Cardona - Time

A Path Still Taken: Some Early Indian Arguments concerning TimeAuthor(s): George CardonaSource: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 111, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1991), pp. 445-464Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/604264 .Accessed: 27/12/2010 15:53

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A PATH STILL TAKEN: SOME EARLY INDIAN ARGUMENTS CONCERNING TIME*

GEORGE CARDONA

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The treatment of "time," both as a syntactic and a semantic category, by the Indian grammatical tradition, is here discussed, and certain objections by the Buddhists to the views of Bhartrhari and the Paninfyas are set forth and resolved.

1. SCHOLARS IN EARLY INDIA GIVE us considerable evidence about arguments concerning time.' These arguments range from the very general to the particular, and the principal issues dealt with are as follows. In general, what requires one to operate with time (kala) as a separate ontological category? Once time has been granted a separate ontological status, how many varieties of time are to be recognized? In particular, can one justify operating not only with past (bhiita, atikranta, etc.) and future (bhavisyat, anagata) but also with

* I am grateful to Ashok N. Aklujkar, Yohanan Grinshpon, Wilhelm Halbfass, Bimal K. Matilal, David Seyfort Ruegg, Ernst Steinkellner, Peter M. Scharf, and Albrecht Wezler for their comments on drafts of this paper, a shortened version of which was delivered as the presidential address before the American Oriental Society on March 27th, 1990. Note that metalinguistic markers (it, anubandha) attached to Sanskrit elements are printed in bold face; e.g., laV refers to the L-affix which bears the markers a and t. In addition, I follow a convention concerning homorganic nasals instead of anusvara with which only some editors agree: within compounds and across a word boundary between very closely knit terms I show nasals homorganic with following stops; e.g., sambandha instead of sarhbandha. kificit instead of kirheit or kirh cit.

current time (vartamdna kala)? If one operates with a separate entity called time, what accounts for its divisions? If association with activities accounts for these divisions, just how is this possible? In particular, can one assume entities called actions which can distinguish varieties of time, or are actions themselves merely to be inferred? Can one justifiably speak of an action (kriya) currently taking place? For, an action is not a single entity but a complex of constituent action-moments (samaharipa kriyd), whose unity is invented by speakers; it is not a finished entity but something that is brought to accomplishment. Hence, the question arises: is there any moment at which an action can be said to be current? If not and if time is so linked with actions that they serve to make it known in different aspects, then current time cannot be justified. Given such prob- lems, should one assume instead that time divisions are revealed by something other than actions? Finally, if actions are required to account for time divisions, why not simply operate with such actions, doing without time as a separate category? Assume, on the other hand, that something like a path that is traversed serves to make known different aspects of time. Is there then a justifiable present time?

In this paper, I shall be concerned principally with two discussions in Patanfjali's Mahdbhdsya where questions concerning time are taken up and with parallel discussions in Vaisesika, Nyaya, and Madhyamaka works. These serve to demonstrate not only that scholars of differing persuasions felt obliged to consider issues touching on language and its description but also that by the time of Patan-jali systematic views concerning such major issues as I have noted had already been elaborated.

2. As is well known, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas accept time as a distinct substance (dravya); it serves as the cause for certain caused knowledges: relative

Many of the major arguments are discussed briefly by Balslev (1983). See also the introduction in Peri Sarveswara Sharma 1972. My chief aim here is to place important discussions found in the Mahdbhdsya in an appropriate context. Accordingly, I could not consider again certain issues and arguments about time in some important Buddhistic discussions, as considered by Schayer 1938 and Frauwallner 1973. Note also that in presenting viewpoints and arguments from various schools of thought in what follows I do not intend to imply historical relations except where I explicitly speak of such relations.

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446 Journal of the American Oriental Society 111.3 (1991)

proximity or removedness independent of spatial relation,' simultaneity, non-simultaneity, long duration and quickness of actions. Such knowledges require a cause that determines them, so that, by virtue of imply- ing such a cause, they are "marks" (lingdni) which make known time as an entity to be accepted.3 In addition, it is accepted that-as opposed to direct perception, which has as its possible object only a presently existent something-inference applies to objects connected with any of three time divisions, past, present, and future, so that it can make known what is not now existent by virtue of being past or yet to come. Accord- ingly, three time divisions are accepted.4

3. A grammarian describing an Indo-European language like Sanskrit, of course, also has to accept a category of time, since particular constructions in the language require operating with such a category. Thus, for example, Sanskrit has what Western grammarians traditionally call an accusative of extent, as in mdsam svapiti' . . . is sleeping for a month', krosam svapiti' . . . is sleeping for the distance of a krosa'. Accordingly, AstadhydyT (henceforth A) 2.3.5: kdlddhvanor atyanta- samyoge provides for introducing accusative endings after nominal bases denoting time and paths on condition that there is a constant connection with the time or way referred to. In addition, a grammarian has to recognize three time subdivisions: past (bhata), current (vartamana), and future (bhavisyat). Panini operates with these as primitive notions which serve to condition the occurrence of particular linguistic elements. Thus, for example, A 3.2.84: bhiite heads a section of rules that introduce affixes after verbs on condition that the actions in question are referred to the past (bhite); one such affix is the L-suffix lun (A 3.2.110: lun), introduced in deriving forms such as abhat (3rd sg. aor. of bhii) 'was, came into being, became'.5 Simi- larly, A 3.2.123, 3.3.13: vartamdne lat, Irt sese ea (bhavisyati 3) introduce la( and lr(, respectively, if ac-

tions are referred to current time and the future, as in bhavati'is, becomes', bhaviyyati'will be, will become'.

As I said, Panini simply accepts concepts like vartamdna, bhiita, bhavisyat as primitives. In the same vein, he assumes as primitive the knowledge of what is meant by adya 'today', so that he does not need any special rule in order to allow his using anadyatane '(past or future) other than the day of reference'. In this respect, Panini stands apart from some other grammarians, who felt it necessary to formulate rules specifying just what was meant by adyatana.6

Now, given the clear evidence indicating that specu- lation concerning time and its status harks back to the Vedic era,7 there can be no doubt that Panini must have been aware of at least some of the issues under discussion. That his grammar does not touch upon such matters is only to be expected: the Astadhydyr is a set of rules describing Sanskrit, not a discursive treatise considering such matters as the ontological status of time or its subdivisions. On the other hand, in the course of their comments on Paninian siitras, Katya- yana and Patan-jali do find occasion to bring up such issues. Moreover, some of the things said on this topic in the Mahdbhdsya are of genuine interest both in connection with what we find said in major works of later times and from the more general point of view of methodology in considering such issues.

4. It is obvious that time is most intimately related to actions, which take place in time and are describable as being referred to past, current, or future, as in Paninian siitras like 3.2.84 and so on (see sec. 3).

4.1. In addition, one of the major positions taken concerning time is that it is an all-encompassing (vibhu) eternal (nityam) substance (dravyam) that serves as a measure of things involved in actions (parimdnam kriydvatdm).8 Given that time is said to be a single entity, one must account for its being referred to as various: one speaks of present time (vartamdna kala), today

2 As when a young person and an old man who are respectively more distant and closer in space to a person are known to be less removed and more removed from that person.

3 VaiS 2.2.6: aparasmin param yugapad ayugapac ciram ksipram iti kdlalingdni. NVt. on NS 2.1.39 (1.5 18): pardpard- dipratyaydndrh ca sanimittatvat kdlapratisedho na yuktah.

4 NBh on NSL.1.5 (1.158-61): sadvisayam' ca pratyaksam sadasadvisayam canumdnam I kasmat traikdlyagrahandt trikdlayukta arthd anumdnena grhyante bhavisyatlty anumT- yate bhavatTti cdbhuid iti ca I asac ca khalv atTtam andgatam ceti. Cf. NM 1. 198.

5 Abstract L-suffixes are replaced by finite verb endings and participial suffixes; see Cardona 1988: 169-81 (229-39).

6 See, for example, the Kasikd on A 1.2.57: kdlopasarjane ca tulyam, which according to some scholars is an interpolation (see Cardona 1976: 158-59 [1.3.3f.]).

7 For example, the Atharvaveda has two hymns (19.53, 54) where, among other things, it is said that time created both heaven and the various firm grounds that lie beneath (AV 19.53.5ab: kda6 'm umh divam ajanayat kala imah prthiv r utd) and that it gave rise to creatures and Prajapati (19.53.1Oab: kalah praja asrjata kda6 agre prajapatim).

8 VP 3.9.1: vydparavyatirekena kalam eke pracaksate I nityam ekam vibhu dravyam parimdnam kriydvatdm. Cf. Vai S 2.2.7: dravyatvanityatve vdyuna vydkhyate, Candrananda: adravyavattvdt paramdnuvdyor iva dravyatvanityatve kalasya.

CARDONA: Some Indian Arguments Concerning Time 447

(adya), the time when something is begun (drambha- kdla), and so forth. This is accounted for on the basis of actions associated with time, viewed as accompanying entities (upddhi) that impose their properties on time, which is thus viewed as various.'

4.2. Nor is this point of view to be attributed exclu- sively to Vaisesikas. It is clearly reflected also in grammarians' circles as one possible view concerning time, without attribution to any particular sect.

4.2.1. Consider what is said in the Mahdbhdsya on A 2.2.5: kdldh parimdnind. This siitra serves to derive tatpurusa compounds like mdsa-jdta 'born a month ago'. The rule provides that terms referring to time (kdldh) combine with a semantically and syntactically related term denoting one whose measure (parimdnind 'with one that has a measure') is the particular time referred to. Thus, mdsa-jdta refers to someone who was born one month ago, so that he is associated with a month as a measure of time that has passed since his birth.

In the first varttika on A 2.2.5 (kalasya yena samdsas tasydparimdnitvdd anirdesah), Katyayana poses an objection to the rule as formulated: the rule is stated in such a way that it fails to convey any understandable meaning (anirdegah = agamako nirdesah) because what is signified by the term with which a time-word is supposed to combine to form a compound is not related to the time in question through having it as its measure. Patafijali explains as follows. That with which a time-word forms a compound is not related to the time in question as having it for a measure. Because it does not have it for a measure, the siitra does not state a meaning, that is, it does not convey a meaning that is comprehensible.10 He goes on to note that a month is not a measure with respect to someone born; on the contrary, it is a measure for a group of thirty nights. That is, the relation between the significands of mdsah and jdtasya is indirect, since mdsah first is related, as a measure, with triMs'adrdtrasya (mdsas triims'ardtrasya jdtasya); this is comparable to drono badardndm devadattasya 'a drona of badara fruits of Devadatta': as a

drona is not a measure relative to Devadatta-it is directly related as a measure to the fruits that make up this measure-and these fruits are directly related to Devadatta, so is a month a measure directly related to thirty nights that make up this length of time."'

In his second varttika (siddhaih tu kdlapariminaii yasya sa kdlas tena), Katyayana suggests that the de- sired result is obtained under a modified formulation: a term X denoting a time Tx combines with a term Y referring to some Y if Y is related to that which has Tx as its measure." This itself is subject to the objection

9 Vai S 2.2.9: karyavigesena ndndtvam; Candrdnanda: kalas- yaikatve katham drambhakalddivyapadega Tty atraha... kdryam kriya kriydvigesendvistasya vastuna drambhasthiti- vinasakriyd drstva kalasya ndndtvopacardd drambhakdlddiv- yapoadesah; Pragastapdda 120: kalalifigaviksesd afijasaikatve pi sarvakdrydndm drambhakriyabhinirvrttisthitinirodhopdd- hibhedan manivat pdcakavad vd ndndtvopacdra iti; cf. Vyo- mavatl 129.19-130.4, Kiranavalf 80.

10 Bh 1.409.14-15: kdlasya yena samdsah so)7arimdnT tasya- parimdnitvad anirdedah I agamako nirdego 'nirdedah.

Bh 1.409.15-17: na hi jdtasya mdsah parimdnam I kasya tarhi trirhmadrdtrasya I tadyathdI drono badardnarh devadat- tasyeti I na devadattasya dronah parimdnam I kasya tarhi badardndm.

12 Bh 1.409.19-20: siddham etat j katham I kdlaparimanarh yasya sa kdlas tena saha samasyata iti vaktavyam. In the example under discussion (mdsajdta -mdsa-s jdta-as), the person born (jdtasya) is related to a period of thirty nights (trimhsadrdtram) which has a month as its measure. As can be seen, I have adopted an interpretation of varttika two in which kdlaparimdnam is a bahuvrihi compound, kdla- in this compound refers to a month, and the compound itself refers to the period of thirty nights that has a month as its measure. This brings the varttika into harmony with what Patafijali says in his Bhasya on varttika one. It must be noted that the precise formulation of varttika two brings up several difficulties of interpretation, centering around whether kdlapari- manam is interpreted as (a) a sas~thi-tatpurusa (kdlasya parimanam) or (b) a bahuvrThi compound (kalah parimdnam asya) and what one considers the referent of kala in this compound. Taking mdsajata- as the standard example to be accounted for, let Tstand for time in general (kdlasdmdnyam), Tx for a particular time span such as a month (masddih kdlavisesah) which serves to measure T, X for a term denoting Tx, J for one whose birth is delimited by the time span Tx, and Y for a term referring to J. Under either interpretation (a) or (b), yasya is equivalent to Y, referring to J. Kaiyata (Pr 11.663) considers both interpretations of kdlaparimalnam: (a1) kala- in this compound refers to general time T, and the tatpurusa compound refers to a time TX, which measures general time; sa kdlas, on the other hand, also refers to such a measure of time; a term X denoting a month or such, which measures general time related to some J forms a compound with the term denoting J (Pr: kdlasabdena kalasamanyam ucyate I yasya jdtddeh sambandhinah kdlasamdanyasya parimdnam mdsddi sa kdlo mdsddih samasyate); (b') kdla- in kdlaparimdnam refers to a particular time Tx, and the compound refers to general time T, which has Tx as its measure; a term X forms a compound with a term Y denoting some J if T is related to it (Pr: athavd kdlagabdena mdsddih kdlavigesa

that, although it succeeds, the sitra now is formulated differently."3 The immediate answer, of course, is that the siftra should be left as stated (yathdnydsam evdstu), which brings up a retort: It was precisely under this formulation that the objection made in the first varttika was set forth.14

And this brings us to the central point. The objector is asked: What do you consider time to be when you say this? To which the reply is made: Time is said to be (kalam dhuh '... say time is . . . ') that on account of which increases and decreases in material beings are seen.'" Further, it is said, when this entity time is connected with a certain action, it gets designations like 'day' and 'night'. The action is the movement of the

sun. And time gets the designations 'month' and 'year' due to the repeated action of the sun.16 If this position is taken, however, then a time called 'month' is indeed a measure with respect to someone born."7 That is, time in one of its varieties serves to delimit an act, the act of being born, which is a boundary; from the time of birth, a month has passed.18

4.2.2. When a participant in the discussion on A 2.2.5 asks another what conception of time he has when he sets forth an objection (see 4.2.1), it is not farfetched to conclude that more than one conception of time was indeed well known at the time. And when the answer is given that time is said to be that on account of which increase and decrease are witnessed in material things, Patafijali is setting out in brief a view that is also maintained by others. Later on, too, this view is maintained. In particular, Bhartrhari goes into considerable detail to expound how time is said to be the efficient cause (nimittam) with respect to the coming into being (utpattau), remaining in existence (sthitau) and disappearance (vind.e) of all things that come into being, exist, and disappear; and time, which remains throughout, functions as cause in different ways, divid- ing itself (vibhaktenatmand 'through a divided self').'9 The universe of all there is (visvam) is divided by time (tena vibhajyate) through its inhibiting and permitting (pratibandhdbhyanujiidbhydm) particular acts to occur. Hence, it is spoken of as the string-puller (swtra- dharam 'string holder') for this world viewed as a pup- pet.20 For if time did not inhibit and also let go of such

ucyate I sa kdlah parimdnam yasya kdlasdmanyasya tad yasya sambandhi tena sa kdlo mdsddih samasyata ity arthah). As Nagega notes (Ud 11.663), under (a'), the identity of the meanings of the terms kdla used in the varttika, which fits with what one understands must have been intended, is done away with, so that Kaiyata suggests the alternative (b). (Ud: kdlasab- deneti I kalaparimanam iti sasthTtatpurusah I atra vydkhydne vdrttikasthakdlapaddrthayoh svarasata aikyam pratTyamdnam bhajjetety ata dha athaveti| atra pakse kdlaparimdnam iti bahuvrThih tad yasyeti tat kalasdmanyam.) Annambhatta brings up another difficulty under (a'): kala- is now linked with yasya, hence is not immediately connected with pari- mana, so that one has an improper compound. (Udd V.133: nanv evam yasyety etadapeksamanasya kdlasabdasya pari- mdnasabdendsdmarthydt samdso na sydd ata aha athaveti.) The Ratnaprakasa adopts a tatpurusa interpretation that is different: (a2) kdla- of the compound refers to a time stretch such as thirty nights, of which a month is the measure, and the compound refers to Tx. A term X compounds with Y denoting J, if a span like thirty nights delimits J. (Ratnaprakdaa V. 135: kdlaparimdnam iti I kdlasya trimsadrdtrddeh parimanam kdlaparimdnam mdsddi I tadvdcako mdsddisabdah svavdcyamdsd- diparicchinnah kdlas trims~adrdtrarupo yasya paricchedakas tadvdcakenajatddind samasyate sa tatpurusa iti vacandrthah.) As can be seen from Sivaramendrasarasvati's explication, his tatpurusa interpretation involves difficulties in that yasya refers to one that bears a relation to a thirty-night span, which is not the direct referent of kalaparimdnam. In effect, a bahuvr'i-i interpretation seems most appropriate. Kaiyata's interpretation invokes general time, and thus departs to a degree from what Patafijali has said earlier. Hence my preference.

3 Bh 1.409.20: suitram tarhi bhidyate. 1' Bh 1.409.20-21: yathdnydsam evdstu I nanu coktam kd-

lasya yena samdsas tasyaparimdnitvdd anirdesa iti. 1' Bh 1.409.21-23: kam punah kalarn matva bhavdn aha

kdlasya yena samdsas tasyaparimdnitvdd anirdesa iti I yena martindm upacayds cdpacayds ca lak~syante tam kalam dhuh.

6 Bh 1.409.23-25: tasyaiva hi kayacit kriyayd yuktasydhar iti ca bhavati rdtrir iti ca I kayd kriyayd I ddityagatyd I tayai- vdsakrd dvrttayd mdsa iti bhavati samvatsara iti ca.

17 Bh 1.409.25: yady evami bhavatijdtasya mdsah parima-nam. 18 Pr 11.665: jdtasya jananakriydvadhir ma-sena paricchid-

yate na ca mdsavyatiriktah kascit trims~adrdtro'sti yasya mdsah parimdnam sydt I na ca kdlasdmdnyam paricchidyate kdla eva hi samsargibheddvdptamdsddibhedavyavahdrah kriydydh parimdnam na vastvantarasya

1' VP 3.9.3: utpattau ca sthitau ca vina-se cdpi tadvatdm nimittam kdlam evdhur vibhaktendtmand sthitam.

20 VP 3.9.4: tam asya lokayantrasya suitradhdram pracaksate pratibandhdbhyanujiadbhydam tena visvamh vibhajyate. The view of time as a power that governs what comes about through its inhibiting and permitting powers is set forth not only in this section of the Kdlasamuddesa, where it fits within the context of tenets maintained by Vaisesikas-and acceptable within Bhartrhari's general system-but also elsewhere in the Vdkyapadiya and in Bhartrhari's autocommen- tary thereon, as well as in the commentaries of Vrsabhadeva and Helaraja. The roles played by time as permitting and


inhibition, stages of evolution would become inter- mixed, without their due sequence." Moreover, Bhar- trhari also explains that a single entity, time, takes on divisions imposed on it through its association with accompanying factors, namely, activities in particular of the sun: Its being (tasydtmd 'its self') is differentiated in many ways by virtue of the differences that rest on external properties; for there is no thing that is in and of itself differentiated or non-differentiated.22 A similar note is struck by Vaisesikas, who also operate with a single entity, time, and differences imposed upon it.23

inhibiting are further elaborated in VP 3.9.15-23 and 24-26, respectively. In VP 3.9.30, these are said to play a role in time's having sequence imposed on it, and in VP 3.9.70, they are considered in connection with the flow of water out of a tube, used in measuring out different spans of time. VP 1.3, adhyahitakalath yasya kalaiaktim updfritdh I Janmddayo vikd- rah sad bhdvabhedasya yonayah, brings in for the first time in the Vakyapadlya the concept of time as a power (sakti) of Brahman which has imposed upon it divisions. The six modi- fications of being which are the sources (yonayah) of different modes of being and acting (bhdvabhedasya) rest on this power. In his Vrtti, Bhartrhari explains as follows. All capacities of being (saktayah) that come about (janmavatyah) are dependent on and accompanied by the independent power (svdtantryena 'independence') of Brahman that is called 'time' (kdldkhyena), so that they are in accordance with the activity of this time-power. Hence, the varied status of all things is seen as something that appears as in sequence, because of the restriction on the powers of things due to the inhibiting and permitting of time; Vrtti on VP 1.3 (18.3-19. 1): kdldkhyena hi svdtantryena sarvdh paratantra janmavatyah ?aktayah samd- vistah kdlasaktivrttim anupatanti I tatas ca pratibhdvam vais- varuipyasya pratibandhdbhyanujfidbhydih saktyavacchedena kramavdn ivdbhdsopagamo laksyate. That is, all things that come into being, such as trees, do so in a certain order: first one has a shoot, then buds, and so on. The material cause of such things has a power to produce them, but time has the inhibiting and permitting capacities that impose order: at one stage, it inhibits the arising of buds while allowing a shoot to arise, at another it inhibits a shoot but allows buds. The other powers, then, are dependent on this independent power which is time. In his Vrtti to VP 2.22 (p. 202), Bhartrhari remarks that the independent power (kartrsaktih 'capacity of an agent') called time provides for sequence, through inhibiting and permitting, only in things that are produced: kdldkhyd hi kartrsaktih kdryesv eva pratibandhdbhyanujfidbhydam paur- vdparyam prakalpayati. This is brought up in connection with a consideration of vakyasphota, which is without sequence. Time's inhibiting and permitting powers are also brought up in the Vrtti on VP 2.49: santa eva visesd ye paddrthesu vya- vasthitdh I te kramdd anugamyante na vdkyam abhidhdya- kam. This concerns a particular view-which Bhartrhari does not ultimately accept-about how a sentential meaning is understood, namely that a sentence is a sequence (krama): particular qualifications of entities denoted by given words such as devadatta, go, and abhy-dj in sentences like devadatta gdm abhydja 'Devadatta, bring the cow', namely the status of being an agent, object and so on, are already present in these meanings and are understood in order by hearers, as they hear the words that make up an utterance, so that one need not assume that a unit called vdkya 'utterance' is independently the signifier of this meaning. In the Vrtti to this karika (p. 213),

Bhartrhari remarks that the particular qualifications are understood by hearers due to time's favoring this, and this favoring behavior of time is called its power to inhibit and permit: arthatvam dpadyamdnesu ydvanto visesah sannihitd niyata- prasiddhavyavasthds te ... kdlavrttyanugrahena pratiban- dhabhyanujnidkhyena pratipattrbhir anugamyante. In his commentary on VP 3.9.30, Helaraja explicitly notes what is meant by pratibandha and abhyanujfid; see also VP 3.9.1 1, Helaraja's comments on VP 3.9.10, 11, 13, 26, 42, 46, 53, 56, 62, 71, 73, and Phullaraja's commentary on VP 3.7.34.

21VP 3.9.5: yadi na pratibadhnlydt pratibandham ca notsr- jet I avasthd vyatikfryeran paurvdparyavindkrtdh.

22 VP 3.9.6: tasydtmd bahudhd bhinno bhedair dharmdn- tara-srayaih I na hi bhinnam abhinnam vd vastu kificana vidyate. Elsewhere in the Kalasamuddesa, Bhartrhari returns to the same theme of how a single entity, time, is differentiated by properties imposed on it. Thus, he says, different designations, such as carpenter, apply to a single person, depending on different activities that he might engage in; similarly, according to different activities, designations like season and season names come up in respect of the single entity, time; 3.9.32: kriydbheddd yathaikasmims taksddydkhyd pravartate kriydbheddt tathaikasminn rtvddydkhyopajdyate. The single entity, time, accompanied by activities that impose their properties on it (kriyopddhis ca san), acquires the properties of being past, future, and current (bhuitabhavisyadvarta- mdnatdh), divided according to eleven kinds (ekddasabhir dkdrair vibhaktdh); 3.9.37: kriyopadhis ca san bhuitabhavisya- dvartamanatdh I ekadasabhir dkdrair vibhaktdh pratipadyate. This repeated stating of a theme is not actually repetitious, since Bhartrhari makes the point in different contexts of the Kdlasamuddesa. The point that Bhartrhari makes is reiterated by later Paninlyas. In particular, Kaiyata cites VP 3.9.6-8 in his comments on the Bhdsya to A 2.2.5 (11.664).

23 See note 9 above. Vaisesikas also speak of time as a cause of an effect. For example, Vyomasiva says that time's being an accompanying cause is recognized through reasoning on the basis of concurrently present and absent cause and effect, as when one sees a blossom at a restricted time, not at another time; thus, blossoms such as the patala come up in spring, not


4.2.3. It is obvious that Bhatrhari's treatment of time is in great part indebted to what Patanijali said earlier, and indeed Kaiyata cites from the VakyapadTya in the course of his comments on the Mahdbhdsya on A 2.2.5.24 It is also clear that Bhartrhari knew of and referred to Vaisesika doctrines. On the other hand, it is not self-evident that Vaisesikas are at all indebted to Patanijali or any grammarian for their view that time is a single entity whose variety is accounted for through imposition of properties of actions associated with it. In addition, note carefully that when Patanijali speaks of time's being said to be that which determines increase and decrease in material beings (4.2.1 with note 15), he is reporting a viewpoint. This is most easily understood under the assumption that in Patanijali's time thinkers had already arrived at systematic conclusions concerning such entities as time. To be sure, one might hesitate and say instead that the passage in question shows merely that Patanjali knew of a view-possibly only a folk view-concerning time and that this does not necessarily imply prior systematic thinking about the topic.

5. There is, however, additional evidence which lends support to the position that such topics were indeed considered systematically prior to Patanijali's epoch.

5.1 The Mahdbhdsya on A 3.2.123: vartamane lat deals with two main issues. Does the siitra as formulated account for the use of present endings in certain particular instances? Is one justified in countenancing a current time (vartamana kala) distinct from past and future?

5.1.1. A 3.2.123 specifically provides for introducing the L-affix laf on condition that an action is qualified as taking place currently, at a current time (vartamane). In varttikas 1-2 ( pravrttasydvirdme s4iyd bhavanty avartamdnatvdt, nityapravrtte ca kdldvibhdgdt) Katyayana states two objections to the rule as formulated, claiming

that present endings (bhavantf)25 have to be provided for separately for instances where: (1) a particular act has been begun and not yet terminated but is not currently going on; (2) an act is spoken of that always is going on, so that there is no time division in question. Patanfjali illustrates these with the following examples: [1] (a) ihadhTmahe 'we are studying here', (b) iha vasamah 'we are staying here', (c) iha pusyamitram yajayamah 'we are serving her as sacrificial officiants for Pusyamitra'; [2] (a) tisthanti parvatdh 'the mountains are in their place', (b) sravanti nadyah 'the rivers flow'. He also explains why the use of present forms like adhTmahe, vasamah, yajayamah, tisthanti, sravanti does not succeed by A 3.2.123, as formulated:

(A) Because the actions in question, although they have begun and have not come to their termination, may not actually be going on (avartamdnatvdt'because of their not being current') when [1] (a-c) are used.26 For example, [1] (a) can be used by students whose studies have begun but not yet been finished, at a time when they are not actually engaged in studying but doing such things as eating; in terms of A 3.2.123, as formulated, then, adhTmahe does not obtain, since the act of studying is not currently going on, so that a separate statement is necessary to provide for present endings in such instances.27

(B) It is assumed that the category of current time (vartamanah kalah) is always in opposition to past and future (bhuitabhavisyatpratidvandvah). Since A 3.2.123 provides for laf to occur if an action is referred to current time, then, it will not account for usages such as [2](a-b). Here there can be no question of any current time opposed to past and future. The mountains spoken of have always stood in their place; it is assumed that they are eternally standing, so that there is no past time at which their act of standing took place which no longer takes place; nor is there a future time at which this act will take place that did not occur beforehand. Similarly for the rivers' flowing.28

at another time. Similarly, one speaks of something requiring a time of birth, which shows that time is an accompanying, efficient cause. Vyomavatr 128: tatha niyatakale kusumadeh kdryasyopalambho na kdldntare ity anvayavyatirekdbhyarm tasya kdranatvam vyjhdyate I tatha hi vasantasamaya eva pdta- ladikusumdndm udgamo na kdldntare ity evam karydntaresv apy uihyam I tathaprasavakalam apeksate iti vyavahdrdt kdra- natvami kdlasya I tathd hi sahakdrinam apeksyopalabdheh kdlasya sahakdritdm antarena prastadv ayamh vyavahdro na sydt.

24 VP 3.9.6-8 are e-ited in Pr 11.664; note that in his Uddyota on the passage (11.664) Nagesa has the reading dharmyan- tarairayaih instead of dharmantarasrayaih.

25 bhavanti is an old term used by prior teachers, instead of the Paninian term la(, which refers to an L-affix that can be replaced by personal endings; Pr 111.279: bhavantlti latah puirvdcdryasajifid .

26 Bhasya 11. 123.3-4: pravrttasydvirdme sdsitavya bhavantij ihddhrmahe iha vasdmah iha pusyamitram yajayamah I kith punah kdranaam na sidhyati I avartamdnatvdt.

27 Pr 111.279: ihddhrmaha ity adhyayanamh prdrabdham na tu viratam I yadd ca bhojanddikriydrm kurvanto nddhryate tadddhrmaha iti prayogo na prdpnotlti vacanam.

28 Bhdaya 11.123.6-8: nityapravrtte ca sdsitavya bhavantlf tisthanti parvatah sravanti nadya iti I kith punah kdranamh na


Clearly, Katyayana and Patanijali envision current time only as opposed to past and future, standing between these two extremes. Only under this assumption do the examples given by Patanijali make sense. Suppose, on the contrary, that one considered being current merely the property of pertaining to now (sam- pratitanatvam). It would then be quite in order for the mountains' standing and rivers' flowing to pertain to current time: they never cease to stand and flow, so that, a fortiori, they now stand and flow. Accordingly, commentators quite rightly remark that the argument in question is based on considering current time only in the restricted manner noted.29 Now, one could at least claim for examples like [2] (a-b) that the mountains and rivers stand and flow forever only from the point of view of human speakers, who cannot know of any possible point at which these acts did not occur and at which they will cease. For an example like [2](c) dtmdsti 'the self is', from the point of view of most orthodox philosophical stands in India, there is no question at all of any present time as opposed to past and future.

Accordingly, later commentators give this as an additional example.30

Commentators go even farther, arguing as follows. An example like [2](a) involves the standing of mountains, which always occurs, so that it is not something that is brought about. By definition, an action (kriya) is something brought to accomplishment (sadhya), so that the standing in question is not an action. Accord- ingly, currency (vartamdnatva), which is a property of actions, also fails to hold here. Moreover, an impermanent entity that is brought to completion must have a state of future coming into being, by virtue of its being a created impermanent being; and an entity that has come into being perishes, so that it has a state of being past. Accordingly, an act signified by a verb is current only in opposition to past and future. And whatever always is, in effect, has neither property of being past or future, so that it has neither the property of currency nor the property of being an action."

5.1.2. In varttikas 3-4 on A 3.2.123, the objections brought up in the first varttika are met, as follows:

(C) Examples such as [1](a-c) involve a currency that is within the norm, since they involve acts that have been initiated but not brought to termination; moreover, there is a temporary cessation of given actions even in instances where there is no question that acts are properly considered to take place currently (vtts. 3-4: nydyyd tv irambhd-napavargat, asti ca muk- tasarhsaye virdmah).

(D) In addition, there are indeed divisions of time involved in examples like [2](a-b). Patafijali explains as follows. What is regularly considered current time relative to an action is that stretch of time during which an act has been initiated and not brought to its

sidhyati I iha bhitabhavisyatpratidvando vartamanah kalo na cdtra bhitabhavisyantau kdlau stah.

29 Helaraja on VP 3.9.79 (72.5-14): nanu ca sampratitanat- vam vartamdnatvam bhitabhavisyatpratiyogi I nityesu cavic- chedena pravartamdnesu bhutabhavisyator abhdvdt sutardam tadupapattih I tatrocyate I iheme kdlanimittd vyapadeSdh para- sparavydvrttaSarfrdh kiIakrtopakdrdand-m eva bhdvdndam yuk- tdh I te ca janmavantah I tatra hi niyatdvadhijanmaparigra- henaitadupapattih I tathd ca sddhanasannidhdne 'bhimukhot- pattayo bhdvinah | ydvadavasthdnam vartamdndh I vyapagata- SarTrd bhtatdh I tad ayamh vartamd-navyapadeSo bhutabhavis- yadavadhimadhyavartiyatra bhuitabhavisyantau na stas tatra naiva sambhavati tad uktam bhdaye bhutabhavisyatpratid- vando vartamdna iti I yatra hi bhutabhavisyantau tatra tat- pratiyogi vartamdna ity arthah I nitye~su ca bhuitabhavisyator abhdvdt tadabha-vah.

Ud 111.280: nanu vidyamdnakdlasambandhitvaru pam vartamdnatvam asddhyasydpi sambhavatity ato bhda.ye bhuitet- ycddi.

Pr 111.280: nityapravrttasya bhuitabhavisyattvdbhdvad var- tamdnatvdbhdvah.

Ud 111.280: vartamdnatvdbhdva iti| bhuatddivirodhivarta- mdnatvdbhdva ity arthah I tddrsam eva vartamdnatvam sitre vivaksitam piurvam bhute ity ukteh agre ca bhavi~yatfti vaksyamanatvdd iti bhdvah. As can be seen, Nagesa remarks that the view in question assumes that Panini also viewed current time in this manner, since he formulated the sutra A 3.2.123 between 3.2.84: bhMte and 3.3.3: bhavisyati gamydda- yah.

30 E.g., VBhS 120: dtmdsti parvatdh santityddau tattatkd- likdndam rajnidm krivdyd anityatvdt tadvdistasyotpattyddikam dddya vartamdnatvam uihyam. On the Bhdsya examples to which Kaundabhatta appeals, see 5.1.3.

31 Pr 111.279-80: nityapravrtteti parvatds tisthantity ddau sthdnddeh sarvadd sadbhdvat sddhyatvdbhavdt kriydrupatvd- bhdvdt taddharmasya vartamdnatvasydpy abhdva iti bhdvah | sddhyasydrthasydnityatvad avasyath bhavisyattvena bhdvyam utpannasvdpi na-sad bhiutatveneti bhatabhavi~satpratidvandvo vartamdno dhdtvarthah I nityapravrttasya bhiutabhavisyattvd- bhdvdd vartamdnatvabhdvah kriydrapatvdbhdvas cety arthah.

Helaraja on VP 3.9.79 (72.17-19): evami ca krtvdtra kdla- vacchedabhdvdt kalopadhirpapd kriyaiva ndsti| sd hi kalo- pddhih sakramd sddhyamdnasvabhdvda tadabhavas cdtreti kriydkdrakopadhinibandhand sarvaiva vyavasthd vaktavyety uktam.


termination.32 The person who brought up the objection, moreover, is addressed as follows. You consider an example like [3](a) bhuhkte devadattah 'Devadatta is eating' to involve indubitably current time. Yet while Devadatta is involved in eating he also interrupts the actual eating with other actions; he laughs, chats, drinks water. If, then [3](a) is viewed as involving proper current time, so should [1](a-c) be viewed as involving proper current time.33

5.1.3. The second objection is answered with the observation that there truly are time divisions (vt. 5: santi ca kdlavibhdgdh). One can properly say not just [2](a) tisthanti parvatah but also [4](a) sthdsyantipar- vatah, (b) tasthuhparvatdh. Moreover, it is not merely because sentences like [4](a-b) can be used that one concludes there are time divisions involved. There actually are such divisions, viewed as follows. There were past kings, are present kings, and will be future kings who have performed, do now perform, and will perform certain acts. These acts serve to characterize the mountains' standing as occurring in the past, in current time, and in the future.34

5.1.4. The validity of the concept of present time is also brought into doubt. Patanijali goes on to remark that someone else says there is no current time.35 More- over, he remarks that those who maintain this view cite verses,36 as follows:

1. The wheel is not turning, the arrow is not being made to fly, rivers are not flowing to the ocean. This world is immobile, not active. One who perceives thus is truly sighted.37

2. A young man, wise and held in respect, considered himself one who pondered on matters, and questioned the crow: "Tell me, crow, what it is that makes up your flight. You are not flying in the time that is yet to come or in the time that has passed; and if you are flying in the immediate moment, then this entire world is in flight." Even the Himalaya then is in motion.38

3. There is a triad of times: the one that has yet to come, the one that has passed, and the current one. And in all of these there is no going. Of what, then, is it that one says ' . . . is going'?39

As Kaiyata notes in his comments, speaking of a future flying by using the present form patasi 'you are flying' is not possible, since the act of flying in question, by virtue of its not yet coming to be, is non-existent at present, and patasi also is not justified with reference to a past act of flying, which too is non-existent. If, despite the act of flying not occurring currently, one could use

32 Bh 11.123.11: esa ndma nydyyo vartamdnah kdlo yatrd- rambho 'napavrktah.

3 Bh 11. 123.13-15: yamh khalvapi bhavdn muktasamsvayam vartamdnami kdlami nyayyamh manyate bhunkte devadatta iti tenaitat tulyam I so)pi hy avasyam bhunjdno hasati vajalpati vd pdnTyam vd pibati I yady atra yuktd vartamdnakdlatd drsyata ihdpi yuktd drsyatdm. The Vdkyapadiya in turn presents two ways of viewing this situation: (a) All acts are interrupted by other activities in their course; (b) The activities that could be viewed as interruptions are considered part and parcel of the total set of acts that make up composite activities such as eating. VP 3.9.82-84: (a) vyavadhdnam ivopaiti nivrtta iva drsyate I kriydsamuiho bhujyddir antard- lapravrttibhih I na ca vicchinnaruipo pi so 'virdmdn nivartate sarvaiva hi kriydnyena saihkTrnevopalabhyate (b) tadantard- ladrstd va sarvaivdvayavakriyd sdd~rydt sati bhede tu tadani- gatvena grhyate.

34 Bh 1.123.17-22: santi khalvapi kdlavibhdgdah tisthanti parvatah sthdsyanti parvatah tasthuh parvatd iti| kith sak- yanta ete sabdd prayoktum ity atah santi kdlavibhdgah| ndvasyam prayogdd eva I iha bhutabhavisyadvartamdndndm rdffdrm ydh kriyds tds tisthater adhikaranam I iha tavat tisthanti parvatd iti samprati ye rajdnas tesami yah kriyds tdsu vartamdndsu sthdsyanti parvatd itla uttaram ye rdjdno bhavisyanti tesdm yda kriyds tdsu bhavisyantfsu tasthuh parvatd itrha ye rajino babhuivus tesdmi yda kriyds tdsu bhtadsu.

Rh 11.123.23: apara dha ndsti vartamdnah kala iti. Siva- ramendrasarasvatT remarks appropriately that the claim being made is based on the momentary nature of activities that supposedly make up a composite act. There is no activity that has the form of a composite of component acts and is distinct from these. The component acts, moreover, are momentary (ksanikdh), so that they may appropriately be past or future, but they cannot appropriately be current. Ratnaprakasa VI.289: avayavdtirikto 'vayavr kriydruipo ndsti I avayavarupas ca kriyda ksanikdh I tatha ca tdsdam bhuitatvami bhavisyatvamh va sambhavati na tu vartamdnatvam iti bhdva#h. The same point is made again and again by other commentators; see below.

36 h 11. 123.23: api cdtra Rlokdn uddharanti. 37 Bh II.123.24-25: na vartate cakram isur na pdtyate na

syandante saritah sdgardya I kutastho 'yam loko na vicestitasti yo hy evam pasyati so py anadhah.

38 Bh 11. 124.1-5: mTmdrhsako manyamdno yuvd medhd- visammatah j kdkam smehdnuprcchati kith te patitalak- sanam andgate na patasiatikrdnte ca kdka na I yadisamprati patasi sarvo lokah pataty ayam II himavdn api gacchati.

39 h 11. 124.6-7: andgatam atrikrdntamh vartamdnam iti trayam I sarvatra ca gatir ndsti gacchatfti kim ucyate.


patasi, then one would open the door to using patasi with reference to any thing, including a mountain.40 Bhartrhari earlier sets forth the same argument, in the following way. A thing either is an existent or not; there is no third. Thereby, leaving aside past and future,

41 there is no middle, which one could call current. Helaraja explains thus: An action is said to have the

42 property of being brought to accomplishment. Now, of all the possible moments in an act, a moment that is past has already come into being (san 'being'), hence is an accomplished entity, and the action is past at that moment. A moment that is not yet existent (asan 'not being') has yet to be brought about, is a future one, and an action is characterized as to be in that moment. These are the only possible kinds of moments. There is no moment that has both characteristics, of being and not being, since it is contradictory for a single entity to have contradicting essential properties. Hence, it is not possible to justify the property of being current as a qualifier of what a verb denotes,43 Helaraja goes on to cite the third verse of the Mahdbhdsya passage given above,44 and then makes an important point. An action is not directly known (paroksd 'beyond direct perception'). Instead, it is inferred from a result, which means that it must be past. How, then, can it be spoken of using a present affix, as in patati? And, if one insisted on such usage, then one would have to allow speaking of the Himalaya, which is not seen to be associated with any separation and conjunction with places as a result of any activity on its part, using the same verb form.45

5.1.5. In saying that an action is not directly perceived and has to be inferred, Helaraja is in fact hark- ing back to what Patanfjali said centuries earlier. In the Mahdbhisya on A 1.3.1: bhavddayo dhdtavah, the suggestion is made that a verb base (dhdtu) be defined as a speech unit that signifies an action (kriydvacana). The question then immediately arises: What is an action? The first answer is: It is Thd ('activity'). Where- upon, the question arises: What is Thd? To which the answer given is: It is cestd.46 The questioner now shows his annoyance, remarking: You just explain words with words. You don't show any particular sort of thing and explain that an action is of this kind. This evokes a definite answer: An action is absolutely not visible. An action cannot be pointed out visually as a mass like a foetus come out of the womb.47 Instead, it can only be known through inference (sdsdv anumdnagamyd). And

40 Pr 111.283-84: andgata iti I andgatatvdd evdsattvdt pdtak- riydydh patasTti vyapadeso'nupapanna ity arthah. atikrdnta iti I tathaiva kriydyd asattvdt. sarvo loka iti I kriydyd vartamd- natvdbhdve gi yadi pataslti vyapadesas tadd viSesdbhdvdt parvatdddv api patasTti vyapadesaprasanga ity arthah.

41 VP 3.9.85: sad asad vdpi vastu sydt trtTyam ndsti kinicana | tena bhitabhavisyantau muktvd madhyam na vidyate.

42 sddhyamdndvasthd: cf. VP 3.8.1 (note 49). 43 Helaraja on VP 3.9.85 (76.6-9): sddhyamdndvasthd kriyd

bhanyate I tatra ca yah ksano'tTtah sa san siddhasvabhdva iti kriyd tatrdtltd I yas cdsan sa sddhyah sa bhdvT ksana iti tatra bhavisyadupddhikd kriyd I na cdnyo'sti ksanah sadasadu- bhayarupah I viruddhasvabhdvasyaikatvavirodhdt I tatas ca vartamdnatd dhdtvarthaviSesanamh nopapadyate.

44 The passage is cited with some variants; see note 45. 45 Helaraja on VP 3.9.85 (76.9-15): tad uktam bhd.ye

andgate na patasi atikrdnte ca kdka na yadi samprati patasi krtsno lokah pataty ayam I himavdn api calati iti I paroksa kriyd phalendnumryamdntvdt kathamn vartamdnapratyayenoc-

yeta I evam himavin aparidrstasamyogavibhagakriyakaryah kasmdn na patatrti vartamdnapratyayena vyapadiiyetety arthah.

46 As Kaiyata points out, although ihd and cestd elsewhere signify distinct activities, they are used in the present context with reference to activity in general: Pr 11.179: Thdcestdiab- dayor anyatra vydpdravUiesavacanatve )gTha vydpdramdtra- vacanatvami boddhavyam. Nagega properly notes that rhd is a mental activity, wishing, while cesta is a physical activity involving movement of the body; Ud 11.179: mdnasavya-para icchdrtipd ihd. ... kayaparispandag cesta.

47 Or: as a foetus still in the womb cannot be shown visually. Bh: kriyd ndmeyam atyantdparidrstd I agakyd kriya pindT- bhuad nidarsayitum yathd garbho nirluthitah. The two interpretations depend on whether garbhonirluthitah is taken as (a) from garbhah nirluthitah or (b) from garbhah anirluthitah. Pr 11. 180: garbho nirluthita iti I yathd kuksistho garbho prat- yaksas tathd kriyety arthah I athavd yathd nirluthito nirgatah kukser garbhah pratyakso naivam kriyeti vaidharmyena drstantah. Here, (a) can be appropriate: one can point to and directly show a foetus once it has come out of the womb, but one cannot similarly point out an action as a whole, the complex of constituent action-moments (pindTbhiuta 'become a mass'). On the other hand, as Kaiyata notes, (a) involves a comparison of entities with different properties: a foetus that can be seen as a single mass versus a total action, which cannot be seen as a single whole. Moreover, one could argue that there are more immediate examples available to illustrate something that is directly perceptible, so that interpretation (b), which also does not involve a contrastive comparison, should be preferred. Whichever interpretation is preferred, moreover, the stress is clearly on the fact that a composite action is not directly perceptible. An additional point, which I


this inference can be of two sorts. First, on condition that all participants that serve to bring an activity to completion-as when grains of rice, a pot, water, fire and a person like Devadatta-are present, sometimes one rightly says pacati' . . . is cooking', and sometimes one does not have this. That, as a consequence of whose being one rightly says pacati, is an action. Al- ternatively, that on account of which someone like Devadatta is first in one place and then in another

48 place such as Pataliputra, is an action. 5.1.6. As we could expect, Bhartrhari considers the

same issues and presents them in some detail, basing himself on what Patafijali had said earlier. Let us consider briefly, then, some major points that Bhartrhari makes in the Kriyd- and Kdlasamuddesa sections of the Vdkyapadfya [VP]. A verb such a pac is considered to denote an action, cooking. The essential feature of what is understood to be an action (kriyetipratTyate) is that it has sequence (daritakramarapatvdt) and is accordingly spoken of as something that is brought to accomplishment (sddhyatvendbhidhlyate), whether it has or has not been brought to accomplishment, as when one says apaksft'. . . has cooked', pacati' . . . is cooking', paksyati' . . . will cook'.49 In fact, what users of the language speak of, using such verb forms, is not a single simple entity but a complex (samuihah 'group') of constituent activities (gunabhftair avayavaih 'parts that are subsidiary [with respect to the whole]').50 The

whole in question is a composite of parts that arise in sequence (kramajanmandm) and are not ever actually together.51 Accordingly, Bhartrhari says that the composite that is called 'an action' (kriyeti vyapadisyate) is something whose unity (abheda) is conceived by the mind (buddhydprakalpitdbhedah).52 Now, the constituent moments of activity that make up the composite act occur in sequence, no sooner arising than they pass (kramat sadasatam . . . samuihindm), so that they do not themselves (tesdm dtmdnah 'their selves') come into relation with organs of perception like the eyes, whose range of operation is limited to existent objects.53 In effect, the action-moments in question cannot be objects of direct perception, since they are indeed momentary. Bhartrhari emphasizes that, as pouring

cannot take up here, concerns precisely what is meant by nirluthita-, given that luth means 'roll about, wallow'.

48 Bh 1.254.13-19: yadi punah kriydvacano dhdtur ity etal laksanam kriyeta kd punah kriyd I ih/ I kd punarihd I cest| kd punas cestd vydpdrah I sarvathd bhavda- sabdenaiva sabddn dcaste na kificid arthajdtam nidarsayaty evaiijdtiyikd kriyeti I krivd ndmeyam atyantdparidrstd I asakyd kriyd pindibhiad nidarsayitum yathd garbho nirluthitahl savdv anumdnagammyda ko 'sdv anumdnah| iha sarvesu sdddhanesu sannihitesu kaddcit pacatlty etad bhavati kaddcin na bhavati yasmin sdadhane sannihite pacatity etad bhavati sd nu~namh kriyd I athavd yayd devadatta iha bh/utvd pdtaliputre bhavati sda nunamkriyd. Cf. BA 11.114.10-11 (on A 3.2.102), 120.9- 10 (on A 3.2.115).

49 VP 3.8.1: ydvat siddham asiddhamh vd sddhyatvendbid- hfyate I daritakramaru~patvdt tat kriyeti pratlyate.

50 The major constituent acts involved are said to be: putting a pot on a stove, pouring water into the pot, putting rice grains into the water in the pot, bringing firewood up to the stove, lighting it, stirring what is in the pot with a spoon, letting out the scum that forms on top of the water, and taking down the pot from the stove. E.g., Bhadsya on NS 2.1.42 (1.524): ndndvidhd caikdrthd kriyd pacatitil sthadlyadhisra-

yanam udakdsecanam edhopasarpanam agnyabhijvdlanam mandasrdvanam adhovatdranam iti (see also below with note 54). As Vatsyayana says, the entire composite has a single purpose (ekdrtha): to produce softened rice grains. Bhartrhari speaks of the constituent acts as subsidiary in that separate terms are not used with reference to them when one uses a single verb such as pac. Helaraja on VP 3.8.4 (9.4- 5): tatrdvayavdndrm samuddye gunabhdvdpatteh sabdabhedaprayo- jakatvdbhdvdd ekadhdtapdddnakriydika samuddyasvabhdvdva- tisthate 'since the constituent parts get the status of being subsidiary with respect to the whole, they do not condition the use of separate terms, so that there is a single act that is a complex denoted by a single verb'.

51 As opposed to the parts of a substantial entity, such as the threads of a piece of cloth, which do indeed occur together to form a whole.

52 VP 3.8.4: gunabhatair avayavaih samuthah kramajanmandm I buddhyd prakalpitdbhedah kriyeti vyapadi.yate. Helaraja (9.3-4) succinctly puts it as follows: The sequential action-moments that come into play with one single result as an intended goal are made unified by the mental activity of gathering together (sahkalandbuddhyd samdpdditaikydndm); it is these unified moments that one speaks of as an action: kramavatdam ksandndm ekaphaloddesena pravrttdndm san- kalanabuddhyd samdpdditaikydndrm kriydtvaivyavahdrah.

5 VP 3.8.6: kramdt sadasatdam tesda- tesdan dtmdno na samuhindm I sadvastuvisayair yanti sambandham caksurddi- bhih. Helaraja (10. 12-14) appropriately brings this into connection with the Mahdbha.ya's statement that an action has to be inferred. Earlier, in his commentary on VP 3.8.1 (5.23-25), Helaraja remarks that it will be said that a meaning entity which is sequential, so that its parts arise and disappear, does not have the property of being perceived directly, since its parts do not continue to occur currently: evam ca piurvd- par bhutasya sakramasydrthasydgamdpdyitvdd bhdgdndm avartamdnatvdt pratyaksdbhdvah.


water into a pot, and so on, constitute parts of cooking, so must the acts of pouring water into a pot, and so on, also be recognized to have parts.54 One can go on down to the very last atomic moment of activity, no longer divisible into components, and each such prior moment is divisible into components; moreover, kriyd 'action' is simply not used of this very last indivisible moment." Accordingly, one cannot say that an action as such is directly perceived. As Patanijali said earlier, it is inferred.

And from this, one can conclude that there is no moment at which one can truly speak of an action as current, as Bhartrhari says in VP 3.9.85 (see 5.1.4 with note 41).

5.1.7. From the Mahdbhdaya discussion summarized in sections 5.1.4-6, it is patent that scholars earlier than Patafijali had considered how one could justify the concept of current time; some had rejected such a concept, basing their position on the view that what one considers an action is nothing more than a series of action-moments, none of which can be directly viewed as current.56 It is worth emphasizing that in the Maha- bhdaya on A 1.3.1 Patafijali cites verses which encap- sulate the conclusions reached; he reports what he has received as accepted doctrine of some thinkers, reflected in these verses.

5.2. A similar argumentation lies behind a section of Nydyasitra [NS], which I shall now consider briefly.

The position is set forth that there is no current time (vartamdndbhdvah), and this is based on the following argument. Relative to something that falls (patatah), one can properly account for only a time that has already been covered in falling and a time to be covered, no third time.57 In his Bhdsya on this sUtra, Vatsyayana invokes an example familiar not only from Nyaya but also from Madhyamaka (see 6), that of a path that is traversed during motion. A fruit that breaks loose from where it is attached to a tree falls to the ground. During this fall, at any given point, what is above the fruit between it and the starting point is the path which has been covered in falling (patito 'dhvd) and what is below the fruit between it and the ground is the path to be traversed in falling (patitavyo 'dhvd); the time connected with the former is that of past falling (patitakalah) and the time connected with the latter is that of future falling (patitavyakdlah). There is no third part of a path of falling which could be grasped as involving a current time, during which one would say that falling is currently taking place. Therefore, one concludes that there is no current time connected with this or any act.58

There is no need here to consider in detail the arguments given in subsequent sutras to justify the concept of current time. Nevertheless, what Vatsyayana says in his Bhdsya on NS 2.1.40 is worth noting. The argument proposed to show that one cannot correctly operate with current time assumes that time is linked with things like paths traversed and things that fall, so that any time varieties are revealed by these. But, says Vat- syayana, time in its varieties is not brought out (vyah- gya 'to be made manifest') by participants in acts; it is brought out by actions, as when one says patati ' ... falls, . . . is falling'.59 In the particular example

54 VP 3.8.9: yathd ca bhdgdh pacater udakdsecanddayah| udakdsecanddlndam jfieyd bhdgds tathdpare. Some maintain that, although the composite action said to be denoted by a verb like pac is indeed not directly perceptible because the components do not occur together, each moment is directly perceptible and pacati is used on the basis of mentally unifying these perceptible constituent moments. Pr 11.181: dhdtuvdcyasya samahasya yugapadasannidhdndd apratyak- satve py ekaikasya tu ksanasya pratyaksatve buddhyd tdn ksandn sahkalayyapacatTtiprayujyate. As Nagega notes in his comments on this Pradlpa passage, others hold that component acts like putting a pot on the stove are not single moments but themselves composites of other activity-moments such as putting out one's hand, taking the pot, bringing into contact with the stove, and so on; and the final most minute moment, which is no longer divisible, is, by the very nature of speech, not signified, nor is it directly perceptible. Ud 11.181: pare tv adhigrayanddir api naikaksandtmakah tasydpi hasta- prasdranapdtraddnacullTsamyojanddayo 'vayavah santy eveti so pi samuharupa eva I yas tu tesdm apy avayavah para- manvdkhyah sa tu sabda.taktisvabhdvdn naiva vacyo napi pratyaksah.

5 VP 3.8.10: yas cdpakarsaparyantam anupraptah pratU- yate I tatraikasmin kriyasabdah kevale na prayujyate.

56 The concept of present time is also defended; see 5.4.

57 NS 2.1.39: vartamdndbhdvah patatah patitapatitavyakd- lopapatteh.

58 NSBh 1.517: vrntdt pracyutasya phalasya bhumau prat- ydsidato yad urdhvam sa patito 'dhvd tatsamyuktah kdlah patitakdlah I yo 'dhastdt sa patitavyo 'dhva tatsamyuktah kdlah patitavyakdlah I neddnTm trtTyo 'dhvd vidyate yatra patatTti kdlo grhyeta tasmdd vartamdnah kdlo na vidyate.

59 NSBh 1.520: nddhvavyangyah kdlah kim tarhi kri- ydvyangyah patatlti; cf. NM 1.203. A falling fruit and a path along which it falls are not considered proper to bringing out time differences in that they remain the same; for example, the space in which a fruit falls is the same whether a fruit has started to fall along it or not. NVTT 1.520: ndtitddirqpatd


under discussion, one has past time when the act of falling has ceased; future time is that at which this act will begin (utpatsyate 'will arise'). And current time is the time at which an ongoing act (vartamdnd kriya 'current action') is grasped in a substance. Moreover, if one does not grasp falling as currently going on in an object, in relation to what does one understand cessation and beginning?60 In connection with this last argument of Vatsyayana's, Vacaspatimisra invokes inference, in a manner partly comparable to that of the Mahdbhdaya (see 5.1.5 with note 48): In the absence of a falling that is going on, of what is the fruit's heaviness the cause, in relation to what does the fruit play the role of a kdraka, and relative to what is the contact between the fruit and the ground a result to be brought about?61

5.3 Vdtsyayana's arguments are doubtless directed specifically against arguments which Nagarjuna ad- vanced in his Mulamadhyamakakdrikds [MMK].62 Nagarjuna's claims, moreover, are quite reminiscent of the claims set forth in 'lokas cited by Patan-jali in the Mahdbhdsya (see 5.1.4), and some of the arguments brought up trying to defend the notion of current time also remind one of what Patafijali said. Let me, there-

63 fore, summarize the major points brought Up.

5.3.1. The aim of the second chapter of Malama- dhyamakakdrikas is to demonstrate that there is no going (gatih), no goer (ganta), and no path that is to be gone upon (gantavyam)." The arguments center around the terms [1] gamyamdna; [2] gamyate; a combination of these, [3] gamyamdnaih gamyate; and [4] gacchati. A brief discussion of background concerning them is in order.

[2] is derived, according to Paninian rules, from gam-la(: the L-affix la( follows the verb gam 'go'. This L-affix is introduced here under two conditions: an object (karman) relative to going is to be signified65 and the action denoted by the verb is referred to current time (A 3.2.123 [see 3.2]). The L-affix is replaced by the verb ending ta,66 whose -a is then replaced by -e:67 gam-L - gam-ta - gam-te. Once the verb is thus followed by an ending, of the sarvadhatuka class, signifying an object of going, it takes the suffix yak:68 gam-te gamyate. For example: adhvd gamyate 'the path is being gone on', devadattena adhvd gamyate 'the path is being gone on by Devadatta'. An L-affix is also introduced if an agent is to be signified, as in gacchati '... is going (- gam-lat), where the parasmaipada ending tip replaces la(, introduced to signify an agent. In deriving the present participle gamyamdna, one also begins with gam followed by la(, introduced under the same conditions as [2]. gam-ya-mana is comparable in structure to adhfydna- 'studying' (- adhi-iy-ana) and in function it is also comparable to saydna- 'lying'.

In [5] saydnd bhunjate yavandh 'Yavanas eat while lying down', saydndh refers to persons whose act of lying characterizes how they perform the act of eating; in [6] adhTydno vasati' . . . is staying while he studies', adhTydnah refers to someone whose studying is the reason for his staying somewhere. According to A 3.2.126: laksanahetvoh kriydydh (latah satrsdnacau 124), la( is replaced by the parasmaipada suffix S'at( or the atmanepada suffix hdnac, if it has been introduced after a verb whose significand is spoken of as character- istic (laksana) or cause (hetu) relative to an activity.

kdlasya kdrakavyangyd tayos tadavasthydt api tu kriydv- yangya; 1.521: tasmat kriya kalabhivyaktinimittam nddhvd gantavyasya tddavasthydt I yo 'sau gantavyo desah sa yathd- bhiuta evanutpannakriye phale tathabhiuta evotpannakriya ity abheddn nadhvd kalvyaktihetuh.

60 NSBh 1.520-21: yadd patanakriyd vyuparatd bhavati sa kdlah patitakdlah I yadotpatsyate sa patitavyakdlah I yadd dravye vartamdnd kriyd grhyate sa vartamdnah kdlah I yadi cdyamh dravye vartamdnarh patanam na grhnati kasyopara- mam utpadyamdnataim va pratipadyate.

61 NVTT I.521: na ca vartamdnapatanam asiddham yena na kdlam vyanjydt I tadasattve kasyedam kdranam gurutvam kasya ca phalam karakam kasya ca phalabhiumisamyogah karyah.

62 It has also been suggested that Nydyasiutra 2.1.39-43 were interpolated into the text by Vatsyayana, ' . . . inasmuch as the objections raised therein emanated most probably from Nagarjuna. . . '(Vidyabhusana 1920: 106 n. 1). However, I do not think the arguments in the sutras require Nagarjuna as an opponent, since the major claim against which they are directed was already raised much earlier.

63 For secondary literature, including translations, of the Mulamadhyamakakdrikds, see Ruegg 1981: 126-27; on the second chapter in particular, see Ruegg 1981: 10-11, with references. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya 1980 has emphasized that Nagarjuna's arguments are largely based on grammatical considerations (cf. Ruegg 1981: 11).

64 MMK 2.25cd: tasmad gatig ca gantd ca gantavyam ca na vidyate. As is known, what Nagarjuna denies is movement and so on considered as self-existent entities.

65 A 3.4.69: lah (kartari 67) karmani ca bhdve cakarmake- bhyah. On this and the satras cited in note 66 see Cardona 1988: 173-74 (232).

66 A 3.4.77-78: lasya, tiptasjhisipthasthamibvasmastdtdm- jhathdsdthdrhdvhamidvahimahin.

67 A 3.4.79: tita dtmanepaddndm ter e. See Cardona 1988: 178, 321 (235, 396).

68 A 3.1.67: sarvadhatuke yak. See Cardona 1988: 117 (156).


Now, sentences like [7] tisthan muitrayati'... urin- ates (is urinating) standing up' or [8] gacchan bhaksayati'... eats (is eating) on the go' can answer different sorts of questions. First, these could be used in reply to the questions [9] katham muitrayati 'how does . .. ur- inate?' asked in connection with, say, a Yavana, and [10] katham bhaksayati 'how does . . . eat?', asked of some person such as Devadatta. The acts of standing and going are here spoken of as characterizing the acts of urinating and eating, and the participles used are immediately accounted for by A 3.2.126. In addition, [7]-[8] could answer to the questions [11] ko yavanah 'which is the Yavana?', [12] ko devadattah 'which is Devadatta?' That is, someone sees several people urinating and eating, and inquires which one of these in particular is a Yavana or Devadatta.

In his first varttika on A 3.2.126 (laksanahetvoh kriydyd guna upasahkhydnam), Katyayana proposes that an addition has to be made to the rule to account for the replacement of la( by a participial affix in order to derive sentences like [7]-[8], on the assumption that what is being characterized is a participant in an act.69 In his second varttika (kartus ca laksanayoh paryd- yendcayoge) Katyayana goes on to suggest a second addition to the rule: If there are two actions that serve to characterize an agent (kartuh. . . laksanayoh), la( following each of the verbs signifying these is in turn replaced by a participial affix, provided ca 'and' is not used in connection with the verbs. This is meant to account for sentences like [13] yo 'dhiydna dste sa devadattah 'Devadatta is the one who is studying while he sits', [14] ya dsino WhTte sa devadattah 'Devadatta is the one who is sitting while he studies'.70 Later on, however, Patanfjali says these additions do not have to be made. In [7], the act of standing characterizes the

act of urinating, and in [8] the act of going characterizes the act of eating, even if these are considered to answer [1 1]-[12].7' Urinating and eating, thus characterized, then characterize Devadatta, in which case one can be more specific about what [7]-[8] answer to by using more explicit sentences like [15] yas tisthan muitrayati sa devadattah 'Devadatta is the one who is standing while urinating'.72

Now, in a comparable way, [3] gamyamdnam (adhvajdtam) gamyate contains the participle gamyamdnam. It could hardly be the case, moreover, that [3] would be used in answering to a question of type [11]: anything that is being gone upon or gone to by someone is indeed being gone upon or gone to; it would, therefore, hardly make sense for a person to ask which among several things being gone upon is a sort of path and to be answered with [3]. By the same token, [3] is peculiar as an answer to a question of type [9], namely [16] katham gamyate 'dhvd 'how is the path gone upon?' or [17] kadd gamyate 'dhvd 'when is the path being gone upon?' Still, [3] could more easily be conceived of as an answer to this type of question. Accordingly, let us translate it, 'the path is being gone upon as it is being gone upon', a redundant but still comprehensible answer which amounts to saying that the path in question is being traversed now, not at a future or past time.73

In addition, there is a past participle gata-, in the derivation of which the suffix kta-one of two suffixes (the other being ktavatu) called nisthd-is introduced after gam on condition that the act of going is referred to the past (bhuite) and that an agent or an object is to be signified.74 In [18] adhvd gatah 'the path has been

69 Bh on vt. 1 (11.127.27-28): laksanahetvoh kriyaya guna upasankhydnam kartavyam I tisthan miurayati gacchan bhak- sayatTti. Pr 111.292: yadd tu kdrakam laksyate tadartham idam vacanam I bahusu muitrayatsu ko devadatta ity ukte yas tisthan miurayatlti prativacanena devadatto laksyate. It does not matter for the present discussion that Kaiyata goes on to suggest that guna could be interpreted to speak of a quality- such as the impurity that accrues to someone who does something like urinating while standing-and not a participant in an action (karaka), viewed as a subsidiary (guna) in comparison with an action, which is the principal thing spoken of.

70 Bh on vt. 2 (11.128.2-4): kartus ca laksanayohi parya- yendcayoga upasankhydnam kartavyam I yo 'dhiydna aste sa devadattah ya asTno 'dhite sa devadattah I acayoga iti kimar- tham I ya dste cddhTte ca sa caitrah. As shown, participles are not used in sentences like ya dste cddhTte ca sa caitrah 'Caitra is the one who is sitting and studying'.

7' Bh 11.128.15-17: tat tarhi vaktavyam I na vaktavyam I laksanahetvoh kriydyd ity eva siddam I iha tdvat tisthan miitrayatfti tisthatikriyd miitrayatikriydyd laksanam I gacchan bhaksayatiti gacchatikriyd bhaksayatikriydyd laksanam.

72 Pr 111.293: sthitikriydlaksitd tu miitranakriyd yas tisthan miitrayati sa devadatta iti sarvandmapardmarse devadattasya laksanam tadgatasya vdsaucdder iti bhdvah. Similarly, Patafi- jali says that in [11] the act of studying characterizes sitting and in [2] sitting characterizes studying.

73 The essential difficulty of course lies in the fact that [3] has to involve an act of going that characterizes the very same sort of act, an act of going. And if only one act is involved, the difficulty is all the more sorely felt. The latter point is crucial, in that Nagarjuna insists on it. For, as Peter Scharf has pointed out, one could have sentences like asmdbhir gam- yamdno 'dhvd tendpi gamyate 'he also takes the way we go by', involving different instances of going.

74 A 3.2.102: nisthd (bhiite 84), A 3.4.72: gatyarthdkarma- kaslisasTnsthasavasajanaruhajfryatibhyas ca (ktah kartari ca 71, tayoh 70).


gone on', gata- refers to an object and is coreferential with adhvan-.

5.3.2. Nagarjuna begins his argumentation by considering three possible types of paths (adhvajdtam) where going (gamanam) could take place: (a) one already traversed (gatam), (b) one not yet traversed (agatam), (c) one being traversed (gamyamdnam). It is not possible to say of either (a) or (b) that it is currently being gone on (gamyate). A path on which going has ceased is referred to by gata-, while gamyate is said of a path which is being currently involved in going. It is incoherent that a path on which going has ceased be referred to by the term gamyate, which expresses a connection with going, so that it is improper to say that what has been gone upon can be spoken of using gamyate. Further, agatam refers to a path on which going has not begun, while gamyate refers to something on which going is currently occurring; since what is yet to be and what is currently occurring are absolutely different, then, it is also improper to speak of what is yet to be gone upon, using gamyate. Moreover, there is no third kind of path aside from (a) and (b) (gatdga- tavinirmuktam) of which one could predicate that it is currently being traversed.75 Accordingly, an act of going cannot be said to occur in what is referred to by

- 76 gamyamana.

5.3.3. Nagarjuna next takes up and refutes an argument for saying that one must consider a path currently being gone on to be the locus of going. The claim made is that going is known to take place where there is a physical activity-moving one's feet and so on (cestd yatra gatis tatra). It occurs on (c), not on (a) or (b).77 This claim is rejected, as follows. We have the terms [1] gamyamanam, in which the participial suffix skanac denotes an object, and [2] gamyate, in which the ending te denotes an object. In each instance, the object is relative to an act of going. [1] and [2] are combined in the utterance [3] gamyamanamh gamyate, which, according to normal understanding, involves only one act of going. On the other hand, if one assumes that going takes place currently on (c), and that [3] conveys this, a problem arises. It is not possible to justify two such acts here (gamyamdne dvigamanam. . . naivopapadyate) with respect to one path. Yet this is what one would

have to assume. Conversely, if one continues to accept that only one such act is involved, then one would have to assume that the referent of [1] is not connected with going (gamyamdne vigamanarhihy agamanam). Accord- ingly, how can one justify going relative to (c)? (gamyamdnasya gamanarh katharh ndmopapatsyate?)78

If, in order to maintain a single act of going for [3], one accepts that only [2] directly involves a signified relation with going, then one also accepts that this act is brought into relation with the reference of [1] (gamyamanasya gamanam yasya); one then has to accept the undesired consequence (tasyaprasajyate) that [1] is used with reference to an entity that is not linked with going in the first instance (rte gater gamyamdnam).79

If, on the other hand, one accepts that the referents of both [1] and [2] are related to going to begin with, then [3] involves two acts of going, denoted by gam in [1] gamyamdnam and gam in gamyate.80 This has an undesirable consequence. It is not possible to account for an act of going without someone who performs it (gantdrarh ... tiraskrtya gamanarh nopapadyate), so that under this view [3] would now involve two agents of going (dvau gantdrau prasajyete).8'

5.3.4. Let us say one argued that, despite the prob- lems pointed out, it is proper to accept that an act of going does indeed take place, since there is a person such as Devadatta, who performs as agent of, hence is the locus of, this activity. But, argues Nagarjuna, it can be shown that there is no such entity. If going cannot be accounted for without an agent of going (gantarath cet tiraskrtya gamanarh nopapadyate), in the absence of an act of going (gamane 'sati) for what reason will there be a goer?82

7 MMK 2.1: gatarh na gamyate tdvad agataii naiva gamyate I gatdgatavirnirmuktarh gamyamanaii na gamyate, with Candraklrti's expatiation (PP 92.9-93.3).

76 PP 93.8-9: tasman ndsi gamyamdnam I ato na tad gami- kriyayd dvisyate na gamyate iti ndsti gamyamdne )9i gamanam.

77 MMK 2.2: cestd yatra gatis tatra gamyamdne ca sd yatah I na gate ndgate cestd gamyamane gatis tatah.

78 MMK 2.3: gamyamdnasya gamanami kathami ndmopapatsyate I gamyamdnam vigamanami yadd naivopapadyate, with Candraklirti's comments (PP 94.14-95.3). As has long been known (see de La Vallee Poussin 1903-13: 94 notes 2-3; Bhattacharya 1980: 92 note 10), the readings vigamanam 'devoid of movement' and dvigamanam 'movement inhering in two' (PP 94.14: dvigatam gamanam dvigamanam) are at issue in the second half of the verse. In my paraphrase, I have allowed for the arguments assuming either reading, in accordance with the Prasannapadd.

79 MMK 2.4: gamyamdnasya gamanami yasya tasya prasa]- yate I rte gater gamyamdnami gamyamanamh hi gamyate, with the Prasannapada (PP 95.8-12).

80 MMK 2.5: gamyamanasya gamane prasaktam gamanad- vayam I yena tad gamyamdnami ca yac catra gamanarm punah.

81 MMK 2.6: dvau gantdrau prasajyete prasakte gamanad- vaye I gantaram hi tiraskrtya gamanami nopapadyate.

82 MMK 2.7: gantdrami cet tiraskrtya gamanarm nopapa- padyate I gamane 'sati gantatha kuta eva bhavisyati.


Under an argument analogous to that of MMK 2.1, an agent of going (gantd) does not currently go (na gacchati), and one who is not an agent of going (aganta certainly does not currently go (naiva gacchati). What third one is there distinct from one who goes and one who does not go?83 If it is not possible for there to be an agent of going without an act of going (gamanena vind gantd yadd naivopapadyate), how will it be possible to have the utterance [19] ganta gacchati 'a goer is going'?84

One who maintains the position that a given in- dividual is a goer by virtue of his association with going-so that one says ganta gacchati-(pakso gantd gacchatti. ... gantur gamanam icchatah) suffers the undesirable consequence that there is a goer without an act of going (tasya prasajyate gamanena vina gantd).85 And if the same person maintains that one uses not only gacchati but also gantr- because of a connection with an act of going, then one suffers the undesired consequence of having two acts of going involved in the utterance gantd gacchati: one going by virtue of which gantr- is used and a going which the goer referred to by gantr- performs, so that one uses gacchati.86

5.3.5 One could argue as follows. It is well known from common usage that one can say things like [20] devadatto gantd gacchati 'Devadatta, an agent of going, is going', comparable to [21] vaktd vdcam bhdsate 'the speaker is uttering speech', [22] karta kriydam karoti 'the agent is carrying out an act' ('the doer is doing a doing'). In each instance a single act is involved, so that the act of going whereby the agent of going in [20] is expressed as such is the very same act of going which he performs. Accordingly, the faults given do not obtain, and it is accepted that there is indeed an act of going.87 Against this the following is said. An agent of going does not come into connection with and carry out the self same act (gatim tam sa na gacchati 'he does not go that going') whereby he is shown as and called an agent of going (gatyd yaydjyate gantd). A sentence like [23] devadatto grdmam gacchati 'Devadatta is go-

ing to the village' is normal: a certain person (kascit) goes to something (kificid dhi gacchati) that is distinct from him. On the other hand, an agent of going- spoken of in a sentence like [20] -who would carry out the act of going whereby he is an agent of going does not obtain before the act of going (na gatiparvo 'sti).88 Nor does an agent of going spoken of in a sentence like [20] perform an act of going (sa na gacchati) that is distinct from the one whereby he is referred to as an agent (gatyd yaydjyate gantd tato 'nydm), since it is not possible that there be two acts of going (gatTdve nopa- pady ete yasmdt) when one person is going (eke [= ekas- min] tu gantari).89

5.3.6. It is not necessary to dwell on the rest of Nagdrjuna's argumentation in the present context. I think it worthwhile, on the other hand, to consider in more detail the situations he deals with, and how he envisions them to be logically incoherent. Let us begin with the sentence [19] ganta gacchati. The argument involved is that [19] concerns a single act of going, by virtue of which one says gacchati. There is not a second

8 MMK 2.8: gantd na gacchati tdvad agantd naiva gacchati | gamane 'sati gantdtha kuta eva bhavi~yati.

84 MMK 2.9: gantd tavadgacchatrti katham evopapatsyate gamanena vind gantd yadd naivopapadyate.

85 MMK 2.10: pakso gantd gacchatrti yasya tasya prasajyate I gamanena vind gantd gantur gamanam icchatah.

86 MMK 2.11: gamane dve prasajyete ganta yady uta gacchati I ganteti cdjyate yena gantd san yac ca gacchati.

87 PP 105.12-14: atraha I iha devadatto gantd gacchatTti lokaprasiddham I tatra yathd vaktd vdcari bhdsate karta kriydih karotrti prasiddham I evari yayd gatya gantety abhiv- yajyate tdm gacchatrti na yathoktadosah.

88 MMK 2.22: gatyd yaydjyate gantd gatim tdra sa na gacchati I yasmdn na gatiparvo 'sti kaicit kinicid dhi gacchati. Situations such as those envisioned in [23] are considered in a slightly different context also in the Vakyapadrya, in connection with the distinction between external being (bahyasattd) and mentally conceived being (aupacdrikT sand). Just as one can use [23], one should be able to say atkurojdyate 'a shoot is arising (from a seed)', which concerns a shoot's coming into being. This requires an externally existent act of reaching a state of being (dtmaldbha 'gaining a self'), an object of this act, namely the self that is gotten (labhya), and an external agent which obtains this (labdhr). This is not possible under the view that terms refer to externally existent beings. For, if a term like ankura refers to such an externally existent thing, for what reason is it said to be arising (yadi sad jdyate kasmdt); and if there is no such external being, how is it said to arise? (VP 3.3.43: dtmaldbhasya janmdkhyd satd labhyaii ca labh- yate I yadi saj jyate kasmdd athdsaj jdyate katham). The act of going (gamanam) denoted by gam takes place in connection with an existent agent of going (sato gantuh) and with an existent object that one goes to (sati gamye). If, now, the agent of coming into being is considered comparable to the agent of going, so that it is an existent entity before the act, then the meaning of the verb jan, namely 'coming into being', fails; and if the agent of coming into being is not treated as comparable to the agent of going, then it cannot be an existent that is agent of coming into being (nafjayate 'is not born'). (VP 3.3.44: sato hi gantur gamanam sati gamye pravartate I gantrvac cen na janydrtho na cet tadvan najdyate.)

M9 MMK 2.23: gatyd yaydjyate gantd tato 'nydm sa na gacchati I gatr dve nopapadyete yasmdd eke tu gantari.


act of going involved with respect to the designation gantr-. Without an act of going, however, it is not possible to say gantr- of someone, as it is impossible properly to say [18] agacchan gantd 'a goer who is not going'. Accordingly, [19] is improper. To be sure, one could correctly say gacchati, but to add gantd to form [19] is improper.90 Conversely, if one starts out saying that gantr- is used as a designation by virtue of relation with going, so that it refers necessarily to someone involved in movement, since there is no second act of going involved, [19] is not appropriately possible.9' In addition, it is assumed that [3] gamyamanam gamyate involves a similar paradox for the same reasons: If one single act of going is involved, by virtue of which one says gamyate, so that this alone involves a relation with the act, then one would have to say, improperly, that gamyamdnam can refer to something not involved in going, so that the sentential meaning of [3] would remain unfulfilled.92 Conversely, if one begins by saying that the designation gamyamdnam applies because of a connection with going, it will not be possible, given that there is a single act of going at issue, to have an additional relation with going, as designated by gamyate.93

5.3.7. The question arises: are [3] and [19] necessarily as parallel as Nagdrjuna makes them out to be?

And the answer must be that they are not, if one takes a particular stand. Consider again [1] gamyamana from the point of view of how Panini derives this participle. The suffix S'dnac here replaces the L-affix lat, which is introduced to denote an object, and on condition that the action in question is referred to current time. Accord- ingly, the passive participle gamyamdna- can properly be used only with reference to an object that is actually involved in an act of going. Now, there are other participial forms that, from a grammatical point of view, do not have such a requirement. Thus, yajamdna-94 refers to someone who is a patron of sacrifices, but the use of this term does not require that the yajamdna actually be involved in this act at the moment it is used. In this respect, yajamana- is comparable to a term like dsana- 'seat' or Sayana- 'bed'.95 To be sure, dsana- signifies a locus relative to sitting and Sayana- signifies a locus relative to lying, but the very use of these derivates does not require that they play the role of locus at that moment. On the contrary, these terms refer to entities that are apt to be used as loci. Accord- ingly, one can have these followed by a locative ending, showing that they function as loci of acts at a given time, as when one says [20] dsana aste' . . . is sitting in the seat', [21] Sayane Sete' . . . is lying in the bed'.96 The same can be said of an agent noun such as pacaka-, paktr- 'one who cooks'.97 In terms of Pdninian rules, the affixes of dsana-, Sayana-, pacaka-, paktr- are introduced without any condition of time reference. Accord- ingly, it is grammatically proper to say [20] pacakah pacati, just as in English one can correctly say 'The cook is cooking'.98 Moreover, it is possible to say that each of the sentences [19], [20], [21] does indeed involve two actions: one denoted by the verb in the derivate,

90 PP on MMK 2.9 (98.10-13): gantd gacchatrti vdkya ekaiva gamikriya tayd ca gachatlti vyapadigyate I ganteti tu vyapadege ndsti dvitrya gamikriyeti I gamanena vind gantdgac- chan ganteti yadd na sambhavati tadd gantd gacchatlti na yujyate I kamam gacchatity astu I ganteti tu na sambhavati. As in MMK 2.9cd, so also in MMK 2.16cd, Nagarjuna insists that one cannot say someone is a goer unless that person is actually involved in going (gamanena vind ganta yadd naivopapapadyate). This is said in the context of denying the possibility that a person refer

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