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PRESENTERS
Laurore Antoine
Social Safety Net Technical Coordinator
Kore-Lavi Program - CARE
Roseval Supreme
Deputy Chief of Party
Kore-Lavi Program - CARE
Afurika Juvenal
Chief of Party
Kore-Lavi Program - CARE
E-food vouchers institutionalized within the national social protection system for scale-up
CARE Haiti Webinar Presentation for ELAN
October 29th, 2015
Content
Country Context
Kore Lavi Program Overview
Early results, challenges and Lessons: Government Stewardship ,Targeting, E-
voucher Transfers, Private sector linkages , Complementary Services
Questions and feedback
Context of the Social Protection in Haiti: The Need for the Paradigm Shift Demand vs Supply (WB analysis Dec 2014 )
• Near half of the households are
chronically poor
• 41% of the population in food
insecurity around (CNSA, 2011)
• One million people slightly above
poverty line, with high levels of
vulnerability
Social Protection- Means to an End & an End in Itself
17.5 4.7
43.7
18.5
31.1 38.8
15.1
30.6
51.4 56.6 41.1 51.0
All socialassistance
Othertransfers
Scholarship Food aid
Extreme poor Moderate poor Non-poor
• Only 8% of the total population receive social
assistance (transfers, food aid, …)
• In Haiti, 5% own 50% of the national wealth;
• 17.5% of public spending in all Social sectors
combined (2011)
• Short-lived and insufficient safety nets
underserving the chronically neediest , in particular in remote areas
• The prominence of food imports over local production and failing and unsustainable food systems and food consumption practices
• Strained community safety net practices & dependency on assistance – diaspora, state, international solidarity
• Beyond inertia in public service reforms, ineffective substitution of national leadership by temporal social assistance actors and the disconnect of private sector are part of institutional weakness
Linking Kore Lavi safety net with long term development priorities
• National vulnerability targeting systems led by GoH (MAST): a National index on Vulnerability and Deprivation (HDVI); 150,000 households in a national vulnerability database (20% most vulnerable in16 communes include. 2 urban areas)
Food Voucher based Safety Net Transfers: 25$/month/households (+ compl. services) for 10% most vulnerable HH in 16 communes ( 2 urban areas), i.e., 17,700 households to access to locally produced nutritious food through electronic and paper transfers .
Prevention of malnutrition for 173 000 beneficiaries: 1000 days approach (care groups, behavior change communication), conditional in-kind food transfers, support to community engagement and national community health system in 24 rural communes
Overall Goal Reduced food insecurity and vulnerability by supporting
the Government of Haiti (GoH) in establishing a
replicable safety net system and expanding capacities to prevent child undernutrition
:
Key Government institutions (MAST principally) gradually and competently taking over coordination and management functions and systems of Kore Lavi Safety Net (Human Resources, institutional collaborations -inter agency and with civil society organizations )
Government stewardship: GoH/MAST “owning” the program and leading key decisions (food basket, value, targeting, vendors profile….); two monthly working groups; over 100 or so meetings chaired & led by MAST/ GoH within government premises (Oct. 2014-Oct.2015), two inter-ministerial agreements signed for multi-sectorial coordination of SF implementation
• Navigating institutional competitions between varying government agencies (MAST, FAES) in absence of a clear social protection policy and plans and divergent donors’ orientation.
• Getting government to formally assign staff for the long term takeover of key functions -coordination /oversight, monitoring & quality assurance, operating the vulnerability MIS.
• Fast track processes with public servants (in absence of genuine civil service reform and with USAID funds procedures
• Consistency in staying behind MAST,
constantly/genuinely emphasize from the
outset GoH takeover. Take the long haul
(beyond the project timeframes)
• Regular monthly MAST-led small
working groups meetings to gradually
build MAST confidence (to be ahead of
the game)
• Creativity to stimulate and sustain an
active participation), e.g. emphasizing
legitimate oversight authority vs capacity
building of GoH personnel
• A communication strategy to convey the
relevance of social safety net in the
context of widespread extreme poverty.
Targeting: A national HDVI & methodology widely accepted by different stakeholders; 150K households in 16 communes a GoH-led national data base in less than 18 months.
• Competition between agencies with different targeting methodologies, social protection projects, varying partners.
• Counting on existing targeting data; dependency on third party targeting plans (FAES) $, start-up timing
• Community acceptance of targeting results of previous projects (due to quality)
• Stay consistent with the choice of MAST as strategic/ legitimate institution (irrespective of its present weakness)
• Consensus building meetings/events around the table to value and build on existing experiences from all (openness)
• Emphasis on national, standardized, institutionalized, scalable targeting methodologies (as a public goods, assets, not belonging to Kore Lavi); responsiveness/openness to requests for targeting data, tools…
HAITIAN DEPRIVATION & VULNERABILITY INDEX (HDVI)
+ Sécurité alimentaire
(Hunger, absence of food, Restricted consumption of food)
Demographic Vulnerability &
Health
• HH composition • Children <5 yrs • Elderly at home • Disabled/perma
nently injured • Chronically ill
Education
• Illiteracy • Absence of
basic school • School
attendance • School lag
Labor conditions
• Inactivity • Unemployment • Child labor
Resources at Home
• Absence of remittances
• Deprived material of floor, ceiling and walls
Living Conditions
• Overcrowding • Deprived
lighting access • Deprived
access to water
• Deprived sanitation conditions
Vulnerability Targeting
Operationalizing the e-food voucher transfers
• Private sector long term investment in the e-platform
• A national e-voucher platform (TPAGO) delivering key operational functionalities (voucher printing, refill, vendor payment);
• A dozen Microfinance institutions servicing previously underserved clients vendors; 500+ local food vendors with new business practices (bank transfers , legal paperwork, sales receipts)
• Bargaining a good deal with (& manage) a “powerful” e-platform provider, e.g. TPAGO propriety rights vs contractual obligations.
• Start-up technical issues with the e-platform processes (voucher printing, activation, vendor payment).
• Acceptance and compliance of local vendors to Hard bargain with microfinance services to bring their services to clients (markets).
• CARE leveraged its earlier hands-on involvement in the development of similar services (Merchant-Pro)
• Establish and follow internal control and oversight protocols for the e-platform performance (efficiency, integrity, reliability, security)
• Back-up plans (temporal substitution of e-vouchers by paper vouchers )
• “Selling” to vendors and microfinance institutions the long –term benefits and prospects of the safety net and related advantages for them, plus program capacity building
Food voucher-based transfers: Close to 15,000 households enrolled in (and served by) the safety net in remote areas (16 communes) in less than 18 months . Visible boost to the production and supply of local food in markets (incl. hard to reach Island); over 500 fresh produce small vendors participating in the program
• Door-to-door Individual notification of selected beneficiaries in hard to reach/remote areas.
• Suspicions, skepticism to negative perception of a state led social protection intervention (based on prevailing practices- partisan interventions).
• Negative perception of the voucher value (25$/month)-considered small !
• Hard time for beneficiaries accepting a food basket composition (local products vs imported food products)
• Small fresh food vendors’ skepticism on payment modalities (same market day)
• Having local skilled staff work in their own communities (notification, verification)
• Emphasis on key differences in relation to rigor of targeting & predictability of transfers
• Intensive awareness raising that 25$ represent a contribution not the full cost of the food basket
• Consistent message on the twin SF objectives –protection & local food production; stringent enforcement of vendors’ compliance to program rules
• Anticipate “pressures” to increase the amount
transferred; mind and manage the risk of
creating inflation and negatively affect the
whole community.
0
20000000
40000000
60000000
80000000
100000000
120000000
140000000
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
30000000
35000000
40000000
45000000
Y1 Q3 Y1 Q4 Y2 Q1 Y2 Q2 Y2 Q3 Y2 Q4
Value of the transfers
Montants transferes/Qtr Cumul montants transferes
Volume of transfer to the 14, 432 household-
based beneficiaries
Early & foundational results:
• Scaled-up prevention of malnutrition (1000 days approach & in-kind transfers) decreasing MAM cases in areas where health/nutrition interventions work in tandem with nutrition sensitive food basket
• An established and rapidly expanding network of savings groups ( 700 VSLAs, $688 K in savings, 70% in loans).18% SF benef in savings groups/VSLAs and growing.
• A school feeding pilot model- local entrepreneurship-based is underway (2000 children served, 50 local private food caters involved, clean energy kits in use, cost-shared by vendors)
• Connecting two separate community agents networks (food voucher and health/nutrition)
• Assuring people that getting into savings groups does not threaten SF benefits (food vouchers or nutrition)
• Convince caterers/food vendors on propane kits and new payments modalities
• Integration of different components (health/nutrition and food voucher safety net)- needs management constant attention and small concrete initiatives beyond “integration workshops”.
• Good communication (cautious/realistic) about graduation so as to not undermine beneficiaries’ self-reliance efforts .
• For private small food vendors “seeing is believing” the new ways of doing business.
Linking SF beneficiaries to complementary socio-economic services
In support of sustained,
institutionalized, impactful social
protection in Haiti
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=9w6wICG8YVU