in abroad sense referringo (oftennon-Chinese) cholarsstudyingChina,pastandpresent, n institutionsmostly)outside China.25 - This distinction was suggested by Charles Stevenson in EthicalJudgmentsand Avoidability:PersuasiveDefinitions, Mind 47 (1938): 331-350, wherehe deals with conceptual and emotive meaning. In his book EthicsandLanguage New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1944, 1972), conceptual sreplaced by descriptive.26 - See HerbertFingarette,Confucius:The Secular as Sacred(New York:Harperand Row, 1972), p. vii;my emphasis.27 - See Wang Bo ?t1, Laozi sixiang de shiguan tese t,T, S^ b',~ (Thecharacteristics f the publicservant n Laozi'sthought) Taibei:Wen JinPress,

1993), pp. 171-188.28 - See JinZhong, Wentan hei ma' LiuXiaobofanwenji Aninterviewwith theblackhorse of the literaryworld,LiuXiaobo),Jiefangyuebao, no. 12;quotedinWoei LienChong, Kant nd Marx n Post-MaoChina:The IntellectualPathof LiZehou (Ph.D.diss., LeidenUniversity,1999), pp. 241-242.29 - Ge Zhaoguang gives an overview of the argumentsand proponentsof thispositionin Qi shiji qianZhongguode zhishi, pp. 5-8. Famoussupporters fthese positionshave been LiangQichao,JinYuelin,FuSinian,TangJunyi,andChenQiyun.30 - Liu Dong, Qinggao renwei de 'yangjingbinxuefeng 'Watch out for pur-poseful pidginscholarship ),Ershiyi hiji32 (1995):4-13. Thisarticle,alongwith several of the reactionsit provoked,are discussed in Intellectuals:TheSelf and Others, n China News Analysis,no. 1556 (March1996).31 - Thisview has partly o do with the fact thatthe Chinese masters,unlike theirphilosophical counterparts, re not so much linked to the sciences and theirpretensionsof universality, ut rather o art and itsmoreparticularendencies.32 - LudwigWittgenstein mploysthe term game as an exampleof how it is im-possibleto explicatethe essence that all games share,althoughone can point



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to elements that are characteristicof differentgames, so that they belongtogetherlike a groupof familymembers.See his PhilosophicalInvestigations,trans.G.E.M.Anscombe(Oxford:BasilBlackwell, 1958, 1984), ?66-?67.

33 - Thismetaphorand the developmentof this idea are indebtedto the thoughtofRudiVisker.See his Truth nd Singularity:TakingFoucault nto Phenomenol-ogy (Dordrecht:Kluwer,1999), pp. 11-13.

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