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AUTHOR: GEORGE CARDONA TITLE: The Sa|Almbandha—samuddes ´ a (chapter on relation) and Bhart|Alrhari’s philosophy of language SOURCE: Journal of the American Oriental Society v119 no1 p88-125 Ja/Mr ’99 The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. ABSTRACT In connection with a recent work on the Sambandhasamuddes ´ a of the Va - kyapadi - ya, I consider some major issues concerning Bhartr hari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholar might approach the Va - kyapadi - ya. I discuss theoretical principles which have been set forth as a basis for dealing with Bhartr hari and evidence from the Va - kyapadi - ya in connection with these principles, chiefly what is referred to as Bhartr hari’s perspectivism. I take up in some detail one large issue: the status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called s ´ is t a, who use speech forms characterized as “correct” (sa - dhu) linguistic units (s ´ abda) opposed to incorrect linguistic units (asa - dhus ´ abda, apas ´ abda), that are viewed as corruptions (apabhram ˙ s ´ a), with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principal issue here is: do apas ´ abdas directly signify meanings for s ´ is t as when they communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a translation technique such that the apas ´ abda used calls to mind a sa - dhus ´ abda, which then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question: how one should consider the Vr tti and other commentaries in relation to what is said in the ka - rika - text. ABBREVIATIONS Amba - kartri - : see Raghuna - tha S ´ arma - . Bh: Maha - bha - s ya: see Abhyankar. Darpan a: see Joshi, Sada - s ´ iva S ´ a - stri - . Di - pika - I: see Bronkhorst. Hel(a - ra - ja): see Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. Jaimini - yasu - tra - rthasan ˙ graha: see Narayana Pillai. JS: Mi - ma - m ˙ sa - su - tra of Jaimini: see Abhyankar and Joshi. Kala - : see Tripa - t hi - . Ka - vya - lan ˙ ka - ra: see Durgâprasâd and Pan s ´ îkar. Kuñjika - : see Tripa - t hi - . LM: Laghumañju - s a - : see Tripa - t hi - . Mbh: Maha - bha - s ya: see Abhyankar. Nirukta: see Bhadkamkar. Nya - yasudha - : see Mukund Shâstri. Nya - yasu - tra: see Ta - ra - na - tha Nya - ya-Tarkati - rtha et al. Paddhati: see Subramania Iyer 1966. Pari - ks a - : see Joshi. PLM: Paramalaghumañju - s a - : see Kapil Dev Shastri. RaPr: Ratnapraka - s ´ a on Maha - bha - s ya: see Narasimhacharya. RjuP: R juvimala - Pañcika - : see Subrahmanya Sastri. S ´ Bh: S ´ abara’s Bha - s ya on Jaiminisu - tras: see Abhyankar and Joshi. S ´ lV: S ´ lokava - rttika on S ´ a - barabha - s ya: see Dva - rika - da - s S ´ a - stri - . TC IV.2: Tattvacinta - man i volume IV.2: see Ka - ma - khya - na - tha Tarkava - gi - c Ra. TV: Tantrava - rttika: see Dva - rika - da - s S ´ a - stri - . Uddyotana: Annambhat t a’s Uddyotana on Kaiyat a’s Pradi - pa: see Narasimhacharya. Ud: Na - ges ´ a’s Uddyota on Kaiyat a’s Pradi - pa: see Vedavrata. 1

Cardona on Vakyapadiya

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Page 1: Cardona on Vakyapadiya

AUTHOR: GEORGE CARDONA TITLE: The Sa|Almbandha—samuddesa (chapter on relation) and Bhart|Alrhari’s

philosophy of language SOURCE: Journal of the American Oriental Society v119 no1 p88-125 Ja/Mr ’99

The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced withpermission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited.

ABSTRACT

In connection with a recent work on the Sambandhasamuddesa of the Va-kyapadi-ya,I consider some major issues concerning BhartrÞhari, the tradition he represents, andhow a modern scholar might approach the Va-kyapadi-ya. I discuss theoretical principleswhich have been set forth as a basis for dealing with BhartrÞhari and evidence from theVa-kyapadi-ya in connection with these principles, chiefly what is referred to asBhartrÞhari’s perspectivism. I take up in some detail one large issue: the status of thereceived high language, associated with a group of model speakers called sisÞtÞa, whouse speech forms characterized as “correct” (sa-dhu) linguistic units (sabda) opposedto incorrect linguistic units (asa-dhusabda, apasabda), that are viewed as corruptions(apabhramsa), with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principalissue here is: do apasabdas directly signify meanings for s isÞ tÞas when theycommunicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to atranslation technique such that the apasabda used calls to mind a sa-dhusabda, whichthen directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question:how one should consider the VrÞtti and other commentaries in relation to what is saidin the ka- rika- text. ABBREVIATIONS

Amba-kartri-: see Raghuna- tha Sarma-. Bh: Maha-bha-sÞya: see Abhyankar. DarpanÞa: see Joshi, Sada- siva Sa-stri-. Di-pika- I: see Bronkhorst. Hel(a- ra- ja): see Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. Jaimini-yasu- tra- rthasangraha: see Narayana Pillai. JS: Mi-ma-msa-su- tra of Jaimini: see Abhyankar and Joshi. Kala- : see Tripa- tÞhi-. Ka-vya- lanka-ra: see Durgâprasâd and PanÞ sîkar. Kuñjika- : see Tripa- tÞhi-. LM: Laghumañju-sÞa- : see Tripa- tÞhi-. Mbh: Maha-bha-sÞya: see Abhyankar. Nirukta: see Bhadkamkar. Nya-yasudha-: see Mukund Shâstri. Nya-yasu-tra: see Ta-ra-na- tha Nya-ya-Tarkati-rtha et al. Paddhati: see Subramania Iyer 1966. Pari-ksÞa- : see Joshi. PLM: Paramalaghumañju-sÞa- : see Kapil Dev Shastri. RaPr: Ratnapraka- sa on Maha-bha-sÞya: see Narasimhacharya. RjuP: RÞ juvimala- Pañcika- : see Subrahmanya Sastri. SBh: Sabara’s Bha-sÞya on Jaiminisu- tras: see Abhyankar and Joshi. SlV: Slokava-rttika on Sa-barabha-sÞya: see Dva-rika-da-s Sa-stri-. TC IV.2: Tattvacinta-manÞ i volume IV.2: see Ka-ma-khya-na- tha Tarkava-gi-cRa. TV: Tantrava-rttika: see Dva-rika-da-s Sa-stri-. Uddyotana: AnnambhatÞtÞa’s Uddyotana on KaiyatÞa’s Pradi-pa: see Narasimhacharya.Ud: Na-gesa’s Uddyota on KaiyatÞa’s Pradi-pa: see Vedavrata.

1

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VBh: Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞa: see BhatÞtÞa-cha-rya. VBhS: Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞasa-ra: see Joshi. VBhS-Ka- sika- : see Nandkishore Shastri. VP: Va-kyapadi-ya: see Aklujkar, Rau, Subramania Iyer. [Ka-rika- numbers are first

given according to Rau’s edition, then according to Subramania Iyer’s edition, withpage and line numbers from the latter.]

VPTÞ i-ka- : PunÞyara- ja’s commentary on Va-kyapadi-ya, ka-nÞdÞa 2: see Subramania Iyer1983.

VPVrÞ: Va-kyapadi-ya VrÞtti: see Subramania Iyer 1966, 1983. 1. BhartrÞhari’s Va-kyapadi-ya is, without any doubt the single most important work in

the long history of Pa-nÞ inian grammar, after the works of the three munis: Pa-nÞ ini,Ka-tya-yana, and Patañjali. It certainly is the most widely cited early treatise concerningwhat scholars generally refer to as Indian “philosophy of grammar,” not only amongsubsequent scholars in India in various schools of thought but also among modernscholars.(FN1) Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the Va-kyapadi-ya andBhartrÞhari’s Maha-bha-sÞyadi-pika- . The work under review here, a revised version ofHouben’s doctoral dissertation, treats principally one section of the third ka-nÞdÞa of theVa-kyapadi-ya, the Sambandhasamuddesa,(FN2) where in eighty-eight verses BhartrÞharitreats questions concerning relations between linguistic items and meanings.

The subtitle of his work reflects Houben’s main concern, to which the central partof the book is devoted: “The Sambandha-samuddesa, Translation and Discussion ofthe Ka-rika-s” (pp. 137-324), an annotated translation of the Sambandhasamuddesa,followed by an appendix, “Hela- ra- ja’s Commentary ‘Praki-rnÞ apraka- sa’ on theSambandha-samuddesa” (pp. 325-424). The other two major sections of Houben’sbook are “Sambandha in some early Indian traditions and in BhartrÞhari’s Philosophy ofLanguage” (pp. 29-79) and “The Third Ka-nÞdÞa and the immediate context of theSambandha-samuddesa” (pp. 81-135). These are preceded by an introduction (pp.1-27); the book ends with a bibliography (pp. 425-48) and three indices: a generalindex (pp. 449-53), an index locorum (pp. 453-57), and an index referring to textcriticalobservations on the Sambandhasamuddesa and Hela- ra- ja’s commentary (pp. 457-60).

Houben exhibits an impressively wide-ranging erudition together with considerableattention to philological detail and to what other scholars have said. This can bebrought home more vividly by noting the contents of this work in greater detail.

In his introduction, Houben takes up BhartrÞhari’s life and time (pp. 3-10) and theVa-kyapadi-ya and its interpretation (pp. 11-22), then considers research that has beendone on the Sambandhasamuddesa and the notion of sambandha, “relation” (pp.23-26). The introduction ends with a brief note on the present work (p. 27).

The first major part of this book is divided into four sections. Most of the secondsection concerning early grammarians is devoted to the Maha-bha-sÞya discussion on thefirst part of the va- rttika siddhe sabda- rthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte sabdaprayogesa-strenÞa dharmaniyamhÞ . In the third section, Houben considers views of Mi-ma-msa- (pp.46-47), VaisesÞ ika (pp. 48-53), Buddhism (pp. 53-58), and “other schools: Sa-mkhya,Veda-nta” (pp. 58-63) on the notion of “relation.” As Houben notes (p. 46), thesediscussions “... are mainly based on presently available secondary literature.”(FN3) Thelast section on sambandha in the Va-kyapadi-ya consists of four subsections in whichthe following topics are treated: the assumption that there is a beginningless relationbetween words and meanings (pp. 64-66), the relation between sounds and signifiers(pp. 66-75), “the intimate relation between sabda ‘language’, artha ‘reality’ and jña-na‘knowledge’” (pp. 75-77), and “sambandha and the primary unit in language” (pp.77-79). Part two of Houben’s work is devoted to a description and discussion of theorganization of the Va-kyapadi-ya’s third ka-nÞdÞa.

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The third and largest part of Houben’s book consists of three sections: “GeneralRemarks” (pp. 139-40), “Analysis of the Sambandha-samuddesa” (pp. 141-44), and“Translation and Discussion of the ka- rika-s” (pp. 145-324). The translation in turn isdivided into two parts, each further subdivided into two parts, covering respectivelyka- rika-s 1-38, 39-51, 52-59, and 60-88. Houben first gives his translations, then dealswith grammatical and semantic issues concerning terms and syntax, and finallydiscusses the import of ka-rika-s—individually and in groups—in the light of what is saidelsewhere in the ka-rika- text, in the available VrÞtti(FN4) on the first and second ka-nÞdÞas,and, even more extensively, in light of what Hela- ra- ja has to say. This leads toredundancy. In the appendix containing the translation and comments on Hela- ra- ja’sPraki-rnÞ apraka- sa the transliterated text of the eighty-eight ka- rika- s appears again,Houben’s translations of these ka- rika-s is repeated with occasional slight variations totake Hela- ra- ja’s interpretation into account, and there is additional discussion of whatHela- ra- ja says.

Houben’s book affords an opportunity to consider some major issues concerningBhartrÞhari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholar—from whateverbackground that scholar be—might approach BhartrÞhari’s major work. My discussion isorganized as follows. First (section 2), I outline the theoretical principles Houben setsforth as the basis for his dealing with BhartrÞhari, then (section 3) I consider evidencefrom the Va-kyapadi-ya in connection with Houben’s principles, chiefly what he refers toas BhartrÞhari’s perspectivism. I subsequently take up (section 4) one large issue: thestatus of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers calledsisÞtÞa,(FN5) who use speech forms characterized as “correct” (sa-dhu) linguistic units(sabda) opposed to incorrect linguistic units (asa-dhusabda, apasabda), that are viewedas corruptions (apabhramá), with respect to how meanings are understood by users.The principal issue here is: do apasabdas directly signify meanings for sisÞtÞas whenthey communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to atranslation technique such that the apasabda used calls to mind a sa-dhusabda, whichthen directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question:how one should consider the VrÞtti and other commentaries in relation to what is saidin the ka- rika- text.(FN6) Following this discussion, I take up (section 5) some pointsconcerning Houben’s translation.(FN7)

2. As I said at the outset, I think Houben’s book demonstrates considerablelearning. It is to be expected, then, that Houben will have his own particular views topropound and devote more attention to the views of some scholars than to those ofothers. The very breadth of the work and the attention paid to details both in thetranslations and in the annotations make it difficult to write a general review or to makecritical remarks without seeming to be a nitpicker. What is more, in connection with awork such as this, there is the danger of being viewed as a “traditionalist” as opposedto a more open-minded “modern” scholar. Despite these risks, however, Houben’s bookexhibits qualities—both good and bad—which invite such comments.

2.1 The most important chapter in the introduction is the second, concerning theVa-kyapadi-ya and its interpretation. Here, Houben expresses his doubts with respect togenerally held opinions concerning how one should understand what BhartrÞhariintended to set forth and postulates three principles which, he says (p. 16), “... clarify,in my view, a great deal of BhartrÞhari’s thought, and particularly of his treatment of thenotion of sambandha ‘relation’.”

Houben accepts (p. 18) that “... BharthÞari did have some theoretical preferences....”At the same time, he expends considerable energy arguing against some scholars whosee certain basic ideas maintained and defended in the Va-kyapadi-ya. Thus, heremarks (p. 15): “According to Peri Sarveswara, the whole of the VP is to be

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understood on the basis of the first four ka- rika-s ... But what would happen if we wereto take first other parts of the VP into account and return next to these introductoryka-rika-s?”(FN8) On the same page, Houben later remarks that in the course of hisstudy of the Sambandhasamuddesa he became convinced that “... attempting tounderstand BhartrÞhari in the framework of “linguistic monism” would always leave someimportant characteristics of the VP unexplained.”

2.2. In the same section of his introduction, Houben postulates the three principlesI alluded to earlier. He states them as follows (p. 16): “(a) different perspectives havetheir own validity; (b) there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversity ofwords and discourse; (c) there is a permanent relation between linguistic unit andthing-meant.”

Principle (a) is adopted as guiding the interpretation of BhartrÞhari’s work. Houbentakes a strong stance in saying that BhartrÞhari’s approach to issues of language,meaning, and reality may be qualified as “perspectivistic,” not simply in that he takesinto consideration views proposed by Mi-ma-msaka, VaisesÞ ika, and various Buddhisticthinkers but also (p. 16) that “... the validity of different perspectives is accepted” andthat “... the validity of a single perspective is limited.” In Houben’s opinion, earlierscholars have failed to appreciate properly BhartrÞhari’s attitude. Thus, in connectionwith his first principle, he says (p. 17):

The principle manifests itself first of all in the complex argumentative structureof BhartrÞhari’s exposition. His awareness of the limits of each single approachto reality explains why the VP has become to a very great extent a samgraha,an encyclopedia of different existing views on linguistic and philosophical issues.The importance of this encyclopedic approach has not been fully realized bymany interpreters and critics of BhartrÞhari. In the case of theSambandhasamuddesa we will see that some views which have been widelyconsidered as the view of BhartrÞhari on the subject, occupy, in fact, a certainwell-defined place in a whole range of different, and within their limitsacceptable, angles of approach. Too often, BhartrÞhari’s statements have beeninterpreted in a polemic instead of an encyclopedic framework (this point I hopeto elaborate at other places, e.g., in Houben, forthcoming, e).(FN9)

Houben goes on to modify this by noting (p. 18) that BhartrÞhari did have sometheoretical preferences, although he had a “basically constructive” attitude towardsideas of other thinkers.(FN10)

Principle (b) is later (p. 19) put in a different manner: “The second principle saysthat it may be the case that there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversityof words and theoretical discourse.”(FN11) Houben notes that this principle preventsthe first one from leading to total skepticism or nihilism. He also remarks, touchingmore closely on the central topic of his book, that this principle explains “BhartrÞhari’sarguing for the acceptance of a relation which by definition cannot be expressedas-it-is” in that “both the limits of language and a possible underlying reality are takeninto account.”

The third principle is one which Pa-nÞ inian grammarians maintained from the verybeginning. Houben goes on (p. 20) to say that this has as a theoretical implication “...that thought and knowledge of a thing are always intimately, perhaps even inseparably,connected with language.”

2.3. In connection with the thesis for which he argues strongly, that BhartrÞharipresents other positions in a spirit of equality, Houben also considers, in the lastsubsection of part 1, an important issue that is the centerpiece of the Va-kyapadi-ya’ssecond ka- nÞ dÞ a: whether words (pada) and their meanings (pada- rtha) are to beconsidered real (sat) constituents of utterances/sentences (va- kya) and utterance

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meanings (va-kya- rtha) or merely assumed units abstracted formally from indivisibleutterances and utterance meanings for the purpose of grammatical description anddiscussion. The second ka-nÞdÞa of the Va-kyapadi-ya is concerned with the various waysin which a sentence is defined. Concerning this ka-nÞdÞa, Houben (pp. 78-79) makesthree observations that are relevant to his study of the Sambandhasamuddesa. Thesecond of these is as follows (p. 78):

... in the second Ka-nÞdÞa BhartrÞhari discusses numerous views in a positive way,in accordance with his ‘perspectivism’ and his encyclopedic approach totheoretical problems. Much positive attention is therefore also paid to viewswhich accept words as primary units....(FN12) One gets the impression thatBhartrÞhari does not try to establish one view to the exclusion of others, butwants to show different views in contrast with each other. Throughout thesecond Ka-nÞdÞa he is extremely conscious of the value of different viewpoints.That BhartrÞhari has still a preference for the sentence as the primary unit is notalways very clear in the second Ka-nÞdÞa, but it is emphasized in a few strategicalplaces in the third Ka-nÞdÞa. There, BhartrÞhari refers to the process of apoddha-ra‘abstracting from, analysis’ and to the idea of abstracting linguistic or semanticunits from more comprehensive ones (3.1.1-2, 3.4.1-2, 3.7.164, 3.13.6, 3.14.144,3.14.169). Among these places, only 3.1.1 refers to the sentence and the wordand smaller linguistic units, in the other [sic] the emphasis is on the sentencemeaning and the word meaning and/or word meaning and smaller semanticunits.

Houben goes on (pp. 78-79) to make his third point: if the sentence is ultimatelyconsidered the primary unit of language, then the Sambandhasamuddesa asks thewrong kind of question. The question asked in this samuddesa is: what sort of relationholds between words and their meanings? “The entire discussion in theSambandha-samuddesa,” Houben argues, “becomes very tentative or hypothetical inthis light,” and he concludes his third point as follows:

The validity of the discussion is limited by the acceptance of theoretical choiceswhich are not without problems. It may be pointed out, moreover, that in thesecond Ka-nÞdÞa BhartrÞhari does not discuss just a single view in which thesentence is primary, but several views. What all views which accept thesentence as primary have in common is that the status of individual words (andcorresponding word meanings) is strongly relativized.

Houben ends this section (p. 79) emphasizing that, after all, those who upheld theprimacy of constituent words included grammarians, the younger BhartrÞhari amongthem:

If it was so important to BhartrÞhari to relativize the status of individual wordmeanings, one may wonder: who were the thinkers who did attribute a highstatus to these? Interpreters of the VP have identified these with Mi-ma-msakas.In “Who are BhartrÞhari’s padadarsins?” (Houben 1993) it has been argued thatthe ‘upholders of the word’ include also grammarians and to some extent theauthor of the MbhD who may have been the young BhartrÞhari.

The tenor of Houben’s inquiry which shows through in these passages appearselsewhere, also, as when, in the final chapter of his summary of the third ka-nÞdÞa, heincludes the following among nine observations (p. 132):

(2) In the third Ka-nÞdÞa, as in the previous ones, there is a tendency to paypositive attention to quite divergent views, and usually there is no absolutecommitment to one view to the exclusion of others. The approach to thedifferent problems may be characterized as perspectivistic. (3) Against the background of this perspectivistic approach, there are stilltheoretical preferences. It seems possible to locate the preferences evinced in

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the third Ka-nÞdÞa in the context of the discussions in the second Ka-nÞdÞa. There,the main problems were: is the primary unit in language the word or thesentence? is the individual word meaning primary or the sentence meaning? Thepreference evinced there for the primacy of the sentence and sentence meaningimplied that individual word meanings, if at all they are accepted, have noindependent status. The primacy of the sentence is usually no explicit argumentin the discussions in the third Ka-nÞdÞa. Only at a few places the reader isreminded of the idea that, in fact, the sentence and the sentence meaning arethe primary units. Apart from these places, it may be said that in the third Ka-nÞdÞaviews in which word meanings are not well-defined individual basic units aregenerally preferred; there is no strong or absolute commitment to views whichwould imply word meanings as well-defined individual basic units.

3. The three principles which Houben sets forth are basic to his treatment of thematerials in the Va-kyapadi-ya, and they are put in a manner that would appear to makedisagreement difficult. It is nevertheless difficult to see how Houben can maintain someof his claims, at least in the strong versions he formulates, and some of what he sayspuzzles me.

3.1. Consider Houben’s reaction to Peri Sarveswara’s appreciation of theintroductory ka- rika- s (above, 2.1). One may choose to ask what would happen if,instead of starting from the beginning, we studied other parts and came back to thebeginning. It is nevertheless reasonable that an author begin his work by presentinghis general thesis, and it is also reasonable to let this be a background for one’sunderstanding of what follows.

3.2. The Va- kyapadi-ya begins with a description of brahman in ka- rika- s 1-4.BhartrÞhari immediately introduces the theme of multiplicity and unity: though brahmanis memorialized in the Veda as one, so that there is no separation between it andpowers, it appears as though distinct from these powers; and it appears as distinctthings by virtue of its several powers.(FN13) Moreover, the theme of imposition is alsobrought in at the beginning, where BhartrÞhari says(FN14) that the sixmodifications—being born and so on(FN15)—which are the sources of differences inbeing have their basis in the time-power of brahman, a power on which parts areimposed.(FN16) BhartrÞhari goes on to speak of the means of reaching this brahman,namely the Veda. Once more, he immediately strikes the note of unity versus diversity:although one, the Veda has been memorialized in a form appearing as though it hadmany “paths.”(FN17)

Subsequently, BhartrÞhari outlines in three ka- rika-s(FN18) the topics which are to becovered in his work. Two types of meanings are distinguished: those which have afixed nature and those which are obtained through extraction of partial meanings fromputative complexes. Parallel to these are two kinds of linguistic units: those which areto be explained and those which serve to convey the former. Two kinds of relationsare said to link linguistic units with meanings: a relation such that one is the cause andthe other an effect and a relation such that a linguistic unit has the property of beingnaturally apt to make known a meaning. Moreover, such relations can connectlinguistic elements and meanings in ways that can have two results: a relation servesas means with respect to merit or merely to the comprehension of meaning; the formerholds for correct speech forms, whose use leads to merit, and the latter for incorrectforms in addition to correct ones. There can be no doubt at all that the VrÞtti is correctwhen it says that the total content of the work which has been undertaken issummarized in these three verses.(FN19) There can also be no doubt whatever thatthe Va-kyapadi-ya itself distinguishes between linguistic units that are to be explainedand those which serve as means to explain them in a grammar—Pa- nÞ ini’s

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AsÞtÞa-dhya-yi-—and between meanings that are fixed and those which are abstractedthrough analysis. Again, there is the distinction between unity and division, nowresulting from abstraction.

No one has denied that BhartrÞhari brings in many of points of view throughout theVa-kyapadi-ya, but one cannot be faulted for considering it appropriate to appreciate theentire work in the light of the introductory ka- rika-s. In addition, BhartrÞhari makes it clearthat he bases himself on a long tradition of usage and grammar. Thus, in VP 1.26, hesays not only that the eight topics noted earlier are described in grammar both throughindirect indications and direct statements but also that they are now followed accordingto tradition, to memorialize them. The Paddhati appropriately stresses that BhartrÞharihere says he is not doing anything without precedent, only following a tradition inpresenting the eight topics at issue, and that he does all this in accordance withtradition, so that there is no invention (utpreksÞa- ‘fancy’) for the sake of novelty.(FN20)BhartrÞhari goes on to say, in accordance with the Maha-bha-sÞya,(FN21) that the correctlinguistic units that are a means to merit are established from the tradition that stemsfrom the sisÞtÞas. Moreover, no one can render purposeless this settled situation, so thatsisÞtÞas like Pa-nÞ ini composed a smrÞti whose object is the correctness of speech.(FN22)After stressing again that pure reasoning by inference cannot replace what isestablished through tradition, BhartrÞhari completes the section in question by sayingthat sisÞtÞas have undertaken grammatical teaching basing themselves on the teachingthat has no author—that is, the Veda—and smrÞti based on it.(FN23)

3.3. Houben’s third principle as formulated is a restatement of what Ka- tya-yana andlater Pa-nÞ ini-yas have maintained. The theoretical implication Houben draws from this,on the other hand, is not obvious. It is one thing to say that a linguistic item like ghatÞabears a permanent relation with a referent, a pot;(FN24) it is another thing to claim thatone cannot have knowledge of such an entity without language, that all or most“cognitive episodes” are verbal thoughts at some implicit level.(FN25) It is well knownthat for BhartrÞhari any cognition of anything in the world is permeated by language.This stance is compatible with accepting a permanent relation between linguistic itemsand what they signify, but it does not necessarily follow as a consequence of thisacceptance.

3.4. I also think some caution is called for in connection with Houben’s firstprinciple. As he recognizes, scholars before him have stressed BhartrÞhari’s dealing withviews of different schools of thought in a nonpolemical manner. BhartrÞhari does notorganize his work as a series of pu- rvapaksÞa to be refuted, thus establishing hissiddha-nta. There is no repeated iti cen na, iti siddha-ntahÞ , or iti siddha-ntitam. In thisrespect, BhartrÞhari differs from such scholars as the Pa- nÞ inian grammariansKaunÞ dÞ abhatÞtÞa, and Na- gesa;(FN26) the Mi-ma- msakas Jaimini andVa-caspatimisra;(FN27) Naiya-yikas such as JayantabhatÞtÞa and Gangesa;(FN28) andmany other defenders of tenets maintained in particular schools. This does not mean,however, that BhartrÞhari should be considered not to have held definite views of hisown and to have argued—even in the Va-kyapadi-ya—against other positions. Theclosest parallel to his way of proceeding is, I think, to be found in the work whichserves as BhartrÞhari’s major source of ideas to be developed, the Maha-bha-sÞya.Patañjali also presents arguments for various points of view—for example, that a verbalbase (dha- tu) can be defined as signifying activity (kriya- ) and being (bha-va)—andinterpretations of given su- tras, without overtly and emphatically presenting a definitivesiddha-nta. Yet his very argumentation leads one to see—though not always—hisaccepted view, since certain alternatives involve such a complex of principles andmetarules to be applied that they clearly suffer from what commentators callpratipattigaurava ‘prolixity in understanding’ and certain others clearly do not harmonizewith what is said elsewhere in the AsÞtÞa-dhya-yi-, in va- rttikas and in the Bha-sÞya.

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3.5. Although I agree that the Va-kyapadi-ya text calls for a great deal of study andthat for any single student much may indeed remain unexplained, I also think thatHouben has applied his first principle in a way that fails to pay appropriate attentionto BhartrÞhari’s defense of certain theoretically important positions. Consider in thiscontext what Houben says about the second ka-nÞdÞa (see 2.3).

In this ka-nÞdÞa, BhartrÞhari devotes a large section (VP 2.64-87) to arguments indefense of the word and its meanings as valid. This section ends with a verse sayingthat all the principles of interpretation dealt with in what has preceded, principles thatdepend on word-meanings, would not serve to interpret sentences correctly if theindividual word did not signify.(FN29) Thereafter begins a section the first verse ofwhich asserts that there is no contradiction between what has been adduced requiringthat one accept as real the individual words of utterances and the position statedearlier, that an utterance is an indivisible unit whose meaning also is indivisible. Evenif the utterance meaning is indivisible, it is subject to having partial meanings extracteddue to differences in expressive capacity one sees in different utterances.(FN30) Oneexample will serve to illustrate. If A says to B (1) vana-t pika a-ni-yata-m ‘a cuckoo shouldbe brought from the forest’ and B does not know what pika means, the latter inquiresabout the meaning of this term alone, not about what the utterance means.(FN31)Therefore, one may claim, the word pikahÞ is a separate independent constituent in (1),with its own distinct meaning. The answer to this is given as follows: a sentence suchas (1) is totally distinct from a sentence such as (2) vana-d rÞksÞa a-ni-yata-m ‘a bearshould be brought from the forest.’ Nevertheless, people assume a similarity betweenthe two: they know what the extracted words vana-t, rkÞsÞahÞ and a-ni-yata-m mean andthey assume that (1) and (2) share some parts, so that they inquire about the putativepart they do not know. But this is merely an analytic procedure applied to a unit thatis used as a single indivisible entity in communication. A parallel is drawn between thisand the way in which people perceive entities like a gayal (gavaya) andNarasimha—VisÞnÞu as “man-lion.” Each of these is an entity sui generis. Accordingly,each is the object of a single cognition. Nevertheless, one understands in each a partthat is similar to some entity of a different generic class: a cow and a man,respectively. Hence, one also understands (anupasyati ‘sees subsequently’) that ineach of these there is a part which, though not there, is supposed to be there, a partwhich is not well known as coöccuring with the other and which one has not seen withthe other—namely, a horse and a lion. But a person who reasons this way is said tobe confused, since what he is perceiving is a single indivisible entity in eachcase.(FN32)

BhartrÞhari does not just show that the arguments for assuming that words are thetrue units of communication can be refuted. He also emphatically argues against thisposition elsewhere, saying that, if a sentence meaning is considered not to arisedirectly from speech units, then a word meaning too will have to be dissociated fromwords, with the consequence that the direct relation between words andmeanings—which a Mi-ma-msaka too assumes to be permanent and not instituted by anindividual—also will be given up.(FN33)

It is generally accepted that BhartrÞhari is arguing here against Mi-ma-msakas. Thisis justified not only by the arguments advanced but also by the fact that BhartrÞharidirectly alludes to the Mi-ma-msa- principle of interpretation according to which the directexpression by an affix that something plays a contributing role in an act takesprecedence over what is understood indirectly through inference based on what mustobtain in order for a stated provision to be effective or through the coöccurrence ofterms in an utterance.(FN34)

It is also noteworthy that Kuma- rila reacts to arguments which appear in theVa-kyapadi-ya. Thus, in connection with sequences like dadhy a- naya ‘bring some

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curds’(FN35) BhartrÞhari remarks as follows. Padas often lose through samÞ dhi theirpresumed primitive forms. This being so, how can one determine the boundariesbetween padas? And how can one then discriminate a meaning for a word whoseboundary has not been grasped?(FN36) In his Slokava-rttika, Kuma-rila sets forth thesame argument in more detail while presenting the claims of those who maintain thata sentence alone signifies, as an indivisible unit. One should determine that a meaningM is associated with a word W through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka: if W ispresent, M is understood and if W is absent, the meaning M is not understood. Thus,if one has ra- ja- (nom. s.) meaning ‘king’, then in the absence of this word, one shouldnot understand this meaning. Yet it is understood when one says ra- jña- (inst. s.), ra- ja-being absent. Similarly, if one associates the meanings ‘curds’ and ‘cow’ with dadhiand gauhÞ , respectively, then these meanings should not be understood when one saysdadhy atra and ga-m.(FN37) Kuma-rila goes on to answer such objections and to upholdthe view that padas are the true units. Similarly, Kuma-rila reacts to the argumentpresented in VP 2.16 (see above, with note 33): even though a sentence meaningdoes not directly derive from words, this does not have as a consequence that theword meanings are not directly related to such speech units. The word meanings canhave no other source and are not conveyed merely for their own sake but with theintention of conveying a relational sentence meaning, so that, through these wordmeanings a sentence meaning is indirectly related to words.(FN38)

On the basis of the evidence, I think it is difficult to maintain that in the secondka-nÞdÞa of the Va-kyapadi-ya BhartrÞhari is granting equality to the view of those whomaintain the principles of interpretation which are based on accepting words as thetrue units, namely Mi-ma- msakas, or to deny that he is indeed arguing againstMi-ma-msakas.

3.6. As noted earlier (§2.3), Houben says that the “upholders of the word”(padadarsinahÞ ) are not just Mi-ma-msakas but also grammarians. In this context, it isworth emphasizing something which Houben is aware of but downplays.(FN39) Thatgrammarians could and did operate with words as constituents of sentences is beyonddoubt. This does not mean, however, that BhartrÞhari’s arguments against padadarsinahÞare also aimed at grammarians. The issue actually comes down to something that isbrought out clearly in commentaries.

Let us begin with the ka-rika- in which BhartrÞhari contrasts the adherents of the twoviews in question, VP 2.57: abhedapu- rvaka- bheda- hÞ kalpita- va- kyava- dibhihÞ |bhedapu- rva- n abheda- ms tu manyante padadars inahÞ “Differences preceded bynondifference are posited by those who maintain that the utterance is the unit ofcommunication; those who maintain that the word is the unit of communication, on theother hand, consider nondifference to be preceded by differences.” The previous ka- rika-sums up two alternatives under the position that there is an indivisible utterance:(FN40)whether one assumes that there is a permanence of putative composites or of a singlegeneric unit, those who uphold this position say that a single entity has a singlemeaning,(FN41) which never deviates from it.(FN42) The first half of VP 2.57 thus linkswith this preceding verse, stating that those who maintain the primacy of a sentenceas a single meaningful unit that is indivisible and has a single indivisible meaningnevertheless countenance division of such units into constituents, only these differentconstituents are fictitiously posited (kalpita-hÞ ) and necessarily based on the true, whole,units. Those who maintain the opposed view say that the “wholes” are composite andare based on their constituent units. Under this view, it is appropriate that only wordsare based on the status of being real and sentences that are said to be single unitsare “fictitiously” posited. PunÞyara- ja emphasizes this contrast.(FN43)

BhartrÞhari goes on in subsequent verses to treat the related issue of whether oneshould consider the continuously recited Vedic texts (samhita-pa- tÞha) as the source of

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the analyzed texts (padapa-tÞha) or vice-versa.(FN44) The VrÞtti on VP 2.58 notes someviews which merit mention here. First, an absolute opposition is made such that eitherthe samhita- or the pada is permanent. According to some, the padas are products ofpadaka-ras (lit., ‘makers of words’) or identical with words known from the oral traditionhanded down; for others, it is the samhita- which is a product of a human tradition andthe padas are eternal. Still others hold that both are equally eternal, but in differentways: the pada text is handed down as an eternal entity which serves to conveysomething else and the samhita- text is handed down as an eternal entity that isthereby conveyed. Finally, some maintain that there is only one eternal traditionhanded down, and that these are simply two aspects (sakti- ‘powers’), of being dividedand undivided, which play the roles of being what conveys and what is to beconveyed.(FN45)

3.7. With this, it is appropriate to come back to what is said in the VrÞtti on VP1.2-26 (see §3.2), since, as Hela- ra- ja rightly points out, the second ka-nÞdÞa is whereBhartrÞhari reaches conclusions concerning the sentence as an object of explanationand its meaning as a fixed meaning.(FN46)

The VrÞtti explains in detail what is meant by apoddha-rapada- rtha (‘meaning gottenthrough extraction’), sthitalaksÞanÞo ‘rthahÞ (‘meaning whose character is fixed’), andanva- khyeyahÞ sabdahÞ (‘linguistic unit that is to be explained’). Anapoddha-rapada-rtha—the meaning, e.g., of a case marker in a noun or a tense markerin a verb—has the following properties. It is absolutely fused in a single wholemeaning, so that it is extracted from a putative complex in a guise that is gotten byinference and assumed, and only in this guise does its distinction from other abstractedpart meanings become relevant. Such a partial meaning discriminated from other partialmeanings has a form that is beyond normal communication.(FN47) Not merely is sucha form outside the realm of actual communication, it is established generally in a waythat the VrÞtti speaks of as a fancy, thus emphasizing that it is an invented entity. Inaccordance with what they have understood, grammarians establish such partialmeanings, which they reach through repeated exposure to them from theirtraditions.(FN48) Thus, under the assumption that different utterances contain the samecomponent because of similarity in form, grammarians abstract component elementsassumed to occur in what is actually an impartite linguistic unit and they do this for thepurpose of carrying out grammatical operations which account for such whole units.The partial meaning that goes beyond normal communication is then adopted as whatis signified by these component linguistic items abstracted through reasoning byanvaya and vyatireka.(FN49) Clearly, this abstracted meaning (so ’yamapoddha-rapada-rthahÞ ) enters into grammatical talk, as when a grammarian like Pa-nÞ iniderives complex units from posited components. The VrÞtti remarks that it also takespart in everyday talk involving parts, which is similar to that of a grammar.(FN50) Thatis, in everyday speech also speakers act as though sentences like those cited in §3.5spoke of a distinct object, agent, and so on, separable from actions.

VrÞsÞabha notes appropriately that the VrÞttika- ra says atyantasamsrÞsÞtÞahÞ , with ayanta-‘absolutely’, in order to exclude a whole preceded by parts which are combined.(FN51)In addition, since the whole meaning from which parts are extracted is a single wholewithout actual parts, the form in which such a part meaning is abstracted is said to beassumed, something to be inferred. That is, to begin with there are no real partsassociated with distinct meanings, so that reasoning through anvaya and vyatireka thatsuch and such a partial meaning is associated with a particular part of a larger unitis an assumption, not a given fact.(FN52) Further, in normal interaction, as when someone acts upon being told to do something or refrains from doing something, suchcommunication takes place through whole utterance meanings, not discrete partmeanings.(FN53)

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The VrÞtti also says, with respect to the linguistic units characterized as those to beexplained, that for some the explanation has the word as its boundary, for others thesentence.(FN54) That is, some grammarians derive words like purusÞa-s (‘the man’) andpac-a-ti (‘cooks’) individually, as though they could stand alone, and others considerthe derivational procedure immediately to involve words as related to each other insentences.(FN55) Now, saying a unit is to be explained amounts to saying its meaninghas a fixed character. In fact, the VrÞtti later says that in grammar the meaning of eithera pada or a sentence is considered to be fixed.(FN56) On the other hand, the VrÞttialso emphasizes that a meaning is fixed only relative to a sentence. Meaning divisionswithin padas vary. They are not necessarily linked to units with fixed boundaries, sincethey are abstracted in various ways by different grammarians, who divide padasdifferently.(FN57)

That is, so far as actual communication is concerned, the utterance or sentence(va-kya) is viewed as the unit of communication and the unit of meaning is a single,indivisible utterance meaning. Utterances are broken up into words and words intosmaller units for the sake of grammatical description, and such sub-sentential units areassociated with meanings abstracted from utterances, but only in a grammar (sa-stre)can one legitimately consider a word an upper boundary of description or a wordmeaning a fixed meaning, just as only grammarians deal with items like bases andaffixes.

3.8. The Va-kyapadi-ya ka- rika-s make the very same points. Thus, after listing eightdifferent views concerning what constitutes a sentence and a sentence meaning, aswell as considering definitions of sentences proposed by Ka- tya-yana and in Mi-ma-mÞ sa-,the second ka-nÞdÞa starts by emphasizing the unity of the sentence and its meaning.BhartrÞhari invokes as parallels the cognition of a variegated picture and the pictureitself. As there is a single cognition which takes the entire picture into its purview, andthis is then divided in imitation of the different things seen, there is the understandingof a sentence meaning in the same manner: there is one understanding, which is thenartificially divided. There is a picture, which has a single overall form, but onedescribes it by means of colors blue and so on, which are distinct in character andrepresented as such. In the very same manner, a single sentence, which semanticallyis totally independent, is accompanied by an explanation by means of other words,which are semantically dependent.(FN58) Further, the extraction of words in a sentenceis possible in the same manner that bases, affixes, and so on are divided from eachother in a word.(FN59) Similarly, at the beginning of the third ka-nÞdÞa BhartrÞhari saysthat words are divided into two, four, or five classes by different thinkers and that sucha division is made only on the basis of abstracting from sentences, just as one extractsbases, affixes, and so on from words. He also notes different positions concerningindividual and generic property when one abstracts word meanings.(FN60)

Of course, verses 24-26 are not the absolute beginning of the first ka-nÞdÞa. However,they constitute a summary of the general topics to be covered. Consequently, it isappropriate to say that BhartrÞhari introduces the first ka-nÞdÞa with a statement of topicshe will take up and each of the next ka-nÞdÞas with a statement of his general thesis:that the unit of actual communication is the sentence, associated with a sentencemeaning, that words and word meanings are abstracted from such sentences throughthe same reasoning grammarians use to abstract bases, affixes, and so on fromwords.

3.9. In sum, I consider that the evidence from the Va-kyapadi-ya(FN61) supports theposition that BhartrÞhari does indeed have a well-conceived theoretical stance, which heupholds, and that he does indeed argue against scholars, such as Mi-ma-msakas, whodo not accept the primacy of the sentence and of sentence meaning. That BhartrÞhari

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also discusses many different views and variations on them should not obscure thispoint. Nor should one expect him constantly to remind his audience of this centralthesis. It is sufficient that this is established firmly and that a diametrically opposedview is refuted in the second ka-nÞdÞa, the subject of which is the sentence and itsmeaning. It is also sufficient to begin the third ka-nÞdÞa with a statement which againemphasizes that classes of meanings and the particular sets of words with which theyare associated are abstracted from sentences and their meanings. The remainder ofthe third ka-nÞdÞa is devoted to discussing such individual categories as well as the waysin which complex terms—compounds and derivates with taddhita affixes—are viewed.

Finally on this topic, we have to confront the third point Houben makes in hisdiscussion of sambandha and the primary unit of language (see §2.3), namely that ifthe sentence is ultimately considered the primary unit of language, then theSambandhasamuddesa asks the wrong kind of question. I consider that the materialconsidered above is sufficient to show that it is Houben who has missed the point.BhartrÞhari can maintain that the sentence is the real unit of actual communication andstill accept that through analysis one can and should abstract words and wordmeanings. This is necessary in order to carry out a grammatical description. Further,in everyday life people also accept words and word meanings, though here too theseare to be considered abstracted from sentences and sentence meanings. In addition,there are scholars who accept the word and its meanings as the true units ofcommunication. Accordingly, it is appropriate that, once he has established the primacyof the indivisible sentence, BhartrÞhari proceeds to discuss classes of words and theirmeanings. Moreover, it is appropriate to begin with a discussion of generic propertyand individual as word meanings, since, as Hela- ra- ja points out, different scholarsmaintain that one or the other is the meaning of all abstracted words.(FN62) Thisincludes finite verb forms, since, under the points of view BhartrÞhari takes up, thesetoo can signify a generic property that characterizes all instances of a given action andan individual instance of action (kriya- ) can also be viewed as a being (satta- ).(FN63)Given all this, it is proper to take up in the third samuddesa the possible viewsconcerning a relation between words and word meanings.

4. In VP 1.25 (see §3.2, with note 18), BhartrÞhari speaks of correct and incorrectlinguistic units in connection with merit and the comprehension of meaning. This pointis linked with a series of issues, which were objects of discussion starting at least withPatañjali, concerning terms like (3) go (nom. sg. gauhÞ) considered correct linguisticunits (sa-dhusabda) and related terms like (4) ga-vi-, gonÞ i-, gota- , gopotalika- , consideredincorrect linguistic units (asa-dhusabda, apasabda), both used in the same meaning(‘cow’). The following issues are treated:

A. Are the types (3) and (4) equally old or is one to be considered derived fromthe other?

B. If one is derived from the other, does type (3) derive from type (4) or (4) from(3)?

C. At the time that both types (3) and (4) are in use, does everyone understand themeaning in question when either (3) or (4) is used?

D. Is there a direct word-meaning relation between (3) and the meaning and alsobetween (4) and the same meaning or is only one directly related, the other indirectlyrelated, and for what reasons?

It is agreed that both types of terms convey given meanings. On other points, thereare disagreements. The discussions concerning terms of types (3) and (4) can besummarized as follows.(FN64)

1. If both (3) and (4) are inheritances from time immemorial, they both simply signifythe meanings in question.

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2. On the assumption that terms of type (4) are corruptions (apabhramsa) of (3), aconclusion compatible with this is that for those persons who know both types and aremembers of an élite stratum, the sisÞtÞas:

2a. Terms of type (3) directly signify meanings. 2b. Terms of type (4) indirectly signify meanings, through the intermediary of type

(3).(FN65) 3. The fact remains that there are persons who normally communicate with terms

of type (4). Accordingly, under 2, one has to assume further that the corruption whichgave rise to (4) led to institutionalized terms that directly signify meanings at least forsuch speakers. Nevertheless, there are still two possibilities open:

3a. Type (4) now simply is part of usage and directly signifies, even for sisÞtÞas. 3b. Though institutionalized, type (4) is, by virtue of its origin, still considered to

signify only erroneously. 4. These options are of import for considering whether or not both types of items

bear sakti, which in turn has to do with what one defines as sa-dhu. 4a. If both types (3) and (4) bear sakti, and being sa-dhu consists by definition in

bearing sakti, then the distinction between sa-dhusabda and apasabda is eliminated.This is something neither grammarians nor others find desirable.

4b. Under 3b, it is possible not only to maintain that being sa-dhu consists bydefinition in bearing sakti but also still to maintain the distinction in question, sinceitems of type (4) do not truly bear sakti because they still are considered to signifythrough error.

5. While maintaining 3a, the distinction between types (3) and (4) can still bemaintained, if being sa-dhu (sa-dhutva) is defined in a different manner:

5a. Sa-dhutva is a property of that which can be explained according to theprocedures of an authoritative grammar like Pa-nÞ ini’s.

5b. Sa-dhutva is a property of that which is appropriate to the production of merit;that is, the use of a sa-dhu term entails merit which the use of an equivalent apasabdadoes not.

4.1. Patañjali brings in (3) and (4) several times during discussions in the Paspasa- .Thus, he notes that teaching correct linguistic units is briefer than teaching incorrectones, since for each correct linguistic unit there are many incorrect ones. (3) and (4)are cited as examples of this situation.(FN66) Now, in Paspasa- vt. 6, Ka- tya-yanaremarks that if there is merit in the knowledge of correct linguistic units there is alsodemerit (jña-ne dharma iti cet tatha-dharmahÞ ). Commenting on this, Patañjali makes twopoints. First, demerit obtains for one who knows correct linguistic units because sucha person also knows incorrect ones. That is, even sisÞtÞas, who use sa-dhu terms, arepresumed at least to know apasabda terms for everyday interaction. Further, becausethere are many incorrect terms for each correct one, greater demerit obtains.(FN67)Patañjali also makes the well-known and important observation concerning such terms:given that there is the same comprehension of a meaning through a correct linguisticunit and an incorrect one, the grammar serves to establish a restriction intended formerit: the meaning in question should be expressed by means of a correct term, notan incorrect one.(FN68)

It is noteworthy that Patañjali not only contrasts correct and incorrect linguistic unitsusing the respective terms sabda and apasabda but that when speaking of one singleitem like go as opposed to the group of items (4), he characterizes the latter asapabhramsa with respect to the former. That is, these are not merely treated asincorrect speech elements contrasted with correct ones, they are also consideredsomehow to be corruptions with respect to the correct speech items. Patañjali thustakes a stand on the questions A and B. Since items of the type ga-vi-(FN69) are

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considered to be corruptions, it follows that only the correct linguistic units are to beconsidered eternal, so that only these bear an eternal relation with meanings.(FN70)

In addition, both Patañjali and Ka-tya-yana indicate—though not directly in connectionwith the issue of sabda versus apasabda—how one might consider at least someapasabdas to have arisen. In Sivasu- tra vt. 1, Ka- tya-yana gives several reasons why lÞmust be taught in Pa-nÞ ini’s aksÞarasama-mna-ya despite its restricted occurrence. One ofthese is to account for the citation of terms that result from incapacity. To illustrate,Patañjali gives the example lÞtaka. Someone is named rÞtaka, so that this term is to beused when referring to him. Say some bra-hÞmanÞa woman has used lÞtaka instead andhas done this out of incapacity, because she is unable to pronounce rÞ. This is anerror, so that lÞtaka as pronounced by the woman is a corruption of rÞtaka. On the otherhand, if someone else says, “the bra-hmanÞa woman says lÞtaka,” that person is quoting,so that he is not himself using an incorrect form.(FN71)

Further, since Patañjali states explicitly and Ka-tya-yana implicitly assumes that onewho knows correct speech terms also knows their incorrect counterparts, question Cis answered at least in part: at the time that both types of terms were in use, thesisÞtÞas who used sa-dhusabdas also could use and understand apasabdas.

The last question noted (D) is not dealt with in the Maha-bha-sÞya, but all the issuesare considered elsewhere.

4.2. Let us begin with Mi-ma-msakas and Naiya-yikas. 4.2.1. As a pu- rvapaksÞa, Jaimini states that there cannot be any settled division with

respect to linguistic items such that only items of the type (3) go or of the type (4)ga-vi-, gonÞ i-, gota- , gopotalika- , etc., should be used, because there is no teachingconcerning the situation where such usage would arise.(FN72) That is, there is noteaching—such as Pa-nÞ ini’s grammar—whose authority is accepted in this sphere,whereby one could decide the issue. Sabara’s arguments are as follows. The questionat issue is: are (3) and (4) equally means of knowledge with respect to the objectpossessed of a dewlap and so on? In other words, should one consider go to signifythe object in question as the single term with unbroken tradition of usage and thenconsider the other terms (4) corruptions, or are all the terms to be considered equallywithout beginning?(FN73)

The immediate answer is that all should be considered to signify the object inquestion without beginning. The reason given is that the meaning in question isunderstood from (4) and that there was similarly a relation between them and thismeaning a hundred years ago, earlier than that, and earlier still, so that (4) and theirrelation with this meaning has no beginning. Moreover, it has already been establishedthat there is no creator of a relation between words and their meanings, this being afixed eternal relation.(FN74) Consequently, both (3) and (4) are to be considered sa-dhuin the sense that they bring about (sa- dhayanti) the comprehension of the samemeaning and both may be used in speaking. (3) and (4) thus have the status ofsynonyms, much like hasta, kara, pa-nÞ i ‘hand’.(FN75) Such terms are uttered for adirect purpose—to convey a particular meaning—not for some as yet unseen resultthat is to be brought about, and there is no teaching that instructs one to pronouncethem for such a purpose. Therefore, it cannot be established that one term is sa-dhuand the others are asa-dhu.(FN76)

4.2.2. Jaimini and Sabara refute the pu-rvapaksÞa and establish a siddha-nta on thebasis of several arguments. A liguistic item can be such that an error has a part in it,since it is produced through articulatory effort.(FN77) It is thus possible to discriminatebetween (3) and (4) by considering the latter to result from errors in attempting toproduce (3). A person may intend to jump on to dry land yet fall in the mud, to touchwater once or once to spit out water with which he has rinsed his mouth, yet

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accidentally do this twice. In the same way, (4) can have come into use due to errorand need not be part of an unbroken tradition of usage.(FN78)

It is also contrary to principle that, unless otherwise definitively established, oneassume more than one term for a single meaning.(FN79) Moreover, the choice is notarbitrary, since there is an authority concerning such usage that allows one to makea decision: the special authority of the learned.(FN80) A particular term that suchauthoritative persons teach alone as correct should be understood to be correct.(FN81)Further, people understand the meaning in question from (4) due to the similarity ofthese terms to (3), so that (4) do not have the capacity that (3) has to signify thesame object in question.(FN82) Apabhramsa terms like (4) play a role in theunderstanding of a meaning by bringing to light the capacity which properly belongs totheir origins alone.(FN83) Sabara describes what is at play as follows. Due toincapacity, someone pronounces ga-vi- when he wishes to pronounce a form of the termgo, such as gauhÞ . Someone else understands that this person means to refer to ananimal with a dewlap and so on, and that to this end he wants to pronounce gauhÞ butinstead pronounces ga-vi-. Thus learning from this situation, others also say ga-vi- whenwhat they wish to refer to is the same animal. Thereby, this animal is understood fromga-vi-, etc. For ga-vi- and so on are similar to go.(FN84) Finally, Jaimini likens this to thesituation where someone uses a form with a certain ending that is not appropriate, yetone understands what that person intends to say, thus recalling the form with theappropriate ending.(FN85) For example, someone might say asmakair a-gaccha-mi “I amcoming from Asmaka,” using an instrumental instead of an ablative form. Theinstrumental form asmakaihÞ is heard. However, in accordance with what is intended,the appropriate form asmakebhyahÞ is recalled, and from this the meaning “fromAsmaka” is understood. Similarly, when one hears ga-vi- and so on, one has arecollection of go, and from this one understands the animal with a dewlap, and soon.(FN86)

4.2.3. The situation where a hearer interprets an incorrect form in the way notedcan thus be treated as the first step in establishing for later generations that items oftype (4) directly signify, without an intermediate step of recalling an equivalent of type(3). Such usage is then traced back to accidents in conversations where one speakermakes a mistake, another knows what that person intends to say, concludes that hemeant to use a particular term and himself understands the intended meaning fromthat term. Still other persons assume that the form which was accidentally usedactually directly signifies the meaning in question. This scenario is envisaged by othersalso.

Commenting on Prabha-kara’s BrÞhati- to JS 1.3.8.29,(FN87) Sa- lika-na- tha says thatwhat Prabha-kara intends to convey is the following. A person A, wishing to utter theword go, utters ga-vi- instead, due to a fault in his articulating speech organs or to notbeing mindful or a similar reason. Through context, the adult B with whom A is talkingunderstands what A intends to say, so that he understands the object signified by goand continues his conversation with A. The conversation is witnessed by two otherpeople, who have not acquired the understanding that go is related as signifier to theobject in question. These two mistakenly determine that B had directly understood thismeaning from ga-vi- and not through the intermediary of go. They therefore mistakenlyconclude that ga-vi- is itself a signifier, and in this conviction they continue to use thisterm in their conversations with others. Following their usage, other children thenconverse using ga-vi-, since they had not acquired the knowledge associating any otherword with the object in question. In this way, the use of ga-vi- is established as havinga particular beginning.(FN88)

4.2.4. Similar considerations are found later also, as in the Tattvacinta-manÞ i, whereGangesa argues against assuming that apabhramsa terms as much as samskrÞta terms

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directly signify. Having concluded that only a samskrÞta term bears the signifyingrelation (sakti), which is secondarily transferred to apabhramsa terms, Gangesa has anopponent object: how can mlecchas and others of their kind, who do not knowsamskrÞta terms, impose the sakti of such terms on other terms? This is answered byrecounting how one considers the erroneous attribution of sakti to apabhramsa termsin times long past.(FN89) Due to neglect, some person A, instead of using go as heshould, uses ga-vi-. A does this while conversing with B, who already has learned(vyutpannahÞ ) the signifying relation between go and a cow. B understands what Aintends, so that he concludes that the latter meant to use go, and he understands themeaning ‘cow’ from this correct term, thus carrying out his conversation with A. Thereis also a bystander, a child who wants to learn (vyutpitsuhÞ ) the relation between theword and the meaning in question. He considers that B has understood ‘cow’ from ga-vi-

alone, so that he acquires the understanding of ga-vi- as bearing the signifying relationwith a cow (gosaktatvena). Moreover, this individual then serves as a model for othersto learn that ga-vi- is so related to a cow. In this way, it is established erroneously thatapabhramsas have direct signifying relations with meanings.(FN90)

4.3. It is thus admitted that at some stage apabhramsa terms also directly signifymeanings. Now, even if one insists that the signifying relation that holds between termsof type (4) ga-vi-, etc., is ultimately due to an error, the fact remains that this relationdoes hold. At the stage where ga-vi- and such do signify, persons who use such termsand do not know their samskrÞta equivalents—indeed do not know Sanskrit atall—cannot be said to understand a meaning through recollecting a samskrÞta term.Moreover, at this stage there can no longer be any question of error. Later Pa-nÞ ini-yasset out such arguments in opposition to Naiya-yikas and Mi-ma-msakas.

4.3.1. KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa presents the following arguments.(FN91) Under the assumptionthat sakti consists in a term’s bringing a meaning to mind (bodhakatvam),(FN92) it ispossible to say that vernacular terms like ga-vi- also have sakti, because these tooconvey meanings. Since there is thus no difference between items of types (3) and (4)in that both have this property, the latter also can be considered to be sa-dhu, contraryto the accepted view.(FN93)

The answer Naiya-yika-s and others have to this objection is given in the ka- rika-

asa-dhur anuma-nena va-cakahÞ kaiscid isÞyate.... “Some consider it appropriate that anasa-dhu term convey(FN94) a meaning by calling to mind(FN95) a sa-dhu term.”(FN96)In addition, four ka- rika-s from the Va-kyapadi-ya are cited in support of this position.According to these verses, an apabhramsa item that is used where a sa-dhu term isto be used serves as a means whereby a given meaning is expressed, but not directly:it is separated from the apabhramsa term by the sa-dhu term. Apabhramsa terms thusare causes for the understanding of meanings to arise through the intermediary ofrecalling sa-dhu terms; they bring the meaning of a correct term to one’s understandingby apparently identifying with it.(FN97) An analogy is drawn with how adultsunderstand a baby. A child learning to say amba amba ‘mommy, mommy’(FN98)makes a mistake in speaking and might say something indistinct, likebambamba.(FN99) Those who know the proper linguistic units, however, determine themeaning meant once the distinct form has been recalled. Apabhramsa terms,moreover, are not accepted, in teaching that continues tradition,(FN100) byauthoritative persons who serve as models, in the way that synonyms areaccepted.(FN101)

Of course, actual usage is the main source for concluding that a given term has thecapacity to signify a certain meaning and this is the same for both types of terms.KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞtÞa therefore goes on to summarize reasons for considering thatapabhramsa terms do not directly signify meanings, as follows. First, if terms of both

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types (3) and (4) were considered directly to signify, one would have to conclude thatall of them possess the capacity to signify, which involves prolixity. Moreover, theycannot be considered synonyms in the same way that sa-dhu terms with the samemeaning are said to be synonymous. The latter occur as synonyms in all speechareas, but terms like ga-vi-, gonÞ i-, and so on are restricted in their distribution, each usedin a different area. Accordingly, Naiya-yikas and Mi-ma-msakas conclude that being asa-dhu item consists in having the capacity directly to signify.(FN102)

KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa then notes that in the second half of the verse cited above—that is,va- cakatva- visesÞe va- niyamahÞ punÞ yapa- payohÞ—BhatÞtÞoji states his own view. Thefollowing is said to be the intention of this passage. If apabhramsa terms did not havethe capacity to signify, there would not be any verbal cognition from them at all. Nordoes such a cognition arise from recollecting the associated sa- dhu term, sincespeakers of a lower stratum, pa-maras, who do not know sa-dhu terms, also understandmeanings from apabhramsa terms and not from sa- dhu terms. Moreover, suchunderstanding does not arise due to erroneous assignment of signifying capacity, sinceno factor enters into play that would cancel what could be the false assumption thatapabhramsa terms convey meaning, so that the knowledge that such terms directlyconvey meanings is not falsely acquired and the knowledge that arises from hearingthe terms also is not an error.(FN103) To buttress this position with what is said byearlier authority, two more ka- rika-s from the Va-kyapadi-ya are invoked. As interpretedby KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa and his commentators, the first verse says the following. Apabhramsaterms acquired the status of being established as everyday usage due to a continuoustradition of speaking among faulty speakers.(FN104) Among such speakers, a sa-dhuterm does not signify.(FN105)

Of course, this means that being sa-dhu cannot be considered equivalent to beinga meaning signifier. Hence, being sa-dhu is said to consist in lending itself to theproduction of merit, and being asa-dhu is said to consist in lending itself to theproduction of demerit. The last part of ka-rika- 38 of the Vaiya-karanÞasiddha-ntaka-rika-

thus states that a restriction is provided by the grammar with respect to merit anddemerit.(FN106)

4.3.2. Na-gesa too argues strongly that sakti resides not only in sa-dhu terms butalso in apabhramsa terms, because verbal exchange, which is the main source forlearning the relation between speech units and meanings, is the same for both.(FN107)That is, whether a form like gauhÞ or ga-vi- is used, one learns from usage that eachis related as signifier to a cow.

In addition, Na-gesa also argues against those who maintain that a meaning isunderstood from an apabhramsa term through recollecting a related sa- dhuterm,(FN108) and he too has his opponents cite VP 1.177ab and 179 (see note 101)in support of this position.(FN109) Anuma-nena in VP 1.177ab signifies a type ofknowledge, namely remembering, so that the verse speaks of a recollection whoseobjects are sa-dhu terms. Those who know sa-dhu terms have such a knowledge ofthese from an apabhramsa because the latter can recall the former due to its similaritywith it, since it has such a sa-dhu term as its source.

The first arguments advanced against this view concern people who know bothsa-dhu and apabhramsa usage. To begin with, such people are known to understandwhat apabhramsa terms signify even without recalling corresponding sa-dhu terms.There are also some who may not know particular sa-dhu terms for certain meanings.Yet they still understand what is meant by the apabhramsa terms. The position beingmaintained would entail the unjustifiable consequence that those who do not knowsa-dhu terms signifying given meanings could have no understanding of those meaningsfrom the apabhramsa terms.(FN110) One could, to be sure, say that upon hearing an

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apabhramsa term for which they do not know a sa-dhu equivalent, such persons wouldassume that there must be some such term, so that they too understand a meaningonly indirectly through such recollection.(FN111) This is not acceptable. Therecollection of a sa-dhu term from an apabhramsa cannot be considered truly to bringa meaning to mind. For a verbal cognition to take place appropriately, one mustperceive directly a signifying element characterized by a particular sequence of soundsthat defines the item in question as signifier of a given meaning. This is not true ofanything remembered, which is not perceived as actually uttered at themoment.(FN112) Nor does one have a recollection so vague that the entity signifiedby the apabhramsa item in question could be considered as referred to by apronoun.(FN113) For example, if someone says gagari-m a-naya “bring a pot,” one doesnot understand the meaning of gagari-m(FN114) by recollecting ta-m (‘it’ [fem. acc.]).Finally, and most generally, it is known that only an actually uttered term has theproperty of producing a verbal knowledge, so that it is not possible for such aknowledge to arise from a recalled sa-dhu term that is not actually uttered.(FN115)

Na-gesa next takes up arguments which invoke error in connection with persons whoknow only apabhramsa usage. The claim is advanced that pa-maras use a word likegagari- instead of the sa-dhu word ghatÞa ‘pot’ and understand this meaning from it.However, this results from a continuous error. Thus, one accounts for an erroneousattribution of sakti to gagari-, although one does not learn a true sakti for this term. Atsome time, someone mistakenly used gagari- instead of ghatÞa, and this error continuedup to the present. This is unacceptable. Mistaking one term for another requires somesimilarity. The sakti that is said to reside in a term like ghatÞa is learned not only withrespect to an object qualified by the generic property of being a pot but alsoassociated with a distinct sequence of sounds. One can see no property common togagari- and ghatÞa, so that claiming an error that continues to the present cannot bejustified.(FN116)

This problem is circumvented in the manner outlined earlier (§§4.2.1-4). As before,moreover, here too the Va-kyapadi-ya (1.177ab) is invoked.(FN117) This too is refutedon the grounds that it is not possible to decide on the basis of given terms that certainones are apabhramsas relative to particular samskrÞta terms simply on the basis ofwhat each signifies. Nor is it appropriate to say that those are samskrÞta terms whichsisÞ tÞas acknowledge to occur universally, as opposed to apabhramsas, which haverestricted dialect distribution, since it is accepted that sisÞtÞa usage also has dialectdistribution: savati is used as a verb meaning ‘go’ in the Kamboja country but in theA- rya country only the derivate sava- ‘corpse’ is used. Accordingly, apabhramsas havesakti.(FN118)

What is more, Na-gesa finally notes, it is because of this that one sees that whenwomen, su-dras, and children have a doubt concerning the meaning of a sa-dhu termused, they determine what is meant through the apabhramsa.(FN119)

Further, Na-gesa conceives of the property of being sa-dhu (sa-dhutva) in the sameway as KaunÞ dÞabhatÞtÞa (§4.3.1): this is a particular generic property, revealed bygrammar, that resides in a speech unit qualified by a particular meaning and definessuch a unit’s having the capacity to produce merit.(FN120) The Paramalaghumañju-sÞa-also considers that sa-dhutva can consist simply in being what is to be explained byPa-nÞ ini’s grammar.(FN121)

4.4. As has been shown, the Va-kyapadi-ya is invoked in the course of argumentssupporting two positions: that apasabdas/apabhramsas signify only indirectly, throughthe intermediary of recollected sa-dhusabdas, and that both equally signify. Let us nowconsider more closely VP 1.175-83 and 27 together with the VrÞtti.

4.4.1. The first two of these ka- rika-s state what authorities consider appropriate(icchanti ‘desire, wish’) to call an apabhramsa: a linguistic unit, such as gonÞ i-, that is

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devoid of the purification endowed by proper grammatical formation, uttered when onewishes to use, for example, gauhÞ . Authorities consider such an item an apabhramsaunder particular circumstances: when it is linked to a particular meaning. Terms likeasva and gonÞ i- are treated as apabhramsas if they are used in particular meaning: asva‘horse’ instead of asva, and gonÞ i- ‘cow’ instead of go. Such items are sa-dhu terms,however, when used in another sphere, that is, in other meanings. In all such cases,being sa- dhu is determined by a difference in the meaning that conditionsusage.(FN122) For example, gonÞ i- used with reference to a receptacle that holds acertain amount of grain, etc., and asva referring to someone who does not havemoney (a-sva) are sa-dhu.(FN123) In addition, gonÞ i- and asva can be sa-dhu terms usedalso with reference to a cow and a horse, for a reason other than what usuallydetermines the use of these terms for such animals: a cow is likened to a gonÞ i-

because it has a lot of milk, so that it shares a property—holding a large amount—withthe receptacle called gonÞ i-, and a horse is spoken of as lacking money.(FN124)

VP 1.175 speaks of terms considered to be apabhramsa. Moreover, a term like ga-vi-

is an apabhramsa in that it is used when a speaker intends to say gauhÞ . That is, thisis viewed as a corruption, and the VrÞtti remarks that apabhramsas like ga-vi- are useddue to a speaker’s incapacity, inattention, or similar cause. Further, these corruptionshave sources, namely the sa-dhusabdas which a speaker intends to use in the firstplace. The VrÞtti on VP 1.175 not only notes this but also cites the author of theSangraha, who says that any apabhramsa has a correct linguistic unit as a source.Moreover, ultimately, there is no independent apabhramsa lacking such a source(aprakrÞtihÞ ): every apabhramsa has a sa-dhu term for its source. It is, of course,undeniable that not every use of apabhramsa terms is due to error, since somespeakers simply use ga-vi- and so on as normal everyday terms. This is explained asa generalization. Due to their becoming well known, some apabhramsas achieve thestatus of being normal everyday terms and thereby gain independence.(FN125)

4.4.2. Once apasabdas like ga-vi- are considered ultimately to be corruptions ofsa-dhu terms, with which they coexist in a setting where speakers of the accepted normmust interact with others who use apasabdas normally, two views immediately arepossible. First, one may refuse to grant status to apabhramsas, so that for sisÞtÞas atranslation situation obtains: they interact with those who use apabhramsas normallybut they understand in terms of their own usage—something akin to a “pidgin.”Alternatively, they may accept a true diglossic status, using the accepted norm amongthemselves and interacting with others in their own vernacular. Of course, this is aquestion of degree, and if the speakers of the vernacular do not also control the modelspeech at least to some extent the sisÞ tÞas themselves actually must interact in thevernacular.

VP 1.177 operates with the model in which apabhramsas signify indirectly. Theyserve to make meanings understood, but only by bringing to mind sa-dhu terms, withwhich they are seemingly identified; only in this manner do they serve to bring to lightthe meanings of such terms.(FN126) The VrÞtti brings out how this indirect significationtakes place by invoking the parallel of gestures like constricting one’s eyes.(FN127)Apabhramsas used in the sphere of sa-dhu terms make a meaning understood throughthe intermediary channel of sa-dhu terms, just as gestures such as constricting the eyesconvey meanings through people’s being acquainted with conventions, so that thegestures themselves seem to take on the form of these conventions and are wellestablished as such.(FN128) Although these gestures appear to convey meaningsdirectly, this is only because conventions have been set such that they are understoodto convey what certain utterances signify; the utterances which describe what thesegestures will convey by convention are directly connected with the meaning, and it is

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only because one identifies the gestures and the conventional utterances that theyseem to convey meaning directly.(FN129) Similarly, apabhramsas do not directlyconvey meanings. They only appear to do so because they are identified with the truedirect signifiers. The VrÞtti notes explicitly that VP 1.177 is stated in order to say thatapabhramsas do not have direct signification.(FN130)

4.4.3. Although apasabdas might be considered corruptions of sa-dhusabdas, theynevertheless do indeed signify meanings, even should one insist that they do soindirectly. Therefore, the question comes up: why are apabhramsas like ga-vi- and soon not recognized as synonyms of sa-dhusabdas like go? In this context, the behavioris invoked of authoritative persons referred to as sisÞ tÞa, who serve as models forspeech and other modes of behavior. In connection with such issues, which dependon lore traditionally handed down, no governing cause is stated other than theestablished custom of how these sisÞtÞas behave. If ga-vi- and so on were indeed merelyalternative expressions to go and so on, sisÞtÞas like Pa-nÞ ini would allow them also tobe made known by rules of their grammars—that is, would allow for their explanationby such rules—and they would use them.(FN131) They do neither. Further, a sa-dhuterm is one which is used for a meaning, which is what prompts the use of words, onthe assumption that it directly signifies such a meaning (pratyaksÞapaksÞenÞa), and ameaning which directly prompts the use of words is conveyed by sa-dhu terms.(FN132)Hence, BhartrÞhari says what he does in VP 1.178.(FN133)

4.4.4. The next three ka- rika- s concern how apabhramsas originate and arepropagated to the point where they attain full status among certain speakers. The firstsituation is the familiar one. A child learning to talk makes mistakes because it doesnot yet have the full capacity of all its articulatory organs; even though it exerts itselfto speak clearly in the desire to produce the correct word it has been told, it producesan indistinct sound. Adults listening to what the child is saying, on the other hand,determine the distinct word that is at the source of the indistinct sound made by thechild and consider only that to be connected with a meaning, not its corruptionproduced by the child. Similarly, some meaning is expressed by an apabhramsa whichis used when a sa-dhu term should be used, but this is not directly expressed. It isseparated from the apabhramsa by the sa-dhu term.(FN134)

The VrÞtti here speaks of speech or language which has become mixed. In thislanguage, apasabdas are used in the sphere of sa-dhu terms, but sisÞtÞas, who knowgrammar, understand sa-dhu terms through them, and it is only through these sa-dhuterms that they consider the meaning as being expressed. An asa-dhu term is thusnothing more than a means of knowing other terms, just as smoke is a means ofknowing fire.(FN135)

There are others, however, for whom the reverse holds, as is stated in VP 1.181,the VrÞtti on which says the following. Apabhramsas, being used repeatedly by women,su- dras, ca- nÞdÞ a- las and such, reached the status of being fixed among negligentspeakers, so that conversation using them became more commonly established amongsuch speakers. Moreover, now when a doubt comes up consequent on someone’s useof a sa-dhu term, one determines what is meant by means of the apabhramsa of thatterm. Further, people thus consider only the asa-dhu term to be the direct signifier andthey set the sa-dhu term on the side of what serves to recall another term.(FN136)

4.4.5. The final ka- rika-s of the first ka-nÞdÞa deal with three positions. The first of theseverses begins with a transition from what was said in the previous ka-rika- . It speaks ofthis divine speech which has been defiled(FN137) by incapable speakers and goes onto note the contrary thinking on this issue of those who view speech as not beingeternal (anityadarsina-m).(FN138) There are thus far two positions. A third position isbrought up in the second ka- rika- . Under this view, there is a continuous unbroken

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stream of both sorts of speech units—sa-dhusabda and apasabda—so that there is noquestion of one deriving from the other. Nevertheless, these come down distinguishedfrom each other, so that if a certain term is used when one means to express ameaning through another that term does not signify that meaning.(FN139)

The VrÞtti on VP 1.182 begins by recounting what is known from accepted tradition.In the beginning, the speech of self-luminous men was as free from any apabhramsasas it was from falsehood and such. Over time, however, due to its being associatedwith the memory of continuous repetition of earlier faults, speech went on gettingmixed with apabhramsas to the point where this reached the state of being the norm,so that for speakers of this time such speech was treated as original, not a deviationfrom a norm.(FN140) This is one extreme view. Others go to another extreme. Theymaintain that there is no continuum of eternal sa- dhu speech forms(anityava-dinahÞ )(FN141) and accordingly do not accept that sa-dhu terms are sources ofmerit. These people say that sa-dhu speech is established purely by convention, justas rules are established in contests between wrestlers, and that the set of sa-dhu termsis derived from the vernacular original in that it has its source in that.(FN142)Moreover, this set of sa-dhu forms is considered a modification that is establishedlater,(FN143) and is determined by confused men(FN144) according to accent,grammatical formation, and such.(FN145)

Finally, the VrÞtti considers another position, that both types of speech forms equallycome down in an unbroken tradition. Even those for whom there is no primal age ora divine speech which was unmixed with apasabdas accept an unbroken tradition,handed down by the sisÞ tÞas, establishing a difference between sa-dhu and asa-dhuterms, just as they accept such a tradition, similarly handed down, establishing thatsome women may be approached and others not. Since this distinction is thus set,whether a well-established asa-dhu item like ga-vi- or one which, like asva, is a mistakeand not well established, is used when one wishes to signify something using anotherparticular term—namely go or asva—both fail to signify in and of themselves. Whethera meaning is understood through the intermediary of a sa-dhu term or, as withconventional gestures such as constricting one’s eyes, there is an immediateunderstanding of a meaning for people who have become confused by repeated useof asa-dhu terms, what comes about is an understanding but nothing more.(FN146)

This is understandable from the point of view of a Pa-nÞ ini-ya, for whom the grammarserves to establish a restriction such that in particular circumstances one who canshould express himself using sa-dhu terms only. To be sure, there are and may wellalways have been asa-dhu terms also, but for this person they do not signify if aspeaker with whom he is engaged in conversation intends to communicate in the highspeech. Note, moreover, that, in consonance with the entire tradition that theVa-kyapadi-ya represents, the VrÞtti does not countenance still another view, whichpossibly could also be entertained under the thesis that both sa-dhu and asa-dhu termscome down in an unbroken continuum. This is that someone wishing to speak in thevernacular and accordingly to use a term like ga-vi- or gonÞ i-, might instead mistakenlyuse a term like gauhÞ .(FN147) For, even if apasabdas are not considered to bedeviants of sa-dhusabdas and are granted equal antiquity, they are not granted equalstatus. There is always an assumption that, if a mistake in usage takes place, itconsists in using an apasabda instead of an intended sabda. This is maintained notjust by grammarians but also by Mi-ma-msakas; see §4.2.2. This is also understandablein terms of how these usages coexisted. At least from the eras of Ka- tya-yana andPatañjali, correct Sanskrit usage coexisted with vernacular usage, viewed as relativelyincorrect, and BhartrÞhari considers this distinction to be carried on by sisÞtÞas. Whenspeaking vernaculars to contemporaries, then, such speakers would hardly be viewed

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as using Sanskritic forms by mistake. Nor was a sisÞtÞa’s use of apasabdas in informalcontexts viewed as damning. On the contrary, it is in the context where chaste usageis absolutely required—especially in ritual—that lapses into vernacular are censured.

By ending the first ka-nÞdÞa in the way he does, BhartrÞhari nicely rounds things out.For he thus harkens back to a ka- rika- (VP 1.27) which immediately follows his summaryof what will be dealt with (see §3.2, with notes 18, 19). The VrÞtti on VP 1.27 drawsa parallel between the established distinction of sa-dhu and asa-dhu usage, whichcomes down in an unbroken tradition, and other such established traditions. Theseconcern: other means of achieving merit, which are positively enjoined; practices likekilling living beings, telling lies, and stealing, which are forbidden; and acts likehiccuping, laughing, and scratching, which are neither enjoined nor forbidden. These allcome down in unbroken traditions and are not subject to doubt.(FN148) In acomparable manner, VP 1.158 reiterates that Pa-nÞ ini’s grammar is a smrÞti, a workwhich hands down a memorialized tradition, that is determined by the uninterruptedtradition of usage by sisÞtÞas.(FN149) The VrÞtti on this ka- rika- again draws a parallel withthe distinctions carried on in other smrÞtis—between what may be eaten or not eatenand so forth—and grammatical tradition. SisÞtÞas do not transgress the way of properbehavior that is set forth in these other traditions, and the grammar is a similar smrÞti,whose domain is what speech should and should not be used.(FN150)

4.4.6. As was noted earlier (see §4.3.1, with note 96), VP 3.30 also plays animportant role in discussions concerning sa-dhu and asa-dhu items. What the first halfof this verse says accords with what was said in VP 1.180cd (§4.4.4, with note 134).The second half, on the other hand, assumes that sa-dhusabdas and apasabdas do notdiffer in that both signify, so that a restriction is stated with respect to merit anddemerit: only the use of sa-dhusabdas gains one merit. This is reconcilable with theposition that apabhramsa terms have come to gain established status over time, asportrayed in VP 1.181, except that here the understanding of meaning directly from anapasabda is not restricted to those speakers that are considered incapable. This isalso reconcilable with the third view treated at the end of the first ka-nÞdÞa, such thatsabdas and apasabdas are both considered to have come down in a continuousstream.

4.4.7. To summarize what can be said on the basis of the Va-kyapadi-ya passagesconsidered here: BhartrÞhari recognizes, as did his predecessors, that bothsa-dhusabdas and apasabdas are used and that the latter predominate. He also takesthree possibilities into consideration concerning their relative status:

Apasabdas are accounted for as corruptions (apabhramsa) of sa-dhusabdas, andat one primeval time there was a divine speech unsullied by such impurities. Both apasabdas and sa-dhusabdas have existed as far back as one can go, andthere is no use insisting that the former derive from the latter through some sortof error. What people call apasabdas are actually part of the natural speech of people,without the adornment of grammar, and sa-dhusabdas have arisen from them viagrammatical analysis.

BhartrÞhari also has to admit, as did Patañjali, that even sisÞ tÞas can understandmeanings from apasabdas as well as sa-dhusabdas. That is, although there was amongsisÞ tÞas an accepted high speech, they also used vernaculars in their everydayencounters. Here too, however, there are different approaches:

There is, to begin with, what we may call the translation thesis. A sisÞ tÞaconsiders the apasabda a corruption and understands a meaning only indirectly,by recalling a sa-dhusabda that is linked directly as signifier with the intendedmeaning. For those who are not part of the sisÞtÞa tradition, it is not only true that

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meaning is understood directly from what sisÞtÞas call apasabdas, it is also truethat even if they can communicate with sisÞtÞas, in case of doubt they understandthrough their apasabda, just as the s isÞ tÞa may understand through theintermediary of sa-dhusabda. A sisÞtÞa might have to admit that he can indeed understand a meaning directlyfrom an apasabda, even if this is a corruption and all the more so if it has asunending a tradition of usage as does any sa-dhusabda, but that is all he willadmit. He will not go so far as to grant that the apasabda actually signifies inthe same manner as does a sa-dhusabda.(FN151)

4.5. Hela- ra- ja’s comments on VP 3.30 reflect closely what is said in the ka-rika-s andVrÞtti discussed in §4.4. He begins with what is, in effect, a paraphrase of VP1.182(FN152) and notes that for learned persons(FN153) speech that has becomedefiled signifies not directly, as a corrupt speech, but only once it has had its originalundefiled form made known. He specifies that the learned do not determine a meaningdirectly from an apasabda, so that for them there is no relation between apasabdasand meaning.(FN154) Hela-ra- ja then alludes to the tradition mentioned in the VrÞtti onVP 1.182 concerning the primeval time when speech was devoid of apabhramsas andto the Sangraha’s statement that any apabhramsa has a correct linguistic unit as itssource, while emphasizing that apabhramsas do not signify, that they only bring tomind a sa-dhu term due to similarity, and that it is from sa-dhu terms that meaningcomprehension results.(FN155) He immediately goes on, however, to speak of whatprevails nowadays: impurities of speech have gained general currency in the samemanner as falsehood and such, due to the prevailing lack of merit, so that meaningis indeed directly understood from apasabda without the intervention of sa-dhu terms.Although this is so, one concludes that only sa-dhu terms are means of attaining merit,on the authority of teachings that say one should not use mlecchaspeech—apasabdas—that one should speak only using sa-dhu terms. Accordingly, thegrammar follows suit and teaches these alone.(FN156) Further, since it is acceptedthat a diversity of entities is preceded by a unity and it is also true that there is amultiplicity of human views because they are not restricted, one concludes that a groupof apasabdas like ga-vi-, gonÞ i-, and so on, has a single sa-dhusabda (go) for a sourceand not vice versa.(FN157) Thus, an apasabda has as its source a sa-dhusabda, whichis the object of knowledge.(FN158) In addition, as the ultimate stage of knowledge isidentical with the undifferentiated Brahman,(FN159) so the stage of the sa-dhusabda isthe stage of knowledge, and as differentiation in the ultimate knowledge is false(vitathahÞ ‘contrary to fact’), so is the apabhramsa stage of speech that consists inimpurities false in contrast to the true form of speech that lacks these impurities.Accordingly, there is a difference in conception (vikalpahÞ ) that depends on whether oneis considering the ultimate or something else.(FN160)

Hela- ra- ja then goes on to consider the Maha-bha-sÞya’s evam iha-pi sama- na- ya-marthagatau sabdena ca- pasabdena ca (see 4.1), concerning which he says thefollowing. This is stated only with respect to the stage of speech characterized asignorance. Since Patañjali states arthagatau (“there being a comprehension of ameaning”),(FN161) the possibility that he might be saying that apasabdas signify is notgranted respect.(FN162) What is meant, says Hela- ra- ja, is the following. Granted, to besure, in the stage of speech characterized as ignorance, people communicate for themost part with apasabda, so that there may well be just a comprehension of meaningthrough both sabda and apasabda. According to Hela- ra- ja, then, it is considered thatPatañjali’s statement, of course, shows he concedes that one understands a meaningthrough both, but not that an apasabda is thereby on a par with a sa-dhusabda as asignifier. However, Hela- ra- ja continues, because such usage is generally current,

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BhartrÞhari says it does not make a difference between sabda and apasabda so far asconcerns comprehension of meaning, and the grammar establishes a restrictionconcerning merit and sin.(FN163)

4.6. Houben emphasizes VP 3.3.30 and the associated ka-rika-s from the first ka-nÞdÞain arguing that Hela- ra- ja has not understood BhartrÞhari’s position, that the author of theVrÞtti need not represent what BhartrÞhari thought, and that those who have followedthese commentators are mistaken. Thus, arguing against Virendra Sharma, Houbensays (p. 25):

Sharma notes that KaunÞdÞa BhatÞtÞa and Na-gesa hold corrupt forms to be directlyexpressive, and say that it is the view of the grammarians. Sharma argues thatthis would be an alteration of the traditional view of the grammarians(1977:239-249). In my view, however, KaunÞdÞa BhatÞtÞa and Na-gesa agree on thispoint with both BhartrÞhari and Patañjali (cf. discussion of ka-rika- 30), while it isHela- ra- ja who (following the ancient VrÞtti) deviates from the traditionalgrammarian’s view.

The discussion of VP 3.3.30 to which Houben refers actually is fairly short,approximately five pages (pp. 237-42).

4.6.1. Concerning VP 3.3.30cd, in particular, Houben says (p. 238): “The secondline of ka- rika- 30 of our chapter, devoted to the other view, tells us two things: (1) thereis no difference between correct and incorrect words in being significative or expressiveof a meaning; (2) there is a restriction with regard to merit and demerit.” He goes onto note that the same points are made in VP 1.27, then remarks (p. 239): “The pointthat there is no difference between correct and incorrect word in being significative, ismoreover elaborated in ka- rika-s 181-183.” Houben’s position is that one should notaccept the interpretation of the ka- rika-s found in the VrÞtti (p. 239):

Usually, these ka-rika-s are interpreted on the basis of the ancient VrÞtti. However,on the basis of the ka-rika-s in their own context one has to arrive at differentconclusions, conclusions which are moreover in perfect accord with somerelevant remarks by the author of the MBhD. This passage is therefore one ofthe reasons to keep what is said in the VrÞtti strictly separate from what is saidin the ka- rika- s, in whichever way one decides the authorship of these twoworks.(FN164)

Houben nevertheless admits that to him parts of VP 1.182-83 (see notes 138-39)are not absolutely clear and remarks (p. 239): “What is not directly clear from theSanskrit, is which opposite opinion is being referred to in 182cd. Nor is the exactmeaning of ubhayesÞa-m and aviccheda-d clear.”(FN165)

There is much in Houben’s discussion that I find less than acceptable. Let me beginwith a general point. I consider it objectionable that in a book of 460 pages, withverses cited twice and translations repeated, the author could not take a few pages topresent in full his arguments concerning VP 1.181-83; that instead he merely tells ushe intends to discuss problems on another occasion, although he wishes readers toaccept his conclusion that the VrÞtti does not represent what BhartrÞhari intended. Thearguments Houben does set down, moreover, are not cogently formulated. Thus, hesays (p. 240):

In the light of the preceding ka- rika-s 181-182, however, it is very likely that 183was intended to refer also to the tradition of ‘incorrect’ Prakrit words (which werethe original and correct words according to the other group). In view of the factthat in some circles in BhartrÞhari’s time (fourth or fifth century CE) the ‘incorrect’Prakrit forms were cultivated, and in the light of 181, which seems to refer tothis situation, ka- rika- 183 would then also refer to someone who wanted topronounce an ‘incorrect’ Prakrit word, but knew only the corresponding ‘correct’Sanskrit word.

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The first of these verses clearly says that apabhramsas gained established statusover time, with the result that for some speakers sa-dhu terms are not signifiers.Houben does not demonstrate, however, how the two ka- rika-s make it “very likely” thatthe final verse intended to convey what he claims. Moreover, although it is beyonddispute that vernaculars were indeed generally used, it does not follow that VP 1.183thereby concerns speakers who wished to use a vernacular form but mistakenly useda Sanskritic one instead. Houben should have taken into consideration the repeatedstatement in the first-ka-nÞdÞa ka- rika-s and VrÞtti that the distinction between sa-dhu andasa-dhu terms is an accepted tradition and the view among Pa-nÞ ini-yas and others thatmisuse involves the use of apasabdas where sa-dhusabdas should be used.

4.6.2. Houben’s arguments concerning the particular issue whether asa-dhu termssignify or not could also do with more precision. He says (pp. 240-41):

What is important is that ka- rika- 183 contains no indication whatsoever thatBhartrÞhari would not [emphasis in original] accept that in some circumstances“incorrect” words express their meaning directly. It was precisely the point of 181that ‘incorrect’ words may be expressive among some speakers. And at twoother places, 27 in the first Ka-nÞdÞa and 30 in the Sambandhasamuddesa,BhartrÞhari allows that “incorrect” words express their meaning directly. The VrÞtti, however, suggesting that in 182 a different view is being discussed(different from the two views referred to in 181),(FN166) denies that “incorrect”words can be expressive. On this view, according to the VrÞtti, the “incorrect”word, whether it has become well-established (as in the situation described in181) or not (as in 175-180, where the speaker does intend to pronounce thecorrect word), is by no means expressive of the meaning (na va- cakaubhavatahÞ).

What VP 1.27 says is that asa-dhu terms are those which are contrary to sa-dhuones—either in that they are not established from a tradition handed down by sisÞtÞasor in that they are not means of achieving merit—although there is not a distinctionbetween both types in that they both convey meaning.(FN167) This does not sayexplicitly that both signify meaning directly. Even under the thesis that asa-dhu termssignify indirectly, it is still true that they signify, so that they do not differ in this respectfrom sa-dhu terms.(FN168) Similarly, VP 3.3.30 also says that there is no distinctionbetween the two types of terms in that they both have the property of being signifiers,but again this does not necessarily mean that both directly signify. Nor can one saythat va-caka refers only to a direct signifier. This would be incompatible with VP 1.178,which says of asa-dhu terms that they are not directly signifiers and uses sa-ksÞa-dava-caka-hÞ . If va-caka meant only ‘which signifies directly’, then ava-caka would refer toan item that does not signify directly, so that sa-ksÞa- t ‘directly’ would be otiose. Similarly,abhi dha- can mean ‘signify, express’, without specifying whether this is done directlyor indirectly, so that VP 1.180 can say that a certain meaning is signified by anasa- dhu term indirectly, as separated from its signifier by the correct term(sa-dhuvyavahitahÞ ), which directly signifies it. Of course, va-caka and abhidha-yaka canalso refer specifically to direct signifiers. Thus, VP 1.183, in which abhidha-yakahÞoccurs, says with respect to a term used when one wishes to use another one thatit does not signify the meaning. The verse specifies the particular condition underwhich this holds. The VrÞtti (see note 146) uses va-caka, but also goes on to stress thatin both cases there is a mere understanding (sampratyayama- tram) of the meaning inquestion. That is, an apasabda like gonÞ i-, which has become established, seeminglysignifies, but this is in the way that conventional gestures convey meanings, and anapasabda like asva for asva signifies only through the intermediary.

In connection with the same issue, Houben (pp. 241-42) appeals to theMaha-bha-sÞyadi-pika- :

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As for the MBhD, its author evinces an awareness of both the view thatincorrect words are not expressive (MBhD 1:10.14-15) and the view that theyare (MBhD 1:26.13-14, 27.34-35). The author of the MBhD, as the ka- rika--authorand unlike the author of the VrÞtti and Hela- ra- ja, does not advocate an absolutedenial of the possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstancesexpressive.

In footnote 380 (p. 241), appended to this passage, Houben criticizes VirendraSharma, saying: “Sharma (1977: 147-148) mentions only MBhD 1: 10.14-15 as ‘proof’of BhartrÞhari’s denial of direct expressive powers to incorrect words, and neglects theother two places which would have compelled him to modify his position.” In footnote377 (p. 241), appended to the text where Houben says “BhartrÞhari allows that‘incorrect’ words express their meaning directly,” he remarks: “Exactly the same attitudeis evinced in the MBhD 1: 26.13-14 and 27.4-5.” The Di-pika- passages are as follows:

I.10.14-15: apabhramsa- ye [te] tv apy apratya-yaka-hÞ | esÞa eva paksÞo naitepratya-yayanti-ti “But terms that are apabhramsas ... are not meaning conveyors.The position is just this: these do not convey meaning.” I.26.13-14: evam artha-vabodham prati sarvo ’rthahÞ sabdam apasabdam caprayunkte | tatra sabdena-sau pratya-yyo neterenÞeti niyamahÞ kriyate “In the sameway, any meaning provokes both a sabda and an apasabda for theunderstanding of a meaning. This being so, a restriction is formulated: that is tobe made understood with a sabda, not with the other.” I.27.4-5: yady apy esÞahÞ paksÞahÞ sya- t sa-dhuvad apasabda- api va-caka-hÞ ity evamapi drÞsÞtÞam phalam tulyam artha-vabodhahÞ | iha tv adrÞsÞtÞam phalam abhyudaya iti“Though this view too is possible, that apasabdas signify as sa-dhu terms do,nevertheless, they have the same direct result: the comprehension of a meaning.In this case, however, there is an unseen result: prosperity.”

Clearly, the second passage speaks of a restriction that a meaning is to beconveyed (pratya-yyahÞ) by one term and not by another, but it does not expressly sayanything about an apasabda signifying directly. The last passage does indeed useva-cakahÞ . However, as noted earlier, this too does not mean that the term in questionnecessarily signifies directly. Accordingly, I think Houben’s use of “directly” isexaggerated. It is also an exaggeration to insist that the VrÞtti does not allow thatapasabdas do signify directly under particular circumstances. The VrÞtti on VP 1.181(note 136) certainly does admit, as does the ka- rika- , that for speakers among whomapabhramsas have become established, they signify and sa-dhu terms do not.

In sum, I find that Houben’s discussion of this issue lacks cogency. In addition, Iconsider less than straightforward the strategy of argumentation adopted inapproaching the texts in question. Towards the beginning of his book, Houben makesit clear (p. 7) that he considers the author of the VrÞtti to be someone different formthe author of the ka- rika- s, whom he considers identical with the author of theMaha-bha-sÞyadi-pika- . Subsequently (p. 13), he recommends caution and remarks: “Evenfor someone who would like to establish continuity and unitary authorship of the twoworks, it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the two in order to provethis point.” In his commentary on VP 3.3.30, he maintains the sharp distinctionbetween the works but, as can be seen from what I have said, he also abandons agreat deal of his caution. Here Houben argues on the basis of his own interpretations,which are supported by saying “it is very likely that” VP 1.183 meant to say what hethinks it did and, negatively, that this ka- rika- does not contain any indication thatBhartrÞhari would not accept that apasabdas can signify directly. Houben does notdemonstrate that what he considers likely is supported by evidence and is not merelya feeling on his part. Yet, starting from his own interpretation, he goes on to argue thatHela- ra- ja has somehow misrepresented what the ka- rika- text says.

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4.6.3. The materials thus presented constitute for Houben (p. 241) “... thebackground against which Hela- ra- ja’s commentary on 30 should be evaluated.” Asnoted in §4.6.2, Houben characterizes Hela- ra- ja as advocating “an absolute denial ofthe possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstances significative.” Hereagain, he has exaggerated and his presentation lacks subtlety. Hela- ra- ja’s comments onVP 3.3.30 (see §4.5) immediately set the tone by speaking of the learned (vidva-msahÞ ).For him, it is they who do not determine a meaning directly from an apasabda, so thatthere is no relation between such a term and a meaning. Now, when Hela-ra- ja saysthat apabhramsas are not signifiers (ava-caka-hÞ ), he clearly means they are not directsignifiers, since he immediately goes on to note that such terms bring sa-dhu terms tomind, from which one has a comprehension of meaning. He then speaks of the stageat which apabhramÞ sas have become established, and relates this to what Patañjalisays. In addition, Hela-ra- ja makes explicit the circumstances under which apasabdassignify meanings directly, just as do sa-dhusabdas: at the stage alluded to in VP 1.181and the VrÞtti thereto. It is also with this very stage in mind that Hela- raja first bringsin Patañjali’s comments (see §4.1) that a restriction is established such that one shoulduse only sa-dhusabdas to signify meanings, which are equally understood from the useof such terms and apasabdas.

Houben remarks in particular on what Hela- ra- ja says concerning the Maha-bha-sÞya’ssama-na-ya-m arthagatau sabdena ca-pasabena ca. In his comments on VP 3.3.30,Houben notes (p. 241): “From the use of arthagatau ‘in the understanding of meaning’Hela- ra- ja wants to infer Patañjali’s reluctance to accept that incorrect words have acapacity to express the meaning.” Later (p. 366), Houben translates the pertinentphrase from Hela- ra- ja’s commentary as follows: “From the expression arthagati,“understanding of meaning” [it is clear that] [Patañjali] is unwilling to accept thatincorrect words have expressive power towards their meaning.” He also remarks (p.366, note 697): “Note the plural in reference to Patañjali, whereas BhartrÞhari is referredto by Hela- ra- ja in singular.” Of course, having Hela-ra- ja say that Patañjali does not wishto accept that apasabdas signify directly suits Houben’s thesis, under which Hela- ra- jain effect denies what Patañjali actually intended and interprets the issue in accordancewith the Va-kyapadi-yavrÞtti, as opposed to the Va-kyapadi-ya itself. On the other hand,Houben simply asserts that Hela- ra- ja’s avakarnÞayanti refers to something Patañjanli did.He does not show that Hela-ra- ja elsewhere comparably refers to the Bha-sÞyaka- ra in theplural. In fact, Hela-ra- ja frequently refers to Patañjali, using bha-sÞyaka-ra and bha-sÞyakrÞtand, as far as I can ascertain, always in the singular.(FN169) In view of the evidence,it is obviously not appropriate to consider that avakarnÞayanti in the Praki-rnÞapraka- sa onVP 3.3.30 has reference to Patañjali. Instead, it is proper to consider this an instanceof an impersonal third plural form (see note 162). That is, Hela- ra- ja here is reportingan opinion he knows of, one which agrees with what is said in the VrÞtti on VP 1.183(see note 146). Hela-ra- ja also notes immediately thereafter that the author of the textspeaks of a non-difference in usage due to the fact that apabhramsas have becomeestablished and that under these circumstances the grammar provides a restrictionsuch that one should use only sa-dhu terms to signify meanings in order to gain merit.

4.6.4. All this is in accord with what is said throughout the Pa-nÞ inian tradition.Ka-tya-yana begins by saying that the grammar serves to establish a restriction intendedfor merit. Patañjali explains this and says that the restriction is stated showing that,although there is the same understanding of meaning through an apasabda as well asa sabda, only the use of the latter results in merit. It is possible that in saying thisPatañjali considered that both types of terms signified meanings directly. On the otherhand, it is also important to see that Patañjali does not discuss this issue, so that adefinitive conclusion is not possible. One can only surmise that this point may not evenhave been a source of contention for Patañjali.

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As I have noted (§4.4), BhartrÞhari elaborates on the issue of sa-dhu and asa-dhuusage in a manner which can be understood as reflecting thinking that occurred overthe years not only among grammarians but also among Mi-ma-msakas and others (see§4.2), including differences of opinion on whether apasabdas signify directly orindirectly and for whom, as well as on whether apasabdas are to be considered trulycorruptions (apabhramsa) of sa-dhusabda and how they came about if they are sotreated. On the other hand, BhartrÞhari does not enter into discussions concerningrelative brevity and prolixity in assuming that several apasabdas signify a meaningsignified by a single sabda, although we know this dispute goes back much earlier,since one finds it in Jaimini’s Mi-ma-msa-su- tras (see §4.2.2). Further, by the time ofHela- ra- ja, the question of relative brevity and prolixity, centering around whether a saktishould be assumed for an apasabda distinct from a sa-dhusabda had probably alreadycome to have considerable importance in arguments, although this does not play animportant role in the Va-kyapadi-ya or in Hela- ra- ja’s commentary.(FN170) As shownabove (§§4.2.4-4.3), this issue came to play a large role in discussions concerningsa-dhu and asa-dhu terms. In this context, let us consider Na-gesa’s comments on thePradi-pa to Bha-sÞya I.8.21-22. As I have pointed out (note 168), KaiyatÞa contrasts twopositions: that apabhramsas have come to be established through usage, so that theysignify directly without calling to mind their sa-dhu counterparts, and that they simplysignify in the same way as sa-dhu terms. Na-gesa associates the first position with theview already set forth in VP 1.181, but he puts this in terms familiar from Nya-yadiscussions: apabhramsas convey meaning through erroneous attribution of sakti(saktibhramenÞa). He also describes, in a manner that is familiar, how this comes about(see §§4.2.3-4.2.4): A mistakenly says ga-vi- where gauhÞ should be used and Bunderstands the intended meaning by remembering the sa- dhu term gauhÞ , but abystander C takes it that B has understood the meaning directly from ga-vi-, thusmistakenly attributing to this the capacity to signify a cow. The error that has thissource is subsequently continued.(FN171) Na-gesa then notes that KaiyatÞa brings in thesecond position because there is no decisive factor to show that apabhramsas gainedtheir ability to signify in this manner, so that sakti resides also in vernacularterms.(FN172)

It is patent, I think, that although Na-gesa does indeed subscribe to the position thatapabhramsa terms signify as directly as do sa-dhu terms, he does not say exactly whatBhartrÞhari says. He is concerned with the situation, noted by Hela- ra- ja (see §4.5, withnote 156), such that apasabdas have already achieved currency and some speakerscommunicate with these only. The arguments in the Mañju-sÞa- are also specificallyaimed at Mi-ma-msaka and Naiya-yika opponents, and the issue of prolixity in assumingseparate sakti relations between individual apasabdas and a single meaning occupiesan important position. In addition, recall that, although KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa cites VP 3.3.30from BhatÞtÞoji’s Siddha-ntaka- rika-s (see §4.3.1), he does not attribute the ka- rika- toBhartrÞhari, despite the fact that he subsequently cites verses which he does explicitlyattribute to the Va-kyapadi-ya. Moreover, the first half of VP 3.3.30 now is said torepresent the position of Naiya-yikas and others, the second half BhatÞtÞoji’s siddha-nta.Given that BhartrÞhari quite unpolemically entertains the view that apasabdas signifythrough calling to mind their sa-dhu equivalents, KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa’s presentation too cannotbe said to agree in full with what BhartrÞhari says. I therefore consider Houben’s baldassertion (p. 25) that “... KaunÞdÞa BhatÞtÞa and Na-gesa agree on this point with bothBhartrÞhari and Patañjali ...” inappropriate and lacking in perspective.

4.6.5. In sum, Houben’s discussion of VP 3.3.30 and related ka- rika-s which concerndifferent views on the status of sa-dhu and asa-dhu terms is so intent on demonstratingthat BhartrÞhari definitely allowed for asa-dhu terms directly to signify that he overlooks

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something he himself makes the very basis of his own study, BhartrÞhari’s“perspectivism.” With respect to this issue, as with regard to other major disputes,BhartrÞhari does indeed present various points of view. He does not polemically attackother positions, but he shows a clear preference for one: whether asa-dhu terms areconsidered truly corruptions of sa-dhu terms, even if both come down in uninterruptedtransmission, the latter are definitely given higher status. This is the tradition of sisÞtÞas,to which he adheres.

5. To my knowledge, Houben’s is the first English translation of the Praki-rnÞapraka- saon the Sambandhasamuddesa. As he notes (p. 23), the ka-rika-s were translated intoEnglish earlier by K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971), who also summarizes Hela- ra- ja’scomments. Concerning this work, Houben says (p. 23): “His translations suffice to givea general impression of the subject matter, but are not always precise and aresometimes more based on Hela- ra- ja’s commentary than on the ka- rika-s of the VP.”

In some cases, Houben’s claim is justified, and he has based his translation on arigorously established text, so that scholars must be grateful for his effort in producinga disciplined translation of two difficult texts. Houben deserves thanks also for thedetailed discussions which follow the translations of ka-rika-s. Nevertheless, as I think Ihave demonstrated, these discussions show that Houben is at times unjustifiably intenton attributing misrepresentations to the Va-kyapadi-yavrÞtti and Hela- ra- ja’s commentary.Despite their rigor and usefulness, some of the translations also do not do full justiceto the original and in fact do not compare all that well with those of K. A. SubramaniaIyer. I am aware that translations are happy hunting grounds for nitpickers and whatmany would consider among the most excellent could be subject to criticism at thehands of a determined critic. With all due deference, however, I think it appropriate toconsider three examples in Houben’s translation to make my point.

5.1. Houben’s translation of the VP 3.3.1 (pp. 145, 331) is: The cognition of the speaker, the external thing meant and the own form [of theword] are understood through words which are uttered. The relation of these(namely, the cognition, external thing meant and own form) [with the wordswhich are uttered] is well-established [p. 331: “thing-meant”].

K. A. Subramania Iyer’s translation of the same verse is (1971: 76) From words which are uttered, the intention of the speaker, an external objectand the form of the word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed.

Aside from the use of parentheses and brackets in one, both translations conveyjust about the same information, although I think one would have to accept that thesecond is clearer and more felicitous. One phrase which immediately strikes a readerin Houben’s translation is cognition of the speaker, as opposed to K. A. SubramaniaIyer’s intention of the speaker. Here Subramania Iyer follows Hela- ra- ja, whoparaphrases jña-nam prayoktuhÞ with prayoktur abhipra-yahÞ . This is appropriate. For thetranslation conveys more precisely what the ka-rika- speaks of. BhartrÞhari is not talkingabout any cognitive process or result of such a process. He is talking about aknowledge which a speaker has in his mind and wishes to convey to someone inwords. Admittedly, this is a relatively minor point. Yet a translation should certainly aimto convey to readers the content of the original text in a way that is both precise andunderstandable, and currently fashionable jargon that fails to accomplish this aimshould be avoided.

5.2. Consider now the same authors’ translations of VP 3.3.6ab (Houben, pp. 176,341; K. A. Subramania Iyer, p. 81):

Houben: As regards samÞ yoga (connection) and samava-ya (inherence), they (aretacchabda-hÞ :) are called by that word (sc. ‘relation’) because they have (as itwere) that property (sc. dependence).

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Subramania Iyer: Conjunction and inherence are called relations because theyhave the attribute thereof.

Here again, I think it is fair to say that Subramania Iyer’s translation not only ismore felicitous but also more immediately conveys precisely what the text intends. Thepoint made is that conjunction (samyoga) and inherence (samava-ya) are spoken of asrelations because they have a property which defines what a relation is, namely theproperty of being dependent. Subramania Iyer translates the Sanskrit taddharmanÞohÞ“because they have the attribute thereof,” but Houben translates “because they have(as it were) that property (sc. dependence).” He also devotes much of his commentaryon the ka-rika- to explaining this term, as follows (p. 177):

In this interpretation, the first word taddharmanÞos is a Bahuvri-hi going withsamyogasamava-yayohÞ . Hela-ra- ja takes it as an upama--bahuvri-hi, and tad in thecompound as a reference to sambhandha, the topic of the preceding threeka- rika- s. This gives the following: samÞ yoga (connection) and samava- ya(inherence) have as it were the property (sc. dependence) of this (relation). Thatthe compound is interpreted as an upama--bahuvri-hi is not without reason, for ifit was a simple Bahuvri-hi, there would be the suggestion that relation still doeshave an own property. And since upama- -bahuvri-his are not uncommon inSanskrit, it is not far-fetched to interpret the compound this way, in a context inwhich identities and near-identities are of crucial significance. A translationwithout ‘as it were’ or equivalent would use less words, yet say more thanwarranted on the basis of the Sanskrit compound. In my translation, tad- in thecompound is taken as a direct reference to the property of dependence. In thatcase, if ‘as it were’ is omitted there is still no suggestion that relation (pure andsimple) is an entity having its own property. Because samÞ yoga (connection) andsamava-ya (inherence) are dependent in some respects, but independent in otherrespects, the words ‘as it were’ have been added between parentheses.

Houben reiterates his difference with Hela- ra- ja in a note appended to his translationof the Praki-rnÞapraka- sa.(FN173) I confess that I find the discussion cited aboveconfusing. VP 3.3.5 says that there is no term which signifies a relation qua relation(svadharmenÞa ‘in its own quality’)(FN174) and that, since a relation is absolutelydependent,(FN175) its characteristic form is not referred to by any particular nominalterm. Accordingly, a relation does indeed have a property, dependence (pa-ratantrya).

Moreover, Houben does not justify choosing his interpretation of taddharmanÞohÞ . Hedoes not demonstrate why one should choose to say that tad in this compound “refersto dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratva in 4.” Hela- ra- ja’s interpretation is at leastwell grounded in BhartrÞhari’s own diction. TaddharmanÞos tu ta-cchabdyam in VP 3.3.6reflects a reasoning which is formulated in several places, both in grammar and inNya-ya. For example, in the Maha-bha-sÞya on 4.1.48, Patañjali says that a term x isused with reference to some Y that is not X, a proper referent of x, for four reasons:because Y is located in or on X, because Y has a property or properties that X has,because Y is located near X, and because Y is accompanied by X.(FN176) Inconsonance with such usage, VP 3.3.6 says that conjunction and inherence are termed(ta- cchabdyam ‘the property of having that for word’, i.e., being so designated)sambandha because they have a property that characterizes a relation. The propertyin question is being dependent on something else (pa- ratantryam), as Hela- ra- ja rightlynotes: one considers that the defining feature of a relation is being dependent;conjunction and inherence have this feature with respect to substances and qualities,so that the term sambandha is used for them.(FN177) On the other hand, these arenot absolutely dependent in that they can be independent entities served by other,dependent, ones. Hence, Hela- ra- ja takes taddharmanÞohÞ in the ka- rika- as equivalent to

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tasyeva dharmo yayohÞ .(FN178) Taddharman used here is then equivalent totaddharmadharma ‘which has a property that is (like) the property of X’, just asusÞtÞramukha (‘camel-face’) used of someone who has a face like that of a camel istantamount to usÞtÞramukhamukha and tatka- la used with reference to vowels that havethe time duration of a given vowel is equivalent to tatka- laka- la.(FN179) Of course, thismeans that tad of taddharmanÞohÞ refers to a relation (sambandha): taddharmahÞ = tasyadharmahÞ ‘property of that’ = sambandhasya dharmahÞ ‘property of a relation’;taddharmadharma = taddharma iva dharmo yasya ‘something which has the propertywhich is the property of that’. This makes good sense, since in VP 3.3.4-6 BhartrÞhariis speaking of a relation and what its basic characteristic is, then speaks of whatconjunction and inherence have in common with this.

5.3. Finally, consider Houben’s translation of a passage from the beginning of thePraki-rnÞ apraka- sa on 3.3.2 (123.11-2): svaru- pa- vivekenaiva hy arthapara- marso’bhidha-nam ucyate vrÞddhavyavaha- ra- t tathaiva sambandhavyutpattehÞ . Hela- ra- ja heresays that only referring to a meaning as not distinguished from the term that signifiesit is spoken of as signifying, and he gives a reason for this: because from the usageof elders the relation between signifier and meaning is learned (... -vyutpattehÞ) in thisway alone. Houben translates (p. 333): “For we speak of ‘expression’ only if thething-meant is grasped as being not different from the own form, because the relationarises in exactly that way [with the thing-meant being not different from the own formof the word] from the usage of the elders.” He thus interprets vyutpatti here to mean‘arising’. This is confusing. If Houben understands that in Hela- ra- ja’s view aword-meaning ‘relation’ arises in the sense of being produced, then Hela- ra- ja is madeto contradic what he says in his commentary on VP 3.3.1, where he emphasizes thatthe relation is not a matter of agreed convention established by men. How, then,should one understand that “the relation arises ... from the usage of the elders”? Onedoes not have to make the effort. For Hela- ra- ja is clearly using vyutpatti here in awell-known sense, with reference to learning a relation. Similarly, vyutpanna refers toone who knows the relation between a sa-dhu term and a given meaning, and vyutpitsurefers to someone who wishes to learn such a relation; see §3.7, with note 49;§§4.2.3-4, and note 110.

6. In his work, Houben has undertaken both to translate rigorously the ka-rika-s ofthe Sambandhasamuddesa and to explain these in a historical and theoreticalperspective. He has in addition not only translated Hela- ra- ja’s commentary on theseverses but also attempted to demonstrate that in important ways Hela- ra- ja hasmisrepresented what BhartrÞhari meant to say and that he has done this by acceptinginterpretations found in the VrÞtti. While attempting to maintain a neutral stance towardsthe question whether the author of the VrÞtti is BhartrÞhari himself, moreover, Houbennevertheless makes it clear that he considers the VrÞtti to have misrepresented what issaid in important ka- rika-s of the Va-kyapadi-ya’s first ka-nÞdÞa.

Houben is to be admired for his ambitious undertaking and for his learning. Forreasons given above, I nevertheless consider that his undertaking has not succeededin some important respects. I think he exaggerates what he calls BhartrÞhari’s“perspectivism.” He also depends too often on vague argumentation and assumptionwhen he attempts to demonstrate that the VrÞtti and Hela- ra- ja have misrepresentedBhartrÞhari’s views. And, for all its rigor, Houben’s translation at times either fails toconvey the intent of the Va-kyapadi-ya clearly or actually misunderstands what BhartrÞhariand Hela- ra- ja say.

I suggest that, instead of seeking to find “our” interpretations of what BhartrÞhari saysas opposed to what we consider misrepresentations on the part of commentators likeHela- ra- ja, we would do well patiently to consider with more receptive minds what all

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these authors say as well as full evidence from scholars representing other schools ofthought on common topics of discussion. ADDED MATERIAL

GEORGE CARDONA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA This is a review-article of: The SamÞ bandha-Samuddesa (Chapter on Relation) and

BhartrÞhari’s Philosophy of Language: A Study of BhartrÞhari’s SamÞ bandha-samuddesa inthe Context of the Va- kyapadi-ya with a Translation of Hela- ra- ja’s Commentary,Praki-rnÞ a-praka- sa. By JAN E. M. HOUBEN. Gonda Indological Studies, vol. II.Groningen: EGBERT FORSTEN, 1995. Pp. 460 + xv. I wish to express here mygratitude to scholars who helped me by reading a draft of this review. I have adoptednumerous suggestions Ashok N. Aklujkar made regarding both style and content.Edwin Gerow suggested important stylistic revisions, which I have also adopted. ClausOetke helped me sharpen thoughts on “perspectivism” and translation. Had it beenpossible, I would have taken his cue and gone much more deeply into both theseissues in general and in connection with BhartrÞhari specifically. Jon Yamashita madeseveral suggestions and corrected many typographic errors. FOOTNOTES

1 For bibliographic information see Cardona 1976: 295-305; forthcoming, §4.2; andRamseier 1993. 2 On the cover and the title page samÞ bandha appears—with mÞ for the bindurepresenting anusva-ra—but elsewhere sambandha. I shall uniformly write sambandha.3 I consider this section the weakest part of Houben’s book. Thus, in subsection 3.1(pp. 46-47), concerning Mi-ma-msa- , he does not even mention Jaiminisu- tra 1.3.8.24ff.,where the issue is taken up whether terms like ga-vi-, gonÞ i- are to be granted authorityin the same way that go is; see below, §4.2. 4 In what follows, I shall refer to the VrÞtti on the Va-kyapadi-ya and to the VrÞttika-ra,although I accept that BhartrÞhari is the author of both works, as well as of theMaha-bha-sÞyadi-pika- . Recent arguments that have been proposed to show that BhartrÞhariand the VrÞttika- ra are distinct are not acceptable, in my opinion. For literature andarguments against some recent claims, see Cardona forthcoming, §4.2.3. 5 These sisÞtÞas are bra-hmanÞas characterized not only by their speech but also by theirmoral behavior, and they inhabit a particular area in the subcontinent. See Cardona1997: 550-54 (§834). In a more general perspective, sisÞtÞas are the carriers of Vedictraditions governing behavior. 6 Another topic that brings up this question is that of how word and meaning areidentified with each other. Due to limitation of space, I do not take this up. 7 A comment is in order concerning the physical aspects of this book. In general, theproduction is good. There are typographical errors, as is to be expected in any bookof this size, but misprints are relatively few and mostly self correcting. One error thatis not appears on page 241, note 380, where a reference is given to “Sharma (1977:147-148).” The correct reference is to pages 247-48. More surprising is the fact thatin both copies which I received—one a review copy, the other a complimentary copyfrom the publisher—pages 145-60 are missing and pages 161-76 are duplicated.Fortunately, M. M. Deshpande did me the favor of copying and sending the missingpages, for which I thank him. 8 I have omitted only a reference to Peri Sarveswara Sharma’s article. 9 The article alluded to has been published: Houben 1992-93. 10 Similarly, Houben 1992-93: 2. 11 Italics in the original. 12 I have omitted references Houben gives here to two articles by him.

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13 VP 1.2: ekam eva yad a-mna- tam bhinnasaktivyapa- sraya- t | aprÞthaktve ’pi saktibhyahÞprÞthaktveneva vartate. 14 VP 1.3: adhya-hitakala- m yasya ka- lasaktim upa- srita- hÞ | janma-dayo vika- ra- hÞ sÞadÞbha-vabhedasya yonayahÞ . 15 ja-yate ‘is born’, asti ‘is, exists’, viparinÞamate ‘changes’, vardhate ‘grows’, apaksÞ i-yate‘diminishes’, vinasyati ‘perishes, ceases to be’. E.g., Nirukta 1.2. 16 adhya- hita- is equivalent to adhya- ropita-, as the Paddhati notes (18.9-10):adhya-hita-hÞ adhya- ropita-hÞ kala-hÞ yasya-hÞ . 17 VP 1.5: pra-ptyupa-yo ’nuka- ras ca tasya vedo maharsÞ ibhihÞ | eko ’py anekavartmevasama-mna-tahÞ prÞthak prÞthak. 18 VP 1.24-26: apoddha-rapada-rtha- ye ye ca- rtha-hÞ sthitalaksÞanÞa-hÞ | anva-khyeya- s ca yesabda- ye ca-pi pratipa-daka-hÞ || ka- ryaka-ranÞabha-vena yogyabha-vena ca sthita-hÞ | dharmeye pratyaye ca- ngam sambandha-hÞ sa-dhvasa-dhusÞu || te lingais ca svasabdais ca sa-stre’sminn upavarnÞ ita-hÞ | smrÞtyartham anugamyante kecid eva yatha-gamam. 19 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65.1): trisÞv apy esÞu slokesÞu prastutasya parisama-ptihÞ . 20 Paddhati 64.21-23: smrÞtyartham iti: na maya- kiñcid apu- rvam kriyate kintusmaranÞa-rtham asÞtÞapada- rthi-samanugama iti prakaranÞaprayojanam a-ha | yatha-gamam iti:notpreksÞaya- api tv a-gama-nusa-renÞeti. 21 VP 1.27: sisÞ tÞebhya a- gama- t siddha- hÞ sa- dhavo dharmasa- dhanam |arthapratya-yana-bhede vipari-ta-s tv asa-dhavahÞ . See below, $4.4.5. 22 VP 1.29: na-narthika-m ima-mÞ kascid vyavastha-m kartum arhati | tasma-n nibadhyatesisÞtÞaihÞ sa-dhutvavisÞaya- smrÞtihÞ . 23 VP 1.43: tasma-d akrÞtakam sa-stram smrÞtim ca sanibandhana-m | a- sritya- rabhyatesisÞtÞaihÞ sa-dhutvavisÞaya- smrÞtihÞ . 24 For the present discussion, it does not matter whether this referent is an individualor an individual qua member of a class delimited by a defining generic property, anexternal existent, or a mental entity. 25 See Houben, p. 20. 26 In the Vaiya- karanÞ asiddha- ntaka- rika- , Vaiya- karanÞ abhu- sÞ anÞ a, andVaiya-karanÞasiddha-ntamañju-sÞa- , as well as abbreviated versions of the last two, theVaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞasa-ra and Vaiya-karanÞasiddha-ntalaghumañju-sÞa-. 27 In their Mi-ma-msa-su- tra and Bha-vana-viveka or Vidhiviveka. 28 In their Nya-yamañjari- and Tattvacinta-manÞ i. 29 VP 2.87: iti va-kyesÞu ye dharma-hÞ pada-rthopanibandhana-hÞ | te sarve na prakalperanpadam cet sya-d ava-cakam. 30 VP 2.88: avibhakte ’pi va-kya- rthe saktibheda-d apoddhrÞte | va- kya-ntaravibha-genayathoktam na virudhyate. 31 VP 2.72: nirjñta- rtham padam yac ca tadarthe pratipa-dite | pika-di yad avijña- tam tatkim ity anuyujyate “There are words whose meanings are understood, and when theirmeanings have been understood, one asks ‘what is ...’ concerning words whosemeanings have not been understood.” I have translated with plural forms under theassumption that padam and so on are generic singulars. The issue of how to interpretwords like pika—which are used among mlecchas but not among sisÞtÞas—is taken upin the A- ryamleccha- dhikaranÞ a of Mi-ma- msa- su- tras (JS 1.3.5.10: coditam tuprati-yeta-virodha- t prama-nÞena), where the siddha-nta is that such terms are to beunderstood in the meanings authorized by mleccha usage and not on the basis ofetymological or grammatical analysis. 32 VP 2.90-92: gavaye narasimhe ca-py ekajña-na-vrte yatha- | bha-gam ja- tyantarasyaivasadrÞsam pratipadyate , aprasiddham tu yam bha-gam adrÞsÞ tÞam anupasyati | ta- vatyasamvidam mu-dÞhahÞ sarvatra pratipadyate , tatha- pika-diyogena va-kye ’tyantavilaksÞanÞe| sadÞ rsasyaiva samjña-nam asato ’rthasya manyate. For 2.90b, I have accepted the

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reading ekajña- na- vrÞte in accordance with PunÞ yara- ja’s commentary, where heparaphrases this with ekajña-nena abhinnena a-vrÞte visÞayi-krÞte paricchinne sati “by oneknowledge: one that is not split up, when ... is covered: when ... has been made theobject of ..., has been determined.” That is, a gayal or Narasimha is the object of asingle undifferentiated knowledge. The reading shown appears also in K. A.Subramania Iyer’s and Raghuna- tha Sarma- ’s editions, as well as in A. N. Aklujkar’sunpublished edition. Rau’s edition, based on the ka- rika- manuscripts alone, readsekajña-na-d rÞte “without....” Under this reading, the verse speaks of one’s understandinga part that is similar to what pertains to a totally different generic class without actuallyhaving a cognition of such a part in a gayal or Narasimha. In Aklujkar’s edition, 2.90has va-py instead of ca-py and 2.91 is: aprasiddham tu yad bha-gam adrÞsÞtÞam anupasyati| ta-vat tv asamvidan mu-dÞhahÞ sarvam na pratipadyate. 33 VP 2.16: asabdo yadi va- kya- rthahÞ pada- rtho ’pi tatha- bhavet | evam ca satisambandhhÞ sabdasya- rthena hi-yate. I have adopted the reading asabdo instead ofRau’s asa-bdo on the basis of the VrÞtti. The argument advanced in this verse isobviously against Bha- tÞtÞa Mi-ma-msakas, who let individual words signify their meaningsand then have these word meanings come into relation to yield a meaning that is notsignified by any speech unit. See Cardona 1983: 148-51. 34 VP 2.73: sa-marthyapra- itam yac ca vyaktyartham anusÞajyate | srutir eva-nusÞangenÞaba- dhika- lingava- kyayohÞ . This alludes to what is said in JS 3.3.7.14:srutilingava- kyaprakaranÞ astha- nasama- khya- na- na- m samava- ye pa- radaurbalyamarthaviprakarsÞa- t, which is actually cited in the VrÞtti on VP 2.75. Direct expression,indirect inference due to the capacity of something said to serve as as indication thatsomething else must obtain, use of a term with another in a single utterance, themutual expectation between the meanings of terms, collocation, and the use of aderived term are placed on a scale such that each later factor has less weight thanan earlier one in case of both coming into play for interpreting a given statement. TheVrÞtti on VP 2.73 (itas ca-vibha-gapaksÞo na yuktahÞ | srutiva-kyasamava-ye srutitva-visesÞenÞaparadaurbalya-sambhava-t) begins by noting that this gives another reason (itas ca) whyit is not proper to consider an utterance as a single indivisible whole (avibha-gapaksÞona yuktahÞ ). If both sruti and va-kya come into play (srutiva-kyasamava-ye), under thisview it is impossible to make a decision, because it is not possible that one be lessstrong than the other, since there is no distinction in that there is simply sruti.BhartrÞhari takes up the same issues in the Ja- tisamuddesa (VP 3.1.75-76) andconsiders also the possibility that the referents of both terms are directly linked to theaction. These issues cannot be discussed here. 35 This example is given in PunÞyara- ja’s commentary on VP 2.95. PunÞyara- ja here alsoemphasizes that the argument is made against those who assume that only padas arereal: yadi pada-ny eva satya-ni tada- dadhy a-nayetya-disamhita-ya-m ru-pavina- sa- t padasyaniyatasya-bha-ve kam avadhim grÞhi-tva- tadartho vivicyata-m ... 36 VP 2.95: ru-pana- se pada-na-m sya- t katham ca-vadhikalpana- | agrÞhi-ta-vadhau sabdekatham ca-rtho vivicyate. 37 SlV, Va-kya-dhikaranÞa 178: tatha- ra- ja- rthava-n drÞsÞtÞo ra- jñety atra ca na-sty asau | dadhigaur iti na-pi-mau vidmo dadhy atra ga-m iti. 38 SlV, Va- kya- dhikaranÞa 230: asa- bde ca- pi va- kya- rthe na pada- rthesÞv asa- bdata- |va-kya-rthasyeva naitesÞa-m nimitta-ntarasambhavahÞ . 39 Houben (1993: 160) remarks, “It should be pointed out that even according to theview that the sentence is the primary unit, it is acceptable to divide the sentencesecondarily into words and these into smaller parts.” I cannot enter here into detailsconcerning passages from the Di-pika- . 40 PunÞyara- ja introduces this, saying sphotÞapaksÞam apy upasamhartum a-ha “He says... to summarize the position that an utterance is sphotÞa.”

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41 K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition reads ekasyaiva-rthata-m “only one has meaning,”which is found in the VrÞtti on VP 2.75. 42 VP 2.56: nityatve samuda-ya-na- m ja- ter va- parikalpane | ekasyaika- rthata-m a-hurva-kyasya-vyabhica- rinÞ i-m. This follows ka- rika-s (VP 2.54-55) summarizing the position thata sentence is a composite of words whose meanings enter into relations with eachother and the view that the sequence of words itself constitutes the utterance. 43 VPTÞ i-ka- 2.57. 44 The contrasting views are set forth in VP 2.58: padaprakrÞtibha-vas ca vrÞttibhedenavarnÞyate | pada-na-m samhita- yonihÞ samhita- va- pada- sraya- . BhartrÞhari goes on todiscuss places in the Maha-bha-sÞya where Patañjali speaks of padas as products whichauthors of padapa-tÞhas (padaka- ra-hÞ ) produce. 45 VPVrÞ 2.58: tatra kesÞa-ñcit paurusÞeya-nÞy a-mna-yapada-ni sabdesÞu smrÞtipaksÞasya va- |kesÞa-ñcit tu padaru-pa eva-mna-yahÞ samhita- paurusÞeyi- smrÞtipaksÞasya va- | kesÞa-ñcit tunitya-v ubha-v apy etau sama-mna-yau padasama-mna-yas tu pratipa-dakatvena nityahÞitaras tu pratipa-dyatvena nityahÞ | kesÞa-ñcin nityasyaikasya-mna-yasya dve ete nityevibha-ga-vibha-gasakti- pratipa-dakapratipattavyaru-penÞa vartete. 46 Hela- ra- ja, introduction to VP 3.1.1: iha pada- rtha- sÞ tÞakaparatva- d va- kyapadi-yasyaprathamaka- nÞ dÞ ena prayojana- dipada- rthe nirnÞ i-te ’nantaraka- nÞ dÞ opapa- ditopapattibhirva- kyatadarthayor anva- khyeyasthitalaksÞ anÞ ayohÞ pada- rthayor nirnÞ i-tatva- ttadaupayika-poddha-rapadavica- rahÞ prakramyate. 47 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65.1-3): tatra-poddha- rapada- rtho na-ma- tyantasamsrÞsÞ tÞahÞ samsarga-danumeyena parikalpitena ru-penÞa prakrÞtavivekahÞ sannapoddhriyate | praviviktasya hitasya vastuno vyavaha-ra- ti-tam ru-pam. 48 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65: 3-4): tat tu svapratyaya- nuka- renÞ a yatha- gamambha-vana-bhya-savasa-d utpreksÞaya- pra-yenÞa vyavastha-pyate. 49 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65: 4-6): tathaiva ca- pravibha- ge sabda- tmani ka- rya- rthamanvayavyatireka- bhya- m ru- pasamanugamakalpanaya- samuda- ya- d apoddhrÞta- na- msabda-na-m abhidheyatvena- sri-yate. This point is also emphasized elsewhere. VP 2.12states that vrÞsÞabha ‘bull’ (cf. rÞsÞabha ‘bull’), udaka ‘water’ (cf. udan ‘water’), ya-vaka‘food made from barley’ (cf. ya-va ‘food made from barley’) contain meaningless parts;they are analyzed, to be sure, and this is done by reasoning through anvaya andvyatireka, but anvaya and vyatireka are merely a means allowing one to speak of suchitems in terms of grammatical operations describing them through derivation (bha-gairanarthakair yukta- vrÞsÞabhodakaya-vaka-hÞ | anvayavyatirekau tu vyavaha-ranibandhanam).Commenting on this ka- rika- , PunÞyara- ja remarks as follows: There is no understandingof the meaning of an element rÞsÞabha separately in vrÞsÞabha or that of udan, ya-va inudaka, ya-vaka. However, how would one who does not know be instructed in thegrammar except through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka with respect to bases andaffixes? Thus also, the only view that is appropriate is that an impartite sentence aloneis a signifier (nahi vrÞsÞabhe rÞsÞabhasyodakaya-vakayor vodaya-vasabdayor artha-nugamahÞkascid asti api tu sa-stre padasya prakrÞtipratyayayor anvayavyatireka-bhya-m vina- kathamajño vyutpa-dyeta | evañca niramsam eva va-kyam va-cakam ity eva yuktam). 50 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65: 6-7): so ’yam apoddha- rapada- rthahÞ sa-stravyavaha-ram anupatatisa-stravyavaha-rasadÞ rsam ca laukikabhedavyavaha-ram. 51 Paddhati 64.26-65.1: apoddha- ranÞam samsargapu- rvakam iti pu- rva-vastha-m a-haatyantasamsrÞsÞtÞa iti | vibha-gapu- rvakasamsarganisÞedha-ya- tyantagrahanÞam. 52 Paddhati 65.10-12: katham niravayavatva- t prÞthakkriyety a- ha anumeyeneti |anvayavyatireka-bhya-m bha-ga-numa-na- t | ta-v eva niravayave katham ity a-ha kalpiteneti| asatyata-m anvayavyatirekayor a-ha. Much later, Na-gesa again makes the same pointwhen he says (LM 14): ... prativa-kye sanketagraha-sambhava- t tadanva-khya-nasyalaghu- pa- yena- sambhava- c ca kalpanaya- pada- ni pravibhajya pade

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prakrÞtipratyayabha- gakalpanena kalpita- bhya- m anvayavyatireka- bhya- mtattadarthavibha-gam sa-strama- travisÞayam parikalpayanti sma-ca- rya-hÞ “Since it is notpossible to grasp a conventional relation with respect to each sentence and alsobecause it is not possible to describe each sentence in a brief manner, teachersfictitiously divided up words and, by assuming bases and affixes as separate parts ina word, posited such and such meaning parts—whose domain is solely thegrammar—through assumed anvaya and vyatireka.” The assumption that one can thuscarry out reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka with respect to putative parts in turnrests on the assumption that certain things that look similar are in fact the same.BhartrÞhari makes this point frequently, as in VP 2.92 (see §3.5, with note 32); see alsoabove with note 49. 53 Paddhati 65.15-16: yatahÞ pravibhaktaihÞ padr-thair na pravrÞttinivrÞttilaksÞanÞo vyavaha-rahÞ... samsrÞsÞtÞair eveti. 54 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (68: 5-6): anva-khyeya- s ca ye sabda- hÞ : kesÞa- ñcit pada-vadhikamanva-khya-nam va-kya-vadhikam ekesÞa-m. My earlier wording (Cardona 1976: 301: “... inaddition to the sentence, some take syntactic units (pada) as the units to be analysed”)was poor, since one could misunderstand the intent. I should not have used ‘analysed’.55 The VrÞtti goes on to give examples such that Pa-nÞ ini could be understood to workunder the padasamska- rapaksÞa in addition to the va- kyasamska- rapaksÞa. I cannotdiscuss this point here. 56 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (77.1): sthitalaksÞanÞas tu ss-tre pada-rtho va-kya- rtho va- . The VrÞtti goeson to explain just what this meaning is. I do not think it is necessary to consider thishere. 57 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (66.4-67.1): tatha- pu- rvapada- rtha uttarapada- rtho ‘nyapada- rthahÞpra- tipadikr-tho dha- tvarthahÞ pratyaya- rtha ity ekapadava-cyo ‘py aniyata-vadhir bahudha-

pravibhajya kaiscit kathañcid apoddhriyate. 58 VP 2.7-9: yathaika eva sarva- rthapraka- sahÞ pravibhajyate | drÞsyabheda-nuka- renÞava-kya-rtha-nugamas tatha- || citrasyaikasya ru-pasya yatha- bhedanidarsanaihÞ | ni-la-dibhihÞsama-khya- nam kriyate bhinnalaksÞanÞ aihÞ || tathaivaikasya va- kyasya nira- ka- nksÞasyasarvatahÞ | sabda-ntaraihÞ sama-khya-nam sa-ka- nksÞair anugamyate. In 2.7d, I have adoptedthe reading va-kya-rtha-nugamas tatha- , found in the editions of Raghuna- tha Sarma- , K.A. Subramania Iyer, and Aklujkar, instead of Rau’s va-kya-rtha-vagamas tatha- , for tworeasons: this accords with 2.9d anugamyate and it is the reading reflected inPunÞyara- ja’s commentary. 59 VP 2.10: yatha- pade vibhajyante prakrÞtipratyaya-dayahÞ | apoddha-ras tatha- va-kyepada-na-m upapadyate. K. A. Subramania Iyer’s and Raghuna- tha Sarma- ’s editions haveupavarnÞyate ‘is described’, which occurs also in PunÞyara- ja’s TÞ i-ka- . 60 VP 3.1.1.-2: dvidha- kaiscit padam bhinnam caturdha- pañcadha-pi va- | apoddhrÞtyaivava-kyebhyahÞ prakrÞtipratyaya-divat || pada- rtha-na-m apoddha- re ja- tir va- dravyam eva va- |padr-thau sarvasabda-na-m nitya-v evopavarnÞ itau. 61 Due to space limitations, I have omitted discussing evidence from theMaha-bha-sÞyadi-pika- , which, though understandably scantier than the evidence from theVa-kyapadi-ya and its VrÞtti, nevertheless is in harmony with it. 62 Helara- ja 3.1.2 (8.4-5): tatha- hi sarvesÞ a- m api sabda- na- m padaru- pa- nÞ a- mÞna-ma-khya- ta-disvabha-va-na-m ja- tiva-dimate ja- tir eva- rtho na dravyam | dravyava-dimate tudravyam eva na ja- tihÞ . Hela- ra- ja goes on to say that the use of va- ‘or’ twice in theka-rika- indicates a third view: that a term signifies an individual qualified by a genericproperty. This need not be discussed here. 63 What is more, as is pointed out in the VrÞtti on VP 1.24-26 (67: 1-2: sthitalaksÞanÞastu va- kyaru- popagrahahÞ kalpitodde-savibha- go vis isÞ tÞa ekahÞ kriya- tma-

vicchinnapada-rthagrahanÞopa-yapratipa-dyahÞ ), in the Pa-nÞ ini-ya scheme of things, the fixed

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meaning that is linked to a sentence is an action (kriya- tma-), qualified by the ka- rakasthat participate in bringing this to completion, and this meaning is conveyed using themeanings of abstracted words as means. One such abstracted word is a verb form.Accordingly, a separate samuddesa is devoted to considering what an action is. 64 In what follows, I will use sa-dhusabda (or simply sabda) and apasabda (orapabhramsa where appropriate) to refer to terms of the types (3) and (4), respectively.In accordance with usage in various schools of thought, I will also use sakti (‘power,capacity’) as a cover term to refer to several things: the capacity that a given term hasto produce a verbal cognition (bodhakatva) of a given meaning and a relation thatholds directly between a given term and a meaning. The latter is considered to be awish (iccha-) that a given meaning be understood from a term or that a term producethe cognition of a given meaning as well as a signifier-significand relation(va-cyava-cakabha-vasambandha). These positions are most prominently associated withKaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa, the Naiya-yikas, and Na-gesa. 65 Conversely, if (3) is treated as derived from (4), the latter signify directly and theformer signify indirectly, through the intermediary of (4). See §4.4.4. 66 Bh I.5.20-22: laghi-ya- ñ sabdopadeso gari-ya- n apasabdopadesahÞ | ekaikasyasabdasya bahavo ’pabhramsa- hÞ | tad yatha- gaur ity asya sabdasya ga- vi- gonÞ i-

gopotalika-dayo ’pabhramsa-hÞ . 67 Bh I.10.6-8: jña-ne dharma iti cet tatha-dharmahÞ pra-pnoti | yo hi sabda-ñ ja-na- tyapasabda-n apy asau ja-na- ti | yathaiva sabdajña-ne dharma evam apasabdajña-ne ’pyadharmahÞ | athava- bhu- ya-n adharmahÞ pra-pnoti | bhu- ya- mso ’pasabda- alpi-ya- msahÞsabda-hÞ | ekaikasya sabdasya bahavo ’pabhrama- shÞ | tad yatha- gaur ity asya sabdasyaga-vi- gonÞ i- gopotalika-dayo ’pabhramsa-hÞ . See Cardona 1997: 549 (§833). 68 Bh. I.8.20-22: evam iha-pi sama- na- ya- m arthagatau sabdena ca- pasabdena cadharmaniyamahÞ kriyate: sabdenaiva- rtho ’bhidheyo na-pasabdeneti. See Cardona 1997:547 (§830). 69 Such items are not just nominals. They are also verb forms. Thus, in 1.3.1 vt. 12,Ka-tya-yana says that one reason for listing verb bases in the Dha- tupa-tÞha is to preventthe class name dha- tu from applying to a set of terms a- nÞ apayati and so on(bhu-va-dipa- tÞhahÞ pra- tipadika-nÞapayatya-dinivrÞttyarthahÞ ). Patañjali gives as examples alsovatÞtÞati and vadÞdÞhati. These are clearly Middle Indic equivalents of Sanskrit a- jña-payati‘commands’, vartate ‘occurs’, and vardhate ‘grows’, with active rather than middleendings and phonological developments characteristic of Middle Indic. 70 From earliest known times, Pa-nÞ ini-yas maintained this, as is clear from Ka- tya-yana’sfirst va-rttika (siddhe sabda-rthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte sabdaprayoge sa-strenÞadharmaniyamahÞ). In accordance with this, as interpreted in the Maha-bha-sÞya, BhartrÞharisays that great rÞsÞ is—authors of su- tras such as Pa-nÞ ini, authors of va-rttikas and authorsof bha-sÞyas—have handed down the tradition that linguistic units, their meanings, andthe relations between the two are eternal (VP 1.23: nitya-hÞ sabda- rthasambandha-statra-mna- ta- maharsÞ ibhihÞ | su- tra-nÞa-m sa-nutantra-nÞa-m bha-sÞya-nÞa-m ca pranÞetrÞbhihÞ ). 71 Bh. I.19.21-23: asaktija- nukaranÞ a- rthahÞ | asaktya- kaya- cid bra-hmanÞ ya- rÞtaka itiproyoktavya lÞtaka iti prayuktam | tasya-nukaranÞam bra-hmanÞy lÞtaka ity a-ha kuma-ry lÞtakaity a-heti. 72 JS 1.3.8.24: prayogotpattyasa-stratva-c chabdesÞu na vyavastha- sya- t. 73 SBh 1.3.8.24 (II.182-83): gaur ga- vi- gonÞ i- gopotalikety evama- dayahÞ sabda-

uda-haranÞam | gosabdo yatha- sa-sna-dimati prama-nÞam kim tatha- ga-vya-dayo ’py uta netisandehahÞ | kim atraikahÞ sabdo ’vicchinnapa- ramparyo ’rtha-bhidha-yi- itare ’pabhramsa- utasarve ’na-dayahÞ . 74 SBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): sarva iti bru- mahÞ | kutahÞ | pratyaya- t | prati-yate higa-vya-dibhyahÞ sa-sna-dima-n arthahÞ | tasma-d ito varsÞasate ’py asya- rthasya sambandha

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a-si-d eva tatahÞ parenÞa tatas ca parenÞety ana-dita- | karta- ca-sya sambandhasya na-sti-tivyavasthitam eva. Cf. JS 1.1.1.5: autpattikas tu sabdasya-rthena sambandhahÞ ... 75 SBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): tasma- t sarve sa-dhavahÞ sarvair bha-sÞ itavyam | sarve hisa-dhayanty artham yatha- hastahÞ karahÞ pa-nÞ ir iti. 76 SBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): artha-ya hy eta ucca-ryante na-drÞsÞtÞa-ya | na hy esÞa-m ucca- ranÞesa-stram asti | tasma-n na vyavatisÞtÞheta kascid eka eva sa-dhur itare ’sa-dhava iti. 77 JS 1.3.8.25: sabde prayatnanisÞpatter apara- dhasya bha- gitvam. I have takenprayatnanisÞpattehÞ as an ablative stating a reason. This is the first interpretationKuma- rila gives (TV II.211: prayatnanisÞpatter itipu- rvoktanya-ya-vadha- ritaprayatna-bhivyaktir eva hetutvenopadisyate), although he goeson to give alternative interpretations, which cannot be considered here. 78 SBh 1.3.8.25 (II.210-13): tatra-para-dhyeta-py ucca- rayita- yatha- susÞke patisÞya-mi-tikardame patati sakrÞd upaspraksÞya- mi-ti dvir upasprÞsati | tato ’para- dha- t pravrÞtta-ga-vya-dayo bhaveyur na niyogato ’vicchinnapa-ramparya- eveti. 79 JS 1.3.8.26: anya-yas ca-nekasabdatvam. Accepting many terms would require alsoaccepting many separate relations between these terms and the single meaning, thusresulting in prolixity. 80 JS 1.3.8.27: tatra tattvam abhiyogavisesÞa- t. tatra can refer to the items underdiscussion or to the doubt concerning them. tattvam (‘being that’) is best interpreted torefer to the properties of being correct or incorrect. The property of being learned(abhiyoga) characterizes the authoritative learned (abhiyukta) speakers who instituterestrictions, that is, the tradition of grammarians. Kuma-rila (TV II.215) and Somesvara(Nya-yasudha- 310) explicitly bring in the connection with grammar. 81 SBh 1.3.8.27 (II.215): ... yam abhiyukta- upadisanty esÞa eva sa-dhur iti sa-dhur ityavagantavyahÞ | 82 JS 1.3.8.28: tadasaktis ca-nuru-patva- t. See note 84. 83 TV 1.3.8.25 (II.214): yatha- ca prakrÞtisa- ru-pyadva- renÞ a-pabhramsa-hÞ pra- krÞti-m evasaktim a-virbha-vayanto ’rthapratipatta-v upayogam gacchanti tatha- tadasaktis ca-nuru-pya-dity atra varnÞayisÞyate. See below concerning Sabara’s description of what occurs. 84 SBh 1.3.8.28 (II.228): atha yad uktam artho ’vagamyate ga-vya-dibhyahÞ ata esÞa-mapy ana- dir arthena sambandha iti tadasaktir esÞ a- m gamyate | gosabdamucca-rayituka-mena kenacid asaktya- ga-vi-ty ucca- ritam | aparenÞa jña- tam sa-sna-dima-n asyavivaksÞ itahÞ tadartham gaur ity ucca- rayituka-mo ga-vi-ty ucca-rayati | tatahÞ siksÞ itva- ’pare ’pisa-sna-dimati vivaksÞ ite ga-vi-ty ucca-rayanti | tena ga-vya-dibhyahÞ sa-sna-dima-n avagamyate| anuru-po hi ga-vya-dir gosabdasya. As shown, Sabara says tadasaktir esÞa-m gamyate,and esÞa-m must refer contextually to the apabhramsa terms ga-vi- and so on, so thattadasaktihÞ has here to be interpreted as a sÞasÞtÞhi-tatpurusÞa (= tesÞa-m asaktihÞ ) in whichtad refers to sa-dhu terms like go, and asakti denotes the absence of sakti whichpertains to them: apabhramsa terms lack the sakti which sa-dhu terms have. 85 JS 1.3.8.29: ekadesatva-c ca- vibhaktivyatyaye sya- t. 86 SBh 1.3.8.29 (II.228): ata eva vibhaktivyatyaye ’pi pratyayo bhavati | asmakaira-gaccha-mi-ty asmakaikadesa upalabhyate | asmakebhya ity eva sabdahÞ smaryate | tato’smakebhya ity esÞo ’rtha upalabhyate | evam ga-vya-didarsana-d gosabdasmaranÞam tatahÞsa-sna-dima-n avagamyate. The examples are well chosen: ga-vi- and so on are MiddleIndic, and in Middle Indic the instrumental plural and ablative plural merge, with theform etymologically equivalent to the Old Indo-Aryan instrumental serving bothfunctions. 87 The passage in question concerns the issue noted above. The claim is advancedthat there is no occasion to assume that the use of terms like ga-vi- in signifying whatis also signified by go had a beginning, since it is not recorded in any smrÞti that suchterms had their relation with their referent created by someone. This claim is refuted

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by showing how there can be a beginning for the use of ga-vi- and so on. This occursin the way that a child pronounces while wishing to utter something else; e.g., katta-

and vinÞ nÞ uhÞ instead of karta- and visÞnÞ uhÞ . (BrÞhati- III.143: ... na ca ga- vya- di-na- mghatÞa-di-na-m iva sambandhasya karta- smaryate | tasma-d a-dimatta-ya- avasara eva na-sti| satyam yady avasaro na asti tv asau | drÞsyate hi ba- la- na- manyasabdocca-ranÞeccha-ya-m api sabda-ntarocca-ranÞam yatha- karteccha-ya-m katteti visÞnÞurvinÞnÞur iti). 88 RÞ juP III.143: idam atra- bhipretam: kenacid gosabdam ucca- rayituka- menaapatÞukaranÞ ena prama- da- dina- va- ga- vi-ty ucca- ritam | tatra vrÞddha- ntarenÞ a kenacitprakaranÞa-dina- tadi-ya- m vivaksÞa-m avagamya gosabda- rtham prati-tya tena vyavaha- rahÞpravartitahÞ | tatra-nya-bhya-m avyutpanna-bhya-m bhra-ntyaivam avadha-ritam: ga-vi-sabda-deva-nena-yam artho ’vyavadha-nena pratipanna iti | tatas ca ta-bhya- m sa- sna-dimativa- cakatvam ga-vi-sabdasya bhra- ntyaiva- vadha- ritam | tatha- vasa- yinau tena sabdenavyavahrÞtavantau | tadvyavaha- ra-d ba- la- apare ’vyutpattya- vyavaharanti-ty a-dimattaya-

vyavaha- rasiddhihÞ . 89 I say this because Gangesa uses the perfect babhu-va (see note 90). 90 TC IV.2.642-43: nanu mleccha-di-na-m samskrÞtam aja-nata-m katham tacchaktya- ropahÞ| ucyate | kenacid gaur iti sabde prayoktavye prama- da- d ga- vi-sabde prayuktevyutpannas tena gosabdam unni-ya tato ga- m prati-tya vyavahrÞtava- n | yatha-huhÞ :amba-mbeti yada- ba- lahÞ siksÞyama-nÞahÞ prabha-sÞate | avyaktam ’tadvida- m tena vyaktebhavati nirnÞaya iti | pa- rsvasthas ca vyutpitsur ga-vi-sabda-d eva-yam ga-m prati-tava-n ityavagamya ga-vi-sabdam eva gosaktatvena prati-tya-nyesÞa-m vyutpa-dako babhu-veti | tatahÞprabhrÞty apabhramse saktatvabhramahÞ . The reference is to VP 1.179 (see §4.4.4).Earlier (TC IV.641), Gangesa cites also JS 1.3.8.26 (see note 79) to buttress one ofthe arguments against granting aprabhramsa terms the sakti relation. Na-gesa portraysthe same situation; see §4.6.4. 91 In order to shorten the presentation, I am taking the Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞasa-ra asmy basic source, giving abbreviated references to the Vaiya- karanÞ abhu- sÞanÞ a, asappropriate. For the same reason, I do not deal with what BhatÞtÞoji says in hisSabdakaustubha concerning what constitutes sa-dhutva and whether apabhramsa termssignify—directly or indirectly—as well as what is said on the same topic in texts suchas the Padamañjari- and Uddyotana. 92 VBh 218 (end of ka- rika- 37): tasma-d bodhakatvam saktir iti mate na kascid dosÞa itisiddham. Although this sakti is indeed a capacity that resides in words as signifiers,it is not strictly speaking a relation. 93 VBhS 296: nanv evam bha-sÞa-dito bodhadarsana-d bodhakata- ru-pa- saktis tatra-pi sya- t| tatha- ca sa-dhuta-pi sya- t | saktatvasyaiva sa-dhuta-ya- vya-karanÞa-dhikaranÞe pratipa-dana- t.... VBh. 218 (introduction to ka-rika- 38): nanv evam bha-sÞa-dito ’pi bodhadarsana- t tatra-pisaktisvi-ka- ra a-vasyakahÞ ... tatha- ca saktimattva-visesÞa-d ga-vya-di-na-m sa-dhuta-pattihÞ iti ced.... The allusion in the Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞasa-ra is to the section of the Jaiminisu- trasdiscussed above in §4.2.1. 94 va-cakahÞ , glossed (VBhS 296) as bodhakahÞ . 95 anuma-nena. In the Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞa, KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa says this means ‘due toremembering a sa- dhu term’ or ‘due to erroneously attributing sakti’ (VBh. 218:anuma-nena sa-dhusmaranÞa- t saktibhrama-d va- ). In his shorter work, he explains this witha parallel: apabhramsa terms serve for recalling sa-dhu terms (sa-dhusabdam anuma-ya“after recalling the sa-dhu term”) just as written symbols serve to recall spoken sounds;they do not directly signify, so that they are not sa-dhu. VBhS 296: asa-dhur ga-vya-diranuma-nena sabdam anuma-ya va-cako bodhakahÞ kaiscid isÞyate | tatha- ca lipivat tesÞa-msa-dhusmaranÞa evopayogo na tu sa-ksÞa- ttaddva-cakatvam ato na sa-dhutvam iti bha-vahÞ .Harivallabha (DarpanÞa 296: anuma-nam atra smrÞtihÞ anu pasca-n ma-nam iti vyutpattehÞ

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na tu vya-ptijña-nam tacchu-nya-na-m api sa-bdabodhadarsana-t) notes that anuma-na hererefers to recollection and that the anuma-na in question is not inference throughknowledge of pervasion, since one sees that even those who do not have a knowledgeof pervasion as applicable to inference have a verbal cognition from asa-dhu terms. TheVrÞtti on VP 1.180 invokes the example of fire and smoke (see §4.4.4, with note 135),but this can be used as a parallel: an asa-dhu term calls to mind a sa-dhu term assmoke calls fire to mind. 96 VBh 218: atra naiya-yika-di-na-m sama-dhim a-ha prathama-rdhena: asa-dhur anuma-nenava-cakahÞ kaiscid isÞyate | va-ca-katva-visesÞe va- niyamahÞ punÞyapa-payohÞ . This is ka- rika- 38of BhatÞtÞoji’s Vaiya-karanÞ asiddha-ntaka- rika- . Although the verse is taken from theVa-kyapadi-ya (3.3.30), KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa treats it simply as part of BhatÞtÞoji’s text uponwhich he comments. Given that KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa was BhatÞtÞoji’s nephew, there is noreason to doubt that this was intended. In the Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞasa-ra, KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞaintroduces the ka- rika- saying that BhatÞtÞoji answers in two ways the doubt set forthearlier (ity a- sanka- m dvidha- sama-dhatte). However, he later (VBhS 298: ida- ni-msvamatam a-ha) introduces the second half of the verse saying that now BhatÞtÞoji stateshis own view. 97 The interpretation preferred by commentators is that apabhramsa terms areapparently identified with sa- dhu terms: Paddhati on VP 1.177 (141) (230.20-21:ta- da- tmyam iti: sa- dhusabda- tmata- m pratipadya; DarpanÞ a 297: gopada ucca- ranÞ i-yekaranÞ a- pa- tÞavena ga- vi-ty ucca- ritam | vastuto gopadam evedam iti ta- da- tmyenabha-sama-na- ga-vya-disabda- gava-dipada- rthasya praka- saka- ity arthah; Pari-ksÞa- 297:ta-da- tmyeti: sa-dhuta-da- tm-yapraka-rakajña-navisesÞyata-m pra-pya vety arthahÞ . There is alsoanother interpretation, under which apabÞhramsa terms are identified with meanings justas sa-dhu terms are; e.g., VBhSKa-sika- 422: ta-da- tmyam upagamyeveti: arthata-da-tmyamgagarya-disabde grÞhi-tvety arthahÞ . In view of the comparison the VrÞtti draws betweenthis identification and the way of communicating through gestures (see $4.4.4, withnote 128), I consider the first interpretation preferable. 98 I assume that this has to do with a child learning to address its mother, so that themother uses the vocative; cf. Ra-maprasa-da Tripa- tÞhi- 1990: 129. Of course, amba-mbetican also refer to the nominative amba- repeated. 99 The reading bambeti yatha- ba- lahÞ in VP 1.179a is known from commentators (e.g.,VBhS-Ka- sika- 423). See $4.4.4, with note 134. 100 smrÞtisa-strenÞa. In the first instance this encompasses grammars like Pa-nÞ ini’s, butalso includes other works, such as dictionaries, which have to do with the transmissionof speech, and other authoritative works. There is also a reading smrÞtima- trenÞa. 101 VBhS 296-97: uktam hi va-kyapadi-ye: te sa-dhusÞv anuma-nena pratyayotpattihetavahÞ| ta-da- tmyam upagamyeva sabda-rthasya praka- saka-hÞ na sisÞtÞair anugamyante parya-ya-

iva sa-dhavahÞ | te yatahÞ smrÞtisa-strenÞa tasma- t sa-ksÞa-d ava-caka-hÞ amba-mbeti yada- ba- lahÞsiksÞama-nÞahÞ prabha-sÞate | avyaktam tadvida- m tena vyakte bhavati nirnÞayahÞ | evamsa-dhau prayoktavye yo ’pabhramsÞahÞ prayujyate | tena sa-dhuvyavahitahÞ kascid artho‘bhidhi-yate. These verses are cited in VBh 219 also after a short series of argumentsthat ends with na ca- pabhramsa- d bodho na sya- d iti va- cyam vyutpannasyasa-dhusmaranÞa-d bodhopapattehÞ | uktam hi va-kyapadi-ya a-gamasamuccayaka-nÞdÞasesÞe“Nor should one say that there would be no cognition from an apabhramsa item, sincea cognition is accounted for from remembering a sa-dhu item. It has been said in thesupplement to the A- gamasamuccayaka-nÞdÞa in the Va-kyapadi-ya.” The verses are VP1.177-80. I have given them as they appear in Aklujkar’s edition, which differs slightlyfrom Rau’s. 102 VBhS 297-98: nanv apabhramsa- na- m sa- ksÞ a- d ava- cakatve kim ma- namsaktikalpakavyavaha- ra-des tulyatva-d iti cet | satyam | tattaddesabhinnesÞu tesÞu tesÞu

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saktikalpane gaurava- t | na ca parya-yatulyata- sankya- | tesÞa-m sarvadesesÞv ekatva-dvinigamana- virahenÞ a sarvatra saktikalpana- | na hy apabhramse tatha- | anyatha-

bha-sÞa- nÞ a- m parya-yataya- ganÞ ana- pattehÞ | evañca saktatvam eva- stu sa- dhutvam itinaiya-yikami-ma-msa-di-na-m matam. KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa speaks of verbal communication andso on (vyavaha- ra-dehÞ ), since with respect to sa-dhu terms not only usage but alsogrammar and lexicon have authority. As can be seen the arguments are thoseconsidered earlier ($4.2.1). The claim that the same sa-dhu and apabhramsa terms aredifferentiated in that the former are used everywhere is not acceptable even fromPa-nÞ inian tradition, as Na-gesa later notes (see $4.3.2, with note 118). 103 VBhS 298-99: ida-ni-m svamatam a- ha va- cakatva-visesÞe ceti | ayam bha-vahÞ :apabhramsa-na-m asaktatve tato bodha eva na sya- t | na ca sa-dhusmaranÞa-t tato bodhahÞ| ta- n avidusÞa- m pa- mara- nÞ a- m api bodha- t | tesÞa- m sa- dhor abodha- c ca | na casaktibhrama- t tebhyo bodhahÞ | bodhakatvasya-ba-dhena tadgrahasya-bhramatva- t. Cf. VBh220: atrocyate: apabhramsa- na- m abodhakatve tato bodha eva na sya- t | na casa-dhusmaranÞa-d bodhahÞ | tam avidusÞa-m ja-yama-natva- t tasma-d aja-yama-natva-c ca ...na-pi saktibhrama- t tato bodhahÞ | bodhakatvasya-ba-dhena tajjña-nasya-bhramatva- t. 104 These speakers are usually viewed as incapable of pronouncing in certain ways(vigunÞa ‘lacking a quality’) due to some fault in their articulatory organs. E.g., DarpanÞa,Pari-ksÞa- 300: vaigunÞyam ca karanÞa-pa-tÞavaru-pam. VrÞsÞabha, on the other hand, says thatthe speakers can be faulty also due to inattention, laziness, and deprivations such asthirst, and hunger: Paddhati 232.25-233.1: vigunÞ esÞv iti: [a]sakti[hÞ ]prama-da- lasyatrÞtÞksÞudha-di. 105 VbhS 300: uktam ca va-kyapadi-ye: pa- ramparya-d apabhramsa- vigunÞesÞv abhidha-trÞsÞu| prasiddhim a-gata- yesÞu tesÞa-m sa-dhur ava-cakahÞ | daivi- va-g vyavaki-rnÞeyam asaktairabhidha- trÞbhihÞ | anityadarsina-m tv asmin va-de buddhiviparyayahÞ iti. The ka- rika-s citedare the next-but-final verses of the first ka-nÞdÞa of the Va-kyapadi-ya (1.181-82). VBh 220introduces the same verses with uktam hi va-kyapadi-ye. KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa does not givean exegesis of the first ka- rika- cited but does say that by ava-cakahÞ is meant ‘whichdoes not produce a verbal cognition of a meaning’ (abodhakahÞ ), and he notes that thisis based on the position that the capacity in question consists only in producing acognition. VBh 220: ava- cakahÞ abodhakahÞ | bodhakatvasyaivoktari-tya- saktitva-d itibha-vahÞ ; VBhS 300: ava-cakahÞ abodhakahÞ . I will take up the second verse in connectionwith the Va-kyapadi-yavrÞtti interpretation (see $4.4.5). 106 VBhS 301-2: nanv evam sa- dhuta- tesÞ a- m sya- d ity ata a- ha niyama iti |punÞ yajananabodhana- ya sa- dhu- na- m sa- dhubhir bha- sÞ itavyam iti vidhihÞ |pa-pajananabodhana-ya na-sa-dubhir iti nisÞedhahÞ | tatha- ca punÞ yajananayogyatvamsa-dhutvam | tatra pa-pajananayogyatvam asa-dhutvam. 107 LM 125: sa- ca saktihÞ sa-dhanesÞv iva-pabhramsesÞv api áktigra- hakasiromanÞervyavaha- rasya tulyatva- t. 108 LM 125-26: na ca sa-dhusmaranÞa- t tato bodhahÞ ... iti va-cyam. 109 LM 125-26: te sa-dhusÞv anuma-nena pratyayotpattihetavahÞ | amba-mbeti yada- ba- lahÞsiksÞyama- nÞ ahÞ | avyaktamÞ tadvida- m tena vyakte bhavti niscayahÞ iti haryuktehÞ |anuma-nam atra jña-nam | sa-dhuvisÞayasmaranÞenety arthahÞ | tadvida-m sa-dhuvida-m |asa-dhohÞ sa-dhuprakrÞtikatva- t sa-drÞsyena tajjña-nam. 110 LM 126: sa-dhusmaranÞam vina-pi bodha-nubhava- t tadva-cakasa-dhusabdam aja-nata-mbodha-na-pattes ca. The second objection could equally apply with respect to personswho know only apabhramsa usage. In my presentation, I have followed Vaidyana- tha’sKala- commentary on the assumption that, being Na-gesa’s direct student, he reflectsthe author’s intent. The Kala- notes that there are two sorts of persons who are learnedin Sanskrit usage (vyutpanna-hÞ): those who know each particular Sanskrit word andthose who are lacking in such detailed knowledge. The second objection is intended

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for the second type of speaker. Kala- 127: nanu vyutpanna- dvividha- hÞtattadva-cakasamskrÞtavisesÞajña-navantahÞ tadvikala- s ca | tatra-dya-na- m tatha-bodhe ’pidviti-ya-nupapattir datta- | sa- na yukta- sa-ma-nyajña-pakatvena ru-penÞa tatsa-dhusmaranÞa-dbodhasambhava- t ata a-ha: tadartheti. 111 Kuñjika- 125: etadarthabodhakam kiñcit sa-dhupadam bhavisÞyati-ty anuma-na-d bodhaiti matam nira-karoti: na- rtheti. 112 LM 126: tadarthajña- pakatvena smaranÞ am tu na- rthopastha- pakamsaktata-vacchedaka-nupu-rvyagraha- t. 113 LM 126: tadva-cakasarvana-masmaranÞa-nanubhava-c ca. 114 In the present context, Na-gesa brings into play gagari- used in the same sense asghatÞa ‘jug, water pot, jar’. It is also possible in other contexts to consider this anapabhramsa for gargari-, known as a sa-dhu term synonymous with manthani-, referringto a vessel in which curds are put and churned; cf. Amarakosa 2.9.74: manthani-gargari- same. 115 LM 126: ucca-ritasyaiva bodhakatvena smrÞtasa-dhuto bodha-sambhava-c ca. 116 LM 126-27: na ca saktibhrama-d bodhahÞ pu- rvapu-rvabhrama-c cottarottarabhrama itipa- mara- nÞ a- m saktyagrahe ’pi tadbhramopapattir iti va- cyam |ghatÞatvavis isÞ tÞaghatÞa- diru- pa- rthaniru- pita- y a- ghatÞa- dipadavrÞttitvena grÞhi-ta- ya-bhinna-nupu- rvi-katvaru-pavisesÞadarsanasattvena sa-dha- ranÞadharmadarsana-bha-vena cagagari-pada-dau bhrama-nupapattehÞ . 117 LM 127-28: yadi tu asaktya- kenacid gagari-ti prayukte ’mba-mbetya-da-v iva ghatÞa itisa-dhusabdasmaranÞa- t prayojyasya bodhe tatÞasthasya gagari-sabda-d eva-sya bodha itibhramenÞ a- dyasya saktibhramas tanmu- lakas ca- nyesÞa- m api | tad uktam harinÞ a- :ta-da- tmyam upagamyeva sabda-rthasya praka- saka-hÞ | iti | ivasabdena tadupagamasyabhramatvam su-citam. Na-gesa also has the defender of this view invoke JS 1.3.8.28and Sabara (see §4.2.1), LM 130: tad uktam jaiminina- : tadasaktis ca-nuru-patva-d ititadbha- sÞyakrÞta- ca tatroktari-tya- saktibhrama ity ucyate.... The section cited here,beginning with yadi tu ... ity ucyate (“But if the following is said ...”) gives the argumentrefuted immediately afterwards (see next note). 118 LM 130-31: ... tada- pratyekam tattatsamskrÞtasya tattadapabhramsenavinigamana-viraha- t tesÞu saktihÞ | na ca sakaladesasisÞtÞaparigrÞhi-tatvam vinigamakam |savatir gatikarma- kambojesÞu vika- ra evainam a- rya- bha- sÞanta itya- dibha- sÞyari-tya-tattaddesaniyatasamskrÞtesÞu saktisiddhyana-pattehÞ . The reference is to a Maha-bha-sÞyapassage (I.9.24-10.1), where Patañjali illustrates dialectal usage. Na-gesa goes on togive an additional argument, involving Prakrit poetry, which I omit. 119 LM 131: ata eva stri-su- draba- la- na- m prayukte sa- dha- v arthasamsayetadapabhramsena nirnÞayahÞ . Presumably Na-gesa reflects the kind of situation foundnowadays among panÞdÞ itas, who speak and write Sanskrit with what amounts to nativecontrol but normally interact in a vernacular. In Varanasi, even rickshaw drivers controla register of Hindi and Bhojpuri that is fairly Sanskritized, so that they can understanda great many Sanskrit words. On the other hand, even the best panÞdÞ ita sometimescannot make clear in Sanskrit alone something he wishes to explain and then resortsto invoking a term from the vernacular (... iti bha-sÞa-ya-m). The situation Na-gesa speaksÞof was known much earlier, since the VrÞtti on VP 1.181 speaks of this: see note 136.See Aklujkar 1996, Deshpande 1979, Hock and Pandharipande 1976 for recentdiscussions of issues concerning the use of Sanskrit at various times in Indian culture.120 LM 139: sa- dhutvam ca vya- karanÞ avyangyo ’rthavis isÞ tÞasabdanisÞ tÞahÞpunÞyajanakata-vacchedako ja- tivisesÞahÞ . 121 PLM 49: sa- dhutvam ca vya- karanÞ a- nva- khyeyatvampunÞyajanakata-vacchedakadharmavattvam va- tadbhinnatvam asa-dhutvam. In accordancewith manuscript evidence, I have emended tadbhinnam of Kapil Deva’s edition totadbhinnatvam, which appears in my critical edition (§19).

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122 VP 1.175-176): sabdahÞ samska-rahi-no yo gaur iti prayuyuksÞ ite | tam apabhramsamicchanti visisÞ tÞa- rthanivesinam || asvagonÞ ya- dayahÞ sabda- hÞ sa- dhavo visÞaya- ntare |nimittabheda- t sarvatra sa- dhutvam ca vyavasthitam. I have kept the readingprayuyuksÞ ite, which appears in editions other than Rau’s. This has support frommanuscripts as well as commentaries and is also syntactically preferable. The readingprayuyuksÞyate is Rau’s compromise accounting for prayuyuksÞate, prayuyumksÞate, andprayuyuksÞ ite found in ka- rika- manuscripts. 123 VPVr 1.176/140 (229.9): a-vapane gonÞ i-ti svaviprayoga-bhidha-ne ca-sva ity etayoravasthitam sa-dhutvam. 124 VPVr 1.176/140 (230.1-3): tatha- sa- sna- dimati hresÞa- dilinge ca nimitta- ntara- tpravrÞttayor anyatra visÞaye labdhasamska-rayohÞ sa-dhutvam eva vijãa-yate | gonÞ i-va gauriti bahuksÞ i-radha- ranÞa-divisÞaya-d a-vapanatvasa-ma-nya-d abhidhi-yate | tatha-vidyama-namsvam asya so ’yam asva iti. The same is said in the Di-pika- (I.9.26-10.3) on theMaha-bha-sÞya passage (I.2.19) where the verse yas tu prayunkte kusalovisesÞe ... iscited: sa eva sabdo ’rthavisesÞe kasmimscit sa-dhuhÞ kasmimscid asa-dhur ity a-khya-yate| yatha- gonÞ i-sabdahÞ sa-sna-dimaty asa-dhuhÞ | tatha- svasabdahÞ kesara-dimati sa-dhur nanihÞsva iti | asva iti nirdha-ne sa-dhur naikasapha-dilaksÞanÞe | yadi tu gonÞ i-sabdo ’pinimitta- ntara- t sa- sna- dimati prayujyate—gonÞ i-va gonÞ i-ti—sa- dhur eva sya- t | asveva- svasabdam dhana- bha- vadÞ va- rakam prayuñji-ta sa sa- dhur eva. The VrÞtti on VP1.175/139 (229.5-6: te ca sa- sna-dimaty eva labdhasvaru-pa-hÞ sa- dhutvam vijahati |artha- ntare tu prayujyama- na- hÞ sa- dhava eva vijña- yante | na hy etesÞ a- mru- pama- trapratibaddham asa- dhutvam) ends on the same note: terms consideredcorruptions of others lose their status as sa-dhu terms only when they have a particularform used with respect to a particular meaning, and the very same forms arerecognized as sa-dhu when used in some other meaning; their not being sa-dhu is notlinked solely to form. 125 VPVr 1.175/139 (229.1-5): sabdaprakrÞtir apabhramsa iti sangrahaka-rahÞ | na-prakrÞtirapabhramsahÞ svatantrahÞ kascid vidyate | sarvasyaiva hi sa-dhur eva-pabhramsasyaprakrÞtihÞ | prasiddhes tu ru-dÞhita-m a-padyama-na-hÞ sva- tantryam eva kecid apabhramsa-labhante | tatra gaur iti prayoktavye ’saktya- prama-da-dibhir va- ga-vya-dayas tatprakrÞtayo’pabhramsa-hÞ prayujyante. 126 VP 1.177: te sa-dhusÞv anuma-nena pratyayotpattihetavahÞ | ta-da- tmyam upagamyevasabda- rthasya praka- saka-hÞ . As VrÞsÞabha notes, the ka- rika- is susceptible to differentinterpretations that depend on different syntactic connections. I consider theinterpretation which takes anuma-nena in construction with sa-dhusÞu to be preferableboth in that it maintains the integrity of the half-verse and in that the VrÞtti on VP 1.180agrees with this (see note 135). 127 Such gestures are considered to convey certain meanings without one’s having touse words. In the Maha- bha-sÞya on 2.1.1 (I.363.25-26) and 2.1.34-35 (I.388.3-4),Patañjali remarks that many meanings are understood without the use of words:antarenÞa khalv api sabdaprayogam bahavo ’rtha-hÞ gamyante ’ksÞ inikocaihÞ pa-nÞ iviha-rais ca... 128 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.8-10): apabhramsa- hi sa- dhu- na- m sabda- na- m visÞayeprayujyama-na- yathaiva-ksÞ inikoca-dayahÞ paricaya-d upagrÞhi-tasvaru-pa- iva prasiddha-s tatha-sa-dhupranÞa-dÞ ikaya-rtham pratya-yayanti. The same parallel is invoked in the VrÞtti on VP1.24-26 (72.3), 1.183 (235.5). 129 Paddhati 230.25-231.1: yatha-ksÞ inikoca-dayo [na] sa-ksÞa-c chabda-rtham pratya-yayantiapi tu pu- rvam sanketava- kyam ... upagrÞhi-tasvaru- pa- iveti: tasya sanketava- kyasyasvaru-pam a- tmani nivesya tadru-pata-m a-padya sa-ksÞa-d iva pratipa-dayanti. 130 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.9-10): tatra sa-ksÞa-d abhidha-nam neti sloka-ntaropanya-sahÞ . 131 VrÞtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.1-3): atha kasma-d ete gosabdasyaga- vya- dayahÞ paryÞa- ya- na vijña- yante | na hi s isÞ tÞasama- ca- raprasiddher anyad

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etatpraka- resÞu smrÞtinibandhanesÞv arthesÞu nimittam abhidhi-yate | ga- vya-dayas cetparya-ya-hÞ syur ete ’pi sisÞtÞair laksÞanÞair anugamyeran prayujyerams ca. 132 VrÞtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.3-5): yas ca pratyaksÞpaksÞenÞa prayojakesÞvarthesÞv abhidheyesÞu pravartate sa sa-dhuhÞ | sa-ksÞa- t tu prayojakam va-cyam artharu-pamsa-dhubhihÞ pratya-yyate. Aklujkar suggests emending to asa-ksÞa-t and asa-dhubhihÞ . On theother hand, tu can be justified, since there is a contrast in that the second sentencedeals with the other side of the coin: the meaning that is to be signified in contrast tothe term which signifies. 133 VrÞtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.5), VP 1.178: tasma-d a-ha: na sisÞ tÞairanugamyante parya-ya- iva sa-dhavahÞ | te yatahÞ smrÞtisa-strenÞa tasma-t sa-ksÞa-d ava-caka-hÞ .134 VP 1.179-181: amba- mbeti yada- ba- lahÞ siksÞama-nÞ ahÞ prabha- sÞate | avyaktamtadvida-m tena vyakte bhavati niscayahÞ || evam sa-dhau prayoktavye yo ’pabhramsÞahÞprayujyate | tena sa-dhuvyavahitahÞ kascid artho ’bhidhi-yate || pa- ramparya-d apabhramsa-

vigunÞ esÞv abhidha- trÞsÞu | prasiddhim a- gata- yena tesÞa- m sa-dhur ava- cakahÞ . I haveaccepted the readings amba-mbeti and prabha-sÞate found in most editions, includingAklujkar’s. Rau has ambvambv iti and siksÞama-nÞo ’pabha-sÞate. See §4.3.1, with notes98-99. 135 VPVr 1.180/144 (232.8-10): sankirnÞa-ya-m va-ci sa-dhuvisÞaye ’pasabda-hÞ prayujyante/ taihÞ sisÞ tÞa- laksÞanÞavidahÞ sa-dhu-n pratipadyante | tair eva sa- dhubhis tadarthamabhidhi-yama-nam pasyanti | anuma-nam tudhu-ma iva-gner asa-dhur itaresÞa-m. K. A.Subramania Iyer and Raghuna- tha Sarma- both have anuma-nas tu in the VrÞtti text, butthis is an error. The Paddhati correctly has anuma- nam, which appears also inAklujkar’s edition. I have interpreted anuma-nam here as a derivate signifying aninstrument. 136 VPVr 1.181/145 (233.1-4): iha- bhya- sa- t stri-su- draca- nÞ dÞ a- la- dibhir apabhramsa- hÞprayujyama-na-hÞ tatha- prama-dyatsu vaktrÞsÞu ru-dÞhim upa-gata- yena tair eva prasiddhatarovyavaha- rahÞ | sati ca sa-dhuprayoga- t samsaye yas tasya-pabhramsas tena sampratinirnÞayahÞ kriyate | tam eva ca-sa-dhum va-cakam pratyaksÞapaksÞe manyante sa-dhumca-numa-napaksÞe vyavastha-payanti. The ka- rika- directly states that since apabhramsashad become established among such speakers, for them a sa-dhu term does not signify(sa-dhur ava-cakahÞ). 137 VrÞsÞabha (Paddhati 233.20: vyatiki-rn-eti: sambhinna- ka- lusÞyam upani-ta- ) first glossesvyatiki-rnÞa- with sambhinna- (‘mixed, identical’), then adds ka- lusÞyam upani-ta- ‘brought tothe state of being dirty’. The VrÞtti also interprets vyatiki-rnÞa- to mean ‘mixed’, since ituses sanki-ryama-nÞa- (see note 140) in speaking of speech becoming mixed withapabhramsas. Elsewhere, BhartrÞhari refers to the impurities that affect speech and forwhich grammar is the cure (VP 1.14ab: tad dva- ram apavargasya va- nmala-na- mcikitsitam) as well as of the impurities affecting the body, speech and the mind, whichare purified through teachings of medicine, grammar, and those teachings that concernthe inner self (VP 1.174: ka- yava- gbuddhivisÞ aya- ye mala- hÞ samavasthita- hÞ |cikitsa- laksÞanÞa-dhya- tmasa-strais tesÞa-m visuddhayahÞ ). These impurities of speech areapabhramsas. Accordingly, I have used “defiled” here. 138 VP 1.182: daivi- va-g vyatiki-rnÞeyam asaktair abhidha- trÞbhihÞ | anityadarsinaa-m tvasmin va-de buddhiviparyayahÞ . 139 VP 1.183: ubhayesÞa-m aviccheda-d anyasabdavivaksÞaya- | yo ’nyahÞ prayujyatesabdo na so ’rthasya- bhidha- yakahÞ . The Paddhati (234.20-21: aviccheda- d iti:sa-dhvasa-dhuvibha-gasmaranÞasya-viccheda-t) relates the continuity to the distinction madebetween sa-dhu and asa-dhu terms: the recollection of these being distinct is withoutinterruption. Raghuna- tha Sarma- (Amba- kartri- 1.183/155: ubhayesÞa- m sabda- na- mapasabda- na- ñ ca- na-dau samsa- re ’viccheda- t) relates the continuity to sabda andapasabda.

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140 VPVr 1.182/146 (233.7-234.2): sru-yate: pura-kalpe svasari-rajyotisÞa-m manusÞya-nÞa-myathaiva-nrÞta-dibhir asanki-rnÞa- va-g a-si-t tatha- sarvair apabhramsaihÞ | sa- tu sanki-ryama-nÞa-

pu- rvadosÞa- bhya- sabha- vana- nusÞanga- t ka- lena prakrÞtir iva tesÞa- m prayoktnÞ a- m ru- dÞ himupa-gata- . 141 The VrÞtti says simply anityava-dinahÞ . In view of what it says subsequently, the viewin question is that the sa-dhu terms are not eternal. This is a view explicitly mentionedin the Di-pika- on Maha-bha-sÞya I.6.12 (kim punar nityahÞ sabda a-hosvit ka- ryahÞ ), whereBhartrÞhari contrasts two views (Di-pika- I.16.28-17.2): kecid evam manyante: ya evaitepra-krÞta-hÞ sabda-s ta evaite nitya-hÞ | prakrÞtau bhava-hÞ pra-krÞta-hÞ | anye manyante: iyamdaivi- va-k | sa- tu purusÞa- sakter a- lasya-d va- praki-rnÞa- yatha- svasti-ti siksÞama-nÞo ba- lo’nyathocca-rayati-ti “Some say that pra-krÞta terms alone are eternal. These are pra-krÞta inthat they have their source in the original. Others maintain that divine speech hasbecome mixed with impurities due to the incapacity or laziness of men, as when achild learning to say svasti pronounces this otherwise.” 142 Commenting on VP 1.12, the VrÞtti says that what is meant by va-cahÞ paramo rasahÞ‘the highest essence of speech’ is the mass of words whose status as sa-dhu isestablished because they signify and are sources of felicity (VPVr 42.6-7: paramorasahÞ : va- cakatva- bhyudayahetutva- c ca vyavasthitasa- dhubha- vahÞ sabdasamu- ho’bhidhi-yate). In the present context, this very set of words is viewed differently, bythose who do consider sa-dhu terms neither eternal nor sources of merit. For them,sa-dhu terms are not original but derivate, and the original stuff (prakrÞti) from whichthey derive as modifications (vika- ra) is the speech forms others call apasabda andapabhramsa. VrÞsÞabha (Paddhati 234.15-16: prakrÞtau bhavam iti: prakrÞtihÞ svabha-vahÞ |apabhramsa-hÞ sva-bha-vika-hÞ ) notes that prakrÞti signifies something’s nature (svabha-va),but immediately goes on to say that apabhramsas are natural. That is, although fromthe point of view of those who maintain that sa-dhu terms are eternal and originalapabhramsas are corruptions and only apparently have the status of original stuff(prakrÞtir iva), from another point of view these very terms are treated as establishednorms that are sources of artificial sa-dhu usage. 143 This is a view found elsewhere, as is well known. Thus, in his commentary onKa-vya- lanka-ra 2.12, Namisa-dhu accounts for pra-krÞta in several ways. He first describesit in the usual manner, as a derivate with the taddhita suffix anÞ added to a pada N-7,with a seventh-triplet ending, to form a derivate meaning ‘located in X’ (tatra bhavahÞ :AsÞtÞa-dhya-yi- 4.3.53). He notes that pra-krÞtam thus derives from prakrÞti-i and meansprakrÞtau bhavam, and that the source denoted by prakrÞti here is the inherent speechactivity of all creatures, without the adornment endowed by grammar and such. Hethen says that alternatively pra- krÞta is that speech itself (pra-krÞteti: sakalajantu-na- mvya-karanÞa-dibhir ana-hitasamska- rahÞ sahajo vacanavya-pa- rahÞ prakrÞtihÞ | tatra bhavamsaiva va- pra-krÞtam), then goes on to give other explanations; see Pischel and Jha-

1965: 14 (§16). In the GaüdÞavaho (93ab: sayala-o imam va-ya- visanti etto ya nÞentiva-ya-o) Va-kpati similarly says that all languages emanate from and go back to Pra-krÞta.On tadbhava, see Kahrs 1992. 144 VrÞsÞabha (Paddhati 234.16-18) remarks that sambhinnabuddhibhihÞ refers to menwho cannot discriminate between what women may be approached or not, what maybe said or not, and so on, and that this amounts to speaking of heretics (na-stika). Heis not alone in considering that sambhinnabuddhi refers to a special type of person, ana-stika; KaiyatÞa does too (Pradi-pa II.389). 145 VPVr 1.182/146 (234.2-5): anityava-dinas tu ye sa-dhu-na- m dharmahetutvam napratipadyante mallasamaya-disadrÞsi-m [sa-dhva]sa-dhuvyavastha-m manyante te prakrÞtaubhavam prakrÞtam sabda-na-m samu-ham a-caksÞate | vika-ras tu pasca-d vyavastha-pitahÞyahÞ sambhinnabuddhibhihÞ purusÞaihÞ svarasamska-ra-dibhir nirnÞ i-yate.

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146 VPVr 183/147 (235.1-5): yesÞa-m api ca naiva pura-kalpo na ca daivi- va-g asanki-rnÞa-kada-cid a- si-t tesÞa- m api gamya-gamya- divyavastha-vad iyam sa- dhvasa- dhuvyavastha-nityam avicchedena sisÞtÞaihÞ smaryate | tatra-nyasabdavivaksÞaya- ba- laprala-pavad arthesÞuprayujyama-no yahÞ sabdo ru-dÞho yas ca na ru-dÞhas ta-v ubha-v apy arthasya na va-cakaubhavatahÞ | tatra tu sa- dhuvyavahita- va- bhavaty arthapratipattir abhya- sa- d va-pramatta-na-m aksÞ inikoca-divat sampratyayama- tram ja- yate. Aklujkar’s edition differsslightly from that of K. A. Subramania Iyer, which I have followed above. 147 For Houben’s position on VP 1.183 see §4.6.1. 148 VPVr 1.27 (82.1-4): yathaiva- nya- ni dharmasa- dhana- nivisisÞtÞopadesapa- ramparya-gama-vicchedena-gata-ny anabhisankani-ya-ni vyavasthita-ni yatha-ca pratisÞ iddha-ni himsa-nrÞtasteya-di-ni asisÞ tÞa-pratisÞ iddha-ni ca hikkitahasitakanÞdÞu-yita-di-nitatha- sa-dhvasa-dhuvyavastha-nam apy anavacchinnapa- rampar yam anabhisankani-yamyatha-gama-d eva siddham iti. I have adopted here the text that agrees best with theMaha-bha-sÞya and the Paddhati. 149 sa- dhutvajn-a- navisÞaya- seyam vya- karanÞ asmrÞtihÞ | avicchedena sisÞ tÞa- na- m idamsmrÞtinibandhanam. The second half of the verse is subject to different syntacticinterpretations. If idam is coreferential with smrÞtinibandhanam and the latter is asÞasÞtÞhi-tatpurusÞa, both refer to a composition relative to a smrÞti, a tradition. Under thisinterpretation, sisÞtÞa-na-m smrÞtinibandhanam is a construction of the type devadattasyagurukulam (“Devadatta’s teacher’s home”) such that sisÞtÞa-na-m is construed with smrÞti,referring to the recollection (smrÞtihÞ = smaranÞam) of sisÞtÞas. This recollection is carriedon without interruption (avicchedena). That is, sisÞtÞas continue to carry on a tradition ofcorrect usage, which is memorialized in the grammar. On the other hand, if idam isconsidered to refer to the grammar (vya-karanÞam)—in accordance with vya-karanÞasmrÞtihÞof the preceding half-verse—and smrÞtinibandhanam is interpreted as a bahuvri-hi, thenthis refers to the grammar as a work whose cause is the continuous recollection ofsisÞtÞas. 150 VPVr 1.158/133 (212.8-213.2): yathaivbhaksÞya- bhaksÞ yagamya- gamyava- cya- va- cya- divisÞa ya- vyavasthita- smrÞtayahÞ ya- sunibaddham sama-ca-ram sisÞ tÞa- na vyatikra-manti tatheyam api va-cya-va-cyavisesÞavisÞaya-vya-karanÞasmrÞtihÞ | smrÞto hy arthahÞ pa- ramparya-d avicchedena punahÞ punar nibadhyateprasiddhasama-ca- ra-ya-m ca smrÞta-v anibandhanasabda-ya-m sisÞtÞasama-ca- ra-vicchedenaivasmaryate. I have adopted Aklujkar’s reading instead of Subramania Iyer’sprasiddhasamaya-ca-ra-ya-m. 151 This is made also a theoretical issue: must one grant sakti to apasabdas at therisk of prolixity or is there some way to avoid this? However, BhartrÞhari does not gointo this debate. 152 Hela- ra- ja 3.3.30 (143.12-13): daivi- va-g asaktair vyavaki-rnÞa- ... anumitamu- laprakrÞtirvidusÞa-m va-cika- . I have shown a lacuna where K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition hasba- lavad andha-divad (“as that of a child, as that of a blind person”). Aklujkar suggeststhe emendation ba- lapada-mba-divad (“as a child’s word amba and such”). Houben says(p. 364 note 687), “Emend to ba- lavad amba-divad” and translates (p. 364), “like [theword] ‘amba- ’ etc. [of incompetent persons] like children.” I suggest one should alsoconsider ba- labamba-divad, which has support from testimonia (see notes 99, 134). 153 vidusÞa-m. These are clearly the sisÞtÞas, speakers who know correct speech. AsVirendra Sharma suggests (1977: 235) these same learned persons can be referred toby kaiscit in the ka- rika- , though KaunÞdÞabhatÞtÞa and BhatÞtÞoji consider kaiscit to refer toother upholders of a particular view. 154 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.13-14): na hi vidva- mso ’rtham apasabda- t sa- ksÞa-d avasyanti-tina-pasabda-na-m arthena kascit sambandhahÞ . 155 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.14-18): ata eva pura-kalpe ’nrÞta-dibhir iva-pabhramsair api rahita- va-ga-si-d iti brahmaka-nÞdÞa uktam | ava-caka- apabhramsa-hÞ | te tu sa-drÞsya- t sa-dhusabdam

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anuma-payanti tebhyo ’rthasampratyaya iti | tatha- ca sangrahaka- rahÞ sabdaprakrÞtirapabhramsa iti. See notes 125, 140. 156 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.18-144.1): adyatve tv adharmaba-hulya-d anrÞta-divad va- nmala-na-mru- dÞ hihÞ | tatha- ca- vyavadha- nenaiva- pasabdebhyo rthaprati-tau na mlecchitavaina- pabha- sÞ itavai sa- dhubhir bha- sÞ itavyam iti sa- strapra- ma- nÞ ya- t sa- dhu- na- m evadharma- ngatvam iti tadanusrÞtihÞ sa-strenÞa. “na mlecchitavai ...” is an implicit reference toMaha-bha-sÞya I.2.7-8. The phrase tadanusrÞtihÞ sa- strenÞa “following after them by thegrammar” is like sisÞtÞair anugamyante in VP 1.178 (see §§4.3.1, 4.4.3). 157 eva ‘only’: “that apasabdas are preceded by an unsplit sa-dhusabda is aloneconcluded.” The view expressed accords with BhartrÞhari’s emphasis on grantingprimacy to indivisible units from which parts are abstracted; see §3.2. Similarly, in theDravyasamuddesa (VP 3.2. 16: va-cya- sa- sarvasabda-na-m sabda- s ca na prÞthak tatahÞ| aprÞthaktve ca sambandhas tayor na-na- tmanor iva), BhartrÞari stresses the unity in theultimate being (satta- ), that is, in Brahman, of all words and all things signified: thatultimate original source (para- prakrÞtihÞ ) spoken of in the preceding ka- rika- is what allwords signify and these words themselves are not distinct from it, so that there is arelation between them only as though it were between two separate entities, althoughthere is no true distinctness. 158 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.1-3): tatha- ca bhedasya- bhedapu- rvakatva- tpurusÞavikalpa-niyamena-nantatva-d apasabda-na-m abhinnasa-dhusabdapu- rvakatvam evanisci-yata iti sabdaprakrÞtir apasabdahÞ siddha iti sabda eva vidya- . Hela- ra- ja literally saysthat the sabda alone is knowledge (sabda eva vidya- ), but this is surely to beunderstood as based on a sabda’s being the object of knowledge (vidya-visÞayahÞ), asnoted by Raghuna- tha Sarma- (Amba-kartri- 3.3.30, p. 260). The usage is comparable toBhartrÞhari’s speaking of a sentence meaning as a flash of knowledge (pratibha-), sinceit is the object of a single cognition. 159 The ultimate level of speech in BhartrÞhari’s system is identical with Brahman; seethe literature referred to in Cardona 1976: 302 with note 359. 160 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.3-5): tad atra yatha- vidya- vastha- bhinnabrahma- tmika- tatha-

sa-dhusabda-vastha- vidya- yatha- ca vidya-ya- m bhedo vitathahÞ tatha-pabhramsa-vastha-

va- nmalaru-peti parama- rthataditara-vastha-peksÞo vikalpahÞ . 161 He does not also say artha-bhidha-ne “there being a signifying of a meaning.” 162 avakarnÞayanti. Cf. avakarnÞya in Sisupa- lavadha 15.67: abhidha-ya ru-ksÞmam iti ma-

sma gama iti prÞtha-suter i-rita-m | va-cam anunayapara- m sa tatahÞ sahasa-varkarnÞyaniriya-ya samsadahÞ . “After delivering himself of the harsh statement and hearing withscorn YudhisÞ tÞhira’s conciliatory ‘Don’t go’, (Sisupa- la) quickly left the assembly.”Mallina- tha notes that avakarnÞya means “after hearing without respect” (ana-darenÞasrutva- ). I take avarkarnÞayanti as an impersonal third plural of the type a-huÞh ‘... say’.See §4.6.3. 163 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.5-9): avidya-dasa-peksÞam eva sama-na-ya-m arthagatau sabdenaca-pasabdena ceti bha-sÞyam | arthagata-v iti vacana-d artha-bhidha-nam apasabda-na-mavakarnÞayanti | avidya-ya-m bhu-yasa-pasabdair vyavaha- ra-d arthaprati-tima- tram bhavenna-mety arthahÞ | ru-dÞhatva- t tu vyavaha-rasya-visesÞam granthaka-ra a-ha | tatra ca sa-stramniya- makam: sa- dhusabdair eva- rtho vaktavyo na- pasabdaihÞ evam kriyama- nÞ amabhyudayaka- ri bhavati-ti. 164 This is accompanied by a note (373) in which Houben refers the reader to“‘BhartrÞhari and the ancient VrÞtti’ (forth-coming, c)” for additional discussion of theproblem of authorship. His bibliography lists (p. 437) under “Houben” an entry “forthc.,b ‘BhartrÞhari’s Va-kyapadi-ya and the ancient VrÞtti’,” which one must assume is meant.An article entitled “BhartrÞhari’s Va-kyapadi-ya and the ancient VrÞtti (1): The VrÞtti andVrÞsÞabhadeva’s Paddhati on Va-kyapadi-ya 1.46a a- tmabhedam / a- tmabhedas ...” and an

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addendum to this entitled “Postscript: A note on Pt. Raghuna- tha Sarma- ’s interpretationof VP 1.46 and VrÞtti” are scheduled to appear in the Annals of the Bhandarkar OrientalResearch Institute. Houben kindly sent me copies of these papers, and, with theauthor’s permission, I have discussed them in §4.2.3 of Cardona, forthcoming. 165 Houben’s translation of VP 1.182 is (p. 239), “Divine speech is nowadays (iyam)mixed up by incompetent speakers. But the propounders of the impermanent have withregard to this doctrine the opposite view.” 166 In view of the content and the citation from the VrÞtti given at the end of thisparagraph, one must conclude that “182” and “181” are errors for “183” and “182.” 167 sisÞ tÞebhya a-gama- t siddha-hÞ sa-havo dharmasa-dhanam | arthapratya-yana-bhedevipari-ta-s tv asa-dhavahÞ . As the Paddhati points out, asa-dhu terms can be contrary byvirtue of either of these (81.22-23: vipari-ta- iti: sisÞ tÞopdesapa- ramparyenÞa-navasthita-adharmasa-dhanam va-). 168 The Paddhati (81.21-22: yady api sa- ksÞa- d anuma- neneti ca bhedas tatha- pyarthapratya- yanam abhinnam sa- dhu- na- m asa- dhu- na- m ca tulyam) points this out.Similarly, commenting on Bh I.8.21-22 (see note 68), the Pradi-pa notes that, althoughunder one thesis apabhramsas do not signify directly, they nevertheless still signifyindirectly, through the intermediary of sa-dhu terms. KaiyatÞa goes on to note that someapabhramsas have gained established status through continuous transmission, so thatthey convey meanings directly, without calling sa-dhu terms to mind. He also remarksthat some maintain apabhramsas signify directly jsut as do sa-dhu terms. Pr I.35: yadyapi sa- ksÞ a- d apabhramsa- na va- caka- s tatha- pismaryama-nÞ asa- dhusabdavyavadha- nena- rtham pratya-yayanti | kecic ca- pabhramsa- hÞparamparaya- niru-dÞhim a-gata-hÞ sa-dhusabda-n asma- rayanta eva- rtham pratya-yayanti |anye tu manyante: sa-dhusabdavad apabhramsa- api sa-ksÞa-d arthasya va-caka- iti. See§4.6.4. 169 bha-sÞyaka- rahÞ : III.1: 235.16 (a-ha), 236.21-22 (manyate), 279.12, 296.18 (a-ha),299.4-5 (pratya-casÞ tÞe), 305.18-19 (codayati), 336.23 (na pratya-caksÞ i-ta), 338.25-339.1(manyate); III.2: 30.11 (necchati), 99.22-24 (a-ha), 104.14-15 (samarthayate), 301.20(a-ha), 353.11, 361.17-18 (na- tra niradiksÞat), 374.18 (pra-ha), 374.25 (pra-ha), 402.27(a-didesa), 408.9-10 (pratya-cakhyau); bha-sÞyaka- renÞa: III.1: 107.14, 201.14, 202.6-7,328.21; III.2: 3.2, 20.2, 124.3, 127.12, 127.16-17, 138.19, 166.4, 167.20, 314.27,336.24, 356.15, 360.21, 386.7, 410.5; bha-sÞyakrÞta- : III.1: 235.17-18; III.2: 22.7-8, 287.6;bha-sÞyaka-rasya: III.1: 352.11, III.2: 285.7, 340.14-15, 349.5, 371.23-24. References areto pages and lines of K. A. Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. These references areavailable from the indices to these volumes, although only the stem forms bha-sÞyaka-ra,bha-sÞyakrÞt appear in the indices. I have given references only to passages whereHela- ra- ja uses case forms of these terms, omitting places where these appear inderivates. I have also cited in parentheses verb forms, where these occur. 170 It is probable that BhartrÞhari used sakti not merely in the sense of power orcapacity but more specifically in the sense of the capacity inherent in a word to signifyits meaning. I say this because a passage such as the VrÞtti on VP 2.226 speaks ofextracting sakti from the meaning of a whole compound, which is associated with manysaktis (VPVrÞ. 2.266 [p. 247]: samuda-ya-rtha-d anekasaktehÞ saktyapoddha-renÞa...). Thatis, avyayi-bha-va, tatpurusÞa, bahuvri-hi, and dvandva compounds are described by somein terms of semantics, such that they are respectively compounds whose principalmeaning is that of the prior term, the last term, neither term, and both terms. Thewhole is associated with a single meaning but one can extract partial meanings. 171 Ud I.35: niru- dÞ him a- gata- iti : te ca saktibhramenÞ a bodhaka- iti bha- vahÞ |saktibhramas cettham : kenacid ga- vi-ti prayukte gaur iti sa- dhusabdasmaranÞ a- tprayojyasya bodhe ’pi tatÞasthasya ga-vi-sabda-d eva-sya gobodha iti bhramahÞ tanmu- lako’nyesÞa-m api bhrama iti.

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172 Ud I.35: vastuto vinigamaka-viraha-d bha-sÞa- sabdesÞv api saktir evety a-ha : anye tviti. Similarly, the Ratnapraka- sa on the Maha-bha- }Alsya passage under discussiondirectly remarks that Patañjali’s saying sama-na-ya-m arthagatau serves to refute thosepseudo-scholars who maintain that apabhramsas do not signify directly, as do sa-dhuterms, and instead do so indirectly, through serving to recall sa-dhu terms. This isbecause it conflicts with experience and with what the Bha-sÞya passage in question,based on this, has to say and also because the understanding of meaning whicharises from apasabdas for pa-maras, who do not know sa-dhu terms, cannot have therecollection of sa-dhu terms as intermediary. RaPr I.91: sama-na-ya-m arthagatav iti :etena apabhramsa- na- m sa- dhusabdasma- rakatvena- rthabodhakatvam na tu sa- ksÞa- tsa- dhusabdavad iti vadantahÞ panÞ dÞ itammanya- nirasta- hÞ anubhavenatanmu- lakaprakrÞtabha-sÞyenÞa ca virodha- t sadhusabda-n aja-nata-m pa-mara-nÞa-m apasabdairja-yama-nasya-rthabodhasya sa-dhusabdasmaranÞadva-rakatva-sambhava-c ca. 173 Page 341, note 567: “... According to Hela-ra- ja tat in taddharmanÞos refers to tasyasambandhasya; in my interpretation it refers to dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratvain 4.” 174 na-bhidha-nam svadharmenÞa sambandhasya-sti va-cakam | atyantaparatantratva-dru-pam na-sya-padisyate. That is, as Hela- ra- ja notes, only a genitive ending is used inconveying a relation qua relation. 175 atyantaparatantratva- t. Houben (pp. 170, 340) translates the second half of VP3.3.4, “Because it is extremely dependent, its form cannot be pointed out”; earlier, K.A. Subramania Iyer (1971: 80, “Being extremely dependent, its own form is nevercognized”) also translated using “extremely” for the Sanskrit atyanta. Both would havedone better using “absolutely.” For, as Hela-ra- ja points out, what is at issue is that arelation is absolutely dependent, so that one can never refer to it separately as arelation by means of a term other than a genitive ending. In this respect, a relationdiffers from a quality (gunÞa), which, though dependent, can be referred to as a qualityby means of a distinct term. For example, one can say suklam ru-pam ‘the color white’.176 Bh II.218.14-19: katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati | caturbhihÞ praka-rairatasmin sa ity etad bhavati : ta- tsthya- t ta-ddharmya- t tatsa-mi-pya- t tatsa-hacarya-d iti |ta- tsthya- t ta- vat : mañca- hasanti girir dahyate | ta- ddharmya- t : jatÞinam ya- ntambrahmadatta ity a-ha | brahmadatte ya-ni ka- rya-nÞ i jatÞiny api ta-ni kriyanta ity ato jatÞi-brahmadatta ity ucyate | tatsa- mi-pya- t : ganga- ya- m ghosÞahÞ ku- pe gargakulam |tatsa-hacarya- t : kunta-n pravesaya yasÞtÞi-hÞ pravesayeti. The Bha-sÞya on 6.1.37 (III.32.12)also mentions such extended usage due to Y being intended for X (ta-darthya- t), andthis relation too is used frequently in interpreting terms in u- tras. Cf. also Nya-yasu- tra2.2.62. 177 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.10-11): pa- ratantryam sambandhalaksÞanÞam iti samyogasamava-yayordravyagunÞa-disÞu tattva- t sambandhasabdapravrÞttihÞ . 178 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.11): tasya sambandhasyeva dharmahÞ pa- ratantryalaksÞanÞo yayos tautaddharma-nÞau. 179 Cf. Maha-bha-sÞya on 1.1.70 (I.180.18-19): uttarapadalopo ’tra drasÞtÞavyahÞ | tad yatha-

usÞ tÞramukham iva mukham yasya so ’yam usÞ tÞramukhahÞ kharamukhahÞ evamtatka- laka- las tatka- lahÞ tatka- lasyeti. It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss herehow such compounds are obtained and interpreted without assuming deletion of aterm.

Abhyankar, Kashinatha Vasudev. 1962-72. The Vya-karanÞa-Maha-bha-sÞya of Patañjali,edited by F. Kielhorn, third edition ... Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Abhyankar, Kashinatha Vasudev, and Ganesh Ambadas Joshi. 1976.Sri-jaiminipranÞ i-tam Mi-ma-msa-darsanam ... (A- nanda- srama Sanskrit Series 97). Pune:A- nanda- srama.

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Aklujkar, Ashok N. 1996. “The Early History of Sanskrit as a Supreme Language.”In Houben (1996a), pp. 59-85.

Aklujkar, Ashok N. n.d. Critical edition of the Va-kyapadi-ya with the VrÞtti andHela- ra- ja’s Praki-rnÞapraka- sa on the Sambandhasamuddesa. [I have a computer file ofthis through Aklujkar’s kindness.]

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Bhate, Saroja, and Johannes Bronkhorst. 1993. Proceedings of the FirstInternational Conference on BhartrÞhari, University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992.Asiatische Studien 47.1. Bern: Peter Lang, 1993. (Reprint 1994, 1997: BhartrÞhariPhilosopher and Grammarian, Proceedings of the First International Conference onBhartrÞhari, (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass.

BhatÞtÞa-cha- rya, Manudeva. 1985. BrÞhadvaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞam of Sri- KaunÞdÞ BhatÞtÞa [ACommentary on BhatÞtÞojidikshita’s Vaiya-karanÞamatonmajjanam], Edited with ‘Ru-pa- li-’Notes and Appendix. Varanasi: Chaukhamba Amarbharati Prakashan.

Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1987. Maha-bha-sÞyadi-pika- of BhartrÞhari, fascicule IV: A- hnikaI. Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 28. Pune: Bhandarkar OrientalResearch Institute.

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Cardona, George. 1983. Linguistic Analysis and Some Indian Traditions. PanditShripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures, first series. Pune: Bhandarkar OrientalResearch Institute.

Cardona, George. 1997. Pa-nÞ ini, his Work and its Traditions, volume I: Backgroundand Introduction, second edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Cardona, George. Forthcoming. Recent Research in Pa-nÞ inian Studies. Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass.

Deshpande, Madhav M. 1979. Sociolinguistic Attitudes in India: An HistoricalReconstruction. Ann Arbor: Karoma.

Durgâprasâd and Wâsudev LaxmanÞ Sâstrî PanÞ sîkar. 1928. The Kâvyâlankâra (ATreatise on Rhetoric) of Rudrata with the Commentary of Namisâdhu. Ka-vyama- la- , 2.Bombay: NirnÞaya Sa-gar Press. [Reprinted 1983: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.]

Dva- rika-da-s Sa-stri-, Sva-mi-. 1978. Slokava- rttika of Sri- Kuma- rila BhatÞtÞa with theCommentary Nya-yaratna-kara of Sri- Pa- rthasa- rathi Misra. Pra-chyabha- rat Series 10.Varanasi: Tara Publications.

Hock, Hans Henrich, and Rajeshwari Pandharipande. 1976. “The SociolinguisticPosition of Sanskrit in Pre-Muslim India.” Studies in Language Learning 1.2: 105-38.

Houben, Jan E. M. 1992-93: “BhartrÞhari’s Perspectivism (3): On the Structure of theThird Ka-nÞdÞa of the Va-kyapadi-ya.” Sambodhi 18: 1-32.

Houben, Jan E. M. 1993. “Who are the Padadarsins?” In Bhate and Bronkhorst1993. Pp. 155-69.

Houben, Jan E. M. 1996. Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to theHistory of the Sanskrit Language. Brill’s Indological Library, volume 13. Leiden: E. J.Brill.

Joshi, Sada- siva Sa-stri-. 1939. The Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞanÞasa- ra by M. M. Sri- KaunÞdÞaBhatÞtÞa with the DarpanÞa Commentary by Sri- Harivallabha, the Pari-ksÞa- Commentary byBhairava Misra, and a short Commentary by Sri- Krisna Mitra, with Tinarthava-dasa-ra bySri- Khuddi- Jha- Sarma-. Ka-shi- Sanskrit Series, 133. Benares: Chowkhamba.

Kahrs, Eivind, 1992. “What is a tadbhava word?” IIJ 35: 225-49.

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